# ETHNICITY

## Ethnic Identities and Integration
## of the Society

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## IDENTITY OUTSIDE TIME AND SPACE:
## INTELLECTUALS AND SOCIETY

The article deals with one aspect of the poly-angular problem, which still should be solved by identity studies enforced in Latvia: to a high degree, formation of Latvian modern identity is affected by intellectuals' understanding about the crux of the matter and communication of this understanding in society. Latvian reality does not reflect, or perhaps reflects very deficiently in the mirror of the culture. This, of course, means that Latvians have difficulty seeing themselves in the context of modern world's development. In addition, such difficulties are also characteristic of ethnic groups, who live in Latvia and who develop their own system of values in relation to the so-called titular nation's value system. Therefore, first we have to analyze the situation of intelligence in the modern Latvia.

**Key words:** Latvian society, identity, intellectuals, self-understanding, time, space.

Obviously the problem of self-consciousness and self-understanding has turned into a major social problem in the society of Latvia, as it is the main reason why development capacity of the community is hindering.

We could refer to the development of modern philosophy, especially to the hermeneutic tradition, which is stressed in the 30-th to 33-rd paragraph of M. Heidegger's work "Being and Time" (Sein und Zeit). In this work, the author reveals the existence of the culture, inter alia science in the herme-

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neutic circle, where the main task is becoming a part of the circle and not getting out of it. In other words, to a high degree the quality of human and social life depends on self-understanding; on how an individual and the society sees, feels and recognizes itself. If we do not keep developing such a mirror, where to reflect ourselves on the cultural – literature, arts, humanities as well as the daily life level, then, if speaking prosaically, the economic crisis cannot be overcome. In general, a person and society gets stuck in the unsolved individuality, togetherness, self-understanding, self-cognition and identity problems, which prevent disengagement of creative power, in order to make a targeted move towards the development of a mentally and materially better life. In fact, it is not even possible to define the unifying goals of a society, if it is not clear what this society is like, what its people are like, in what kind of historical tradition it has or, may be – from what tradition is it extracted and what should be cultivated anew.

Accumulation of life practices and cultural course in the development of the renewed Latvian state has not been reflected during the period of twenty years and so it foliates on the background formed by the perverse forms of the anthropological, social and ethnic perceptions politicized by the Soviet regime through decades.

It significantly impedes the development capacity of contemporary Latvian society. This deficiency of self-awareness, identity and ambitions sometimes is accented as the main reason for preclusion of society's development. For example, when writing a review on the play "Squeaky Silence", which touches topical problems of demographical decadence, Silvia Radzobe, a famous drama critic dissociates from the exaltation of the audience about the play: "*I remain seated with my own (patriotism), and we feel increasingly lonely*". Of course, with this "we" the author thinks of people, who wish to see the vision of Latvia which is rooted in rationality and problem solving as opposed to momentary flashes of apparent unity based on ignited and artistically driven emotions. S. Radzobe stresses that patriotism may not bind only with the past, with worship of ancestral merits, singing together traditions and incitement against those who are more in number. "*Finally it's time for something to be born, something we don't have – idea of the future Latvia*", writes theater critic (Radzobe 2011).

In this article, I will analyze only one aspect of the poly-angular problem, which still should be solved by identity studies enforced in Latvia: to a high degree, formation of Latvian modern identity is affected by intellectuals' understanding about the crux of the matter and communication of this understanding in society. Latvian reality does not reflect, or perhaps reflects very deficiently in the mirror of the culture. This, of course, means

that Latvians have difficulty seeing themselves in the context of modern world's development. In addition, such difficulties are also characteristic of ethnic groups, who live in Latvia and who develop their own system of values in relation to the so-called titular nation's value system. Therefore, first we have to analyze the situation of intelligence in the modern Latvia.

### Intellectuals outside the society?

Often one can hear a public request for investing into development of public value-orientation. It especially refers to representatives of Latvian intelligentsia / intellectuals, as more than 20 years ago Latvian intelligentsia was leading the Awakening processes and the Singing Revolution – firstly, passing on the public understanding of independence and self-confidence of the nation. Thus, in the end of the 20-th century, despite the Soviet regime, Latvian intellectuals were able to follow the tradition as it had been from the beginning of formation of Latvian national intelligentsia in the end of the 19-th and the beginning of the 20-th century. Traditionally, Latvian intelligentsia fought for "*the rights of Latvian people to exist as a nation, not only as individuals*" – written by folk poet Rainis in the newspaper "Daily Page", published in the end of the 19-th century. It reflected the efforts of raising self-confidence in the nation, understanding of the nation's mission and progress (Eihvalds 1999, p.59).

Even during the Soviet time, many Latvian intellectuals were aware of belonging to such recognized tradition. As now we can read, for example, diary fragments of the famous writer Regina Ezera (March 21, 1982), her Latvian intelligent self-awareness is of crucial importance when solving twists and turns in her personal life, when she finishes the painfully neglected relationship with her partner. She writes such harsh words: "*My social functions do not include alleviating the destiny and extending life for a disabled person who has participated in the Great Patriotic war, but giving the Latvian nation (if only it exists and as long as it exists) high-quality literary essays. And let's stop admitting this fact with one hand and erasing with the other leg, as soon as it becomes personally profitable*" (Ikstena 2007, p. 96).

After restoration of the Latvian statehood, representatives of Latvian intellectuals called for a review on the issue about Latvian identity, Latvian verity and an appearance after the fifty years of occupation. Thus, philosophy professor Igor Shuvajev offers a solution for the question of Latvianness within the context of psychoanalytical anthropology. The author characterizes functioning of Latvianness ideology developed by Latvian intellectuals as a neurotic currency. Concept is borrowed from Freud's vocabulary, and describes a situation, when "*effective is only the*

*intensively devised, affectively imagined, something the conformity of which with reality is inessential*". Thus, Latvianness is a conglomerate of feelings, desires, emotions and passions, into which producer's subjective thoughts and complications are often transposed. Author's task is to get rid of mythology in Latvians' attitude towards them, which is based on exemplification cult – desperate quest of the prototype, the genuine Latvian. In its turn, formation of human depersonalization – self-insufficiency takes place when life turns into the false life and when a man looks for the option to justify himself in the history and instead of being himself, being free and reflective (Shuvajev 1998, p.61-62). However, philosophers' call remained unheard by Latvian society in the end of the 20-th century, but its repercussions can be read in reflections written by representatives of today's rising generation, which have obviously the most difficult life in the society that is unaware of itself and its goals.

Psychotherapist recognizes that today Latvian people do not have consummated self-realizing and self-feeling culture and they do not promote it. Authoress thinks that one of our major characteristics is adaptation – so it was during the Soviet era, as well as within the last 20 years when savage capitalism evolved in Latvia. Our people are very good at adjusting themselves and achieving a lot in foreign countries, but in our own homeland, we pine away and are not able to use properly our freedom. The point is that we do not know how to strengthen ourselves in what we are, in our own meaning of life and in significance of our existence (Kreisler 2009).

This is a situation, which would require an intelligent / intellectual understanding of reality and communication in society.

Right now, there are two designations as synonyms in Latvian public space –intelligentsia and intellectuals. As understanding of a certain social group, intelligence is partly related to the well-known notion in the Russian culture *intelligentsia*, however in the Latvian cultural environment, intelligence concept is closer to the designation of *intellectuals*, known in the Western cultures. Therefore, in the English version it would be probably more appropriate to use the concept of intellectuals. Alternatively, we can use *intelligentsia*, speaking of Russian society, whose research we will use here.

However, the key is that, one way or the other, both designations are based on the concept of *intellectus*, known from the scholastic philosophy and which stands for the mind (*mens*) activity in the active processing mode of reality impact. Besides, it should be noted that the mental capacity as designation of such (*mens*), as specified by the St. Thomas Aquinas, comes

from the word *mensurare* – measure. In other words, the human mind is designed in such a way that any perception is measured or evaluated, and, because of that, understanding is always moving towards the value-orientated reality picture in the human's inner world. Therefore, whether we are talking about *intelligent people* or *intellectuals*, society is waiting for the understanding about reality and value-orientated communication from representatives of those self-confident groups of people.

Obviously, it is possible to talk about modern human's global need for understanding of the reality and value orientation, which would be led by intellectuals according to their responsibility in the social hierarchy. For example, in his book "*Intellectuals and Society*", American culture-critic Thomas Sowell criticizes idea *dealers* – that is how he called intellectuals – because they have drawn away from the practical wisdom in their abstract rationalism. This wisdom is very much needed in the social everyday life, because ideas are raised over existence, and it is expressed by depressing intellectual's arrogance against natural links of a human, which unite men and women with their families, religion and homeland. In author's opinion, many of today's social problems occur due to the non-compliance of reality and intellectual theory (Mahoney 2010).

In its turn, with reference to those Russian sociologists' studies, who work in a special intelligence research (*intelligentovedenie*), we see that in measurements of intelligence's (*intelligentsia*) social apperception or in research of public expectations with regard to intelligence, respondents stress the importance of people's ethical position and responsibility in front of peers. Thus, ability to understand people and the power of empathy are comprehended and it is simultaneously viewed as an equivalent service to the nation (Marcinkovskaya 2008). If we look at intelligence empathy in a broader philosophical context, for example, comparing it to Edith Stein's (a student of the founder of phenomenology E. Husserl) theory of empathy, we see that it is essential for the constitution of society. In other words, waiting for the intelligence empathy, respondents actually look forward to its participation in the development process of society.

By reviewing the sociological concepts of her time critically, E.Stein focuses on F. Tennisa's distinction between the society and a community. Stein's concept is – community is the foundation of society, consequently, any society can exist only if there is a community at first, which is formed from interaction of individuals. Only a person can be an agent of love or hate, solidarity and participation, or perhaps rivalry and violence in a society. By objectivization of their inner self, people with their own intentionality affect the behavior, feelings and assessment of public association's nature by means of communication (Ales Bello 2008). A true human community is formed on the basis of empathy's intentionality, which allows people to refer to the strengthening of common benefit in terms of spirituality and materiality in different ways – thus, individuality is able to affect typical character of the whole social group. In other words, intelligence is a community of those persons, from whom the society expects something; it looks forward to their initiative of self-transformation and development.

As it was determined by observing the rare, but in terms of social cognition, useful discussions on the web about the role of intellectuals (see: Repse 2008), Latvian society also shows that statements of intelligence about the moral situation in the country, cause biting assessments from members of the society on intellectual's own ethical position. Those are admonishments regarding intellectuals' political and financial engagement, priority rights for respective groups and not for the major national interests, incapability to educate the nation, understand the ongoing and to keep moral criteria within society, personal dishonesty, and consumerism. In its turn, if we classify characteristics, which society expects from their representatives of intellectuals, then we can bring to the forefront the following demands: posture full of self-esteem, clarity of inner thinking, ability to raise important societal goals, to deal with the meaning of life problems, to overcome social apathy, fair and truthful life, understanding of political processes and high moral standing.

It is significant that intelligence is required to show its *strength* or power in the society. That points to the need for intellectuals, who are active and purposeful in their participation in social life, and above all – the intellectuals are expected to play an active role in the creation of society. For example in this context, dramatist Paul Paulins directs an extremely harsh criticism towards Latvian intelligentsia, reproaching it for turning away from participation in dealing with relevant issues for the Latvian state, inter alia for quitting politics after the Popular Front won the elections in 1990, thus leaving the power in the hands of dishonest politicians (Terzens 2010). However, in order to realize the power of intellectuals in development of society, in formation of ethnic, religious and social group relations – they do not have to participate in political administration; they should distribute their power through communication of discourse, arguments and value-orientation (Rozenvalds 2005).

However, in this particular aspect researchers question the strength of intellectuals' power within the newly growing societies. Researchers stress that society doesn't see the social group (speaking in sociological terms), which has its own identity, positioning themselves as intellectuals therein,

so that it could be like now – dissolved in society, hiding behind the walls of university departments and it eventually shows the deficiency of mental and moral values in communication (Merkulova 2006). Researchers explain it as cardinal characteristics of intelligence – locked mental nature (Mansurov 2008). If you do not have it, then you have nothing to share with other people – the Latin word *communicatio* means "sharing", and above all – sharing the merit.

 If this mental nature is empty and deformed, then it really does not have to appear in public, because, as written by H. G. Gadamer, ugly *(aischron)*, which is simultaneously not-good and not-truthful, is indeed to be hidden from the sight *(aphanizontes kryptomen)*. Only the beautiful *(kalos)*, as shown *(ekphainesthai)* to itself as good, and power of truth *(Dynamis)* is so shiny and clear that does not allow to be disappointed (Gadamer 1986, p.116). Only thus we can talk about intelligence as an important factor in of society development because "*the nature and level of intelligence establishes the culture of society, its sympathies, tastes and moods, which becomes a stable form of the national life*" (Intelligencija 2009).

That is exactly why the strength of intelligence's power is mistrusted in society, because the society mostly does not see the roots of intelligentsia / intellectuals in the power of entity or *exousia,* as Cardinal J. Ratzinger metaphysically characterizes it. Only life in harmony with existence provides power, which, moreover, is not man's own power, but participation in the Creator's power and, therefore, Truth and Love is the strongest power in the world. Man cannot live contrary to existence, because then he reaches the power of non-existence, appearances and lies, and, after all, the power of death. (Ratzinger 2002, p.58).

In the context of existence's intuition, granted to every person, we can explain those extremely harsh statements, encountered in the Latvian public space about inability of intelligence. It emerges from the life of intelligentsia / intellectuals in opposition to existence, when their alienated, delimited, only self-directed, as thought observing position and refusal to take care of ongoing in mental terms, is compared to cannibalism – the destruction of their own nation (Jaunzeme 2010).

No doubt, the helplessness of intellectuals has also historical reasons. Firstly, intelligentsia was in an ambiguous situation under *proletarian dictatorship conditions.* On the one hand, intellectuals as people capable of thinking and analyzing, were controlled by security institutions, but, on the other hand, intelligentsia could be turned into a powerful *weapon of Soviet propaganda*, as well as be involved in scientifically technical reconnaissance tasks abroad and in the so called spying within the ethnic Latvian exiles

in the West. As stressed by the historian, in many cases co-operation with KGB was held because of personal welfare (Zalite 1998).

Secondly, when ideological pressure system collapsed and an opportunity for liberal capitalism started in the land lacerated by communism, many intellectuals practiced the so-called phantom behavior, thus trying to gain as much as possible larger material and power resources. Philosopher Maija Kule points out that in modern European living conditions, when the form with the following money mythology dominates on the "*life-surface*"; it is intellectuals, who have the responsibility to defend that existential part of human life, which cannot be measured in money (Kule 2006, p. 209).

However, culture-critic Arno Jundze notes ironically that we do not even have to imagine the moneybags – bribery of intelligentsia can be done by evidence of small public attention, because creative people feel strong need for recognition of their work. Intelligentsia is gladly given a membership in non-deciding councils and committees, where they can express their thoughts, they are offered to sign public letters on a wide variety of topics, which are published – thus the illusion of intelligentsia's impact on social processes is created (Jundze 2009).

Thirdly, ability of intellectuals' power in Latvia is affected by the Soviet-established and still continuing world-viewing eclecticism, which allows a person to uncritically accept fragments of different beliefs and value systems, if the truth is not an emotionally experienced value of the intellectual's life (Ladusans 1994, p. 28). In that case, the intellectual loses even autonomy of thinking. It becomes apparent through intellectual's public image, when he, as a speaker of the truth (*parrhesistes*, M. Focault), takes up the cudgels for those who have been denied the right to vote. In its turn, according to researchers we cannot speak of the full social autonomy concerning intelligentsia, considering that intellectual's professional activity is dependent on how the intellectual work is organized, it also depends on the social system and on political and economic factors of public administration.

Thus, intellectuals' self-confidence starts showing itself, which explains, why one could say that intellectuals in Latvia experience difficulties to be recognized as an epicenter of self-understanding and identity comprehension.

However, it should be also taken into account that Latvian society, where intellectuals live, can be viewed as a society outside time and space; how Latvian "mirror" has formed throughout the history of European culture. And thus, intellectuals, who should form the culture, appear to be the dark layer prisoners of their own culture.

## Society outside time and space?

Formation of national identity depends on how the society perceives itself in the historical time and space. And it should be recognized that the issue related to Latvian society reveals a paradoxical situation – Latvian reality is not reflected or perhaps remains invisible in the mirror of European heritage values. This, of course, means that Latvians have difficulties of seeing themselves in the context of European identity. And, more generally, such difficulties overtake different ethnic groups, which live in Latvia forming their own value systems, to a certain extent, in relation to the so-called titular nation's value system.

Therefore, we will start with a hermeneutically critical perspective; examine the course of development of Latvian reflection in European historical consciousness. In other words, what is the place of Latvian time and space in the scope of European time and space, whose perception is so important for the Latvian national identity during the formation process of European identity?

### a. outside time?

Countdown of history in the consciousness of society started in the 13th century, when Christianity in Latvia begun, as reflected in the Chronicle *of Henricus Lettonicus*. Chronicle is written in the genre characteristic to medieval historiography, which is based on the concept of Saint Augustine's historical philosophy. At the same time, the Chronicle also can be considered a documentary evidence of Latvian self-perception, because it is believed that Henry of Livonia could be one of the Latvians, who was a prisoner of war and like many others ransomed by Bishop Maynard and later sent to the Segeberg seminar of priesthood studies in Germany. Riga Bishop Albert brought him back to Livonia (Kučinskis 1993, p. 38).

In contradistinction with some earlier fragmentary attempts of Scandinavians or Krivichs, the mission of bishop Maynard for the first time introduced people to the lesson of living God systematically and offered religious practices, which changed their lives. Acceptance of Christianity was followed by a gradual interweavement of Christian values in life forms and, after all, by transforming them into forms of Christian traditional culture. And the outcome of this process was the so-called principal transformation of ancient Latvian existence that opens the door to the solution of human existential tension. But linkage structure of time, national and religious identities expired from the historical consciousness of Latvians, when Latvian public visibility disappeared from the frame of European historical time.

By the order of the president, historian of the interwar period A. Spekke was appointed an ambassador in Rome, in addition, he could use the opportunity to access the historic archives of romantic world – especially Italian and French, and to explore documents related to Latvian history alongside with his diplomat duties. While exploring the archives, the historian constantly came across legends. In descriptions of medieval Livonia he noted the deductive thinking of the Middle Ages, alienation of Latvia from the world's great centers and a mix of stereotypes, the outcome of which was "wonderful" – we have a legend – "*one of the most characteristic medieval ways of understanding the world – the legend, the natural tendency of humans to fly across the high walls of narrow life of that time*" (Spekke 1995, p. 87).

Further, the historian has pointed out that the bizarre historical analogy and literary stylistic associations could be found in the cartography of Livonia. For example, Livonian humanists have acted according to modern concepts of their time and have looked for stylistic samples in the travel guides written by acquirers of America Columbus and Vespucci. Wherewithal, description of Livonia has proved to be just an exercise of proper travel genre, which included individual elements about life in Livonia.

Spekke characterized the 14th century treatise on the Livonian people *"De Proprietatibus Rerum",* which was written by Bartholomew of England (*Bartholomeus Anglicus*), a monk from Minorite Order, as channeled in the direction of hardly identifiable information. After research of the testimony by French knight Gilbert de Lanua, historian made no secret of his surprise that Lanua's "*accurate and valuable report of eyewitness about Ancient Livonia had remained with no influence on further texts, from which many will "fall away" in more or less shadowy and fantastic horizons*".

One might ask – why didn't adequate discursive practice about Livonia and its people's lives develop? Or – why has discursive practice strengthened, in the frame of which the world of life is described in the language of legends, borrowed stylistics or literary and historical associations? It seems to be another issue, the solution to which could open a new possibility of understanding Latvian heritage and identity.

Thus, even until now, for unclear reasons historical time, which is a necessary component for self-perception and identity-building process of a certain nation, is darkened in the historical consciousness of Latvians, because it has not been reflected anywhere with the desire to look at it again, as if looking in the mirror and recognizing yourself. It is rather that such self-perception practice has been embedded in the culture, so that we see ourselves as persons, who are non-timely, non-opportunely or have dropped

out of time. Following this contextual approach, we could talk about the opportunity for Latvia to become a part of European historical time along with the National revival and further – with the establishment of Latvian independence in 1918. However, we should conclude that in the period until 1940, when the Soviet occupation started, Latvian culture failed to gain visibility and self-perception within the European history.

One of the most important reasons is that eternity is secularized in such a manner that history of Latvia is interpreted as a targeted direction of the Latvian community towards the establishment of Latvian state. But, if the state is an ultimate goal, which now replaces the eternal purpose, called *Summa Bonum* by scholastics, then the historically existing state is made as a substantial *eternal Latvia* in the consciousness of the society.

Emergence of the concept "eternal Latvia" is related to the first Latvian national revival in the end of the 19th century, when the aforementioned strata of Latvian intellectuals was formed in order to modernize Latvian nation and let it stand along with other European nations. One of the members of this movement, a folk-teacher Atis Kronvalds was asked to share his thoughts on whether it was worthwhile to continue publishing Latvian newspapers in St. Petersburg, where many representatives of Latvian educated society had gathered at that time. Is this nation going to exist at all? To that Kronvalds replied, "*Do you have any doubts? This nation is eternal.*"

Later this statement was reinforced in the religious context by public figure Vilis Olavs in the beginning of the 20th century, who wrote that everything could be forgiven, except for the lack of confidence that the nation was eternal.

If based on the Gospel, it is easy to interpret this approach in religious context, when heritage of the fatherland and human culture is a reference to the eternal Native land (John Paul II 2005, pp. 105-106).

From the critical point of view it is clear that during interwar period *Eternal Latvia* is secularized and identified with a specific historical state of Latvia, which is perceived as over-timely category in the historical consciousness of Latvians, thus losing the opportunity to see our own time.

Such a self-feeling in the consciousness of the society cancels the question of time as well as the opportunities to work out comprehension of the history in culture, which would be important in the formation of the national identity. Consciousness of the Latvian society assumes that two totalitarian regimes, the disaster approaching the pre-war Europe, is taking place somewhere beyond the border of Latvia and in some other time, too. And, then this real time breaks into Latvia with a destructive force by opening a tragic page in the history of the country.

In the frame of national identity, the origin and functioning of *Eternal Latvia* concept in the historical consciousness means that the static and motionless model of the over-historical concept starts to dominate the issue of what is a Latvian. Everyone has to ratio himself with that to determine his identity and membership in the Latvian society. Without doubt, within the framework of such a model there is no reason for research on changes of identity in the background of stable nuts and bolts. This model still dominates and public criticism expands increasingly because of the fact that we – Latvians do not know, who we are. Fact of the matter is that we are not able to consolidate ourselves in our own meaning of life, importance of our existence and, finally, in who we are. The psychotherapist emphasizes that if we are able to do this, then we might experience the "Latvian time" (Kreisler 2009).

### b. outside space?

What was said about time perception in the Latvian culture – can be related to space perception too, as we have seen it, for example in Livonia mapping studies. The so-called *spatial turn* is methodologically important in the analysis of space perception, as it largely pays attention to the space perception like determination of life practices and formation of culture. However, it has more promoted the development of the so-called humanitarian geography (Döring 2008). If we want to determine the direction of the national identity's self-consciousness within perception of the space, then we should link territoriality and ethnic identity concepts in a single conceptual model.

It should be mentioned that in the frame of zoo-psychology, *the concept of territoriality* clearly contains ironically analogical pressure, which initiates associations with human society. For example, we can read that many different species exhibit territorial behavior, because it offers several advantages to the territorial animal. An animal which has a "home ground" can develop reflexes based on its surroundings. Thus it can react quickly to dangerous situations without having to actively seek hiding places or defensible ground. By spacing out potential competitors, territoriality also prevents the depletion of an area's natural resources. This regulation of population density may also slow down the spread of disease (Territoriality 2011).

Today, territoriality is practically always associated with the state. In our historical consciousness, spatial expansion has always been the strengthening of the national sovereignty (Bauman 2003, p. 13). At the same time, we should admit that "*little work has been done to explore the moral foundations of the state's right to territory. .. the state has been assumed to be a ter-*

*ritorial unit, and no need was perceived to reflect on precisely what justifies it's territorial jurisdiction*" (Blake, Risse 2007, p. 1).

This discussion is based on the characteristic feature of human nature, about which Simone Weil writes that one of the basic needs of human existence is the need to participate in collective ownership. And here we are not talking so much about possessing some material goods or legally established property, but about the feeling of possession or property. In truly civilized societies, each person feels himself as an owner of public monuments, parks and brilliant public ceremonies, and in this way life glitter, which would be desirable for each individual human being, becomes available even to the poorest ones (Weil 2000, p. 56).

Discourse of modern political philosophy also begins with a reference to the collective property of the Earth as a common property of mankind. Based on that the question arises, as to what extent it is morally right to use humanity's common resources in favor of one or another culture, because "*the cultural considerations cannot defeat the moral importance of common ownership of the earth's surface*". Consequently the territorial rights of the group members lies on upon their political status as citizens of the state (Blake, Risse 2007, pp. 20, 28, 34).

Philosophical approach reviews territoriality in close relation to the space perception of the intellect. Space image evidently supposes a special nature in the subject, the faculty of receiving extensive impressions, and that of combining them by synthesis natural to man (Space). Thus, philosophical principle excludes mathematical approach to the *spatium* or space as a contrary to physical bodies, id est., as a place that is clear of physical bodies. Classical phenomenology deals with the phenomena of space as the meaningful place formed through definite functional relations with the body, which, in its turn, has a place in the surrounding world and in the physical world. Latvian philosopher M. Kūle writes, the human being is not capable to create space, but could only fill it with meaning, could occupy it, so starting the truly human existence by "domestication" of the Universe (Kūle 2002, p. 133). Connection of inner spatiality and territoriality in the sense of meaningful domestication has found the deepest emotional expression in the notion of human home, as "*the inhabited space is a component part of the process of the human being's self-interpretation*" (Kūle 2001, p. 138)

Homeland, as it is described, is the claim that a particular territory belongs to a particular people. It is a claim which is specific with reference to place and people, as befits men and women at home, commonly think of themselves in familial terms, so homelands are also motherlands and

fatherlands, and the people are children of the place, brothers and sisters (Walz 2011). We have inherited a fatherland from our fathers and mothers, but according to eschatological and eternity aspect, as written by John Paul II, at the same time we have to understand that this land is inherited from the Christ, and, thus, heritage of the fatherland and human culture is a reference to the eternal Native land (John Paul II 2005, p. 105-106).

However, in globalized world "*the territory is equally losing it's importance through acquiring a new significance: symbolic and casting a ghostly shadow of the gravity lost*" (Bauman 2003, p. 21). Sociologist analyzes the territorial perception in the context of a question raised by ancient Greek philosophers: how to live a good and happy life.

As written by Z. Bauman, today happiness is understood as an individually achievable goal, as a series of moments full of happiness following one after another and not as a permanent existential condition of a human despite the different events which concern or hurt him. And, at the same time, an opportunity to gain the happiness "*is not related ... to previous investment in the place*" (Bauman 2003, p. 24). As the sociologist points out, "*attraction of happiness ... is evoked with the magnetic power of "virgin lands" and " new beginnings" whose promises are all the more believable and seductive for having been untested*" (Bauman 2003, p. 24). So, he concludes, "*in the transgressive imagination of liquid modernity the "place" (whether physical or social) has been replaced by the unending sequence of new beginnings*" (Bauman 2003, p. 24).

Tourism activity in the modern world is like such perceptual modality. Tourist is the one, to whom everything is possible and everything is allowed, or, as sometimes it is used to be said, the one who implements the three 'S' – *sun, sea, sex*! Professor M. Kule comments on this approach by observations on the streets of the Old Town, where the number of sexual adventurers has increased in the recent years and those people do not want the sea and the sun, even as much as animals would do. As written by professor, tourism in European civilization is based on the cultivation of material scarcity, which strives for the search of something new and even newer, something more and more. In that way, it appears that it is not lechery, which creates a sense of inadequacy, but the sense of inadequacy causes the search for constantly new pleasures (Kule 2006, p. 241). In spite of that, comprehension of the homeland is associated also with pain and wherewithal – the reality.

Once again, we can refer to H. G. Gadamer's passage, where he talks about pain (*lupe*) as a phenomenon, which returns the human existence back to the reality, because pain destroys human's self-awareness, acquired

material goods and the pleasure in categories, and makes him remember about existence and reconnects with reality (Gadamer 1983, p. 180). Thus, we can say that the Homeland as joy and pride, but also as a source of suffering and pain, is the basic concept, which characterizes the existential structure of a person. Space, as a Homeland's perception, is an implementation of the spatial structure, existent in person's intellect, which includes a specific content for each person, since this person belongs to a particular nation, which, at the same time, structures the body of citizens, who inhabit exactly this corner of the land in the world. It should be admitted that such geological involvement affects other forms of the world's perceptions.

As an interesting study in that connection, we can mention the Russian philosopher N. Berdyaev's reflections on the geographical factor, the role of the huge territoriality in the Russian history, which has often been mentioned in the history of Russian philosophy. Berdyaev points out that it has always been easy for Russian people to conquer huge territories, but they have not succeeded in developing those territories, especially – in re-organization of the territories into states The greatness of Russian territory has kept people under the permanent stress, and therefore all the power had to be sacrificed for the sake of the country in order to organize the statehood; almost nothing was left for the free development of individuality. Berdyaev writes that the Russian soul is in depression because of the greatness of the snow-covered areas – as if it could be crushed by that; that is why the development of soul's form has not been the strong point and it would be inconsistent with the power of space – impression of such a big territory on the soul. It has been quite different in the Western Europe, where people had to deal with sufficiently narrow areas. Because of that impact on the soul, Western Europeans were forced to actively calculate and plan their actions, taking into account spatial limitations, and that has led to the creation of the exquisite soul, as now reflected in the Western culture. This typical Western European's spreading in a particular space has drawn criticism and dislike from the side of Russian writers and thinkers, who have scornfully responded to the narrow-minded Western life. In the same way, ordinary people have taken the German demand for observation of precise limits, working discipline and purposefulness with disgust and aggression. Similarly, for example, Germans have never understood Slavic laxity, carelessness and inability to organize their lives. Berdyaev calls Russian people not to be afraid that foreign influence could suppress their national uniqueness, but on the contrary, Russians have to finally overcome the impression of the huge spatial on their souls, which makes them slaves; they have to create their own special domestication of huge territories and

forms of development of energy (Berdyaev 1990, pp. 59-64).

Russian philosopher's text is challenging in order to start the research on Latvian territoriality and its impact on human mental life, because, as already mentioned, in Latvian studies we still cannot find many models, which analyze the characteristics of Latvian space perception as one of the determinants of national identity. And thus, in the case of space's self-perception, if it is not embedded in our culture, we have to find ourselves existent outside of humanity's common space.

Characterizing the individual space perception, we can mention fragmented statements, which ramble in Latvian cultural awareness. As often as not, Latvian territory has been considered a place of an endless battles and warfare, as a territory, which has been aimed and fought for by many military troops. With that and with awareness about differences between other European territories of that time, our historical consciousness has begun.

During the Duecento or the 13th century, Europe had already opened first universities, Gothic cathedral towers were decorating the sky, philosophy had reached High Scholastics; many modern researchers believe that foundations of modern Europe have been laid during this period. However much we would wish, it has occurred in accordance with national feelings, nothing more than evidence of struggle for survival appears, if talking about material life of Latvian population at that time. While the spiritual life, especially the religious aspect, can be characterized with words "*slavery of senses and long darkness*". P. Crisis has compared the culture of Western Europe and Ancient Latvia, "*We have not heard of any lowest type of school that was administered by Latvian tribes, not talking about something like university or abovementioned western writers, thinkers, theologians ... Not even talking about the Amiens cathedral! In those days we didn't even know how to build stone buildings*". It can be said that predatory wars were continuous and happened all over the territory of Latvia in those times. For instance, according to Norse saga about forays of Egil Scalagrimson in Kurzeme, Western Latvia, the land was stricken by endless predatory wars. In historian's opinion the boundary between commerce and robbery was marked very weakly. It is possible that ceasefire maintained during the trade and exchange of commodities and parties stepped back quietly, but still it's probable that the one, who found himself the strongest, suddenly attacked the other party (Balodis, 1991, p. 23). P. Cirsis considers that those circumstances squashed cruelty in Latvian character, although, our ancestries have been characterized as hospitable and sincere people according to several sources. But what is the point of this personal touch in the conditions of war? Motivation of existing legal norms was, "*Forefathers have*

*done that…Everyone does that…we are fulfilling the old share*". And the "Old share" also means that the robbed bee tree was decorated with entrails of the thief, who was caught while stealing it (Švābe 1990, p. 73).

However, war, battles and military action descriptions were dominant in future consciousness of historical time in relation to the Latvian territoriality. For example, legends, which tell about the time when the Russian Czar Peter "*unfolded the window to Europe*" through the living flesh of the nation and when Vidzeme was destroyed in such a way that inhabited houses were far from each other – one could not even hear, how neighbor's rooster crows. But within historical consciousness, establishment of the national state on the Latvian territory is much more related to the Freedom struggles than to Latgale Congress in May 1917, when it was decided to join the territories populated by Latvians in the Vitebsk province – now Latgale, to other parts of Latvia. This decision is the basis for implementing the idea of the national state, because it unites all Latvian-populated counties, which over the centuries have been owned by a large variety of foreign governmental entities.

This historical segment of consciousness, which characterizes the perception of territoriality in our cultural-consciousness, can be called the paradigm of crossings, as it was already described in the Soviet times. In 1970s and 1980s it could be heard every day in the so-called "kitchen conversations" – "*Why did our ancestors decided to settle here, at the crossroads between East and West?!*" However, the content of this paradigm changed very quickly after regaining independence in 1991, when settlement at the crossroads was presented in politics as a newly opened opportunity to benefit from this location good for trade.

Meanwhile the word "between" in Webster's dictionary is explained as meaning "*in the middle of two*", where the significance comes from the Old English betweonum – by twain (Old English twegin) or by two. This leads us to self-understanding, that has been promoted for too long a time, and seems to be justified by historical experience. For Baltic countries to be "between" has the intonation of being impacted, even pressurized by those two – the East and the West. Also, being obliged to calculate between those two in order to survive. At least made by those two to become like some kind of amorphus stuff, not having quality of self-development. This is what could be called the enter of an ideology of survivism. One of our essential characteristics is adaptation – it happened in the Soviet times and it has happened also in the time, when wild capitalism has been developing in Latvia during last 20 years. Our people reach good results and get accustomed freely in foreign countries, but in our own homeland we pine out and are not ca-

pable of using the freedom (Kreislere 2009).

It seems that the view of Latvia as being "between", is some kind of tradition of unrootedness. Indeed, even if understand the new "between paradigm" as trade and transit possibilities in Latvia between the East and the West, the question still remains as once expressed: "Who wants to live a long time on the bridge?", i.e. about the rootedness in that land or about the space perception praxes in Latvian culture.

These practices certainly have developed under the influence of the modern history, for instance, by loosening European identity's layer in historical consciousness wherewith the second Soviet occupation and continued presence inside the Soviet "Eastern Bloc". Pope John Paul II has pointed out that dividing Europe into Eastern and Western parts was made for political and military reasons and national histories were completely ignored. The Pope wrote that it had been very difficult for Poles to acknowledge themselves as a part of the East. John Paul II continued, "I think that this acknowledgement has been difficult for Czechs, Slovaks, and Hungarians as well as for Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians" (John Paul II 2005, p. 215).

In this historically provoked mess of territoriality perceptions, "Heart of Latvian" paradigm – as a sufficiently stable form of perception – was formulated for Latvian cultural-consciousness during the Soviet times. This paradigm was associated with the concept of the Latvian state.

Pastor G. Kalme describes this concept in such a way: "*The Latvian state started as a brave idea of our state founders … it did not occupy more space than heart and mind of any patriot. Yet it was not possible to show it on the political map of the world, but when struggles ceased, our country appeared, because, firstly, it was born in our hearts*". Similarly, but as if the other way round, the author describes the events, when the Red Army entered Latvia in 1944 and "*the Latvian state was now shrunk entirely small: forests of Kurzeme, marshy meadows, edges of the forests, swamps, cellar of some home – at any place where guerrillas continued to fight*" (Kalme 2008, p. 130). Heart of the Latvian theme was running through our cultural consciousness all the Soviet times, for example, expressed as idea of "big" and "small" homeland. Great – the socialist Fatherland Soviet Union was not discussed publicly because of quite understandable political reasons, while therein communities of intellectuals, especially poets and writers were talking about the "little homeland" – Latvia, its history, nature and people.

Territoriality principle within the Soviet policy functioned in a completely different perspective, where very high organizational and propaganda efforts were applied to force to return to Latvia, or in this case it would

be more correct to say – to the Soviet territory – Latvian nationals, who be-gun refugee course and found a seat in the West. They were agitated to return under the slogan – "there are no two native countries". Both, due to the quite pragmatic economic reasons, and, even more – ideological reasons: "*The Kremlin did not want to permit that the West would keep a larger number of "anti-Soviet elements", which could develop there "harmful activities*" (Germanis 1986, p. 44). Thus, "Heart of Latvia" was always presented physically and socially in the places where Latvians lived. However, some limitations of this paradigm appear, for instance, if it remains as the only, the unreflected and not evaluated expression of territorial perception. Today in the media, it is acknowledged by intellectuals' comments on the Heart of Latvia as a political and moral ideal in opposition to reality of social injustice in the modern Latvia. In that case, it results in socially stained concerns – if isolation in the Heart of Latvia prevents humanitarian development in the real territory of the Republic of Latvia. In other words, maybe we have to take action in order to make sure that the territory of the Heart of Latvia would conform to the territorial borders of Latvia? Should we review and update our territorial concept in our cultural consciousness?

These suspicions are indirectly confirmed by political scientist's Vita Matisa when characterizing the Latvian and the Swiss or any other Western psychological perception of space. Following the political scientist's view, a European "*will try to see and perceive people, who are outside his own people's circle. He will notice if someone who is not his friend, child or mother, passes by*" (Burve-Rozite 2010). That means, says V. Matisa, that Latvians currently do not have a broader sense of space and that they do not see interconnections, do not see the whole area and they have no historical consciousness.

Art historian Ojars Sparitis sees the roots of the present situation in the Revival time, when idealism ruled, and the leading intellectuals could not see the economic mechanisms for realization of good life's hopes. In the aspect of personal benefit – it was foreseen by the nomenclature of the new time, Young Communist League and party functionaries of the last Soviet years who used the opportunities of perestroika, studied market economy abroad and burdened it all on the impunity of Communist Party staff. Poet Janis Peters added that Gorbachev had established such practice of mixing the public property with private gain (Medina 2011, P.2).

In confrontation with Europe's values, V. Matisa characterizes existence in the post-Soviet space in such a way that in the beginning of 1990-s politicians were thinking to which side it would be more profitable to bend; were ready to say "yes" to any Western values, wanted to get benefits, but had not

yet understood the new rules of the game. For many people it was not the support of Western values, but the way to acquire Armani products and to travel to the Seychelles Islands. Then they realized that the borders were open, and they could get all benefits with the same old Soviet methods, the same pretence skills. In the Soviet times they shouted out the slogans of Communism, and then learned the slogans of Brussels bureaucracy: "*Man understands that he must say one thing and do vice versa, but actually thinks of something completely different. I am sorry, but it is still quite Utopian to expect that Latvian people's words, actions and thoughts will match. .. The worst was the fact that in the Soviet times people lied because of the pressure of foreign ideology and power, but now they lie on behalf of the Latvian state*" (Ibid.).

In the ruthless view of the writer Gundega Repse, mixing the truth with lies and self-understanding duplicity is the form and content of state's development and a norm for human relations. Soviet occupation is like a wonderful feeder of nostalgia; not a crime with non-revaluated consequences. Typical chronic resistance is characteristic of intellectuals' life – some time ago resistance to the occupation regime and now to the sick and deformed spirit of the state (Repse, 2011).

In this context, obviously we can talk about the deficit of territoriality perception, when, in fact, a wide range of simulation models coexist in person's consciousness and these models are activated depending on the location, purpose and motives. And thus, unfortunately, we have to speak about the existence of Soviet territoriality, which materializes into morally corrupt persons in the real physical and social territory of the present Latvia (the Latin word "corruption" means – "demoralized, stricken with damage").

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Accordingly, in this article we revealed the difficulties Latvian intellectuals have to face, both, in connection with their self-esteem, and Latvian cultural identity, which intellectuals are invited to establish. Apparently, for all that, thinkers and intellectuals should be reminded of precise connection to their place in this world, which to a high degree forms their unique type of thinking and global comprehension and which is peculiar for a certain place; that's why it is interesting in the context of the world culture. Political choices, then, construct the various agencies of the state in order to actualize the values of this particular peoplehood, as well as to provide for

the concrete material needs of people according to the material particulars of the historical circumstances (Sawicki 1998).

As written by the Brazilian philosopher, N. De Oliveira, while politics is just a simple war of politicians against all the others or search for consensus in spite of the sequence of things, we will be dealing with deficiency of peace and justice in the world. Society should constantly experience criticism about its identity, past and present, in order to allow the peace and justice to flourish and radically transform itself. The philosopher also points out that today's social phenomenology – in its characteristic life-world or Lebenswelt studies – is close to ethnicity and sociality synthesis, when analyzing the cultural and social environment (De Oliveira 2010).

Therefore, beside the perspective of already exposed space and time perception within the formation of Latvian society's identity, we should refer to the analysis of connection between ethnicity and sociality as an important clue of the research.

It is induced, for example, by the reflection of historical experience, as confirmed by the famous film critic Valentina Freimane. She describes brightly – still academically insufficiently identified – connection of ethnicity and sociality in her autobiographical novel, "*I cannot stop wondering how people are firstly detected by nationality and only then they are being characterized by personal characteristics or position. ... In my child's imagination, I compared differences of my two places of residence; they reminded me of two pieces of furniture: Berlin is a wardrobe, but Riga – chest of drawers. In the wardrobe, all clothes are hung together in line and they can be combined according to needs and liking. In the chest of drawers, all toys are placed in drawers. Drawers are closed and it's not customary to arrange the content in different combinations. Coexist peacefully, but previously resolved differences will still remain*" (Freimane, 2010, p. 114).

As written by Myoshi, nowadays ethnicity and ethnic groups "*are newly the awaken agents not for construction of autonomous nations, but for abandoning expectations and responsibilities of the political-economic national projects*" (Bauman 2003, p. 18). In other words, bringing of one type of identity to the forefront is a human's, as existent in concomitance with other beings, attempt to start a dialogue with the community about himself and others, too. Different identities, which are selected as separate study subjects, are identity's different aspects of united human persons, which, of course, have their own specifics by expressing themselves in public association and therefore are legitimate fields of research. However, in this movement of understanding from one aspect of identity to another and back, the main question is still about the human dignity, challenge and op-

portunities of personal overall development, which are unleashed by those identity studies and their reflection in the culture as in a mirror, where one can take a look, evaluate himself and see what should be changed.

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**Vladislav Volkov**

## THE INSTITUTION OF SOCIETY INTEGRATION IN LATVIA: PECULIARITIES OF THE MODERN SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE

If sociological theory considers social integration as a universal process which involves the whole society and all types of its diversity, the public consciousness in Latvia, as well as the scientific discourse, persistently relate this term to just one dimension – ethnic. The findings presented in the article demonstrate that the scientific research on the integration processes in Latvia has become more critical towards the methodological assumptions which appeared in the 1990s, but in the theory there is a reconsideration of the values of those ideological approaches to the understanding of society integration which first were formulated in T. Parsons' conception. At the same time, the ideas of J. Habermas who considered it necessary to recognize a collective identity of ethnic minorities in the multicultural society might become a significant ideological resource for the research on society integration in Latvia. The article presents some data from the sociological research carried out in the largest city of Eastern Latvia – Daugavpils, the city with an ethnically diverse population. The data obtained in the run of the research demonstrate the possibility to reconcile the liberal conception of society integration in Latvia with the recognition of the value of a collective identity of ethnic minorities.

**Key words:** society integration, collective identity, liberal values, actors, ethnic minorities

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## 1. Sociological approach to the concept "society integration".

The concept "society integration" is interpreted rather loosely in modern sociology. It is understood as a way of various elements of society coexisting with one another. And the concept "social integration" is considered along with the concept "social order". (Integration 2006, p. 202) It refers to any social communities – small social groups, as well as nations. (Strobl 2007, p. 4429)

The understanding of the significance of society integration is realized to its full extent in the sociology of Talkott Parsons who related this concept to the substantiation of "issue of order". For Parsons it was also important to emphasize the significance of "idealistic-collectivist" values in the organization of a society, without which, in his opinion, a complex modern society cannot be integrated. (Parsons 1961, p. 311-365).

In general, the idea of social integration performed several roles for T.Parsons: Firstly, the legitimacy of the only one normative cultural system which can serve as a basis for society's integrity was proclaimed. Secondly, social diversity acquired its social value only in terms of hierarchy, and subordination of connected public functions within the framework of a common normative system which does not call its integrity to challenge its integrity. It is crucial that the people, bearers of various social roles would be "*conformal in relation to the existing value consent in the society*". At the same time Parsons did not think that a "full" social integration on the basis of some sort of system of cultural values was possible in a real-world context. A person has a choice of various value models and a possibility to deviate from prevailing cultural standards. It should be taken into account that in modern societies there is a diversity of subcultures which offer value standards alternative to the prevailing ones Ethnic communities inside national states are a vivid example of such social entities which are orientated to the value systems different from the whole society. Moreover, Parsons considered it acceptable for the society with a certain level of tolerance should not impede formation of such "*a sub-society which is somewhat different from it*". The presence of such ethnic entities within social systems allows stratifying assessments on the basis of the culture of the given ethnic group. (Parsons 1937).

In general these ideas of Parsons (presence of one normative model of culture, subordination of cultural differences) provided the basis for the understanding of integration of multi-ethnic societies in modern Latvian social science.

However, such a concept of social integration causes serious objections even within the framework of structural functionalism which Parsons himself belonged to. For instance, Alvin Gouldner reckoned that the concept of integration offered by Parsons was extremely conservative, it was drawn towards Platonism. In addition, Gouldner explained the reason of high demand for such concepts of integration – the need of any society for "stabilization". (Gouldner,1970, pp.418-456)

Robert Merton while criticizing Parsons' concept of social integration, demonstrated that in reality a society is in a constant change, which generates various, often competing normative models which pretend to be the basis for social integration. Merton was one of the most consistent of Parsons' opponents in understanding the essence of integration of social systems. In general, in Merton's opinion, the concept "integration" itself is of a rather abstract and formal character. There is a varying degree of social integration in the social systems which function in real-world, which generates varying conditions for social mobility. Nevertheless, the social integration of various types of societies should not be reduced to a common denominator on any account. (Merton 1968).

The further criticism of a non-alternative variant for social integration was developed in the sociology of Ervin Goffman (a doubt in the value of a universal social order for formation of people's common identity), Harold Garnfinkel (the importance of "triviality" in the understanding of "social integration"), Charles Horton Kooley and George Herbert Mead (diversity of social communication as a prerequisite for integration), *Jürgen Habermas* (a person's life world as a basis for modeling social integration), etc.

## 2. Studies on society integration in the modern Latvian social science.

A modern stage in the interest of Latvian social scientists in the sociological concept of society integration can be characterized as the beginning of discussions on this topic. These discussions are of high importance for Latvian social science because the concepts of integration of the Latvian society have been not only a remarkable aspect of ethnic and sociological, and ethnic and political research for the last twenty years but they have become a part of the political life of the state. One of these concepts resulted in the State Programme of Society Integration in Latvia accepted in 2010. There even used to be a special government structure – Secretariat of Minister for Special Assignments for Society Integration Affairs (2002-2008) in Latvia.

If the sociological theory considers society integration as a universal process which involves the whole society and all types of its diversity (eco-

nomic, political, social and group, religious, etc), the public consciousness in Latvia persistently relates this term to just one dimension – ethnic. Thus, in the State Programme the society integration is understood, first of all, as a process focused on ethnic minority groups with the aim to form a common cultural space which is based on the Latvian language:

"*Society integration means the mutual understanding and cooperation between the individuals and groups within one state. The basis for social integration – is the loyalty towards the Latvian state, comprehending the fact that the future of every individual and their personal well-being are closely connected with the future of the Latvian state, its stability and safety. Readiness to voluntarily accept the Latvian language as the state language, respect towards the Latvian language and culture, as well as languages and cultures of the ethnic minorities living in Latvia are the basis of the integration*". (State programme 2001, p. 6)

There are certain grounds for the ethnic dominant in the understanding of integration. Latvia in the past as well as the present is a country with explicitly expressed ethnic diversity. The Latvians comprised 59.4% of the total 2.2m population of Latvia in 2010, the ethnic minorities – 40.6%. (Latvian population 2010). Furthermore, the share of the Latvian Russians comprises 27.6%, which two and a half times outnumbers the share of other ethnic minorities together. One of the most significant peculiarities of the Latvian ethnic diversity is that it is highly accentuated in people's private lives as well as in the public domain.   The display of the ethnic minority's symbolic identity is especially peculiar to the Russian population in Latvia. The Russian language is the main marker of their ethnic identity for the Latvian Russians and one of the main markers for a considerable share of the Latvian Belarusians, Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians. The Russian language is the second language in terms of its real spread after Latvian as the state language in the sphere of education, business, mass media, culture, and as a means of everyday communication.  The Russian population of the country is the only ethnic minority in the state of ethno-political mobilization (there are a number of political associations, one of which – Harmony Centre – occupies a quarter of the seats in the Saeima).

"Practice and Prospects for Integration" (2006) became one of the most large-scale sociological research on the undergoing processes after the State Programme of Integration was approved. However, it should be pointed out that the Latvian scientists studied various aspects of society integration before the Programme was approved. The role of the Latvian language and culture as a normative basis for integration, the degree of spread of the Latvian language in the inter-ethnic communication, the status of eth-

nic minorities in the civil society and national state in Latvia, the hurdles and contradictions of integration, the overlapping of the social and class society stratification with the ethnic stratification, and the peculiarities of the formation of a common Latvian political nation within a multi-cultural society were the most popular issues for study (See e.g.: Rungule 1992, Zepa 1992,Vēbers, Kārkliņa 1995, Vēbers 1998, Zepa 1998, Djačkova 2000, Pabriks 2000, Indans 2000).

The study "Practice and Prospects for Integration" scrutinizes the integration processes as a system phenomenon which involves various actors-the Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking mass media which construct collective identities (political, civil, cultural and ethnic); political parties and their "ethnic" electorate; non-government organizations; political elite, and its attitude towards the integration policy (Zepa, Šūpule, Krastiņa, Ķešāne, Grīviņš, Bebriša, Ieviņa 2006, pp.5-6)

Furthermore, the authors based their study on those ideological approaches to society integration which are included into the state programme "The Integration of Society in Latvia". In fact, this study performed the task of the empirical testing of the basic postulates of the principal normative document on the issue of integration. The research problem was formulated as a statement of discord of the integration policy among its varied actors. "The nationalistic-political discourse" presented by the radical nationalistic political alliance "Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK", as well as in the public speeches by the radicals directed against the Russian population in Latvia is considered as the opponent to the model of integration described in the normative documents. At the same time, the viewpoint of the largest newspapers issued in the Russian language in Latvia turns out to be opposing the official policy of integration (Zepa… 2006, p.4). In fact, the authors of the research "Practice and Prospects for Integration" consider the model of integration which is included in the State Programme "The Integration of Society in Latvia" as the "ideal" one, and the prevalent discourses among Latvian radicals, on the one hand, and in the Russian-speaking environment, on the other, as alternative to it.

At the same time, the authors of the research state some problem points which incline to specificate the realization of the integration policy but which have not yet found an adequate solution and perception by the collective consciousness and political elite. Firstly, they are the peculiarities of the Russian population in Latvia which is hard to characterize as the country's national minority. (But the Programme of integration considers the national and ethnic minorities as the object of this policy). Secondly, this is the effect of two different principles which constitute Latvian society:

Latvian ethnic nationalism which proved its resilience in the period of restoration of the country's independence and civil nationalism. The effect of these different principles pinpoints the question that, possibly, the integration of various ethnic groups into the society will happen under pressure of different principles – ethnic and political (Zepa… 2006, p.9).

Already in this research the authors relate the issues of integration of the Latvian society to the necessity for clarifying such concepts as "national state", "national minority", and "multiculturalism" (Zepa 2006, p.8). Thus, speaking about the concept "national state", the authors of the research point out its internal inconsistency. Such a state means the coincidence of the ethnic and territorial and political principles, but these states do not virtually exist (Zepa 2006, pp.8-9). That is why it is necessary to adopt those concepts which presuppose the existence of ethnically heterogeneous groups in the civil society.

Mentioning the two principles in the construction of the Latvian civil society – ethnic and political – the authors of the research demonstrate the necessity for a permanent articulation of one or another principle. (Zepa 2006, p.10) As for the characteristic of national minorities in Latvia, the researchers pay attention to the historic character of their formation as a result of a mass migration in the Soviet time, which makes the Latvian national minorities different from the national minorities in the countries of Western Europe (Zepa 2006, p.11). Characterizing the peculiarities of multiculturalism acceptable for Latvia, the scientists state that it is realized within the context of strengthening of the national state, as well as the opposition from the minorities (Zepa 2006, p.14). The frequently mentioned term "acculturation" is reviewed in accordance with its understanding in the works by J. Berry as the possibility for four strategies (assimilation, integration, segregation and marginalization) (Zepa 2006, p.16).

However, the publication of the multi-author monograph "How Integrated is Latvian Society. An Audit of Achievements, Failures and Challenges" (Muižnieks 2010) in 2010 became the most remarkable event in the scientific life in Latvia which was directly connected with the analysis of integration processes in the country. This book is a kind of conceptual generalization of the research on the integration of Latvian society which has been carried out since Latvia regained its independence in 1991. The obvious scientific and public value of this work lies in the fact that the authors refer to the analysis or use of the materials of all the best known studies on social integration carried out in Latvia since 1991. The social and political context (and the subtext) of the integration processes in Latvian society is examined, as well as the conceptual paradigm of the society integration is offered.

The Director of the Institute for Social and Political Research of Latvian University and the editor of the edition "How Integrated is Latvian Society. An Audit of Achievements, Failures and Challenges" Nils Muižnieks in the article "Social Integration: A Brief History of An Idea" envisages the works of E. Durkheim and T. Parsons as a basis for the theoretical grounding of the concept "social integration". These two sociologists examined the social integration as the most significant characteristic of a social system which is in a constant process of complexity, development, and differentiation peculiar to the modern age (Muižnieks 2010, p.16). Muižnieks writes that such views on society integration were extremely popular in the 19th century in the works by the theorists of liberalism (Durham, Mill). In addition, those views led to in the spread of the idea of assimilation of ethnic minorities among the ethnic majority.

Moreover, the author proves the methodological limitation of this approach which does not take into consideration the value of differences and cultural diversity peculiar to ethnically and socially heterogeneous societies. That is why Muižnieks refers to the theoretical statements by the specialists in political theory of the last third of the 20th – beginning of the 21st centuries. It is the time when, in the author's opinion, the interest in the problems of society's social integration in general and the ethnic aspect of this process in particular in Western science increased dramatically (theories by A.Lijphart, T.Gellner,W.Kymlicka, L.Kuper, B.Parekh, J.Habermas, etc). This approach to the concept of social integration is really widely spread in the theoretical literature.

In general the author's skeptical attitude towards the functionalistic interpretation of social integration presented in the methodological approach by Durkheim and Parsons is expressed in the following assessment:

"*While cultural homogeneity may facilitate social solidarity, render democratization easier, and make democracies more stable, cultural diversity is now an inalienable part of all European societies. Moreover, even if policymakers were tempted to resurrect the kinds of assimilationist policies common in the 18th and 19th centuries, the effort would be in vain, as insuperable barriers to mass assimilation have emerged in democratic European systems. It is important to understand the nature of these barriers, as they also point to the necessity of pursuing an integration policy that does not set the unrealistic goal of creating culturally and linguistically homogeneous societies*" (Muižnieks 2010, p.20).

The explanation of the peculiarities of the society's integration policy which has been implemented after the restoration of independence of Latvia is presented in the article by professor of Latvian University Juris Rozenvalds

"The Soviet Heritage and Integration Policy Development Since the Restoration of Independence". The author believes that the understanding of the social integration policy in modern Latvia is impossible without taking into consideration the perception of the Soviet period in the history of this Baltic state by the Latvians. Rozenvalds writes that unlike the Lithuanian and Estonian societies, the Latvians acquired a black-and-white perception of this stage in Latvian history. And, as a result, since the restoration of independence, *"one of the most typical manifestations of these day-to-day habits of mind in the 1990s was the lingering hope that problems could be resolved through a surge of activity based on simply denying the Soviet legacy and restoring the pre-war social order and its ethnic composition. This hope often displaced debate about the suitability of various solutions based on the past to the situation of 1990s Latvia and contemporary understandings of social and economic policy"*. The tragic history of Latvia in the 20th century, in Rozenvalds' opinion, formed a belief in the Latvian consciousness that *"Latvians had the right, in the name of overcoming the injustices of the past, to act in ways that were not always in accordance with the accepted standards for civilized political behavior of the Western world"*. The author underlines that these ideas were especially popular in the 1990s but they still retain their influence despite the obvious dominance of the Latvians in the political life (Rozenvalds 2010, pp.34-35). As a result, *"since the beginning of the 1990s, the notion that only Latvian politicians know what Russians should want has dominated the thinking of the Latvian political elite"* (Rozenvalds 2010, p.45).

How the State Programme "The Integration of Society in Latvia" – the basic document in which the fundamental ideas of the Latvian political elite and the majority of the civil society about the issues of integration are reflected – is evaluated now. Rozenvalds agreed with the analysis of the reasons of disintegration in the Latvian society presented in the programme– *"differences in values and interpretations of history, threat perceptions, mistrust, and unwillingness to link one's future to the state of Latvia"*. Furthermore, he reckons that *"the programme does not indicate how to address these controversial issues"*. At the same time, the norm of the programme proceeds from *"a preconceived set of values (primarily understood as ethnic Latvian values), neglecting the process of negotiation between proponents of divergent values. The programme stresses the priority of the Latvian language and culture, but recognizes the rights of persons belonging to minorities to nurture their own cultures. The fact that integration is a two-way process is mentioned, though subsequently the emphasis is on the tasks of minorities – the need to accept Latvian culture, learn the Latvian language, understand history, be loyal…"* (Rozenvalds 2010, p.55).

That is why J. Rozenvalds assesses more positively the document "Social Integration Policy Guidelines 2008-2018" prepared by Secretariat of Minister for Special Assignments for Society Integration Affairs. This document emphasizes *"the importance of a democratic, inclusive civil society in social integration, as well as the significance of the ideas of multiculturalism in inter-ethnic relations"* (Rozenvalds 2010, p.58). (But this document has not been adopted because of the extremely negative attitude of the Latvian political elite towards the ideas and values of multiculturalism.)

The integration of society presupposes the participation of many collective actors, as well as the nature of their mutual recognition and precise identification of their functional roles. One of the most crucial issues is characteristic of the object of integration. The Director of the Latvian Center for Human Rights Ilze Brands-Kehris in the article "Citizenship, Participation and Representation" shows that the European understanding mainly relates the object of integration to immigrants who should be included into the receiving society (Brands-Kehris 2010, p. 97).

This is a very important point taking into account the context of the policy of integration in Latvia, as, here, people who arrived in Latvia during the Soviet time, as well as Latvia's citizens and their descendants who resided in this territory before 1940 are related to as this kind of object. However, both in the modern scientific literature on the issues of the integration of society in Latvia and in the public consciousness this difference has not acquired any marked understanding. Nevertheless, neglecting this difference does not provide, in our opinion, the full explanation of the fact that the representatives of those national minorities, whose ancestors were the citizens of the independent Latvia in 1918-1940 acted as the most prominent opponents of the official ethnic policy. The qualifying of all groups of non-Latvians as one object of social integration (citizens of the Republic of Latvia in 1918-1940 and their descendants, naturalized former USSR citizens in 1990-2000, citizens of other states, permanent residents of Latvia who do not hold the citizenship of other countries) constricts resources of the institution of integration itself. In this context the ethnic identity of the representatives of national minorities, citizens of Latvia, acquires its legitimacy within the framework of all-Latvian civil identity only when it implements the fundamental principles of the policy of integration.

The term "integration of society" cannot substitute the concepts of political analysis which have been applied to describing and theoretical modeling of multi-ethnic societies and national states for centuries. One of the most important among them is the concept of "ethnic minority" (variant – "national minority"). The social and economic, and political peculiarities

of the Russian minority of the country affect most significantly the use of this concept in the Latvian conditions. Various researchers give these peculiarities a controversial assessment. A number of the Latvian scientists reckon that the Latvian Russians do not fall under the classical definition of an ethnic minority. Thus, for instance, Ilze Šulmane having analyzed the peculiarities of the Latvian media space which exists in the Latvian and Russian languages, applies the concept "community" in relation to Russians.

Spiritual needs of ethnic minorities, in Šulmane's opinion, focus on satisfying "specific cultural needs" exclusively and cannot create a self-sufficient alternative to the nationwide cultural and media space. During the years of independence, Russians in Latvia managed to create a diverse information space of the Latvian Russian-speaking mass media, as well as the one orientated to the information resources of the Russian Federation. These peculiarities of the Latvian Russians, in Šulmane's opinion, characterize them as a self-sufficient community but not an ethnic minority (Šulmane 2010, p. 227).

This characteristic of the Latvian Russians as a community but not an ethnic minority is not merely an issue of terminology. As it is known, the fundamental international documents protecting the interests of the population which is different from the ethnic majority of the country, qualify these groups as minorities – ethnic, national, regional, religious, etc. The Latvian legislation also uses the concepts "ethnic minority" and "national minority". That is why the concept "community" in fact takes the largest non-Latvian ethnic group out of the basic legal discourse. However, it is typical for Latvian social science in the last decade to synonymously apply the terms "ethnic minority" and "ethnic community" in relation to the Latvian Russians.

In spite of such synonymous application of the concepts "minority" and "community", they still require an additional analysis. The ethnic identity, by all means, should be applied as an addition to the civil identity. That is why the identity of non-title groups which is connected with a minority status is more preferable than the identity which is orientated to the status of community, whose interpretation in the scientific as well as everyday discourses is extremely controversial. For instance, the description of the "community" given above as a self-sufficient alternative to the civil values, as a way of self-segregation is possible. At the same time, if the ethnic minority is expected to have only those differences from the culture of the majority which are related to just the sphere of folklore, peculiarities of private life and communication, then it is an obvious impoverishment of the minority rights for their identity. In the Latvian public discourse the representatives of ethnic minorities mainly provide the assessment of the fragment

of social, cultural and economic lives of the civil society which functions in the Russian language as a display of the ethnic minority identity.

The Latvian researchers from the Centre PROVIDUS, M.Golubeva and I. Kažoka, directly relate difficulties of integration of the Latvian society to the lack of a dialogue between the Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking environment of the country. These scientists assess critically the level of the integration of the Latvian society because in the public space (debates in parliament) there is often the rhetoric which delegitimizes the Russian minority of the country. Thus, according to the counts by the authors of the research, in 2007 at the plenary sitting of the Saiema in 56 cases such rhetoric was targeted at all "Russian-speakers" in Latvia and in 32 cases at "non-citizens" (Golubeva, Kažoka etc. 2010, p. 60). At the same time the Russian-speaking print media in Latvia ("Vesty segodnya", "Chas") encourage the ethnic mobilization by the way of attributing the Latvians the image of "unfair winners in the social and political changes in the 1990s", but the Latvian Russians the quality of "suppressed minority". Such rhetoric is qualified by the authors as "self-marginalization" (Golubeva, Kažoka etc. 2010, p. 61). But the Latvian newspaper "Latvijas avīze" identifies "multi-culturalism" as the value system for Latvia and "Russian imperialism" (Golubeva, Kažoka etc. 2010, p. 62).

In general, the issue of integration of the Latvian society constantly addresses the issue of identity of the actors who constitute the most active subjects of this society, whose actions it directly depends on. The scientists I. Ījabs and M. Golubeva describing the level of integration draw on the reality – the Latvian civil society is represented by organizations and communities which express "Latvian" and "Russain" interests. In order to consolidate the Latvian society it is necessary to recognize the presence of these interests and organizations which defend these interests (Ījabs, Golubeva 2009, p.1). These scientists carried out the research based on the idea that the language identity of the public organizations itself (they spoke about the Russian non-government organizations) is not a barrier for establishing a dialogue in the Latvian society. (Ījabs, Golubeva 2009, p.2).

The research by V. Makarovs and A.Dimitrovs "Latvian non-citizens and voting rights: compromises and solutions" proceeds from acknowledging the fact of tension in the society. In order to remove the tension the authors suggest authorizing the Latvian non-citizens with the right to elect the municipality bodies. (Makarovs, Dimitrovs 2009, p.4) In fact, this research demonstrates the necessity to strengthen the integration in the society on the way to the serious political reforms, and institutional changes.

In spite of the new approaches and beginning of the discussions on the

conceptual bases of the theory of social integration, some crucial aspects have not acquired development in the Latvian social science yet. Here we mean such an important issue of the theory of social integration as the characteristic of ethnic groups as subjects of integration processes. It is relevant to appeal to the main statements of J. Habermas' theory which relate to the fruitful discussions between the representatives of liberalism and multiculturalism on the issue of recognizing the ethnic groups' subjectivity in multicultural societies.

### 3. The integration of Latvian society and dialogue between the cultures.

The content of the modern sociological and political science literature in Latvia in relation to the concept of "social integration" in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations, to a greater or lesser extent, comes from the idea that the cultural identity of the representatives of ethnic minorities can be integrated into the Latvia society. The right for such cultural integration is guaranteed by the Latvian law. The representatives of ethnic minorities have the right to use their mother tongue in public life, there are possibilities for obtaining the secondary education funded by the state in the languages of ethnic minorities. The ethnic minorities have the right to the institutialization of private higher education, mass media, scientific research, activity of the institutions of culture, non-governmental organizations, etc. in their mother tongue. In general, this type of integration of ethnic minorities can be characterized as the dominance of the national state's values (first of all, the Latvian language as the only state language) with the guarantee the ethnic minorities' rights for preserving their cultural identity mainly in the structures of a private sphere of the civil society.

Notwithstanding the fact that the state programme of integration was adopted by the government in 2001, the fundamental elements of this model existed since Latvia regained its independence in 1991. According to the dynamics of understanding the institution of society integration in the Latvian social science, the principles of liberalism which were aimed at the formation of an integrated society where large ethnic communities had been interacting through a long historic period are being subjected to the most critical analysis. One of the variants of multiculturalism which relates the process of formation of a civil society to the recognition of the value of a collective identity by such actors as, for instance, traditional ethnic groups can become, in our opinion, an important constituent of a scientific understanding of the integration of society in Latvia.

Apparently, in order to realize a complete integration of a multicultural society, it is not enough to just simply recognize certain people – bearers of a specific ethnic identity – as its fully-fledged subjects. A certain level of recognition of a positive potential of a collective identity of the entire ethnic groups in the formation of a civil society is also important. As it is known, the issue on the recognition of ethnic groups as fully-fledged subjects of the inter-ethnic dialogue is the most debatable in the scientific literature about the problem of balance between individual and collective rights, a national state and pluralistic civil society, multiculturalism and liberalism.

Consistent critics of the theories of multiculturalism and recognition of the special rights of the entire ethnic groups to be the subjects of the interethnic dialogue (for instance, Brian Barry) fairly protect the legal entity of a civil society and stand for the unconditional equality of all its members regardless of their ethnic origin. These critics are right that the social activity in the liberal society, including participation in the inter-ethnic dialogue, should be based on the individual choice of a person but not to be assumed a priori by the fact of separating the society into ethnic or any other social groups itself. At the same time, the opponents of such liberalism when it calls for absolute neglect of the cultural and ethnic differences of the groups in polyethnic societies are also right. In the modern civil societies alongside with the individual bearers of identities, including the ethnic one, there are collective actors, social subjects, even if their understanding of their own ethnic identity is sometimes of a fragmented character. Within the framework of these discussions, J.Habermas' approach seems to be the most reasonable. It does not contradict the constitutionalism of the national states, and at the same time, it demonstrates wide opportunities of the civil society for recognition of collective identities of ethnic or any other cultural minorities.

According to Habermas, the problem of recognition of collective identities of non-dominant groups in western society (religious, ethnic, class) is connected to the fact that the existing legal discourse itself isorientated to the recognition of subjective, individual human rights. At the same time Habermas reckons that collective actors who argue about collective aims and the distribution of collective amenities act in the political life. Habermas thinks that it is possible to coordinate the individualistically orientated western law and interests of collective subjects , which is proved by the historic experience of liberalism and social democracy. These political forces managed to overcome the deprivation of rights of non-privileged groups. However it happened in the forms of fight for social and state universalization of civil rights. (Habermas 1993, pp. 128-155)

In order to demonstrate the attitude of a civil society towards the participation of collective actors (ethnic groups) as fully-fledged subjects of in-

tegration processes in the modern Latvian Republic, the author has carried out the sociological research "Interrelation of a collective and individual identity of the representatives of the Daugavpils ethnic groups in the in the development of a civil society". The sociological research which was carried out in the spring-summer 2010 in Daugavpils. The research was done by the Institute for Social Research of Daugavpils University. Selection of the research participants was based on several criteria – nationality, age, gender of the respondents and place of their residence in urban districts of Daugavpils. In general, the selection comprised 578 people.[1] In terms of national identity the selection looks as follows:

*Table No.1.* **Selection of the research participants.**

| Nationality | N | % |
|---|---|---|
| Latvian | 95 | 16.4 |
| Russian | 324 | 56.0 |
| Pole | 77 | 13.2 |
| Byelorussian | 46 | 7.9 |
| Ukrainian | 7 | 1.3 |
| Lithuanian | 3 | 0.6 |
| Other | 27 | 4.6 |
| Total | 578 | 100.0 |

The character of the attitude towards these forms of revealing and development of the ethnic minorities' socio-cultural and political life shows to what extent the society perceives these groups as fully-fledged collective actors of public life. The respondents were offered several variants of attitude towards
- mass media in the ethnic minorities' languages,
- educational institutions in the ethnic minorities' languages,
- ethnic minorities' public organizations which express the ethnic minorities' interests,
- political parties which express the ethnic minorities' interests.

The task of this research was to find out the attitude of the Daugavpils population towards this peculiarity of the city's public life. The character of

1  The author expresses his deepest thanks to the scientists of the Institute for Social Research of Daugavpils University, Dr.oec. Olga Lavrinenko and Alina Ohotina for the work they have done while compiling the selective total of the respondents and processing the statistic material of the research.

the attitude towards these forms of revealing and development of the ethnic minorities' socio-cultural and political life shows to what extent the society perceives these groups as fully-fledged collective actors of public life. The respondents were offered several variants of attitude towards mass media, educational institutions in the ethnic minorities' languages, as well as the ethnic minorities' public organizations and political parties which express the ethnic minorities' interests.

They are:
- Latvia's historical tradition;
- evidence of the weak position of the Latvian language (for assessing mass media and educational institutions in the ethnic minorities' languages);
- evidence of a weak government policy of ethnic integration (for assessing non-government organizations and political parties which express the ethnic minorities' interests);
- heritage from the Soviet period (for assessing mass media and educational institutions in the ethnic minorities' languages);
- the ethnic minorities' aspiration for preserving their culture and language;
- the ethnic minorities' aspiration to form a multi-community state; minorities' rights stipulated by the legislation of Latvia;
- a type of entrepreneurship (for assessing mass media and educational institutions in the ethnic minorities' languages);
- a way of influencing the state's policy (for assessing non-government organizations);
- a way of entrepreneurs' influence on the authority (for assessing political parties);
- influence of foreign countries.

From all the offered assessment options revealing ethnic minorities' activity in the public environment (mass media, educational institutions, non-government organizations and political parties), the most frequently chosen option was: "the ethnic minorities' aspiration for preserving their culture and language" (73.4-82.7% of the respondents). This is the evidence of the fact that values of the whole civil society include an extensive manifestation of the ethnic minorities' activity in the public sphere of the society in the consciousness of Daugavpils population.

It is significant that the respondents do not think that the socio-cultural infrastructure of the Latvian society which either functions in the ethnic minorities' languages or reflects specific interests of these groups, signifies

the weak position of the Latvian language as a state language and the state policy of integration (from about one third to two fifths of all the respondents agreed with these statements). Most respondents did not agree with such negative interpretation of various forms of a public display of the ethnic minorities' activity as 'heritage from the Soviet period', 'a type of entrepreneurship', 'a way of influencing the state's policy', 'a way of entrepreneurs' influence on the authority', 'influence from foreign countries'. However, the research data demonstrate that more than one half of the respondents think that the types of the ethnic minorities' public activities mentioned above, act as a means of formation of a multi-community state (Tables No.2-6, Pictures 1-4) But, at the same time, the data of the present research do not allow to draw a certain conclusion about assessing by the majority of the interviewed Daugavpils inhabitants the idea of a multi-community Latvian state. In order to clarify the attitude of the Daugavpils inhabitants towards this fundamental issue of development of the integrated civil society in Latvia it is necessary to carry out some additional research.

*Table No.2.* **Options of attitude towards mass media, educational institutions in the ethnic minorities' languages, as well as the ethnic minorities' public organizations and political parties which express the ethnic minorities' interesēts, %. (Answer: "more or less evident"). (N=578)**

| | Mass media | Educational institutions | NGO | Political parties |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Latvia's historical tradition | 46.2 | 51.8 | 57.6 | 42.0 |
| Evidence of the weak position of the Latvian language | 34.6 | 33.4 | - | - |
| Evidence of a weak government policy of ethnic integration | - | - | 37.4 | 43.4 |
| Heritage from the Soviet period | 42.3 | 44.9 | - | - |
| The ethnic minorities' aspiration for preserving their culture and language | 81.6 | 82.7 | 77.7 | 73.4 |
| The ethnic minorities' aspiration to form a multi-community state | 54.3 | 54.7 | 56.7 | 52.4 |
| Minorities' rights stipulated by the legislation of Latvia | 56.5 | 54.3 | 51.8 | 49.2 |
| A type of entrepreneurship | 43.5 | 34.7 | - | - |
| A way of influencing the state's policy | - | - | 48.6 | - |
| A way of entrepreneurs' influence on the authority | - | - | - | 44.2 |
| Influence of foreign countries | 27.8 | 30.7 | 29.5 | 25.7 |

*Picture 1.* **Options of attitude towards mass media in the ethnic minorities' languages, %. (Answer: "more or less evident"). (N=578)**

*Picture 2.* **Options of attitude towards educational institutions in the ethnic minorities' languages, %. (Answer: "more or less evident"). (N=578)**



*Picture 3.* **Options of attitude towards the ethnic minorities' public organizations which express the ethnic minorities' interesēts, %. (Answer: "more or less evident"). (N=578)**

*Picture 4.* **Options of attitude towards political parties which express the ethnic minorities' interesēts, %. (Answer: "more or less evident"). (N=578)**



*Table No.3.* **Options of attitude towards mass media by Latvians (N=95), Russians (N=324) and Poles (N=77), %. (Answer: "more or less evident").**

| | AR | L | R | P | MW -LR | MW -LP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Latvia's historical tradition | 46.2 | 55.5 | 41.9 | 56.8 | 0.334 | 0.517 |
| Evidence of the weak position of the Latvian language | 34.6 | 31.5 | 34.2 | 26.0 | 0.544 | 0.431 |
| Heritage from the Soviet period | 42.3 | 46.3 | 41.3 | 27.5 | 0.948 | 0.020 |
| The ethnic minorities' aspiration for preserving their culture and language | 81.6 | 73.3 | 83.5 | 83.3 | 0.000 | 0.004 |
| The ethnic minorities' aspiration to form a multi-community state | 54.3 | 49.5 | 50.4 | 57.9 | 0.210 | 0.083 |
| Minorities' rights stipulated by the legislation of Latvia | 56.5 | 60.7 | 58.5 | 60.9 | 0.297 | 0.405 |
| A type of entrepreneurship | 43.5 | 40.6 | 46.3 | 32.8 | 0.152 | 0.737 |
| Influence of foreign countries | 27.8 | 33.8 | 26.9 | 30.9 | 0.459 | 0.954 |

*Symbols: AR – all respondents, L – Latvians, R – Russians, P – Poles, MW-LR – Mann-Whitney U Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) (for the comparing of Latvians and Russians), MW-LP – Mann-Whitney U Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) (for the comparing of Latvians and Poles).*

*Table No.4.* **Options of attitude towards educational institutions in the ethnic minorities' languages by Latvians (N=95), Russians (N=324) and Poles (N=77), %. (Answer: "more or less evident").**

| | AR | L | R | P | MW-LR | MW-LP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Latvia's historical tradition | 51.8 | 64.7 | 47.3 | 68.8 | 0.163 | 0.226 |
| Evidence of the weak position of the Latvian language | 33.4 | 34.1 | 34.1 | 29.5 | 0.391 | 0.708 |
| Heritage from the Soviet period | 44.9 | 59.2 | 45.7 | 28.9 | 0.102 | 0.001 |
| The ethnic minorities' aspiration for preserving their culture and lan-guage | 82.7 | 70.9 | 85.5 | 82.6 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| The ethnic minorities' aspiration to form a multi-community state | 54.7 | 46.3 | 54.3 | 58.8 | 0.031 | 0.040 |
| Minorities' rights stipulated by the legislation of Latvia | 54.3 | 53.3 | 60.4 | 54.7 | 0.028 | 0.356 |
| A type of entrepreneurship | 34.7 | 32.6 | 37.1 | 26.0 | 0.058 | 0.524 |
| Influence of foreign countries | 30.7 | 31.4 | 32.1 | 35.5 | 0.076 | 0.190 |

*Symbols: AR – all respondents, L – Latvians, R – Russians, P – Poles, MW-LR – Mann-Whitney U Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) (for the comparing of Latvians and Russians), MW-LP – Mann-Whitney U Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) (for the comparing of Latvians and Poles).*

*Table No.5.* **Options of attitude towards the ethnic minorities' public organizations by Latvians (N=95), Russians (N=324) and Poles (N=77), %. (Answer: "more or less evident").**

| | AR | L | R | P | MW-LR | MW-LP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Latvia's historical tradition | 57.6 | 51.3 | 58.5 | 66.7 | 0.028 | 0.021 |
| Evidence of a weak government policy of ethnic integration | 37.4 | 33.0 | 39.0 | 30.9 | 0.631 | 0.838 |
| The ethnic minorities' aspiration for preserving their culture and language | 77.7 | 62.2 | 80.0 | 78.4 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| The ethnic minorities' aspiration to form a multi-community state | 56.7 | 60.8 | 53.0 | 59.5 | 0.683 | 0.256 |
| Minorities' rights stipulated by the legislation of Latvia | 51.8 | 45.1 | 56.4 | 59.5 | 0.011 | 0.003 |
| A way of influencing the state's policy | 48.6 | 41.3 | 51.0 | 47.7 | 0.008 | 0.066 |
| Influence of foreign countries | 29.5 | 27.7 | 29.9 | 34.5 | 0.213 | 0.177 |

*Symbols: AR – all respondents, L – Latvians, R – Russians, P – Poles, MW-LR – Mann-Whitney U Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) (for the comparing of Latvians and Russians), MW-LP – Mann-Whitney U Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) (for the comparing of Latvians and Poles).*

*Table No.6.* **Options of attitude towards the ethnic minorities' public organizations by Latvians (N=95), Russians (N=324) and Poles (N=77), %. (Answer: "more or less evident").**

| | AR | L | R | P | MW-LR | MW-LP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Latvia's historical tradition | 42.0 | 46.6 | 41.4 | 37.8 | 0.349 | 0.192 |
| Evidence of a weak government policy of ethnic integration | 43.4 | 45.3 | 43.6 | 31.4 | 0.994 | 0.075 |
| The ethnic minorities' aspiration for preserving their culture and language | 73.4 | 63.5 | 76.3 | 59.5 | 0.001 | 0.787 |
| The ethnic minorities' aspiration to form a multi-community state | 52.4 | 46.5 | 55.1 | 48.2 | 0.726 | 0.706 |
| Minorities' rights stipulated by the legislation of Latvia | 49.2 | 49.3 | 53.7 | 49.4 | 0.350 | 0.753 |
| A way of entrepreneurs' influence on the authority | 44.2 | 42.6 | 42.3 | 48.2 | 0.885 | 0.812 |
| Influence of foreign countries | 25.7 | 31.5 | 24.1 | 27.2 | 0.590 | 0.938 |

*Symbols: AR – all respondents, L – Latvians, R – Russians, P – Poles, MW-LR – Mann-Whitney U Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) (for the comparing of Latvians and Russians), MW-LP – Mann-Whitney U Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) (for the comparing of Latvians and Poles).*

Preservation of the ethnic minorities' language and culture is understood by all groups of respondents as a task which requires active involvement of a great number of various factors. They are mass media and educational institutions in the ethnic minorities' languages, their non-government organizations, as well as activity of businesses, political parties, religious and ethnic communities, a person himself and the state's interest. As can be seen from Tables No.2-6, the overwhelming majority of Latvians, Russians and Poles consider themselves the most important factors when speaking about maintaining the ethnic groups' language and culture. The greatest hopes are connected with mass media and educational institutions in the ethnic groups' languages (84.8% and 86.5% of all respondents), as well as with each person's individual activity (84.4%). The least significant

role in this process is attributed to the activity of businesses and political parties (56.9% and 56.7%).

Interpretation of these data might be the following. Preservation of the ethnic groups' language and culture in a modern society is impossible outside the system of modern education financially backed by the state, and, on the whole, without the interest of the state itself in maintaining ethnic variety of a civil society. The most significant role is attributed to mass media in the ethnic groups' languages which daily supports the multi-cultural information environment and acts as the most important means of implementation of the citizens' ethnic identity in the public sphere of the society. It is crucial that the respondents reckon that the mother tongue and cultural maintenance is also a matter of a person's own individual stand. This fact denotes the high actualization of liberal values as a factor for the ethnic identity maintenance among Daugavpils inhabitants.

However, such institutions of a civil society and market economy as political parties and businesses have not yet acquired a proper authority in public consciousness as those forces which are able to solve efficiently important social and cultural issues of the society in Latvia. Latvian scientists have repeatedly pointed out the low authority of political parties in the society, which is, first of all, connected with their strong dependence on entrepreneurial structures, which, in its turn, leads to the fact that political parties mainly realize private but not national interests. Besides that, the citizens of Latvia do not have well-developed skills of political participation, social solidarity, etc. As a result, political parties in Latvia are numerically small political organizations. According to the researchers, the present structure of Latvian political parties does not stimulate the process of political participation among the citizens of Latvia.

Preserving the mother tongue and culture is a significant task for representatives of all ethnic groups in Latgale, Latvians as well as the ethnic minorities. It should be pointed out that the share of respondents from ethnic minorities (Russians and Poles) turned out to be larger than the share of respondents of Latvian nationality who connected most significance in preserving a language and culture with such factors as mass media and educational institutions in the ethnic groups' languages, their public institutions, activities of religious and ethnic communities and a person's individual activities, and the state's interest. Apparently, these data witness that the ethnic minorities' representatives as compared to Latvians, are experiencing a bigger threat to preservation of their mother tongue and culture.

The importance of studying a language identity of Latgale people along with their ethnic and national identities is understood, first of all, by the

scientists in Latgale. It was demonstrated, for example, in a comprehensive research of 2006-2009 'Study of the Ethno-linguistic Situation in Latgale in the Period 2006-2009'. The authors of this research reckon that an adequate study on the ethnic variety in Latgale and Latvia in general, is possible only if the inhabitants' national identity is examined including the ethnic groups' identities, 'The peculiarity of Latvia as well as Latgale is in the fact that there is a national identity along with the Latvian ethnicity, besides that, this national identity in Latvia consists of two parts – a tie between the Latvian identity with the state and a presence of people of other nationalities. Every ethnos living in Latvia is original and unique'. It is important that the research methodology is not based on the concept about a normative subordination of languages and linguistic identities in Latgale. For example, the findings of the present research in Daugavpils have showed that the share of those who want to improve their skills in speaking, reading and writing in Latvian comprises 33.2%, in Russian – 31.5%, in Latgalian – 28.8%. The share of the respondents who believe that it is not possible to have a normal life in Daugavpils without knowing the Latvian language comprises 57.3%, the Russian language – 78.5%, the Latgalian language – 20.8%. The share of the respondents who find it important to use the Latvian language in administrative institutions comprises 55.3%, but the Latvian and Russian languages – 41.9%.

### Conclusion.

A modern public, social and scientific discourse in Latvia usually considers the relationships between the ethnic groups, the Latvians and ethnic minorities on the basis of normative ideas about the need for integration of the Latvian society. And the present sociological research contains a lot of evidence that the Daugavpils citizens of various ethnic backgrounds are able to relate the preservation of their own ethnic identity to the recognition of cultural peculiarity of other ethnic groups, as well as the value of ethnic diversity of the public environment of social life. A deep penetration of multi-cultural ideas into the consciousness and public practices of the Daugavpils citizens lowers the interest to the issue of integration of society. The data obtained in the run of the research demonstrate the possibility to reconcile the liberal conception of society integration in Latvia with the recognition of the value of a collective identity of ethnic minorities.

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**Denis Hanov**

## WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH THE OTHER?
## ETHNIC DIVERSITY OF INTEGRATION POLICY IN LATVIA

There has been varying political, institutional and financial support for integration policy in Latvia since the late 1990-s. While there was rapid development before and shortly after Latvia's accession to the European Union in 2004, the issue was pushed off the political agenda after the reorganization of the Secretariat of the special assignments minister for social integration (IUMSILS). The only social integration policy document adopted up to the present is the state program "Social integration in Latvia." The continuation of this program, "The Integration of Society in Latvia: A Framework Document," was debated and reformulated over a number of years in the light of shifting political realities and expert opinions.

This paper will analyze the Framework by presenting the phenomenon of the ethnic Other as an element of discourse in Latvian integration policy, which the author believes is the central and most problematic aspect of the Framework Document. Social integration in Latvia follows a vertical model, with participation in and responsibility for this process unevenly distributed between the ethnic majority and minorities. The inclusion of the Other proceeds by reproducing the collective traumas of Latvia's history in the 20th century, with the Other primarily designated for inclusion in the Latvian linguistic environment without the enhancement of this integration formula with civil society instruments. The author asserts that in the Framework Document the Latvian language is put forward as both an integration channel and as the dominating message of integration.

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**Key words:** the Other in integration policy, "guidelines", the Latvian language, political nation.

## INTRODUCTION. THE OTHER AND PARTICIPATING IN THE SOCIAL LIFE OF LATVIA NOWADAYS

The integration policy of Latvia can celebrate its first serious anniversary in 2011, as ten years ago, after being ratified by the government; the national program called "Society Integration in Latvia" came into force. Since 1999 when the program was being worked out, many political parties, the government of Latvia as well as all kinds of social organizations, mass media and foreign institutions with different levels of influence have taken part in creating the society integration policy. The integration policy experts have admitted that these have been the European Union as well as other international institutions to influence the political elite of Latvia in the second half of 1990-s. Their goal was to start the integration policy which was explained by the nationally-conservative politicians of Latvia as a precondition for receiving help from the West (Rozenvalds 2010, p. 49).

Maija Kule, philosopher, professor from Latvia University, in her article "Philosophy of a Dialogue; the Way to Solitaire Society in Europe and in Latvia" (2008) already in 2008 analyzed critically Latvian society integration policy. It was the time when society integration was still one of priorities in Latvian politics. She stated that, "The main philosophical positions of the dialogue were not adequately implemented." Criticizing the political environment as the politicization of ethnic relations and describing several side effects of such politicization, such as the decline in interest amongst minorities to be part of the Latvian cultural environment, the philosopher calls for the expansion of the traditional "we" in Latvian culture with a new, inclusive concept (Kule 2008, p. 23.). Two years later, at the end of 2010 the new Minister of Culture Sarmite Elerte (political block "Vienotiba" (Unity)) publicly formulated her position on identity enhancement processes as "the open XXI century" (Elerte). This was the basis for the new policy of the Ministry of Culture. In February 2011 the Consultative Council was established with the aim of developing a new concept for social integration policy in Latvia. The introduction to the integration policy document published in March 2011 includes the concept of the *state nation*, which "determines the national and cultural-historical identity of the state".[1]

There has been increasing state policy interest in integration processes in 2011 after two years of "decline" in this area. Marked changes to the institutional structure of integration policy were brought about in December

2008, indicating a lessening in importance for integration policy on the political agenda. On December 30, 2008 IUMSILS was reorganized. Since the beginning of 2009, integration policy at the state administration level has been the responsibility of several institutions: the Ministry of Children's and Family Affairs, then following its liquidation in 2009 the Ministry of Justice, which encompassed the Social Integration Department until the end of 2010 until its restructuring and transfer to the Ministry of Culture in early 2011, marking a new stage in social integration policy. From the end of 2005 to the beginning of 2011, the main priority for integration policy was the development of "The Integration of Society in Latvia: A Framework Document", which was intended to follow on from and supersede the "Social integration in Latvia"[2] program developed in 2000, which researcher M. Ustinova from Russia described as the homogenization of society on the basis of Latvian culture and language, simultaneously exaggerating the significance of this program in fostering multiculturism in Latvia. (Ustinova 2009, p.138)

Researcher Timofey Agarin has commented regarding the "Social integration in Latvia" program that up to now the integration process has proceeded as a requirement to become part of the Latvian community formulated and offered by the majority group (Agarin 2009, p. 220). Viewing integration policy planning from the aspect of power sharing by the majority and participation by minorities, Agarin sees a lack of balance between the dominant group and its strategies to include the ethnically Other (Agarin, ibidem). The Minister of Culture's current integration vision anticipates the retention of the hierarchical integration process, the elements of which are the state nation and Others, minorities, immigrants[3]. The task of the state nation is not only to determine the content of Latvia's culture, but also the content of "social memory". Current integration policy could continue the primary aspect of inclusion policy detected by Agarin – the dominance of the ethnic majority in forming the common space. It should be noted that only fragments of the new policy document are available for public analysis.

Nils Muiznieks, a researcher residing in Latvia and former Integration Minister, concluded in the collection of articles *"How integrated is Latvian society?"* that in 2010 Latvia's state policy had abandoned the integration field without reaching political consensus on the new Framework Document, while also noting that the overall integration picture is highly contradictory, with both marginalization and integration tendencies visible in various areas (Muiznieks 2010, p. 282.).

In my opinion, the current version of the Framework meets the re-

quirements of the integration process in 2010, provides a range of operational definitions for important phenomena in the integration process, and marks an important turn toward the inclusion of a multi-ethnic environment and civil values in the dominant ethnic integration concept. In this formulation the text was doomed to failure in political discourse due to the contradictory integration concept and the clear politicization of minority rights development.[4] I would agree with Nils Muiznieks's thesis that a lack of political consensus plays an important role in the slow development of integration policy (Muiznieks 2010, p. 283).

Overall, the discursive "gridlock" of the framework, which concluded at the end of 2010 with a change in the competence of the ministries and the transfer of the integration agenda to the Ministry of Culture, may serve as an illustration of the changeability, instability and shifting level of priority of the social integration concept in Latvia and of the dependency of state administrative practice on short-term political decisions and fluctuations in "political will." The aforementioned defects in integration policy form the analytical context of this paper. In the paper I will present a hypothesis regarding a number of shortcomings in the view of ethnic diversity within the discourse of ethnic integration in Latvia. The most significant barrier is the politically dominant discourse about the threat to the Latvian collective identity. In this context, ethnic diversity is viewed as a risk to the cohesion of society on the basis of ethnic homogeneity. The next sections of this paper will present various interpretations of ethnic diversity in the context of integration policy: 1) a theoretical overview of inclusion of the ethnic Other in Western European academic tradition 2) an analysis of ethnic diversity inclusiveness in "The Integration of Society in Latvia: A Framework Document" (the text of the Framework was released for public discussion at the end of 2010).

## 1. AN OVERVIEW OF THEORETICAL CONCEPTS OF THE INCLUSION OF THE *OTHER*

Approved by the Cabinet on December 7, 1999, the Concept "The Integration of Society in Latvia" was created as an open ended state policy document in the integration sphere. The following situation in society in Latvia was defined as the objective of integration policy:

*The **objective** of integration is to create a democratic, cohesive civil society based on common core values. One of these core values is Latvia as an independent, democratic state.*[6]

The legal and institutional basis of Latvia's integration policy was signif-

icantly intensified by the approval of the state program "The Integration of Society in Latvia" in place of the Concept in 2001, the establishment of the Fund for the Integration of Society in Latvia on September 1, 2001, and the establishment of IUMSILS in December 2002. Significant legislative progress was made on May 31, 2005, when Parliament ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of February 1, 1995.

Apart from the aforementioned expansion of the range of laws and policy planning instruments, in the first decade of the new century integration policy in Latvia suffered from a lack of stable political will capable of creating consensus in principle on the essence, model and development scenarios for a cohesive society in Latvia and ensuring the sustainability of integration policy. One of the most important challenges for integration policy was and continues to be the conceptual question of *participation in Latvia's public space* by ethnic minorities and the connection of this participation with the development of the concept of the Latvian ethnic nation. Analysis of this question is a significant issue covered in this paper, and it is closely tied to the phenomenon of the Other in the European cultural space and attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of integration policy in society in Latvia.

The quality of minority participation is one of the indicators of the effectiveness of integration policy defined by Nils Muiznieks and Ilona Kunda (Muiznieks 2010, p. 285). The willingness of minorities to participate is an indicator of the particular ethnic minority's level of self-organization, (although, one can see from the history of Europe that feelings of historic discrimination are characteristic of minorities and it influences their general character as well as attitude towards this group within the majority cultural space). The non-inclusion of the Other in European history has an influence on contemporary integration policies in European states, creating the modern and historical base for the complicated inclusion articulated in the political space which forms the collective memory, action and context for participation in political power, determines the language used in media and political discourse, supplies historical parallels and structures the context of political participation by minorities.

From this it can be concluded that the creation of a political consensus on the existence of the Other in national states will succeed if a view is developed in the political culture of the specific national state that minority groups have special needs rooted in historical experience not only for preserving the ethno-cultural uniqueness of the group, but also for the equal inclusion of these groups in the country's dominant political culture. This is especially the case in societies where, in contract to Habermas's consti-

tutional model, the culture of the ethnic majority is more or less conflated with the general, universal, publically dominant culture (Neumann 2004, p. 36).

Based on several works by Jurgen Habermas on inclusiveness policy in contemporary liberal Western European democracies, this paper employs the concept of the "Other" as a keyword in analyzing integration policy. Analyzing the possibilities for including the Other in contemporary European society, Habermas cites symbolic state policy, including the state constitution, as an instrument of inclusiveness that allows the Other to remain as such without reducing its participatory space (Habermas 2001, p. 374). Habermas sees the ability to create an "abstract form of social integration" rather than inclusion based solely on membership of an ethnic group to be a positive achievement of the contemporary nation state. However, he also considers participation in the political space based on cultural community nationalism to have been a historic "necessity" which stimulated broader civic participation and belonging (Habermas 2001, p. 370). It would therefore be overly simplistic to interpret the philosopher's attitude toward the ethnic majority in the public space as entirely negative. The destructive experience of ethnic nationalism in the 20th century is a very broad empirical base used by Habermas to illustrate his warnings about the risks of domination by ethnic culture, which I will mention later.

Observing trends over recent decades in ethnic policy in national states, it must be concluded that Habermas's idea of the ability of constitutional values and the legal framework to include a broader group of society has proven empirically unsuccessful. Criticism is also leveled at Habermas's constitutional integration in the political discourse of nationalism. Researcher George Schöpflin opposes Habermas, asserting that a constitution is also the projection of the political interests of the ethnic majority of a state and can therefore not be ethnically neutral, irrespective of whether so-called "constitutional patriotism" appears to be "civil" (Schöpflin 2010, p. 122).

France, the apparent "model" in this area, experienced conflicts in the urban areas of Paris in 2005, which in the opinion of Etienne Balibar were caused by deep, longstanding racism and the exclusion of immigrant youth that was invisible under an effectively popularized national identity, political nation and other elements of French political culture (Balibar 2008, p. 284).

This particular scenario was produced by a long-term policy of simulated consensus, in which ethnic minorities with the "status" of immigrants and the descendants of people from the colonies represent the Other in the

entire socialization space – the labor market, education quality and participation in media and political discourse. The most recent studies in Latvia present a panoramic review of integration policy in the 1990's and 2000's and also catalogue the many mistakes made by political parties across the spectrum and the media and through the influence of foreign policy, rehashing stereotypes of minorities as either the Other or as collective victims. Sociologist A. Tabuns found that one of the positive results of integration of the Other is the opportunity for each ethnic group to preserve and develop its own ethnic identity (Tabuns 2010, p. 278). However, it must be concluded that such opportunities afforded by Latvia's ethno-political development have yet to give significant support to participation in politics by minorities.

In the works of Habermas, which form the theoretical basis for this paper, the Other is not an abstract philosophical category. Habermas's concept of the Other embraces many different meanings and designations, such as ethnic minorities, subcultures and religious groups.

All of these groups are part of Habermas's model of society in which the best model of inclusiveness is neither the culture and interests of the ethnic majority nor the diverse priorities of minorities and subcultures, but rather a political culture based on a broad constitutional framework which allows for a balance between the needs and rights of the majority and minority groups (Habermas 2002, p. 215).

One of the "extreme models" of social cohesion and inclusiveness which in the philosopher's opinion may upset the balance is *the conflation of the majority's interests with the political culture* in which all of the inhabitants of the country participate. In such a case, Habermas believes there is a risk that the majority culture may be elevated to the parameters of self-perception or self-identification. In other words, the elevation of the interests of the majority to "the national level" increases the risk of making the self-understanding and self-reflection of the Other dependent on the majority's view of the content, form and course of this process (Habermas 2002, p. 255).

Another German philosopher, Niklas Luhmann, wrote in the chapter "Differentiation" (Differenzierung) in his work "The Society of Society" (Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft) that differentiation (or the process of separation) based on the multifaceted inclusion or exclusion of groups may affect the legal situation of the groups, and before a concrete situation is reached the dominant group decides on the "scope" of status arising directly from the logic of the inclusion/exclusion processes (Luhmann 1996, p. 24, 40). In the light of Luhmann's interpretation, the quality of participation in the political life of the state may be associated with the scope of participation "granted" through the legitimation of the political elite and mass opinion of the majority.

In contrast to Habermas, who supports state political culture as an inclusive mechanism, Luhmann criticizes modern state institutional inclusion mechanisms due to their limited effectiveness in relation to phenomena such as long-term social, economic or political exclusion (Luhmann, p. 41).

The mechanisms of exclusion may take on many forms, and in line with J. Habermas's thesis their risk may increase if the majority culture gains the status of the instrument creating social reality.

According to Homi Bhabha, the forms of minority self-isolation, which may also be demonstrated perfomatively and therefore also in cultural and political activities, may lead to social differences (Bhabha 2010, p. 4). Viewing the connections between the theses of Bhabha and Luhmann on the exclusion process, social integration policy can be interpreted as *the content of political discourse which in its broadest form spreads a message to society about the essence and preconditions of belonging and the participants in this process.*

Taking into account the aforementioned views on functional systems of belonging and exclusion postulated by contemporary analysts of nation state political culture, the author has formulated a view on the effectiveness criteria for social integration policy arising from the fact that J. Habermas's thesis on a broader concept of inclusiveness in the state political community or political nation most closely correlates with the idea of general participation by the citizens of the state in its functioning:

*Effective integration policy is policy which, through the participation of the broadest possible spectrum of political participants/actors, provides individuals and communities with opportunities to affirm in the public space their equal participation in political power while preserving and affirming in this space a range of self-selected membership of other groups and their cultures.*

This definition reveals an attempt to combine various layers of "belonging". Their diversity is seen as being equal. It does not stipulate mutual exclusion or hierarchical ranking. On the contrary, the author believes that in place of hierarchy there should emerge a new, pluralistic, horizontal structure allowing minority groups to achieve full participation in a national politics where they have received a symbolic sign of belonging, such as *citizenship.*

What should be the concept of inclusiveness for society in Latvia? Up to now, the dominant integration discourse has been the inclusion of the Other in the ethnic majority's cultural space, which consists of the majority's collective memory, cultural heritage and a range of other aspects forming membership of the community. At the same time this concept of inclusion is an immanent challenge to the integration process itself, because in defining the subject of inclusion as an Other, the subject of inclusion is granted differentiating characteristics which in the concrete political discourse may become grounds for differing degrees of recognition and participation. As Ludmila Jordanova has written, "otherness serves as a constant reminder of differences" (Jordanova 2000, p. 245).

## 2. THE PROBLEM OF THE INCLUSION OF THE *OTHER* IN INTEGRATION POLICY IN LATVIA

The interpretation by Latvia's political elite of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which resulted in the adoption in 2005 of a disclaimer, is a good illustration of how the nation state paradigm still directly affects ethnic policy despite several centuries of work by transnational European institutions in various spheres of ethnic security and equality. Equal rights for minorities in policy development in the nation state's public space is taking place in the form of economic, political or cultural participation, which traditionally and in spite of the influence of globalization is an expression of political consensus in the concrete country.

Based on J. Habermas concept, the current integration policy of Latvian society is blameworthy, since it foresees making all society a part of the cultural framework, thus planning to expand it to the representative cultural status of all Latvian society. Instrumental range of such concept is very wide and these instruments themselves are dominant, but with a limited effectiveness.

At the end of the 20th century, nation began to dominate Latvian political discourse, with an objective to start the recovery process of political sovereignty of the ethnic majority. Simultaneously with the renovation process of sovereign power within the framework of an ethnic nation, the nation to be restored had to deal with quantitative, discursive, foreign policy and historical problems, as well as, in different other dimensions, hardly acceptable and forced upon them problems connected with the Other. Considering consolidation of collective culture one of the objectives of a national state, Seyla Benhabib believes that, this and several other national state's

objectives nowadays are subjects to significant changes (Benhabib, p. 179). Besides the effect globalization processes have on concepts of the classical state's sovereignty, the author raises the question about intra-national social unity as well – "what is meant by "we"?" (Benhabib 2002, p. 180).

Change of belonging criteria in modern national state is one of the changing elements mentioned by Benhabib. In the case of Latvia, the current content of integration policy is concentrated around spreading of the Latvian ethnic culture towards inclusion of the state and society into Latvian cultural space, consequently inclusion of the official power and numerous social fragments.

The defined integration policy, one of the key elements of which is the Latvian language and culture, is so far dominant and is the only integration scenario that is existent in public space. Following the German ethnoresearcher's Jörn Rüsen's definition of ethnocentrism, one can agree that since the end of 1980-s, ethnic identity has gained new strength and has become one of the main instruments for community self-legitimacy (Rüsen 1998, p.15). According to Rüsen's definition, ethnocentrism is a "cultural practice" by which the world and self-identity is explained and which tries to create a social collective, based on objective and natural criteria. Dominating the political discourse about society's unity in Latvia – the model of ethnocentric integration, is being supported using a number of state policy instruments, but it is open to criticism by various political analysts – already mentioned article by Maija Kule is not the only criticism it has experienced.

While critically analyzing implementation of the Social integration program, researcher Elmar Weber not only placed a notion "(non)implementation" in the subheading, but also came to the conclusion in the final chapter that:

*"... there is a reason to affirm that implementation of the Program was not launched at all, because an enforcement mechanism according to the guidelines was not established .... Hesitation, uncertainty, uncertain behavior has proven to be provocative; it clears the way for resistance"* (Veber 2007, p. 127).

E. Weber's criticism contains undefined resistance phenomenon, from which the perception of latent has resulted; extensive tension carriers and objectives are not articulated. It is indisputable that thesis of the resistance is a "complex" concept, as it foresees tension between the ones who are to be integrated and the ones who are initiators of integration. As verified by the Latvian political calendar of historical event's celebrations, ethnocentrism may become apparent as a historical interpretation, in which

the resistance to a particular policy can be shown by celebrating certain days or ignoring them. Following Barbara Misztal statement – that is how the mass memory develops, which would be defined as a form of political practice, whose spectrum may range from a radical contrast with a content of dominant memory to a significantly supportive interpretation (Misztal 2003, p. 64, 66). In the classical work about collapse of modernism paradigm "Modernity and Ambivalence" Zygmunt Bauman has underlined the proactive nature of the social integration, focused not on the Other's tolerance, but on the active solidarity of various groups – introducing the concept of "common fate" and contrasting "participating" past of the different groups, which requires solidarity. Based on the Rorty concept of the language political discourse, Bauman has comprehended that this solidarity is generated when the language supporting alienation, discrimination and humiliation disappears from the political discourse (Bauman 2005, p. 371-372). In this context, in future it will be necessary to analyze the integration policy document, which is currently being prepared.

Several Latvian analysts of integration processes believe that direct inclusion of minority impacts the quality of this group's life (Apine, Volkov 2007, p. 213), while others have established that integration policy defines "responsibilities" of a minority towards the Latvian nation and integration processes, but it does not notify ethnic majority about anything at all (Zepa, Supule, Krastina 2006, p. 23).

Perception of the so-called Other, mostly ethnical Other, in the political discourse is an essential issue, since integration policy in Latvian public space is directed to including the ethnical Other into Latvian cultural space, which, in its turn, is defined as inclusive for the whole ethnic group; still ethnical instead of political culture space. Since priority of Latvian integration policy until now has not been establishment of a political nation, but expansion of the dominant ethnic nation's inclusion-ability with the purpose of propagating Latvian ethnic culture throughout society's public space; so the Other has been the most important object, purpose and audience of such policy. Overall, the Other of contemporary Europe becomes an increasingly visible challenge of political consensus and legality culture. As noted by J. Habermas in his essay "Post-national Situation and the Future of Democracy", besides the growing intolerance, the present-day Europe, including Western European countries, has a tendency also of an increasing "desolidarization", which is provoked by "the question of redistribution" (Habermas 2002, p. 111); apparently understanding that redistribution is related also to the power and participation resources. In his turn, Z. Bauman participated in the conference "Integration and Disinte-

gration: 20 Years After Liquidation of the USSR" on March 24, 2011 and in his opening presentation he noted the ineffectiveness of assimilation policy in the age of myriad diasporas.[7]

As noted by philosopher and politician Sami Nair, if we analyze the ethnic policy of contemporary European countries, we can see an increasingly intense and fast extinction of cultures, identities, group movements and borders, so assimilation trends in the politics of European countries continue to intensify (Nair 2010, p. 17). Listing the reasons, for which even such a traditionally multicultural country as Holland has developed the policy of assimilation, Nair concludes that the most complicated test for European societies is habits and religious values, which also include normative values. Consequently, such cultural elements, which instead of national rules may regulate how and whether the Other will follow or not follow the laws and regulations, established in the country, where the Other is settled.

However, state policy on effective participation of minority groups, based on recognition of ethnic diversity and followed by the logic of Nair, is an opportunity to create a content and space in globalization processes, with a design to strengthen the role of "drowning" national state.

The concept of the Other itself and its "allocation" process and content is a background on which (if we follow Luhmann thesis) differentiation has occurred previously – a certain individual or a group is declared to be the Other. That is to say, importance is attached, the roles/functions are assigned in connection with other things; usually it is the status of a minority community, rights and political influence.

Until now, the article has created a panorama of the theoretical concept on the inclusion and participation of the ethnic Other which will let us come up with analysis of a more urgent document on the state integration policy – analysis of the "Social Integration Guidelines" in the context of minority participation.[8]

### 3. IS THIS A PARTICIPATION "GUIDELINE"? CRITICAL COMMENTS ON THE POLICY OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION.

This section has two analyzable documents: a concise document "Framework of the Social Integration Policy", elaborated by the Ministry of Justice in 2010 and a more extensive document on the state policy "The Basic Policy of Social Integration", which consists of a detailed case-study and action plan.

Introduction of the "framework" briefly outlines the situation on the integration level, realizing that integration processes in Latvia became topi-

cal in the mid 1990-s; as an example, we can mention amendments to the Constitution of Latvia that strengthened the legal framework of minorities wishing to maintain their own identity and culture.[9] The main objective of integration policy is formulated on the fourth page of the document, following the list of social integration's institutional framework:

The main objective of society integration policy is a united society for a balanced development of democratic, national state of Latvia through the establishment of an environment, where respectful attitude, cooperation and the principle of equality exist. When implementing the social integration policy – constitutional basis and long-term development goals of democratic national state of Latvia should be respected.[10]

We should pay attention to the fact that the main objective is concentrated around the country; it is not concentrated on the improvement of society conditions. Integration of the society is interpreted as interaction of the elements of nationals' communication and systemic functioning, which is intended to be optimized with the help of the mentioned guidelines. The term "cooperation" is often used in connection with the concept "environment", so it provides additional information about what kind of environment could be optimal – to my mind, respective cooperation is the keyword for interpretation of the mentioned document. Vocabulary of life quality is regularly found, both, in the framework of the text, and the "Guidelines". Positive environment is perceived as a contributing factor to achieving the long-term national goals; besides subordinating individual actions to the national development. Such integration "statism" also continues in an attempt to provide a description of the nature of integration policy – an argument about respect, understanding, etc. between the social majority and minority is maintained and reiterated:

According to this document, social integration is a bilateral process, which is directed towards mutual understanding and cooperation between the majority    and minority – an inalienable part of society.[11]

It is clear that such formulation is reproducing until now dominant concept of Latvian society as a hierarchical unit, which consists of two groups – majority and minority group. Hereto, by default majority and minority groups have a primary ethnical feature, which, in the content of "Guidelines", expresses itself as a dominant of the ethnical integration and is based on Latvian cultural and linguistic space. Also in this context, the term "cooperation" illustrates the existence of two discourse groups, between which hierarchical relations must occur, which are improved by a series of integration "tools" – respect, equality, the constitutional framework. It is important to note, how exactly the constitutional framework (J.

Habermas interpreted it as a tool for the development of new, broader public policy's "framework") is treated within the framework of the guidelines as an existing quantitative hierarchical communication-building tool. Further, it becomes clear that such vertical direction of society integration is an opportunity to include the minority within the cultural space of majority; it also stimulated the nomination of integration policy's target groups:

*The main target groups of social integration policy are ethnic minorities or minorities, inter alia Roma – people exposed to intolerant attitude and discrimination, because of their race or ethnic origin, religion or belief or sexual orientation; as well as immigrants and public on the whole.*[12]

Latvia as a shared space for different ethnic groups is less productive concept directly in the dimension of society integration. That is because the space, as a framework of ethnos coexistence in the context of Latvian historical and topical policy, means the process of ethnic hierarchy, identity reproduction and collective contradictory, probably conflicting memory. Past factor, which continues to "supply" Latvian culture's danger discourse with regular historical references, develops a dominant barrier for content's resumption of public discourse and, wherewithal, forms an application of alternative impulses within integration policy as well.

Latvian ethno-policy is centered on interpreting the past. National-scale integration policy is based on the treatment of the 20th century history of Latvia, which develops, thus influencing the content of academic debates and moving academic debates to the service process of political agenda. Time, history, interpretation of past events and their symbolic actualization in mass meetings, mass media and in popular history and fiction genres – forms symbolic boundaries between different communities in Latvia and stimulates alienation, which is hardened and based on temporal conflict, instead of stimulating dialogic understanding of common past. Thus, parallel time and existence of parallel past forms progresses – Latvian celebration calendar is a good illustration of the fact that over the past 20 years there have been established and are functioning two parallel pasts, which have been reproduced by those, who do not see their place and their own narrative in the newly legitimated past. According to Jan Assmann's concept, such social groups, which are rationally excluded from the public remembrance process, remember what is related to their actual needs. This argument can apply to both, procession participants (SS Legion war veterans) on March16, and celebratory participants or so-called "The Great Patriotic War" veterans on May 9, whose remembrance dates are not legitimized, because of the conflicting collective memory discourse, or their legitimacy has a discursive resistance, mistrust towards remembrance

content. According to Aleida Aaamann's concept, collective remembrance processes also occur with a purposeful remembrance and forgetting policy (Assmann 1999, p. 15-16).

Listing of the "Guideline's" target groups is an illustration, which gives a perception about "topography" of integration policy by using a spatial turn's conclusion that political space is a concept of this space, created by public group – interpretation by Edward Soja. When following this interpretation, it is important to note that Soja analyzed the concept of "spatial justice" in recent years and highlighted that space, as a product of political communication, can be changed (Soja 2009, p. 254, 255). In comparison with dynamics of the time, place is not only more static, but it also acknowledges greater resources during the development process of identities and possessive forms. Already in the end of the 20th century and in the beginning of the 21st century representatives of Western Europe, mostly representing continental cultural studies, observed the fast emergence of the space turn in the development processes of European collective identities and in their analytical framework; it concerned both, humanities and social sciences (Soja 2009, p. 152; Döring, Thielmann 2008, p.7-48).

According to cultural studies dominant in German scientific world and its conclusions are included in this article – space is comprehended as a framework of individual and collective conception about significance of the surrounding reality, which expresses itself in a spatial dimension – consequently, in itemization, constructive environment of various symbolic actions. Doris Bachmann-Medick defined the space as a perceptual category and a theoretical concept, which remained in the shadow of time and social processes for a long time. Currently, space has become the topical category in social studies. Thus, we can see that interpretation of space is an interpretation of subjects' activity inside this space and in this text, spatial turn should be understood in the context of political process's analysis, because the perception of space means understanding of tools which regulate the availability of the space for the Other – within the borders of public space.

In other words, to quote Jörg Döring and Tristan Thielmann, space is being analyzed by cultural studies, only when that or something in it is converted into a text – semiotic elements (Döring, Thielmann 2008, p.16). It is exactly in this approach that the framework of "Guidelines" reestablishes the space, where minority is intended to integrate into Latvian cultural space; in its turn, Latvian nation is to ensure sustainability of ethno-linguistics and culture of this space in time, when an ethnical Other is included in it:

*The success of Latvian society's integration process, based on an official language depends not only on people, whose native language is not Latvian*

*and who do not have skills, necessity and motivation to use it, but also on the involvement of majority in the creation process of appropriate environment for the usage of Latvian language.*[13]

The official language is interpreted as political basis and the majority has a task to open up to minority group's desire to acquire and use the Latvian language. Latvian community does not have other tasks, except mutual tolerance and intercultural dialogue, which is not being discussed in detail – there are no formulated tasks for the whole society, including ethnic majority, to learn competence of cultural diversity. In the framework of the text, Latvian language is rather perceived as yet another mechanism for separating social groups – language skills (native and learned) and linguistic status of the person and group becomes a symbolic demarcation line between the communities. Thus, it includes Latvian population into gradation of linguistic skills and making the integration policy dependent on knowledge of the language and individual level of skills. In my opinion, including language skills into the indicator spectrum of integration process (except for politicized parliamentary discourse on language skills for elected politicians), establishes proficiency groups, thus, escalating the role of knowledge in possessive criteria and emphasizing the importance of symbolic community ownership on the level of collective identity and political process.

It should be noted that in both documents of political planning, two important questions were missing – what will happen to the Latvian concept and Latvian cultural space and what transformations are scheduled for includible groups, namely – minorities? In author's judgment, there is no answer to this question neither in framework, nor in "Guidelines".

At the same time, framework is fundamental for the possibility to supplement integration discourse with the concept of *a political nation*. Within the framework of the current integration policy, the idea of political nation is marginal, but the concept "Latvian nation" is mentioned exactly in the frame, which has been transferred from the text of the Constitution and is understood as a citizens' group. In the context of Latvia, considering the slow naturalization tempo, potentiality of political nation is greatly bothered by the lasting politicization of citizenship concept and phenomenon in the context of already mentioned history and past. According to Svetlana Rizakova, a Russian ethnographer, it allows to describe the Latvian society as a society of future history, where actual reality changes rapidly over to the history, within the framework of myth-epical traditions (Rizakova 2010, p. 476, 477). The same researcher optimistically believes that the discourse on Latvian identity may eventually develop into the discourse on identity of

"Latvians" or Latvian people, political nation (Rizakova 2010, p. 496).

The text of the "Guidelines" contains detailed analysis of the intercultural dialogue, national identity-fortification, anti-discrimination and tolerance promotion, as well as immigrant integration.

In section 1.1.1 of the text "Intercultural Dialogue Space and Intercultural Competencies", authors have proved by numerous accomplished sociological studies that different ethnic groups can have rather harmonic mutual communication and possibilities to develop their own identity.[14] Among positive trends, we can give examples of minority participation in the work of agencies (associations) of interests, organizing various inter-ethnic public events, holidays and other activities. Another positive factor, mentioned in the description of the situation, is area. Namely, it is non-existence of a compact populated area for this minority and that is defined as a "geographical isolation" in the text, wherewithal equating compact ethnical topos to the factors that do not facilitate the integration processes; it is realizable through the pretext of the so-called Convention on Protection of National Minorities.[15]

Despite the accomplished voluminous case study using the SWOT analysis elements, the "Guidelines" contain attempts to define concepts of a political nation and include them into the frame of integration policy. In section 1.2 of the document "Strengthening of the National Identity", it is understood as "one of the most significant action directions of social integration policy".[16] In this section, we can ascertain conceptual inaccuracy, because alongside with the ethnic majority and minorities, the term "nation" and "national identity" is introduced without an explanation.[17]

The concept of nation is not defined precisely, but contextually this term could mean such a group of Latvian inhabitants, which, on the one hand are ethnically, religiously, in terms of race and in other dimensions pluralistic and heterogeneous; but, on the other hand, turn into an equal citizen's community directly during their identification process with the Latvian state. Culture-political dominance of an ethnic majority cannot be found in this text, thus, the hierarchical aspects of integration processes and the dominance of ethnic culture space – clearly demonstrable in the framework text of the "Guidelines", are not topical. In the second "Guidelines" section of this essential article, 1.2.2 "Promotion of Public Involvement", the number of minority NGOs and the legal framework is approved as well developed, simultaneously ascertaining the presence of the so-called "Latvian" and "minority" NGOs.[18] Overall, "Guidelines" provide an analysis of the situation and offer an action plan to improve the situation, but, at the same time, they reproduce the dominant characteristics of the current integration process – unclear participation of ethnic majority in the proceedings, the minimum "tasks" that should be completed by representatives of the Latvian nation. In the fourth section of "Basic Political Principles of Social Integration", social integration is defined as a two-way principle, however, there is no description of majority "obligations" in the principle of the "mutual acceptance process".[19]

Similarly, minority language's maintenance policy is not clearly explained. Overall, the base for the integration policy is not formulation of political nation and its development in different political fields as mentioned in the Constitution, but it is the State Language Law, which does not regulate integration policy. As far as the author knows, the State Language Law provides for the legal framework of the language, its status, usage and other aspects of the language policy. In return, the first objective in the sixth section – "Political Results and Resulting Indicators for Consummation" of the "Guidelines" reads as follows, "in accordance with the State Language Law – to facilitate the social integration by using the state language and by increasing the role of the Latvian language in the development process of intercultural dialogue". In its turn, political result is re-defined as follows, "the level of the state language skills has increased among those Latvian citizens, for whom the Latvian language is not native".[20]

From this objective, which is defined as number one, it can be concluded that strengthening of the Latvian language position among minorities is perceived as an essential precondition and factor during the integration process. Thus, the linguistic competence is promoted as a guide to the integration process. Inter-cultural dialogue concept and citizenship aspect are subordinated to this purpose – it means, such aspects, which are not directly related to the information acquirable in the Latvian language or communication in that language. In the context of the Latvian language skills characterizing participants of the integration process, it can be affirmed that the endangerment discourse concerning the Latvian language, as a task for a stable domestic policy and cultural agenda, dominates the current interpretation of integration policy. It also provides an impulse for the next framework of integration policy, as well as illustrates the player of political process – discursive priority of the ethnic political elite – maximum dissemination of the Latvian language in the public space of Latvia. Undeniable progress can be seen in the above-analyzed documents related to political correctness – implementing the concept of a political nation, as well as phenomena of tolerance and inter-cultural dialogue in the documents of state administration. Application of the mentioned concept in the analyzed documents is rather like a poster – without analysis of the prob-

lems and would rather be treated as a stylish expression of the document within the framework of political correctness.

In its turn, dominance of the Latvian language within the spectrum of integration instruments turns linguistic integration into inclusion into the space of the Latvian language skills, neglecting the fact that a language is a channel of integrative notification and not the goal. In this way, the former policy is being repeated by making a logical mistake – creating a pars pro toto situation, when a language/channel (the Latvian language) of the integration message, replaces the message itself. In the author's opinion, an effective integration message should be wider than the cultural space of an ethnic majority, at the same time offering both, an opportunity to become a part of the Latvian cultural environment and including the Latvian ethnic cultural environment itself into the citizenship discourse of common public development.

## REFERENCES AND COMMENTS

1	The Council's first meeting was held on February 24, 2011. Leaders from minority schools, academics, historians and anthropologists sit on the council. The author of the paper is a member of the council. Information about the first meeting: http://www.km.gov.lv/lv/jaunumi/?news_id=1777

2	http://www.delfi.lv/news/comment/comment/kulturas-ministrija-nacionala-identitate-un-sabiedribas-integracija-problemas-un-merki-ievads.d?id=37543977 (viewed 23.03. 2011.)

3	The text of the Framework is available on the Ministry of Justice website: http://www.tm.gov.lv/lv/noderigi/sabiedribas_integracija/TMPam_200810_sit_rakst.pdf (viewed 12.03. 2011.)

4	See reference 2.

5	The author formulated their evaluation for the Framework text: http://www.politika.lv/temas/sabiedribas_integracija/Neiespejama_integracija/ (viewed 10.12. 2010.)

6	Text quoted from: http://www.politika.lv/temas/sabiedribas_integracija/4104/ (viewed 16. 10. 2010.)

7	According to Z. Baumanis's conspect of the introductory report which was read by the author on March 24, 2011 in Berlin, during the conference "Integration und Desintegration. Ordnungsmodelle in Europa 20 Jahre nach Auflösung der Sowjetunion" March 24 – 25.

8	The author is aware that currently the Ministry of Culture is working at a new concept, but its degree of readiness is still minimal to be able to talk about this new concept.

9	Framework	text:	http://www.tm.gov.lv/lv/noderigi/sabiedribas_integracija/TMPam_ietvars_030810.pdf – p. 3

10	Same place – p. 4

11	Same place

12	Same place

13	Framework	text:	http://www.tm.gov.lv/lv/noderigi/sabiedribas_integracija/TMPam_ietvars_030810.pdf – p. 6

14	Guidelines text: http://www.tm.gov.lv/lv/noderigi/sabiedribas_integracija/TMPam_200810_sit_rakst.pdf – p. 5

15	Same place – p. 6

16	Same place – p. 14

17	Same place

18	Same place – p. 21

19	Same place – p. 37

20	Same place – p. 39

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## DOES MULTICULTURALISM APPEASE NON-DOMINANT GROUPS?

Most of the EU-member states recognise that they govern multi-cultural societies and in doing so, they also recognise ethnic pluralism on their territories, and to a degree support sustainable relations between the dominant and non-dominant groups on their territories. However, the policies on ethnic pluralism and diversity tend to be void if they do not recognise the equality of groups affected. This is why, it is essential to discuss *how* and *for what reason* political theory had been claiming the importance of recognising ethnic diversity, producing scholarship broadly known under the catchy label of multiculturalism. While discussing some of the aspects of 'practical multiculturalism', the paper addresses whether policies aimed at recognition of diversity stand to what is at the core of liberal democracy, namely the autonomy of decision-making and equal treatment. In the first section of the paper the author discusses how the relations between political institutions and the societies they govern is envisaged in multiculturalist debates. The second section of the paper addresses the place of agency in the relations between state institutions and the diverse communities they affect. And finally, the author looks into the process of agenda-setting from the vantage point of multiculturalism.

**Key words:** democratisation, post-socialist publics, identities, multicultural diversity, multiculturalism, of non-dominant groups, recognition of diversity, political institutions.

During the 'Third Wave' democratisation, many observers of the global

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swing toward pluralist political regimes suggested the triumph of democracy over other forms of government. At the same time, many others continued to be sceptical, especially of the post-communist publics' aptness to embrace democratic virtues in full. This reservation is particularly important for societies undergoing state-building following the painstaking experience of socialism and, in part, traumatised by repression of ethnic distinctness. Comparative analyses of public attitudes towards political performance and political institutions in place continue to suggest that, today more than ever, the greatest portion of the post-communist publics are increasingly sceptical of democratic nature of political processes. In part the scepticism of post-socialist publics is explained by limited account of ethnonational claims in political structures of the democratising states.

Indeed there is an agreement that the outcome of transition from socialism should end in some kind of democratic political regime, accountable to the people it governs and by no means oppressive of their identities. At the same time, much less attention was granted to the way former socialist societies framed different identities, ethnic among others. The lack of public debate on the mechanisms of institutional accountability to agency claims during the transition from socialism has been made responsible for limiting the successful accommodation of complex sets of identities across the CEE region. In particular, the members of post-communist publics who found themselves to be in the position of losers from democratic transition have sought connect their social and political grievances to their 'inborn' identities, such as cultural, linguistic or ethnic. On the other side, the members of publics who emerged as winners of the post-communist transition have continuously claimed that (ethno-) political regimes installed were democratic and accommodating of diversity.

This is not a mean feat in societies with a long history of interethnic tension, communal animosities and experience of structural disadvantages based upon ethnonational agendas. For this reason, I suggest to look at the way how present-day CEE polities deal with their culturally diverse, multilingual and multiethnic societies they govern from a theoretical perspective. Although across Europe, East and West, state level politics are envisaged as decision on national issues, all governments make considerable steps towards securing the multicultural diversity in their countries. In the process, multiculturalism has emerged as a quasi universal solution to guaranteeing equal representation of diverse interests put forward by ethnic communities residing at the territory of nation-state.

Most of the EU-member states recognise that they govern multicultural societies and in doing so, they also recognise ethnic pluralism on their territories, and to a degree support sustainable relations between the dominant and non-dominant groups on their territories. However, the policies on ethnic pluralism and diversity tend to be void if they do not recognise the equality of groups affected. This is why, I believe, it is essential to discuss *how* and *for what reason* political theory had been claiming the importance of recognising ethnic diversity, producing scholarship broadly known under the catchy label of multiculturalism. Cultural policies – and multicultural policies as explicit political approach devised to regulate cultural diversity are but a part of them – tend to develop mechanisms of preferential treatment of one culture over others, because policies targeting expressions of culture in themselves prefer certain concepts of culture over others (Festenstein 2005). While members of some cultural communities can push for specific cultural rights, because they are numerous enough to use the civil liberties to their group's advantage, other communities find themselves disadvantaged as a result of the cultural bias of state policies. It is from this perspective that the implementation of equality is jeopardised. Differentiated treatment of groups whether by means of cultural policies, group differentiated rights or in demonstrating cultural sensitivity, harms rather than facilitates intercultural dialogue (Safran 1994; Inglis 1996). This is because cultural policies necessarily prioritise certain aspects of culture over others, encouraging disproportionate emphasis on some cultural markers and, crucially, contesting assumptions about the hybridity of cultures (Dirlik 1999). For example, granting preferential status to one group's language on the territory it considers its own advances the concept of language becoming a cornerstone of that group's cultural identity and dominance, and conterminously marks the hierarchical relationship between different language communities.

The debate on multiculturalism has grown broader over the past decade, while some off-stream theories of multiculturalism have also added depth to our understanding of why cultural diversity should not be taken for granted. While discussing some of the aspects of 'practical multiculturalism', I address whether policies aimed at recognition of diversity stand to what is at the core of liberal democracy, namely the autonomy of decision-making and equal treatment. In the first section of my paper I discuss how the relations between political institutions and the societies they govern is envisaged in multiculturalist debates. The second section of my paper addresses the place of agency in the relations between state institutions and the diverse communities they affect. And finally, I look into the process of

agenda-setting from the vantage point of multiculturalism. By drawing on the agency/structure tension in multiculturalism debates, I argue that there is little space for what is generally held to be pluralistic about multiculturalism.

Emerging from the background of liberal democratic understanding of interpersonal, as well as individual's relations with political institutions, multiculturalism presumes the dominance of one group in the public sphere and assigns all other groups auxiliary functions. In doing so, multiculturalism underlines the importance of diversity only in so far as it affirms the leading role of dominant group and recognises ethnic pluralism in order to perpetuate the relations of dominance between the majority and minority communities. Needless to say, there is little to no space left in the public arena for non-dominant groups' identities that can not be instrumentalised by the dominant groups to reaffirm dominant group's superiority. The focus on the CEE states and societies allows me to show when multiculturalism went awry.

## 1 Multiculturalist Institution Building: An Oxymoron?

Democratisation of the CEE states has been welcomed by those members of society, who perceived previous regimes to provide little accountability to social dynamics and to guarantee limited opportunities for state/society dialogue. Indeed, increasing political and social pluralism allowed diverse interests within societies to be expressed. Numerous cultural groups saw their claims accommodated, while political institutions updated embedded understandings of equal individual participation. More to the point, providing structural options for accommodating diverse claims allowed the elaboration of novel forms of intercultural communication, which democratising political structures saw as being conducive to societal integration.

Following emancipation from the socialist regimes all the CEE countries sought to plug into the global discourse of equality in diversity and gradually came to address the democratic deficit in their relation with non-dominant groups, residing on their territories. Under the pressure of European organisations all of the CEE states implemented liberal policies that could be seen as a starting point in democratisation of political processes, allowing for diversity of opinions to be expressed in public unprecedented for decades earlier. Although some overoptimistic observers have celebrated political shifts in the CEE as a proverbial return to the 'West', befitting the logic of the civilisational 'clash', it appears that while some structural changes were made, many procedural issues remained much the same, utterly undemocratic (Huntington 1991, 2002).

No doubt, some of the liberal democratic principles were established across the region, but the policy-making is hardly guided by the principles ensuring democratic equality of all individuals affected. Particularly, individual rights of the members of minority groups were particularly badly reconciled with cultural bias of post-communist political institutions designed primarily, if not exclusively to serve the members of the majority ethnic group. This fact is increasingly leading political theorists to doubt whether liberal connotations of personal identity are not inherently at odds with group-focused policies, pursued by the states thus far while recognising ethnic pluralism (Habermas 2001, 2003). Liberal approach to recognition, most argue, presumes and guarantees individual autonomy in agenda setting and presumes an agenda-driven relation between members of society, however ethnically diverse, and political institutions. Individual freedom of choice to join any group thus seems to be undermined by the very notion of primordially defined individual membership in ethnic community. Furthermore, by recognising ethnic pluralism of their societies, polities followed the previous tradition of essentializing groups and hampering individual choice to opt out and not be treated as group member.

As had been assessed in various studies of the CEE societies, both democratisation and accommodation of multicultural diversity appeared to be no different from early-day conformism to dominant culture. which many observers interpret as being an inherent goal of the current rise of citizenship and language policies by the CEE states. Even Will Kymlicka – the vocal proponent of multicultural solutions to social and cultural diversity – has recently pointed that multiculturalism is unlikely successes in practice (Kymlicka 2002, 2007; Kymlicka, Opalski 2001). In this, the liberal democratic approach to multiculturalism appears to bear an inherent contradiction in terms: It is unclear whether accommodation essentializes identities, and to what extent recognition of differences between the communities (cultural among others) governed by state structures is at odds with the social cohesion these very structures exercise upon social groups. Some of the states, Kymlicka observes in his studies over the years, have recalled the policies of accommodating diversity at the expense of more stringent social cohesion, such as most of his Western European case studies. In other societies, mainly located in the CEE, Kymlicka observes the discourse on societal communities comprising diverse citizens, reshaping the politically accepted notions of diversity acceptable for the members of dominant communities, but failing to tap into the dominant understanding of multiculturalism. Ultimately, a range of political theorists have concluded that some tensions within multicultural policies is irreversible and makes coherent multiculturalist policy making impossible (Benhabib et al. 2006; Fraser, Honneth 2003).

Various public policy approaches were devised to the management of cultural diversity in CEE societies, among which multiculturalism stands out for its immanent popularity. Multiculturalism came to put additional stress on respect and tolerance for differences among ethnic and linguistic groups through emphasis on the uniqueness of cultures. However, while originally multiculturalism was devised to emphasise differences between the dominant and non-dominant groups, across the CEE it is used to legitimise the existing status quo between the titular and other communities. It seems that across the CEE, the institutional framing of state/minority relations in terms of multiculturalism constitutes an integral part of a far-from-complete state-building process. My own previous research on the attitudes of the Baltic minorities does not find any evidence of these groups' inherent opposition to the emergent unitary state structures (Agarin 2006, 2007).

Most contributors to multiculturalism debate in the CEE argue that the state communities would have been much better off, if they treated non-dominant groups as partners rather than unreliable migrants during the process of state-building (Delgado-Moreira 2000; Kuzio 2005; Lauristin, Heidmets 2002; Parekh 2000; Silova 2006; Soutphommasane 2005). This seems to make particularly urgent call for accommodation of cultural differences as state institutions across the region are in dire need of consolidating their approach to nation-cum-state building. The fact that the majority of voters throughout the region refrains from questioning the institutional design of the new state structures should not overshadow the concerns of non-dominant groups, who are usually excluded from the deliberations on the design of political institutions. Doubtlessly, this leaves little leeway to renegotiate state/society relations writ large, and majority/minority relations in particular and calls into question the very nature of democratic decision making in the region.

Whatever the outcome, the policies aim at state-cum-nation building and at first create only the provisions for the development of multicultural societies. In this situation, plenty of room is left for improving the relations between the majorities and minorities across the CEE region. Multiculturalism takes on to guarantee equality in the relations between the dominant and non-dominant groups, but also to find a way out of the groups' concern for the future existence of their cultures. In this sense, multiculturalism can do nothing more than to essentialize group features, which is probably the worst solution for *de facto* multicultural societies, because it identifies, if any, only the mainstream cultural groups as a legitimate representative of all potentially different in- and out-groups.

In culturally diverse societies, the political relevance of group membership and the existence of groups have an objective and a subjective side to them (Romney, Weller, Batchelder 1986). However, primarily, groups are based on external recognition expressed in the right to self-determination, group differentiated rights in general or support for maintaining cultural identity – only because policies recognise certain groups, their members can claim support for what they hold to be central for and defining their 'culture'. Policies grant and secure the individual's right as part of a larger group-differentiated right for culture; recognition from other group members matters little for individual opportunities to maintain cultural difference. In turn this means that states calling for culturally differentiated policies are limited by the embedded interpretations of whether and to what extent cultures (groups) per se and to a lesser degree cultural contents can be recognised in a politically relevant sense.

In theory multiculturalism can avoid the trap of groupism, however in practice policies need to identify collectivities about to profit from affirmative action, positive discrimination or the like and inevitably essentialize differences. In doing so, multiculturalist policies tend to undermine both the individual agency able to determine their own identity on the one hand, as well as social structures that predispose individuals and not the groups as the agenda-setters. Individual capacity to make choices and in so doing establish societal structures guiding other agents in their choices, are the core issues for debates on outcomes of multiculturalist social processes. On this assumption, policies not only presume that individuals as members of cultural communities are bearers of particular attributes, but also uphold cultural diversity, promote cultural contents on the assumption that these are relevant for the members of cultural communities, thereby establishing the existence of groups and expecting individual identification with them based on the terms determined by the policies. And therefore, policymaking in multiculturalist states serves primarily – even if not exclusively – the perpetuation of differences between cultures.

In what follows I demonstrate that the focus on the agency allows one to determine how deeply multiculturalism relies on the notion of individual liberty. In the following section I make clear that the analyses of institution-building across the CEE had rightfully drawn attention to the shortcomings in implementing democratic principles during state-cum-nation building. What they did not however, was to point out that the difficulties of accommodating minority communities in this region are in no way different from attempts of accommodation elsewhere in the EU. The situation, as I argue, results largely from the lack of agreement among the political elites, how

state institutions should be designed to perform best, and how the members of society should interact with these institutions, and who should be seen as a primary beneficiary of state institutions.

## 2 TWO FACES OF MULTICULTURALISM: COMMUNITARIAN VERSUS PLURALIST

Multiculturalism has many faces and many more conceptual formulations. Two currents can be distilled out of the large array of approaches, with "communitarian multiculturalism" dominating the scene and "pluralist multiculturalism" sidelining with debates on the design of democratic processes (Rawls 1993; Taylor 1992, 2003). The communitarian version of multiculturalism, naturally, distinguishes the groups as objects of rights, estimates the policies' effectiveness with respect to cultural communities and treats them as homogeneous. The pluralist version on the other hand sees groups to be the bearers of specific rights and obligations, but underlines that each group is different and requires special consideration. In doing so, pluralist multiculturalism defends non-dominant cultural groups and suggests different forms of political representation of group interests, such as self-government, cultural autonomy, or the like (Benhabib et al. 2006; Kymlicka 1995, 2007).

Both versions of multiculturalism however, fail to address the bias in policies, naturally resulting from the guiding principle of liberal democracies, namely that the majority rules. The dominant group is therefore always empowered more than all other minority groups affected by the decision, and as such has a greater impact on policy-making and sees other groups as contenders of power-resources already allocated to the dominant group. Decisively, because multiculturalism does not address individuals, but the groups as bearers of distinct rights and freedoms, it can only marginally contribute to debates on interpersonal interaction and thus intergroup negotiations. Whatever is at stake in debates on multiculturalism, groups – however defined – hardly engage in any interaction measures. Instead, – and this is consistent with the premise of liberal democracy, – groups claims are expressed as nothing more than a sum of individual interests, favouring more resourceful members of groups over the ones with less resources. The paradox of the outcome is the following: it is the individual of the non-dominant group who is affected by incentives and policies agreed upon by the more resourceful members. However, she has limited space in determining both the direction and the pace of multicultural interactions, because these are already predetermined by the members of the dominant

group. Hence, by looking at non-dominant groups and not at individual members of these groups, multiculturalism flaws its very basic assumption: individual freedom to choose among the options available.

Individual differences and cultural particularity are central to all liberal thinking, no matter how communitarian it is. What communitarian multiculturalism underlines however is that individual differences play an insignificant role in the public space and therefore can be easily suspended in order to ensure best institutional performance, ideal outcomes for social cohesion and, ultimately, to guarantee a single moral bottom line for social interactions. In his *Theory of Justice,* John Rawls conveys the idea of principles of justice that are fair and non-discriminatory, as long as individuals are treated as inherently equal and unaware of their position in society (Rawls 1971). The bottom-line of equality, in the Rawlsean sense is embedded in the principle of individual liberty to make use of the resources available to all members of society, even when ending up in a position of disadvantage for oneself. Thus, due to a fair selection, in the public sphere individuals are perceived as equals from an onset, with political structures treating them equally regardless of their group-specific particularities and differences.

However, communitarian multiculturalism fails to address the crucial question: where do the groups come from, as a prerequisite for dismantling the claims of majority groups that their dominance is natural and inborn. Failing to discern the question of group origins, communitarian multiculturalists cannot effectively deconstruct the relations between the individuals and groups, groups and identities these require, and ultimately between political groups (such as nations) and institutions framing these (e.g. state institutions, border, citizenships). For example, Charles Taylor argues that members of the dominant group are inescapably privileged in the process of nation-building, as it is their culture and their language that shape state institutions and are empowered by the established political institutions. With no society being entirely homogenous, the communitarian multiculturalism thus advocates for focus to be put on the equality between cultural communities and not solely the equality of individuals. It urges for cultural sensitivity when dealing with issues of equality of persons, opportunities and equality before the law, as any other approach would imply assimilationist treatment of non-dominant groups by state institutions (Parekh 2000).

In this sense, recognizing differences between the cultural communities is a prerequisite of the different groups' participation in the same political processes on equal terms. Constitutional accommodation of cultural di-

versity, following Parekh, would allow guarantee of fundamental rights for minorities and therefore ensure the minorities' claims for equality. Cultural rights would allow non-dominant communities to develop an increasing sense of security and hence also facilitate integration into the wider society (Parekh 1999, 449-453). However, when he advocates incorporation of cultural rights into the list of human rights to be protected, the notion of equality between the cultures becomes highly problematic, protecting cultural right in the same manner as individual /human rights. Although potentially a useful tool for guaranteeing the rights of non-dominant groups vis-à-vis the state, communitarian, or group-rights' multiculturalism is designed to promote different cultures within a framework where one culture is already accepted as dominant. As such, communitarian multiculturalism is addressing the inherent cultural bias of political institutions, without aiming at redressing it, or even providing for equalities in access of non-dominant cultures to already established institutions.

The communitarian logic can additionally be reinterpreted in such a way, that the rights of non-dominant *groups* are put before the rights of *individual*s from the dominant group. Naturally, in a twist of a logic, one could also argue that potentially disadvantaged in the face of competition with the numerous non-dominant groups, the state-bearing community are prior to the rights of all other groups and needs greater protection then all other groups. However, precisely this is what multiculturalism is trying to avoid, it seeks to recognise the equality of all groups, dominant or not, and place them on the equal footing and hence secure their positions for the future.

This is not an easy dilemma to crack: how can be individual rights balanced by rights that are owned by collectivities? How can one establish a principle of equality between various collectivities already so different in their access to structural resources? Maybe pluralist multiculturalism provides a way out of the impasse?

Indeed, communitarian multiculturalists are frequently accused of favouring the collectivities as transmitters of human rights to individuals. Should this agenda be pursued, liberal multiculturalists argue, the result will be the restriction of individual freedom to choose a community, beliefs or practices independently and will bind individuals to their inborn identities making constructs primordial. On the other hand, putting individual freedoms in a disadvantaged position over the group rights, communitarian liberalism are said to avoid the recognition of differences available at the subgroup level. Thus, in order to attain an equal status the members of different groups would thus need to strive for recognition of equality

of groups at the expense of intragroup differences. In doing so, communitarian multiculturalism is bound to treat groups as homogeneous entities, lacking contingency within their boundaries.

According to the pluralist models of multiculturalism on the other side, one would need to emphasise rights of the individual members of groups, actively undermine discrimination of the members of non-dominant communities, and aspire to modify (political, social etc) institutions in order to make them more accommodating to cultural differences. At the same time, while the communitarian models of multiculturalism advocate separation between the cultural communities in the public sphere in order to allow for culture-blindness of the political institutions, pluralist multiculturalism seek another way. With the policies implemented seen by the pluralism multiculturalist as being likely outcomes of interest convergence (even if not of integration) between the dominant and non-dominant communities, pluralists treat ethnocultural communities as coexisting in separate social spaces. Where respective cultures dominate and have little opportunity for interaction and recognition of differences as being constituent to individual identities, providing for the basic interactions of individuals and guiding groups negotiations. This is impossible for pluralist multiculturalists because there are no salient groups to be observed, what we see are individuals with divergent and situatively defined interests.

Whichever interpretation of social reality we pick to understand processes under way in the multicultural societies, it seems that it policies that need to remedy the inequalities first. However, the policies being guided by the ideologies of equality were unable to develop a coherent set of policies to take the increasingly multicultural character of today's societies into account. What both attempts of multicultural solutions advocate is the increase in the individual/group participation in the common public processes, while at the same time reducing social interaction between the members of different cultural groups to a minimum in the private. Will Kymlicka is particularly vocal in this respect: 'Integration into common institutions operating in a common language should still leave maximal room for the expression of individual and collective differences, both in public and private, and public institutions should be adapted to accommodate the identity and practices of ethnocultural minorities. Put another way, the conception of national identity, and national integration, should be a pluralist and tolerant one' (Kymlicka 2001: 48).

As we observe across the democratising states of the CEE the culture of the dominant groups takes prevalence in the public sphere, basic differences between the cultural communities and support of the bottom-line equality for all individuals are predicated upon the cooptation of non-dominant groups into political projects of the dominant groups and those determining the way political institutions work. Across the CEE region, state institutions provide only a limited set of prerequisites to guarantee cultural pluralism in the public in so far as they are designed to serve primarily the interests of titular groups.

Most of the states in the CEE (with the exception of those experiencing ethnic strife during the transition from the socialism) are defined and acknowledged to be ethnonational states. In such ethnically divided societies, even if in private there is a degree of cooperation among individuals of different ethnocultural communities, in public and especially in the political sphere acknowledged differences between the individuals will be unlikely to lead to the revision of the institutional design and opening up of the public space for diverging, even if not challenging opinions. In other words, cultural pluralism does not stand a chance of producing a more democratic public space within political institutions designed to favour the members of one ethnic group over all other citizens (Anderson 2001; Brubaker, Laitin 1998; Jubulis 2001; May 2001; Mihas 1997; Tishkov 1997; Tismaneanu 1998).

Whether the right balance will be found between the state policies of social cohesion on the one hand, and the contestation of political processes by non-dominant groups largely depends on the effective implementation of guarantees of liberal democratic principles. Differences in starting point for redistribution of potential for democratic participation across much of the democratising states needs to take into account the difference in the nature of the liberal rights vis-à-vis rights in non-liberal regimes. Reinterpretation of what individual rights entail, and actively demoting the common perceptions that individuals have rights only in so far as the groups to which they belong bestow these very same rights, is central for implementation of even the minimal principles of multiculturalist governance.

In many cases the members of non-dominant groups lack formal rights to participate in political decision making, in other cases, social and economic constraints disallow the minorities' equal engagement. Always however, the dilemma of democratisation brings similar challenges to all members of society: Whether Russian-speakers in Estonia or Latvia, Poles in Lithuania or Ukraine, Hungarians in Slovakia or Romania – all these cases represent the so-called 'imperial minorities' whose 'worse off' status today is implicitly linked to their 'better off' in the earlier days. In many cases, the guarantee of these groups' equality with the dominant communities (de facto state-baring nations) would be in contradiction of the current state-

cum-nation building logic extended by the dominant groups. This brings the question of power relations and power redistribution to fore: how states manage their multicultural societies is dependent on the already dominant groups preparedness to cede some of its privileges to other groups.

## 3 MULTICULTURALISM ON INDIVIDUAL CHOICE AND AGEN-DA SETTING

In the light of the tension within the multiculturalist debate itself, both communitarian and pluralist multiculturalisms tend to avoid the internal disagreement on the signposted policy objective: accommodation of interests of diverse societies, multicultural policies affect. Arguably, multiculturalism cannot deliver adequate policy propositions to diversity regulation because it fails to account for potential domino effect that results from providing recognition of non-dominant groups (Fraser 2006; Phillips, Benhabib 1997; Young 1997). As a result thereof, the internal debate in multiculturalism produced a finer distinction of the interface between the cultural diversity and policy-making on the issues. Specifically, the focus on the migrants and illegal residents, differential treatment of the new and old minorities caused multiculturalist debate to reconsider the foundations of the liberal claims of democratic principles. Claims for recognition of the special status of the atomised minority groups, such as homosexuals, religious communities, individuals with disabilities and sectarian social groups brought the legitimacy of claims to the centre of multiculturalism debate.

Whose claims are legitimate, and whose are just mimicking the dominant narratives to arrive at their own piece of the pie? Is it legitimate to distinguish between the objects of legislation, resident aliens, and foreigners, who potentially have similar rights and obligations but are excluded from active participation in the decision making process, affecting the local, dominant, original society? Today – and this appears to be an accepted notion in debates on multiculturalism – there is no non-discriminatory way to distinguish between any groups without explicit reference to the vaguely defined notions of group identity and individual reflexivity on the group dynamics. Ultimately, since 'identity' has lost prominence in the multiculturalist debate, individual autonomy and capacity for independent decision making has been increasingly important for the foundational liberal democratic notion of personal liberty.

The two lessons to learn from the internal debate on multiculturalism provide for a point of departure here. Firstly, individual autonomy for decision making is to be taken seriously, while secondly, the intention of agency

should be addressed from the perspective of agency equality. These two notions, discussed above find themselves in constant tension over potential implications for decision making affective collectivities, political institutions regulating diverse societal communities, and for the individuals constantly updating their subjective positions in the relational field of others' identities.

Equality between the individuals of different cultural backgrounds can hardly be guaranteed as long as it is the group that is in focus of non-discrimination and equality protections. This makes individual autonomy central for implementing real equality in practice. In this sense, individual choice of identity undermines the consistency of the group, infringes on group-centred rights and freedoms, and limits the scope of group protection by political structures, such as states or international organisations. This is what we see in cases, where society integration is claimed to be successful, as witnessed across the EU during the 1990s. If the numbers of minority individuals proficient in the state language, acquainted with the dominant cultural practices and ultimately engaging in political participation are on the rise, states tend to withdraw attention from non-dominant communities and support individual initiatives on the basis of personality principle (Hagendoorn, Veenman, Vollebergh 2003, Kastoryano, Harshav 2002; Grillo, Pratt 2002; Delgado-Moreira 2000).

At the same time, individual freedom to choose loyalties, cultural and linguistic among others, opens way for an interpersonal dialogue, limits opportunities for group-exclusion and makes groupist/culturalist discrimination more difficult. Along the lines advocated by communitarian multiculturalists, differential treatment of groups would undermine exclusion based on group membership, as in cases of intergroup competition on the same political stage, for example in territorially defined ethnic enclaves South Tyrol – Alto Adige, Western Finland, Catalunia and the Baleric Islands. The guarantee of individual choice of identity – as is proposed by the multicultural pluralists – on the basis of which the person could opt for an 'ethnicised' treatment by state institutions, would extend the options for greater *formal* equality between individuals affected, but can do so only in addition to groupist approach to individual choices. This principle is at work in the cases of state interaction with their endogenous, non-dominant residents, such as Sámi in Nordic states and First Nations in Canada. In all cases however, when the members of the non-dominant community prefer not to present themselves as the members of group different from the dominant community, they are likely to gain greater acceptance with the dominant publics, as both schools of multiculturalism agree.

However, the models fail because it is always that the members of the non-dominant groups are in focus. Unlike the members of the dominant community, the members of non-dominant groups are presumed to possess features that distinguish them from mainstream (dominant) society. In so doing, the inherent difference of non-dominant groups is thought to provide clear criteria for non-dominant groups' claims for special protection, but these claims can only operate on the basis of institutionally driven groupism.

The way out, as appears to be, is to address what is at stake for *all* members of the political community, irrespective of their minority or majority status. Retarding perceptions of group identity as a centre-piece of institutions governing societies, underlying sovereignty, legitimising access to political membership and panning out the basis for political participation would be an option. Multiculturalists claim that groups identities need to be emptied of cultural content to provide for the minimal group-blind interaction capacities. Ideally, the space for interpersonal interactions will be determined by the culture-unspecific social accords, functional enough to bind both members and non-members of the societal community, and thus decouple interactions from any constructed categories, seen as primordial. Among these 'primordialised identities' (Anderson 1991), multiculturalisms suggest national, ethnic and linguistic identities would be the first to loose salience in the situations where other identities, such as professions, skills, place of residence are more important.

Needless to say, non-dominant group would also have it easier to grasp the perceptions of equality in individual choice, if their minoritised identity would not be perceived as a potential reason for discrimination (Phillips 2003; Phillips, Dustin 2004). Thus defined, membership in any primordial community would positively inform the members of collectivities about their individual options for personalised choice. Preference formation on the basis of individual, and not unquestionable group identities, multiculturalisms say, can effectively create a base for a consolidated multicultural society. Side-stepping ethnocultural understanding of nationhood and unquestionable linguistic loyalties would automatically allow individual choice in favour of the civic or constitutional community identity over cohesive ties of ethnic or linguistic kinship.

This would question how we think of successful or failed communication across the cultural boundaries. Institutions ensuring intercultural communication are usually attested success by far and large because they do not impose any obligations on the dominant community to participate in the process. As a result, the members of the non-dominant group have to

comply with the idea that the state, political institutions and political processes can be ran by the majority group with little consultation on the agenda of the non-dominants. Hence, collective identities seem to be increasingly perceived as markers of groups' distinctness, legitimise the structural rigidity of the institutions serving the group's interests and identity. While on the side of the non-dominant group this logic is more often than not interpreted in terms of unwillingness to cooperate with the existing institutions of the dominant society, the members of the dominant group can be fully exempt from taking any note of non-dominant groups' specific expectations and demands.

The group-bias of multiculturalism leads most of the theories to suggest that the collectivities are necessary base-line for equality of non-dominant and dominant groups. However, because dominant and non-dominant groups have unequal access to structural resources, preferences and beliefs to be negotiated in the public sphere, the group-based take of multiculturalism does not do alleviate the existing inequalities. What multiculturalist approaches to integration do, is promote self-interested identification of all individuals with the dominant group in order to gain access to resources already available in greater numbers to that group. Especially, where non-dominant communities struggle to access to scarce (and, at times, highly contested) resources, central positions and benefits controlled by the dominant group, shifting group affiliation seems to be the quickest way upward. Despite the differences in minority members' motivation to integrate into dominant society as minor partners of dominant communities, the process is only a one-way adaptation of non-dominant groups to the structural constraints imposed by the dominant one. The process taking place requires only non-dominant groups to adapt to the rules, set out by a dominant community; the dominant group however does not need to adapt any new patterns of behaviour.

This points to yet another difficulty of reconciling multiculturalist rhetoric with the socio-political realities of the day. Opposed to a commonly held view, multiculturalism does not emerge as a result of intellectual construction, neither is it an attempt to address potential conflict of multiethnic societies. Instead it holds foot in the problems of the real world politics and is driven by growing awareness of inequality between different segments of society. Increasing heterogeneity of political communities across the globe links various questions of concern for multiculturalism debate: from international relations between the states to intergroup relations within state borders, from choices individuals of non-dominant groups to states' approaches to integrating their citizenry. The above makes clear that

if multiculturalism is to maintain its liberal commitment, it has to abandon the presumptions on the fixed nature of cultural communities. Instead it would be best advised to incorporate views that the cultural contents are subject to interpretation and thus the boundaries of cultural communities are constantly negotiated in interactions between the group members.

Ultimately, this is where liberal conceptions of cultures and culturally specific contents of individual choice are at odds with the social realities they seek to regulate: individuals are increasingly reluctant to make judgements based on their own embeddedness in a fixed cultural context, while policies posit such choices as necessary. Disregarding these differences between the groups at cost of pushing for societal and political homogeneity would be light-headed at best, counterproductive at worst. In this light, social integration is a mean and an end in the multiculturalism debate. Offering solutions to agents on the ground, the makers of policy-framework and monitoring international community debates on social integration are always about the real-world society and on the limits of political and social theories. At all times however understanding what is the base-line for integration and what is the drive behind the respective policies is central to estimation of the envisaged outcomes.

## 4 IS MULTICULTURALISM RELEVANT FOR THE CEE SOCIETIES?

Discussing the agenda of multiculturalism one should be attentive to its main fraud: It is attentive to cultural projects of those groups already in the key position and in doing so multiculturalism is unable to challenge the existing division of resources, subjective positioning or intergroup power-relations. This is a particularly salient issue in societies undergoing the consolidation of their political institutions, or finding themselves in the process of nation- and state-building. This is where the problems lie with the CEE multiculturalisms.

The treatment of cultural communities by multiculturalists decisively subordinates individual choices to culturally determined action patterns and assumes cultural luggage to be important background for intercultural communication. At the same time, any judgement on cultural patterns is dismissed as being immoral and discriminatory, bluntly discouraging any negotiation on the differences and similarities between the members of different cultures. This puts off the evaluation of similarities between the cultures not only on impediments for collaboration, but also on the possible ways of mutual enrichment. Issues such as the value of human life, ethics

and perceptions of individual freedoms all need to disappear from multicultural discourse. What you see, is what you get: Institutions assume that cultures are fully homogeneous within, and the subjects belonging to cultural community mutually share not only the language and values, but also interests and resources. However, with no multiculturalisms being built on the social ground zero, all versions of multicultural institutions accommodate dominant perceptions of politics, society and culture. The vicious circle is often thus reinforced by political institutions and social structures designed and driven by majorities' concern for preservation of existing *status quo*. Clearly, institutional determinism is embodied in the approaches to minority integration in the CEE states; however, married with multiculturalist rhetoric it is also embedding a biased cultural determinism into social relations.

The Western European societies seek to integrate the members of minority who either moved into these states following the demise of the imperial structures, or arrived in search of better economic and political opportunities. Opposed to them, most of the CEE societies face the challenge of devising policies to integrate minorities who previously were the majorities in former colonial states, or have found themselves on the wrong side of the border drawn as a result of international conflicts. These non-dominant groups did not come to accept the dominance of the state-baring nations as pack and package of rights inherent to liberal democracy, as happened to the minorities in the Western Europe. The CEE minorities were mostly marginalised in the process of decision making, which undoubtedly was democratic for the dominant groups in the region, but in no way sought to reflect the opinions of non-dominant communities on their status, contribution or terms of inclusion into a new policy. Across the CEE the members of minority groups had little say as to in which state they would like to live and as to how their state of residence should relate to them. This particular aspect of debating multicultural policies emphasises the inherent results of reducing individual preference formation to group action-patterns, cultural or otherwise.

The trouble with multiculturalism across the CEE is not that groups do not interact with each other to a degree necessary to declare the success of multiculturalism in any one country. Rather, the affected communities see multiculturalist solutions to their conflicts over resources as a way of interaction among each other, as if they were homogeneous, self-sustained and largely independent units within nation-state borders. There is no debate on the fact that multiculturalism is reality across the CEE states and societies. However, policies of social cohesion focus on collectivities with hard

boundaries: group rights depend on freedoms of their individual members, where affirmative action and special consideration standards are highly desired criteria for re-allocation and distribution of resources made available. By far and large, CEE multiculturalisms affirm group rights, but do so by essentialising cultures and homogenizing them for policy purposes; it thus neglecting differences within and similarities between cultures.

On the one hand, political institutions across the CEE are said to be too stiff to be able to address the real grievances of the non-dominant members of any of the affected societies. The fact that the state is perceived to be a bulwark of national identity is not always unproblematic, as is reflected in the Western European debate on integration. The examples of the CEE countries suggest that the understanding of whose interests the state institutions should serve and how differences – cultural, ethnic, linguistic being only the tip of the iceberg – should be addressed is highly problematic. The statehood became deeply ethnicised in the process of political competition, perpetuating inequalities between the majority and the minority communities by making the state home to only one, ethnocultural community. In most cases, the political elites in the CEE states have anticipated the minorities' discontent with their disadvantaged position, but still have established regulations favouring the titular groups over those of non-dominant communities. National legislation and programmes fostering social integration to fulfil the criteria required/set by the international institutions focus on minorities, but do so half heartedly and more often then not, redistribute the funds available to the members of majority working with minorities, rather then channelling these directly into the non-dominant communities. By means of example, neither the approaches to Roma across the CEE, nor to Magyars in Slovakia or Romania, nor to Russian speakers in the Baltic States sought to increase multicultural accountability of the state institutions to these groups. Instead, they provided minority groups a margin option to cooperate within the existing (majority dominated) institutions toward accommodation of their interests.

On the other hand, there is a limited edge for action of non-dominant groups in the public sphere across the CEE. Common identities are reinforced and created by recurring expression of allegiance and mass attachment on the side of majority, prompting minority groups to engage in the same processes defining their group borders. Framed and reframed in the national political rhetoric, common parlance and self-understanding, these ethnic/cultural/linguistic identities are sticky and provide a set of clear action patterns expected from individuals as the members of one specific group. If anything, political institutions playing the role of "service station"

further undermine the options for equal access of various cultural groups, even from among the well-resourced and connected citizenry. Much more, institutions framed as guarantors of majorities' cultural identity and dominant groups' tools reversing previous discrimination undermine the very idea of culturally diverse society. Independently of the limitation imposed on the non-dominant groups, the cultural favouritism of political institutions across the CEE, infringes on both pillars of the European minority rights instruments: non-discrimination and equality (Agarin, Brosig 2009).

To address multicultural nature of societies in the CEE, liberal equality and autonomy need to be assessed consistently and thoroughly. In turn, only via individual equality and autonomy can the balanced development of culture and identity of non-dominant groups can be guaranteed, where checks on political institutions' performance are still difficult. Further contestation and debate on the framework and recognition of multicultural nature of CEE societies is hence a necessary step to move beyond groups and address the ways where group interests converge.

## Conclusion: Are Multicultural Solutions Possible?

My paper makes clear that both, the advocacy for and opposition to multiculturalism were fanned on exactly the same grounds. Multiculturalism assumes that cultural memberships are primordial and involuntary, and hence constrain their members' options for interaction with representatives of other cultural groups. This allows multiculturalists to call for accommodation of individuals who (allegedly) lack autonomy within political institutions that are (allegedly) culture blind. At the same time, these institutions are streamlined on the majority culture, and allow only for its members a degree of freedom and equality, which the members of non-majority cultures can never enjoy. The purpose of political institutions is thus to liberate the members of non-dominant communities from their cultural ballast and make them autonomous agents, in the sense of political institutions. And although the two claims are central to multiculturalism, they are also inherently contradicting each other. Hence, the adherents to multicultural communitarism are able to claim primordial nature of cultural features, while at the same time favouring assimilation of minorities of a less sophisticated culture into a dominant one. At the same time, multicultural pluralists are vocal defenders of cultural equality, while at the same time underline the impossibility of communication across cultural divide.

This is where my discussion on the contribution of minority to cultural diversity of the CEE societies has a clear fit with the multicultural-

ism debate: Cultural claims of minority individuals are more often than not agent-driven and thus provide sufficient incentives for political institutions to respond accordingly. However, the claims of minority groups for their greater institutional accountability are misperceived by dominant groups as being agenda-driven, in the sense reflecting majorities own experiences with political institutions. In all cases, agenda-driven claims of the dominant groups seek to further redistribute available resources and gain greater structural disadvantages for their dominant groups. If political institutions were to consider the stakes of minority integration carefully, they would need to address the disparities embedded in treatment of groups as the bearers of rights and duties. In the process however, individuals with dissenting opinions are bound to be the losers of liberal democratic turn, undermining the very project of institutional consolidation in the long run.

Largely because throughout the CEE the majority groups perceived themselves to be under siege and requiring protection from potentially 'renegade' residents, they also devised policies emphasising the link of (national) minority communities to neighbouring states. In effect, this resulted in the official denial of the individuals' possibility to identify with more than one culturally defined political community, and neglected the fact that 'objective' group belonging does not determine the subjective desire of belonging to a specific group. The development of cultural policies in the CEE states thus runs against the grain of liberal perceptions, showing a unique dynamic. Over the past decades, the policies also in the established Western democracies have been aimed at accommodating diversity, increasingly acknowledging the local minority communities' difference by recognising their cultural and linguistic rights (Agarin 2003; Malloy 2005). Much like under the communist regimes, cultural policies target a specific group, whether dominant or non-dominant, rather than devising policies that allow for a dynamic understanding of culture. In both contexts, communities are treated as groups previously established as collectivities with fixed boundaries.

The bottom line is that in declaring their liberal and democratic commitment, the CEE states need to work toward greater accommodation of minority cultures within the common institutional framework. Whether accommodation is successful will largely depend on the willingness of majority groups to recognise minority group identities as contingent, their agendas as self-set (as opposed to being a reactive projection of majority inspired policies) and redistribute resources claimed by the majority as being their own. Unsurprisingly, therefore, an ever closer Europe will need to ensure minority protection allowing for greater recognition of diversity

of as well as within the cultural groups. A liberal state aware of the bias in favour of majority embedded in all multicultural debates will need to work towards devising specific cultural policies that are attuned to minorities' own perceptions of reasonable accommodation and protection and not result from majority's attempts to sanitize public space of minority cultures. Until such policies are in place, states will continue to engage cultural reasons, reinforcing rather than blurring cultural boundaries and further sponsoring tension between cultural groups.

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Scientific life

**Denis Hanov**

### ARCHIPELAGO OF DIASPORAS IN GLOBAL DIVERSITY...

Notes after Zygmunt Bauman`s lecture on contemporary diversity politics in Europe

International conference "*Integration und Desintegration Ordnungsmodelle in Europa 20 Jahre nach Auflösung der Sowjetunion*" (Berlin, 24.-25. 03.2011).

*The typically modern practice, the substance of modern politics, of modern intellect, of modern life, is the effort to exterminate ambivalence: an effort to define precisely- and to suppress or eliminate everything that could not or would not be precisely defined. Modern practice is not aimed at the conquest of foreign lands, but at the filling of the blank spots in the compleat mappa mundi. It is the modern practice, not nature that truly suffers no void.*

*Intolerance is, therefore, the natural inclination of modern practice. Construction of order sets the limits to incorporation and assimilation. It calls for the denial of rights, and of the grounds, of everything that cannot be assimilated- for de-legitimation of the other. As long as the urge to put paid to ambivalence guides collective and individual action, intolerance will follow- even if, ashamedly, it hides under the mask of toleration...[…] Since the sovereignty of the modern state is the power to define and to make the definitions stick-everything that self-defines or eludes the power-assisted definition is subversive. The order of this sovereignty is no-go areas, unrest and disobedience, collapse of law and order.*

*Z. Bauman. Modernity and Ambivalence, 1991.*\*

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As already known, Latvian Ministry of Culture, inspired by ideas of social engineering produced by the current minister Elerte, is working on a new concept of society integration in Latvia. The concept, as the introduction tells us, preserves ethnic hierarchy among ethnic groups in Latvia – *jus sanguini* based division of population will most probably receive state financial support if the programme is accepted by the Cabinet of Ministers. The idea of a *state nation* and minorities, most of which are turned into new or old immigrants is an example of a 19th century based ethnic nation which, as a result of a complicated 20th century history has to deal with a significant number of ethnic minorities who are slowly acquiring citizenship and thus will someday be able to improve their participation in basic democratic processes, including sharing power in various institutions.

While this is still not the case and participation among NGOs of ethnic minorities is low, the new concept, in my opinion, being produced too quickly and without real consultations with wider spectrum of political actors, is aimed at further deepening the gap between ethnic majority and various minorities – according to the introduction the majority is entrusted with various tasks which produce the "one and only" version of collective identities and numerous minorities (approx. 40% of the whole population of Latvia) are invited to join the set of values and politics produced for them but not jointly with them.

In Berlin in March this year the things ran differently – scientists from all over Europe, mostly representing research centres and universities, took part in two days long discussion on integration politics of the post Soviet countries towards their old/new minorities. The high level of the conference was signified by introductory speeches of various ambassadors, but guests expected someone else to take the floor – Zygmunt Bauman was invited to hold an introductory lecture on ethnic diversity and European integration policies. Before I go over to the major theses of Bauman, I should sum up the major idea of his speech – Europe can not go back to the nostalgic ethnic unity and conformity of various groups of population under the roof of a national state. This story ended after WWII and is never to return. Ethnic diversity is there for ever and can not be managed without equal participation of those who represent diversity. It became clear to me that Latvia is heading quite in the opposite direction, trying desperately to grasp the past of the national state which, as scholars know, never succeeded in harmonizing inter- ethnic relations through hierarchy of rights and participation.

Bauman`s speech was to enjoy in many ways. To start with, Bauman introduced his vision of Europe`s role in the world. It is location of Europe which is most significant for European identity. Central Europe in

Bauman`s opinion is important because of its centrality, being a bridge. European culture makes Europe significant and that is why in other parts of the world Europeans were significant. Various phenomena made Europe a leading intellectual and cultural power, including European military and cultural invasions, westernization of various parts of the world.

Nowadays Europe is trying to rediscover itself, because it has lost its unique cultural position, challenged by the United States. Being a prominent expert in globalization, Bauman could not ignore the issue of redundant people – a part of population in post industrial countries, who are "unnecessary" because of global production being shifted to less industrialized parts of the world.

Another feature of Europe – local problems were overcome by global solutions, including various periods of expansion outside Europe, but, as Bauman stated, contemporary Europe has not produced local solutions for global problems and thus a nation state still remains the most effective tool for inclusion – this thesis is to be found already decades ago in his famous book *Modernity and the Holocaust.*

Europe`s strength, in Bauman`s opinion, is to offer a long experience of co-existing with the Other. This point produced various skeptical responses to the probably much too spotless history of living with ethnically, religiously different groups. Bauman, being a passionate European, strongly convinced of progress of mores within the Enlightenment paradigm, in my opinion presented a much too detached version of Europe in its diversity – such a distance logically ignores details which may disturb, such as politically supported and technologically well prepared massacres of Muslims in Europe at the beginning of the 21st century in former Yugoslavia…

Still the conviction of Bauman is impressive – his idea of Europe`s input into "making planet hospital for politics without military power" is connected with the idea of Europe loosing its military significance, but, at the same time, acquiring new capacities of mediating between ethnic and cultural diversity and nation state. Supporting his idea with Gadamer`s concept of living with the Other, Bauman proposes not to expect the Other to become assimilated. He explained assimilation using the language of biology – do not assimilate by eating up the Other, this simply does not work in sociological dimension.

Europe`s advantage, so Bauman, is thanks to differences, not despite differences.

The most important message for Latvian state institutions involved into integration politics is – we entered a new age of diasporas, which is not to stop. As there are no local solutions to global issues, according to Bauman

we are doomed to accept and live with diasporas – Berlin as a megapolis was used to depict a European city made up of isles of various diasporas. Bauman is convinced of Europe`s capacities to cohabit with the Other and in his opinion assimilation is not possible anymore because there is no more "clear cut". Assimilation, according to Bauman is only possible if there is a hierarchy of cultures, but, "no clear cut is possible, no harmony order possible" – this idea is to find in Bauman`s book *Modernity and Ambivalence.*

Summing up his inspiring, but controversial lecture, which lasted almost one hour, Bauman repeated his view on Europe`s niche in the global world – to transform a cultural difference into a profit, an advantage for Europe`s growth.

This recapitulation of Bauman`s major theses on diversity makes one skeptical about Latvian politicians` attempts to grasp a vanishing 19th century politics of unifying and assimilating minorities within the cultural predominance of a national state. Bauman warns that this dominance is already passé in most parts of post modern Europe.

Does the new concept of integration make sense? Are we in Latvia still too modern not to see the fading dominance of state ideology confronted by cultural decentralization of contemporary identity building processes in mass media shaped society? Will the new integration concept produce any advantages for the Latvian society? Will it support or hinder cohesion? Rereading Bauman, one may doubt the efficiency of the state integration policy in Latvia…

* More on the participants of the conference http://www.dgo-online.org/events/2011.3 (in German) *(this report is based on written notes from the conference, produced by the author)*

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