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dc.creatorPodnieks, Karlis
dc.date2008-11
dc.date.accessioned2013-09-02T03:36:20Z
dc.date.available2013-09-02T03:36:20Z
dc.date.issued2013-09-02
dc.identifierhttp://scireprints.lu.lv/201/1/Podnieks_Indispens.pdf
dc.identifierPodnieks, Karlis (2008) Indispensability Argument and Set Theory. The Reasoner, 2 (11). pp. 8-9. ISSN 1757-0522
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.lu.lv/dspace/handle/7/1802
dc.descriptionOne may take several different positions with respect to the ontological status of scientific entities such as, for example, quarks (quarks can't be observed even in principle). Do quarks "really exist", or are they only a (currently successful) theoretical construct used by physicists in their models? Perhaps, the "least committed" position could be the formalist one: let us define the "real existence" of some scientific entity as its invariance in future scientific theories.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.language.isolaven_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Kent, Centre for Reasoning
dc.relationhttp://www.thereasoner.org/
dc.relationhttp://scireprints.lu.lv/201/
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectB Philosophy (General)
dc.titleIndispensability Argument and Set Theory
dc.typeArticle
dc.typePeerReviewed


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