| dc.creator | Podnieks, Karlis | |
| dc.date | 2008-11 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-09-02T03:36:20Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2013-09-02T03:36:20Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-09-02 | |
| dc.identifier | http://scireprints.lu.lv/201/1/Podnieks_Indispens.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | Podnieks, Karlis (2008) Indispensability Argument and Set Theory. The Reasoner, 2 (11). pp. 8-9. ISSN 1757-0522 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://dspace.lu.lv/dspace/handle/7/1802 | |
| dc.description | One may take several different positions with respect to the ontological status of scientific entities such as, for example, quarks (quarks can't be observed even in principle). Do quarks "really exist", or are they only a (currently successful) theoretical construct used by physicists in their models? Perhaps, the "least committed" position could be the formalist one: let us define the "real existence" of some scientific entity as its invariance in future scientific theories. | |
| dc.format | application/pdf | |
| dc.language.iso | lav | en_US |
| dc.publisher | University of Kent, Centre for Reasoning | |
| dc.relation | http://www.thereasoner.org/ | |
| dc.relation | http://scireprints.lu.lv/201/ | |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en_US |
| dc.subject | B Philosophy (General) | |
| dc.title | Indispensability Argument and Set Theory | |
| dc.type | Article | |
| dc.type | PeerReviewed | |
