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REGIONAL IDENTITY UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE CENTRES. SILESIANS DURING WORLD WAR II, THE CLASH OF LOYALTIES AND MARGINALIZATION OF REGIONAL SPECIFICS IN THE POST-WAR CREATION OF NATIONALS NARRATIVES

In the course of the 20th century, the creation of collective identities in Central-Eastern Europe was almost entirely dominated by centre-conceived national narratives. However, the concept of a homogeneous unified national body, as formed in the notions of the political and ideological centres, ignored the specifics of individual regional identities. This factor can particularly be illustrated by the example of Upper Silesia, divided after World War I among three states – Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

In its history, Silesia has never developed its own state in the sense of an independent political unit. To the contrary, it has been subordinated to other states, be it the Polish or Czech Kingdom, Habsburg- or Hohenzollern Empire, or modern German, Polish or Czech states later on. Simultaneously, throughout many centuries Silesia has experienced many migration waves of different ethnics. All these determinants led to the formation of a very specific mixed society with different identities, often mixed or non-national. However, this became a problem at the time when the influence of nationalism, which gradually became

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the central idea of most states, was growing in Europe. The rapid transformation of borders during the period 1918–1945 led to a constant clash between the required loyalty and perceived regional identity. The declaration of complete loyalty, repeatedly demanded by one or another superior state's authorities, led to a pragmatic approach of local Silesian population. Locals tried to cope with the requirements, mainly due to their fear of possible persecution and/or with the intention to preserve their own properties and basic rights.

During World War II, local men were called into the German army. Many of them served obediently and fought hard for Germany and even felt sympathy for the Nazis. To the contrary however, many defected to Allies or fell into their captivity. These prisoners-of-war and defectors became a welcome and abundant recruiting source for the Polish and Czechoslovak exile armies. Their value and importance, however, were completely marginalized after the war in the effort not to disturb the strenuously built image of a "fighting nation", according to which most exiled army soldiers were supposed to be ethnic Czechs (respectively Poles), who fled abroad for patriotic reasons. It was only after 1989 when the region's own specific reflection of its war experience slowly emerged. In this reflection, service in three different armies on both sides of the front is seen as its natural and unproblematic part, in sharp contrast to the perception of the war from the centres.

The paper is based on the long-term research concerning the issue of inhabitants who lived in the lands occupied by Germany during World War II and who were forcibly conscripted to the *Wehrmacht*.[1] The research approach to the Silesia region is based on the theory of territory formation (*Raumkonzept*), on the attempt at deconstruction the dominant national narratives, and on the conceptions of making and moulding Silesia identities (e.g., Schroer 2006; Lorenz, Berger 2006; Bahlcke 2015; Gawrecki 2015; Karch 2018).

Key words: Silesia, regional identity, non-national identities, World War II, armies-in-exile, marginalization

1 The paper is one of outputs of the research project *Former German soldiers in the Czechoslovak Army during World War II as an example of marginalization in the process of shaping historical memory* funded by the Czech Science Foundation (standard project No. 18-11418S).

Silesia: history of a land without its own state

Silesia is a historical territory that, generally speaking, follows the watercourse of the Oder River, to which its economic growth is, after all, connected, and which, therefore, to a large extent determined its significance. [2] From this perspective, Silesia has surprisingly many common features with the territory of today's Latvia, despite the considerable geographic distance between the two regions. Silesia can boast a long and glorious history. Its fame was mostly derived from its economic potential however, which had been developing in a close bond of good transportation possibilities, related trade options, and the local production potential, which was changing throughout the centuries, from medieval linen guilds to weaving manufactories in Early Modern Period, later mining, to heavy industries in the 19th century. [3]

The economic potential of Silesia was so huge over the centuries that Silesia had a fundamental importance for the states which controlled it at any given time. In Early Middle Ages, Silesia – particularly due to its good access to the chief city of the Polish Kingdom, Krakow, along the Oder River – was the main connection link between Poland and the West. During the High Middle Ages, Silesia was considered the economically most developed land of the Bohemian Crown, [4] while during the Early Modern Period, it was the richest province of the Habsburg Empire. Its seizure by Prussia during the so-called Silesian Wars in the

2 The importance of rivers for the overall development of individual regions is becoming an ever more explored subject of many scientific fields, thus becoming a separate, individually monitored inter-field phenomenon (Mauch, Zeller 2008; Bernhardt, Koller, Lichtenberger 2019). This trend can also be observed in the Baltics (Mačiukėnaitė, Povilaitienė 2013). For more about the Odra River in this field, see (rather popularization attempt) Rada 2009. For the issue of river perception in professional historiography, see especially Rau 2010.

3 An excellent summarizing monography of the Silesia history is presented by Bahlcke, Gawrecki, Kaczmarek 2015.

4 The territorial core of the Crown of Bohemia in the Middle Ages was represented by Bohemia and Moravia. Silesia was gradually acquired by John of Bohemia during the first third of the 14th century. Silesian subordination to the Crown of Bohemia was officially confirmed by an agreement concluded with the Polish king in 1335. Silesia then remained a part of the Crown of Bohemia (even though it was eventually within the frame of the Habsburg Empire) until the middle of the 18th century, when it was seized in a war by Prussia.

18th century represented a defining moment of Prussia's rise to power.[5] Towards the end of the 19th century, Silesia was rightfully considered one of the most important industrial centres of the German Empire. Even the small part of Upper Silesia, which was awarded to the independent Polish state after 1918, was of a fundamental importance for the Poles. It was here where the industrial core of the interwar Polish Republic was. The same was true for the Polish People's Republic after 1945, which acquired the entire territory of Silesia.[6]

In contrast to its enormous economic potential, Silesia has never had its own state in the sense of a single unified unit. This important land had always been the subject of great interest from surrounding states, which had managed to form unified political centres of a large military and political power despite the fact they had usually not reached the economic level of Silesia. Thus, instead of becoming a unified entity and mover of political history due to its economic power, Silesia was, most of the time, only a subject of such history or even a victim of the surrounding sovereign political entities.

One of the crucial moments of the modern history of Silesia was the end of World War I. Year 1918 in East-Central Europe is mostly celebrated as a historical milestone of the liberation of several nations from subjection to monarchist empires and attainment or renewal of their state and national independencies. On the other hand, however, this milestone also factually established nationalism as the leading and main principle of state identity. [7] This applied to "victorious" states, i.e. Poland or Czechoslovakia in East-Central Europe and the Balkan and Baltic states within the wider context of Eastern Europe, as well as to

5 Prussia seized Silesia during the wars of 1740–42, 1744–45 and 1756–63.

6 However, the historical constant of the economic significance of Silesia does not have to necessarily also be a permanent canon of the future. Silesia, similar to other European heavy industry regions, is currently trying to address the difficult issue of restructuring its economy and society, as plentifully demonstrated by, for example, summary report by Bukowski, Śniegoski, Wetmańska 2013.

7 The perception of nationalism as a positive development in professional historiography has endured for a long time, not only after the end of World War II (see, for example, the – at its time – renowned study Halecki 1957), but till today it remains an inspirational topic, when the multispectral character of its legacy is still vividly perceived (Auer 2004).

the "defeated" states, i.e. Germany and Austria, but also to, for example, Turkey.[8]

However, national and nationalistic rhetoric often goes hand in hand with economic and strategic reasons. From this perspective, Silesia was a typical example. In the given time, it became the subject of mutual rivalry between Germany and two newly founded political entities, Poland and Czechoslovakia, which were supported by the winning powers, and particularly by France. [9] The region along the borders of three national-political units became a subject of their interest not only as a place where several ethnic groups had mixed, but especially because of its enormous economic importance. During the first few after-war years, German, Polish as well as Czech militant groups unleashed a bloody fight for the determination of new borders.[10]

As a result of the plebiscite, but especially due to the pressure applied by the great powers, Upper Silesia was divided (see Wilson 2010). While Germany kept the main part of the former Prussian province of Upper Silesia, Poland was awarded its important part that included about one fourth of its area (approximately 3,200 km2), but almost half of its population (41%), half of its strategically important steelworks (50 %), and almost three quarters of its coalmines (71 %). Germany also lost the small area of Hlučín Region, which was awarded to Czechoslovakia, which had also kept most of the territory of the former "residual" Austrian Silesia (these areas which still remained a part of the Austrian Empire after its defeat in the 18th century). However, one of its parts, the Duchy of Teschen, had become a subject of a struggle between Poland and Czechoslovakia, in which both sides claimed their right to its en-

8 For more about the issue of the growing importance of nationalism and its transmutations after 1918 in East-Central Europe, see the classical works by Gellner 1983; Alter 1989.

9 Silesia is historically divided into Lower and Upper Silesia. However, an overwhelming part of this study applies to the eastern part, i.e. Upper Silesia, since it was here, where a distinctive, multispectral society developed from the perspective of the national identity issue.

10 Already in January 1919, Czechoslovak and Polish units clashed in fights over the Teschen region, which was eventually divided between these two countries. In August 1919, August 1920, and then again between May and July 1921, three anti-German uprisings took place in the eastern part of Upper Silesia. They greatly contributed to turning a part of this territory over to Poland.

tire area. After a short, undeclared war, the Teschen area was divided between the two of them (Gawrecki 2003).

For Upper Silesia, the end of World War I thus meant the collapse of a territorial arrangement that had been stable since the middle of the 18th century. The region and especially its communities became heavily segmented.[11] This political segmentation was further amplified by significant antagonism among all three affected states, which made business as well as social contacts even more difficult to maintain. The long-term political, business, and social relations were disrupted. Nevertheless, the society of Upper Silesia had been going through tremendous changes already during the last few decades before World War I: extensive migration movements and the rise of the nationalistic phenomenon were reflected in the arisen wide-spectrum identity changes of the local population (Struve, Ther 2002; Karch 2018).

Complex regional identity

Contrary to the American model of a "melting pot" (Gordon 1964), in which all arrivals melt and mix into a unified (American) nation, many internal, but especially external pressures played a significant role in the case of Silesia. Since the beginning of the Middle Ages, the area with autochthonous Slavic population experienced a massive influx of the German element. However, after several centuries, these immigrants could, completely rightfully, consider themselves Silesian autochthons as well (Struve, Ther 2002). The diversity of the Middle Ages was also contributed to by the Czech administration of the entire area and, since the 16th century, by significant religious differences (Bahlcke, Störtkuhl, Weber 2017; Bjork 2008). Generally speaking, the influence as well as the numerical share of the German element had been gradually growing during the Middle Ages, especially in its "Lower" part. On the other hand, with the industrial development of the 19th century, a significant number of workers came to Silesia, and particularly to Upper Silesia, from Galicia, Central Poland and elsewhere (Haines 1976).

Reoccurring changes of the borders and superior state bodies were causing enormous problems for the formation of a local identity. The

11 In Poland, all the awarded Upper Silesian lands were merged into the autonomous Silesian Voivodeship. In Czechoslovakia, the Silesian lands initially formed a separate Silesian Land. However, in 1928, due to its small size, it was unified with the Moravian Land and thus incorporated in the so-called Moravian-Silesian Land.

local society could not – contrary to the neighbour lands – rely on its own state body, which would usually become a crucial platform for the formation of a strong collective identity, be it a state or national identity. While a certain degree of collective political awareness did exist in Silesia, it had to practically always come to terms with requirements and pressures from the states that controlled Silesia at a given moment. The identity issue in Silesia was thus always directly related to the issue of loyalty to the given "foreign", i.e. "non-Silesian" power (Gawrecki 2015).

The gradual influx of immigrants from the nationally already formed territories did not have to always necessarily mean that the individuals in question were ethnically conscious or that they would continue to behave that way after they settled in Silesia (Karch 2018). This is especially true for the labour migration of the poorest blue-collar wage laborers from Galicia during the last few decades of the 19th century. While these immigrants from the poorest social classes originally grew up in their households with Polish, Ruthenian or Ukrainian identity, this identity was based on natural language and locally cultural roots, and not on a conscious national sentiment or even conscious political nationalism. In Silesia, these simple people (very often analphabets) were mostly trying to meet their basic living needs. Based on the new environment, they were susceptible to natural assimilation. Quite a few of them sided with Germanness, while others embraced the Polish, or even Czech, national movement, depending on the environment they lived in. Nevertheless, due to their absolute economic dependency, they also easily succumbed to targeted pressures. For pragmatic (respectively often for purely existential) reasons, they were sometimes willing, at least formally, to embrace one or another national self-determination calls. A remarkably interesting phenomenon was the loyalty of many Slavic inhabitants to Germany, be it among the population that remained living within the German borders, or people who had become Polish or Czechoslovak citizens. Apart from ephemeral reasons, such as traditions and customs, these people particularly appreciated the German Empire (prior to 1914) as a functional state with a sophisticated system of social protection.[12]

12 Until 1914, Upper Silesia was situated along the border between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. Its inhabitants were thus able to compare first-hand the given state functionalities and living conditions of the people who live in the above stated neighbour countries.

The border changes after 1918 meant that people in these areas were exposed to a relatively intensive propaganda, especially in a national spirit of either one of the three states, during the two decades between the wars. The Germanization, Polonization and Czechization pressures naturally found expression in the local inhabitants' perception of their own identity (Kamusella 2001; Wódz, Wódz 2006). "*After twenty years of living in different countries, there were already many things that distinguished one from another, however, they still had remained a single ethnic group*", as the Silesian historian Sebastian Rosenbaum characterized the situation (Maršálek, Neminář 2020, p. 131). Three Silesians with a (for example) Polish identity may have lived in three different countries separated by political borders, however, they resembled one another incomparably more than the Poles, Germans or Czechs who lived around Warsaw, Berlin or Prague.

Further border changes took place after less than two decades, at a time when the aggressive international politics of Nazi Germany were successful. Not even within a year after the Munich Agreement (from the beginning of October 1938 to the end of September 1939), after the Czechoslovak capitulation and quick defeat of Poland, both countries, including the corresponding Silesian territories, found themselves under German occupation. The Nazis incorporated all the Silesian areas (be it the areas that belonged to Germany prior to World War I, or the Polish as well as Czech parts of the former "residual" Austrian Silesia) into the Province of Silesia. [13] This forced change paradoxically brought a fundamental twist of the relations in the Silesian region: after two hundred years, the entire Silesian area became unified within the borders of

13 Already on October 9th, 1939, i.e. shortly after the conquest of Poland, Adolf Hitler decided to annex parts of the Polish territory. This mainly concerned the territories that belonged to Germany before 1914, but also some others. Reichsgesetzblatt, Teil I, 1939, Nr. 204, S. 2042–3, Erlass des Führers und Reichskanzlers über Gliederung und Verwaltung der Ostgebiete vom 8. Oktober 1939. All the occupied Upper Silesian territories thus ended in the so-called government district of Opole (*Regierungsbezirk Oppeln*) or in a newly established government district of Katowice (*Regierungsbezirk Kattowitz*). The areas that belonged to Germany until 1914 – i.e. the Czechoslovak Hlučín Region and a relevant part of the Polish Silesian Voivodeship – were instantly incorporated in the "Old Reich" (*Altreich*). While the areas of the former Austrian Silesia, as well as other small areas, were also incorporated in the Reich, they were separated by a police (passport) border; for more details, see Stefanski 2005, pp. 43–4.

a single state again. However, the state was a Nazi state and the entire area was subjected to harsh Germanization.

Census as the means for artificial manipulation and "soft" pressure

Complex ethnic issues and particularly the issue of national self-awareness and identity in Silesia thus did not correspond at all to the standard conditions in the centres of the individual national units. The disparities were not just the usual regional differences. [14] However, it was the perception of the issue of national identity that had become a norm in the "centres", which became a basis for the establishment of the criteria for its assessments. In reality, this aspect was particularly evident in the materials used in individual states for census purposes (Zeman 1990). Extended literature has demonstrated that seemingly technicist questions of census protocols became a "weapon", respectively a manipulation means of state nationalism. [15]

One of the significant aspects of the "central perspective" of the national issue was the axiom of natural unambiguity of national identity. The census documentation defined nationality as a category that is strictly positive (everybody had to state a nationality) and can only acquire a single value (census participants were allowed to state only one nationality). The seeming simplicity of the census completely ignored nationalistically indifferent populations, as well as those who considered themselves to have two or more national identities. However, both above-stated categories occurred in Silesia, as well as in other border regions, very often. Moreover, the nationalists in the centres did not grasp at all that there were residents who declared the Czech (or Polish) mother tongue and, despite of that, desired their homes to remain in Germany.

14 It is not the objective of this study to examine the theories of regionalism explorations. Nevertheless, let us just mention that the nationalism perceived in a centralistic manner in the 20th century, would rather intentionally suppress regional identity. The claim of Eric Storm that "*regionalism has often been interpreted as a reactionary movement*" undoubtedly represents an excessive simplification, however, it very well illustrates the, at that time, image of nationalism as a progressive phenomenon (Storm 2003, p. 255).

15 For an illustration of the complex Czechoslovak issue, see, for example, Kučera 1999, especially the chapter: Die Sprachenfrage als Funktion der Staatsidee, pp. 9–19.

Furthermore, all the census organizers intentionally and purposefully used the census to optically enforce their own, i.e. majority state, nationality. The tendency to include ethnically ambivalent local populations among the majority nationality group represented a stable and common element of individual censuses in all the affected states. As an example, we can state the approach of the Czechoslovak authorities during the 1921 and 1930 censuses. First of all, the inhabitants were allowed to claim only those nationalities that were officially approved. The detailed instructions for the census commissars specified that should somebody claim the Silesian nationality ("Silesians"), he/she had to also claim one of the "official" nationalities, which should be considered the superior and decisive. The authorities hoped that the locals would select the Czechoslovak nationality. However, this assumption was fulfilled only partially.[16] On the other hand, in the Hlučín region, where the state authorities worried about a strong inclination of the local population towards the German state, the censused inhabitants were allowed to state, without any further details, their local "Moravian" nationality. However, the officials subsequently included this nationality as a subgroup under the Czechoslovak nationality. [17]

The other countries approached the census in a similarly "creative" way. In 1921, Poland used the "nationality" category in its census. However, ten years later, it changed it to the category of "mother tongue", thus making the group of "Poles" optically bigger (Pierwszy Powszechny Spis 1928; Drugi Powszechny Spis 1932).

The German administration approached the issue after the occupation of the Czechoslovak and Polish parts of Upper Silesia in a similar manner. Police registration of the population was organized already in December 1939. To optically reduce the share of the Polish and Czech populations, the Nazis allowed the inhabitants to "finally freely" declare Silesian nationality and language. The inhabitants on their part welcomed the possibility not to directly claim Germanness and yet to maintain more extensive property and personal rights than the Nazis allowed the Czech and Poles to have. "*Claiming the Silesian nationality in the atmosphere of pressure and threats was, to a significant extent, a tactical issue, an attempt to 'camouflage'*" (Borák 2010, p. 113).

16 Out of the total of 47,314 people who claimed to be "Silesians" in the 1921 census, 24,299 of them also claimed Czechoslovak nationality (Sčítání lidu 1924, p. 59).

17 A total of 38,033 people claimed "Moravian" nationality (Ibid).

The Nazis marked autochthonic "Silesians" as an ethnic group that could be Germanized, pointing out its supposedly "German roots" and the relatively long influence of the German cultural circle, to which many of them naturally had become accustomed. In real life, this "flattery" towards the local population looked like a classic application of the "sugar and whip" method. The Nazis used the results of the above-stated registration later on, when, in 1941, they established the so-called German People's List (*Deutsche Volksliste* – DVL). To be included in the list, mere claiming of German nationality was no longer sufficient and had to be demonstrated by evidence on the German origin, race and political stance. The list was divided into four groups with different legal positions. The first two groups basically included ethnic Germans. The third group (the most numerous by far) included populations that were, according to the authorities, suitable for Germanization. They were awarded a German nationality, however, it was only conditional for a trial period of ten years (Borchers 2014). With much less legal rights, Poles and Czechs were to remain outside the *Volksliste*, as well as Jews, Gypsies and some others who were destined for a completely lawless status.

Since voluntary registration progressed slowly, the Nazi authorities started to apply administrative pressure which preceded threats and sometimes even terror. When Silesians refused to register, the sanctions were quite harsh. If they declared themselves to be Poles, they would practically lose many of their rights. Most inhabitants who were entitled to be registered in the *Volksliste* acceded to it. [18]

The Nazi system thus categorized the local inhabitants based on their ethnic, racial, and political "value". While this is not a suitable place for a comparison, its introduction represented an additional external interference by remote centres as yet another imposition of unambiguous identity on local populations.

18 From the total of 2,450,000 inhabitants of the annexed Silesian territory who were reported in January 1944, 1,040,000 of them were marked as Poles, while 875,000 of them were registered to the (the most numerous) *Volksliste*-group III. The same list shows also 100,000 *Reichsdeutsche* and 230,000 people registered in the groups I and II (these people can be, with a certain reservation, considered ethnic Germans) (Broszat 1961, p. 134).

In a foreign war

Military service within the modern European tradition represented one of the main civic obligations. However, apart from purely military tasks, the armies within the given state structures also carried out many other tasks. Apart from other things, military service represented an important education platform. The state was able to inculcate and indoctrinate young people who were separated from the influences of their family and local environments with its ideology during the time when they were forming their own worldviews and value attitudes. The army was "*considered the main society socialization tool in the spirit of national unification*" (Rosenbaum 2020, p. 133) a long time before 1914. And its role of a representative and armed force of the (state) nation during the interwar years grew even more. This was true for all the armies in question, i.e. German, Czech and Polish.[19] However, while the latter two officially operated under the civic principle of conscription, the German *Wehrmacht*, after its establishment (and reintroduction of a general conscription) in 1935, set a new quality from this perspective. The *Wehrmacht* was defined as "ethnic" (i.e. German), as a "*militarized union of the Germans*" (Wette 2002, pp. 172–3, see also pp. 85, 88–9).

Prior to World War I, conscription represented a standard part of life for Silesians from both sides of the Austrian-Prussian border. After the conditions in this region dramatically changed after 1918, local men would be conscripted to the armies of the corresponding states, Poland, Czechoslovakia and, after 1935, also Germany. Nevertheless, the long-forgotten antagonisms of the 18th century then came back to life: Young men from the same region, often related by blood, but divided by artificial political boundaries, would put on various uniforms of belligerent armies once again.[20]

19 More or less discriminating approach towards minority ethnic groups and basically also to all non-majority groups (from ethnic and political groups to Jews) can be demonstrated not only in the case of the German, but also Polish and Czechoslovak armies (Maršálek 2019; Karpus, Rezner 2001).

20 From this point of view, the Silesian society lived through a very traumatizing experience at the time of the already mentioned Silesian Wars, when the Prussian Army would use force to conscript local inhabitants, who still were, at that time, subjects of the Austrian Empress. These traumas reappeared, even though with a smaller intensity, during the Austro-Prussian War in 1866. However, shortly after that, the German Empire and Austria-Hungary became allies.

During the time of the Munich crisis in September 1938, three mobilized armies were facing one another on the Silesian territory, preparing for a mutual clash.[21] A man from the Hlučín Region, whose homeland had formed a part of Germany from the middle of the 18th century until 1920, was now supposed to fight in a Czechoslovak uniform against Germany, and therefore also against his recent neighbours and often also relatives on the German side of the border. A Silesian man from the part of the former German territory, which was awarded to Poland after 1918, found himself in a similar role. Men from the divided Teschen Region were facing one another in Polish and Czechoslovak uniforms, be it with the task "to defend their motherland against a foreign aggression", or "to free a part of the motherland unjustly usurped by enemies". Silesians in German uniforms were supposed to kill their neighbours, to whom they were much closer than to the Nazi ideal of "Germanic Aryans". Furthermore, they were supposed to fight for a regime with which they often disagreed.

After the Reich gained control over the entire Silesian territory in October 1938 and September 1939, it incorporated the territory inside its borders. With the gradual categorization of the local population, the question of military service in the German armed forces also arose. However, in accordance with the Compulsory Military Service Act, only citizens of the Reich could be conscripted.[22] Certain steps were taken already in 1940, however, only the introduction of the above-mentioned institute of the *Deutsche Volksliste,* related to awarding unconditional or conditional citizenship, allowed the Reich to also conscript many men from the occupied territories who would not have previously met the required ethnic "Germanness" criterion (Kaczmarek 2016, p. 62). Mass conscriptions of these persons started in 1942 and continued practically until the end of the war.

21 During the escalating tensions between Germany and Czechoslovakia, Poland came with an ultimatum – it demanded a part of the Teschen area which had been awarded to Czechoslovakia in 1919. In the Polish part of Silesia, a strong military task force was mobilized, ready to exact the territorial claims by force. Nevertheless, Poland did not proceed in collaboration with Germany, which meant that there were actually three armies standing in Silesia, "facing one another".

22 The Compulsory Military Service Act was published in May 1935 and remained a basic legal regulation until the end of the Third Reich despite all further legal innovations. Reichsgesetzblatt, Teil I, 1935, Nr. 52, S. 609, Wehrgesetz vom 21. Mai 1935.

No thorough analysis of the service of Upper Silesians in the German Army has been conducted yet.[23] The question of the attitude of the Silesians towards serving in the *Wehrmacht*, as well as the attitude of the Nazi authorities towards them, remains unanswered as well.

The German armed forces approached the problem actively, and partially even with a certain degree of responsiveness. The *Wehrmacht* was supposed to Germanize these men and the commanders were even personally responsible for that (Rosenbaum 2020, p. 144). While the soldiers were supposed to speak German, and were not supposed (especially publicly) to use their Silesian (Slavic) mother tongue, small violations in this area were often tolerated. Contemporary witnesses often mention that their superior tolerated private talk and even singing of Slavic (Polish) songs inside the military zones. On the other hand, punishments in this area were not unusual either. Even if it is not being possible to characterize the attitude of the military authorities towards the ethnically ambiguous soldiers (not only Silesians) as directly distrustful, there certainly were limitations – there was an order that prohibited the men of the *Volksliste*-group III from being promoted to a higher rank than *Obergefreiter*;[24] and their proportion in particular units, which was not supposed to exceed five percent, was also monitored (Kaczmarek 2016, p. 63).

There are no doubts that many Silesians actively supported the Nazis (Fritzler 2012; Karch 2018, pp. 218–257). On the other hand, there were many Polish and Czechoslovak patriots among the Silesians who joined the resistance against the Nazis. Nevertheless, probably the largest group of the Silesians approached service in the German Army

23 The existing literature, even though plentiful, has usually explored a wider problem of the military service of the former Polish citizens from the annexed areas. The special case of Upper Silesia has been somewhat neglected. Moreover, other categories of recruits, such as members of the Polish minority in Germany or, on the other hand, the German minority in Poland or Czechoslovakia, have also remained unexplored (Rosenbaum 2020, p. 135). Due to a lack of archive materials, we can only estimate the overall numbers of recruits, similarly to the number fallen or, on the other hand, deserters (ibid, p. 137 etc.).

24 *Obergefreiter* – a lower rank in the *Wehrmacht*; the highest one among the lower ranks of "enlisted" soldiers. Since the rank systematization was different in different armies, it is difficult to exactly determine the equivalent at that time. According to the current NATO rank system, it corresponds to the OR-3 rank (in the Latvian Army, the corresponding rank is *dižkareivis*).

in a fatalistic and ambivalent way. Most Silesians of a Slavic origin considered the "ethnically German" Nazi armed forces to be just another "foreign" military force. However, those who lived in a location that had belonged to Germany prior to World War I, felt a certain sentiment towards Germany. At the very least, Germany was something close and known to them (Rosenbaum 2020, p. 142). Dan Gawrecki introduced a certain analysis of this phenomenon, using the example of the small Hlučín Region. Even though these inhabitants did not perceive German as their mother tongue and often did not even speak the language, "… *they would sometimes consciously claim their allegiance to the German cultural circle*." On the other hand, their perceived identity did not correspond to the (not precisely translatable) specific German term *eigensprachige Kulturdeutsche* (Gawrecki 2003, p. 225; see also Pavelčíková 1999). Their connection to Germany was rather based on tradition and long-term natural impacts of everyday life.

These people most often perceive the service in the German Army as a natural obligation, more or less unpleasant, but natural after all. A certain illustration of this attitude is clear from many pictures of the Silesian Slavic conscripts to the *Wehrmacht* who dressed up richly in the tradition of the spirit of recruitment festivities. The feeling of a natural course of events as well as the significance of this masculine ritual outweighed ideological or national reservations.

In the "right" uniform?

Many Silesians became prisoners of war of the Allies, particularly during the second half of the war. Some of them crossed the front intentionally. However, such an active manifestation of resistance was rather rare. An overwhelming majority of them was captured either due to a capitulation of large, encircled formations, or during deep retreats, such as in Ukraine and France in the summer of 1944. Such times presented the best opportunities for staying behind or hiding. It was at these times when their real attitude towards the German armed forces was best demonstrated: while they resignedly serve in the German Army, they did not feel the need to be active on their own or even to die for the Nazi cause.[25]

25 We need to state here that it is a far-reaching simplification. Overall, the German military authorities saw Silesians as whole as reliable and obedient soldiers

Many Silesians in Allied captivity joined the Polish or Czechoslovak exile armies, formed in Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Overall, however, they were not very numerous and especially the size of the Czechoslovak armed forces was, for a relatively long time, rather symbolic. During the last stages of the war, recruitment of prisoners of war was the most abundant source of new recruits for these armies. It was just prisoners of war, i.e. especially former Polish and Czechoslovak citizens, forcefully mobilized to the *Wehrmacht*, who, in 1944 and 1945, allowed for continuous replacements of the war losses, but also for the organizational development of these exile armies. We can say that the Polish and Czechoslovak exile armies would not have been able to fully engage in a large-scale combat at the front without these men. Towards the end of the war, their share in the Polish and Czechoslovak Armies in the West reached one third of the total numbers (!): every third Czechoslovak or Polish soldier thus served in the *Wehrmacht*.[26] And most of these soldiers came from Upper Silesia (Maršálek 2020, p. 117; Kaczmarek 2017, p. 322). A large part of them subsequently took part in frontline battles against the Germans and some of them even "managed" to fall in Czechoslovak or Polish uniform.

However, the enormous importance of the former *Wehrmacht* soldiers for the exile armies was not at all reflected in the after-war narrative of the struggle against Nazism. What was the reason of this paradox? Once again, the main reason became the problems related to the differences between the central (master) national identity and the regional Silesian identity.

The national narratives, formed in the 19th century in the national, resp. nationalistic spirit, used to stress the same "enemy" element in practically all European countries. Yet another element of these narratives was the canon of national unity. In both Poland and Czechoslovakia, the Germans were considered an "age-long enemy", and the defeat and occupation amplified these antagonisms to an absolute extreme. Everything

(Kaczmarek 2016, p. 73). Many Silesians in the German uniforms were awarded for their bravery.

26 In July 1945, the Polish Exile Army counted 228,000 soldiers, out of which 89,000 had previously served in the *Wehrmacht* (Biegański 1981, p. 351 and 353). The Czechoslovak Army had 10,000 men in its disposal, out of which 3,000 were former *Wehrmacht* soldiers (Maršálek 2017, p. 265).

German was rejected. The fight against Germany was therefore perceived as a continuation and culmination of a historical struggle.

In this context, the exile armies, for their part, were supposed to mainly represent the determination of the given nation to fight against occupiers. The narrative of a nationwide resistance was supposed to – after the defeat and therefore also a discredit of the establishment's legitimacy – create a new ideological pillar, a common narration, around which the given nation would be able to unify again after the war. We can observe this phenomenon practically in all European countries that experienced occupation by the Axis powers (Lagrou 1999); Poland and Czechoslovakia were no exceptions in this sense. The size of the given exile army was supposed to – together with resistance in the occupied homeland – represent proof of the mass character of the nationwide resistance.

Thus, in the artificially created image of the resistance, a "typical" soldier of the exile armies was supposed to be a Czech, resp. Pole, who decided to flee from the occupied homeland with the only objective to join the fight against the Germans abroad. However, several "uncomfortable" aspects did not fit this picture. While the relatively small numbers of the exile armies could have been explained by the difficulties related to escape from the occupied territories, the personnel composition of the (especially) Czechoslovak Army did not correspond to the expected picture. Volunteers from home formed only a small part of the armies and the exile governments were scrambling for new soldiers literally one by one. To add to these numbers, they recruited mobilized compatriots and other people, motivation to resistance or ethnic identity of whom did not correspond to the desired profile of a national fighter. For example, a big part of the Czechoslovak Army was formed by Jews, who were escaping racial persecution in Czechoslovakia. The fact that a relatively large part of the troops was formed by Czechoslovak citizens with the German mother tongue (mostly Jews) did not correspond to the desired picture at all.[27]

The same applied to the recruited prisoners of war from the *Wehrmacht*. The propaganda attempted to present a "typical soldier" as a volunteer-passionate patriot from the homeland and it did not want to admit that such a huge part of the exile armies was formed by men

27 The author of the study explored the national issue in the Czechoslovak Exile Army in a special monograph (Maršálek 2017).

who initially served in the enemy armed forces. And there was yet another problem: the identity of a majority of men from Upper Silesia did not correspond to the image of a "pure" Czech or Pole. The picture of a "nationwide struggle" did not correspond to the fact that among those who fought for the interest of the Czech, resp. Polish nation, there was such a huge share of Silesians, who were, on top of it, former *Wehrmacht* soldiers. That is the reason why this fact practically disappeared from the pleaded heroic history of the exile resistance for long decades. From the perspective of the needs of the "centre", it was necessary to marginalize these "uncomfortable" aspects as much as possible.[28] It is only in recent years that the resistance in the Czech Republic and Poland has been undergoing a demythization process, after all, the Western European countries are actually going through the same process as well.

Inconvenient and hidden identity

Joining the exile armies represented yet another chapter in the history of the Silesians and of the repeated pressures on their personal identity. Once again, they found themselves in the centre of a struggle between states they were a part of, and they were forced to accept the centrally perceived national identities.

Not all Silesians who became prisoners of war of the Allies joined the exile armies. Those who did were especially those who identified themselves with the Polish or Czech identity. On the other hand, the Silesians who felt distinctively German remained in the POW camps. However, the biggest group of the prisoners of war was formed by ethnically ambivalent men. A big role in their decisions was again played by pragmatic reasons and various forms of psychological pressures and fears (see Neminář 2015, 2016). Apart from Czech or Polish patriotism and anti-Nazi feelings, we cannot overlook the fear from possible after-war persecution, such as seizing properties, prison terms, and collaboration accusations. Many of them understood that if they wanted to return to

28 The affected soldiers were exposed to a strong pressure in this direction even after the war. The opportunities to openly present "their" resistance story was accompanied by fears. Because of their (forced) service in an enemy army, the Silesian were exposed to a danger of being accused of collaboration or at least "insufficient patriotism". They were supposed to be happy that they were "given a pardon". A high degree of self-censorship represented a common phenomenon for several decades after the war.

a serene life in their homes, they must demonstrate their loyalty to the victorious national states. While Czech or Polish patriotism represented a motivation for many people, a great role was again played by the motif of a mandatory service to the (remote) centre.

The ingeneration in personal identity went quite deep again. In 1939, the Nazis permitted people to declare Silesian nationality. However, such declarations later became a basis for a forced identification with "Germaneness". The Silesians did not find freedom in this area in the exile armies either. They were made aware of the fact that they must distance themselves from the Germaneness as much as possible already during interrogations and screening procedures conducted at the POW camps (Neminář 2015, 2016). It was the declaration of their "Silesian" nationality or mother tongue, profaned by the Nazis that represented a certain problem in this regard. The prisoners of war were instructed not to state "Silesian" but Czech as their mother tongue in the given questionnaires.[29] They had no other option than to oblige – their previous service in the enemy armed forces represented a strong instrument of pressure, which forced them to adapt to the requirements.

It was thanks to the prisoners of war that the Czechoslovak military units in the West went through a pronounced "Czechization" process during the last months of the war, when the percentage share of the soldiers with the German mother tongue as well as Jewish confession significantly decreased due to the overall increasing numbers. The exile army thus finally got its desired "national character". However, this really only happened "on paper" – an overwhelming majority of the new "Czechs" was, in reality, represented by the Silesians. They were just used again for the purpose of improving a picture within the frame of the ideological national constructs, formed in remote national centres.

The pressure exerted by the national centres would lead to some schizophrenic situations. Apart from the necessity to distance themselves

29 This phenomenon can be well demonstrated by comparing questionnaires completed at different times. Many prisoners of war in their first questionnaires in the POW camp declared their Silesian mother tongue or nationality, while their later personal materials from the exile army show them claiming Czech as their mother tongue. These materials of particular people are stored in the Central Military Archives – Military Historical Archives in Prague, collection No. 24. No more than just four soldiers have the Silesian mother tongue recorded in the appropriate sections of the personal army materials.

from the Third Reich and to claim a Czech or Polish identity, the prisoners of war faced other challenges as well. The Czech part of the Teschen region, which became a bone of contention between both countries already shortly after 1918, was annexed by Poland in October 1938. The Polish exile government considered this area to be Polish throughout the war. However, the same was true for the Czechoslovak government, which did not recognize the consequences of the Munich Agreement and subsequent developments. Even a certain "fight" subsequently developed in the POW camps for the soldiers from the Teschen part, each state trying to claim them as its respective citizens (this problem was explored in detail by Friedl 2003). There were even threats since both governments assumed that the area would be awarded to them after the war. The men from this area faced a difficult choice again: they were afraid that a bad decision could result in serious troubles for them in the future. The men from the Teschen area had to once more claim allegiance to one of the states which had moved the borders in their homeland back and forth. A Teschen inhabitant was born in Austria-Hungary. However, in 1919, his native region as well as the town itself was divided by a border [30] and he became citizen of Czechoslovakia. In October 1938, he was "freed" by the Polish troops and became Polish citizen. A year later, the town was occupied by the Nazis and he was forced to sign the *Volksliste,* thus endorsing Germaneness. He received a conditional Reich citizenship and had to enlist in the *Wehrmacht*. Once in the POW camp, he was pressed by the Polish and Czech officers to claim allegiance "to his homeland". The imperative of a nation, so self-evident in Prague, Warsaw or Berlin, could have been completely foreign to him, however.

Conclusion: forced modulation of one's own identity as a survival strategy

The most remarkable aspect of the entire process is the finding of the diametrically different forms of the collective memory: of the national narrative, developed, formed, and propagandistically pleaded "from the centre", and of the memory in the given region. The national heroic master narrative talks about an unrelenting struggle against the occupiers. In the Silesian region, however, joining the exile army is perceived in the context of the local regional history, identity and their

30 The town of Těšín was divided along the Olza River. Until today, half of the town belongs to Poland, while the other half to the Czech Republic.

problems.[31] The prevailing war experience of a majority of the population is the forced signing of the already mentioned *Deutsche Volksliste*, and conscription to the *Wehrmacht*. It is particularly clear from individual recollections that those "central" national narratives are not quite the narratives of the local population. Instead, they are the narratives of Warsaw, Prague and Berlin. The pressure of the centres to unambiguously declare their identification with this or that nation did not manage to completely liquidate the local identity, the nature of which has often been of a non-national or supranational character. When it comes to recollections of the war, we can see a significant paradox in the region. However, this paradox is paradoxical only at first glance.

Disputes between the veterans who fought on the German and the Allied sides are not too harsh in the region, to the contrary. The local society knew very well that joining the German armed forces represented an unwanted obligation for most of the men. Some of them had the opportunity to desert and to join the Allies, while some did not. After all, the national master narratives of the Czech and Polish resistances did not fully reflect the needs and will of the Silesian population either. As before in their history, they became a political object of the remote centres once again. Even though the war directly touched everybody, its goals and requirements were formulated in Berlin, Warsaw, and Prague. The Silesians have often perceived the war as a "foreign" war.

The constant clash of loyalties did not find its end even after 1945. After the war, society in Silesia underwent a massive transformation, probably the largest in its history. Most local Germans were displaced. Simultaneously, hundreds of thousands of immigrants resettled from the eastern parts of Poland came to the region. The remaining local population was then subjected to a new wave of Polonization. Silesian identity remained a sensitive issue, however (Service 2010; Karch 2018).[32]

31 The presented conclusions certainly represent a considerable simplification of a complex problem. However, it is the complexity and multi-layered quality of each presented claim here that can be seen as yet another proof of the distinction from central narratives.

32 An inspiring comparison of the approach of the superior state and the ways of pressure to homogenize the community was conducted by Karch 2018; especially see the chapter: The Instrumental *Volksgemeinschaft*: Making "Loyal" Germans, 1933–1944, pp. 218–257; and the chapter: The Postwar Ultimatum: Making "Loyal" Poles after 1945, pp. 258–294.

With the revival of regional sentiment in the postmodern society in the EU, the question, "Who is Silesian?", remains alive and open even today (Baron, Michalczyk, Witkowski 2015; Nowak 2012).

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MULTIPLE BODY AND PRIVATE COMMEMORATIVE PRACTICES: TOWARDS A NEW RESEARCH PARADIGM

Cyborg anthropology studies techno-human assemblages and documents the multiple and intimate links of the human body with technologies, both modern and traditional. The entanglements of human bodies with artefacts, infrastructures and various elements of human-made environments create a split between a person's physical and social death. The author argues that the death of a multiple body is heterochronous due to the existence of a number of various types of assemblages that include the human body and its immediate environment. Current death diagnostics focus on biological criteria and ignore the social and cultural perceptions of death; bio-medical approach to death excludes the concept of a social body, which plays important part in personal commemoration practices. The elements of the distributed

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social body that survive the physical death of a human being serve posthumously as triggers for the private commemorative acts and practices that have not so far attracted the attention of social researchers both in the domain of death studies, as well as in memory studies. This is a position paper that outlines the contours of the new research paradigm for the study of mundane commemoration acts and their tacit geographies. The research for the paper has been fulfilled in accordance with the research plan of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences.

Key words: body multiple, social body, techno-somatic assemblages, death studies, memory studies, private commemorative practices

The issue of commemorative practices in the context of social and historical memory brings together separate debates in several research areas, including enhancement debates, body studies, death studies, and memory studies. Particular ideas and concepts from eco-theory, techno-anthropology, material semiotics, and new materialism are also relevant for the subject. This complex array of approaches and methods was necessitated by the cross-cultural study of the communicative aspects of thanatological practices and beliefs that had started some three years ago by a team of anthropologists from the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. For the purposes of comparison, our fieldwork had been conducted on three continents, and my colleagues from the project's team were involved in the research of the funeral and commemorative practices in several provinces in China, as well as in Tanzania, Estonia, Germany, Cyprus, and several regions in Russia. This article aims at elaboration of a theoretical framework that might be useful in dealing with the field, where human bodies (alive and dead), memories, and material objects are in constant interaction.

Communication with the dead, at least in the case of many modern European cultures and societies, does not necessarily involve the interference of any mystical figures or forces. Vivid memories and imagination suffice. Social scientists tend to ascribe memory and commemoration almost exclusively to humans. This tendency, however, might be just an unfortunate aberration, since not only animals, but also other non-humans, artefacts and natural objects included, possess their own types of memory in the form of traces of the past interactions with other living and inert objects and substances. In the context of material semiotics such traces reflect (and the interactions constitute) the acts of 'commu-

nication', albeit not always traceable and legible for the humans. There is also a tendency in memory studies, even in social memory studies, to associate memory exclusively with mental acts, with the brain and its "products" of mostly verbal nature, that is, with texts, discourses, and ideologies. Apparently, even the material objects that we most frequently encounter within social memory and death studies are usually viewed as some kind of "representations": monuments, photos, museum collections, archive documents, graves and cemeteries, etc. 'referring to' or 'indicating' to the transcendental world of the dead. This bias towards the representational happens due to the excessive attention to collective memory and relative neglect of personal commemorative practices. With the help of the conception of extended and embedded memory I will attempt if not to rectify, than to amend this bias.

In what follows I draw upon various critical approaches and theoretical perspectives, including actor-network methodology, object-oriented and neo-materialist approaches, as well as theories of embodiment to offer a treatment of bodies as cultural, material, mediated, interacting and assembled entities, existing as parts of complex agglomerates or 'integrated circuits', wherein living and inert substances interact and form durable wholes.

Extended mind hypothesis and its implications for death and memory studies

Since the publication of the pioneering work by Andy Clark and David Chalmers (Clark, Chalmers 1998) the scholars of human mind, cognition and memory debate the idea that human faculties do not reside exclusively "in the head". Traditional attempts to study human mind are based on the belief that all mental processes, including perception, memory and recollection, thought and rational argumentation are located in the brain and enacted or executed exclusively by cerebral functions. The opposing view that becomes prevalent in cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind unites brain, body and its environment, presenting thoughts and feelings as embodied, embedded and extended. This ecological approach to human perception and cognition has deeper roots, but for the present purposes its history might be omitted. The on-going dispute between traditional view on the location of human faculties and the new ecological theories of mind is known as internalists vs. externalists debate (cf.: Lenay, Steiner 2010). The ecological arguments

in favour of the extended mind case are further strengthened by the concept of extension, first suggested by the German philosopher of technology Ernst Kapp (Kapp 1877) and elaborated later by such eminent scholars from diverse research fields as Siegmund Freud (Freud 1930, 2006), American inventor, architect, and philosopher Richard Buckminster Fuller (Buckminster Fuller 1935, 1938), American anthropologist and pioneer of proxemics Edward Hall (Hall 1959, 1976), and Canadian media theorist Marshall McLuhan (McLuhan 1966), among others. Whether or not one subscribes to the Clark–Chalmers hypothesis, further elaborated by Clark (Clark, Chalmers 1998) or to its various variants and alternative conceptualizations, such as "enactivism" by Francesco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch (Varela, Thompson, Rosch 1987, 1992), Mark Rowlands' "environmentalism", or Susan Hurley's "vehicle externalism", one finds that the new approach to mind in cognitive sciences fits well with the reconceptualization of the organism–environment interactions that emerged due to the works of the researchers, mentioned above. In both domains arising phenomena are treated as the joint product of brain, body, and their immediate environment.

How these new approaches influence death and/or memory studies? In order to answer this question we shall need more detailed and nuanced understanding of the interactions of organisms (in this case, human bodies) with various elements of their environment.

Human body and its environmental entanglements

There are multiple ways of human body integration with its immediate milieu, that need at least a working typology of emerging links or relations between body or its parts, on the one hand, and environment or its elements, on the other. What happens to such organic-inorganic conglomerates, the units that are constitute both by the living and inert matter, or somatic-technical assemblages after the death of the physical body? How our memories of the deceased are influenced by the elements of their remaining 'social bodies', i.e. by the material remnants of former assemblages in which their bodies have constituted integral parts?

In the following parts of the paper I will outline the concept of heterochronous death of 'social' and 'physical' bodies and illustrate with a few examples the consequences of death's multiplicity for the research of communication with the dead and for the study of private geography

of commemoration and memorialization practices that this particular perspective opens up.

Let us look closer at the material assemblages that include human bodies and their environments as their constitutive elements. Instead of mental constructs of the past, the focus of our discussion will shift to human bodies, or to use the now famous concept by Annemarie Mol, to "body multiple" (Mol 2002), as well as on various objects, natural and artificial, organic and inorganic, and the material traces that we as humans leave when we depart from life. I claim that such traces act as routine triggers, provoking fleeting commemorative acts as a part of our quotidian activities that due to the elusive, idiosyncratic, and deeply personal nature of such acts have gone so far largely uncommented, unnoticed, and under-researched.

My argument runs as follows: organisms and their varying environments form inextricable units. This point has been argued long ago by many eco-theorists, Jakob von Uexküll (von Uexküll 1920) and Gregory Bateson (Bateson 1972, p. 319 – 320) among the first. Human death involves the more or less quick deterioration and demise of the physical body, but very gradual disappearance into anonymity of various elements of the distributed social body of the person (cf.: Hallam, Hockey, Howarth 1999; Lock 2002). From the anthropocentric perspective the forces that support memory, the so-called 'memorial objects' or memory triggers, often turn out to be precisely the elements of techno-human or 'biological–inert' assemblages that survive after physical death of its 'avatar'.

To see how it works, consider the working typology of techno-human (or to use the Greek root, techne-human) units that fuse cultural and/or technical artefacts and human body into various types of assemblages. Psychosomatic assemblages are rarely perceived as hybrid entities or the results of natural and artificial elements. André Leroi-Gourhan (Leroi-Gourhan 1943; 1945) followed Marcel Mauss (Mauss 1934) in making a significant contribution to the study of the techniques of the body and developed the principles of comparative technology, which subsequently formed the basis of the French school of cultural technology, or what he called the 'ethnology of technique'. This group of techne-human assemblages includes skills, habits, daily routines, bodily dispositions, cultural mannerisms (such as culture-specific gestures and mimic) and those deeply ingrained cultural rules and norms a person follows automatically and unconsciously.

Such skills as driving a car, or riding a bicycle, swimming or paddling in a boat, or even using a ladder or an escalator become 'engraved' or 'impressed' in bodily dispositions, movement styles and a set of habits or habitus that form and sometimes deform human bodies. Habitual use of certain objects blur perceived body boundaries via integration into the body image and body schema. Famous examples are the blind person's cane in Maurice Merleau-Ponty's "Phenomenology of Perception" (Merleau-Ponty 1945) or an automobile in Richard Buckminster Fuller's "Nine Chains to the Moon" (Buckminster Fuller 1938). Various human body and brain extensions that encompass culture as a whole had been described and analysed by various scholars of the long tradition of the human prostheses and extensions studies: besides the already mentioned works by E. Kapp, S. Freud, R.B. Fuller, E. Hall, and M. McLuhan (McLuhan 1966), in more recent research by Bruno Latour (Latour 2005) and his colleagues (e.g., DeLanda 2016), and by cognitivist scientists mentioned above.

Fig. 1. Groups of technomorphic or techno-somatic assemblages

Psycho- and somatotechniques	Prosthetic devices and apparatuses
Skills	Implants
Habits	Medical prostheses
Routines	Technical extensions
Body dispositions	Infrastructures
Norms	Drugs and medicines
Rules	

Plurality, multiplicity and the human body

There are several ways in the history of body studies, philosophy and medicine to approach and conceptualize the multiplicity of a human body. Medicine and bio-anthropology study physical human body and its variations across the globe. In medical anthropology Annemarie Mol contrasted human body's plurality with its multiplicity, by supporting (in her study of atherosclerosis in Dutch clinics) Donna Haraway's idea that human body might be paradoxically "less than many, but more than one". In phenomenological philosophy physical human body is contrasted

with lived or phenomenological body, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty had famously demonstrated that the boundaries of the latter might exceed the perceived external boundaries of the former. Finally, in sociology of the body that emerged in 1980s with social body as its basic object, the social aspects of human body are contrasted with physical body. Recently, STS and object-oriented philosophies added one more dimension to this multiplicity: the idea of body as an aggregate, included in complex techno-somatic assemblages. These three 'bodies' – physical, phenomenological, and social – die or cease to exist differently, each in its own and specific way, and leave distinctive traces after their demise. Now, we come to the issue of memory.

I have already mentioned the bias in social memory studies towards collective and the neglect of attention to its individual or personal dimensions. My main thesis runs as follows: various forms and types of social body's embeddedness in immediate surroundings leave lasting traces, outliving by far the physical body death. Some of such traces are anonymous: we do not remember, or do not care enough to recollect who or what has left a particular trace, but when we do it, the attribution or ascription of the trace with a particular human or non-human entity turns out to be not only the acknowledgement of the link, but simultaneously contributes to the stability of the assemblage that we encounter and recognize. When this concerns a departed person, such recognition contributes to sustenance of her or his social body. Such assemblages or their surviving parts form private geographies of commemoration that in their turn create hitherto unexplored commemorative landscapes and communication channels of the living with the deceased.

Russian poet Aleksandr Pushkin in his free translation of Horatio's "Exegi monumentum" famously remarked:

> "No, *never will I die in full* – the soul in sacred
> lyre will ashes mine survive and decay will escape
> and famous will I be until below the moon yet
> here lives at least one poet left …" [italics added]

Great poets and artists, travellers and inventors, scientists and politicians are not alone in securing material memories of their deeds for eternity. Ordinary mortals with their daily routines, skills, habits, inventions and continuous entanglements with surrounding forces and entities cannot but leave lasting traces of their existence that have

literally formed parts of their cyborgian bodies and minds. The triviality and everydayness of such traces prevent us from seeing them as such, but if we for a moment concentrate on the task, we immediately recollect numerous and practically daily instances when we remember, revive, and commemorate our friends, acquaintances and relatives, thus communicating with them via our recollections and commemorative practices. As such practices are normal, spurious, and private, they are not visible and do not attract scholars' attention, which usually encompasses only publicly visible or official commemoration sites, such as cemeteries, cenotaphs, monuments, museums, etc. We encounter the descriptions of private commemoration practices only in memoirs, autobiographies, family chronicles, journals and diaries. Thus the prevalent academic genres for their discovery would be autoethnography and discourse analysis.

Idiosyncratic nature of most stimuli or triggers that invoke our memories of the deceased prevent their systematic study or even their appearance as the objects of research. Another reason for such oblivion is the scientific tendency to focus on universal, repetitive, and common and to neglect unique, particular, personal, and private. Subject to this modernist ideology we tend to forget that private and personal could be at the same time common and universal. This tendency to emphasize and privilege universality over particularity, and abstract over concrete, underlies such trait of the globalized Western culture as the obliteration of personal connections and links between humans and non-humans, the disguise or covering such links with universal anonymity. At the same time in folklore and daily life of many traditional societies (especially among animists, as well as among younger children) such links preserve their personal dimension, connecting unique persons, living or dead, with other humans and non-humans. We, as a rule, tend to forget who invented, created, made or used this or that particular thing that we encounter. This anonymity and depersonification, is nonetheless not absolute, and I will provide some pertinent examples, illustrating the idiosyncrasy of private commemorative practices and habits.

New York Times columnist Ryan Holiday in his regular review of fiction mentions some private memories of a friend he had. In a comment on the book by Tetsuko Kuroyanagi "Totto-Chan: The Little Girl at the Window" he writes:

"It's the story of the extraordinary childhood and education of Tetsuko Kuroyanagi, basically the Ellen or Oprah of Japan. She was pre-

cious and strange and met exactly the right kind of teachers who knew exactly how to cultivate those virtues in her. This book has a special place in my heart because it was a favorite of my friend Seth Roberts, who died suddenly a few years ago. I think about him every time I think of the book."

Just one more example: I had never met my granddad, who was sentenced by troika and shot in 1933. I knew him only by his portrait in my grandma's house. Nevertheless, he was a person who accompanied my every meal as we fought with my cousin for the right to eat with the tin spoon that was known to be his own. Granddad, as all the family on my mother's side, belong to old-believers, who always used only their own individual and thus very personal cutlery and tableware. So it was a real privilege to get access to his spoon, and my connections with my granddad felt lasting and real. I was about twelve, when the spoon got lost as our boat overturned on one of our fishing trips to the river junction where the biggest waterway of Western Siberia Ob' starts its way to the north. It felt as if my connection with granddad had been irreversibly severed.

A brief survey among my acquaintances and friends on the subject of such spurious commemoration acts revealed a broad range of stimuli, from olfactory to haptic and visual, that triggered memories of the deceased. Most of my respondents were of the age, when their parents are still alive, but their grandparents passed away, so their memories of the dead had been very often related to their own childhood. One of my friends told me that she always thought of her grandmother, who died many years ago, whenever she smelled creosote, a wood preservative used for railroad sleepers or ties to prevent their rotting. When a child, she travelled by train every summer with her grandma to village relatives, who lived in a neighbouring region, and the pungent smell of ties had fused with memories of her granny. When she narrated this story, tears welled up in her eyes, as she told me: "I rarely recollect her now; there are no wooden ties left. Nowadays they use concrete sleepers, – she complained, – so the days of creosote passed, together with my memories."

The individualism and egotism of our age, as well as the modernist tendency to reduce body to 'skinbag boundaries' and mind to brain's 'grey matter' prevent us from acknowledging and fully appreciating the crucial parts that various material things and other persons, including humans, animals or plant species play in such reminiscences.

Unlike official places that were specially designed for the practices of commemoration and have stable spatial co-ordinates, like cemeteries or museums, the geography of private commemorative triggers is rarely spatially stable and has its anchors, instead of places, in material assemblages, sets of practices and private encounters or events that formerly included both those who remember and those who passed away. We tend to interpret our commemoration as purely mental acts, or 'cerebral events', whereas it certainly has its material side ('material extensions'), without which we tend to lose our contact with the deceased. This kind of extended or materially enhanced memories is yet one more kind of 'extension' or rather human–nonhuman assemblage that inconspicuously prolongs the lives of distributed human social bodies, which slowly pass away when anonymity and amnesia obliterates their multiple 'inscriptions' or traces of their material entanglements. As our bodies are partible and easily permeated by various others, both humans and non-humans, our deaths are heterochronous, and our memories extended, entangled and embedded in environments that we as humans create and inhabit together with other beings.

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MODERN TECHNOLOGIES IN THE SERVICE OF COMMEMORATING THE VICTIMS OF UNDEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS. THE CASE OF POLAND

Human memory can be defined as the ability to record, store, and reproduce sensory experiences, associations, and various types of information. In the most general sense, memory contents are created in two ways, where the first way is the individual's own experience, and the second – the immersion of the person in the culture in which he or she functions. Thanks to being in the culture, an individual is able to draw from stories about the past and interpretations of events important for the community, which co-create the content of his/her memory (next to experience). Among these stories about the past (memory narratives) there are scientific and popular science works, media and journalistic messages, witnesses' accounts, art products, myths, symbols and contents of politics of memory. It is worth noting that modern technologies have a significant share in the transfer of these stories about the past. This fact, in turn, is reflected in the research issues raised in this article.

Therefore, the main purpose of presented text was to answer the question about the role of modern technologies in commemorating the victims of undemocratic systems. The developed deliberations focused on answering the questions: how modern technologies influence the commemoration; what effects they have on the memory of societies,

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and what challenges they pose. The indicated research problems were discussed on the example of Poland, based on the results of the author's own research. The issues discussed were divided into three areas in order to organize the results of scientific reflection: (I) museums, (II) websites and Internet portals, as well as (III) mobile applications and digital devices. This allowed to formulate conclusions that focused, among other things, on the problem of availability of new forms of commemoration and the effects of their possibilities, or on the consequences within individual and collective identity.

Key words: modern technologies, collective and individual memory, politics of memory, site of memory, commemorating the victims of undemocratic systems

Introduction

Over the years, the issues of constructing the content of human memory, as well as commemorating the past, have been the subject of research of scientists from around the world, representing various fields of knowledge (including social sciences, humanities, biological and medical sciences). As a result, the interest in remembering has become an area of interdisciplinary dialogue, and explaining the phenomenon of memory has often been accompanied by reflections on the reasons for the fascination with this very area of human life and functioning of societies. Authors described various premises, very often emphasizing their co-occurrence and interaction (see among others: Assmann 2009, p. 101 – 123; Bernhard, Kubik 2014; Erll 2018, p. 11 – 18; Lebow, Kansteiner, Fogu 2006; Marszałek-Kawa, Piechowiak-Lamparska, Ratke-Majewska, Wawrzyński 2017; Marszałek-Kawa, Wawrzyński, Ratke-Majewska 2017; Skibiński, Wiścicki, Wysocki 2011). For example, German professor of cultural studies, Astrid Erll pointed to the coincidence of three factors in the last two decades of the 20th century. The first of them was the historical transformations (consisting in: the passing away of the generation that survived World War II and directly experienced the Holocaust; the collapse of the binary structure of the Eastern and Western culture of remembrance as a consequence of the end of the Cold War; the stimulation of a multitude of national and ethnic memories as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union; the emergence of a category of truth and reconciliation in the countries that have gone from authoritarianism to democracy; the increase in the multi-memory structure of societies as

a result of migration and decolonization; the impact of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the war on terror on the construction of memory). The second factor pointed out by Erll was the changes in media technologies and the role of popular media (meaning the infinite possibility of storing digital data by computers and the Internet, with the simultaneous threat of cultural amnesia, where the data stored in excess become "dead knowledge" and the existing overload makes it difficult to select content worth remembering). The third mentioned factor in turn was the processes taking place within the scientific world, in which the increase in significance of the notion of memory became an unexpected result of the post-structuralism of the 1980s and postmodern historiosophy (Erll 2018, p. 15 – 18).

In view of the above, it should be emphasized that the issue of remembrance and commemoration has also become – just as for other sciences – important for the political sciences, serving analysis, explanation, and prediction of numerous political phenomena and processes. In this way, the problem of constructing memory can be considered for political sciences as a great and still unfathomable area of exploration. For this reason, this text – as part of a broader political reflection on the relationship between remembrance or commemoration and the domestic or foreign policy of a country – presents the issue of the importance of modern technologies, i.e. various types of advanced technical solutions, in commemorating the victims of undemocratic systems. Considerations contained in the presented article also try to show how modern technologies influence commemoration, what effects they bring on the memory of societies, and what challenges they pose.

How do we remember?

Regardless of the scientific perspective considered, human memory can be most simply defined as the ability to record, store, and reproduce sensory experiences, associations, and various types of information (taking place at both conscious and unconscious levels). Such a definition covers both the functioning of the brain and broad issues of individual participation in society, culture, and interpersonal interactions. It therefore takes into account not only the processes of learning by heart (including mnemonic methods), but also the participation in cultural traditions acquired through education.

The very general understanding of the term "memory" shown above indicates two ways of creating memory content. On the one hand, it can be constructed according to human personal experience. On the other hand, it is a structure created on the basis of stories about the past existing in the culture, of which a given person is part and within which he or she functions. These stories of the past, placed in the cultural context, are memory narratives, characterized by the fact that they do not reflect the past itself, but interpretations of the past (images existing in the culture and concerning past events). The memory of past events – alongside experience – is also created through stories. These stories include, among others, scientific and popular science works, media and journalistic messages, witnesses' accounts, art products, myths, symbols, and contents of politics of memory (by means of which state authorities determine the constituent parts of collective memory in order to protect the continuity of the community and to achieve benefits in the field of current politics) (Assmann 2009, p. 101 – 123; Erll 2018, p. 19 – 22; Maruszewski 2001, p. 79, 117 – 118; Ratke-Majewska 2018b, p. 350, 353; Schacter 2003, p. 22; Szacka 2006, p. 44 – 45; Tokarz 2005, p. 4 –11; Topolski 1996; see also: Assmann 2008).

Nowadays, modern technologies are important in transferring memory narratives (both within the community and on the state-society line). These technologies, in fact, co-create or create sites of memory[1] and become transmitters of scientific, popular science, journalistic and media contents. They are also able to disseminate witness accounts and

1 Site of memory (*lieu de mémoire)* is a site that is a living history, evoking the past and constituting a symbolic element of the heritage of memory at every community. The researcher who is considered to be the initiator of scientific reflection on the issue of sites of memory was Pierre Nora. The first analyses of this subject appeared in his works from the 1970s. The descriptions presented at that time prove that the author actually considered the site of memory as a place – in the literal sense of the word – where communities, such as a nation, family, ethnic group or party, store their memories. These were: topographical places (archives, libraries, museums), monumental places (architecture, cemeteries, monuments), symbolic places (pilgrimages, anniversaries, commemorations) and functional places (autobiographies, textbooks, associations). However, the meaning of the term "site of memory" in Pierre Nora's deliberations has expanded over time. Initially, the researcher focused exclusively on material places, but later, as his work from the 1980s shows, he began to include the aspect of immateriality in their perception. (Ratke-Majewska 2018a, p. 269 – 271).

various types of art products. So, they are able to serve commemoration. What, therefore, is the relation between the commemoration (in the case shown in this text – of the victims of undemocratic systems) and new technologies? It is worth presenting these issues divided into various areas of using modern technologies. For the purposes of this text, three such areas are distinguished: (I) museums, (II) websites and Internet portals, (III) mobile applications and digital devices. They were discussed based on Polish examples.

Modern technologies in the service of commemoration – museums

A museum is one of the traditional topographic sites of memory. It should be noted that modern museums very widely and commonly use modern technologies, including elements of interaction with visitors. Audio guides which offer exhibition descriptions in many languages, are increasingly used, audio-visual documents are provided as part of exhibitions, and digital tools are often used for educational initiatives. It is worth mentioning here – to confirm – examples of Polish historical museums which draw on modern technologies very widely, while also commemorating the victims of undemocratic systems. Therefore, the presentation of examples is included in the descriptions below.

POLIN Museum of the History of Polish Jews in Warsaw

The museum was officially established in 2005. Since 2013 it has been located in a modern building (it was located in a temporary site before). This institution serves both as a traditional museum and as a cultural and educational centre. Importantly, it does not focus its message only on World War II and the Holocaust, but describes the contribution of Jews to the development of Polish culture, science, and economy. It commonly uses interactive exhibitions (e.g. interactive models) and digital tools (creating multimedia positions), and carries out its educational mission during workshops, lectures, and debates, as well as through library collections and publications (see: POLIN Museum of the History of Polish Jews n.d.).

Illustration 1. POLIN Museum of the History of Polish Jews in Warsaw (source: Newsweek.pl 2015).

Warsaw Rising Museum

The museum was established in 1983, and opened in 2004. This institution has an interactive and narrative character: it works through image, light, and sound. Its interior design and the use of multimedia effects are intended to bring the reality of the Warsaw Uprising closer. Many elements of the exhibition show the history of the Uprising through the prism of its participants' experiences. The route marked out in the museum presents the chronology of events and leads through individual themed rooms, decorated in scenery from over 70 years ago (see: The Warsaw Rising Museum n.d.).

European Solidarity Centre

It is an institution established in 2007 to promote the heritage of "Solidarity" in Poland and other countries. The European Solidarity Centre started operating in 2008 in a temporary headquarters, since

2014 it has been operating in a new one. The heart of the new ESC headquarters is a permanent exhibition dedicated to the history of "Solidarity" and opposition movements that led to democratic changes throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Traditional display methods are used for presentations, as well as the latest technological solutions. Visitors have a chance to see historical exhibits. They also have access to spatial and electronic projections, where archive video footage, press clippings, photographs, documents, maps, calendars, and biographies are collected. In addition to the permanent exhibition, the headquarters of the Centre includes, among others, an archive, a library, a media library, and a multi-purpose room (see: European Solidarity Centre n.d.).

Modern technologies in the service of commemoration – websites and Internet portals

Through the websites of many institutions, it becomes possible to obtain information on the course of various events, build knowledge based on the analysis of diverse types of documents (both written and non-written, including audio-visual) and scientific works, as well as gain an easy access to data that can shape our memory of the past. Importantly, the following three groups of examples should be highlighted among official websites of public or public-private institutions:

Museum websites – through them we can take a virtual walk around the museum or watch video lessons from exhibitions, as well as gather knowledge about exhibits without leaving home (e.g. before visiting a given museum). Many museums also publish documents (written, photographic, audio, visual, and audio-visual) on their websites. A good example of such initiatives can be Archiwum Historii Mówionej (Eng. the Oral History Archive) and Fototeka (which is a database of photos from the Warsaw Uprising, the occupation period, as well as pre-war and post-war Warsaw) of the Warsaw Uprising Museum website. Some museums – also through their websites – organize interactive educational quizzes for children or use computer animations for educational purposes. It is worth noting that websites of modern museums very often offer access to related internet platforms, focused on more detailed issues. In the case of the POLIN Museum, these are the following websites: Wirtualny Sztetl (Eng. The Virtual Shtetl – which is an online portal documenting the history of Jewish communities in Eastern and Central Europe), "Polscy Sprawiedliwi – przywracanie pamięci" (Eng.

"The Polish Righteous – Recalling Forgotten History" – project dedicated to those who saved Jews during the Holocaust), Żydowska Warszawa (Eng. Jewish Warsaw – an online multimedia guide), and Centralna Baza Judaików (Eng. The Central Judaica Database – an internet database of information on artefacts and documents related to Jewish culture in Poland and in the world) (see among others: POLIN Museum of the History of Polish Jews n.d.; Polish History Museum n.d.; The Warsaw Rising Museum n.d.).



Illustration 2. The Warsaw Uprising Museum website (source: The Warsaw Rising Museum n.d.).

Websites of state institutions dealing with commemoration – a good example for this group is the website of the Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation (Pol. Instytut Pamięci Narodowej – Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu; IPN), which contains publications, films, and various types of information about commemoration, in particular in Poland. The Institute's website also has references to many thematic online platforms, such as: Pamięć.pl (Eng. Memory.pl – an educational website of the Institute of National Remembrance), Moja Niepodległa (Eng. My Independent – a portal about the celebration of the centenary of regaining independence by Poland), Katyń 1940 (a website dedicated to the Katyn massacre), or Polskie Państwo Podziemne (Eng. Polish Underground State – a website containing descriptions, biographies, witness accounts, film materials, and records of scientific conferences that concern secret structures of the Polish state

existing during World War II and reporting to the Government of the Republic of Poland in exile) and many others (see: Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation n.d.; Instytut Pamięci Narodowej – Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu n.d.).

Digital archives and libraries – these are huge databases containing written and non-written documents (such as photographic, audio, visual, and audio-visual documents) depending on the type of archive. For example, the following websites are worth mentioning: Narodowe Archiwum Cyfrowe (Eng. National Digital Archive – collects, develops, and preserves photographs, file documentation, sound recordings, and films included in the state archival resource; digitized photos and descriptions of some recordings are available online), Archiwa Przełomu 1989 – 1991 (Eng. Archives of the 1989 – 1991 Breakthrough is a website dedicated to the project implemented jointly by the Chancellery of the Senate and the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland; the goal of the project is to create an electronic and nationwide catalogue of resources – documents, photographs, audio recordings, films, posters, leaflets, souvenirs or exhibits – shared in the Internet to anyone interested in the history of this period), Federacja Bibliotek Cyfrowych (Eng. Digital Libraries Federation – a website gathering collections available in Polish libraries, archives or digital museums, including – among many other objects – press materials, monographs, and maps from the 19th and 20th centuries), or Szukaj w Archiwach (Eng. Search in Archives – on-line archival collections with files, records, maps, photos, technical documentation, etc.) (Archiwa Przełomu 1989 – 1991 n.d.; Federacja Bibliotek Cyfrowych n.d.; Narodowe Archiwum Cyfrowe n.d.; Szukaj w Archiwach n.d.). It is worth noting that online platforms associated with museums are also often digital archives.

Importantly, the shape of society's memory can be influenced not only by the official websites of public or public-private institutions presented above. Websites and accounts on social networking sites of individuals and fully private organizations, which through their contents seek to commemorate certain events or people, are also of great importance in the formulation of collective and individual memory. However, unlike the case of official websites of public or public-private institutions (that offer access to data, documents and scientific works), where we expect their contents to be reliable, in the case of private pages and private accounts on social networks, we cannot be sure of their

reliability. In turn, it cannot be said that these not always reliable private contents do not affect individual and collective memory. They create memory and should be treated as an important element of commemoration. Important, because the closest to society, more often used than official websites or museum exhibitions, and, therefore, more common.

In order to develop the above-mentioned reflections, it is worth paying attention to accounts on social networking services, carrying out a brief analysis of Polish patriotic accounts on Facebook[2]. There are several hundred accounts that define themselves as patriotic. Most of them have been created over the last decade and they enjoy popularity from several hundred thousand people (based on the numbers of followers or likes). As for the memory narratives regarding commemoration of victims of undemocratic regimes, it is worth noting that they focus primarily on slogans, maxims, symbols, and images – they do not focus on discussion. They also do not focus on transferring historical knowledge (they often evoke a simplified picture of events or a simple untruth, e.g. on the Cursed Soldiers – whitening of some characters is visible).

2 The research discussed by the author was carried out at the turn of 2017/2018, the results obtained were verified and updated in 2019 and 2020. Among the analysed websites, there were: Jestem dumny, że jestem Polakiem (Eng. I'm proud to be Polish); Lechistan Patriotów (Eng. Lechistan of Patriots); Wychowanie patriotyczne (Eng. Patriotic education); Patriotyczna Polska (Eng. Patriotic Poland); PATRIOTYZM (Eng. PATRIOTISM); Patriotyzm jest w polakach (Eng. Patriotism is in Poles); Patrioci. Z troski o Ojczyznę! (Eng. Patriots. Out of concern for my Homeland!); Polska dla Prawdziwych Patriotów (Eng. Poland for the True Patriots); Młodzi Patrioci (Eng. Young Patriots) (names of websites in Polish are written in accordance with the source spelling) (see: Jestem dumny, że jestem Polakiem n.d.; Lechistan Patriotów n.d.; Młodzi Patrioci n.d.; Patrioci. Z troski o Ojczyznę! n.d.; Patriotyczna Polska n.d.; Patriotyzm jest w polakach n.d.; PATRIOTYZM n.d.; Polska dla Prawdziwych Patriotów n.d.; Wychowanie patriotyczne n.d.).

Illustration 3. One of the graphics from the Facebook account entitled Wychowanie patriotyczne (Eng. Patriotic education) (source: Wychowanie patriotyczne n.d.)

Modern technologies in the service of commemoration – mobile applications and digital devices

Thanks to mobile applications, it becomes possible to disseminate information on specific events from the past, to induce specific memory contents, as well as to interest younger generations in a given section of history – of course, depending on the form of the application, because next to educational games for children and teenagers there are commonly guides and maps (such as Mapa Miejsc Pamięci Narodowej – Eng. the Map of Places of National Memory – application of the Institute of National Remembrance). Importantly, the number of museums investing in the creation of applications is growing every year. It is also worth adding that thanks to digital devices, e.g. e-book readers, it is often easier to reach scientific or popular science contents related to the past of the community.

Summary

In the light of the above-mentioned considerations, what do new technologies bring to commemoration? First of all – they give the opportunity to commemorate at any time and in any place. Thanks to

them we can participate in commemoration at every step, even via our telephone. This can be considered an advantage. On the other hand, the significant participation of private contents in commemoration – easily accessible through modern technologies and – as has already been mentioned – not always consistent with historical knowledge, as well as the politics of memory of a state – can distort (in an uncontrolled way) the image of the past and deprives state institutions of control over commemoration within larger groups.

What's more, new technologies bring theatralization and visualization to the commemoration (theatralization, i.e. the increasingly important role of performative actions in commemoration; visualization, i.e. the dominance of visual impressions in constructing the content of memory) (Szpociński 2011, p. 11 – 12). Therefore, in building and transferring historical narratives, the influence on various senses, through sound, word, and image, is becoming increasingly significant. What are the consequences of this? First of all, the processes of transmitting, creating, and maintaining specific memory contents in the community become easier. Thus, new technologies facilitate commemoration. In addition, theatralization and visualization cause emotions to grow, which enhances the intended effect. This effect may include, among others, stimulating specific attitudes and reactions towards the present (also towards one's own community and/or other communities), evoking specific expectations for the future, strengthening national pride or uniting the community around common ideas. New technologies, theatralization, and visualization evoke great emotions and attract attention, which are able to increase the educational value of a given form of commemoration (see: Ratke-Majewska 2018a, p. 271 – 272).

It is also worth adding that the use of new technologies in commemoration makes it easier to maintain identity (awareness of who you are) in a constantly changing reality. The increasing dynamics of changes, the faster and faster falling into the past of what is present, mean that in order to preserve our identity, also for future generations, we must collect more and more data in memory (and new technologies make it accessible – we are able to collect data for future generations and save them from destruction). Why? Because the changing reality brings consequences in the form of a task, which Pierre Nora called "the responsibility of remembering." The author wrote about this task in the following way: "THE ACCELERATION OF HISTORY: let us try to gauge the significance, beyond metaphor, of this phrase. An

increasingly rapid slippage of the present into a historical past that is gone for good, a general perception that anything and everything may disappear – these indicate a rupture of equilibrium. The remnants of experience still lived in the warmth of tradition, in the silence of custom, in the repetition of the ancestral, have been displaced under the pressure of a fundamentally historical sensibility. Self-consciousness emerges under the sign of that which has already happened, as the fulfilment of something always already begun. We speak so much of memory because there is so little of it left. […] Modern memory is, above all, archival. It relies entirely on the materiality of the trace, the immediacy of the recording, the visibility of the image. What began as writing ends as high fidelity and tape recording. The less memory is experienced from the inside the more it exists only through its exterior scaffolding and outward signs-hence the obsession with the archive that marks our age, attempting at once the complete conservation of the present as well as the total preservation of the past. Fear of a rapid and final disappearance combines with anxiety about the meaning of the present and uncertainty about the future to give even the most humble testimony, the most modest vestige, the potential dignity of the memorable. Have we not sufficiently regretted and deplored the loss or destruction, by our predecessors, of potentially informative sources to avoid opening ourselves to the same reproach from our successors? Memory has been wholly absorbed by its meticulous reconstitution. Its new vocation is to record; delegating to the archive the responsibility of remembering, it sheds its signs upon depositing them there, as a snake sheds its skin" (Nora 1989, p. 7, 13).

It is worth noting, however, that an undoubted threat of using new technologies in commemoration is the creation of different memories. Both memories of those who are able to use modern technologies present in commemoration and those who are unable to do so (and use only traditional forms); the same – memories of those whose commemoration takes place through modern museums, official websites, portals, and scientific publications, as well as those who build commemoration contents through not always reliable private websites and accounts on social networks. This creates new opportunities for the polyphony of memories of ever wider and wider communities.

The use of new technologies to commemorate the victims of undemocratic systems has therefore undoubted advantages as well as undeniable disadvantages. Thus, it is a new, important area of scientific

research, challenging both the humanities and social sciences, as well as politicians and public institutions.

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Rustem Kadyrzhanov

NATION BUILDING IN KAZAKHSTAN: HOMOGENEOUS OR HETEROGENEOUS CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS?

In the course of the study of homogeneous and heterogeneous cultural and linguistic foundations for nation building in Kazakhstan, the author came to the following conclusions which can be considered as scientific results.

1. As in most post-Soviet states, the language issue is at the centre of the nation-building in Kazakhstan, where Kazakhs are the core nation of the ethno-national state. The peculiarity of the language situation is that the Kazakh language cannot really take a dominant position in society to become the language of interethnic communication. Thus, Kazakhstan, having a number of features of an ethno-national state, lacks one of its main attributes – the national language.

2. Due to a real leading position of Russian in interethnic communication, the contradiction of homogeneous and heterogeneous lingual processes raises to the fore in the nation-building in Kazakhstan. Namely,

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the issue of the impact of Russian on the language policy of the state is of great importance for the nation-building.

3. Three socio-political forces with their positions on the issue of cultural foundations of the nation-building in Kazakhstan are identified:

- Kazakh national-patriotic organizations defending homogeneous foundations of the nation-building based exclusively on the Kazakh language;
- A ruling elite that supports both homogeneous and heterogeneous cultural foundations of the nation-building;
- Russian organizations that defend the heterogeneous foundations of nation-building with an emphasis on the support of the Russian language by the authorities.

4. It can be assumed that homogeneous and heterogeneous cultural and linguistic processes of nation-building in Kazakhstan will remain in their current state of parallel existence under the control of the authorities for a long time. In the near and medium term, contradictions between Kazakh-speaking and Russian-speaking Kazakhs on the issues of relations between the Kazakh and Russian languages may increase. In the longer term, we should expect the spread of English and Chinese languages in Kazakhstan.

5. The preservation and parallel existence of homogeneous and heterogeneous cultural and linguistic foundations of nation building means that the Kazakh language will never acquire the real status of the state language. This means that Kazakhstan will remain a national state with the core nation in the future, but without a national or state language, which in ethno-national states is the language of the core nation.

6. The practice of nation-building in Kazakhstan shows that even with a political roof in the face of the national state, the Kazakh language cannot acquire the cultural and linguistic potential necessary to become a means of verbal communication not only for other ethnic groups, but also for urban Kazakhs, who remain to a larger extent a Russian-speaking group.

6. The conclusion about Kazakhstan as an ethno-national state, which actually does not have its national language due to the impact of the Russian language lasting about a hundred years, can be expanded in the context of globalization, in which the country is actively involved. The threat of the Kazakh language's extinction in the future is not exclusively because of the influence of Russian, but also because of the impact of global languages – English and Chinese.

7. The process of disappearance of languages of small and medium-sized nations (up to 20 million people) has a potentially global character, but is still in the initial stage and is not perceived as a real threat. As this process expands and becomes more obvious, we should expect a new look at Kazakhstan: this is not an exception to the rule among nation states to have national language spoken by all citizens of the country, but the beginning of a new rule, a new trend of states without their national language.

Key words: homogeneous and heterogeneous cultural and linguistic foundations, nation building, ethno-national state, national language

Introduction

After the collapse of the USSR, Kazakhstan faced the task of transforming its statehood from a union Soviet republic into a national state. The national state was understood as an ethno-national state dominated by the core nation of Kazakhs, who perceive the state as their property (Wachtel 2013, p. 972). The dominance of the Kazakhs as the core nation is reflected in their political dominance and demographic superiority over other ethnic groups.

However, Kazakhstan cannot be fully considered as a national state of the Kazakhs, because the Kazakh language cannot take a dominant position in cultural and linguistic space of the country as the common language for all its citizens, regardless of their ethnicity. In other words, modern Kazakhstan lacks the most important element of the ethno-national state, which demonstrates cultural and linguistic dominance of the core nation and finally approves perception of the state as "its own". The dominant position in Kazakhstan, as in Soviet times, is occupied by the Russian language, which is considered by Kazakhs as the language of another state, the "northern neighbour".

Naturally, therefore, the language situation becomes the central issue of the nation- building in Kazakhstan. All discussions on the national question, one way or another, relate to Kazakh and its relationship with Russian. It is about the cultural integration of the multi-ethnic society, homogeneous and heterogeneous cultural foundations of the nation-building in Kazakhstan. The logic of nation building is the logic of cultural and linguistic homogenization of various cultures and languages within a given society, the formation of one language and culture as a common cultural basis for the nation (Gellner 1991, p. 119).

The nation building in Kazakhstan is aimed at cultural and linguistic homogenization, integration of multi-ethnic society around the Kazakh language and culture. In reality, however, the state's promotion of Kazakh faces a steady Russian language dominance in the social space. In other words, the desire to homogenize cultural-linguistic area on the basis of Kazakh is confronted by the reality of Kazakh-Russian heterogeneity in which Russian dominates.

This article is devoted to the analysis of the nation building in Kazakhstan in the context of the confrontation of homogeneous and heterogeneous cultural foundations in this process. The main attention will be paid to the study of socio-political forces representing the nation-building on the basis of homogeneous and heterogeneous cultural and linguistic bases.

Building ethnonational state in Kazakhstan

In the strategic document defining the development of Kazakhstan until 2050, the state's first president Nursultan Nazarbayev briefly expressed the formula of the nation building: "The Kazakh people and the state language are the unifying core of the developing Kazakh civil community (Strategy "Kazakhstan-2050"… 2013, p. 72)." In this formula, the nation-building combines ethno-cultural elements (the Kazakh people and the state, that is, the Kazakh language) and civil elements (the developing Kazakhstan civil community). Similarly, the combination of ethno-cultural and civic elements is carried out in other post-Soviet states.

Considering Kazakhstan as an ethno-national state, it is possible to define Kazakhs as its core nation who consider the state as their property and assert their primacy among other ethnic groups. For Kazakhs as a core nation, their relations with Russians and the Russian-speaking population are of particular importance (Olcott 2003, p. 70), during which the Kazakhs, like no other Soviet nation, were subjected to Russification. The most noticeable Russification of Kazakhstan in the Soviet period was manifested in the political, demographic, cultural, and linguistic spheres.

In the political sphere, the head of the Communist Party, that is, the real political and state leader of Kazakhstan for the period from 1920 to 1991, was only three ethnic Kazakhs, all the other party leaders were political appointees of Moscow (Gali 2001). In the demographic sphere, the social mobilization transformations of the regime since

the 1920s led to a sharp increase in the Russian and Russian-speaking population and a sharp decrease in the Kazakh population. As a result, since the 1930s the Kazakhs lost their majority status, remaining until the 1980s the second largest nationality after Russians in "their own" republic (Alekseenko 2016, p. 68). In the cultural and linguistic spheres, the Kazakhs, first of all, in the cities, were most strongly subjected to Russification, to the transformation into mankurts, that is, those who lost their ethnic roots (Dave 2007, p. 50 – 70).

Russification turned the Kazakh SSR into the most "Russian" among all the Soviet republics (Kadyrzhanov 2020, p. 60 – 77), and the Kazakhs did not perceive themselves as a core nation, and they practically did not perceive Kazakhstan as "their" republic. The situation began to change gradually from the mid-1960s, when the demographic growth of Kazakhs led to an increase in their number in cities and to vertical social mobilization. The presence of the ethnic Kazakh Dinmukhamed Kunaev in power since that time contributed to an increase in the number of Kazakh nomenclature and, in general, to the growth of Kazakh ethnic nationalism and the perception of Kazakhstan as "their" republic. This was confirmed in the December 1986 events in the Kazakh capital Almaty, when the removal of Kunaev and the appointment of an ethnic Russian Kolbin by Moscow led to protests by Kazakh youth.

The growth of Kazakh ethnic nationalism in the context of Russian cultural homogeneity in cities and some regions of Kazakhstan naturally led to rigid ethnic boundaries between Kazakhs and the Russian-speaking population, which Rogers Brubaker defined as quasi-racial and intergenerationally persistent. The policy of nationalization in such an ethnic context after independence (despite the official inclusive rhetoric) served primarily to strengthening and empowering the core nation at the expense of clearly distinct minority populations (Brubaker 2011, p. 1789).

The socio-political strengthening of the Kazakhs is promoted by the policy of Kazakhization as a response to the Russification of the Soviet period. Kazakhization is most noticeable in the political and demographic spheres. Political Kazakhization is expressed in the fact that all most important posts in the state at all its levels are occupied by Kazakhs. Demographically, Kazakhization manifests itself in the clear numerical dominance of the Kazakhs among all ethnic groups in Kazakhstan. There are three main features of the post-Soviet ethno-demographic dynamics in Kazakhstan:

1) Growth of the absolute and relative number of the Kazakhs in the population of Kazakhstan;

2) Reduction of the absolute and relative number of the Russians in the population of Kazakhstan;

3) Internal migration of the Kazakhs from rural areas to cities.

Political and demographic Kazakhization contributes to strengthening the position of the Kazakhs as the core nation, and strengthens the Kazakh cultural homogenization of society. Thus, Kazakhstan is increasingly asserting itself as a Kazakh ethno-national state.

In accordance with the logic of the nationalizing state, the authorities of Kazakhstan (both in the centre and on the ground) from the first days of independence began to pursue a policy of supporting the Kazakh language as the most vivid expression of cultural homogeneity. This support was expressed in the desire to spread Kazakh in administrative, educational, informational and other spheres of social life. This policy aimed at the dominance of Kazakh began even earlier, in the late Soviet period. In September 1989, the Law on languages which declared Kazakh the state language of the Kazakh SSR was adopted (The Law of the Kazakh SSR of September 22, 1989).

The state policy of supporting the Kazakh language gave its results, contributing to an increase in the number of native speakers and the spread of its use in a number of social spheres. Among these areas, first and foremost, is the education system, where of the total number of schools (7222) in 2015, the number of schools with the Kazakh language of instruction was 3794, with Russian language of instruction - 1291, with mixed Kazakh-Russian languages of instruction – 2100, and with other languages of instruction – 37 (Education Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2015).

However, these achievements of the Kazakh language cannot be overestimated, they have a relative nature, since they mainly relate to the Kazakhs and to a minimal extent other ethnic groups in Kazakhstan. Almost exclusively the students in schools and university departments with the Kazakh language of instruction are ethnic Kazakhs. Newspapers and magazines in the Kazakh language are read mainly by Kazakhs, and they also watch and listen to Kazakh TV and radio channels. If today we are talking about the growth in the number of native speakers of the Kazakh language, it is due to the fact that the number of speakers of it has increased, first of all, among the Kazakhs themselves and to a much lesser extent among other ethnic groups of Kazakhstan. The post-Soviet

ethno-demographic dynamics leads to an increase in the absolute and relative number of native speakers of the state language in the country.

In terms of cultural integration, if Kazakhs and other non-Russian ethnic groups, in addition to their own language, know and speak Russian, it means their acculturation into the Russian language and culture. There are many Kazakhs (especially in the northern regions of Kazakhstan) and representatives of other non-Russian ethnic groups (Ukrainians, Belarusians, Germans, Tatars, Koreans, and others) for whom Russian is their only language. In this case, we speak about their cultural and linguistic assimilation. Either way, one can assert cultural and linguistic dominance of Russians and the corresponding subordination of other ethnic groups, including Kazakhs, in modern Kazakhstan. This situation, based on the Russification of the Kazakhs and other ethnic groups in Kazakhstan, developed in Soviet times and continues up to this day.

In the process of cultural integration, Kazakhs, using the support of the state in the assertion of Kazakh cultural homogeneity, cannot nevertheless replace Russian as the language of interethnic communication. Kazakh is still limited to the Kazakh ethnic group, and other ethnic groups do not consider it necessary to study it and use it in their daily practice. In cultural and linguistic terms, Kazakhs are a subordinate group. Kazakhs as a core nation find themselves in an ambivalent situation, being the dominant group in political and demographic terms, but appearing to be in a subordinate position in cultural and linguistic terms.

Support of cultural heterogeneity and legitimacy of the regime

The expansion and strengthening of Kazakh cultural homogeneity is the main way to build an ethno-national state and assert the legitimacy of the ruling regime. Despite this, the Kazakh-Russian cultural and linguistic heterogeneity has been preserved in the society since the Soviet era, which is undoubtedly an obstacle to the Kazakh homogenization of the society. However, the authorities are aware that unilateral homogenization causes tension and centrifugal tendencies in society, which became widespread in the first half of the 1990s, when about 2 million Russian and Russian-speaking citizens left Kazakhstan.

Therefore, the state seeks to balance the policy of homogeneity with the support of cultural and linguistic heterogeneity. The most important in this respect is to give a constitutional status to Russian.

Formally, Russian does not have the status of the state language, only the Kazakh language has this status. Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Constitution of Kazakhstan states that "Russian is officially used in state organizations and local self-government bodies on a par with Kazakh" (The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan … 2017). In fact, this provision legalizes the use of the Russian language not only in the administration, but also in all other social spheres of Kazakhstan's society.

The education system is of great importance for the establishment of homogeneity or heterogeneity in society. The education system in Kazakhstan is based on heterogeneous Kazakh-Russian foundations: both Kazakh and Russian languages are compulsory subjects of the curriculum in all schools, regardless the language of instruction. Although the number of schools with Russian language of instruction has decreased in comparison with the Soviet period, it remains significant, namely 1,291, as indicated above in the statistics of the education system of Kazakhstan. This is especially true for cities, as well as for northern, eastern, and central regions of Kazakhstan, where the significant Russian and Russian-speaking population resides.

The increase in the Kazakh population in cities in the context of post-Soviet ethnodemographic dynamics leads to an increase in students of Kazakh nationality in schools with the Russian language of instruction. In Almaty and other major cities of Kazakhstan, students of Kazakh nationality make up the bulk of students of schools with the Russian language of instruction, although there are no exact statistics on this issue. It is known that Kazakhstan ranks first among the CIS countries in terms of the number of students who studied in Russian in the 2017/2018 academic year, the number of which was 909.5 thousand (Arefyev 2020). It is obvious that without students of Kazakh nationality in Russian and mixed schools, it would be impossible to achieve this.

The education system clearly demonstrates that the state pursues a policy aimed at both the development of Kazakh cultural and linguistic homogeneity and the maintenance of Kazakh-Russian cultural and linguistic heterogeneity. But these policies are opposite in their orientations: in the case of homogeneity, we are talking about the nationalizing policy of building an ethno-national state in Kazakhstan, that is, the state of the Kazakhs and for the Kazakhs. In the case of heterogeneity, we are talking about a national policy with elements of citizenship, that is, a state for all its ethnic groups. How to combine these incompatible policies in their goals and actions of the state?

In the post-Soviet world, such a paradoxical situation is very common, which Pal Kolsto drew attention to. All newly independent states faced the formidable task of relating these two entities -the titular 'nation' and the civic 'nation' - to each other in such a way that the entire population will freely identify with and be loyal to the state. Everywhere, the buzzword for the resolution of this task is 'integration' (Kolsto 1998, p. 52). Certainly, this is the integration at a low level, corresponding to the second level of nation building according to the Karl Deutsch classification, that is, it is minimal integration at the level of passive submission to the policies and norms of the unified government (Deutsch 1963, p. 7–8). However, the nationalizing post-Soviet state is quite satisfied with this level of ethnic integration, as long as it prevents ethno-cultural conflicts, maintains the stability of the regime and the integrity of the state to a sufficient extent.

In the early 1990s, experts noted the complex ethno-cultural structure of Kazakhstan in the relations between Kazakhs and Russians as the two leading ethnic groups in the country and predicted conflicts between them in the spirit of "cultural pluralism". Kolsto classified Kazakhstan as a bipolar society which is characterized by a high propensity for conflicts between its two main ethnic groups (Kolsto 1999, p. 15 – 43).

The first priority for the ruling regime in a bipolar society is to prevent ethnic conflicts. The legitimacy of the regime is largely determined by its ability to prevent and resolve conflicts between major ethnic groups. As Schermerhorn notes, questions about conflict or integration are intimately connected with the degree of legitimacy (Schermerhorn 1970, p. 68).

The legitimacy of the ruling regime in Kazakhstan is determined by the fact that in its policy of national integration, the regime seems to show two faces. One face addresses the Kazakhs, offering them Kazakh ethno-nationalism, and cultural and linguistic homogeneity. The second face of the regime addresses the Russian and Russian-speaking groups in Kazakhstan: they are offered the rhetoric of a civil nation and cultural and linguistic heterogeneity.

Attitudes of Russians towards the cultural homogenization in Kazakhstan

Cultural heterogeneity in the nation building of Kazakhstan is largely a Soviet heritage. Thus, the provision for compulsory study of

the Russian language at school, regardless of the language of instruction, was included in the Law on languages of the Kazakh SSR of 1989 and preserved in the law on languages in the period of independence. Although the provision for the status of Russian as the language of interethnic communication in the law of 1989 was not preserved in the Constitution of 1995 and the law on Languages of 1997, however, the wording on its equal official use in state and local self-government bodies with the Kazakh language is essentially equivalent to the status of the language of interethnic communication. We should also note that in most other post-Soviet states, the Russian language has lost its status and has been equated with other foreign languages. In this regard, the existence of the constitutional status of the Russian language in Kazakhstan testifies to its deep roots in the Kazakh society, among all its ethnic groups. Nevertheless, despite this fact and lingual comfort enjoyed by Russians in Kazakhstan, the gaining of independence and the policy of Kazakh cultural and linguistic homogeneity have a significant impact on the centrifugal and centripetal moods of Russians.

Russian reactions to Kazakhstan's independence and its nationalities policy fit perfectly into the well-known formula of Albert Hirschman "Exit, voice, loyalty" (Hirschman 1970). Since the late 1980s, one part of Russians in Kazakhstan chose a centrifugal reaction to the transformation of Kazakhstan into an independent state, that is, they chose the "exit" solution. This part of Russians did not want to integrate into the new state, and preferred and still prefers to leave Kazakhstan.

The scale of the departure of Russians from Kazakhstan was unprecedented in the early 1990s. There are no exact data on the emigration of Russians, since many people left without any registration, and, therefore, one can only say about unofficial data and estimates. Russians leaving Kazakhstan can be estimated if we compare the data of the population censuses of 1989 and 1999. According to the 1989 census, 6227.5 thousand Russians lived in Kazakhstan (Statistical collection … 1991, p. 7–70) and according to the 1999 census, their number was 4479.6 thousand people (National composition … 2000, p. 6–8). The difference is 1747.9 thousand people, which in itself is an impressive figure, although not all of them can be considered emigrants, since the population decline has natural causes, including mortality. But there is no doubt that a significant part of this number voluntarily left Kazakhstan. According to experts, their number is 1.5-2 million people.

In the following years, the departure of Russians and other nationalities from Kazakhstan significantly decreased, but it would be wrong to say that it has completely stopped. On a smaller scale, but the emigration of Russians from Kazakhstan is continuing up to date. In the 2010s, 25-30 thousand Russians left Kazakhstan every year (Russian Exodus … 2016). This suggests that centrifugal tendencies persist among Kazakh Russians, albeit on a smaller scale. For Russians, the option of "exit" as a way to resolve relations with Kazakhstan remains relevant until today.

While experts estimate that 1.5 – 2 million, i.e., 25-30% of Russians left Kazakhstan during the 1990s, 70-75% of Russians remained in the country. Undoubtedly, among them there were also many people who wanted to leave Kazakhstan, but because of financial reasons they could not do so. Moving to Russia required a lot of money and not everyone could afford it. There were, of course, other reasons, including psychological ones, that made people abandon the idea of moving to Russia and, on the contrary, decide to stay in Kazakhstan.

We should not forget that many Russians had a fairly high level of identity with Kazakhstan. Long residence in Kazakhstan contributed to this: 66% Russians were born in the republic, and many families were rooted in the country for several generations (Peyrouse 2008, p. 107). A considerable number of Russians came from mixed Kazakh-Russian families, which was also an important factor in identifying with Kazakhstan. Therefore, among Russians there was a large proportion of those who considered both the Soviet Union and Kazakhstan their homeland, without having any special feelings for Russia and not wanting to move to it at all.

Most Russians who remained in Kazakhstan refused the option "exit" in their relations with Kazakhstan. They have, according to the Hirschman formula, two options left, namely, "voice" and "loyalty". "Voice", as we said above, is a synonym or expression of protest, through which an individual wants to defend their interests and the interests of the group to which they belongs. In the case of Kazakhstani Russians, the protest was primarily aimed at defending the interests of Russians against the state's policy of promoting the Kazakh language and culture as a means of cultural integration to the multi-ethnic society. The use of "voice" in Kazakhstan, which gave priority to the Kazakh language and culture, was inevitable for Russians.

"Voice" practice in the socio-political conditions of modern Kazakhstan shows that it is used by a minority of the Russian population,

although the absolute majority of Russians support the protest against the state policy of promoting the Kazakh language and culture. In the conditions of a soft, but nevertheless authoritarian regime of power in Kazakhstan, the majority of any social group cannot resort to "voice", that is, criticism of the government's policy. This can only be done by an active minority united in organizations or other institutional forms of collective action.

In Kazakhstan, the "voice" of Russian organizations was clearly heard in the 1990s, especially in first half of the 1990s. At that time, within the framework of post-perestroika liberalization in Kazakhstan, there were quite numerous organizations acting on behalf of various social, including national, groups. Russian, Slavic, and Cossack organizations were among them, which acted on behalf of the Russian-speaking population in support of the Russian language and culture. Even at that time, however, the connection between the majority of the Russian population and organizations that spoke on its behalf was loose, without any support and response mobilization. Without support from below, the "voice" of Russian organizations weakened, remaining the choice and work of the minority involved in it (Laruelle, Peyrouse 2007, p. 93–102).

The majority of the Russian population in Kazakhstan originally chose the option "loyalty" from the three-term formula of Hirschman. Loyalty means that Russians recognize the legitimacy of the current socio-political system in Kazakhstan and accept the policy pursued by the authorities in accordance with the logic of this system. Russians in one way or another recognize that Kazakhs are the state-forming nation of Kazakhstan, and the state primarily promotes its interests, in particular, the Kazakh language. Russians recognize the need to learn Kazakh as a compulsory subject in school and study this language throughout their eleven years of school.

However, such loyalty has a passive character, it is a simple submission to the existing order. Practice shows that studying Kazakh in school does not lead to any significant improvement in the knowledge of the state language by Russians. The study of Kazakh as a compulsory subject of the school curriculum began in 1989, when the law on the languages of the Kazakh SSR was adopted. Today, this practice has been going on for more than 30 years. If this practice had achieved its goal, that is, teaching Russian and Russian-speaking children the Kazakh language at school really gave such knowledge of the language which allowed school graduates use this language for social communication,

the Kazakh language today would have acquired the real status of the language of interethnic communication.

Russian loyalty means their acceptance of the Kazakh-Russian cultural and linguistic heterogeneity in Kazakhstan, and, therefore, is in accordance with the policy of heterogeneity of the authorities. However, there is a significant difference in the attitude to heterogeneity on the part of the authorities and on the part of the Russian and Russian-speaking population of Kazakhstan. For the authorities, Kazakh-Russian heterogeneity is a step towards achieving Kazakh cultural and linguistic homogeneity. For Russians, the Kazakh homogeneity of Kazakhstan is in principle unacceptable. As David Laitin notes, in Kazakhstan many Russians cannot take the study of the Kazakh language seriously (Laitin 1998, p. 121). Russian part is a priority for them in the Kazakh-Russian heterogeneity. Russians, of course, cannot demand Russian homogeneity in Kazakhstan, but they are interested in Kazakh-Russian heterogeneity with the dominance of the Russian language and culture, as it was in the Soviet period.

Kazakh national-patriots as champions of ethnocultural homogenization

Today, in Kazakhstan, the only political entity that consistently advocates the homogenization of the cultural and linguistic space is the Kazakh nationalist organizations and groups. In the first half of the 1990s, Kazakh political parties emerged, as well as many public organizations that aimed to develop the Kazakh language and culture. The adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 1995 prohibited the creation of political parties on an ethnic basis, but various Kazakh organizations remained, being considered as civil society institutions. In Kazakhstan, they are labelled as "national patriots".

On a number of issues of implementation of Kazakhization and attitudes to other languages of Kazakhstan, primarily to the Russian language, Kazakh organizations criticize authorities for much concession to Russian and Russians. These articulations put them in a position of opposition to the authorities. This position further limits their ability not only to put their ideas into practice, but even to address them to society. Kazakh organizations that consistently express the ideas of Kazakh ethno-nationalism can be defined as marginal due to their opposition towards the government. This means that they do not have necessary

resources, primarily financial, for their existence as organizations and for practical actions. The number of activists of these organizations is very small, often they consist only of their leader. These organizations often exist only on paper, having been registered by the authorities many years ago.

In this situation, the main institutional means for promoting ideas of Kazakh cultural and linguistic homogenization is the Internet, as well as several newspapers that more or less reflect these ideas. There is a certain segment of the users of Kazakh-language internet who regularly visit sites and social networks that express ideas of Kazakh organizations on the cultural integration of the multi-ethnic society. Sometimes activists of Kazakh organizations manage to attract public attention to the discussion of some problems related to the Kazakh language and other issues of cultural integration in Kazakhstan. Perhaps, the last case was the discussion of the trilingualism programme in 2016 after its announcement by the Ministry of Education and Science. In this programme, Kazakh organizations saw a threat to the Kazakh language, symptoms of its future extinction (Dear Elbasy … 2016).

The policy of cultural integration of ethnic groups is perceived by Kazakh national patriots as a legal and administrative activity of the state to adopt relevant laws and their subsequent implementation. According to this logic, the nation-state must consistently implement its policies, and the citizens must obey these policies. In reality, however, the implementation of laws adopted by the state does not lead to the desired purpose. The Law on languages has not led to the dominance of the Kazakh language and its use in social communication. Seeing this, national patriots accuse the state of not implementing the adopted laws and programmes despite of having necessary resources and powers. This is followed by accusations of a lack of political will to implement the policy of ethno-cultural integration based on the Kazakh language and culture. The question raised in the article if ministers and akims (governors) who do not speak Kazakh can work with the public (How do mayors … 2020).

In addition to authorities, Kazakh national patriots have other accusations of non-compliance or even undermining the policy of cultural integration based on the Kazakh language and culture. One of the objects of accusations are Russian-speaking Kazakhs. National patriots accuse urban Russian-speaking Kazakhs of unwillingness to learn and speak Kazakh, interpreting this as one of the main reasons for the non-

use the state language by national minorities. It is no coincidence that national patriots accuse Russophone Kazakhs of betraying compatriots, serving the Russians and Russia (The slave speaks … 2020).

One of the main objects of criticism by Kazakh national patriots are Russian citizens of Kazakhstan. Their main fault, according to national patriots, is that during the thirty years since Kazakh has been proclaimed the state language, they have not merely learned it, but are not still going to do so. The linguistic behaviour of Russians determines the linguistic behaviour of other non-titular groups, primarily of Slavic and European origin, as well as Koreans, Tatars, and others. They remain Russian-speaking citizens, and Russian is the only means of verbal communication for them. Russian is, therefore, for Russians and other minorities, as well as for many urban Kazakhs, a means of their ethno-cultural integration in modern Kazakhstan. Thus, Russians are considered by Kazakh national patriots as one of the main obstacles to the cultural integration based on the Kazakh language and culture (The quality of teaching … 2014).

It is possible to single out another object of criticism of Kazakh national patriots in matters of language and cultural integration in Kazakhstan. We are talking about Russia, which, according to national patriots, considers Kazakhstan in its foreign policy as a sphere of influence, including cultural influence. From their point of view, Kazakhstan is of particular interest to Russia due to the high level of Russification of its population, including indigenous inhabitants of the country. Russia is interested in maintaining the dominant position of Russian in Kazakhstan. In particular, Russia periodically raises the issue of giving the Russian language the legal status of the second, along with Kazakh, state language. Kazakh national patriots consider such a statement a huge threat to independence of Kazakhstan (Moscow's dream … 2020).

The most important claim of national-patriots is the implementation of the constitutional provision of Kazakh as the state language of Kazakhstan. This requirement is aimed at prioritizing Kazakh in all spheres of society, to use coercive measures laid down in the law on languages for the implementation of its provisions. This claim includes calls for the exclusion of the constitutional provision on the Russian language and, in general, the use of administrative measures by the state to reduce the use of Russian in social practice. This element of the national-patriotic model of cultural and linguistic Kazakhization means the assertion of the dominant status of the Kazakh language on

the basis of legislative activity and the use of coercive measures for their implementation (Kamshy proposal … 2017).

Of great importance for national-patriots is the claim to the Kazakh language domination in the education system. In general, today in Kazakhstan one can observe a dominance of the Kazakh language in the school system and a tendency to expand the scope of the Kazakh language in the higher education system. This is achieved through state support in the field of education. However, Kazakh nationalist elites believe that this is not enough and demand to strengthen measures for the Kazakhization of the education system, in particular, to transform all schools in Kazakhstan into schools with the Kazakh language of instruction. In the world literature, the leading role of the education system in the formation of nations and national integration of the multi-ethnic and multicultural population of society in various regions of the world is confirmed. This means that the requirement to transform all schools into schools with the Kazakh language of instruction is one of the most important elements of the national-patriotic model of cultural and linguistic Kazakhization (Dos Koshim 2019).

Conclusion: Homogeneous or heterogeneous future for Kazakhstan?

The issue of cultural foundations of nation building remains valid and pressing in the socio-political agenda of Kazakhstan. The analysis shows the existence of three main approaches to solving this issue. The first approach is based on the implementation of nation building on a homogeneous Kazakh cultural and linguistic basis. This approach is proposed and defended by Kazakh nationalist organizations (national patriots). The meaning of this approach is that in Kazakhstan as a Kazakh national state, all citizens should use only one state (Kazakh) language in social communication, and all other languages cannot be used in this capacity. The second approach is based on a heterogeneous Kazakh-Russian cultural and linguistic platform and is proposed and implemented by the authorities of Kazakhstan. This approach assumes that all citizens of the country strive to master the state language as their civic duty, but on a par with the Kazakh language in public places, the Russian language is used. At the same time, it is assumed, although nowhere is it explicitly stated, that in the future the Kazakh language will become the language of interethnic communication, justifying its status

as the state language. Russian organizations offer a third approach to solving the issue of cultural foundations of nation building based on a heterogeneous Kazakh-Russian cultural and language platform. This approach accepts Kazakh as the state language, but suggests giving Russian the status of the second state language, bringing it in line with the real situation in society. This is the desire to give a legislative and long-term status to the heterogeneous cultural and linguistic foundations of the nation building in Kazakhstan.

Since these approaches are in a competitive relationship, primarily the homogeneous approach of Kazakh national patriots and the heterogeneous approach of Russian organizations, the question arises which of these approaches will become dominant in the nation building of Kazakhstan in the near and distant future. It can be assumed that the solution of this issue depends on the government, which is the main player in the nation building of Kazakhstan. Today, the government supports heterogeneous foundations of national construction, but if tomorrow it takes a course to support the Kazakh cultural and linguistic homogeneity, then society, in my opinion, will move in this direction.

The government, however, is fully aware that it can regulate cultural and linguistic processes in society, especially in Kazakhstan, but not manage them. These are broad societal processes that have received and are still receiving their power and strength over time and through socio-cultural influences that transcend national borders. The Russification of the Kazakhs began in the 1920s and is inseparable from the modernization processes in which the Kazakhs were involved. Today modernization takes the form of globalization, but still the main language of the Kazakhs' incorporation into globalization remains Russian.

To understand processes of the nation building in modern Kazakhstan, it is important to understand which social groups support cultural and linguistic Russification in the country. It is obvious that since the Soviet era, the main conductors of Russification in Kazakhstan were local Russians. Their influence was based, among other things, on demographic superiority, when Russians were the majority of the population of the republic for 50-60 years. Kazakhs were subject to Russification, especially in the cities, because they lived as a minority among majority Russians, in the "Russian world". However, today the Russian population of Kazakhstan is decreasing in number, including in cities, from year to year. But Russification is not reduced in the cities of Kazakhstan, where the Russian language remains the main means of

interethnic communication. As William Fierman notes, in most cities in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, despite the significant increase in the Kazakh population, the Russian language continues to outshine the Kazakh language (Fierman 2009, p. 92).

Russian population's decline, partly due to the ongoing emigration from Kazakhstan, inevitably leads to a reduction in the influence of Russian cultural and linguistic processes in the republic. How then to explain the continuing Russification in the country? The move of Kazakhs from rural areas to cities leads to an increase in the number of native speakers in cities, the Kazakhization of cities. At the same time, the urbanization of rural Kazakh-speaking Kazakhs means the growth of their interethnic contacts, but also contacts with urban Russian-speaking Kazakhs. The consequence of this is the growth of Russification among Kazakh-speaking Kazakhs, their linguistic heterogenization.

Today, in Kazakhstan, primarily in cities, one can observe parallel cultural and linguistic processes: the first of them is the growth in the number of native speakers, while the second process indicates the stability of Russification, the dominance of the Russian language in the social space. The first of these processes is associated with the homogenization of the cultural and linguistic space, and the second with the heterogenization of this space. As mentioned above, the political regime legitimizes its power by supporting both processes. At the same time, the authorities keep the situation under control so that these parallel processes do not overlap, and the socio-political forces behind them do not oppose each other and do not enter into conflict with each other.

It can be assumed that homogeneous and heterogeneous processes in Kazakhstan will remain in their current situation of parallel coexistence for quite a long time. In the near and middle-term future contradictions between Kazakhphone Kazakhs and Russophone Kazakhs could strengthen over relations between Kazakh and Russian. In a more distant future, the expansion of English and Chinese could be expected in Kazakhstan.

The preservation and parallel existence of homogeneous and heterogeneous cultural and linguistic foundations of the nation building means that the Kazakh language will not acquire the real status of the state language in the future. This means that Kazakhstan will remain a national state with a core nation, but without national or state language, which in ethno-national states is the language of the core nation.

Today, in the context of globalization, national and ethnic languages face the threat of extinction. Dozens of languages disappear in the world every year. They are predominantly languages of small nations that do not have their own statehood and are deprived of support, as people stop speaking them, switching to more powerful languages. Recently, it can be observed when quite large peoples with their statehood as part of a large multinational state face the threat of disappearance of their languages. As an example, we can cite the peoples of the Volga region in Russia, who face powerful Russification and the fact that different age groups, primarily young people, stop speaking their native language.

In the post-Soviet space, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan give an example of states whose titular nations, having a national state, cannot bring their languages to the real level of the state language and main means of interethnic communication. Even in Soviet times, the indigenous peoples of these republics were subjected to the strong Russification. With independence, there was a hope that the national state would be able to provide a "political roof" for the development of the national language and its transformation into the main means of social communication in the new conditions. However, the process of losing the native language was not actually stopped.

This process is typical not only for the post-soviet space, it has a global character. There is UNESCO study that predicts that by 2030, languages spoken by fewer than 20 million people may disappear (UNESCO: Kazakh language may disappear 2018).

Today, Kazakhstan looks like an exception to the rule that an ethno-national state has a national language (the core nation language), which is spoken by all citizens in the country, regardless of ethnicity. But globalization can lead to the fact that dozens of ethno-national states will remain without their national language. In this case, Kazakhstan can be viewed as a pioneer of a new phenomenon.

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NATIVE LANGUAGE AS THE BASIS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY (THE CASE OF RUSSIAN INDIGENIOUS PEOPLE OF THE NORTH)

To date, there is an array of studies revealing the specific features of people's ethnic identity through their native language (Achkasov 2011, p. 204 – 218; Joseph 2005, p. 20 – 48; Kuznetsova 2011, p. 102 – 105; Marusenko 2015; Titov 2017; Fishman 2005, p. 132 – 140). The given research stands out from the existing ones due to the author's comprehensive approach to formulating conclusions and recommendations.

The object of the study is minor indigenous peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of Russia (MIPNSF). The subject of the research is native language as the basis of MIPNSF national identity. The statistical database is comprised of eight censuses: the first general census of the Russian Empire in 1897; the all-Union censuses in 1926, 1959, 1970, 1979, and 1989; and the all-Russian censuses in 2002 and 2010. The censuses of 1937 and 1939 were analysed only methodologically (general census/all-Union census/all-Russian census hereinafter are referred to as GRC).

As of 2020, the key document regulating the issues of Russian Indigenous Peoples of the North is the Common List adopted in 2000 and including 47 peoples. In 2006, 40 minor indigenous peoples of the

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North, Siberia, and the Far East in the List were identified. The main criteria for classifying peoples as MIPNSF are the following:

1. 1) small population numbers (less than 50,000 people);
2. 2) specificity of traditional occupations – hunting, reindeer herding, fishing, etc.;
3. 3) nomadic and semi-nomadic lifestyle.

To formulate conclusions and recommendations, we aim to accomplish four interrelated objectives:

- to analyse normative legal acts when forming a relevant List of MIPNSF;
- to identify the distinguishing features of statistical accounting and dynamics of MIPNSF population according to the all-Union/ all-Russian censuses for the period 1926 – 2010;
- to systematize the fundamental reasons behind a decrease in the number of MIPNSF who considers the language of their nationality as their native language;
- to develop proposals concerning the revitalization of MIPNSF languages.

Key words: ethnic identity, nationality, native language, minor indigenous peoples

Normative legal acts when forming a relevant List of MIPNSF

There are still vivid debates in the scientific community about the year in which the first List of MIPNSF was approved.

Here is the most popular quote about the List of 26 nationalities in 1926: "In 1926, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) adopted a Decree "On the approval of the Provisional Regulations on Managing Indigenous Peoples and Tribes of the Northern Outskirts of the RSFSR", which identified 26 indigenous peoples." It is cited by international organizations (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2014, p. 6), researchers (Donahoe et al. 2008), and academic historians (Golovnev 2012, et al.).

An independent analysis of numerous normative documents on whether it is possible to claim that the List of 26 indigenous peoples of the North appeared in 1926 produces negative results. It is worth noting that the first list of northern indigenous peoples appeared not in 1926, but 1925, and was approved by the Resolution "On Tax Benefits".

In 1926, the Provisional Regulations on Managing Indigenous Peoples and Tribes of the Northern Outskirts of the RSFSR identified 36 (thirty-six!) indigenous peoples. However, the population census in 1926 contained information that there were 27 northern indigenous peoples.

In the period from 1930 to 1935, a List of 27 northern peoples was approved. In 1970–1980, it was reduced to 26 due to the Soyots excluded from the List. The Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of February 7, 1980 provided a List of 26 northern indigenous peoples (no Soyots included);

- in 1991, the List was expanded to 27 peoples by adding the Tozhu Tuvans;
- in 1993, the Shors, Teleuts and Kumandins joined the List, which increased the number of northern indigenous peoples to 30 until 2006;
- in 2000, the Common List of Minor Indigenous Peoples of the Russian Federation was approved.

The List incorporated 45 indigenous peoples of Russia[1], 40 of which were included in the List of Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation in 2006. In 2006, the List of 30 indigenous peoples was expanded by the Alyutors, Veps, Kamchadals, Kereks, Soyots, the Taz People, Telengits, Chelkans, and Chulyms.

Only 4 out of 40 MIPNSF – the Veps, Telengits, Chelkans, and Chulyms – are new indigenous peoples that were not covered in the official documents of 1925–2006.

To date, the 2006 List of Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation has been amended with regard to the names of peoples: in 2010, the Tofalars (obsolete: Tofa) and the Evens (obsolete: Lamuts) in 2011.

1 In 2008, "vod" were added in the Leningrad region, and in 2010, "seto (seto)" were added in the Pskov region, but they do not belong to the KMN SSDV. Thus, for 2020, the Unified List of Indigenous Minorities includes 47 peoples, which is indicated on page 1 of this article.

Special features of statistical accounting and dynamics of MIPNSF population for the period 1926–2010

Despite the List of 27 indigenous peoples approved in 1926, the statistical departments and institutions of the Soviet Union did not aim to record them in the all-Russian censuses until 1989.

When conducting censuses, independent records were maintained for the following number of MIPNSF:

- in 1926, according to the statistical observation plan – 25 indigenous peoples (the List and dictionary of indigenous peoples for the 1926 All-Soviet census included 25 peoples excluding the Nganasans and the Entsy that were to be counted as part of the Nenets group), but scientists independently calculated the numbers of the Nganasans and the Entsy, therefore, in fact, there were 27 indigenous peoples;
- in 1937, according to both the statistical observation plan and the data obtained – for 16 indigenous peoples only;
- in 1939 – for 13 indigenous peoples (the Koryaks, Mansi, Nanais, Nenets, Nivkhs, the Sami people, Selkups, Udege, Khanty, Chukchis, Shors, Evenks, and Evens);
- in 1959 – for 22 indigenous peoples. There is a special record in the section "Peoples of the North" for the Orochs, Ulchs, and Yukaghirs. The Dolgans and Tofalars were identified beyond the Peoples of the North section. In the Dictionary of 1959, the Oroks were named among the Nanai people. However, when publishing the census results, no data for the Oroks were provided: the numbers for the Nganasans were revealed instead, which, according to the statistical observation plan, had to be categorized as "Other peoples of the North";
- in 1970 and 1979 – for 23 indigenous peoples (the Negidals were singled out from the Evenks). The Tofalars in 1970 and 1979 were not included in the group "The peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East". In 1970, the Aleuts and Eskimos with an individual code were assigned to Section 2 "Nationalities and indigenous peoples living mainly outside the USSR";
- in 1989 – for 26 indigenous peoples (the Oroks, Chuvans, and Enets added). In the same year the ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention No. 169 was adopted. All 26 peoples were classified as "Peoples of the North" within the USSR territory.

- in 1990, when releasing the data of the 1989 All-Soviet Census, the Population Statistics Department of the RSFSR Goskomstat combined disparate statistical data on the "Peoples of the North" in dynamics – for 1970, 1979, and 1989;
- in 2002 – for 30 indigenous peoples;
- in 2010 – for 40 indigenous peoples.

Hence, prior to the 1989 census, MIPNSF were grouped into larger categories or assigned to the "Other peoples of the North" section.

In 2005–2008, a research project was performed to restore, digitize, and analyse the archival materials of the Polar Census in 1926–1927 (this is an alternative title for the 1926 MIPNSF census). The project was funded by a government agency The Norwegian Research Council headed by Professor D.G. Anderson at the Arctic University of Norway. As a result of the project, a number of monographs were published that contained data first released since 1926 (Anderson 2013; Kominko 2015).

Some subjectivity in the MIPNSF numbers is also typical of the censuses of 1989, 2002 and 2010.

The censuses of 1989, 2002, and 2010, in contrast to the previous ones, present a detailed statistical picture as all MIPNSF with an independent ethnic status were taken into account. However, in this case some "elements of subjectivity" are also present, since there is a possibility of "changing ethnic identification".

Since 1926, the wordings of the census forms have implied respondents' self-determination, which may result in a change of nationality or leaving the question unanswered:

- changing ethnic identification is especially likely for people of ethnically mixed origin: children from mixed families first recorded according to their mother's nationality as grown-ups may change it to their father's nationality in the subsequent censuses, or vice versa;
- the number of people who did not indicate their nationality in the census form is growing at a fast pace: from 316 people in 1979 to 5,629 million people in 2010, which is nearly 4% of the Russian population (Bogoyavlensky 2013, p. 99).

Self-determination of respondents is in line with Article 26 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation: "Everyone has the right to determine and indicate their national identity. No one can be forced to determine and indicate their national identity."

In December 1932, there was adopted the Decree "On the Creation of a Unified Passport System for the USSR and Compulsory Registration of Passports". Among other personal details, passports contained information about nationality. However, as mentioned above, this information in many cases did not correspond to the facts from the census forms. In August 1974, the Council of Ministers of the USSR approved a new Regulation "On the Passport System in the USSR" that introduced the nationality column in the passports. In 1997, this column was removed.

According to Russian researchers, the increase in the number of MIPNSF in 1926–2010 is due to ethnic indifference that refers to the erosion of ethnic identity expressed in the uncertainty of ethnic affiliation and irrelevance of ethnicity" (Egorova et al. 2013, p. 157). Some scholars argue that this natural rise is assimilation and ethnic re-identification (Ziker, Anderson 2010, p. 3).

According to the GRC, the increase in 1926–2010 was as follows:

- MIPNSF with an independent ethnic status in the modern List of 40 indigenous peoples grew by 34% (from 192,100 to 257,900 people);
- 27 status peoples of the North (including the Soyots in 1926–2010) grew by 65% (from 135,100 to 222,300 people [2]).

Fundamental reasons behind a decrease in the number of MIPNSF who perceive the language of their nationality as their native language

The concept of depopulation means a stable, systematic decrease in the absolute population number in any territory (at macro-, meso- or micro levels). It is difficult to apply this concept to MIPNSF, since the increase in population is primarily due to the growing number of ethnic groups taken into account. Against the backdrop of the rising number of indigenous small-numbered peoples, depopulation is associated with a stable and systematic fall in the absolute number of the population considering the language of their nationality as their mother tongue.

Since the 18th century, researchers have viewed language as the basis of national identity. In the first general census of the Russian Empire in 1897, "nationalities were not included in the list of questions, and the population was distributed according to their native language." This was due to the fact that prior to the census, in 1872, Saint-Petersburg

2 Calculated by the author.

hosted the 8th International Congress on Statistics, where it was agreed that "language is indeed recognized as the most reliable criterion for calculating nationalities."

As the Russian statistician Seraphim K. Patkanov put it, "Language is the most suitable and, moreover, rather objective criterion for determining the nationality of residents" (Patkanov 1912, p. 130). This view is shared by Juliette Cadiot, a researcher of the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences in Paris (Cadiot 2000, p. 128; Cadiot 2005, p. 441; Cadiot 2007).

It is noteworthy that, in addition to their language, MIPNSF have key population genes. According to Sargylana S. Ignatyeva, "these genes keep the culture on a leash: an innate repertoire of behavioural strategies, a matrix with encoded modes of social reactions, spiritual preferences and subconscious instincts transmitted from generation to generation by members of the same race" (Ignatyeva 2015, p. 104).

Ulyana A. Vinokurova, an Honoured Scientist of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), discusses the phenomenon of kogito: "The phenomenon of kogito (an act of thinking, will, feelings, representation) as a driving factor of evolution explains the mental diversity of communities adapted to habitats differing in life-sustaining resources" (Vinokurova 2014, p.165).

The northern peoples have "a special role of space in the formation of the habitat, which is characterized by low permeability, inaccessibility, and autonomy; labour as the basis of physical and spiritual well-being; a culture of dignity that forms a free and responsible person; taking care of children (the tradition is preserved in ethnopedagogy, folklore, cultural heritage of the peoples of the North); culture of human conservation" (Ignatyeva 2015, p. 107).

Thus, the main peculiarity of these people is their ability to live in the North for a prolonged period of time.

For the period 1959–2010, critical negative dynamics of the population numbers was observed in the Veps (–63%), the Chuvans (–28%), and the Orochs (–23%); and negative dynamics of the people considering the language of their nationality as their mother tongue was recorded in the Orochs (–99.6%), the Chuvans (–80%), and the Veps (–78%).

From 1959 to 2010, the number of MIPNSF rose by 60% exhibiting the multidirectional dynamics for 40 peoples, which is associated not only with an increase in the number of nationalities and birth rate,

but also with their special rights introduced in 1999 and enshrined in various legislative acts of the Russian Federation.

According to the 2010 census, approximately half of MIPNSF believe that Russian is their native language.

Scientists of the past and present hold the view that "for all peoples, language remains a stable basis for the identification of the nation" (Drobizheva 1985, p. 7).

In 2012, the work "Expeditionary Ethno-Linguistic Studies of the Language and Culture of the Selkups in the Tomsk Region" was published. The study concentrated on three groups of informants: those who actively speak the language of their nationality; those passively speaking the Selkup language; and those who do not speak the studied language, but are bearers of the Selkup language. The verbal reactions of the members of the Selkup and Russian ethnic groups to the stimuli, such as "place", "sky", "sun" and "swamp" demonstrated "significant differences both in the categorization of space by the Selkups and Russians and in the perception of various environmental objects" (Polyakova 2013, p. 128). For instance, "in the Russian linguistic consciousness, a swamp is an underdeveloped, dangerous territory that does not possess any economic or other sort of value. At the same time, for native speakers of the Selkup language, a swamp refers to berry, cranberry, moss, water, and breadwinner" (Polyakova 2013, p. 127 – 128). The study concludes that "associations of the Selkups who are both actively and passively proficient in the Selkup language differ from the reactions of the Russians, and associations of the Selkups who do not speak the language of their nationality coincide with Russian associations" (Polyakova 2013, p. 127).

There are seven major reasons behind a reduction in the number of MIPNSF perceiving their nationality language as their mother tongue.

The first reason is the denial of the positive experience of the missionary school of the Russian Empire. Since 1917, after the Great October Socialist Revolution, it has been argued for many decades that the peoples of the North did not have a written language and were massively illiterate. By 1917, thanks to the missionaries of the Russian Empire, the overwhelming majority of the peoples of the North had a Russian (Cyrillic) alphabet. The missionaries managed to lay the foundations of the writing system in 27 (68%) out of 40 MIPNSF.

Unfortunately, this experience was disregarded, and the alphabets were created from scratch, but this time on the basis of the Latin script. The use of the Latin writing system was explained in the following way:

"In the 1920s, the non-Russian peoples of the USSR still kept in memory the policy of national oppression of the tsarist authorities, so the introduction of a Russian-based writing system could have been misunderstood. Amid those conditions, alphabets created on the Russian script would have faced more difficulties than those based on the Latin alphabet, which would have slowed down the pace of the cultural revolution."

The second reason is the inconsistency of managerial decisions when building a language system for MIPNSF. Initially, the drafts of the peoples of the North's alphabets were developed on the Latin basis (1926–1931), and later – from 1937 – on the Cyrillic script. The creation of the Unified Northern Alphabet halted the development of writing for the peoples of the North for at least 10 years (1926–1937). On February 11, 1937, the Council of Nationalities of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR adopted a resolution on the transition of the written language of the peoples of the Far North to the Russian graphic basis.

Before the Great Patriotic War (The Eastern Front of World War II), books were published in 9 languages: Koryak, Mansi, Nanai, Nenets, Khanty, Chukchi, Evenki, Even, and Eskimo.

The third reason is the imposition of an ideological model on languages or the introduction of "Marxism into linguistics". From 1920 to 1950, with the approval of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the "class essence of language" was promulgated:

- "All languages are historically linked… and none of them – with the exception of the communist speech of the future – has an advantage over the rest";
- "once nations are certain about the advantages of a common language over national languages, national differences and languages will start withering giving way to a world language common for all" (Joseph V. Stalin 1928-1929: 349).

The so-called "new teaching" about language greatly impaired the study of national languages and the development of theoretical and practical issues of linguistics.

"The Bolsheviks believed that the formal equality of nations will cause their abolition in the individual consciousness" (Arel 2009, p. 19).

Currently, such a situation is regarded as a dispute between primordialists and constructivists (Fishman 2005).

The fourth reason is staff shortage, which affected the quality of and avenues for further research. The results of the intensive research and

organizational work completed by Russian scholars were mainly in vain. The reasons for that are of a dual nature – objective and subjective. The objective reasons are the small number of each nationality, the scattering over a vast territory and numerous dialects within a language. The subjective reason is a conversion of the alphabets' graphic representation from Latin into Cyrillic.

The fifth reason is a disrupted link between generations. Whole generations of the indigenous peoples of the North were brought up in boarding schools. Rituals, customs, and traditions were declared harmful holdovers.

The sixth reason is the policy of "the common Russian language".

The seventh reason is that for more than a century MIPNSF have been living among the Russian-speaking population. As early as 1897, the indigenous peoples of Siberia were a minority and surrounded by the Russian-speaking population.

These seven major reasons have contributed to a decrease in the number of MIPNSF regarding the language of their nationality as their native language.

Proposals concerning the revitalization of MIPNSF languages

Since the 18th century, researchers have treated language as the basis of national identity, since it reflects a link between the past, present, and future. As a whole, the number of MIPNSF who named the language of their nationality as their native language is going down (according to 40 peoples in the total population): in 1959 – 73%; 1970 – 66%; 1979 – 61%; 1989 – 53%; in 2002, the census did not contain a question about the native language; in 2010 – 34%. Over 50 years, there was a 39% decline in relative terms.

In the present study, a grouping of peoples with the corresponding languages is carried out, for each of which its own policy should be framed both at the state and regional levels. Ethno-regional identity should serve as the basis for such policies. In tables compiled using primary data indigenous peoples are differentiated according to their residence – on the territory of one, two or more constituent entities of the Russian Federation – with a view to understanding the feasibility and effectiveness of regional policy's implementation and coordination.

There are five groups in total.

The first group: MIPNSF according to the 2010 General Russian Census who named the language of their nationality as their native language (over 35% of the number of the ethnic group) (Table 1).

This group encompasses 11 indigenous peoples demonstrating mainly a positive population dynamic and the younger generation.

Here, the Chelkans (the Altai Mountain group of languages) with a positive population dynamic are of particular interest. Roughly 55% of the people name the language of their nationality as their native language, and 24% of the people speak the Chelkan language. Despite the fact that 99% of the Chelkans speak Russian, solely 40% of the ethnic group believe it to be their mother tongue.

The second group: MIPNSF according to the 2010 General Russian Census who named the language of their nationality as their native language (less than 35% of the number of the ethnic group) (Table 2).

This group consists of 13 indigenous peoples. The most alarming trends in this group are observed in:

- the Veps. This ethnic group is characterized by a negative population dynamic and a high level of language proficiency (39.8% of the people), but only 28% of them can call Vepsian their native language. Population aging is typical of this ethnic group. The median age is 54.8 years, which is the maximum age for all the 40 MIPNSF;
- the Kumandins. They demonstrate a negative population dynamics and population aging. The median age is 40.8 years;
- the Evens. From 1959 to 2010, their population rose by 148%. According to the latest census, about 30% of the Evens believe Russian to be their native language; 25% name the Even (Lamut) language as their native language, and only 22% can speak it. The situation is aggravated by the fact that approximately 80% of the ethnic group live on the territory of three regions of the Russian Federation. In terms of the number of the ethnic group, the Evens rank fourth following the relatively numerous Nenets, Evenks and Khanty;
- the Evenks. This ethnic group is scattered around four regions of the Russian Federation.

The third group: MIPNSF according to the 2010 General Russian Census who named the Russian language as their native language (over 90% of the number of the ethnic group) (Table 3).

This group is represented by 8 indigenous peoples with an extremely low level of proficiency in the language of their nationality (from 0.5

to 5.1% in the number of the ethnic group) and young population (the median age in Russia according to the 2010 GRC is 38 years).

The fourth group: indigenous peoples with other officially "added" languages that do not speak their native language and show zero knowledge of it. This group incorporates six indigenous peoples: the Kamchadals (Russian added in 2002); the Soyots (Buryat and Tuvinian added in 2002); the Taz people (Chinese and Russian added in 2002); the Telengits (Altaic added in 2002); the Tozhu Tuvans (Tuvan added in 2002); and the Chuvans (Russian and Chukchi added in 2002).

The fifth group: indigenous peoples, the number of which in 2010 did not exceed 5 persons with unwritten languages, and who do not recognize their native language and do not speak it: the Alyutors and Kereks.

Thus, 40 indigenous peoples can be distributed in the following manner:

- 11 peoples (28%), more than a third of which name the language of their nationality as their native language (Table 1);
- 13 peoples (32%), less than a third of which name the language of their nationality as their native language (Table 2). This group is highly heterogeneous in terms of the population dynamics, the scattering in the territory of the Russian Federation and high rates of population aging;
- 8 peoples (20%), whose national language was replaced with Russian, and 90% of which call Russian their native language (Table 3);
- 6 peoples (15%), to which other languages were officially "added" [3]. These peoples left behind the recognition and language proficiency, since nowadays nearly all of them are unwritten;
- 2 peoples (5%) numbered up to 5 members who do not speak their native language – the Alyutors and Kereks.

Despite the fact that the 2010 census asked a question about nationality, the language assimilation is becoming noticeable. MIPNSF are switching to Russian. In the 2020/2021 census, the following languages are expected to disappear: Kerek, Alyutor, Chuvanese, and Oroch. The vitality of such languages as Aleutian, Enets, Negidal, Orok (Ulta/

3 In addition to the six peoples, the following languages were added to: the Koryaks (Aliutor added in 2002); the Kets (Khanty and Yugh added in 2010); the Eskimos (Sirenik and Yupik added in 2002); the Dolgans (Yakut added in 2010).

Uiltra), and Chulym-Turkic is under threat since they are spoken by less than 50 persons.

There are precedents of peoples disappearing along with their language (Sumerians) or languages saving lots of lives (the Navajo language during the Second World War (Navajo ciphers)).

UNESCO distinguishes between six levels of language endangerment: safe, vulnerable, definitely endangered, severely endangered, critically endangered, and extinct. According to this classification, in 2010, 131 languages in Russia were embraced in groups 3–6, including MIPNSF languages (Moseley 2010):

- Group 6 (extinct languages): Kerek, Aliutor, Chuvanese, and Soyot;
- Group 5 (critically endangered languages): Itelmen, Yukaghir, Aleut, Nivkh, Enets, Selkup, Negidal, Ulch, Orok (Ulta/Uiltra), Udege, Oroch, Chulym-Turkic, Tofalar, and Saami.

Thus, four languages (10%) out of 40 languages of MIPNSF are classified as extinct and 14 languages (35%) as critically endangered.

Only three peoples of MIPNSF demonstrate relatively high rates of *proficiency in the language of their nationality* (over 30% of the people); these are the Nenets (43.8%), the Vepsians (39.8%), and the Teleuts (35.5%).

There is a general trend indicating that the numerical value of those who "name the language of their nationality as their native language" usually exceeds the numerical value of those who "speak the language of their nationality". However, there are several exceptions from this trend: the Aleuts (16 people named the Aleut language as their mother tongue, but due to the possibility of indicating up to 3 languages in the census form 19 people revealed that they could speak it); the Veps (for 1,638 Aleut is a native language, but much more people – 2,362 – can speak it); the similar situation is typical of the Sami people, the Orochs, Chulyms, and Tofalars.

Out of 40 MIPNSF, for which there are data available for 1959–2010, or 51 years, only the Veps, Shors, and Eskimos demonstrate significant changes in the settlement structure. The rest of the peoples are characterized by a common half-century settled lifestyle.

For example, in 1959 virtually 94% of the Veps lived in the Republic of Karelia and the Leningrad region. In 2010, 94% of the Veps settled in 6 regions: the Republic of Karelia (57.7%), where "efforts are being made to revive this ethnic group"; the Leningrad Region (23.2%), where "Veps villages" are organized; the Vologda region

(7%); the Moscow city (4.6%); the Murmansk region (1.4%), and the Kemerovo region (0.8%).

We should highlight once again that from 1926 (the first All-Soviet Census) to 2010 the Veps witnessed the greatest fall in population among all 40 MIPNSF: from 32,784 in 1926 to 5,936 in 2010, or a 5.5 times decrease.

In 1959, 91.5% of the Shors settled on the territory of the Kemerovo region; in 2010 – 82.2% of them lived in the Kemerovo region, and 8.9% – in the Republic of Khakassia.

From the territory of their predominant residence – the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (95.8% in 1959), – Eskimos moved to the Magadan Region (1.9%), the Khabarovsk region (1.2%), and the Kamchatka region (0.8%).

The Mansi and the Nanai people with low levels of proficiency in the language of their nationality (6.8 and 6.6%, respectively) for 51 reporting years have not changed the territory of their residence – about 90% of their population have settled within one subject of the Russian Federation.

The area of MIPNSF residence is characterized by a low population density. For instance, as of January 1, 2020, the population density in Russia was about 8.57 inhabitants per square kilometre, whereas in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug it was 0.07 inhabitants, the Nenets Autonomous Okrug – 0.25 inhabitants per square kilometre, etc.

The proposed grouping of MIPNSF into 5 categories for developing a differentiated state and regional policy on language revitalization does not diminish the role and importance of the public in this issue. Language revitalization is a time-consuming process that involves several generations and requires active support from the state and local authorities. The crucial condition for successful language revitalization is the interest, enthusiasm and activity of the language community in language planning and language work. Revitalization is rooted in the family and the head of every individual, and its success depends on the consent of people to take responsibility and invest their personal strength in this process.

In 1992, the Committee of Ministers is the Council of Europe adopted The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. In 2001, Russia joined the countries that signed the Charter, but did not ratify it. The major reason behind it is that, according to the Charter, State Parties have to apply the provisions of Part II to all regional or

minority languages in their territories and to apply at least 35 paragraphs or sub-paragraphs chosen from among the provisions of Part III for the designated languages. Measures should be selected prior to the Charter is ratified. Part III of the Charter provides for the wide use of regional or minority languages in public life: in education ranging from pre-school to vocational training; in judicial authorities (criminal, civil and administrative); in administrative authorities and public services; in the media; etc.

Opportunities for improving Russian legislation on languages can be expanded through active introduction of international principles and norms.

In 2020, a number of amendments were introduced to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, and in particular concerning indigenous peoples. According to Article 69, "The Russian Federation guarantees the rights of indigenous peoples in accordance with the generally recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation. The state protects the cultural identity of all peoples and ethnic communities of the Russian Federation, guarantees the preservation of ethno-cultural and linguistic diversity."

Table 1. MIPNSF in the 2010 General Russian Census who named the language of their nationality as their native language (over 35% of the ethnic group population)[4]

No.	People	Population growth, 2010 to 1959, %	Named the language of their nationality as their native language in the total number of the people, %	Can speak the language of their nationality in the total number of the people, %	Median age, years
Over 35% of the ethnic group name the language of their nationality as their native language					
Positive dynamics in the population growth rates					
80% of the people settle on the territory of one region in the Russian Federation					
1	Nganasans	+20	65	10.8	24.5
2	Chelkans	+38 (2010/2002)	55	24.3	31.2
3	Chukchis	+36	47	28.7	25.6
4	Enets	+15 (2010/1989)	45	15.9	27.8
5	Eskimos	+56	39	26.2	27.6
80% of the people settle on the territory of two regions in the Russian Federation					
6	Dolgans	+101	61	11.8	24.8
7	Nenets	+95	73	43.8	23.1
8	Khanty	+61	36	28.6	24.8

4 Compiled by the author using primary data of the censuses of the Russian Federal State Statistics Service.

Negative dynamics in the population growth rates					
80% of the people settle on the territory of one region in the Russian Federation					
9	Teleuts	-0,3 (2010/2002)	60	35.5	33.4
10	Shors	-14	35	20.4	33.3
80% of the people settle on the territory of two regions in the Russian Federation					
11	Selkups	-1	37	25.9	28.7

Table 2. MIPNSF in the 2010 General Russian Census who named the language of their nationality as their native language (less than 35% of the ethnic group population)[5]

No.	People	Population growth, 2010 to 1959, %	Named the language of their nationality as their native language in the total number of the people, %	Can speak the language of their nationality in the total number of the people, %	Median age, years
Less than 35% of the ethnic group name the language of their nationality as their native language					
Positive dynamics in the population growth rates					
80% of the people settle on the territory of one region in the Russian Federation					
1	Koryaks	+29	28	18.4	27.1
2	Mansi	+94	14	6.8	25.3
3	Nanais	+52	19	6.6	28.8
4	Sami	+1	17	16.9	31.6

5 Compiled by the author using primary data of the censuses of the Russian Federal State Statistics Service.

5	Tubalars	+26 (2010/2002)	22	10.7	33.2
6	Yukaghirs	+264	22	19.4	23.6
7	Negidals	+4 (2010/1970)	17	3.7	27.6
80% of the people settle on the territory of two regions in the Russian Federation					
Positive dynamics in the population growth rates					
8	Kets	+20	19	16.3	30.4
9	Udege	+7	12	5.5	31.1
Negative dynamics in the population growth rates					
10	Veps	-63	28	39.8	54.8
11	Kuman-dins	-7 (2010/2002)	24	18.0	40.8
80% of the people settle on the territory of three or more regions in the Russian Federation					
12	Evens	+148	25	21.9	25.5
13	Evenks	+54	15	11.4	25.4

Table 3. MIPNSF in the 2010 General Russian Census who named the Russian language as their native language (over 90% of the ethnic group population)[6]

No.	People	Population growth, 2010 to 1959, %	Can speak the language of their nationality in the total number of the people in the 2010 GRC, %	Median age, years
Over 90% of the ethnic group name the Russian language as their native language				
Positive dynamics in the population growth rates				
80% of the people settle on the territory of one region in the Russian Federation				
1	Aleuts	+21	3.9	34.1
2	Oroks	+65 (2010/1989)	3.4	29.1
3	Tofalars	+30	1.4	27.5
4	Ulchs	+35	5.1	28.4
80% of the people settle on the territory of two regions in the Russian Federation				
5	Nivkhs	+26	3.9	27.5
6	Itelmens	+191	1.8	30.4
Negative dynamics in the population growth rates				
80% of the people settle on the territory of two regions in the Russian Federation				
7	Orochs	-23	0.5	27.3
8	Chulyms	-46 (2010/2002)	4.8	33.7

6 Compiled by the author using primary data of the censuses of the Russian Federal State Statistics Service.

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