

METAPHYSICAL INSIDEOUTNESS:  
AN INTERPRETATION OF OVERCOMING METAPHYSICS  
IN THE HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON  
JACQUES DERRIDA, AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE THOUGHT OF  
FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER

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A NOTE ON TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS OF  
SCHLEIERMACHER'S WORKS

Since the dissertation is written in English, I quote the English translations of the primary works of Schleiermacher wherever possible. If one wishes to consult the German originals of such works as the *Glaubenslehre* and the *Brief Outline*, I also add the paragraph and section numbers in endnotes. This also applies to the quotations from the basic works of other thinkers, such as Kant, Husserl, and others. I also may occasionally insert some original German words into these quotes from the translated books. As for Schleiermacher's *Dialektik*, one of the basic texts for this investigation, since the full translation is not available in English, I have had to use the German texts. Basically, I use the original, most comprehensive, Jonas edition of 1839, but next to that I also refer to Odebrecht's 1976 edition of Schleiermacher's lectures of 1822 and Tice's English translation of the 1811 lectures (see bibliography). All translations of the quotations from Jonas and Odebrecht are mine, but the German originals of all direct quotations are supplied in endnotes or, in cases of shorter phrases, in parentheses. I do not do so, however, when translating and quoting other German authors writing on Schleiermacher. In addition, in cases where I do not quote Schleiermacher directly, but rather summarize larger fragments in my own words, I may insert the original German for some ambiguous terms in parentheses. Mostly I do it in order to point out a specific term or word or to show when my translation of a term or word intentionally differs from the plain and most direct translation.

## INTRODUCTION

### *General Remarks on Motivation, Arguments, Course, and Significance of the Dissertation*

I have chosen the problem of the overcoming of metaphysics as the main theme of my dissertation. This theme is important today inasmuch as metaphysical foundations in philosophy, as well as in theology, are challenged as never before. Different nonfoundational philosophies and theologies have emerged that claim to have left metaphysics behind. Have they always succeeded? In my opinion, as the dissertation will show, this leaving behind is not as easy as it might seem. Metaphysics has, like the proverbial cat, nine lives, or even many more than nine.<sup>1</sup> Sooner or later, every metaphysics is challenged and overcome. Yet, every new overcoming of metaphysics has its own implicit metaphysical presuppositions, which may be challenged in turn. The always discernible implicit metaphysics appears to make the overcoming of metaphysics impossible. Is the situation hopeless then? Is there no way out? I think that despite the perseverance of metaphysics, there are some ways out of it.

As the title of the dissertation indicates, I am going to contend for a particular position in regard to the problem of metaphysics. My position will be somewhere in the middle between the two ways of overcoming metaphysics. The first is when one metaphysics overcomes another, less adequate metaphysics. The second is when nonmetaphysical thinking leaves metaphysics behind. On the one hand, my position, called *metaphysical insideoutness*, remains inside the game of metaphysics insofar as it acknowledges the impossibility of leaving metaphysics completely behind.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, to

some extent, it opts for the overcoming of metaphysics in the first sense. On the other hand, my position at the same time calls for the overcoming of metaphysics in the second sense and acknowledges at least some ways of stepping outside metaphysics. This stepping outside takes place while remaining inside the first overcoming. Thus, it is a vacillating middle position between the two. Insofar as this position includes both ways of overcoming, I believe it is a finer way to address the problem of metaphysics.

Accordingly, the figure whose thought I would choose as the main object of investigation should have been conscious of both the need of going beyond metaphysics and the impossibility of its final overcoming. Likewise, this thinker would have had to have accomplished some overcoming of metaphysics in both senses presented above: proposing some more adequate metaphysics in contrast to the existing ones and also leaving metaphysics behind. In fact, there are many famous philosophers or philosophical schools to which I could apply this philosophical tactic of metaphysical insideoutness as a hermeneutical key, and I will demonstrate it in the first part of the dissertation. However, as the main object, I chose the thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher, a thinker from nineteenth-century Germany who is not so notable as a philosopher or metaphysician, although he is famous in such other fields as theology, pedagogy, hermeneutics, religious philosophy, and others. However, he also addressed metaphysical questions in the lectures on dialectics, which were edited and published posthumously. Moreover, he also worked to overcome metaphysics in theology.

In any case, Schleiermacher fits all those requirements. His lectures on dialectic represent a serious contribution to metaphysics and its overcoming. As I will present in the dissertation, Schleiermacher appropriated the most current metaphysics of his time, Kantian transcendental philosophy, at the same time striving to overcome it with, in his view, a more appropriate metaphysics. Besides, Schleiermacher's dialectics as logic overcomes metaphysics. He also insisted on the independence of theological discourse

from that of metaphysical speculation. As is well known, he saw Christian dogmatics as an area of reflection that overcomes metaphysics and considered metaphysical categories to be inappropriate for expressing the Christian beliefs. Yet, despite this claim, knowing the inevitability of metaphysics, he hesitated to exclude metaphysics from his dogmatics altogether, but retaining it in certain forms. But above all, I will also find some elements in both Schleiermacher's philosophy and theology that unexpectedly fall outside metaphysics, outside the rule of one overcoming another. Using Heidegger's expression, I call these elements "meta-metaphysical," for they reach even beyond metaphysics, which itself is supposed to go beyond (*meta*).

Before discussing Schleiermacher, in the first part of the dissertation I outline the development of metaphysics until its relatively late self-determination. I also address some key metaphysical problems during this presentation. I continue with some selected examples of overcoming metaphysics from modern philosophy. Although this overview will mainly show the overcoming of metaphysics in the first sense, there will be some instances in which my proposed position comes into view as well. I need this account not only in order to establish my position, but also to show that my approach may indeed be almost universal. It can be applied to most leading philosophers in the history of philosophy after the arising need to overcome metaphysics, which, by the way, coincides with metaphysics' coming to its clear definition in the eighteenth century.

The overview of the first part will culminate in a chapter on the thought of a recent French thinker, Jacques Derrida, whose work I also approach according to the aforementioned double pattern. My interpretation of his thought will delineate my stance toward overcoming metaphysics most expressly. There is a certain reciprocity in my account of the history of philosophy. I consider Derrida's thought to be a peak in the history of overcoming metaphysics from which I look back at previous thinkers. Having this standpoint helps me to see that the other thinkers in the development of overcoming

metaphysics, including Schleiermacher, themselves in one way or another exemplify similar double positions, only related to the philosophical context of their time.

My position of metaphysical insideoutness integrates two one-sided interpretations of Derrida's relationship to metaphysics. On the one hand, some interpreters consider Derrida to be the ultimate metaphysician who has discovered the last quasi-Kantian transcendental presuppositions of metaphysics. This interpretation only helps others to hold that Derrida himself is deeply involved in explicit and implicit metaphysics, unable to overcome it. On the other hand, there are others who believe that his stylistically creative literary writing has left metaphysics behind after its deconstruction. I interpret Derrida from the viewpoint of an oscillating middle position that tries to bring together these two extremes but without synthesizing them. This interpretation will help to arrive at a third, richer, and more complex tactic of overcoming metaphysics. I interpret Derrida's science of writing, grammatology, as further completion of metaphysics in my first sense of overcoming, and I argue that this first overcoming is so fashioned that it opens up possibilities to glimpse from the inside some of what is outside of metaphysics while still remaining inside. It means to reach outside (*meta* of *metaphysica*) from inside, remaining inside (in *physica*) the finite economy of empirical aposteriority.

One might ask about the point of interpreting Schleiermacher—an “old fashioned” nineteenth century's German theorist—in the light of later thinking, especially today's French neo-structuralism? For one thing, Schleiermacher may have influenced Derrida indirectly at least by his hermeneutics through Dilthey and Heidegger, the latter also influenced by Schleiermacher's *Speeches* in arriving at his idea of “being-in-the-world.”<sup>3</sup> For another thing, the point is not that Schleiermacher could have exactly produced today's philosophical arguments. However, certain similarities between unrelated figures of different times may indicate that the present problems are implicit in

the past, and, indeed, the problem of overcoming metaphysics has been present in the history of philosophy for centuries. This fact is related to another quite obvious insight, namely, that rarely is something invented completely anew. The implicit or explicit resources from the past heritage have always been used for the shaping of thought in every present. In my opinion, the texts of all great thinkers from the past, more or less distant, as well as from the present, always return us to the beginnings of the questions that thinking asks. Derrida, for example, acknowledges that even he has not invented anything, but only delved into the marginalized resources in the texts written by others. I also agree with Derrida's acknowledgement that all great texts are still before us, still to be disclosed. There is an inexhaustible reserve or residue, the abundant surplus of meaning in the margins or in the gaps of the great texts.

Hence, neither do I claim to invent something new in this work. I only want to reappropriate what already exists in some old German texts and lecture notes. Yet, I hope to discover some uncommon and intriguing elements in these texts by looking from today's perspective throughout this investigation. That can truly make Schleiermacher a historical "figure," similarly to Rajan's claim about deconstructive and phenomenological motives in Schleiermacher, "in the double sense that he is not an imaginary construction but is at the same time a 'figure,' produced through the intertextual inscription of contemporary theory in an earlier critical discourse."<sup>4</sup> Although I will not provide point-by-point comparisons, there can, indeed, be both some schematic and detailed parallels constructed between Schleiermacher and Derrida. The process of discovery is no less important than the goal. Although there will be no point by point comparisons, there will be many intriguing discoveries in the process of its making, discoveries that might have their own individual scholarly significance. All that will serve to make Schleiermacher contemporary, and I think it is enough reason to justify this dissertation project.



## *What Is Metaphysics and Its Overcoming?*

Since the dissertation deals with the problem of overcoming metaphysics, first I need to define metaphysics. In addition, I need to give some more exact definitions—although still preliminary—of the overcoming of metaphysics that I briefly outlined above. To start with, the etymology of the word “metaphysics” speaks for itself. Literally it means “beyond physics.” I give the first most general definition of metaphysics, in terms of this literal meaning, as *a discipline that inquires beyond physical reality itself into its underlying structures*. In this sense, metaphysics is *ontology*, the science of being. Some sort of congruence between mind and reality is presupposed in this case of metaphysics. Philosophers have been practicing this kind of metaphysics throughout the history of philosophy until our own day. One can mention Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, the Medieval scholastics, Leibniz, Wolff, Whitehead, and others.

However, already during the Renaissance, but especially during the Enlightenment, a different branch of metaphysics emerged. Its focus shifted from being as such to the mind of the knower. Hence, another meaning of metaphysics is *epistemology*, the science of knowledge. According to this second meaning, I give another preliminary definition of metaphysics as *a discipline that inquires into the presuppositions of knowledge*. This metaphysics, instead of dealing with the structures of being, concentrates on the conditions of knowing that being. This kind of metaphysics appears explicitly in Descartes, but culminates in Kant. These and other first modern thinkers started to question the ability of the human mind to comprehend objective being and, instead, concentrated on the mind itself, an entity more proximate to the subject, and therefore, supposedly better knowable. There could also be a subsection under this second meaning of metaphysics that can be very broadly called intuitionism. This epistemology appeals to a direct grasp of reality differently from grasping its ontological and mental structures. I mention it because Schleiermacher could fit in this group. Others

who develop this type of metaphysics include Bergson, Husserl, as well as the early Heidegger.

However, giving these two tentative definitions does not mean that the question about the nature of metaphysics can be answered easily and unequivocally. These are only the two most general definitions. Variations are endless, and classifications could be made in many other different ways. Moreover, these two approaches have been combined, especially after Kant, for example, as in Hegel. In truth, almost every thinker who has struggled with metaphysics has his or her specific and peculiar understanding of metaphysics, usually different from that of others. Certainly, as the above two definitions also show, metaphysics always assumes different forms; every metaphysician of importance has tried to reshape metaphysics, to bring it to a new level of validity.

In my perspective, precisely this reshaping is one meaning of overcoming—*the surpassing of previous metaphysics, which has purportedly lost its credibility, with a new and more adequate metaphysics*. The above mentioned shift from ontology to epistemology is one of the most distinct examples of this overcoming. Notably, the phrase “overcoming of metaphysics” is taken here in subjective genitive; it is metaphysics overcoming itself. Again, in case of the preceding example, epistemology—as critical philosophy, intuitionism, phenomenology, etc.—overcomes metaphysics as ontology. In any event, in this first sense of overcoming, it is another metaphysics that overcomes metaphysics; it is overcoming as replacement and fulfillment.

My second meaning of overcoming refers to the attempts of *setting metaphysics aside altogether, leaving it behind by means of different ways of thinking*. In this case, the phrase is taken in objective genitive. This leaving metaphysics behind is important inasmuch as every metaphysical foundation sooner or later becomes suspect, but thinking outside metaphysics remains outside the sphere of metaphysical validations and refutations. Mention must be made of schools and individual philosophers who saw

themselves in this light, but whom I include in the first group. Thus, British empiricists and their heirs, logical positivists, might have assumed that they left metaphysics behind for the sake of another, instrumental philosophy, content with the problems of logic and experiential verification alone. According to my definitions of metaphysics, their thought remains metaphysical in the second sense, that is, they provide alternative systems of supposedly more credible principles of knowledge.

One of the first true overcomers of metaphysics in my second sense is Nietzsche, despite Heidegger's evaluation of Nietzsche's notions of the will to power and the eternal recurrence of the same as the completion of the Western metaphysical tradition. There is enough textual evidence that Nietzsche wanted to say something beyond his critique of Western philosophy and that this something does not constitute a new metaphysical system, despite appearances. Nietzsche wanted to say what he said differently from metaphysics. The same applies to other thinkers who attempted to circumvent the foundations of knowledge later, such as Foucault, the later Wittgenstein, and others.

The next problem—already present in Nietzsche, as well as in other non-foundationalists—is whether metaphysics can be left behind in the second sense of overcoming at all. Indeed, it is always possible to find some metaphysical principles in the thought of the aforementioned non-foundationalists and, thus, to include them in the group of implicit metaphysicians, like empiricists and positivists. Yet, I want to resist this conclusion. The thought of these overcomers of metaphysics contains another, playful side, which eschews metaphysical categorizations and conceptualizations. To underscore, this doublesidedness of the overcoming of metaphysics is very important to my dissertation. As noted above, I want to uphold a more gainful stance of *metaphysical insideoutness* that combines the two positions simultaneously and overcomes the one-sidedness of each.

## NOTES

1. There is a section titled “The Nine Lives of Metaphysics” in Frederick Sontag, *Problems of Metaphysics* (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler, 1970), 3.

2. Although I use it differently, the word “insideoutness” may also be found, for example, in the title of a subchapter of John Llewelyn’s *Derrida on the Threshold of Sense* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1986). Llewelyn uses this word in regard to Derrida’s unusual resolving of the surface contradiction between two opposite terms. Derrida does not make explicit an ambiguity between the terms, as metaphysical discourse is used to, but brings out a deeper structural “contradiction” by making explicit an ambivalence in the superficially oppositional relation between the terms (p. 99). The markers of this ambivalence are Derrida’s own catachreses, like *différance* and others.

3. See the remark on Schleiermacher’s influence on Heidegger via *Speeches* in editor’s introduction to Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings*, trans., ed. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), xvi.

4. Tilottama Rajan, *The Supplement of Reading: Figures of Understanding in Romantic Theory and Practice* (Ithaca, N. Y.; London: Cornell University Press, 1990), 6.

PART ONE

THE PROBLEM OF OVERCOMING METAPHYSICS  
IN THE HISTORY OF WESTERN THOUGHT

## INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this first part is to establish my position regarding overcoming metaphysics and to set the contextual stage for my investigation into Schleiermacher's thought and its contemporary significance. Inasmuch as the subject matter of the dissertation, broadly speaking, is metaphysics, the account of the general Introduction is not sufficient, and a further clarification of the origins and nature metaphysics is a prerequisite. Since there is no generally accepted definition of metaphysics and its tasks, but different philosophical schools and individual thinkers have their own distinctive understandings of metaphysics, I turn to the history of philosophy for particular examples. So, in chapter 1, I start with the origins of metaphysics in Aristotle and follow its development until a precise definition is reached. Then, I continue with expounding some crucial cases of overcoming metaphysics in the modern period in chapter 2. The most detailed account in this section will be on Kant because Kant's philosophy is not only the most important turning point for metaphysics but also Schleiermacher's immediate context. Chapter 3 of will focus on Derrida and his approach to overcoming metaphysics, which influences my position most.

Before that, however, I should acknowledge that, as in the foregoing case of the interpretation of epistemology as metaphysics, I present the following discussions of concrete philosophers and schools as my own preferred readings, certain readings among other possible readings, without claiming the final interpretative truth. It is possible to argue against them. In principle, it is also possible to provide even more solid and extensive scholarly arguments for these interpretations. However, that would exceed the scope of the dissertation and would hardly leave any space for the main investigation into

the thought of Schleiermacher. Therefore, I leave the scholarly defense of my approach to the history of philosophy quite limited and, perhaps, narrowed for my own purposes. On the other hand, I do need to include this material inasmuch as it develops and supports the main presupposition of the dissertation itself.

Another thing that should be mentioned from the outset is that I am not going to trace the whole sophisticated conceptual development of metaphysics. Although I will refer to the concept of being often and mention some metaphysical categories here and there, I will mostly examine the nature of metaphysics as such. The specific purpose of this preparatory part is to show the problematic nature of metaphysics in regard to its overcoming from the very beginnings until today. This part would illustrate why the overcoming of metaphysics at all, which can only be answered by concrete examples from the history of metaphysics. It may even turn out that metaphysics has appeared in a well-defined form only for a very short time in the history of philosophy. The “death” or the “end” of metaphysics is a kind of catchphrase today, but in many cases it is not even specified what kind of metaphysics it is that has “died.” I want to make sure that it does not happen here. Moreover, all too often, those who use loud polemics against metaphysics do not delve into the history of the overcoming of metaphysics, perhaps to discover that the overcoming happened the very moment metaphysics established itself, or even before. Yet another thing, which should be clarified from the outset, is that I do not intend to disparage metaphysics. It is the most serious discipline in any of its forms. I leave the judgement to metaphysics itself, for it always surpasses itself in its own development. Even if I partly endorse the need to overcome metaphysics in the second, objective, sense, I acknowledge my own metaphysical presuppositions at least in the form of the need to go beyond (*meta*), whatever that means, even if it is going beyond metaphysics itself. This “metaphysical” spirit of transgression, this propensity of self-surpassing, as I see it, is the driving force of philosophy.

CHAPTER 1  
THE WAY FROM AMBIGUITY TO THE RELATIVELY LATE  
DEFINITIVENESS OF METAPHYSICS<sup>1</sup>

*The Problematic Origins of Metaphysics: The Aristotelian Puzzle*

In the Introduction, I defined metaphysics as a science that inquires into the structures of being. Principally, the Western philosophical tradition, from its pre-Socratic beginnings to Plato, may then be considered metaphysical. However, I want to be more exact and start with Aristotle, for it is precisely with him that the beginnings of the science of metaphysics, albeit most ambiguous, are associated.

The Librarian Origins of the Term

The first ambiguity is that there is no documented usage of the word “metaphysics” in Aristotle’s known works. Simply, the first-century BCE editors (Andronicus of Rhodes et al.) of Aristotle’s works found it difficult to classify fourteen assorted treatises and so put them in their classification *ta meta ta physika*, “the (books) after the (books on) nature,” natural philosophy or physics. They could possibly notice the connection to physics in these more theoretical and general books that deal with such topics as form and matter, being and entities, the eternal and temporal, substance and accidents, movement and immutability, potentiality and actuality, unity and diversity, identity and difference, and so forth. To be sure, these topics became the subject matter of metaphysics. Yet, the “librarian” origin of the title of this collection of Aristotle’s books does not reveal whether those ancient editors applied the title of metaphysics to the



content as well. One knows not if these adherents of Aristotle considered, like Thomas Aquinas, *meta ta physica* as “trans-physics” (*trans physica scientia*), that is, as a science that goes beyond nature *meta ta physis*, the treatises located after physics as at the same time knowledge reaching beyond the sensible, physical reality.<sup>2</sup>

### Which Science Is Metaphysics?

The second ambiguity is that, in these books, Aristotle probes at least two different sciences with names different from metaphysics. True, as I will show later, both will have become part and parcel of metaphysics, but confusion none the less, especially because it was perhaps only Heidegger who first found a legitimate conceptual unification of these different aspects of metaphysics. So, in the Book Gamma (IV), Aristotle compares special sciences with a science he is looking for: the first philosophy, or the first science (*episteme prote*). The special sciences deal with particular attributes of being, but never with being in general. But then he defines the science he is trying to establish: “There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature.”<sup>3</sup> It is a science that does not study particular beings but being as such (*to on hei on*), not as what beings are but insofar as they are, insofar as they all share being.

In the Book E (VI), Aristotle likewise weighs the particular sciences against the rudimentary science he is in search of, but in this case, it is *theology* instead of the science of being *qua* being. All sciences, including the first philosophy, seek the principles and the causes of the things that are. But the particular sciences “mark off some particular being—some genus, and inquire into this, but not being simply nor *qua* being...”<sup>4</sup> On this account, according to Aristotle, there are particular theoretical sciences that are rudimentary as well. There is natural science, physics, dealing with things not immovable and inseparable from matter, that is, things embodied and having the principle

of movement in themselves. Then, there is mathematics, also dealing with things inseparable from matter, but immovable. The difference of the first science, theology, is that it deals with things both separable from matter and immovable. Since all principles and causes are eternal, Aristotle's argument goes on, but especially those pertaining to these sciences, insofar as they represent "so much of the divine as appears to us," these are the three basic theoretical sciences superior to all others: physics, mathematics, and theology.<sup>5</sup> Yet, theology stands apart from the other two, for it deals with the highest genus, the highest of existing things. And Aristotle concludes this section with the contentious statement that identifies the first philosophy with theology, the statement most controversial, though hypothetical only: "[I]f there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first (*katholou houtos hoti prote*)."<sup>6</sup> Ultimately, it is this science that is the first philosophy (*theologike episteme prote*). The science of theology considers "being *qua* being – both what it is and the attributes which belong to it *qua* being."<sup>7</sup>

### The Problem of Being

This second ambiguity of the origins of metaphysics in Aristotle is much bigger than the librarian derivation of the name of that science. There are at least two huge interrelated problems: (1) the problem of the status of the science of being as being and (2) the two incompatible sciences in Aristotle's metaphysics. The phrase "being as being" appears to be a tautology. It may be the most empty abstraction, with no content. How can there be a science of it?! The phrase *to on hei on* appears to contain a completely redundant adverb *hei (qua)*, "as." One can only consider something particular as "as." In fact, that is the function of special sciences: to infer properties from something by means of "as" and then to determine its genus. But how can one think of such unqualified being

as a common property of everything there is, even of that which is not, and, moreover, establish a science upon it?<sup>8</sup> That would be a science without an object.

In fact, what happens with the phrase *to on hei on* is that being as being thus inadvertently becomes reduced to a special kind of being. Even more, Aristotle himself is not clear about this issue. On the one hand, he admits that being cannot be a genus of things.<sup>9</sup> On the other hand, he equates the question of what is being with the question of what is substance (*ousia*).<sup>10</sup> Substance can only be particular. But in the same section where he makes the shift from the first philosophy of being to theology, he raises the question “whether first philosophy is universal, or deals with one genus, i.e. some one kind of being...”<sup>11</sup> Precisely in this place, Aristotle makes the move from being in general to the highest being, which is a particular being. In any case, the difficulty is obvious: how can one and the same science be abstract and concrete at the same time? How can it be universal if it is the first due to the highest being as its object?

### *The Middle Ages: The “Golden Age” of Metaphysics?*

It is so surprising that throughout the Middle Ages, supposedly the “golden age” of metaphysics, metaphysics as a concrete discipline did not achieve any more clarity than in Aristotle himself. In fact, the great thinkers in that period, for example, Thomas Aquinas, on whom I will elaborate more, but also William of Ockham, Duns Scotus, Averroes, and others, referred to metaphysics only when commenting on Aristotle. Although they extensively wrote about subjects now understood as metaphysical, they themselves did not consider them as metaphysical, at least not in the specific meaning of the word. Paradoxically, metaphysics was still not defined during the so-called “golden age of metaphysics.”

## Thomas Aquinas: Metaphysics More Confused

In any case, it was also only after fourteen centuries of oblivion that the term “metaphysics” reemerged, and it was only in the context of the rediscovery of Aristotle in the Middle Ages. The first to mention the term was Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. Unfortunately, Thomas’s interpretation effects even more confusion in the discipline than the randomly arranged treatises from different points of Aristotle’s career themselves. Thomas already gives three names to what he thinks is one and the same primary science of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*: the divine science or theology (*scientia divina sive theologia*), metaphysics (*metaphysica*), and the first philosophy (*prima philosophia*).<sup>12</sup> The proper name of metaphysics is thus only one name of the three, and it refers to the science that “considers being and the attributes which naturally accompany being (for things which transcend the physical order are discovered by the process of analysis, as the more common are discovered after the less common).”<sup>13</sup> Aristotle’s first philosophy in Thomas’ hands becomes the science that “considers the first causes of things.”<sup>14</sup> This is the way Thomas divides Aristotle’s original science of being *qua* being. But the Aristotelian theology, according to Thomas, is such insofar as it considers substances separate from matter, which means non-sensible, immaterial substances.

Thomas derives his threefold division from what he calls “the most intelligible objects.” He understands this phrase in three ways: first, the knowledge of the first causes from the viewpoint of the order of knowing. Second, the knowledge of the most universal principles from the viewpoint of comparing the intellect with the senses that give knowledge of particulars only. These principles are both being and what accompanies it, such as unity and diversity, potentiality and actuality. Third, things altogether separate from matter from the viewpoint of the intellect’s own knowledge, which, according to Thomas, is proportionate to its object insofar as they “belong to one and the same genus,

since the intellect and the intelligible object are one in actuality.”<sup>15</sup> Those separate things include God and the intellectual substances.

Thomas unites the three meanings of his interpretation of Aristotle’s fundamental science in this way. First, he considers the aforementioned separate substances as both the universal principles and the first causes of being at the same time. Second, he proposes that since it pertains to one and the same science to consider both the causes of a genus and the genus itself, it is the function of one and the same science to consider separate substances and being in general (*ens commune*).<sup>16</sup> But this unification does not seem to bring more clarity into the original ambiguity of the definition of metaphysics. And this situation goes on throughout the Middle Ages.

It is worth noting that Thomas’ unification does not interpret Aristotle’s first theological science as dealing with God as the highest being. God, according to Thomas, comes into view of this science only insofar as God is the first cause of the subject of metaphysics because of being the cause of being as being.<sup>17</sup> Regarding the divine things as they are in themselves, Thomas refers to Aristotle’s metaphor of the sun and its light. Being the principles of everything, the divine things, “though supremely intelligible in themselves, are in relation to our intellect as the light of the sun to the eyes of the owl; so that we cannot by the light of natural reason attain to them except as we are led to them through their effects.”<sup>18</sup> God as the external cause and the principle stands outside metaphysics itself. For most great scholastics of the Middle Ages, God is the condition of the possibility of metaphysics, but not contained in metaphysics itself. To Thomas, this is a totally different science that includes God as its object, the divine things as they manifest themselves, not through their effects only. This knowledge does not come from metaphysical theology as the philosophical science of reason; it is the sacred doctrine, the theology of revelation.<sup>19</sup> It is the science communicated in the sacred scripture that considers divine things on their own account as its very subject.<sup>20</sup>

## *Metaphysics Finally Defined*

### The First Clarity of Metaphysics: Francisco Suarez

When one hears about the overcoming of the millennia-long metaphysical tradition, it may be useful to note that the exact defining of the scope and subject of metaphysics emerges relatively late. It occurs at the end of the sixteenth century in Suarez's *Metaphysical Disputations* (1597). In fact, it is the first systematic and comprehensive work on metaphysics in the West that is not simply a commentary on Aristotle's metaphysics, even if Suarez's main sources of inspiration are still Aristotle and Thomas. It instantly becomes the standard text on metaphysics in continental Europe, and it has decisive influence on Descartes and the further development of the so-called school-metaphysics, which peaks in the systems of Leibniz and Wolff, and then finally takes shape as an accurately defined science.<sup>21</sup> Even Schopenhauer and Brentano acknowledge the influence of Suarez's metaphysics, whereas Heidegger sees it as the main mediating source that ushers Greek philosophy into the metaphysics and transcendental philosophy of modern times.<sup>22</sup>

Suarez marks a bridge in the development of metaphysics from scholasticism to modernism in the sense that he is the forerunner of the subsequent split of metaphysics into idealism and empiricism. In the first place, for Suarez, the proper object of metaphysics is the formal concept of being (*conceptus entis*). It may sound ordinary, but it was not so in Suarez's time. In fact, it marks the self-overcoming of metaphysics as epistemology, for its object is no longer being as thing itself (*res ipsa*), but its formal concept as the act of mind.<sup>23</sup> The concept of being is universal, comprising all metaphysical contrasts related to concrete entities. All concrete concepts are derived from the most abstract concept of being, which is implicit in all other concepts. Suarez calls it "the objective concept of being," objective in the sense that it is immediately intended by

the act of mind. It is not reality itself that is the object of metaphysics, but its mental representation, “the act of understanding (*conceptus formalis*) whereby the mind understands.”<sup>24</sup> In any event, it is the first significant step toward the primacy of subjectivity over being whereby metaphysics becomes theory of knowledge, the science of the first principles of knowledge—epistemology. Full fruits of this first self-overcoming of metaphysics will be reaped with Descartes and Kant.

In the case of the singulars instead of being, this stance in turn means that knowledge takes place through “a proper and separate concept. . . without having to resort to reflection.”<sup>25</sup> This is the second point that marks the transition from the old to the modern style of metaphysics. Metaphysics, accordingly, becomes the science of “being insofar as it is real being” (*ens in quantum ens reale*).<sup>26</sup> Suarez opposes the inclusion of accidental and conceptual being, as well as God, immaterial substances, or substantial entities, in the object of metaphysics. Again, Suarez supports his view by means of the univocal concept of being, analogically derived from the similarity among things.<sup>27</sup> In any event, these theses lead to an empiricist viewpoint, undermining the prevalent position that singulars are known indirectly, that is, through universals. The British empiricists will fully develop this second position of (self-)overcoming metaphysics.

The last, but not the least, point I want to point out about Suarez is the definition of metaphysics he gives at the beginning of the first disputation: “This science makes abstract palpable or material things. . . and it contemplates on the one hand things that are divine and separated from matter, and on the other common reason of being, which can [both] exist without matter.”<sup>28</sup> Although this definition calls to mind the two sciences of Aristotle, Suarez is the first who conceptually unites them into a twofold system and provides a systematic elaboration.

## Metaphysics in Its Zenith

Suarez's definition of metaphysics is further refined in the so-called school-metaphysics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The principal task of metaphysics becomes to define, corresponding to Suarez's distinction, what is universal on two levels: that of "common being" and "essence."<sup>29</sup> It is according to this distinction that metaphysics reaches its twofold canonical shape of general metaphysics, dealing with being and its general features, insofar as it is shared by all entities, and special metaphysics divided in three sub-disciplines: the rational sciences of God, souls, and bodies. Thus, Christian Wolff, the last most prominent school-metaphysician before Kant's devastation of this discipline, distinguishes general metaphysics or ontology (*metaphysica generalis*) and special metaphysics (*metaphysica specialis*). He also, correspondingly, among many others, writes four separate books, one on each part of metaphysics: general metaphysics or ontology (*metaphysica generalis sive ontologia*), natural theology (*theologia naturalis*), rational psychology (*psychologia rationalis*), and general cosmology (*cosmologia generalis*).<sup>30</sup> Wolff defines the first, ontology or first philosophy, as "the science of being in general, or insofar as being is."<sup>31</sup> But the other three are rational (*vernünftige*) speculations about the nature of God, the human being, and the world. These standard divisions of metaphysics are also reflected in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. According to Kant, the architectonic of pure reason demands this division.<sup>32</sup> But in Kant's book itself, the transcendental analytic as theory of pure conceptual understanding stands for general metaphysics, while the possibilities of all three parts of special metaphysics are refuted in the transcendental dialectic.



## NOTES

1. The presentation of this chapter is significantly influenced by the first lectures of Jean-Luc Marion's course "Metaphysics and Onto-theology" delivered at the University of Chicago Divinity School in spring 1998.

2. Thomas writes: "By another name this science is called metaphysics, that is to say, trans-physics, because it is properly to be learned by us after physics [or natural philosophy], for it is from sensible things that we must take our point of departure in order to arrive at the knowledge of non-sensible things." Thomas Aquinas, *An Introduction to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans., ed. James F. Anderson (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1997), 6 (from *Commentary on The Trinity of Boethius*, 5, I).

3. Aristotle, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1584 (IV, 1).

4. *Ibid.*, 1619 (VI, 1).

5. *Ibid.*, 1620 (VI, 1).

6. *Ibid.* Cf. the same argument on page 1681 (XI, 7).

7. *Ibid.*

8. ". . . we say even of non-being that it *is* non-being" (*Ibid.*, 1584 (IV, 2)). Later on, in connection to the ontological proof of God, Kant argued persuasively that being cannot be a property.

9. *Ibid.*, 1577 (III, 3).

10. *Ibid.*, 1624 (VII, 1).

11. *Ibid.*, 1620 (VI, 1).

12. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, trans. John P. Rowan (Chicago: Regnery, 1961), 2.

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.*, 1.

16. *Ibid.*, 2.

17. See Albert Zimmerman, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Discussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert* (Leiden, Köln, Germany: Brill, 1965), 179. This book shows how the Aristotelian contradiction between the universal science of being and the first theological science is treated in the Middle Ages. According to one position, God is the subject of metaphysics inasmuch as God as the highest being is included in general being. The second, prevalent position, shared by Thomas and most other significant thinkers, locates God outside the subject of metaphysics insofar as it infers God to be the cause of the subject of metaphysics, of being as such and in general (357).

18. *An Introduction to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 103 (*Commentary on The Trinity of Boethius*, 5, IV).

19. See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, vol. 1, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1948), 1-5 (I, 1, §1,7).
20. *An Introduction to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 104 (*Commentary on The Trinity of Boethius*, 5, IV).
21. See Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa, eds., *A Companion to Metaphysics* (Oxford; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1995), 479.
22. Edward Craig, ed., *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 9 (London, New York: Routledge, 1998), 193-94.
23. Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, eds., *A Companion to Epistemology* (Oxford; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992), 495 (*Disputationes metaphysicae* II, 1).
24. *Ibid.*, 495.
25. *Ibid.* (*De anima* IV, 3: 3-7).
26. Kim, Sosa, *Companion to Metaphysics*, 479 (*Disputationes metaphysicae* I, 1: 26).
27. *Ibid.*
28. “Abstrahit haec scientia a sensibilibus, seu materialibus, rebus... et res divinas et materia separatas et communionem rationem entis, quae absque materia existere possunt, contemplatur” (*Disputationes metaphysicae* I). Quoted in Jean-Luc Marion, “Metaphysics and Phenomenology: A Summary for Theologians” in *The Postmodern God: A Theological Reader*, ed. Graham Ward (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 280.
29. See *ibid.* 280-81.
30. This division of metaphysics constitutes only a small compartment within Wolff’s whole system of knowledge and of philosophy as its subdivision along with history and mathematics. Particularly, metaphysics is a part of the philosophy of things, a different branch of philosophy than that of actions. See Christian Wolff, *Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General*, trans. Richard J. Blackwell (Indianapolis, New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963).
31. “Ontologia seu Philosophia prima est scientia entis in genere, seu quantum ens est.” Christian Wolff, *Philosophia prima sive ontologia*, part 2, vol. 3, *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Jean Ecole (Hildensheim, Germany: Olms, 1962), 1.
32. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965), 662f (A 846f; B 874f).

## CHAPTER 2

### THE OVERCOMING OF METAPHYSICS IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY

I turn now to the overcoming of metaphysics. It is striking that it has taken two millennia for metaphysics to achieve its clear definition and scope, and now that it has finally happened, its overcoming simultaneously commenced. There are authors today who behave as if “the end of metaphysics” is something new, something freshly invented and proclaimed at the end of a long unchanged subsistence of metaphysics. In view of that, I think it is instructive to go back to the turning points in the history of metaphysics and its overcomings. Today’s overcomers could point out that, unlike recent overcoming of metaphysics, these past overcomings were not final. I think that precisely these past instances could be taken as a lesson for not taking any final overcoming of metaphysics for granted. I think that the wisest philosophers of today and the recent past (e.g., Heidegger, Levinas, Derrida) are those who do not take it for granted, take metaphysics most seriously, delve into its very depths, push its language to the limits, trying somehow to reach out from the inside, knowing that it is possible only by means of transformation from the limits of inside.

#### *The First Decisive Overcoming of Metaphysics: Descartes*

##### Subjectivity Overcoming Metaphysics

Although the epistemological overcoming of metaphysics is already implicit in the scholasticism of the Middle Ages and becomes more determined with Suarez, it becomes unavoidable with Descartes. In many respects, Descartes’ legacy is also obvious

in Schleiermacher's thought. It is precisely Descartes who was the founder of modern philosophy, as Hegel already noticed, by being the first to identify being with thought, making thought the first principle.<sup>1</sup> Descartes' best known contribution in the history of philosophy is the shift from objectivity to subjectivity, making the ego the foundation of metaphysics. Metaphysics as the knowledge of objective being is overcome by knowledge of being that can only be known subjectively as thinking in the mind of the knower. As Descartes discovers in the second *Meditation*, thinking is the only unfailing reality to the one who thinks as long as s/he thinks.<sup>2</sup> Everything is subject to doubt except thinking, for doubt itself is a thought that cannot be doubted while doubting everything else.<sup>3</sup>

### The Fulfillment of the Beyond of Metaphysics

Thus, in the first place, Descartes fulfills metaphysics understood in its basic sense as reaching beyond the sensible. Descartes brings metaphysics to a level of abstraction never reached before, "because in the act of the *cogito*, the *mens* is itself perceived for the first time before and without the body."<sup>4</sup> For Descartes, too, metaphysics begins when matter disappears, first of all, in the process of doubt, which for right reason is called metaphysical. "Doubt does not make possible just the *ego*, being inasmuch as thinking; it first makes it possible to open the entire horizon of metaphysics, in that, through it, the *ego* thinks purely the insensible beings in general."<sup>5</sup>

### The Epistemological Self-Overcoming of Metaphysics

Second, from Descartes on, metaphysics irreversibly overcomes itself, becoming epistemology, the science of the first principles of knowledge instead of being. In his *Principles of Philosophy*, Descartes writes that metaphysics "contains the principles of knowledge," including those of the attributes of God and the nature of souls, but most

important, of “all the clear and distinct notions which are in us.”<sup>6</sup> Being, or beings as such, are thus dismissed in favor of being known. Being now means “I think” (*cogito*) or being thought (*cogitatio*). As Marion aptly states, “Descartes abandons ontology – science of the *ens in quantum ens* – because he tries first to fix the conditions for the representation of beings – *ens in quantum cognitum*.”<sup>7</sup>

Descartes himself expresses this new transition of philosophy in the well-known text from his letter to Mersenne, dated November 11, 1640, in which he informs Mersenne about sending him the manuscript of the *Meditations*: “I think that. . . it could be called *Meditations on First Philosophy (Meditationes de Prima Philosophia)*; for in the book I deal not just with God and the soul, but in general with all the first things that can be discovered by philosophizing in an orderly way.”<sup>8</sup>

The first thing that should be noted in this quotation is Descartes’ choice of title. Although in the beginning of the letter Descartes refers to the *Meditations* as his work on metaphysics, nevertheless, he uses the term first philosophy in the title. There are enough indications that this choice is not arbitrary but rather indicates the overcoming of metaphysics. The book deals not only with such objects of metaphysics as God and the soul, but, as first philosophy, with all the first things, which basically means substances, things that can be known without reference to anything else outside the mind, things known by means of philosophizing in an orderly, methodical way. Marion summarizes the significance of Descartes’ choice of the title this way: “Here primacy passes decisively from the first being (to be known) to knowledge itself (eventually fixed in a being); inversely, being as such (and even as first) disappears.”<sup>9</sup>

The second point of immense importance in the quotation from the letter to Mersenne concerns philosophizing in an orderly way. What does that mean, and why is it so significant? First of all, according to the *Principles*, the first and most certain thing that takes place when one is philosophizing in an orderly way is the knowledge of *ego*

*cogito, ergo sum* through doubt.<sup>10</sup> This knowledge, once again, confirms the reduction of being to *cogito* under the metaphysical authority of the ego. In any case, “the question no longer bears on *esse*, but on knowledge in and through the order.”<sup>11</sup> In fact, all of Descartes’ works, including the *Discourse* and the *Meditations*, manifest this unfolding of knowledge through order. Descartes contributes to all sciences by ordering their objects by means of structured knowledge. As one commentator says, the originality of Descartes’ philosophy “consists primarily in its logical coherence as a system of interdependent and interlocked truths worked out in the ‘order of reasons’ in which the truths are found logically.”<sup>12</sup> One of the rules of Descartes’s *Discourse* consists of directing “thoughts in an orderly manner, by beginning with the simplest and most easily known objects in order to ascend little by little, step by step, to knowledge of the most complex, and by supposing some order even among objects that have no natural order of precedence.”<sup>13</sup> All of Descartes’ system, accordingly, consists of “a logical nexus of truths in an interrelation and order of proofs, based on a structure of intuition and deduction.”<sup>14</sup> Thus, the first philosophy as logic grounds the whole system of sciences, providing the universal structure of knowledge. The famous Descartes’ metaphor likens metaphysics to the roots of the tree of philosophy, with the trunk representing physics, and the branches—all other sciences.<sup>15</sup>

Next, Descartes’ first philosophy as knowledge through order overcomes the tradition that originated with one of Aristotle’s understandings of first philosophy, namely, that of the science of being *qua* being. This trend, which later acquired the name of ontology, overcomes the other *prima philosophia*, which originated with Aristotle’s theology and culminated in rational theology. The ontological overcoming takes place through the primacy of being as such, *to on hei on, ens in quantum ens*, considered universally. Descartes breaks with this traditional ontology. To Descartes,

the universal instance that surpasses the metaphysics reduced to rational theology is no longer the science of being as such (the *ontologia* of the future), but arranging in the order of knowledge, that is to say, knowledge according to the order in which evidence is brought to light.<sup>16</sup>

As it will be seen later, metaphysics has a very similar orderly role in Schleiermacher's system.

### A Note on Ontology

I have already mentioned ontology several times above. But, there is something else important that should be pointed out. The first part of the fully defined metaphysics is special metaphysics or the science of being as ontology. Encountering this word, one is likely to associate it with the ancient Greek metaphysics, for it is derived from the Greek word “*to on*,” which means being. But it seems needful to remark that the term ontology is, in fact, a neologism coined not much earlier than the aforementioned early clarifications of metaphysics. To be more precise, it first appears in 1613, in the *Lexicon philosophicum* of the German Protestant scholastic Rudolphus Goclenius (Rudolf Göckel), in which he titles one paragraph “Ontology and the philosophy of being” (ontologia [Gr.] *et philosophia de ente*).<sup>17</sup> He gives the name “ontological” (*ontologike*) to mathematical abstraction, but without further defining of ontology. Of course, even more time was needed for the word to enter into wider circulation. In any case, this first mention of the term occurred shortly after Suarez's *Disputationes*, whereas its wider acceptance occurs perhaps even after Descartes. Consequently, ontology, from the time it appeared under that precise name, has been the science of the formal concept of being rather than the science of being as such.<sup>18</sup> It is also evident in the first definitions of ontology by a contemporary of Descartes, Johannes Clauberg (1622-65). In his definition, being (*ens*) as the object of ontology, “. . . denotes all that can be thought (on account of which it is called *intelligibile*).” (“. . . *denotat omne quod cogitari potest [distinctionis causa vocatur intelligibile]*”)<sup>19</sup> Or, alternatively: “Being is, in whatever way it might be

whatever it might be, that which can be thought or uttered” (*Ens est quicquid quovis modo est, cogitari ac dici potest*).<sup>20</sup> So, ontology has always been overcoming metaphysics, for it never really claimed to be the knowledge of being as such, or in the Aristotelian sense of being as substance. Instead, being in the original sense of ontology is considered in terms of *cogitatio* as *ens cogitabile*, “of beings inasmuch as they are thinkable, conceived, and represented, not inasmuch as they are beings.”<sup>21</sup>

### *The Second Decisive Overcoming of Metaphysics: British Empiricism*

#### Experience Overcoming Metaphysics

Descartes and some other continental thinkers, such as Spinoza and Leibniz, are usually considered as representing the rationalist tradition in metaphysics. It is metaphysics that actually corresponds to the primary technical meaning of the word “metaphysics,” going beyond physics, beyond experiential realities, and having its main foundations in the various operations of reason alone, such as grasping self-evident truths and the deduction of logical conclusions from them. At the same time, that is, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a different philosophical trend emerged on the British Isles. It is usually called British empiricism, and its main representatives are Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. This philosophy is also epistemological, that is, it does not deal with being, but with the conditions and possibilities of human knowledge and understanding. The titles of the main works of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume speak for themselves: *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, *The Principles of Human Knowledge*, and *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. But it is different from rationalist epistemology. These philosophers reject the possibility of purely rational knowledge and, influenced by the development of modern natural science, advise that philosophy also subjects its propositions to experiential verification. If rationalism is a metaphysical tendency in which the experientially unverifiable a priori considerations



dominate, then empiricism rejects rationalist metaphysics as unwarranted and overcomes it by appealing to sense experience as the most reliable source of knowledge. For empiricists, real knowledge comes through or is inferred from the data of sense experience.

### The Relativity of Classifications

True, this classification of rationalism and empiricism is only a generalization, and it is hard to find either in a pure form. It is only a tendency to emphasize one aspect over the other. And one should also remember that every metaphysics has the seeds of its own overcoming and that no form of metaphysics can be completely overcome. Usually, the thinkers who are deemed to be rationalists also have different experiential or empirical aspects in their philosophy. So, Descartes' central metaphysical postulate appeals to the perception of ideas, which is one of the basic tenets of empiricism as well. Also, the *Discourse* admits that the further one advances in knowledge, the more need there is for observations (*expériences*). The first principles call for further examination of their effects. The experiential observations are the only means by which to discover the ways in which the vast array of effects depends on the principles.<sup>22</sup> Even the *Meditations* do not start with clear and distinct metaphysical ideas, but instead subject all preconceived notions to doubt. The sense experience itself is needed in order to know that senses deceive, as Descartes' observations of the piece of wax show.<sup>23</sup> And it is similar with most philosophers generally viewed as rationalists.<sup>24</sup> Some rationally indubitable empirical propositions are part of Spinoza's system. Leibniz, very much like Hume, distinguishes between the truths of reason and the truths of fact. Above all, these rationalists all also make significant contributions to the natural sciences based on empirical observations, although they would separate these endeavors from the metaphysical ones. They would simply insist on the difference of methodologies in

physics and metaphysics. The latter, they would say, by definition is supposed to transcend the empirical realm, which is reserved for the investigations of natural sciences.

In the same way, the empiricists also trust the faculties of reason even if they put certain limitations on them. Here and there, they also propound apriori metaphysical principles, such as the principle of efficient cause and the existence of God endorsed by both Locke and Berkeley. Most striking, as I will show below, is that Berkeley's empiricism, in fact, results in idealism, the most metaphysical doctrine. As does Leibniz, Berkeley believes that there are no material substances and that only the active minds or spirits are real beings.

### Locke's Breakthrough

Although Locke still believed in the powers of reason, especially in the mathematical apriori knowledge, he laid the foundations upon which the subsequent empiricists would build. Locke's epistemological inquiry starts with the examination of the origin of ideas. Since ideas, according to him, is the only source of knowledge, the rejection of the rationalist conviction that ideas are innate leaves one with the only possible alternative, namely, that they derive from experience. In Locke's own summary:

. . . EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either, about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the *materials* of thinking.<sup>25</sup>

Notably, as the quotation shows, valid epistemological experience includes not only sense perception, but also introspection into the subjective states and operations of mind. Some of them are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing.<sup>26</sup> In any case, those two—sensation and reflection—are the only windows illuminating the originally “dark room” of the mind.<sup>27</sup> These are the “two fountains of

knowledge” that, inscribing the void of the “clean slate” (*tabula rasa*) or the “white paper” of the original mind, fill it in with ideas, the materials of reason and knowledge.<sup>28</sup> Reason is nevertheless distinct from the sense experience itself, which only provides the raw data. Ultimately, it is reason that arranges the material of sense experience into knowledge. Locke’s motto could well be this expression from a different context: *“Reason must be our last judge and guide in everything.”*<sup>29</sup>

In Locke’s view, there are different kinds of ideas: some are simple, basically acquired via external perception, while others are complexes that mind arranges from the simple ideas in endless different compositions and abstractions. In contrast to the complex ideas, rationally constructed from the simple, the simple ideas are not subject to analysis and definition. This view is closely related to Locke’s theory of language, according to which, the linguistic signification of the complex ideas does not refer to the corresponding classification in the real world, but rather it is constructed in human interests and for their convenience and “are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas.”<sup>30</sup>

Actual knowledge, according to Locke, takes place as the intellectual perception of the connections between the ideas. Some of them are immediate and perceived intuitively, while others are mediated through other ideas and thus subject to demonstration. What is left upon the lack of demonstration is at best probability, resulting in belief or opinion rather than the certainty of knowledge.<sup>31</sup>

There is an important consequence of the empiricism of Locke, accepted by the subsequent empiricists and even Kant. As already mentioned, one of Locke’s main postulates, most likely arrived at through Descartes, is that what can be experienced is not things as they are in themselves, but only ideas. This consequence, indeed, eventually makes this empiricism strange, for it becomes idealism at the same time. Although the

origins of ideas are perceptual, their relation to the things themselves is incomprehensible. If knowledge consists, as in Locke's case, of demonstrations of the theoretical relations of ideas, it is the knowledge that Kant names analytical. This knowledge does not reach reality beyond ideas and their interconnections; it technically remains metaphysical. Although Locke also acknowledges knowledge by sensation, it does not reach far. First, it does not extend to those objects that are not present to the senses here and now. Second, although this knowledge may show that there are objects, very little can be known about their true nature; it is knowledge about the existence of things without knowing their essence.<sup>32</sup> As Schacht concludes about Locke's theory of knowledge:

Because he holds that what we have before our minds are not things themselves, however, but rather ideas whose exact relation to things is beyond our understanding, and because of his high standard of certainty in determining what does and does not count as knowledge, he winds up—very much like the rationalists—denying that most of scientific and empirical knowledge is really knowledge at all.<sup>33</sup>

Paradoxically, from these Lockean beginnings, empiricism leads to idealism and skepticism in regard to the very possibility of empirical knowledge itself. The empirical overcoming of metaphysics immediately becomes trapped in a different metaphysics.

### Berkeley's Metaphysical Pinnacle and Backlash

This metaphysical backlash is most obvious with Berkeley. On the one hand, Berkeley most clearly formulates the main metaphysical principle of empiricism in a nutshell: "*esse is percipi*."<sup>34</sup> As Berkeley thinks, "all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind – that their *being* is *to be perceived or known*. . ." <sup>35</sup> There can be no question of being as such, being insofar as it is being, in empiricism. Instead, for Berkeley, the being of a being is to be perceived (*percipi*) or, alternately, to

perceive (*percipere*), to be “*that which perceives*,” that is, the real substance that may be—mind, spirit, soul, or the ego.<sup>36</sup> Here Berkeley completes the Cartesian metaphysics of the ego.

On the other hand, Berkeley drives Descartes’ and Locke’s insight of the ideal nature of knowledge and the following inability to distinguish between the ideas and real objects to its extreme consequence, that is, the denial of the existence of material substances and, indeed, the material world itself. Thus, Berkeley writes: “It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing. . . , that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding.”<sup>37</sup> Berkeley finds “a manifest contradiction” involved in this realist principle when he asks: “For, what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?”<sup>38</sup> If the ideas and sensations exist only in minds, it must follow, according to Berkeley, that the sensible objects of the external world exist only in minds. This is Berkeley’s ingenious solution to avoid both non-empirical speculation and skepticism about the knowledge of the nature of things. Knowledge is entirely possible for Berkeley, and there can be no other knowledge than that of the ideas, because there is simply nothing else to know about: mind-dependent ideas and the minds perceiving them is all there is on this side of metaphysics. On the other side, there is the second real substance besides mind, that is, God, who produces sensations and ideas in the finite minds. This is the highest point of the empiricist overcoming of rationalist metaphysics, albeit with a metaphysics no less unsettled than the one it overcomes.

## Hume's Completion

The empiricist tradition reaches its full growth with Hume. Although Hume does not invent anything radically new that is not already present in Locke, perhaps he just gives clearer formulations and accents of empiricism and rids himself from the remnants of idealist metaphysics found in Locke and Berkeley. Hume elaborates on Locke's theory of ideas, accepting the basic empiricist claim that it is all one can know. For him, as with Locke's sensations and operations of minds, perceptions with their corresponding impressions and thoughts with their corresponding ideas are the two basic pillars of knowledge. The latter, ideas, derive from the impressions that can have either sensory or emotional experiential origins. But those metaphysical ideas that cannot be traced back to impressions are false or imaginary. Hume writes: "When we entertain. . . any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea. . . , we need but enquire, *from what impression is that supposed idea derived?*"<sup>39</sup> If this proof cannot be produced, the idea is suspect.

Thus, Hume also undertakes the most outspoken attack upon speculative metaphysics. His *Enquiry* ends with the famous statement:

If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.<sup>40</sup>

Referring to abstract reasoning and matters of fact, this statement includes the well-known empiricist epistemological division called "Hume's fork." According to Hume, corresponding to Locke's internal and external sensations and Hume's own aforementioned theory of ideas, there is twofold valid knowledge: "All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, *Relations of ideas*, and *Matters of fact*."<sup>41</sup> The first is the only constituent of rationalism that all empiricists accept to be true knowledge, most clearly exemplified in mathematics, but

also “every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstrably certain. . .

Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe.”<sup>42</sup> The former will later be called analytical truths, the truths of purely logical or mathematical certainty. Matters of fact also give certainty, but of a different kind. While the relations of ideas are completely abstract and do not refer to any substances, such as physical objects, minds, or states of mind, etc., matters of fact do refer to them. It is experimental certainty that accompanies them, and it is all the more needed because logical certainty does not apply in this case.

Although “Hume’s fork” pierces the rationalist metaphysics, it is also the foundation of Hume’s own metaphysics. Notably, Hume only opposes metaphysics that, in his view, does not adhere to scientific criteria but arises “either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions,” namely, religious beliefs.<sup>43</sup> But Hume is not against metaphysics as such. Although Hume believes with other empiricists that there can be no real knowledge either of immaterial substances or the things in the world as they are behind their immediate ideal representations in mind, he is not against abstract and profound metaphysical reasoning. In fact, Hume’s own intention is to overcome the existing deficient metaphysics with a proper one. As he states, “[we] must cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate.”<sup>44</sup> And this true metaphysics, of course, is epistemology, discovering “the secret springs and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations.”<sup>45</sup> This is a very modest “metaphysics,” just establishing the limits of reason that prohibits not only the knowledge claims of speculative, but also of empirical sciences. The question is, can it be considered metaphysics if it does not reach the beyond that metaphysics is supposed to reach? Yes and no. The inquiry into the abilities of reason to reach metaphysical

knowledge may not be metaphysics itself. It may be some kind of prolegomenon to metaphysics. Yet, it may also be considered as metaphysics insofar as it provides theoretical foundations of knowledge. Even if it concerns experience as well, it is the theory of experience beyond experience itself. Hence it may be metaphysics: metaphysics overcoming metaphysics.

### *Kant and Metaphysics*

It is Kant who most decisively determines the further development of metaphysics. He carries further the demolition of the tradition of the school-metaphysics initiated by the British empiricism. In Kant's view, that metaphysics, which he called "dogmatic" or "transcendent," was untenable because it is constructed by pure reason alone without reference to experience in the form of empirical cognition – the insight gained from the empiricists, especially Hume, who, according to Kant's own avowal, awakened him from the "dogmatic slumber."<sup>46</sup> Perhaps it is the destruction of metaphysics with which Kant's name is associated in the first place.

However, it must be emphasized that Kant was not an anti-metaphysician. He always held metaphysics in high esteem. Even in the critical period, he affords to lecture:

Metaphysics is the spirit of philosophy. It is related to philosophy as the spirit of wine <*spiritus vini*> is to wine. It purifies our elementary concepts and thereby makes us capable of comprehending all sciences. In short, it is the greatest culture of the human understanding.<sup>47</sup>

Kant believes that human reason, due to its dialectical nature, can "never dispense" with the "indispensable discipline" of metaphysics.<sup>48</sup> It is only a question of what kind of metaphysics it is that Kant approves of. To be sure, he maintains that such metaphysics has not yet appeared until him. He avows that "there is, as yet, no such thing as Metaphysics."<sup>49</sup> The aim of his whole project in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, like that of Hume, is not only to dissolve the false and illusory metaphysics, but also to conceive a



proper “critical” or “transcendental” metaphysics. It is just the return to metaphysics on a different level, as to “a beloved one with whom we have had a quarrel.”<sup>50</sup>

### Critique Overcomes Metaphysics

First, the critical, negative aspect of metaphysics, in Kant’s own words, does not mean “a critique of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive *independently of all experience*.”<sup>51</sup> It is important that this knowledge cannot be derived from empirical experience. Of course, the knowledge independent of experience is the main aspiration of metaphysics according to its primary meaning of reaching beyond physicality. And it is important that Kant does not deny the very possibility of such metaphysics. He only wants to ascertain how far such knowledge is possible. It is the question of how much one “can hope to achieve by reason, when all the materials and assistance of experience are taken away.”<sup>52</sup> In Kant’s view, before using reason in the constructive enterprise of metaphysics, its own internal limits and credentials must be examined. The reason itself undertakes its most difficult challenge ever, that is, of self-knowledge, “a tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims.”<sup>53</sup> Accordingly, Kant’s project examines “the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics in general, and determines its sources, its extent, and its limits—all in accordance with principles.”<sup>54</sup>

### Transcendental Philosophy Fulfills Metaphysics

Secondly, the positive, transcendental aspect of metaphysics means to Kant laying the principal foundations or presuppositions for that new purified and proper metaphysics. Transcendental, to Kant, means “knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this mode of knowledge is possible *a priori*,” that is, before any experience.<sup>55</sup> The epistemological

conditions of the possibility of knowledge are transcendental, in contrast to transcendent knowledge of objects beyond experience.

Initially, Kant had plans to write a complete system of metaphysics, which, according to his definition consists of

the whole of pure philosophy, inclusive of criticism, and so as comprehending the investigation of all that can ever be known *a priori* as well as the exposition of that which constitutes a system of the pure philosophical modes of knowledge of this type – in distinction, therefore, from all empirical and from all mathematical employment of reason.<sup>56</sup>

The *Critique of Pure Reason* would be a *propaedeutic* (preparation) to this system tracing a complete outline of it, marking out “the whole plan of the science, both as regards its limits and as regards its entire internal structure.”<sup>57</sup> The *propaedeutic* was supposed to be followed by the metaphysics of nature, or of everything there is.<sup>58</sup> Even if Kant did not succeed in writing the complete system, he believes that the first *Critique* accomplishes enough by itself, so that the initial plan may even become superfluous. Kant even ventures to assert that “there is not a single metaphysical problem which has not been solved, or for the solution of which the key at least has not been supplied.”<sup>59</sup> For this reason, in his correspondence, Kant calls it “the metaphysics of metaphysics.”<sup>60</sup> In any case, one can say that Kant not only overcomes metaphysics with critique, but also fulfills metaphysics as pure reason’s examination of its own possibilities.

### The Dilemma of Metaphysics in Kant’s Time

In Kant’s time, after Descartes, there were basically two options regarding the possibility of objective knowledge: Scilla and Haribdis of rationalism and empiricism. Most of his professorial career, Kant himself, through his teacher Baumgarten, was a proponent of Leibnizian-Wolffian rationalist metaphysics, monopolizing the university of his time. This tradition held that it is pure reason, the innate ideas, that can provide an objective knowledge of the world, uncontaminated by the subjective appearances. On the

other hand, a time came in Kant's life—sometimes called a critical turn—when he accepted the claims of British empiricists, who held that reason does not have objective knowledge. Knowledge is subjective, and it is confined, not to the innate ideas, but to the ideas acquired from individual sense impressions. Since this knowledge reaches appearance only, ultimately, it is deceitful. Another outcome of this epistemology is extreme idealism that denies the existence of objective being altogether.

### Kant's Synthesis

Kant's great achievement was his attempt to complement what he thought to be true in these two conflicting approaches, while thus avoiding their individual one-sidedness. For him, neither experience or sensibility, nor reason or understanding alone can provide knowledge. Without sensibility, no object could be given, without understanding, no object would be thought. His famous dictum follows: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."<sup>61</sup> Conceptual form and empirical content must supplement each other. Such a synthetic knowledge is objective. Yet, it is objective not with regard to the world as it is in itself, but objective as it appears through perceptions. This knowledge reaches *phenomena* or appearances only, while the things themselves as *noumena* always remain unknown. Also, the phenomenal world does not depend on the presence of someone perceiving it, as in Berkeley's case. Nevertheless, inasmuch as perception occurs only through one's individual conceptual lenses, the world as it appears gets ordered by the perceiver, while remaining unknown as it is in itself. The objects in the world are objective, while their character is determined by the forms and the concepts, constituting the conditions of the possibility of experiencing them at all. Even if the objects in the world are independent, the assigned character belongs to them only because they are objects of human knowledge. It is Kant's famous "Copernican revolution."<sup>62</sup> The contrary case, namely, deriving perceptions and concepts

from the objects of experience, would by default make metaphysics impossible, for then the metaphysical criterion of the independence from experience would not be satisfied.

So, in his search for the objectivity of knowledge, Kant comes to the possibility of the apriori propositions that must be true prior to, and independently of, any experience. This is Kant's due to rationalism. But then, Kant also acknowledges true propositions of a different kind. Those can be verified only through experience and, therefore, can be true only a posteriori. This is Kant's due to empiricism. Apriori propositions, in turn, can be of two kinds: analytic and synthetic. The former propositions are self-explicative, adding nothing to their content, whereas the latter add new knowledge. Actually, Hume already knew this distinction. He only rejected metaphysics based on synthetic apriori propositions, while, according to his "fork," the analytical apriori and the empirical, synthetic a posteriori propositions constitute the only true knowledge.

### Kant's Key to the New Metaphysics

Kant is not satisfied with Hume's legacy, which forbids the possibility of true metaphysics. The key question of Kant's whole enterprise is: "How are *a priori* synthetic judgments possible?"<sup>63</sup> Kant wants to found a legitimate apriori knowledge, but without falling back into stark rationalism purporting to have knowledge unrelated to any experience. It is illegitimate, in Kant's view, to separate the object of knowledge from the experiential perspective of the knower. There is no way to know the things-in-themselves. His ingenuous resolution (or contradiction in terms?) is to lay a foundation for a possible apriori knowledge, which, being apriori, must ultimately be independent of experience, but at the same time closely related to experience. In Kant's view, this is the only way to direct metaphysics along the path of a true science. Kant's solution limits the apriori knowledge to the knowledge of the world of experience. He confines non-empirical apriori knowledge to the knowledge of the forms of experience. Kant

concentrates on propositions that, though not established on the basis of experience, must be presupposed in or provide the conditions of interpreting every experience. As such, these truths must be universal and objective. In this way, Kant's legitimate form of metaphysics is indeed metaphysics insofar as it goes beyond experience, but it still remains related to experience insofar as it ascertains the conditions under which any experience is possible. Precisely these conditions provide the synthetic factor that belongs to the realm of metaphysics, for it is outside the given economy of concepts as their uniting factor. This metaphysics, in contrast to rationalism, is not a science transcending the realm of experience. It is a theory of experience. But in contrast to empiricism, it is not an empirical, but a transcendental theory of experience.

Now, what are those forms and concepts that govern all experience? Kant argues that there are two peculiar forms of pure intuition without which no experience is possible, namely, time and space. Their being forms of intuition means that all sensations—inner and outer—must always have temporal and, in case of outer sensations only, spatial structure. Time is the inner form of states of mind. There can be no mental state that is not in time, but time itself is made known through its being the condition of possibility of experience. Space is the outer form of perceptions from an independent world appearing to the mind. Every outside can appear as such only if it is perceived as spatially related to the subject. Therefore, space likewise structures one's sensibility. Both space and time are universally valid synthetic apriori presuppositions. The other kind of universal and necessary synthetic apriori presuppositions of every experience, but related to the forms of intuition insofar the latter must permit their application, are the categories of understanding. Although the name is the same as Aristotle's categories, actually Kant derives them from his own analyses of the act of judgement based on the four primary categories—quantity, quality, relation, modality—and their subcategories.<sup>64</sup>

Something can and must only be thought by means of these forms. They mold all intuitions.

### The Failure of Special Metaphysics

While the aesthetic and analytic parts of the first *Critique* establish the new legitimate metaphysics, the dialectic part contains the famed deconstruction of the alleged synthetic apriori knowledge in the traditional dogmatic metaphysics. Reason in its illegitimate use produces ideas that cannot be connected to experience. It uses ideas in order to achieve systematic unity, but this unity is intrasystemic; it makes coherent the use of its own maxims of understanding. It is determined to fail because, striving for more and more basic conditions, it reaches out for the unconditioned beyond any possible intuitions. Having no recourse to a possible experience, having no corresponding intuitions (perceptions), the ideas of psychology, cosmology, and theology about such non-spatial and non-temporal entities as soul, infinite universe, and God, can be nothing but metaphysical illusions. So, putting Kant's *Critique* in the classical division of metaphysics, one can say that he reestablishes general metaphysics as a legitimate apriori science of understanding, but rejects special metaphysics.

### Back to Metaphysics: Regulative Use of Metaphysical Ideas

Despite his having destroyed the threefold classical metaphysics, Kant cannot put it aside altogether; he reintroduces its basic ideas through the backdoor, so to say. Although the soul, the world in its totality, and God can never be known as things in themselves, Kant holds that it would be unreasonable not to inquire about them. It is at least possible "to *think* them as things in themselves."<sup>65</sup> Although these ideas, according to Kant, can never be used constitutively, as descriptions of reality as it is in itself, they still can have a regulative or practical use.<sup>66</sup> If one considers these ideas hypothetically,

“as if” they were true, making no constitutive knowledge claims about their concrete reality, they still may guide one to formulate true hypotheses.<sup>67</sup> The transcendent ideas of reason are significant for the unity of knowledge. As regulative principles, they grant the completeness of the use of the concepts of understanding in experience. That is their proper immanent application in contrast to the illusory transcendent one. Similarly, these ideas are necessary in order to provide a scope for the universal, practical principles required by reason from a moral point of view. Moreover, Kant believes that only the idea of the immortal soul can save one from materialism, the cosmological idea of the complete world—from naturalism, but the idea of God—from fatalism.

Mention can be made that the regulative use of the ideas of reason seems to be not entirely coherent with the basic principles of the first *Critique*. The problem lies in Kant’s assertion that there are things in themselves at all. Their existence cannot be known in principle. In fact, the distinction between noumena and phenomena itself can never be verified experientially. Moreover, even the “as if” principle may not help. Even to act “as if” something were true, one must know something about that something. In other words, a regulative idea must to some extent be constitutive.

### Ethics As Metaphysics

In any case, the first *Critique*, the disclosure of the synthetic apriori conditions of the possibility of experience, is not the only metaphysics of Kant. Another way to pass beyond the limits of all possible experience, to Kant, is the apriori knowledge from a practical, that is, a volitional point of view. Kant writes:

But when all progress in the field of the supersensible has thus been denied to speculative reason, it is still open to us to enquire whether, in the practical knowledge of reason, data may not be found sufficient to determine reason’s transcendent concept of the unconditioned, and so to enable us, in accordance with the wish of metaphysics, and by means of knowledge that is possible a priori,

though only from a practical point of view, to pass beyond the limits of all possible experience.<sup>68</sup>

Thus, the second true metaphysics is ethics. Admittedly, Kant occasionally remarks that practical reason is not allowed to imagine that it has transcended the empirical conditions of its sphere and risen to the immediate cognition of the things in themselves, that a regulative “what ought to be” may, after all, be different from “what is.” Yet, texts like the “Canon of Pure Reason” of the first *Critique* and the second *Critique* give an overall impression that ethics must be about noumena as they are, for appearances cannot provide a sufficient source for the unconditional duty. Hence, the knowledge of ethics must be objective and apriori. This practical knowledge is different from that of pure reason. In this sense, it is not knowledge proper. Nevertheless, it is a kind of cognitive attitude. Kant calls it faith. That is the meaning of Kant’s claim to deny (speculative) knowledge in order to make room for (practical) faith.<sup>69</sup>

In any case, what I want to emphasize is that, as the quotation above shows, even if practical reason functions in the sphere of experience, it also somehow reaches that which speculative reason failed to do: the realm beyond experience, the realm of metaphysics. Therefore, those interpreters of Kant who argue that he himself never got really free from the “dogmatic slumber” of his rationalist origins are to a certain extent right. How else can one interpret the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal selves in the second *Critique*? It is the latter self only to which transcendental freedom applies. This freedom has no application in the empirical world. In order for the moral law to be efficient, it must go beyond the categorial realm of causality and enter into the realm of metaphysics, “beyond nature.” In addition, it is precisely this metaphysical aspect of Kant’s thought that creates another problem in his system: the problem of the relation of the transcendental self to the empirical world. The gap between them remains unbridged in the first two *Critiques*.



## The Metaphysical Solutions of the Third *Critique*

However, as I will show in the chapter on Schleiermacher and Kant, there are some interpretations claiming that precisely the third *Critique* answers the metaphysical problem of the gap in Kant's system. In this light, the aim of the third *Critique* is to solve the problem of the unity of reason, which remained split into theoretical and practical parts. Kant's theory of reflective judgment, in accordance with which the contemplation of the idea of a moral Designer of the world as a necessary principle of both theoretical science and practical morality, supposedly solves the problem of the bifurcated reason. In this way, religion becomes the agent that bridges the worlds of theory and praxis and constitutes a necessary presupposition for the unity. According to this interpretation of Kant, religious cognition is neither theoretical nor practical, but contemplative. This discovery led Kant to reformulate his ideas of the highest good and contemplative hope as the transcendental conditions of the unity of reason. In any case, Kant's solution is not to invent a third domain between that of nature and freedom. The solution is to invent a third cognitive faculty besides understanding and reason. It is the faculty of judgment. Judgment, because of its contemplative mode, participates in both principles—that of empirical deduction and that of moral decision. Just as from the logical viewpoint judgment makes possible the transition from understanding to reason, it also makes possible the transition from the concepts of nature to the idea of freedom. Judgments of taste imply the thought (not objective reality) of a supersensible substrate as a transcendental ground uniting reason and nature.

In addition, this interpretation allows the possibility that the third *Critique* may contribute to the contemporary problem concerning the relations between the various symbolic universes that humans have constructed for themselves. Kant's attempt to establish the unity of reason is claimed to bring the different constructions into a unified worldview by means of religious consciousness. On this account, religion regains its

constructive significance as a particular mode of cognition. Being confined within the bounds of reason, religion establishes itself as the fundamental rational ground uniting all the constructions of reason.

### The Boundary to the Beyond of Metaphysics

In the conclusion to the *Prolegomena*, Kant introduces what he calls “the metaphor of boundary.” I would like to end the exposition of Kant’s metaphysics with it because it fits that same pattern of overcoming metaphysics that I find in recent philosophy, and which I also read back into Schleiermacher. Moreover, Schleiermacher also uses it in his *Dialectics*. This metaphor of boundary is a truly nonmetaphysical element. Being a boundary, it does not any longer belong to metaphysics. Moreover, it does not yet reach beyond metaphysics either, for it just occupies the elusive middle space between the two.

Kant first distinguishes between the boundaries and the limits of reason. Mathematics and physics deal with the latter. His philosophy, as metaphysics, deals with the former. Limits are quantitative, and they show that something is not absolutely complete within the system itself. But a peculiar characteristic of boundaries is that they “always presuppose a space existing outside a certain definite place, inclosing it. . .”<sup>70</sup> That outside space is nothing else but the space that metaphysics always strives to occupy. While limits are merely negative, boundaries are positive. A surface, for example, being a boundary of corporeal space, is itself a space. Boundary belongs to both spaces within and without. Boundaries of reason are places or nonplaces where the experientially occupied space touches the noumenal void. Kant himself summarizes:

But as a boundary itself is something positive, which belongs as well to that which lies within, as to the space that lies without the given complex, it is still an actual positive cognition, which reason only acquires by enlarging itself to this boundary, yet without attempting to pass it; because it there finds itself in the

presence of an empty space, in which it can conceive forms of things, but not things themselves.<sup>71</sup>

Transcendent ideas of reason, insofar as they “do not admit of evasion, and are never capable of realisation,” are such boundaries.<sup>72</sup> They cannot reach beyond themselves; they can only conceive the forms of things beyond them, not their essences. Although reason is bound to cognize appearances only, its ability to reach the boundary must entail a formal knowledge *that* noumena exist, even if not knowing *what* they are. On the boundary, reason is neither confined to the sense experience nor completely detached from it. What remains is the relation itself of what we know to what we do not know: the outside of the boundary. The ideas of reason must show that relation. How can they?

### Nonmetaphysical Theory of Analogy

Kant’s striking solution is the theory of analogy, which somehow endorses natural theology. Pure ideas of reason, of course, being devoid of experience, cannot present anything definite. Nevertheless, Kant concedes that they can be referred to by means of properties borrowed from the sensuous world. In this way, noumena may be conceived of in the forms of appearances. For example, Kant allows that properties like understanding and will can successfully be attributed to the supreme being, while at the same time avoiding dogmatic anthropomorphism. Kant thinks that it is possible to attribute these properties not to the supreme being as they are in themselves, but to the relation of that being to the world, which we are part of. It is a “symbolical anthropomorphism” which concerns language only, not the thing in itself.<sup>73</sup> On this account, to say that the world is a work of the understanding and the will of the supreme being, for example, is to say nothing more than that a watch has a similar relationship to its maker. It is analogical cognition that signifies the similarity of relations between two incongruous things. In any case, analogy sufficiently defines the supreme being *for us*, while letting it be intact in itself. Consequently, this analogy of relation overcomes metaphysics: it “does not signify

. . . an imperfect similarity of two things, but a perfect similarity of relations between two quite dissimilar things.”<sup>74</sup> More than that, relation itself becomes a boundary, the space outside metaphysics, itself belonging neither inside, nor outside.<sup>75</sup> This element in Kant’s metaphysics, applied to the ideas of pure reason, I argue, allows one to look from a different angle at the implicit metaphysics of Kant’s appendix to the *Transcendental Dialectic*. It gives another nonmetaphysical or outside-metaphysical twist to it.

### *Husserl: Phenomenology Overcomes Metaphysics*

One of the next most important overcomings of metaphysics after Kant is phenomenology. Its inaugurator is Edmund Husserl. There is also a special reason why I include a discussion on Husserl’s phenomenology in this section. As I will show below, in several respects, Schleiermacher can be seen as a precursor of Husserl’s phenomenology of consciousness.

### Phenomenological Self-Overcoming of Metaphysics

On the one hand, Husserl’s phenomenology may be considered as a metaphysical overcoming of metaphysics. To say the least, it is a kind of Kantian metaphysics insofar as it tries to define the apriori structures of every possible human experience. It is no coincidence that Husserl calls one of his phenomenological procedures of reduction “transcendental.” However, in opposition to any rationalist metaphysics and to Kant, Husserl denies that there is a special faculty of reason or understanding that is able to identify these truths. Husserl overcomes this metaphysics, concentrating instead on a special “seeing” or intuition. Notably, the latter is not Kantian sensible intuition. Rather, it gives the necessary truths of both empirical facts and reason. This intuition joins the sensible intuition with the intuition of essences and the intuition of categories. In addition, Husserl radically differs from Kant in his claim that one “must go back to the

‘things themselves.’”<sup>76</sup> The things themselves, though, for Husserl, are not Kantian noumena. Just the opposite, Husserl posits phenomena as things themselves, though not phenomena in the Kantian sense of “appearances.”

Husserl’s phenomenology aims simply to describe how the world appears (*phaino*) to human consciousness. Phenomenon is what is immediately evident by means of giving itself to consciousness. Or rather, it is intuition itself that gives, according to Husserl’s “principle of all principles” stating: “that *very primordial dator intuition is a source of authority. . . for knowledge, that whatever presents itself in “intuition” in primordial form (as it were in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself.*”<sup>77</sup>

In a way, Husserl follows Descartes starting with *cogito*, the transcendental subjectivity. Phenomenology, unlike metaphysics, does not begin with the world and thinking about it, but with the analysis of one’s consciousness of the world, the intuition through which phenomena enter into consciousness. In this sense, phenomenology is similar to Cartesian metaphysics of subjectivity overcoming the traditional objective metaphysics. Only it should be noted that it is not correct to say that phenomenon is simply an intuition in the same way as it is incorrect that it is simply an object. The phenomenon is an object as intuited. This factor helps Husserl to eliminate the subject-object distinction. The meaning is located in the intentional relationship between the two, not in either of them separately, as in rationalism and empiricism.

Husserl’s phenomenology also resembles the empiricist overcoming of metaphysics insofar as it holds on to the given data of experience and rejects metaphysics that goes beyond that data. Yet, in contrast to the empiricist skepticism, he maintains that knowledge is possible, but not by way of rationalists and Kant. Instead, Husserl arrives at the truths through that special intuition, capable of grasping the essences of things directly.<sup>78</sup> As far as the essences are concerned, phenomenology may appear to be an

essentialist metaphysics. Albeit, they are, so to say, inessential essences. Phenomena are essences “as if of” objects given in intuition.<sup>79</sup> According to Husserl’s theory of intentionality, following Brentano, consciousness is always consciousness of something. But while Brentano’s objective intentionality fails to account for cases when real object is missing, such as hallucination or imagination, Husserl’s theory may also include the latter, for it focuses on the intentional consciousness itself, which in all cases is “as if of” something. What matters is not whether there is or is not an object, but what are the features of consciousness that make it always to be as if of an object. It is consciousness itself that constitutes objects. Not that consciousness creates objects, as in the idealism of empiricists, but that the components of consciousness are interconnected in such a way that the experience is as if of one object.

#### Nonmetaphysical Metaphysics or Metaphysical Nonmetaphysics?

Although Husserl’s phenomenology carries out the aforementioned metaphysical aims, as the account above already shows, it rather does so in a nonmetaphysical way. The metaphysical formula of beings as such, for Husserl, becomes plain “being-as-given” (*ens in quantum datum*), being only insofar as it is given in intuition.<sup>80</sup> Phenomenology is also nonmetaphysical inasmuch as it, first of all, claims to be presuppositionless in the theoretical regard. Husserl formulates this requirement as “the principle of freedom from presupposition” that seeks “to express strict exclusion of all statements not permitting of a comprehensive *phenomenological* realization.”<sup>81</sup> It means that phenomenology excludes all statements that involve something else besides what is experienced in direct seeing. Husserl also calls this procedure phenomenological reduction.<sup>82</sup> It suspends all attitudes of the subject, be they natural commonsense or scientific. Husserl insists that phenomenology consists solely of reconfirmable descriptions of experience and, accordingly, does not advance metaphysical theories. The phenomenological description

makes void the metaphysical constructions that philosophers impose upon experience. As Husserl claims, phenomenology as “theory of knowledge, properly described, is no theory.”<sup>83</sup>

Second, as mentioned above, phenomenology describes the world even without presuming whether it is real or imagined. It is simply beside the point whether phenomena really exist. Husserl states that phenomenology never involves “the slightest reference to real existence,” no metaphysical, no scientific, and no psychological statements dealing with the existent.<sup>84</sup> In fact, the main objective of reduction is to “bracket” out the existence of phenomena in order to arrive at their essences. Therefore, the next reductive step is the eidetic reduction (*eidōs*, essence). It is a reduction in which one passes from the object to its general features or essences not in reality, but in one’s consciousness. In this way, the eidetic reduction leaves behind the natural attitude dealing with the world around, such as objects, persons, events, actions, and their particular features. The phenomenological attitude is able to abstract to their essences.

The phenomenological reduction makes possible the givenness of the appearing, but the eidetic reduction—the essential givenness of objects. But then there is the third, transcendental reduction that Husserl also calls *epoche*. While the eidetic reduction assures that only the pure, nonmetaphysical essences of the objects in consciousness are described, the *epoche* is no longer even the reduction to pure consciousness, but to the transcendental ego and the transcendental realm. So, this third level of phenomenology, being truly transcendental, in a way fulfills the aim of metaphysics nonetheless. This reduction brackets the phenomenal self as well, so that, strictly speaking, in this phenomenology, there is nothing left of phenomenality, not even the self. Yet, it refers to the transcendental features of the three structures of consciousness: *noema*, *noesis*, and *hyle*. Phenomenology is the study of these. *Noesis* is the intuition of essence. *Hyle* is the “matter” of experience. It can be not only sensory, but also unreal or imaginary matter.

*Noema*, crucial to phenomenology, is the structure itself that makes consciousness intentional, which is the phenomenon proper. Precisely the *noemata* collect the “as if of” structures of intentionality. These three features are transcendental because the ordinary natural attitude is not aware of them. But they are also, according to Husserl, absolutely necessary presuppositions for the appearance of the world to consciousness.

On these accounts, Husserl’s phenomenology appears to be a kind of nonmetaphysical metaphysics, or metaphysical nonmetaphysics, which inevitably fulfills the aim of metaphysics even if overcoming metaphysics. Even the donative intuition itself exemplifies this paradox. That is to say, it is only half-true that phenomenology presents apriori principles of understanding. In fact, the phenomenological apriori of all-preceding intuition, precisely as that of intuition, can only be aposteriori. The paradox is that intuition is an apriori principle, while it itself can only be aposteriori. As Marion points out, the principle of intuition, thus, is not another transcendental (i.e., metaphysical) principle. Rather, as intuitive aposteriori, it goes beyond or outside metaphysics inasmuch as it supersedes all anterior principles, stating that there is no transcendental apriori principle, but only intuitive aposteriori, all-preceding donation, even without recourse to being—the foremost object of metaphysics.<sup>85</sup>

### The Need of Overcoming Husserl

Later on, Husserl became increasingly aware that the *noemata* are culture-dependent, influenced by the intersubjective co-existence of the individuals, their adaptation to their own created common life-world, experienced only from different perspectives. A world as pre-given life-world itself becomes phenomenon, and it is studied not so much by the solitary Cartesian ego as by the ego intimately related to the world and interrelated with others. However, Husserl never went all the way into this direction and never abandoned the centrality of transcendental subjectivity. Philosophers



increasingly started to suspect that the transcendental ego may be too unreliable to be the last foundation of philosophy as the science of sciences (*Wissenschaftslehre*). The immediate intuition may be too subjective, relative, and subject to interpretation, and hence insufficient for providing metaphysical evidence instead of one's mere subjective feeling of certainty. One cannot bracket one's existence in the world as the *epoche* requires. A human being is not a detachable consciousness able to abstract herself from the world. A human being is essentially being-in-the-world. It is precisely this existence and the existence of the world around that is given as the starting point of all phenomenological description. And this is the point where Heidegger comes in. Despite his later developments, Husserl could not approve of Heidegger's turn of phenomenology to radical historicity and hermeneutics and considered it a betrayal and relativization of his own transcendental turn. Husserl thought it was a mere relapse into the natural attitude he himself had overcome. The existential phenomenologists' rejection of the *epoche* leads them to the understanding of phenomenology as (fundamental) ontology, precisely the metaphysics Husserl wants to escape.

### *Heidegger's Overcoming of Metaphysics*

Heidegger's thought is most important in regard to overcoming metaphysics, which is the concern of his whole lifetime, by means of the different approaches to the question of being (*Seinsfrage*). Heidegger's philosophy is a particularly apropos example for my double-sided interpretative scheme of overcoming metaphysics. On the one hand, in his early years, Heidegger presents what he believes is the most authentic metaphysics in the form of his version of phenomenology, overcoming or fulfilling all existing metaphysics by reaching out to the truth of being itself, in contrast to the old metaphysics, dealing, in his opinion, only with beings. On the other hand, later on, Heidegger renounces all metaphysics in favor of thinking that is totally different from

metaphysics. Yet, this different thinking, although breaking out of metaphysics, to some extent remains bound to metaphysics. Also, it remains faithful to the true aim of metaphysics, which for Heidegger is always the attainment to being. So, Heidegger's thought is an example of "metaphysical insideoutness" which, according to my demonstration, culminates in the thought of Derrida and is subsequently applied to Schleiermacher.

### The Early Heidegger (I):

#### From Transcendental to Existential Phenomenology

Being Husserl's student, Heidegger comes to phenomenology through him. He wants to remain loyal to Husserl's own original intent, which is to let "the things themselves" be manifest as they manifest themselves when all theoretical or natural presumptions are put aside. After certain etymological exegesis of the Greek origins of the word "phenomenology," Heidegger concludes that it means "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself," expressing the same as Husserl's maxim "To the things themselves!"<sup>86</sup> However, Heidegger soon finds his teacher's phenomenology going astray and leaving the path of true phenomenology. Heidegger rejects at least three central facets of Husserl's phenomenology. First, whereas Husserl does not accept the German "philosophy of life" (e.g., Dilthey, Scheler), Heidegger, influenced by it, realizes that phenomenology "must be attentive to *historicity*, or the *facticity* of human living; to *temporality*, or the concrete living in time;" and that it cannot "remain content with description of the internal consciousness of time."<sup>87</sup> Second, from the hermeneutical tradition initiated by Schleiermacher, Heidegger understands "that all description involves *interpretation*," that description is only its derivative form.<sup>88</sup> Husserl's pure description, accordingly, becomes impossible if it is not situated in "a radically historicised hermeneutics."<sup>89</sup> Third,

Heidegger rejects Husserl's kind of Cartesianism and subjective transcendental idealism as "egology" and claims instead that the first concern of phenomenology is being.<sup>90</sup> In other words, Heidegger shifts the phenomenological study of the internal structures of consciousness to the more fundamental study of the relation between human being and being itself. It is not the structures of consciousness, but the structures of human existence itself that are phenomena revealing the being in which they are rooted. To be sure, not that being is behind the phenomena, but that phenomenological analysis first of all reveals the being of what is being analyzed. Thus, Heidegger's metaphysics is ontology, but ontology that is possible only as phenomenology.<sup>91</sup> But, to repeat, unlike Husserl, Heidegger never uses such phenomenological concepts as intentionality, *noema*, and reduction. For him, there are no such things as a solitary "I," the transcendental ego, or pure consciousness. Rather, this "I" is always a part and a product of a larger world that includes others. Therefore, Heidegger's phenomenology is existential analysis of the concrete phenomena of the experience of historical, factual, and involved human life, with its fundamental moods, predicaments, and yearnings. Accordingly, Heidegger's phenomenology overcomes not only Husserl's primarily cognitive approach, but also any metaphysics as epistemology, especially as developed after Kant.

### The Early Heidegger (II): Being and Metaphysics

If Descartes considered philosophy to be a tree whose roots are metaphysics, trunk physics, and branches all other sciences, Heidegger's concern is with the ground itself in which metaphysics is rooted—being.<sup>92</sup> As the roots forget themselves in the ground, Heidegger thinks that metaphysics throughout its history has forgotten being as such (*Sein*) and dealt only with beings or entities (*Seiendes*) and their being. Heidegger believes that he is the first one in the history of philosophy who realizes the simple truth

that it is precisely being as such that allows the phenomenological manifestation of what is, of entities. Being as such lets everything that is show itself as what it is.

Certainly, Heidegger knows that being cannot be approached directly. As shown above, it is the emptiest of concepts and cannot be filled with any content. Being is the same as nothing, it cannot be, cannot exist.<sup>93</sup> As seen from Aristotle's *on hei on*, being cannot be represented. As soon as the representation takes place, as in metaphysics, being is reduced to an entity, one among others. Therefore, metaphysics has always eluded the question of being.<sup>94</sup> Metaphysics may deal with entities, such as God, the world, and soul, and ask such metaphysical questions as, "Do they exist?" and "What kind of entities are they?" But questions of this type do not apply to being.<sup>95</sup>

However, there is a different way of questioning, which is neglected by metaphysics. For example, instead of metaphysical questions, "What is the world?" and "Does the world exist?" one can ask "What does it mean to be in the world?" Instead of asking "What is the mind?" one may ask "What does it mean to be thinking?" But instead of asking "Does God exist?" one may ask "What does it mean to be under God's authority?" The alternate questions in these sets escape the approach of metaphysics. Yet, it leads to being at the same time, for all these questions involve the infinitive "to be." One can also approach the question of being this way. Although there is no way to approach being metaphysically, there is something one can ask about being: "What does it mean?" To Heidegger, it is the question of the meaning of being (*Die Frage nach den Sinn von Sein*). For this reason, Heidegger names his phenomenology "fundamental ontology."<sup>96</sup> The meaning of being as such underlies all true metaphysical interrogation in contrast to traditional ontology dealing with statements (*logos*) about the being of entities (*onta*).<sup>97</sup>

Accordingly, in face of the ineffability of being, Heidegger's unique approach to it is through the mode of being that human being itself is, being the only entity able to ask

about the meaning of being, even the only entity able to say “is,” necessarily exposing being to pre-understanding.<sup>98</sup> This entity, the “there” (*Da*) among entities, is best expressed as *Dasein*. *Dasein* signifies the involvement of being in human nature and the relation of the human being to the openness (“there”) of being as such.<sup>99</sup> *Dasein* is the human being in its everyday facticity of being-there, being-in-the-world, or ek-istence—an ecstatic openness to being. Heidegger even states the “essence” or “substance” of *Dasein*, which is existence.<sup>100</sup> Only *Dasein* can “exist” in Heidegger’s sense, standing out in openness to the presence of being. Things, angels, even God, are, but do not exist.

Being *Dasein* entails transcendence, for its nature is ek-static, “stepping out,” achieved by means of care (*Sorge*). It is another moment of true metaphysics. Whereas in traditional metaphysics the mind-world relationship is conceived as mind’s generating concepts that interpret the data of the world, to Heidegger, *Dasein*’s relation to the world is expressed in a nonobjectifying, nonmetaphysical way, as caring being in the world. Another related thought is out-braving the utmost, which is being toward death. The latter, I suggest, is also a metaphysical moment. When *Dasein* accepts its finitude in the authenticity of resoluteness, it raises itself beyond entities toward being. However, it takes place in a finite manner, for ek-stases have temporal horizons. In fact, it is temporality itself that makes transcendence possible. *Dasein*’s temporality is manifest as future in its openness to being that is its coming-to-be itself. But this future comes to a *Dasein* already existing from its past. Then, *Dasein*’s coming-to-be lets every entity, including itself, be present as showing itself as what it is. It is the present of *Dasein*. As such, *Dasein* stands out in all three ek-stases of time. Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis shows how that takes place. Therefore, as the subtitle of *Being and Time* explains, this work is about the interpretation of *Dasein* in terms of temporality and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of being. Time as presence (*Anwesen*) is absolutely necessary to this project insofar as it belongs to the

truth of being. Being conceals itself in the same way as every present moment.<sup>101</sup> In any case, Heidegger understands *Dasein*'s temporality, therefore, historicity, as the prerequisite in questioning the meaning of being as such in its relation to time. Time is not something other than being, as in such metaphysical opposites of being as becoming, thinking, seeming, etc. Being as *einai* and both *par-* and *ap-ousia* contain the present time and duration, therefore, time as such. "Being as such is thus unconcealed in terms of time."<sup>102</sup> But time points to unconcealedness or truth (*a-letheia*) of being.<sup>103</sup>

Here is Heidegger's earlier project in a nutshell: what is asked about, the content of the question (*Gefragtes*), is being; what is interrogated, to whom the question is asked (*Befragte*), is a particular being or entity, the human being, *Dasein*; but what the question wants to know (*Erfragte*) is the meaning of being, which always manifests itself in time.<sup>104</sup>

### Metaphysics As Ontotheology

One of the metaphysical key concepts of Heidegger is called ontological difference. This difference is already implied in Aristotle's formula *to on hei on*. *On* is a participle, and as such can be used as a noun or an adjective. In the first case it means that which is, i.e., an entity (*Seiende*). In the second case, as an adjective (*seiend*), it denotes the process by means of which an entity (as noun) is, i.e., its being (*Sein*). In short, *on* can mean both being as such and an entity. The ontological difference is between the two. Heidegger thinks that the ontological difference is not only in Aristotle's formula, but is also implied in the whole metaphysical tradition. But most important of all, precisely because the tradition itself has not recognized the ontological difference, the oblivion of being prevailed. As indicated above, traditional metaphysics, in Heidegger's opinion, has always concentrated only on *on* as noun, on entities as such and their being. But it is not the fault of metaphysics itself. It is our need for representation, even in the case of being,

to know it as something. But, there is a total difference between being and entity, the ontological difference.

Further thinking through this difference between being and entities leads Heidegger to one of the most forceful and influential recent definitions of metaphysics. It is his famous denotation of metaphysics as double-grounded ontotheology, in effect at least since Aristotle.<sup>105</sup> Only that Aristotle never managed to unite the two meanings of *on* that resulted in different and unrelated kinds of metaphysics, such as the first philosophy and theology. Heidegger for the first time unites them, thus uniting metaphysics. On the one hand, metaphysics is ontology insofar as it deals with the being of entities as their common ground. On the other hand, metaphysics is theology insofar as it deals with the ground that lets entities to be revealed as self-grounding (*ergründen*) and self-accounting (*begründen*) ground (*ratio, logos*). This ultimate ground finally leads to the concept of the first ground as *causa sui*, the supreme among beings, the metaphysical concept of the divine (*theion*), or God. This ontotheological nature without knowing gives metaphysics its unity insofar as the ontological difference between being as the ground and entities as what is grounded remains. It is precisely the ontological difference—the difference that keeps being as the ground from beings as the grounded—where the ontotheological nature of metaphysics arises from. As a result, metaphysics forgets what it is constituted of: the ontological difference itself. In this way, being is put into oblivion. However, the forgetfulness is not metaphysics' fault. The ontological difference can not be thought within metaphysics. It requires a stepback out of metaphysics into its essential nature unconcealing (*a-letheuein*) itself in the unthought of the ontological difference.

The ontotheological unity of metaphysics, in Heidegger's view, is yet unthought by the tradition. The task of true metaphysics, accordingly, is to make a stepback into the tradition into its metaphysical unthought. The overcoming of metaphysics is needed

because metaphysics does not reach being as its ground. The purpose of Heidegger's *Destruktion* has never been the annihilation of the tradition. Rather, it means the un-building (*de-struere*) of the constructed layers of metaphysics covering up being. This destruction is an attempt to dismantle the overlays of the tradition in order to disclose the manner of questioning in the origins of its rise. To reach these grounds of metaphysics, a true metaphysics, a meta-metaphysics is needed. And it must be different from Heidegger's own early metaphysics.

### *Die Kehre* and the Nonmetaphysical Thinking of Being

Somewhere in the 1930s, a shift of emphasis or turn (*Kehre*) occurred in Heidegger's approach to the question of being.<sup>106</sup> This shift, however, does not mean the rejection of the aforementioned views. It only means approaching the question of being from a different perspective, changing direction in the communication between *Dasein* and being. Whereas the early Heidegger inquired how *Dasein* discloses being, after the turn, he believes that it is being that reveals itself to, at the same time concealing itself from, *Dasein*. The term *Dasein* itself gradually disappears from Heidegger's vocabulary, giving place to the clearing (*Lichtung*) of being. Thus, metaphysics no longer originates with *Dasein's* act of thinking; it is being itself that brings about true metaphysics insofar as it presents itself to *Dasein* as worthy of thought. Nothing but the old metaphysics can originate from *Dasein*. If it is to be overcome by true metaphysics, it occurs from being's self-manifestation.

For this reason, metaphysics is no longer Heidegger's preoccupation. Now Heidegger wants to go beyond metaphysics directly into its ground, thinking the question of being differently. Hence, there is an even more important an aspect of the turn, and also more elusive. It is Heidegger's turn from the critique of the metaphysical oblivion of being to the preservation of being's self-presencing or unconcealment. Whereas the



oblivion of being was total—it was even forgotten that something has been forgotten—the later Heidegger holds that in the process of concealment/non-concealment the truth of being could release itself from the oblivion. And that happens not through a new metaphysics, but through poetic thinking, by virtue of the primordial fourfold (*Geviert*), retrieved by Hölderlin, disclosing itself in world's worlding as sky, earth, divinities, and mortals.<sup>107</sup> The fourfold is not a thing or a being in any sense of the metaphysical word "is." It can only presence itself in being, at the same time itself being not. This is the overcoming of the overcoming metaphysics itself.

### Meta-Metaphysical Character of Language

Next crucial point of the turn consists of Heidegger's different understanding of language. The early hermeneutical views are replaced by the understanding of language as an independent ontological reality. Whereas in *Being and Time*, language is the formal expression of the existential manner of *Dasein's* relation to the world, later on, Heidegger no longer believes in prelinguistic intelligibility that only uses language. Now it is language itself that speaks, as expressed in his famous tautology "*die Sprache spricht*." As Heidegger maintains in his "Letter on Humanism" (which also contains the first published mention of "the turn"), thinking is the mediator of being, and it is in thinking that being comes to language.<sup>108</sup> Since thinking can only take place in language, being manifests itself in language. In Heidegger's words, language becomes "the house of being," and it is in this house that human beings find their home, their dwelling place.<sup>109</sup> They need to guard it, for it is the way to belong to the history of being. "Everything depends upon this alone, that the truth of Being come to language and that thinking attain to this language."<sup>110</sup> Taking such a part in being, language even becomes something unfathomable, one could even say metaphysical, in the proper sense of the term, for it "is

only in this mysterious and yet for us always pervasive way,” raising itself into the lighting of being.<sup>111</sup>

Furthermore, the characteristic trait of the language of being for Heidegger is simplicity, a trait hardly applicable to *Being and Time*. This different thinking (*das andere Denken*) or different saying (*das andere Sagen*) is not even philosophy any longer, for it thinks more originally than metaphysics. This thinking, as Heidegger asserts, just “gathers language into simple saying. In this way language is the language of Being, as clouds are the clouds of the sky.”<sup>112</sup> It is so simple; the truth of being in “the splendor of the simple” of poetic sayings.

It is important that Heidegger never claims to go beyond being, be it metaphysically/phenomenologically or by means of thinking differently from metaphysics. To think being always remains Heidegger’s end, whether thinking reaches it, or being itself reaches thinking. In this regard, I would like to stress something that I consider to be significant. That is, Heidegger’s metaphysics, even if metaphysics overcome, always remains a metaphysics of finitude, from *Being and Time* to his late poetic thinking. If it is metaphysics in the exact sense of the word, then it is not a metaphysics going beyond being, but it is a transgression from inside, within the boundaries of being, on this side of being. Heidegger writes: “Thinking does not overcome metaphysics by climbing still higher, surmounting it, transcending it somehow or other; thinking overcomes metaphysics by climbing back down into the nearness of the nearest.”<sup>113</sup> Both the transcendences of *Dasein* and of language are immanent transcendences. To elaborate such metaphysics is an undertaking “more arduous and more dangerous than the ascent” beyond being.<sup>114</sup>

## Heidegger's Later Overcoming of Metaphysics

The later Heidegger tries to overcome metaphysics differently. *Seinsfrage* as such becomes impossible. In view of the unrepresentability of being, Heidegger admits that all that is left for a philosopher is to keep the ontological difference. Now this is the highest point thinking can reach, in contrast to going beyond entities to being. In addition, besides metaphysical keeping the ontological difference, another alternative is to philosophize otherwise than metaphysically, which means poetically. On the other hand, Heidegger repeatedly acknowledges that metaphysics cannot be left behind even if superseded by a different discourse. Even if overcome, metaphysics does not disappear, but always returns transformed and remains in dominance, precisely because of the continuous ontological difference.<sup>115</sup>

In any case, the problem of overcoming metaphysics is that it happens when metaphysics heightens itself through itself. To express it, Heidegger uses the same phrase as Kant, “the metaphysics of metaphysics.”<sup>116</sup> A regard for metaphysics remains in the very intention to overcome metaphysics. Therefore, at the end of the lecture “Time and Being,” Heidegger aims “to cease all overcoming, and leave metaphysics to itself.”<sup>117</sup> Beyond its self-overcoming, metaphysics reveals its essence to thought, which eventually may precipitate the overcoming. But the task, in Heidegger's view, has never been definitely accomplished. He himself felt like Moses on the threshold of the promised land, never entering it. As a result, metaphysics in Heidegger is less overcome than assigned limits. “Transgressing so as to delineate—such might well be the lesson to be learned from this overcoming.”<sup>118</sup>

The difficulty of overcoming metaphysics lies in the nature of language itself. As Heidegger acquiesces, “the difficulty lies in language” (*Das Schwierige liegt in der Sprache*).<sup>119</sup> The difficulty is that Western languages have been the languages of metaphysical thinking and, therefore, are permeated with metaphysical connotations. On

this account, the essay where this utterance appears remains open-ended. The destiny of the overcoming of metaphysics is not yet decided. It is an open question to Heidegger whether language is only metaphysical and, accordingly, determined by ontotheology, or whether it contains other possibilities of saying and at the same time telling not-saying.<sup>120</sup>

There are many things that Derrida, whom I approach in the next chapter, has overtaken from Heidegger. However, there is one crucial difference—precisely in the ambivalence of the question of the overcoming of metaphysics. In Derrida’s opinion, there is no way to approach the overcoming of metaphysics otherwise than with the aid of these same concepts of the metaphysics that is overcome. Heidegger agrees, referring to his own earlier thought: “But in order to make the attempt at thinking recognizable and at the same time understandable for existing philosophy, it could at first be expressed only within the horizon of that existing philosophy and its use of current terms.”<sup>121</sup> However, he realizes that such an approach is “bound to lead immediately and inevitably into error.”<sup>122</sup> In fact, Heidegger calls this same attitude “grotesqueness,” when referring to his own work: “It is hardly possible to surpass the grotesqueness of proclaiming my attempts at thinking as smashing metaphysics to bits and of sojourning at the same time, with the help of those attempts, on paths of thinking and in conceptions which have been derived. . .”<sup>123</sup> He says it despite his own acknowledgements of the persevering return of metaphysics. In Heidegger’s view, such an overcoming, dealing with the materials of what is to be overcome, would be useless. There is no point in fighting against metaphysics, while at the same time holding fast to it. However, what Heidegger does accept, very much like Derrida, is the fact that metaphysics does not disappear completely, even if it is overcome. The problem is that metaphysics always reappears in different forms and disguises. That is the reason why the later Heidegger wants to cease all overcoming and leave metaphysics to itself.

Ultimately, however, there is no final answer in Heidegger as regards the overcoming of metaphysics. One always needs to keep in mind the questioning character of Heidegger's thought. It can never be frozen into unequivocal assertions and denials, such as, "metaphysics is overcome" and "metaphysics cannot be overcome," or correspondingly, "Heidegger escapes the closure of metaphysics" and "Heidegger remains a prisoner of metaphysics."<sup>124</sup> Yes and no. Heidegger's questioning assumes its own weakness, that is, uncertainty, in the face of the apodicticity of modern philosophy (empiricism, Descartes, Kant, et. al.). But today apodicticity is not such a philosophical virtue any more. Rather, it is undecidability that has appeal. Heidegger has it, and that may be one of the reasons today's thinkers still draw on his thought.

*The Prevalence of Metaphysical Insideoutness:*

*Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Positivism, Pragmatism, Levinas*

The foregoing accounts on overcoming metaphysics dealt with a few selected thinkers from the history of philosophy. From the modern period, thus far I have chosen Descartes, British empiricists, Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger. But I could also have chosen different philosophers, applied the proposed hermeneutical tactics to them, and reached similar results. Some of those I missed in the more detailed and consecutive expositions above could, among others, be Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, the positivists, pragmatists, process philosophers, Wittgenstein, Levinas, Foucault, Habermas, and others. I will conclude this chapter with shorter insights confirming the compatibility of my approach to some on this list as well.

Hegel

Hegel is notorious for allegedly building a system of metaphysics, completely ignoring Kant's rendering impossible any such attempt.<sup>125</sup> It is a widespread view on

Hegel, and perhaps it is this view that is responsible for the oblivion of Hegel in times when metaphysics has supposedly come to its end. Of course, Hegel's own systematic works may give justification to this view. But his work is also full of obscurities, metaphors, and allusions that may give a different perspective. In fact, Hegel can also be interpreted as an anti-metaphysician. Definitely, Hegel is the last one who would ignore Kant's critique of metaphysics. Rather, Hegel would say that Kant himself is caught up in traditional metaphysics as a result of his insistence on the existence of a world in-itself, beyond experience, and unknown. I agree with Solomon, who points out:

It is Hegel who is the great anti-metaphysician, purging philosophy of every vestige of "the thing-in-itself," the world behind, or beyond, the scenes. It is Hegel who reduced all questions of *being* (or ontology) to questions about the structures and forms of human experience, and he did so not by going back to the ancients but by carrying modern philosophy – that is, Kantian philosophy – to its logical and radical conclusions. To say that Hegel is an *idealist* is to say that, at every turn, he argues that the world is thoroughly *knowable*, and it is nothing "beyond" the realm of conscious experience.<sup>126</sup>

At least Hegel's *Phenomenology* may be viewed not as a metaphysical treatise on how the world really is, culminating in the ultimate ontological assurance of the absolute, but as a tentative collection of different worldviews, rejecting any single metaphysical perspective. Or, it presents a kind of "meta-view, a view about the correctness of views, rather than a view as such."<sup>127</sup> One can even say that, rejecting the duality of experience and reality, Hegel is not even an epistemologist. If there is a befitting designation for Hegel, it is not that of a metaphysician, an ontologist, or an epistemologist, but rather a "conceptual anthropologist," or better, a "phenomenologist," according to the title of his most controversial book, a phenomenologist one century before Husserl appropriated the word as if it were his invention.<sup>128</sup> Although Hegel's phenomenology is not exactly the same as Husserl's, it is at least phenomenology as a nonmetaphysical science of the manifold forms of experience, showing which conceptions of experience are more plausible.

## Kierkegaard

Kierkegaard is a very elusive writer. It is difficult to classify his writing genres or styles: sometimes it is philosophical, sometimes literary, sometimes polemical, sometimes religiously devotional, etc. He is controversial, iconoclastic, ironic, fragmentary. More than that, Kierkegaard is also ambiguous regarding the issue of overcoming metaphysics. According to him, it is ultimately faith that overcomes metaphysics. To put it precisely, the object of faith is the other of philosophy that may not depend on philosophy for its determination. However, faith must be distinguished from theology, which is also a kind of metaphysics that Kierkegaard wants to avoid. Instead, religion is based on a subjective commitment of faith maintained in a situation of theoretical uncertainty and rational paradox or absurdity.

On the other hand, Kierkegaard could also be discussed under the heading of the overcoming metaphysics in philosophy insofar as his struggle against metaphysical grounds for religion is extended to philosophical matters. As is well known, Kierkegaard spent most of his energy and talent refuting Hegel. Kierkegaard does not believe that Hegel succeeds in unifying the Kantian dualism of being and thinking; he thinks that conceptual thinking can never possess the category of reality. He himself distinguishes thought from concrete reality, the reality of the thinking individual's personal existence, and is, therefore, commonly acknowledged as the father of existentialism (Heidegger has borrowed from Kierkegaard more than he explicitly acknowledges: the notions of nothingness, death, anxiety, boredom, etc.).

Yet, despite his disdain toward system, traces of an alternative metaphysical system (though unfinished and always developing) can be discerned in Kierkegaard's thought, particularly as a speculative analysis of being as existent and existence as becoming.<sup>129</sup> The Hegelian necessity of history, for example, is reversed by the

contingency and freedom of existence as the key metaphysical concepts. Furthermore, as always with the overcoming of metaphysics, it can only be carried out by rational and logical inferences and arguments. Kierkegaard, to be sure, uses reason, though not in metaphysical and epistemological senses. He uses it in the logical sense, using categories, the rules of discourse, logical inference, etc. Hence, Kierkegaard is only able to oppose metaphysics, directing its own means against itself, relying on the same logic that he wants to destroy. Thus, Sartre already observed that Kierkegaard stole the language of knowledge in order to use it against knowledge. No doubt, he pushes the power and inventiveness of reason to its utmost in order to demonstrate its own powerlessness. The question remains: is reason in a position to accomplish its own suicide?

### Nietzsche

Nietzsche, similarly to Kierkegaard, is not always accepted as a serious philosopher by academicians. Like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche is more like a passionate writer or poet. Perhaps precisely that is a factor that carries both of them outside metaphysics. Still, like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche is also involved in sweeping philosophical confrontation, though not so much with Hegel particularly, as with the whole Western tradition traced back to Plato's distinction between the true and the apparent worlds and resulting in nihilism as devaluation of the latter. Nietzsche holds, somewhat like Kant, that many metaphysical convictions and concepts cannot be justified if taken independently from the perspective of the knower. But there is no question that Nietzsche cannot accept Kant's "thing in-itself," for Nietzsche thinks that every entity is relational and its knowing—interpretative, which is Nietzsche's so-called perspectivism. According to the latter, both factual and metaphysical realisms are untenable, for there are no uninterpreted facts, while metaphysical concepts result from improper use of language beyond its basic communicative function. Metaphysics and its truth are but a mobile



army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms, created because of a psychological instinct to ascribe meaning and purpose to the harsh world, thereby achieving security. That is how the fiction of the true world emerges, making philosophy decadent, against real flesh and blood life. Instead of being the love for knowledge and truth, philosophy becomes the battlefield of particular authors' power struggles. It is a very powerful destruction of the metaphysical tradition.

On the other hand, despite his antimetaphysical fervor, many interpreters have discerned an alternative metaphysical system in Nietzsche's works. The first chief exponent of Nietzsche as metaphysician is Heidegger.<sup>130</sup> Heidegger sees in Nietzsche's thought the end or consummation point of Western tradition, but not so much as its overcoming—except the overcoming of nihilism—as its completion by uniting Parmenidean (being as permanent presence) and Heraclitean (being as becoming) traditions. Heidegger thinks that Nietzsche's metaphysics only puts new values in place of the old ones devalued by the history of metaphysics as nihilism. Nietzsche gives two final answers to the main question of metaphysics, what is being: the will to power and the eternal recurrence of the same. The former concerns the constitution of being, the latter,—its mode or way to be. The supreme will to power consists in stamping becoming with the character of being, which is the meaning of the eternal recurrence of the same. As to Heidegger's own main concern, he believes that in Nietzsche's thought being is debased to or equated with a value, therefore, still forgotten as such.

Besides Heidegger, there are many other interpretations that see Nietzsche not only as destroying the metaphysical tradition, but also building his own alternative and more adequate system.<sup>131</sup> The most obvious elements of this system, tentatively, may be (1) the metaphysical principle of the will to power, replacing the traditional concept of will, (2) the cosmological theory of the eternal recurrence of the same, replacing the dualism of the ideal and the real, (3) the ideal of the self as an integrated superman,

replacing the dualistic Cartesian model of subjectivity, (4) the ontological primacy of becoming over being, and (5) a kind of pragmatist coherence or perspectivist theory of truth instead of the representational one.

I believe that there is a third interpretation of Nietzsche besides regarding him as either destroying or building metaphysics. According to this reading, Nietzsche is still a philosopher, though of a special kind. That is to say, Nietzsche is among the first founders of the tradition in which thinkers like Wittgenstein, Derrida, Foucault, and Rorty are situated: an alternative philosophic tradition that shows that the so-called perennial problems of philosophy arise only because of a certain concept of philosophy that is by no means necessary.<sup>132</sup> His thought may also be seen as a certain “therapeutic” overcoming of metaphysics. The metaphysical interpretation of Nietzsche, of course, confirms the inevitability of the return of metaphysics in every overcoming. But I would also maintain that, beyond the critique, Nietzsche wanted to say something that was not intended to be a new metaphysical system. Nietzsche wanted to say it differently from the way metaphysics does.

In this way, the subversion of being with becoming or the celebration of life amidst appearance may be viewed as not just a metaphysical subversion, but rather as dismissing any metaphysical polarity altogether—be it between being and becoming or the ideal and the apparent. What else might Nietzsche’s intention to abolish the apparent world together with the ideal mean? Even Nietzsche’s “naturalism,” the return to the immanence of the earth, may mean something other than a mere reversal between the real and the ideal. To a certain extent, there is metaphysics: a metaphysics that still names being—as the flux of appearances produced by the will to power. But this “metaphysics” also cancels itself, leaning toward equalizing everything, the leveling of meaning within the realm of appearance only. In a word, it is a partial sustaining and a partial overcoming of Platonism. Appearance is retained without its noumenal counterpart. As such, it loses

the metaphysical force evolving from the difference between the opposites. Something must be retained lest one finds oneself in a complete void.

In much the same way, Nietzsche's famous perspectivism is not necessarily a "theory" of knowledge. Nietzsche's statements like "there are only interpretations" and "there is no truth" may be sayings of a different kind. They are rhetorical devices showing a way out of the "ascetic ideal" of the final truth achieved by all means and for its own sake. Furthermore, the doctrines of the will to power, the superhuman, and the eternal recurrence are not supposed to be metaphysical truths corresponding to reality, but a sort of regulative ideals. These "doctrines" may work upon the "as if" principle. One may make sense of one's life, acting as if these "doctrines" were true. Certainly, these are not metaphysical theories. At the very least, as Haar remarks, no metaphysics can be founded on hypothetical propositions.<sup>133</sup> If they have significance, it may be ethical, but not metaphysical. They may be looked at as a sort of therapeutic or diagnostic tools.

Consider the "doctrine" of the eternal recurrence of the same. Its point may actually be in providing a practical directive how to live life affirmatively. It does not claim to be true in the sense of correspondence, but shows how reality should be conceived by those who say an unreserved "yes" to this life. The tentative "truth" of the recurrence only brings forth a certain affirmative attitude toward life and its abundance. It illustrates the attitude that overcomes nihilism. This attitude questions one's disposition toward life: how well disposed one has to be in order to accept the eternal recurrence, to desire nothing else. But this attitude is in fact impossible, for there will always be things in everyone's life that nobody can want unconditionally: sufferings, violences, genocids, etc. This attitude would be possible only in two instances: for the God, whose death Nietzsche proclaims, and the superhuman.

Nietzsche's remarks about the superhuman may be viewed in a similar way. It may not be yet another ideal to strive for. Notably, there are no specifiable behavioral norms given. It may be a general symbol for that same attitude that considers life worthy of infinite repetition. It is a pluralistic and nonobjective counterpart of Kant's unifying and universal categorical imperative: just to become aware of many things that are worthy of infinity in our lives. And then, to have such an attitude toward life as to want to live it again. It is Nietzsche's existential imperative.<sup>134</sup> But it should not be confused with another fundamental principle. Nietzsche does not give an alternative theory of morality, a new set of values. He wants to go "beyond good and evil," to overcome both morality as well as its contrast, immorality. That is why *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is a book for "everyone and no one." Everybody may claim to have understood it. Yet, no one has. The ideal of Zarathustra can not possibly be achieved. No one has realized that it, too, is a mockery. Nietzsche's glad tidings may consist precisely in the realization that liberation occurs when one realizes that the superhuman is impossible, that there are no glad tidings after all, and that there is even no need for them.

### Logical Positivism

The findings of British empiricists are very far reaching, not only through Kant, but also in the twentieth century, particularly in the school of logical positivism. The old "Hume's fork" is the cornerstone of this school, even if it is supplemented by the modern developments of logic that helps to determine the meaningfulness of statements.<sup>135</sup> Because of the emphasis on this determination, it does not falsify metaphysics, but simply renders it meaningless.<sup>136</sup> Metaphysics can at best be an artistic expression of the attitude toward life, similar to poetry, only with the difference that metaphysicians, unlike poets, live under the illusion that they deal with matters of ultimate truth and falsity, while in fact they do not assert anything, but merely express something, like artists.<sup>137</sup>

The uniqueness of the positivist approach to overcoming metaphysics in comparison to other approaches is that, instead of being negative, making the impossibility of metaphysics depend on the nature of what cannot be known, they would rather try to fulfill Hume's impetus to build a credible, though modest, metaphysics. That is why it is positivism: because it determines the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics according to what can be meaningfully said or verified in certain contexts. Method itself precedes doctrine. But since the method depends on radical empiricism or linguistic analysis, it falls back into crude implicit metaphysics: either into foundationalist empiricism, recognizing only sense-data as the proper objects of knowledge, or linguistic idealism, dealing with the inner connection of language only. Moreover, there are positivists who themselves recognize and analyze all kinds of implicit metaphysics of logical positivism in order to consciously build their own "metaphysics of logical positivism," as the title of Bergmann's book expresses.<sup>138</sup> His metaphysics examines the relationship of the ideal language of logical positivism to the ordinary language and the possibilities to render the former into the latter.

### Pragmatism

Pragmatism, in a nutshell, overcomes metaphysics insofar as it, according to Peirce's formulation, seeks the meaning of a concept or a theory in the practical consequences of its application.<sup>139</sup> This is its new "metaphysical" principle. Pragmatism insists on relating theory to praxis. The isolated correspondence theories of truth, characteristic to both rationalism and empiricism, are rejected in favor of truth found in a social context in which its practical implications can be discerned. Knowledge is "common knowledge." Truth is changing together with the social contexts. Truth is forged in the midst of agreements and disagreements of the community of those who pursue it. Practice, as the criterion of truth, takes place in the social, but not in the mental,

realm. Truth emerges from the network of beliefs shared by the community of inquirers and is justified by practice. According to Pierce's analogy, genuine knowledge emerges not by virtue of chainlike reasoning in individual consciousness, but rather from a cablelike interconnectedness of diverse knowledge claims.

But pragmatism is also so diverse that it is difficult to determine its exact relationship to metaphysics. Yet, it is this diversity itself that allows me to apply the scheme of metaphysical insideoutness to pragmatism as well. Although there are varieties of pragmatism that repudiate speculative metaphysics, there are also kinds of pragmatism that offer alternative speculative metaphysics. In this regard, the generalizing division of pragmatism into reformist and revolutionary types is helpful.<sup>140</sup> Reformist pragmatism (Pierce, James, Dewey, et al.) still contains many metaphysical principles and concepts. It only connects knowledge with experience, social context, and action. Revolutionary pragmatism (Schiller, Rorty, et al.), in contrast, abandons any epistemological inquiries for objective truth besides those of relative and contingent cognitive conventions. This pragmatism, in my opinion, is one of the cleanest overcomings of metaphysics.

Perhaps these two approaches are best exemplified by Pierce and Rorty. On the one hand, Pierce wants to rule out propositions of ontology as metaphysical "gibberish." On the other hand, he constructs his own metaphysics, supplied with a set of categories and doctrines. Pierce only wants to differentiate the illegitimate apriori metaphysics from the legitimate, scientific metaphysics that uses observation and reasoning. Rorty, in contrast, completely redefines the task of philosophy, renouncing altogether its role as a form of inquiry. If conceptual thinking has any useful function, it may provide tools for coping with reality, certainly not mirroring it. In Rorty's view, the nature of philosophy ought to be hermeneutical instead of epistemological, or, alternatively, therapeutic instead of constructive, literary instead of scientific. To philosophize, for Rorty, instead

of digging for grounds, simply means to maintain conversation that would lead toward agreement.

Nevertheless, despite these neo-pragmatic moods, metaphysical pragmatism does not belong only to the past. Sandra Rosenthal, for example, proposes a new, pragmatically reconstructed speculative metaphysics that is supposed to go beyond both foundationalism (absolute grounding of knowledge) and non-foundationalism (total scepticism) by virtue of a speculative extrapolation from experience instead of a direct grasp of being as such.<sup>141</sup> This metaphysics deals with the hypothetical generalizations from experience, not with the necessary conditions of experience. Rosenthal and other pragmatic metaphysicians want to combine these two seemingly incompatible approaches: they want to create philosophy without mirrors that nonetheless is systematic, does not jettison metaphysics, and is a sort of ontology, but does not lose touch with reality. Although metaphysical inquiry is bound to be linguistic, although it can begin only by examining already existing formulations, pragmatic metaphysics, it is claimed, may still lead beyond textuality and linguistic conventions to the subject matter of experience, to the reality experienced, to the context in which reflective experience takes place.

### Levinas

Levinas is one of the philosophers who best exemplify my preferred approach to overcoming metaphysics, resolutely struggling with metaphysics and striving to true metaphysics beyond the inherited metaphysics, and at the same time remaining aware of the predicament of overcoming. Here I can only give a most general account, bypassing Levinas' vocabular intricacies in trying to wrest language out of ontology and also avoiding detailed quotes from his inspiring texts.

Like most other great philosophers, Levinas has his own peculiar critique of Western philosophical tradition. Whereas Heidegger indicted the tradition for the oblivion of being and Derrida for the debasement of writing, Levinas charges it for the suppression of the Other, reduction of it to the same. In contrast to that, for Levinas, the Other is something totally alien, something totally incomprehensible, which should be preserved and protected as it is from the invasions and reductions of the same. So, to Levinas, metaphysics must be recuperated by the idea of the Other. One can say that, for Levinas, the Other is the locus of metaphysics proper, that really goes “beyond.” His core metaphysical question would be: how to think the Other as such, as Other? The Other is mystery, not known, not knowable, beyond epistemology, beyond ontology. This Other may appear in various ways: other persons may reveal it when they are not conceived merely as mirror images of one’s own self, it may emerge in ethical experience, it may come about as death, and the like. Philosophy informed by the Other is a philosophy of darkness, of enigma, as opposed to traditional metaphysics that always retains its familiar ground as being, truth, the same, and so forth.

Like other great philosophers, Levinas starts with the overcoming of his own most decisive philosophical influences, particularly those of Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology. Unlike Husserl, Heidegger gives Levinas the understanding of human being as constitutively engaged in time and history. Yet, Heidegger does not oppose phenomenology and ontology. Instead, he poses the ontological question anew from the perspective of *Dasein*. No doubt, the most important question of Heidegger’s whole project is that of being. Levinas thinks that in this respect Heidegger is unable to surpass classical ontology with its problem of the relationship between being as such and entities. Both Husserl and Heidegger, in Levinas’s understanding, are guilty of subsuming the Other under the same, understood as consciousness by the former and as being by the latter. At this point, Levinas feels compelled to depart from phenomenological tradition.



Both Husserl's phenomenology and Heidegger's fundamental ontology entail the imprisonment of the subject. Levinas questions the ambition of that philosophy to be the only way to express the relationship of a human being to being. There must be something that exceeds it; and it is the ethical. The ethical relationship between the self and the Other goes beyond solipsistic, monad-like intentionality and the ontological difference. Phenomenological transcendence must be replaced by "excedence"—an irrevocable exiting from being. Subjectivity, in Levinas' view, must be directed outside, to the nonself, which is free from the categories of representational knowledge.

My special interest in discussing Levinas here is that he is conscious of the paradox to think outside the metaphysical tradition to which one inescapably belongs. The task is immensely difficult, because the means for expressing the Other remain those of traditional ontology insofar as we are bound to use language. Using language by default reduces the Other to the same, the known, the familiar. The Other brought to language becomes a part of being that it is supposed to exceed. The challenge is to bring the Other to thought and language, and at the same time retaining its otherness. On this account, Levinas' texts are utterly ambiguous, they oscillate between the same and the Other, totality and infinity. Will the former be capable to reveal the latter, which it principally cannot contain? The problem is similar to that of apophatic theology. And while Levinas, like any other thinker, is bound to fail explicating the Other, his work at least shows the necessity of addressing the question of the Other.

Insofar as the question of the Other is an ethical question, for Levinas, the first philosophy becomes ethics—true metaphysics going beyond traditional metaphysics. In principle this approach is not new. Levinas himself refers back to the good beyond essence (*epekeina tes ousias*) of the *Republic* of Plato. Already Plato's *to agathon* does not belong to the totality of being. It is the starting point of the separation of the ethical from the ontological in philosophical tradition. Then, of course, Kant proposes ethics as

proper metaphysics. But Levinas cannot accept Kant's grounding of ethics in universal reason, for the latter only produces the same. Levinas rather draws on phenomenological tradition: his ethics, if considered as ethics at all, is not prescriptive but descriptive. It is a "phenomenology" of the relationship between the same and the Other. In Levinas' words, "ethics is an optics."<sup>142</sup> But, this "optics" is different; it even does not have image, characteristic of totalizing and objectifying virtues of vision. Another of Levinas's resources is the idea of excessive infinity from Descartes' third Meditation. In view of that, Levinas does not interpret Descartes in the traditional way of subjectivity. The Cartesian self reaches its subjective self-understanding through its relation to the infinite nonself (the Christian God for Descartes). But it is not self's metaphysical reaching out to the infinite, rather, the location of metaphysics for Levinas is on the "hither side" of essence or being.<sup>143</sup> It is subjectivity beyond metaphysics insofar as formed in the encounter with the Other—a motive also present in Schleiermacher. On this note, I would like to end this chapter and proceed to Derrida, before coming to grips with Schleiermacher.

## NOTES

1. See Gottfried W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, III, 2, 1, A, 1; quoted in Jean-Luc Marion, *On Descartes' Metaphysical Prism: The Constitution and the Limits of Onto-theology in Cartesian Thought*, trans. Jeffrey L. Koski (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 68.

2. See *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 2, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 18 (AT VII, 27).

3. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, 184 (AT IXB, 9-10).

4. Marion, *On Descartes' Metaphysical Prism*, 28. Descartes himself thinks that no one has achieved that before him. He writes: "Admittedly, many people had previously said that in order to understand metaphysical matters the mind must be drawn away from the senses; but no one, so far as I know, had shown how this could be done." Descartes thinks his second meditation accomplishes this transgression. *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 2, 94 (AT VII, 131).

5. Marion, *On Descartes' Metaphysical Prism*, 27-8.

6. See *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 1, 186 (AT IXB, 14).

7. Marion, *On Descartes' Metaphysical Prism*, 83.
8. *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 3, 158 (AT III, 239).
9. Marion, *On Descartes' Metaphysical Prism*, 3.
10. *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 1, 195 (AT VIII A, 7).
11. Marion, *On Descartes' Metaphysical Prism*, 71.
12. Leslie J. Beck, *The Metaphysics of Descartes: A Study of the Meditations* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965), 21.
13. *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 1, 120 (AT VI, 18).
14. Beck, 27.
15. *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 1, 186 (AT IX B, 14).
16. Marion, *On Descartes' Metaphysical Prism*, 53.
17. Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa, eds., *A Companion to Metaphysics* (Oxford; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1995), 373.
18. Marion in Ward, 294, n. 4.
19. Johannes Clauberg, *Ontosophia* (Amsterdam, 1691), 283; quoted in Marion, *On Descartes' Metaphysical Prism*, 83.
20. Marion, *On Descartes' Metaphysical Prism*, 84.
21. Ibid.
22. *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 1, 144 (AT VI, 64f).
23. Ibid., vol. 2, 20 (AT VII, 30).
24. For some detail see Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, eds., *A Companion to Epistemology* (Oxford; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992), 413-14.
25. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Alexander C. Fraser (New York: Dover, 1959), vol. 1, 122 (II, I, 2).
26. Ibid., 123f (II, I, 4).
27. Ibid., 124 (II, I, 4), 211f (II, XI, 17).
28. Ibid., 121f (II, I, 2).
29. Ibid., vol. 2, 438 (IV, XIX, 14).
30. Ibid., vol. 2, 21 (III, III, 11).

31. Ibid., vol. 2, 365 (IV, XV, 3).
32. See this discussion in Richard Schacht, *Classical Modern Philosophers: Descartes to Kant* (London, New York: Routledge, 1984), 126-7.
33. Ibid., 127.
34. George Berkeley, *The Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, ed. G. J. Warnock (Cleveland, Ohio; New York: Meridian, 1963), 66 (§3).
35. Ibid., 67 (§6).
36. Ibid., 68 (§6), 65 (§2).
37. Ibid., 66 (§4).
38. Ibid., 66f (§4).
39. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Antony Flew (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1988), 67 (II)
40. Ibid., 195 (XII, III).
41. Ibid., 71 (IV, I).
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., 58 (I).
44. Ibid., 59 (I).
45. Ibid., 61 (I). This is an analogical ambition to achieve in philosophy what Newton has achieved in physics.
46. Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena: To Any Future Metaphysics That Can Qualify As a Science*, trans. Paul Carus (Chicago; LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1995), 7.
47. Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, trans. and ed. Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 286 (1872-3 [CPUR 1781]).
48. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's, 1965), 664f (A, 849f; B 877f).
49. Kant, *Prolegomena*, 3.
50. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 664 (A, 850; B, 878).
51. Ibid., 9 (A, xii).
52. Ibid., 10f (A, xiv).
53. Ibid., 9 (A, xi).

54. Ibid. (A, xii).

55. Ibid., 59 (A, 11f; B, 25).

56. Ibid., 659 (A, 841; B 869). Kant's plan was to write the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals, which, accordingly, would confirm and fulfill his critiques of pure and practical reason (37 [B, xliii]). The metaphysics of nature or "the *theoretical* knowledge of all things," considering everything insofar as *it is*"—metaphysics "in its *strict* sense"—has not been written by Kant (659 [A, 841; B 869]; 661 [A, 845; B, 873]).

57. Ibid., 25 (B, xxii).

58. Ibid., 14 (A, 21).

59. Ibid., 10 (A, xiii).

60. *Immanuel Kants Werke*, vol. 9, ed. Ernst Cassirer (Berlin: n.p., 1918), 198.

61. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 93 (A 51; B 75). Intuition (*Anschauung*) is Kant's term for perception.

62. See Kant's comparison of his method to that of Copernicus in *ibid.*, 22 (B, xi-xvii)

63. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 55 (B 19).

64. See Kant's list in *ibid.*, 113 (A, 80; B, 106).

65. Ibid., 27 (B, xxvi).

66. Ibid., 532ff (A, 642f; B, 670ff).

67. Ibid., 550f (A, 671f; B, 700f).

68. Ibid., 24f (B, xxi). Cf. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. Lewis W. Beck (London, New York: Macmillan, 1956), 5 (5).

69. Ibid., 29 (B, xxx).

70. Kant, *Prolegomena*, 122.

71. Ibid., 133.

72. Ibid., 123.

73. Ibid., 129.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid., 134.

76. Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol. 1, trans. John N. Findlay (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1970), 252 (II, Intro., §2).

77. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier, 1972), 83 (§24).
78. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, 249 (II, Intro., §1).
79. For the phrase “as if of” as the key of Husserl’s theory of intentionality see Edward Craig, ed., *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 4 (London, New York: Routledge, 1998), 577.
80. Marion mentions this formula in Ward, 289.
81. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, 264 (II, Intro., §7).
82. See this and the following two steps of reduction in Edmund Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, trans. William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian (Dordrecht, Netherlands; Boston, London: Kluwer, 1990), 2ff.
83. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, 263 (II, Intro., §7).
84. *Ibid.*, 264 (II, Intro., §7).
85. Marion in Ward, 286.
86. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco: Harper, 1962), 58 (§7, C).
87. Dermot Moran, *Introduction to Phenomenology* (London, New York: Routledge, 2000), 20.
88. *Ibid.*
89. *Ibid.*
90. *Ibid.*, 21.
91. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 60 (§7, C).
92. Martin Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 277.
93. For the equivalence of being with nothing see *ibid.*, 290.
94. *Ibid.*, 288.
95. See this kind of discussion in the section “Heidegger’s Revolution” in Michael Gelven, *A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989), 6-10.
96. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 61 (§7, C).
97. Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, 287.
98. See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 25 (§2). For the disclosure of being in “is,” see Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Doubleday, 1961), 75-6.

99. Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, 283.
100. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 67 (§9), 152 (§25).
101. Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, 286.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. Cf. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 24 (§2).
105. See Martin Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York; Evanston, Ill.; London: Harper and Row, 1969), 42ff; Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, 287-8.
106. For a concise account of Heidegger's "turn" see Joan Stambaugh, "The Turn," in *From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and Desire*, ed. Babette E. Babich (Boston: Kluwer, 1995), 209-12.
107. Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).
108. Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1978), 193.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid., 223.
111. Ibid., 239.
112. Ibid., 242.
113. Ibid., 231.
114. Ibid.
115. Martin Heidegger, *The End of Philosophy*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 85.
116. Ibid., 92.
117. Martin Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 24.
118. Dominique Janicaud, Jean-Francois Mattei, *Heidegger: From Metaphysics to Thought*, trans. Michael Gendre (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), 5.
119. Martin Heidegger, *Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen, Germany: Neske, 1957), 72.
120. Ibid.
121. Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, 235.

122. Ibid.

123. Martin Heidegger, *The Question of Being*, trans. Jean T. Wilde and William Kluback (New Haven, Conn.: College and University Press, 1958), 93.

124. Cf. Janicaud and Mattei, 18.

125. See e.g., Walter Stace, *The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition* (New York: Dover, 1955).

126. Robert C. Solomon, *In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 8.

127. Ibid., 9.

128. See *ibid.*, 9, 27.

129. For Kierkegaard's implicit metaphysics see, among others, James Collins, *The Mind of Kierkegaard* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 119ff, 129ff, 252ff; Michael Weston, *Kierkegaard and Modern Continental Philosophy: An Introduction* (London, New York: Routledge, 1994), 11ff.

130. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 4 vols., trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper, 1979-87).

131. See, e.g., John Richardson, *Nietzsche's System* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Maudemarie Clark, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995). Admittedly, recent interpretations of this sort, especially Clark's, at least take into account Nietzsche's perspectivism and recognize that Nietzsche's system, though complete in itself, is true as one particular perspective only.

132. Bernd Magnus, "Nietzsche and the Project of Bringing Philosophy to an End," in *Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker*, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel (Dordrecht, Netherlands; Boston; Lancaster, U.K.: Nijhoff, 1986), 57. Magnus reads Nietzsche exactly in the dual way I prefer. The account below is mainly influenced by his article.

133. Michel Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, trans. Michael Gendre (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 109.

134. Bernd Magnus, *Nietzsche's Existential Imperative* (Bloomington, London: Indiana University Press, 1978).

135. See, e.g., Alfred J. Ayer, *Language, Truth, Logic* (New York: Dover, 1952), 31.

136. Ibid.

137. Rudolf Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language," in *Logical Positivism*, ed. Alfred J. Ayer (New York: Free Press, 1959), 78ff. Carnap thinks that at least Nietzsche does not fall in this trap (80).

138. Gustav Bergmann, *The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism* (Madison, Milwaukee; London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967).



139. See Charles S. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, vol. 1, eds. Charles Hartshorne and Peter Weiss (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933-58), 9.

140. Dancy, Sosa, *Companion to Epistemology*, 351.

141. Sandra B. Rosenthal, *Speculative Pragmatism* (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1990).

142. Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 23.

143. Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Hague, Netherlands; Boston; London: Nijhoff, 1981), 14, 43.

## CHAPTER 3

### DERRIDA AND METAPHYSICAL INSIDEOUTNESS

With Derrida's approach to metaphysics, I come to the end of this part dealing with the overcoming of metaphysics in the history of Western philosophy. As I already mentioned above, it is Derrida from whom I acquire the main stimulus for the approach of metaphysical insideoutness.

#### *Derrida's Understanding of Metaphysics*

First of all, it is important to determine Derrida's understanding of metaphysics so that it is clear what he wants to overcome. Since Derrida, despite using the word metaphysics, nowhere defines it exactly, his understanding needs to be inferred from texts in which he concentrates on something else (e.g., structuralism, semiology, etc.). In addition, there are many other terms that Derrida uses interchangeably, while, in fact, meaning metaphysics. Some of them are:

logos, logocentrism, the 'name of god,' positive infinity, onto-theology, infinitist theology, all monisms, all dualisms, indifference, infinite being, classical rationalism, the desire for a transcendental signified, the opposition between sensible and intelligible, the proper, the history of Reason, and language itself.<sup>1</sup>

I will here, for brevity's sake, reduce Derrida's subtle and often incalculable discussions to simply pointing out his use of the word metaphysics and some of its synonyms.

#### The Metaphysics of Presence

In Derrida's writings, the word metaphysics usually appears in a phrase "metaphysics of presence," where presence—in the form of the universal basic concept

of being and its counterparts—is understood as an underlying factor characteristic of the Western philosophical tradition. Derrida writes: “It could be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center have always designated an invariable presence—*eidōs*, *archē*, *telos*, *energeia*, *ousia* (essence, existence, substance, subject) *alētheia*, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so forth.”<sup>2</sup> According to this underlying presupposition, all concepts and objects of metaphysics, including both ontology and epistemology, can be, or are, only if they are present, therefore, presentable as entities. They are supposed to appear in truth as self-identical and present immediacy. Many philosophers impose sweeping generalizations on philosophical tradition, like Nietzsche’s “otherworld,” Heidegger’s “being,” Levinas’ “same.” In this sense, Derrida is no exception, subsuming all philosophical tradition under a single concept of presence.

### Logocentrism and Phonocentrism

Derrida’s invented synonyms for the metaphysics of presence helps to explain further the metaphysics he wants to overcome. The most important term is “logocentrism.” It means the rationalistic tendency of metaphysics to privilege a favored conceptual scheme by virtue of grounding it in some source of meaning as extralinguistic “word” (*logos*) or thought. Logocentrism is intimately related to “phonocentrism,” which means the privileging of voice or speech (*phone*) over against writing in the Western philosophical tradition. Phonocentrism relates to the determination of the meaning of being as such as presence, including such sub-determinations as presence of the thing to sight as *eidōs*, presence as substance/essence/existence (*ousia*), temporal presence of the now, the self-presence of the *cogito*, consciousness, subjectivity, the co-presence of the self and the other, inter-subjectivity as intentional phenomenon of the ego, and so forth. But logocentrism relates to the determination of entity’s being as presence.<sup>3</sup> Derrida maintains that, to metaphysical tradition, it is precisely speech that has the role of

bringing to immediate presence that which within thought as logos relates to meaning; voice has immediate proximity to the mind; voice signifies mental experiences which, in turn, mirror being in mind. Translation between mind and logos takes place in speech where the speaker and the listener in possession of meaning are supposed to be present to one another, to be pure, immediate presence. From this perspective, writing is regarded as subversive, for it creates a spatial and temporal distance between the author and the addressee. Writing brings about plurality and ambiguity of meaning as opposed to the single present one.

### The Transcendental Signified

Another metaphysical element criticized by Derrida is what he calls the “transcendental signified.” Derrida formulates this notion from his critique of the concept of the sign, especially as developed by Saussure. Ordinarily sign (usually a word or sound) is supposed to signify an object or thing. For example, the sound “tree” is supposed to be a sign referring to a real tree, a referent. Saussure, however, instead of concentrating on the relationship of the sign to its real referent, focuses on the sign itself in which he distinguishes two elements. One is a material element—a phonetic entity, a word. Saussure calls it signifier. Another is a mental element—an image, a concept, a meaning. This element he calls signified.<sup>4</sup> Saussure’s observation is that the signifier is never motivated by the signified. That is to say, there is nothing in the concept of a tree that motivates it to be signified by the word “tree.” In principle, any other word would perform the same function. Moreover, that actually happens, for the concept of a tree is signified by different words in different languages. The upshot of this theory is that the signifier gets its identity not because of its relation to its meaning, the signified, but because of its difference from other signifiers.<sup>5</sup> More than that, even though a difference generally implies positive terms between which it is set up, to Saussure, “in language

there are only differences *without positive terms*.”<sup>6</sup> This idea is very important, for Derrida makes it his own as well. But he also goes beyond Saussure. Omitting Derrida’s critique of Saussure’s privileging sounds over written words, suffice it to point out here Derrida’s observation that the lack of the signifier’s presence to the signified entails a possibility of their cutting loose from each other. One consequence of this possibility is the emergence of transcendental signified: a meaning that lies beyond everything, therefore, is no meaning at all.<sup>7</sup> Supposedly, the whole Western metaphysics, philosophy, and also theology, semiology, and so forth, operate with such signifieds, independent of language. Being and God, for example, are such signifieds. Derrida, of course, questions the possibility of transcendental signified and requires that one recognizes that every signified is also in a position of signifier. Precisely this move leads to Derrida’s notorious claim that everything may be a text. The other consequence of the signifier-signified release is just the opposite of the first, and it is Derrida’s subversion of the vertical signifier-signified relation with the horizontal signifier-signifier relation. It is his theory of textuality as unlimited play of signification.

### *The Impossible Overcoming*

One could expect that after his critique of Western metaphysics, Derrida would instantly have to commence its overcoming. Instead, he is cautious not to follow so many preceding radical overcomings that unknowingly deluded themselves about the success of overcoming. As the most radical examples, Derrida mentions the Nietzschean critique of the concepts of being and truth, for which he substituted the concepts of play, interpretation, and sign (without present truth); Freudian critique of self-presence as the critique of consciousness, of the subject, of self-identity and of self-proximity or self-possession; and Heideggerian destruction of metaphysics, of ontotheology, of the determination of being as presence.<sup>8</sup> Although Derrida also wants to outline the closure

of the epoch of Western metaphysics, he knows that it can be done only without leaving it. He presumes that the aforementioned authors were not fully aware of the fact that their destructive discourses, as well as all their analogues, are trapped in a kind of circle describing the form of the relation between the history of metaphysics and the destruction of this history. Derrida himself, in contrast to this supposed ignorance of being trapped, states very clearly:

There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. . . We have no language—no syntax and no lexicon—which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest.<sup>9</sup>

For example, Derrida's horizontal reinterpretation of the concept of the sign would have to entail the rejection of the word and concept "sign" itself. The critique itself would not be possible then.<sup>10</sup>

Although Heidegger is also included in the foregoing Derrida's list, it is, on the other hand, easy to notice a similarity to the later Heidegger's own pronouncements regarding the impossibility of overcoming metaphysics and of overcoming metaphysics by its own means. Derrida also makes an acknowledgement very similar to Heidegger's *das Schwierige liegt in der Sprache*, namely, that even language itself, that is to say, everyday language, is not innocent or neutral. The Western language has evolved together with the development of Western metaphysics. Consequently, it carries within itself not only a considerable number of presuppositions of all types, "but also presuppositions inseparable from metaphysics, which, although little attended to, are knotted into a system."<sup>11</sup> Everyone who uses language becomes a metaphysician without knowing it, even against one's will. Derrida reminds us that in fact there is no transgression, that is, no transgression as "a pure and simple landing into a beyond of metaphysics," landing at a point which would not be a point of language and writing.<sup>12</sup>

The three aforementioned master thinkers also worked within the inherited concepts of metaphysics, and since these concepts are not elements or atoms, and since they are taken from a syntax and a system, “every particular borrowing brings along with it the whole of metaphysics.”<sup>13</sup> If the history of philosophy, as one great and powerful discursive chain, is immersed in a reserve of language, into the systematic reserve of a lexicology, a grammar, a set of signs and values, cannot that history not be limited by the resources and the organization of that reserve? Derrida thinks that “whoever alleges that philosophical discourse belongs to the closure of a language must still proceed within this language and with the oppositions it furnishes.”<sup>14</sup> Derrida even goes so far as to state “a law that can be formalized, philosophy always reappropriates for itself the discourse that de-limits it.”<sup>15</sup> Moreover, precisely this immersion in one common system allows the great destroyers of metaphysical tradition to destroy each other reciprocally. For instance, Derrida thinks that just as Heidegger criticized Nietzsche for being the last metaphysician, the last Platonist, with “as much lucidity and rigor as bad faith and misconstruction,” one could do the same for Heidegger, for Freud, and for everyone else. In fact, Derrida himself successfully practices that over against Heidegger, Husserl, Saussure, and others. And, strikingly, there are critics of Derrida who try to do the same to him. Abrams, for example, writes:

But it seems to me that Derrida reaches this conclusion [of the infinite play of signification] by a process which, in its own way, is no less dependent on an origin, ground, and end, and which is no less remorselessly “teleological,” than the most rigorous of the metaphysical systems that he uses his conclusions to deconstruct. His origin and ground are his graphocentric premises. . .<sup>16</sup>

But Derrida already made himself invulnerable to these criticisms, for he never claimed escaping metaphysics.

Deconstructive Construction of Metaphysics

Provided that there is no simple way out of metaphysical tradition, Derrida turns to that tradition itself in order to work diligently from within, from its inside. Deconstruction is this turn to the tradition. Deconstruction is not negative; although it is not positive either; it is affirmative. Faithful to Heidegger's *Abbau* or *Destruktion*, it is de-construction: constructive destruction, construction after the analysis and dismantling of traditional structures within their historical context.<sup>17</sup> Deconstruction constructs upon the unthought possibilities uncovered during that dismantling. It breaks down the tradition itself, but in order to bring to light its own effaced and marginalized elements. Usually these elements are the repressed poles in the traditional metaphysical oppositions, such as speech-writing, intelligible-sensible, male-female, spirit-matter, culture-nature, time-space, and so forth. Although these elements are opposite to those upon which tradition is based, Derrida shows that they still condition those explicit and privileged presuppositions. In a word, deconstruction does not intend to destroy the tradition. It only asks questions about the logic of the traditional hierarchy of concepts; it thinks the tradition through anew. Only then the limits, or rather, the boundaries of metaphysics, be envisioned—the divisible boundaries between yet another opposition: the inside and the outside of metaphysics. The boundaries of all great texts from the tradition bear the scars of those effaced elements. The scars should be reopened so that the repressed elements could be set free. Even if these elements belong to that same tradition, because seen anew, they reveal themselves as wholly other. The aim of deconstruction is to delve the boundaries in order to bring about that other. In any case, the intent of deconstruction is not to leave metaphysics behind. For this reason Derrida even presents deconstruction quite metaphysically: “Deconstruction. . . is also a thinking of Being, of metaphysics, thus a discussion that has it out with. . . the authority of Being



or of essence, of the thinking of what is, and such a discussion or explanation cannot be simply a negative destruction.”<sup>18</sup> Of course, deconstruction is no metaphysics in the traditional sense. Nevertheless, it strives to fulfill the task of metaphysics as going beyond, that is to say, going beyond metaphysics to meta-metaphysics. As Derrida acknowledges discussing the Platonic *epekeina tes ousias*: “. . . the issue of moving beyond being, is something which interests me greatly. I think that deconstruction is also a means of carrying out this going beyond being, beyond being as presence, at least.”<sup>19</sup> Derrida thinks that the whole tradition of going beyond being from Plato’s *Republic* to a certain Heidegger lies behind the notion of deconstruction.

### Quasi-Metaphysical Grammatology

Definitely, Derrida’s overcoming of metaphysical tradition from within, based on the previously suppressed principles, may even appear as new metaphysics. The most telling example is his so-called grammatology, the science of writing, supposedly prior to any speech and independent of the logos and presence. Derrida brings to light writing as the repressed other of speech. Being detached from the author, it is grounded not in the presence but in the absence of univocal logos; it is disseminated in the multiplicity of the different textual meanings referring to and differing from each other.

The appearance of grammatology as another metaphysics has caused many misunderstandings about Derrida and deconstruction. The most common of them, based on Derrida’s phrase “there is nothing outside the text,”<sup>20</sup> claims that Derrida’s reversal of the tradition establishes a new metaphysical principle, namely, that all there is in the world is inter-referential words and texts. Derrida maintains that this allegation is incorrect and replies that “to distance oneself thus from the habitual structure of reference, to challenge or complicate our common assumption about it, does not amount to saying that there is *nothing* beyond language.”<sup>21</sup> Not that there is no reference, but

simply that there is no reference unrelated to linguistic systems, like the transcendental signified. Grammatology only holds that there is no reference without difference, no reference outside textual chain.

But that does not mean that grammatology would fall back into some kind of realist metaphysics whose language is supposed to refer to the “things themselves” outside textual and contextual limits.<sup>22</sup> If it is metaphysics, then it is only in the sense of going beyond metaphysics. Derrida maintains that deconstruction as “the critique of logocentrism is above all else the search for the ‘other’ and the ‘other of language.’”<sup>23</sup> That is a meta-metaphysical element. What is true, to be sure, is that deconstruction shows that the question of reference is much more complex than traditional hermeneutical theories suppose. Deconstruction may even ask whether the term “reference” itself is adequate for designating “the other.” The other, which is beyond language and which summons language, which is the alterity by which language itself is claimed, is, for Derrida, perhaps not a referent in a normal linguistic sense. This other of language is neither this nor that: neither reducible to language and free play of signifiers nor something free of the constraints of language as if fallen from the sky. It is neither this nor that. It is the other.

In any case, Derrida himself is very careful not to equate his grammatological effort with establishing an alternative privileged metaphysical hierarchy. That would be another “centrism,” graphocentrism this time. Therefore, as soon as the concept of writing is established, it becomes just as suspect as that of speech. It is only a temporal overthrow of the hierarchy. Above all, Derrida wants to question the very idea of hierarchy. Therefore, grammatology is not a new science; it is only a question about the possibility as well as impossibility of such a science. Derrida acquiesces that, ultimately, this science of writing itself is not possible precisely because it is inevitably conditioned

by the metaphysical concepts. For example, the unity of the concepts of science and writing is itself determined by this historico-metaphysical epoch.

### *Insideoutness*

#### Some Opposing Interpretations of Derrida

Derrida's double strategy of overcoming metaphysics is reflected in different reactions to his thought. Schleiermacher has received similar opposing reaction about his overcoming of metaphysics in theology. These reactions help with understanding the intrinsic undecidability in these authors themselves and to realize the advantages of the combined position of insideoutness in contrast to the unilateral approaches that these reactions represent. Simplifying to the extreme, one can say that Derrida is regarded either as the last metaphysician or as the wittiest author, as one who has managed to leave behind the discourse of philosophy in favor of another, unclassifiable genre of writing. Even if some acknowledge both of these sides, they tend to privilege one of them while depreciating or neglecting the other.

Rorty exemplifies this attitude. No doubt, he clearly distinguishes between the two aspects of Derrida's work, observing that Derrida himself proposes not to go between the horns of the dilemma of reinstating or leaving metaphysics, "but rather to twine the horns together into an interminable elongated double helix."<sup>24</sup> Yet, Rorty himself favors only one of these "horns." One of them is Derrida "at his best," and it is the aspect Rorty admires and admits to sharing with Derrida. He ascribes to Derrida his own neo-pragmatist view of language and textuality that conscientiously blurs the literature-philosophy distinction and promotes "the idea of a seamless, undifferentiated "general text."<sup>25</sup> Language, according to this view, is a tool rather than a medium, while meaning is a function of the context in which a word or concept is used. Language is just the use of marks and noises, made by human beings to get what they want. Philosophy and

metaphysics, according to this view, constitute just one more literary genre, albeit distinguished, “but which now survives largely in the form of self-parody.”<sup>26</sup> So, this “good” Derrida, according to Rorty, like Nietzsche and Heidegger at their “best,” does not make surprising philosophical discoveries for the old metaphysical problems, but instead forges new ways of speaking, displaces one intellectual world with another, gives a substitute for previous beliefs. This new way of speaking does not say anything about philosophy, but instead practically shows “what literature looks like once it is freed from philosophy.”<sup>27</sup> What remains after that is what Rorty calls “a kind of writing.” It is delimited, as any literary genre, not by form or matter, but by tradition—“a family romance involving, e.g., Father Parmenides, honest uncle Kant, and bad brother Derrida.”<sup>28</sup> What connects Derrida with the philosophical tradition is that he uses past philosophers to obtain topics for his own “most vivid fantasies.”<sup>29</sup> “Private fantasy” is the fairest of Rorty’s compliments to Derrida’s style.<sup>30</sup> He refuses to play by the rules of the “final vocabularies” of the others; he creates himself in the process of writing by creating his own language game.<sup>31</sup> Derrida has composed incredibly rich texts, with astonishingly wide allusions, which unbelievably overlap intertextually with other texts, which allude to other thinkers of all sorts, which misrepresent creatively, which mime and play, which make linguistic puns and tremendously funny jokes. In a word, Rorty’s “good” Derrida is not a master of metaphysical thought, but a master of writing, of texts, of invention.<sup>32</sup>

But then, there is Rorty’s other Derrida, Derrida “at his worst,” betraying his own project. This is a completely different Derrida, “the latest and largest flower in the dialectical kudzu vine of which the *Phenomenology of Spirit* was the first tendril.”<sup>33</sup> This side of Derrida’s work looks to Rorty “unfortunately constructive.”<sup>34</sup> It appears to Rorty as “yet another transcendental idealism.”<sup>35</sup> It is Derrida who, like Heidegger, wants to find words that could carry him beyond metaphysics. Derrida’s weakness in this perspective is his adherence to the tradition. He tries to outdo the great philosophers of

the tradition at their own game. He makes arguments. But this project, for Rorty, is hopeless. It will only produce one more philosophical closure, one more metavocabulary claiming superior status. Rorty thinks “that Derrida cannot *argue* without turning himself into a metaphysician, one more claimant to the title of discoverer of the primal, deepest vocabulary.”<sup>36</sup> In other words, Rorty sees Derrida as caught in a dilemma that he has consistently not managed to surpass. Rorty thinks that insofar as Derrida remains faithful to nominalism, transcendental arguments should not permit him to infer the existence of such quasi-entities as *différance*, trace, arche-writing, and others (see next section). On the other hand, insofar as he does not remain faithful to it, “he is just one more metaphysician.”<sup>37</sup> Rorty’s own solution of Derrida’s “dilemma” is to stick to the “good” side and jettison the “bad” one, the “rigorous argument” part, the “false youthful beginning.”<sup>38</sup>

Of course, Rorty is right in detecting this side of Derrida’s work. There is also a number of thinkers who defend Derrida as the most rigorous argumentative thinker. Perhaps the strongest cases in this direction are made by Norris and Gasche, who have also engaged in a debate with Rorty. Norris’ chief statement appears to be that Derrida’s deconstruction is basically a Kantian transcendental enterprise, only making writing (or arche-writing) the precondition of all possible knowledge. Norris states that Derrida’s “claim is *a priori* in the radically Kantian sense: that we cannot *think* the possibility of culture, history or knowledge in general without also thinking the prior necessity of writing.”<sup>39</sup> Contra Rorty, Norris believes that “it is mistaken to suppose that deconstruction gives some kind of warrant for dispensing with all the vexatious problems of traditional philosophy and embracing a full blown pragmatist creed.”<sup>40</sup>

Perhaps it is Gasche who has produced one of the most rigorously argued books about the constructive side of Derrida’s work. But he also acknowledges the meta-metaphysical elements in Derrida’s thought, thus representing my approach between the

two extremes. Unlike Norris, he does not regard Derrida's arguments transcendental, but rather quasi-transcendental, belonging inside and outside metaphysics at the same time. I include some aspects of Gasche's interpretation of Derrida that will later resemble Schleiermacher's approach to the contrasts of metaphysics. The title of his book, *The Tain of the Mirror*, comes from Derrida's text in *Dissemination*:

The breakthrough toward radical otherness (with respect to the philosophical concept—of the concept) always takes, *within philosophy*, the *form* of an aposteriority or an empiricism. But this is an effect of the specular nature of philosophical reflection, philosophy being incapable of inscribing (comprehending) what is outside it otherwise than through the appropriating assimilation of a negative image of it, and dissemination is written on the back—the *tain*—of that mirror.<sup>41</sup>

Tain is the tinfoil, the lusterless back of the mirror. The title of the book is chosen in keeping with the objective, to relate Derrida's thought to transcendental philosophy, which Gasche identifies as the philosophy of reflection. Unlike Norris, however, Gasche does not include Derrida's work in this philosophy because of his questioning reflection's unthought, and thus the limits of its possibility. Gasche writes:

Derrida's philosophy, rather than being a philosophy of reflection, is engaged in the systematic exploration of that dull surface [the tain] without which no reflection and no specular and speculative activity would be possible, but which at the same time has no place and no part in reflection's scintillating play.<sup>42</sup>

Deconstruction, rather, is supposed to break through the tinfoil of the mirror of reflection, demonstrating the uncertainty of the speculum. In the deconstruction of reflection and speculation, the mirroring is made excessive in order that it may look through the looking glass toward what makes the speculum possible: its reverse side, the dull side doubling the mirror's specular play, the tain. On this lining of the outside surface of reflection one can read the mold that commands the mirror's play and determines the angles of reflection.<sup>43</sup>

So, the transcendental resources sought by deconstruction are not a positive part of metaphysical conceptuality, but are given in metaphysics in a negative manner or,

rather, in a manner which is at the same time more, and less, than negativity. Less than negativity because there is no meaning, no signification; it is “a negativity without negativity.” More than negativity because it still is the non-mediating “medium” in which philosophy carves out its dialectical contradictions.<sup>44</sup> These “foundations” are, in a certain way, exterior to metaphysics.<sup>45</sup> Though taken from the “inside,” they do not properly belong to it. At least not in a way as “outside” belongs to “inside” as its opposite.

Gasche gives these “foundations” the name of “infrastructures,” a word occasionally used by Derrida himself. With this, Gasche refers to the same names that I will analyze in the next section, like *différance*, trace, *khora*.<sup>46</sup> These infrastructures help deconstruction to avoid the metaphysical operation of the annulment of the conceptual or discursive opposites or differences. That is to say, “deconstruction attempts to “account” for these “contradictions” by “grounding” them in “infrastructures” discovered by analyzing the specific organization of these “contradictions.”<sup>47</sup> The invention of the infrastructures—the formal rules that regulate the play of the contradictions each time differently—in Gasche’s opinion, is Derrida’s most original contribution to philosophy, a contribution that displaces the logic of philosophy and inscribes it within a general heterology. The infrastructures, on Gasche’s account, have pre-ontological and pre-logical status. They cannot be of the nature of the opposites for which they account. Otherwise they would belong to the order of what they account for. The infrastructures must precede in a non-temporal way the alternatives of being and nothing, presence and absence, and the ontico-ontological difference as well. As a “ground,” an infrastructure must be a radical alterity in excess of that which it accounts for. For the same reasons, the infrastructures must be pre-logical. The laws that it formulates must be laws that account for the difference between the philosophical logos and the other of philosophy. Therefore, they govern the possibility of every logical proposition. Yet, they cannot have the

simplicity of a logical principle or a categorical a priori condition. As Derrida himself puts it, the pre-logical possibilities of logic “are not ‘logically’ primary or secondary with regard to logic itself. They are (topologically?) alien to it, but not as its principle, condition of possibility, or ‘radical’ foundation.”<sup>48</sup>

In other words, the infrastructure is not in a relation of opposition to that which it makes possible. It is not the ontotheological relation of opposition between the ground and the grounded. Instead of being a ground in traditional philosophical language, the infrastructure is “a nonfundamental structure, or an abyssal structure, to the extent that it is without bottom.”<sup>49</sup> Furthermore, although the infrastructures are the spaces of inscription of the function of origin, they do not simply represent transcendentalia that, as a priori conditions, rule over origins. Infrastructures are not deeper, supraessential origins. Equally important, if they ground origins, they unground them at the same time. “Infrastructures are conditions as much of the impossibility as of the possibility of origins and grounds.”<sup>50</sup> In summation, for one thing, infrastructures maintain a foothold in the old conceptual order from which they are taken or derived. They must continue to do so if they want to intervene in it effectively. For another thing, as the open matrix of the conceptual differences, the infrastructures function as their grounds of possibility. For yet another thing, “since these infrastructures are a sort of repressed reserve, they also by virtue of their encompassing power delimit the concepts of metaphysics, making them, rigorously speaking, impossible.”<sup>51</sup>

There is some discussion in Gasche’s book that is significant for this project because it enlarges upon the position I defend as metaphysical insideoutness. First of all, as it is clear from numerous utterances of Derrida, deconstruction cannot be an attempt to reach a simple outside or beyond of metaphysics. To recapitulate, deconstruction is neither neutralized by the annulling force of the concepts it borrows from the tradition it deconstructs nor deluded by the illusionary possibility of simply stepping outside of



philosophy. For one thing, Gasche maintains that deconstruction, as an attempt to step outside the always historical closure of philosophy, itself produces this “outside” in a finite fashion. For another thing, since deconstruction is also the deconstruction of the genuinely metaphysical opposition of inside and outside, “the operation by which it must produce this ‘outside’ of the discourse of philosophy can no longer be understood as a passage from an interior to an exterior.”<sup>52</sup> Equally important, neither can such an outside be itself an outside with regard to an inside. In order to affirm itself as transgression, deconstruction must conserve and affirm in one way or another what it exceeds, for it is only with respect to the limit it crosses. For that reason, it can only consist of a sort of displacement of the limits and closure of the discourse. Hence, to “exceed the discourse of philosophy cannot possibly mean to step *outside* the closure, because the outside belongs to the categories of the inside.”<sup>53</sup> “The excess or transgression of philosophy,” Gasche goes on, “is, therefore, decided at the margins of the closure only, in an always strategical—that is, historically finite—fashion.”<sup>54</sup> It is a transgression or excess without transgression. The tain is always concealed from the gaze by its lustrous front side, which, nonetheless, receives its brightness from the lusterless back. Therefore, the outside is always a finite construction, which yet transgresses the inside in the very process of production.<sup>55</sup>

#### Insideoutness As between In- and Outside of Metaphysics

Amidst all of these ambiguities, the question may arise, is it then a vicious circle, neither remaining within, nor overcoming metaphysics? Not necessarily, and Gasche’s interpretation already provided a glimpse of the way out of the dilemma. Clearly, although Derrida himself acknowledges that there is no clear path outside metaphysics, he also denies that “we are incarcerated in it as prisoners or victims of some unhappy fatality.”<sup>56</sup> Derrida refuses to accede that “we are ‘locked into’ or ‘condemned to’

metaphysics, for we are, strictly speaking, neither inside nor outside.”<sup>57</sup> Hence, writing can still function from inside as an exemplary figure of otherness. Therefore, grammatology may be necessary, I would say, as a quasi-Kantian regulative idea, not as a proper figure of metaphysics. In effect, some overcoming occurs. Not overcoming as a finished accomplishment, but as a never accomplished process of writing in which one never knows whether s/he is inside or out. One “is never installed within transgression, one never lives elsewhere.”<sup>58</sup> Even the “thought-that-means-nothing”—the grammatological thought, which exceeds meaning-as-hearing-oneself-speak—“is given precisely as the thought for which there is no sure opposition between outside and inside.”<sup>59</sup> “Deconstruction goes to the hinge.”<sup>60</sup> “Deconstruction goes to the hinge between the two, at the place of interface between that which writes itself as outside and that which it delineates as inside.”<sup>60</sup> It works “on the slash inserted between all the binary schemes on which metaphysics feeds. And that place is of course neither (wholly) inside nor outside of philosophy, which means that it is (in part) both inside and outside philosophy.”<sup>61</sup> Only the limit is always at work. “But,” Derrida’s says, “by means of the work done on one side and the other of the limit the field inside is modified. . . .”<sup>62</sup> And it is such a modification that itself produces the other of the outside, even if in a finite fashion, belonging to the categories of inside. Even being so, the task of metaphysics is satisfied at least to the extent that “the non-place or *non-lieu*” is discovered, which is the other of philosophy.<sup>63</sup> Ultimately, since there is neither inside nor outside of metaphysics for Derrida, the space of the *meta* of metaphysics, of meta-metaphysics, is not even somewhere outside or beyond. It rather is another space or nonspace in an undecided *between* inside and outside, mirror’s tain. Hence, it is insideoutness.

On this account, Derrida sees deconstruction as “a double gesture or double stratification” that is simultaneously faithful and violent circulation between the inside and the outside of metaphysics.<sup>64</sup> On the one hand, it overturns the old hierarchies, at the

same time bringing up paradoxes, disparities, heterogeneities, and aporias that crack and fissure the old discourse. On the other hand, it must safeguard the results of the previous move from being reappropriated metaphysically. The second part of the gesture eventually leads out of the metaphysical appropriation to the new paths of thinking the unthought from the inside, within inside. Something that I would call new and interruptive quasi-concepts emerge in this phase. Although appearing to be like concepts, they no longer fit into the previous regime. But working through them—marking the conditions, the medium, and the limits of their effectiveness, designating their relationship to the machine whose deconstruction they permit—might create a crevice, as Derrida says, through which “the yet unnameable glimmer beyond the closure” of metaphysics can be glimpsed.<sup>65</sup> I turn to some of these quasi-concepts next.

### *Outwitting Metaphysical Language with Words:*

#### *Some Figures of Insideoutness*

In Derrida’s perspective, as shown above, the rapport between the inside and the outside of metaphysics is related to the finitude and the reserve of language. This inside-outside rapport, for Derrida, can be seen from another topos, space, or rather, a-topos, or nonspace (*utopia*), glimpsed through that crevice of deconstruction. This is the other of philosophy through which philosophy appears to itself as other than itself, so that it can “interrogate and reflect upon itself in an original manner.”<sup>66</sup> Derrida tries to disclose this other, this nonspace of insideoutness through a special use of certain words that are recovered from the forgotten margins of philosophical texts, re-invented, or taken from ordinary language. These words belong neither to inside nor outside; they just hang in the between-space from which they can help to catch that glimpse of the unnamable, at least the first times they are used.<sup>67</sup> Insofar as these transgressive words may be immediately conceptualized by “the philosophy of deconstruction,” Derrida always changes them. In

fact, one word works only for one particular Derrida's text. After that, they wear out and become part of the ever-new kinds of metaphysics. Here are some of these words: *différance*, trace, *khora*, arche-writing, spacing, dissemination, *pharmakon*, supplement, iterability, hymen, cinders, and others. Here I will only briefly explain the first three.

### *Différance*

The most popular is Derrida's neographism *différance*. *Différance* is pronounced the same way as the word *différence*, which means "difference," a keyword to Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud, Saussure, and Heidegger. The difference is in spelling only: there is an "a" instead of the "e." The ending with "a" is used in French to produce noun forms from verbs. Since the French word *différer* means both to differ and to defer, the meaning of *différance* is both a differing and a deferring of meaning. It is the imperceptible difference marked in the "differ( )nce" between the "e" and the "a" that makes the inside/outness possible, that produces the strange space in-between, the space neither inside nor outside the metaphysical opposition, in this case, between speech and writing and, accordingly, between the sensible and the intelligible—the founding opposition of philosophy.<sup>68</sup> Furthermore, the "a" of *différance* also recalls that this spacing is at the same time temporization. Since the sign is always a deferred presence of the signified, always represents the present in its absence, *différance* also marks "the detour and postponement by means of which intuition, perception, consummation—in a word, the relationship to the present, the reference to a present reality, to a *being*—are always deferred."<sup>69</sup> This deferring takes place by virtue of the principle of difference itself, according to which an element functions and signifies only by referring to another past or future element in the economy of traces. By the same token, the ending *-ance* remains undecided between passive signification, as in Saussure's theory, and active differing or deferring. Because of its ambiguity, *différance* is not. It is not a concept, because there is

no vertical signification in the play of differences.<sup>70</sup> It is not a word because it cannot be represented as the unity of a concept and the phonic material. *Différance* is not, is not a present-being (*to on*) in any form, however excellent, unique, principal, or transcendent. It has neither essence nor existence. It derives from no category of being, whether present or absent. When one says that it “is,” the “is” should be crossed out, like later Heidegger’s “being.” As a consequence, it eludes the metaphysics of presence, for it cannot even be before the differences in a simple present. On the contrary, when *différance* intervenes, together with the chain of differences attached to it, all metaphysical oppositions become nonpertinent because of their referring to something present.<sup>71</sup>

There is the question of whether this same refusal to bring *différance* into the game of metaphysics does not “simply cast it into the beyondness of the metaphysical?”<sup>72</sup> At the very moment “when *différance* is conceived as being outside the metaphysics of ontological difference it becomes metaphysical; hence it is both outside and inside metaphysics.”<sup>73</sup> Therefore, it is not surprising that Derrida says that as the condition of possibility of signification, *différance* is “older” than the truth of being and older than ontological difference. It is so precisely because being itself cannot have meaning except by dissimulating itself in entities.<sup>74</sup> *Différance* rather is “a bottomless chessboard” on which being itself is put into play. Being “older” than being itself, it has no name in human language, even if it is called by a quite metaphysical name. *Différance* “not only precedes metaphysics but also extends beyond the thought of being.”<sup>75</sup> Derrida also claims: “*Différance* is not only irreducible to any ontological or theological—ontotheological—reappropriation, but as the very opening of the space in which ontotheology—philosophy—produces its system and its history, it includes ontotheology, inscribing it and exceeding it without return.”<sup>76</sup> However, as Derrida stresses, *différance* should not be taken as some hyperessential being of negative theology. *Différance* does

not belong to the hyperessentiality of the beyond, for it occupies the nonspace in-between. *Différance* is “older” in a linguistic sense, not mystical. It only means that God, or being, or anything else, can only be named in the linguistic system of differences.

### Trace

Perhaps Derrida’s word most closely related to *différance*, even its synonym, is “trace.” “*The (pure) trace is différance,*” Derrida states.<sup>77</sup> The trace is the *différance* that opens appearance and signification. Generally speaking, the trace in Derrida’s understanding designates the minimal structure required for the existence of every difference or opposition of terms, for any relation to alterity.<sup>78</sup> In metaphysics, the difference between two terms is perceived from the perspective of one of them, the term of plenitude, from which the second term derives. The first term remains supposedly unaffected by the fact that it appears in opposition to another, less valorized term. Deconstruction, in contrast to metaphysics, holds to the trace stemming from an insight into the constituting function of difference, the holding-against-another. The privileged term in a difference of opposition would not appear as such without the difference or opposition that gives it form. Consequently, the trace is a reflection on the form that a term or entity of plenitude will have to take, insofar as it can appear only in oppositions. The trace can be reflected as the indissociable appearing of what comes to the fore with the other, lesser term or entity.

Actually, the word trace is borrowed from Heidegger’s “early trace” (*die frühe Spur*), namely, the already erased trace of the forgotten ontological difference. Commenting on Heidegger, Derrida writes that in order to exceed metaphysics it is necessary that its trace be inscribed within the text of metaphysics, “a trace that continues to signal not in the direction of another presence, or another form of presence, but in the direction of an entirely other text.”<sup>79</sup> The determination of the trace belongs to the text of

metaphysics that shelters it; it does not belong to the trace itself, because there is no proper trace itself. Such a trace, goes on Derrida, cannot be thought in a metaphysical mode, and no philosopheme is prepared to master it. Trace is not presence, which only can be mastered. The mode of inscription of such a trace in the text of metaphysics is so unthinkable that it must be described as an erasure of the trace itself. “The trace is produced as its own erasure.”<sup>80</sup> It is the characteristic of the trace to erase itself, to elude what might maintain it in presence. As Derrida says, the trace, this “almost nothing of the unrepresentable,”<sup>81</sup> which has always been erased by philosophers, is neither a ground, nor a foundation, nor an origin, and in no case can it provide for a manifest or disguised ontotheology.<sup>82</sup> Trace is that which is not yet language, or speech, or writing, or sign, or even something “proper to mankind.” It is neither “presence nor absence, beyond binary, oppositional, or dialectical logic.”<sup>83</sup> It is the point at which it is even no longer a question of opposing writing to speech. “The trace,” Derrida asserts, “*is nothing*, it is not an entity, it exceeds the question *What is?* and contingently makes it possible.”<sup>84</sup> “Articulating the living upon the nonliving in general, origin of all repetition, origin of ideality, the trace is not more ideal than real, not more intelligible than sensible, not more a transparent signification than an opaque energy and *no concept of metaphysics can describe it.*”<sup>85</sup>

### *Khora*

Another of Derrida’s favorite correlate for *différance* is *khora* (Derrida uses *kh* instead of *ch*). *Khora* is a “sur-name” for *différance*, a sort of “allegory” of *différance*.<sup>86</sup> There is a certain stereotype of Platonism—associated with Plato’s image of the cave—as a dualism of the two worlds: the upper world of the intelligible, the realm of unchanging ideas in the sun of the good, and the sensible likenesses of the ideas in the changing visible world of becoming. It is this distinction that “carves out the very space of ‘metaphysics.’”<sup>87</sup> Derrida observes that the so-called “philosophy of Plato,” the enterprise of

the academy, with its neatly arranged theses and philosophemes, is challenged by the transgressive moments of Plato's texts themselves. One of such moments is *khora* in *Timaeus*, "an unpredictable, dark, and remote spot in the vast and gleaming architecture of Platonism."<sup>88</sup>

In *khora*, Derrida finds a third element that does not correspond to either of the two poles, "some untruth, or barely true remnant, which falls outside the famous distinction. . ."<sup>89</sup> This element is *khora*, which is the immense and indeterminate spatial receptacle, kind of a nurse or a mother, a sort of *tabula rasa*, in which the sensible likenesses of the eternal forms are engendered, inscribed by the Demiurge, thereby providing a "home" for all things. Derrida writes:

*Khora* marks a place apart, the spacing which keeps a dissymmetrical relation to all that which, "in herself," besides or in addition to herself, seems to make a couple with her. In the couple, this strange mother who gives place without engendering can no longer be considered as an origin. She/it eludes all anthropo-theological schemes, all history, all revelation, and all truth.<sup>90</sup>

The *khora* is neither a sensible thing nor an intelligible form; it belongs to a "third genus" (*triton genos*), as *Timaeus* declares. To a certain extent, the *khora* is like the eternal forms: it is not born, neither does it die; it is always already there, and, therefore, is beyond temporal coming-to-be and passing away. Yet, it does not have the same eternity as the forms have; it only has a certain achronistic atemporality. Neither is it the same as the other intelligible objects of the mind, notwithstanding its sensual imperceptibility.

Like *différance* was older than being, *khora* is thinkable only by virtue of returning to a beginning that "is older than the beginning, namely, the birth of the cosmos. . ."<sup>91</sup> *Khora* is a name that, like *différance*, defies "the logic of noncontradiction of the philosophers" and derives from the "logic other than the logic of the logos," the logic of binarity, of yes and no.<sup>92</sup> One cannot even say that it is neither this, nor that, or that it is both this and that. Neither is it intelligible being, nor sensible becoming, rather a



little like both. Neither is it a subject matter of the true *logos*, nor a good *mythos*. Hence, it is not an oscillation between two poles; it is the oscillation between two types of oscillation: the double exclusion (neither/nor) and the participation (both this and that).<sup>93</sup> *Khora* is even not the abyss between the sensible and the intelligible, between being and nothing, between being and entity, being and the existent, between *logos* and *mythos*, between any two oppositions. Yet, it is the abyss, but, increasingly important, “between all these couples and another which would not even be *their* other.”<sup>94</sup> Thus, the *khora* is a place of insideoutness that is outside metaphysical oppositions, and as such it passes the abyss between them and the unopposed other, yet unnameable to come.

### *The Interpretative Scheme of the Dissertation*

I have applied my proposed strategy of insideoutness to my chosen instances of overcoming metaphysics in Western tradition, but my exposition reached its culmination in Derrida’s approach. The following is the summary statement of Derrida’s strategy of insideoutness in overcoming metaphysics, according to my interpretation. First, Derrida criticizes metaphysics, thus, calling for its overcoming. Second, he overcomes that metaphysics in my first sense of overcoming—an overcoming of metaphysics with another metaphysics. That is, he subverts the old metaphysics by means of an alternative graphocentric theory derived from the elements that the old metaphysics has suppressed. Insofar as his new theory must be based on metaphysical concepts, it does not overcome metaphysics as such. Therefore, third, Derrida concedes that, on the one hand, the full overcoming of metaphysics is not possible. Yet, on the other hand, and fourth, Derrida claims that overcoming occurs when the repressed antitheses meet the privileged concepts of the old metaphysics. This encounter releases some indeterminate linguistic residue that remains after the metaphysical reappropriation of the rediscovered antitheses. Strange quasi-concepts emerge, which do not belong either to inside, or outside of

metaphysics, but inhabit the nonspace in-between. From there, Derrida is able to catch a glimpse of *tout autre* overcoming metaphysics in my second sense of overcoming—leaving metaphysics behind. Yet, not in some hyperessential realm, but in the same realm of finite and empirical signification.

Now, the main task will be to discern these features in Schleiermacher's project. First, Schleiermacher understands metaphysics as speculation and proposes ways of overcoming it. Then, although Schleiermacher accepts Kant's critique of traditional metaphysics, he is not satisfied with Kant's overcoming. Therefore, second, Schleiermacher elaborates his alternative to Kant's metaphysics in the lectures on dialectic. Although there are many non-metaphysical moments, here he does not intend to leave metaphysics as such completely behind, but rather presents what he considers a more appropriate metaphysics. He also refuses to privilege any pole of metaphysical contrasts. Third, Schleiermacher claims to overcome metaphysics in his dogmatics in the sense of leaving it behind. Yet, to some extent, he is aware that a full overcoming is not possible. Therefore, he does not fully exclude metaphysics from his system. Moreover, as my critique will show, there are instances in which metaphysics implicitly finds its way back into the dogmatic system. Nevertheless, fourth, there is a way in which Schleiermacher may be regarded as having overcome metaphysics in a sense similar to Derrida's. To demonstrate this, I will interpret his notions of *Gefühl*, *Anschauung*, *Übergang*, and "point-zero" as such instances, emerging from the interplay of metaphysical contrasts, but not of metaphysics themselves. I will then show that they have a similar function in overcoming metaphysics as Derrida's "infrastructures," like *différance*, *khora*, and others. But, finally, even the contrast between metaphysics and religious devoutness will produce an experiential-existential outside of both.

## NOTES

1. Irene E. Harvey, "Derrida and the Concept of Metaphysics," *Research in Phenomenology* 13 (1983), 117.
2. Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 279-80.
3. Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, London: John Hopkins University Press, 1976), 12.
4. See Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, eds. Charles Bally, Albert Sechehaye, and Albert Riedlinger, trans. Wade Baskin (New York, Toronto, London: McGraw Hill, 1966), 65ff.
5. *Ibid.*, 118.
6. *Ibid.*, 120.
7. Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 19.
8. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 280.
9. *Ibid.*, 280-81.
10. *Ibid.*, 281.
11. Derrida, *Positions*, 19.
12. *Ibid.*, 12
13. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 281.
14. Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 177.
15. *Ibid.*, 177.
16. M. H. Abrams, "The Deconstructive Angel," *Critical Inquiry* 3 (1977), 431.
17. Deconstruction is Derrida's translation of Heidegger's *Destruktion*.
18. Jacques Derrida, *Points. . . Interviews, 1974-1994*, ed. Elisabeth Weber, trans. Peggy Kamuf and others (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995), 211.
19. An interview with Derrida, in Raoul Mortley, ed., *French Philosophers in Conversation* (London, New York: Routledge, 1991), 97.
20. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 158. "There is nothing outside of the text (there is no outside-text; *il n'y a pas de hors-texte*)."
21. Jacques Derrida, "Deconstruction and the Other," in Richard Kearney, ed., *Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers* (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1984), 124.

22. John D. Caputo, "The Good News about Alterity: Derrida and Theology," *Faith and Philosophy* 10 (1993), 455-56.
23. Derrida in Kearney, 123.
24. Richard Rorty, "Deconstruction and Circumvention," *Critical Inquiry* 11 (1984), 12.
25. *Ibid.*, 3.
26. *Ibid.*, 19.
27. *Ibid.*, 9.
28. Richard Rorty, "Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida," in *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 92.
29. *Ibid.*, 126.
30. Richard Rorty, "Is Derrida a Transcendental Philosopher?" in ed. Gary B. Madison, *Working through Derrida* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1993), 140.
31. Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 133.
32. See Madison, *Working through Derrida*, 151.
33. Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, 103.
34. *Ibid.*, 99.
35. *Ibid.*
36. Rorty, "Deconstruction and Circumvention," 16.
37. Richard Rorty, "Two Meanings of "Logocentrism," in ed. Reed Way Dasenbrock, *Redrawing the Lines: Analytic Philosophy, Deconstruction, and Literary Theory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 208.
38. Rorty later attributes these two sides of Derrida to his "early" and "later" periods, believing that Derrida himself, like Wittgenstein, would see his early work as a false start (Madison, *Working through Derrida*, 146 et passim; Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, 123 et passim). However, to my knowledge, there is no single reference in Derrida's own work, that would support the idea that he renounces his "early" work.
39. Christopher Norris, *Derrida* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 95.
40. Christopher Norris, "Philosophy as *Not* Just a "Kind of Writing": Derrida and the Claim of Reason" in Dasenbrock, *Redrawing the Lines*, 198.
41. Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 33. This text is quoted as an epigraph to Rodolphe Gasche, *The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986).
42. Gasche, 6.

43. Ibid., 238.
44. Ibid., 103-4.
45. Ibid., 120.
46. Gasche himself analyzes five of them: arche-trace, *différance*, supplementarity, iterability, and re-mark.
47. Gasche, 142.
48. Jacques Derrida, "Limited Inc.," in *Glyph 2*, trans. S. Weber (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 235; quoted in Gasche, 149.
49. Ibid., 155.
50. Ibid., 161. Cf. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 74.
51. Gasche, 174.
52. Ibid., 169.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. These last sentences reflect my further cogitation on Derrida/Gasche's metaphor.
56. Derrida in Kearney, 111-12.
57. Ibid., 111.
58. Derrida, *Positions*, 12.
59. Ibid.
60. Hugh J. Silverman, "Writing (on Deconstruction) at the Edge of Metaphysics," *Research in Phenomenology* 13 (1983), 104.
61. John D. Caputo, "Derrida, A Kind of Philosopher: A Discussion of Recent Literature," *Research in Phenomenology* 17, 247-48.
62. Derrida, *Positions*, 12.
63. Derrida in Kearney, 112.
64. Derrida, *Positions*, 59.
65. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 14.
66. Derrida in Kearney, 108.

67. Rorty seems to be right in pointing out that as soon as a vocable or an inscription gets its place in a language game, it becomes a word (Richard Rorty, "Deconstruction and Circumvention," *Critical Inquiry* 11 [1984] 18). The word *differance*, which I discuss directly below, is by now a very familiar word with a definite dogmatic meaning in the discourse of deconstruction.

68. See Derrida, *Margins*, 5. Notably, the letter "a" may connote another "a," that of Heidegger's retrieved *a-letheia*. There the "a" means truth's coming into non-negative unconcealment - an ambiguity similar to *différance*.

69. Derrida, *Positions*, 29.

70. See Derrida, *Margins*, 11.

71. Derrida, *Positions*, 29.

72. Robert Platt, "Writing, *Différance* and Metaphysical Closure," *The British Society for Phenomenology* 17 (1986), 248.

73. Ibid.

74. Derrida, *Margins*, 22.

75. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 143.

76. Derrida, *Margins*, 6.

77. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 62.

78. The discussion of this paragraph is taken from Gasche, 187.

79. Derrida, *Margins*, 65.

80. Ibid.

81. Derrida, *Points*, 83.

82. Derrida, *Positions*, 52.

83. Derrida, *Points*, 79.

84. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 75.

85. Ibid., 65

86. See John D. Caputo, ed., *Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), 75.

87. Ibid., 84.

88. Ibid., 83.

89. Ibid.

90. Jacques Derrida, "Khora," in *On the Name*, ed. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995), 124.

91. *Ibid.*, 126.

92. *Ibid.*, 89.

93. *Ibid.*, 91.

94. *Ibid.*, 104.

PART TWO

SCHLEIERMACHER'S METAPHYSICS:  
UNDERSTANDING AND CONTEXT



## CHAPTER 4

### METAPHYSICS AS SPECULATION

There are two chapters in Part Two. This chapter will deal with Schleiermacher's understanding of metaphysics, but chapter 5 will explore his relationship to Kant. Kant's philosophy is the main context for any metaphysical undertaking in Schleiermacher's time. Schleiermacher is not only decisively influenced by Kant's thought, but also challenged to overcome it.

Like most philosophers, Schleiermacher must have his own peculiar understanding of what metaphysics is. In the *Dialektik*, for instance, he gives an important and peculiar definition of metaphysics as "the insight about verification of correlation between thinking and being in general."<sup>1</sup> But, if one wants to obtain a more comprehensive outlook of Schleiermacher's understanding of metaphysics, merely using those texts in which he mentions the term itself do not suffice. That would greatly limit this discussion, for Schleiermacher rarely calls metaphysics by its proper name. When he does, it is typically in connection with dialectics as a science that comprises both logic and metaphysics.<sup>2</sup>

Fortunately, at least to my understanding, Schleiermacher talks about metaphysics under different names, and his understanding of metaphysics also comes forth, or at least is presupposed, in many other contexts of the *Dialectic* and other works. In truth, most of the remaining work below will be an elaboration of his understanding of metaphysics. Even more important, some distinctive features of Schleiermacher's metaphysics will be the main points of this dissertation.

In this project, metaphysics in its broadest sense is defined to be a theoretical attempt of going beyond physical reality either to its structures or to the mental conditions of knowledge, or both simultaneously (as in Schleiermacher's definition above). Schleiermacher most often used term for these things is "speculation" (*Spekulation*). As a matter of fact, it may be considered as Schleiermacher's synonym for the word "metaphysics." Therefore, I commence with expounding Schleiermacher's understanding of metaphysics under his use of the term "speculation." The two terms are used interchangeably in this chapter.

In addition, the exposition of Schleiermacher's understanding of speculation will also provide a convenient introduction to his understanding of metaphysics; in that sense this chapter is still introductory. Several themes touched upon here will be elaborated in greater detail later. For this same reason, I will defer discussions of many nuances related to Schleiermacher's understanding of metaphysics. I will only concentrate on those texts, in which Schleiermacher discusses speculation, and will avoid wider connections, saving them for later discussions.

Besides this general introductory purpose, this chapter will also introduce a crucial facet of Schleiermacher's metaphysics that will emerge in all further chapters. This facet has to do with Schleiermacher's consistent rejection of pure speculation and his requirement that speculation be complemented by real knowing. This requirement already shows an important aspect of Schleiermacher's overcoming of metaphysics, an empirically grounded metaphysics overcomes the abstract metaphysics.

### *Speculation Defined*

Since Schleiermacher often uses the term "speculation" without explaining what it means, I begin by adding my own interpretation to clarify the term. Admittedly, I do not know whether Schleiermacher himself was aware of such an interpretation. Maybe he

was, for it is based on a plain etymological level of Latin. Perhaps it simply did not occur to him to point it out. Be that as it may, there is another purpose for my own clarification; it will help with my argument in this chapter. My interpretation of speculation will conform to Schleiermacher's understanding of what true and viable speculation ought to be. So, even if Schleiermacher was not aware of such an interpretation, I believe that it conforms to his spirit.

I should also note that the interchangeability of metaphysics and speculation is not something that I understand as taking place only in Schleiermacher's thought. Speculation is a science that shares its objects with metaphysics. Speculative philosophy encompasses insights from the different branches of metaphysics—such as cosmology, psychology, and theology—in a unified system.

Metaphysics itself has gone through a lot of disgrace in both popular thinking and philosophical critique. To say the least, both often agree in identifying metaphysics as some idle, abstract, unreal, and futile fancy that has lost any connection to reality. Being so close to metaphysics, speculation, by extension, receives a similar treatment. In many cases, however, that skepticism may be oversimplified. As shown in the Introduction, metaphysics is the most serious science of the first principles of being and knowing, which, in reaction to criticisms, often revises these first principles, trying to make them viable in new situations. The same is true for speculation.

Even the etymology of the word “speculation” may lead in directions different from the popular attitudes as well as from the clichés created by the philosophical critique. The Latin word *specere* on the most basic level means “to see, observe,” as well as “to watch over, to keep an eye on.”<sup>3</sup> Also, one of the meanings of *speculari*—a derivative from *specere*—is “to see by observation, to descry.”<sup>4</sup> Obviously, the verb “to speculate” is derived from these words; it also means “to look or gaze at (something); to examine, inspect, or observe closely or narrowly.”<sup>5</sup> Most often, however, its meaning is

already extended: it means “to observe or view mentally; to consider, examine, or reflect upon with close attention; to contemplate; to theorize upon.”<sup>6</sup> It may also mean “to exercise spiritual contemplation” or “to engage in thought or reflection, esp. of a conjectural or theoretical nature, on or upon a subject.”<sup>7</sup> The physical object of speculation has been replaced with a theoretical subject. In fact, the possibility of this extension of meaning made it possible to use the Latin *speculatio* to translate the Greek concept of *theoria*. It refers to abstract or hypothetical reasoning. Since then, speculation has been regarded as the highest form of contemplative activity that pursues knowledge for its own sake. According to this determination, speculation is identical with philosophy itself. Insofar as speculation, like philosophical activity as such, transcends the factual givenness in order to achieve its ultimate grounds, it is a synonym to metaphysics. That Schleiermacher’s usage of speculation proceeds in these lines is seen from his references to speculation as scientific activity related to “the unity and common form of knowing” or as “pure philosophy” concerned with “the unity and interconnectedness of all knowledge and with the very nature of coming to know.”<sup>8</sup>

Although this may be true, I would like to enter a different claim in regard to the meaning of speculation. I want to return to the original meaning of *specere*. Based on this, speculation ought to be contemplation about or reflection upon that which is being *seen*. It means that speculation is a kind of phenomenology, at least in the sense that it can reflect only on something that appears to immediate sight. Simply stated, even theoretically one cannot look at or observe something beyond the observable, beyond phenomena. Therefore, speculation should have empirical ground. Otherwise the gaze runs into the mirror of nothing and returns its own empty self-reflection. And, most important, as I have already mentioned and as I will show below, it is precisely Schleiermacher’s requirement for speculation—to have this empirical or phenomenological ground. Schleiermacher’s understanding of true speculation, as I will

demonstrate, conforms to my understanding of speculation inferred from the etymology of *specere*.

### *Empirical Speculation as the Proper Speculation*

First of all, it is clear that Schleiermacher indeed opposes speculation. In certain cases, he has a derisive disposition towards it. For instance, in the *Dialektik*, he calls speculative theology or theosophy “unconscious brooding” (*bewusstloses Brüten*) or “gymnosophistic navelgazing” (*gymnosophistische Brüten über die Nasenspize*).<sup>9</sup> This speculative theology seeks knowledge of God’s self, isolated from human God-consciousness. However, that is not the whole story. Schleiermacher denies only a certain kind of speculation, while supporting another. Schleiermacher’s early thinking in his 1808 publication of *Occasional Thoughts on Universities* and in his 1811 lectures on dialectic is already programmatic with regard to his true understanding of the role and meaning of speculation.

In his observations about the situation in the academy, Schleiermacher also notices that exploration in the particular areas of “real,” empirical sciences has become the main focus of scientific activity. He further observes that speculation as pure philosophy, in contrast, has been put all the way in background, so that it does not interfere with a healthy development of culture.<sup>10</sup> It is noteworthy that this time Schleiermacher does not accept the devaluation of speculation. On the contrary, I would say that he subverts this conventional hierarchical opposition of empiricism and speculation. He raises the element of speculation from its suppressed position. Schleiermacher insists that all particular knowing rests on that general knowing that only speculation can provide. “Accordingly,” Schleiermacher claims, “there is no such thing as a scientifically productive capacity without a speculative spirit.”<sup>11</sup> He continues that both spirits of speculation and exact science cohere in such a way that an individual who

has not cultivated the speculative mode of thinking will not be able to produce anything with real scientific worth. Speculation gives systematization and overall perspective of the entire domain of knowledge.

But at the same time, Schleiermacher's subversion of the empiricism-speculation opposition in favor of speculation is not so simple and unequivocal. He says: "Only through acquaintance with the first principles is there an escape from the empirical and the beaten path, on the one hand, and from arbitrariness, on the other."<sup>12</sup> At the first glance, this sentence seems strange. Its first part is already familiar. It is speculation and its first principles that help one escape from obstinate, one-sided empiricism. But how can speculation save one from arbitrariness? After all, pure speculation itself is usually regarded as the culprit of arbitrariness. Is there a contradiction? Not necessarily.

If I understand this text correctly, the clue lies in Schleiermacher's understanding of speculation as empirically grounded science. The first principles are indeed developed speculatively, but from the material provided by empirical sciences. The arbitrariness, in Schleiermacher's opinion, is not the fault of speculation as such. The actual error is its being isolated. Speculation alone definitely does not suffice, "but must be embodied at the same time in "real" knowing."<sup>13</sup> It is empirical knowledge that provides speculation with the material to be organized theoretically. Ultimately, speculation arises from the specificities of reality, and it is a tool that aids discovering more about the concretions of reality.<sup>14</sup> The deductive reasoning of speculation by itself does not have the power to produce concretion. It can merely lift out *a posteriori* given structures, although to the extent that these structures are given, they are *a priori*.<sup>15</sup> Hence, the scientific spirit (*Empirie*) and the talent for the first principles (*Speculatio*) are not at all disparate. Rather, they "are always to be practiced only cooperatively."<sup>16</sup> Both together are indispensable. As Schleiermacher states:

Although it rests on sense impressions, no common consciousness is really one and determined without participation in the higher process; likewise, no formula becomes alive if we do not keep in mind the extent of its application in the field of sensuous impressions.<sup>17</sup>

Common here means empirical consciousness, but higher means speculative process.

Noteworthy, according to Schleiermacher, is that even the abstract forms of thought, such as formula “ $a=a$ ” and the highest metaphysical concept of thing, *ens*, must have their organic side. The former expresses either the identity of thought and being, thus being the form of knowledge, or the identity of the subject, thus being the condition of knowledge. Without organic facticity it is only empty repetition. The latter, in turn, must include the organic element insofar as *ens* is something that affects organization and subsists by virtue of the multiplicity of impressions.<sup>18</sup>

Thus, Schleiermacher’s subversion of empiricism-speculation hierarchy is not final. When either speculation or real science works alone, the result is an unnecessary opposition, like that between rationalist and empiricist philosophical traditions. Moreover, each of them separately causes skepticism toward each other—a stance so hated by Schleiermacher.<sup>19</sup> His intent is to abolish any opposition between reason and experience, speculation and empirical base, *a priori* and *a posteriori*.<sup>20</sup> He asserts instead: “There is truth in each of these acts of thinking, and therefore being is also represented in them, and indeed the same being in both; however, the becoming of knowing takes place only insofar as one is related to the other.”<sup>21</sup> One should only note that this relating does not mean that an identity of speculation and empiricism is reached. To Schleiermacher, only in the knowledge of the totality of being could there be the identity of speculation and empiricism. Although it is the same being represented in both, its totality is not given as knowledge, but only experienced outside knowledge, in immediate self-consciousness. For knowledge it is only a presupposition. To say more is to give way to poetry or rhetoric,<sup>22</sup> which is equivalent to pure speculation from an epistemological viewpoint. What can be known, however, according to Schleiermacher, is some particular area of

being, and it can only be known by means of either speculation or empiricism separately.<sup>23</sup> “The true (*eigentlich*) philosophy,” in which the “interpenetration” (*Durchdringung*) of speculation and empiricism could take place, is not possible.<sup>24</sup> Instead, what is possible, in Schleiermacher’s view, is “a scientific critique” (*wissenschaftliche Kritik*) in which only an accompanying relation of speculation and empiricism takes place.<sup>25</sup> A supposed real philosophy—a metaphysical synthesis of speculation and empiricism (like that of Hegel, for example)—must be overcome by critical philosophy in which both run parallel to and influence each other. Philosophy as critique cannot claim the synthesis of speculation and empiricism, yet it needs both for its task to sort out the sound principles of philosophizing from the fallacious ones.

On this account, Schleiermacher also defines philosophy as “establishing knowledge in reference to being and arranging the linking of all knowledge, wherein all knowledge that has not turned into the real field of knowledge [i.e., pure speculation] must be dissolved.”<sup>26</sup>

In any event, as will be seen many more times in the course of this work, Schleiermacher’s metaphysical position concerning the contrasts prefers the state of parallel balance to that of opposition. Also in this case, knowledge can only be produced when both poles of the contrast work together, when reason and sense experience cooperate. The speculative or intellectual function of thinking and the organic or empirical function of thinking are always closely interrelated, but they never completely merge into each other. These conclusions will be important when I return to further analysis of Schleiermacher’s *Dialectic* in the next parts, including the analysis of Schleiermacher’s treatment of such metaphysical contrasts as thinking and being, concept and judgment, intellectual and organic, ideal and real, God and world, and others.

Equally important, returning to etymology, the word speculation can also have connotations to mirror, *speculum*, inasmuch as the latter is derived from the word



*specere*. Again, since reflection in ancient metallic mirrors was fuzzy, this allusion may lead to the popular meaning of speculation as an abstract and obscure meddling in the realm beyond verification. Or, alternatively, it may point to the long-standing Western philosophical tradition that considers the human mind as a mirror reflecting the whole reality. Noteworthy, whereas Schleiermacher goes hand in hand with Kant, endorsing his critique of rationalist metaphysics and its overcoming with the requirement of unification of reason with sense experience, he differs from Kant in regard to the relationship of thinking and being. That is to say, Schleiermacher's approach is totally opposed to Kantian subjective idealism – the modulation of being by reason. (I will return to Schleiermacher's relationship to Kant below, especially in the next chapter.)

Schleiermacher himself represents this long-standing *speculum* tradition with the metaphysical principle of the identity of thinking and being in its apex. In the *Dialectic* he states: "Knowing is the congruence of thinking with being as what is thought. . . , the pure coinciding of reason with being."<sup>27</sup> Notably, this congruence is inevitable because of a simple reason. That is, pure, formal thinking, in Schleiermacher's view, is not possible at all. It would be an instance of thinking about nothing. The nothing, in Schleiermacher's view, can never be present as referring to something that precedes it—a requirement for thought to take place.<sup>28</sup> The nothing cannot be thought. Thinking can only take place under the form of being.<sup>29</sup> Inasmuch as speculation requires the empirical basis, thinking itself requires the organic element.

To add to that, the organic element must be present even in cases where thinking is sheer arbitrariness, fantasy, or error. Pure speculation could also very well fit in this group. In Schleiermacher's perspective, some organic element must be present even in these kinds of thinking, but only as form.<sup>30</sup> It is thinking without question—only thinking that cannot qualify as knowing. For one thing, as Schleiermacher says, all knowing is thinking, for another, not all thinking is at the same time knowing. First of all, knowing is

present only in the process of thinking, not in having been thought. Second, and this is a very important point made by Schleiermacher to which I will return several times, knowing is a process of thinking that can be validated as identical in a community of thinkers.<sup>31</sup> This claim anticipates the pragmatist non-metaphysical theory of truth as agreement. It means that truth is acquired neither through the empiricist conformity of mind to reality nor through the rationalist conformity of reality to the mind. Instead, truth is established inter-subjectively by means of the “communicative action” within the community of thinkers, if I may use Habermas’ term here. Anyway, as Schleiermacher holds, the individual reason is only fantasy, but the individual organization of sense experience—error.<sup>32</sup> But above all, knowing is thinking that corresponds to being; it is thinking “that is pure absorption of reason in being.”<sup>33</sup> Although arbitrariness, fantasy, and error have their organic side, they cannot produce knowledge despite their reference to being, for they do not correspond to objective being.<sup>34</sup> Schleiermacher states: “But thinking to which no corresponding being is posited—like fairies, centaurs, and so forth—is no knowing at all.”<sup>35</sup> Although those creatures have their phenomenal images, one cannot know them because no actual being corresponds to them. I hold that the same happens with speculation. Words that designate its abstract concepts, being signs, have their material form to which, yet, no corresponding real being can be established. As for the error, Schleiermacher points out that it does not proceed from being, for being cannot err. Error proceeds from the subjectivity of reason, from its finitude, inability to grasp the true being. And paradoxically, this finitude is the very reason why even the congruence of thinking with being cannot actually be known. It can only be hypothetically presupposed.

So, if Schleiermacher indeed opposes speculation, one must keep in mind that it is only a certain kind of speculation. There is no question that he rejects pure, unverifiable, unsubstantiated speculation that has lost the necessary experiential reference.

Transcendental philosophy, in Schleiermacher's opinion, is an example of such a useless, one-sided philosophy that has lost its necessary counterpart. His contempt toward pure speculation and its separation from real knowing can very well be felt from this passage:

Indeed, the scientific spirit as the highest principle, as the immediate unity of all knowledge, cannot be represented and exhibited for itself alone – in ghostlike fashion – in sheer transcendental philosophy. Unfortunately, many have tried to accomplish this, carrying sundry phantoms and strange concerns into the effort. Probably no more vapid a philosophy is thinkable than one that extracts itself so purely and expects that real knowing, as something lower, should be given or taken from a totally different source.<sup>36</sup>

Such a philosophy is a waste of time and energy. Or, as Schleiermacher indicates, it is like a disembodied spirit, with no influence on scientific knowing. In contrast to this, “only with its body, with “real” knowing, does its spirit admit of being grasped.”<sup>37</sup> Or, alternatively, as Schleiermacher elsewhere puts it succinctly, “one can know only what one has experienced.”<sup>38</sup>

On the other hand, increasingly important, there is also a legitimate speculation, and Schleiermacher admits it. It is a speculation that has retained its provisional, empirical ground. Only the “love for the real” conquers “merely empty speculation.”<sup>39</sup> The real element fills its emptiness and makes speculation warranted. Even more important, as shown above, it is precisely speculation in this correct understanding that supports Schleiermacher's version of the principle of identity of thinking and being. Only one thing has to be kept in mind, namely, that speculation, in Schleiermacher's understanding, does not produce actual knowledge itself. Instead, it is grounded in actual knowledge. Its task is “the discovery and the description of the structures and processes inherent in the acquisition of actual knowledge.”<sup>40</sup> So, Schleiermacher's metaphysics as speculation is a theory of knowledge, not knowledge of knowledge.<sup>41</sup>

Indubitably, Schleiermacher himself practices this kind of legitimate speculation, especially in his *Ethics* and *Dialectic*. The latter is a speculative endeavor from both

philosophical and theological points of view. In this case, Schleiermacher's dogmatics (the *Glaubenslehre*) could be considered as the necessary empirical counterpart of his speculative theology (the *Dialectic*). And this is not just an arbitrary assertion, for the necessity of both speculation and empiricism appears even in Schleiermacher's division of science into two branches, ethics and physics.<sup>42</sup> And even the *Glaubenslehre* itself may be considered a speculative work according to the true meaning of speculation, for it reflects upon the concrete expressions of actual Christian faith for the benefit of the church government.<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, as will be shown in more detail in the chapters below, Schleiermacher remains faithful to his principle of complementarity in his philosophical theology. His rejection of the knowledge of the metaphysical attributes of God and his requirement of the complementarity of God and world in the *Dialektik*, for example, is one indication of that. This is precisely the case where only the right philosophical speculation can help, bringing to application its "principle of reflection," which allows expressions about the transcendent ground to develop only in correlation to the world.<sup>44</sup>

Furthermore, it is worth noting in this connection that there are several instances in which Schleiermacher likens religious life with empiricism. For example, Schleiermacher presents an imagined analogy between religion and speculation.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, from the first glance they have one thing in common. Traditionally, the new religious life is not supposed to begin from something previously given, for that would negate the freedom of the Spirit. Similarly, the beginning of philosophy or speculation may be considered to be ensuing purely from nothing. If followed more closely, Schleiermacher goes on, the analogy is bound to fail. His conviction is that the spiritual life can only be realized if it intertwines with the sensuous life. In a similar way, the higher speculative consciousness cannot be separated from the common, experiential knowledge. Otherwise the former could not even be communicated. Instead, there would be two separate truths pertaining to each kind of consciousness: speculative and real. This acknowledgment

already leads the discussion to one of Schleiermacher's clues of relating speculation and empiricism, which, in turn, leads to one of his main solutions concerning the relationship of religion and speculation.

Schleiermacher's clue is that he transfers the whole metaphysical discussion of the empiricism-speculation relationship to the level of psychology or phenomenology of consciousness. Therefore, it is understandable why Schleiermacher in his psychology lectures also distinguishes between two ways of the knowledge of the soul: "the *a posteriori* and the *a priori*, the empirical and speculative."<sup>46</sup> The former knowledge, according to Schleiermacher, comes from outside and presupposes something externally given, whereas the latter is purely internal and as such has its origin and sufficient ground in the act of thinking itself.<sup>47</sup> Accordingly, the ancients already distinguished the empirical and the rational psychologies. Schleiermacher's point, however, once again, is that both are absolutely necessary and complement each other. Self-consciousness or ego-positing (*Ich-setzen*), as both self-reference (*Auf-Ich-beziehen*) and going-out-of-oneself (*Von-Ich-ausgehen*), is an act of "pure indifference between givenness and producing from inside."<sup>48</sup> The knowledge of the self as such is achieved in an undecided state of balance between these two movements. This state will be very important in the closer investigations into Schleiermacher's theory of "feeling" (*Gefühl*) in the chapters below.<sup>49</sup>

In the early dialectics lectures, in turn, Schleiermacher tries to determine how general empirical consciousness in a person relates to higher speculative consciousness. Schleiermacher addresses, in his view, an erroneous bifurcation of human nature, resulting from one-sided concentration on one of these forms of consciousness. This one-sidedness results in a differentiation between those who are in possession of speculation—scholars, I suppose—and those who are not—the ordinary people. Schleiermacher argues that if such discrimination were possible, "the unity of life is annulled, pure knowing moves only parallel to common knowing, and it is not possible to

construct one from the other.”<sup>50</sup> As it will be seen later, it is questionable whether Schleiermacher himself is able to avoid this fault. In fact, his latter thought is subject precisely to the criticism of a similar bifurcation.

Be that as it may, after pointing out the impossibility of the bifurcation of speculation and empiricism in consciousness, Schleiermacher introduces the third level of knowing—if it can be called knowing at all—which perhaps corresponds to his concept of immediate self-consciousness, or God-consciousness, “an original knowing wherewith the laws of all construction of knowing are given at the same time.”<sup>51</sup> After certain logical acrobatics, Schleiermacher concludes that this ultimate knowing is attainable through both speculative and empirical ways of knowing. He avows that this third level of consciousness, the level of original knowing is, in a form of some pre-understanding, already posited even in a consciousness that has not yet reached beyond the ordinary, empirical way of knowing. Schleiermacher states that “it exists in all our knowing but previously in an unconscious way and only under the form of activity.”<sup>52</sup> Hence, in Schleiermacher’s view, only a relative contrast exists between speculative and general knowing, for even in speculative knowing there are elements of the subordinate form and, *vice versa*, the elements of common knowing bear the more complete form within themselves. Once again, something coming *ex nihilo*, in Schleiermacher’s view, is inconceivable. There always must be at least some minimum onto which the higher procedures of speculation could be tried. Therefore, there is no way that one person could be predestined to speculative knowing by virtue of nature while another is excluded from it. Schleiermacher recapitulates: “In everyone speculation exists as a power that can be raised to consciousness; it is one and the same stuff in everyone, both in what is crystallized in regularly shaped forms and in the raw crystal.”<sup>53</sup> In a word, from this perspective, every person is a “speculator.” Only some are consciously so, whereas others only anonymously, without knowing it, living it out in the activity of life. The higher

level of immediate self-consciousness endows everyone with this faculty. For Schleiermacher, this truth alone prevents conflict between speculation and empiricism. If consciousness is so constituted, both speculative and empirical functions must be employed. If one of them is neglected, or if one of them dominates, or if they are set off against each other, it can only yield a clash in the human being as a unity.

As noted above, Schleiermacher's attempt to transfer the problematic of the speculation-empiricism relationship to the level of consciousness bears a direct relation on how he relates speculation to religion or piety. Religion, in Schleiermacher's perspective, is an empirical phenomenon. Therefore, he constructs his model of speculation-religion relationship by analogy to the aforementioned model of speculation-empiricism relationship based on the phenomenology of consciousness. A programmatic statement appears in §28.3 of the *Glaubenslehre*:

Those members of the Christian communion through whose agency alone the scientific form of Dogmatics arises and subsists are also those in whom the *speculative* consciousness has awakened. Now as this is the highest *objective* function of the human spirit, while the *religious* self-consciousness is the highest *subjective* function, a conflict between the two would touch essential human nature, and so such a conflict can never be anything but a misunderstanding[emphases added].<sup>54</sup>

Here Schleiermacher nominates the speculative consciousness to be the highest objective function of the human spirit, while the religious self-consciousness is its highest subjective function. Both functions are necessary insofar as they are the ultimate expressions of both subjective and objective poles inherent in human nature itself. Their clash, like that of speculative and empirical modes of knowing, would destroy the essential unity of human nature. On this account, there is no conflict between speculation and religion. These phenomena coexist very well in the same person. Hence, to Schleiermacher, "a true philosopher can be and remain a true believer, and, likewise, one can be pious with all one's heart and still have and exercise the courage to delve into the

very depths of speculation.”<sup>55</sup> Schleiermacher calls this ideal “a prince of the church,” apparently not without certain ambition regarding himself. This “prince” conjoins both speculation and piety, objective-speculative and subjective-empirical-religious functions “in the highest degree and with the finest balance for the purpose of theoretical and practical activity alike. . .”<sup>56</sup> I think, it is this same position that allows Schleiermacher to write statements like one in his later additions to the *Speeches*: “. . . in my opinion, piety and scientific speculation share with each other, and the more closely they are conjoined the more both advance.”<sup>57</sup>

It will be important to return to these subjects later, discussing the relationship of dogmatics and philosophy in Schleiermacher’s thought. Suffice it to say that, to Schleiermacher, this compatibility on the level of consciousness may be at odds with the theoretical relationship of these two disciplines. Later on, Schleiermacher’s famous exclusion of speculation from the field of dogmatics will also be examined. However that may be, all of the accounts above certainly testify to at least one thing, namely, that metaphysics as speculation is indispensable to Schleiermacher, provided that it is the right kind of empirically grounded speculation. To be sure, metaphysics as pure speculation must be overcome, overcome by this proper speculation. Thus, already this still introductory explication of Schleiermacher’s understanding of metaphysics as speculation clearly shows the first aspect of Schleiermacher’s overcoming of metaphysics: the overcoming of one metaphysics with another more appropriate metaphysics.

## NOTES

1. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Dialektik: Aus Schleiermachers handschriftlichem Nachlasse*, ed. Ludwig Jonas, *Friedrich Schleiermacher’s sämtliche Werke*, part 3, *Zur Philosophie*, vol. 4/2 (Berlin: Reimer, 1839), 7. Subsequently *Dialektik* (Jonas). “. . . die Einsicht von der Bewährung des Zusammenhanges zwischen Denken und Sein überhaupt. . .” Especially after Heidegger, the German terms *Sein* and *Seiende* bear special meanings. The former is understood to denote common or general being as such, but the latter, the being of existing things or entities. Schleiermacher, however, does not make this distinction. He uses *Sein* in reference to entities as well. For this reason, I will translate Schleiermacher’s



*Sein* as “being.” Where it indeed is important to make this distinction throughout this work, to being as *Sein*, I add the qualification “as such,” that is, “being as such.” *Seiende* I will translate as “entity.”

2. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 7.

3. *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), s.v. *specio*.

4. *Ibid.*, s.v. *speculor*.

5. *The Oxford English Dictionary*, vol. 10 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1933), s.v. *speculate*.

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*

8. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Occasional Thoughts on Universities in the German Sense with an Appendix Regarding a University Soon to Be Established (1908)*, trans. and annotated by Terrence N. Tice, with Edwina Lawler (Lewiston, N.Y.: Mellen, 1991), 10, 17.

9. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 153, 435.

10. Schleiermacher, *Occasional Thoughts*, 17.

11. *Ibid.*, 18.

12. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Dialectic, or, the Art of Doing Philosophy: A Study Edition of the 1811 Notes*, trans. with introduction and notes by Terrence N. Tice (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1996), 3. Subsequently *Dialectic* (Tice).

13. Schleiermacher, *Occasional Thoughts*, 23-24.

14. Gerhard Spiegler, *The Eternal Covenant: Schleiermacher's Experiment in Cultural Theology* (New York; Evanston, Ill.; London: Harper and Row, 1967), 140.

15. *Ibid.*, 147.

16. *Dialectic* (Tice), 3.

17. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 379-80. “Denn kein gemeinsames Bewusstsein, wengleich auf Sinneseindrücken ruhend, ist wirklich Eins und ein bestimmtes, ohne einen Antheil an dem höheren Prozess in sich zu tragen; und so auch Keine Formel ist lebendig, wenn uns nicht der Umfang ihrer Anwendung auf dem Gebiet der sinnlichen Eindrücke mit vorschwebt.”

18. *Ibid.*, 59.

19. *Ibid.*, 30.

20. Schleiermacher, *Occasional Thoughts*, 27.

21. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 502. “In jedem der beiden Denkacte ist Wahrheit, und also auch ein Sein repräsentirt, und zwar in beiden desselbe; aber ein Werden des Wissens ist nur, sofern das eine auf das andere bezogen wird.”

22. *Ibid.*, 78.

23. Ibid., 142.

24. Ibid., 143.

25. Ibid., 144.

26. Ibid., 33. "Feststellung des Wissens in Beziehung auf das Sein, und Feststellung der Verknüpfung alles Wissens; worin alles Wissen, was nicht schon auf ein reales Gebiet des Wissens übergegangen ist, aufgehen muss."

27. *Dialectic* (Tice), 17. I will return to this quote later in the next chapter where I discuss the contrast of thinking and being in Schleiermacher's thought. There I will point out the importance of the nuance of "being as what is thought" for Schleiermacher's overcoming of metaphysics.

28. Ibid., 20.

29. See *ibid.*, 15-16. Of course, in this case, being is not understood as being as such in the Heideggerian sense of *Sein*. Being as such, like nothing, cannot be thought. This is being as particular being—*Seiende* in Heideggerian terminology. As I noted above, Schleiermacher uses *Sein* without distinction.

30. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 52.

31. Ibid., 486.

32. Ibid., 48, 384.

33. Ibid., 315. ". . . welches das reine Aufgehen ist der Vernunft in dem Sein."

34. Ibid., 50-51.

35. Ibid., 386-87. "Ein Denken aber, dem kein Sein entsprechend gesetzt wird, wie Feen, Centauren u. dgl., ist gar kein Wissen."

36. Schleiermacher, *Occasional Thoughts*, 19.

37. Ibid.

38. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 124. ". . . man wisse nur was man erfahren habe."

39. *Dialectic* (Tice), 62.

40. Spiegler, *The Eternal Covenant*, 146.

41. Ibid.

42. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 311.

43. Thomas H. Curran, *Doctrine and Speculation in Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre* (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1994), 52.

44. Falk Wagner, *Schleiermachers Dialektik: Eine Kritische Interpretation* (Gütersloh, Germany: Mohn, 1974), 225.

45. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 27.

46. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Psychologie: Aus Schleiermacher's handschriftlichem Nachlasse und nachgeschriebenen Vorlesungen*, ed. L. George, *Friedrich Schleiermacher's sämtliche Werke*, part 3, *Zur Philosophie*, vol. 6 (Berlin: Reimer, 1862), 13. “. . . des a posteriori und des a priori, des empirischen und des speculativen.”

47. *Ibid.*, 13-14. Notice Schleiermacher's usage of metaphysical terms.

48. *Ibid.*, 15-16. “die reine Indifferenz zwischen dem Gegebensein und dem von Innen heraus Produzieren. . .”

49. In order to avoid emotional connotations improper to Schleiermacher's theory, I will hereafter use German *Gefühl* instead of its English translation as “feeling.” Otherwise, it could lead to a misunderstanding like Brandt's, who concludes that Schleiermacher views religion as “a kind of feeling, emotion, or sentiment” (Richard B. Brandt, *The Philosophy of Schleiermacher: The Development of His Theory of Scientific and Religious Knowledge* [Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1968], 2). In Schleiermacher's usage, *Gefühl* has to do with immediate self-consciousness rather than emotion.

50. *Dialectic* (Tice), 9.

51. *Ibid.*

52. *Ibid.*

53. *Ibid.*, 10.

54. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, trans., ed. H. R. Mackintosh, J. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1986), 122.

55. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On the Glaubenslehre: Two Letters to Dr. Lücke*, trans. James Duke, Francis Fiorenza (Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981), 86.

56. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Brief Outline on the Study of Theology*, trans. with introduction and notes by Terrence N. Tice (Richmond, Va.: John Knox, 1966), 21, §9.

57. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers*, trans. John Oman, intro. by Rudolf Otto (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), 25.

## CHAPTER 5

### SCHLEIERMACHER AND KANT'S METAPHYSICS

As explained in the Introduction, Kant inaugurated an entirely new stage in the development of metaphysics, closing the old classical way that makes truth-claims about realities beyond finite experience. Starting with Kant, knowledge is confined to the objects possibly experienced under the apriori spatio-temporal conditions and apprehended by means of the apriori categories of understanding. Most subsequent philosophers reacted to Kant's revolution. At the very least, he could not be ignored. Kant's authority forced even those who disagreed with him to go back to him and show the deficiencies in his system only to build anew on his foundation. Schleiermacher was not an exception. His system can be considered from this viewpoint. Although Schleiermacher sees the need to overcome Kant's metaphysics, he himself, to a great extent, builds his own alternative metaphysics of knowledge on that same Kantian foundation. In my opinion, Kant's thought is the main source of Schleiermacher's metaphysics, even if there are other thinkers who greatly influenced him, such as Plato and Spinoza. Overcoming Kant is an essential objective of Schleiermacher's lectures on dialectic. Even if he mentions Kant only a few times in the lectures, his presence can always be felt. Schleiermacher's requirement for the experiential grounding of speculation, discussed in the previous chapter is, I believe, motivated by Kant's synthesis of empiricism and rationalism. As shown above, very much like Kant, Schleiermacher rejects pure speculation and insists that speculation is substantiated experientially if it

does not want to be opposed to real scientific knowledge. This is only one example of Kant's influence on Schleiermacher; there are many more.

Equally important, Kant's delimitation of metaphysics could not but decisively change the course of the development of theology as well. At least the traditional metaphysical or natural theology no longer remains an option. To a great extent, modern anti-metaphysical theologies really begin after Kant and mostly as a result of his influence. Considerably more, precisely Schleiermacher, "the father of modern theology," is probably the very first theologian who coins his theological method fully realizing the limits of scientific knowing established by Kant's critique. Schleiermacher's criticism of traditional theology and his delimitation of theology to the given data of possible religious experience can well be considered a theological application of Kant's critical project.

In short, there are at least two reasons why I cannot avoid devoting a separate chapter to Schleiermacher's relation to Kant's thought. The first reason is Kant's unparalleled importance in the history of metaphysics. Second, as I said, despite the fact that Schleiermacher mentions Kant so rarely, Kant's influence on Schleiermacher is so tremendous that it comes to surface everywhere. An indication of this influence is that I will need to refer Schleiermacher to Kant throughout this study, as I also did in the previous chapter. Needless to say, in one chapter I cannot go into many subtleties or nuances. Hence, I will only present a general account that is related to the subject matter of this investigation, that is, metaphysics, simply exploring some of their similarities, that is, Schleiermacher's use of Kant. Then, I will continue with their differences, that is, Schleiermacher's overcoming of Kant. After that, the most important part of this chapter will follow, discovering that the seeds of the basic differences may be found in Kant's own thought. Hence it will be Schleiermacher's overcoming Kant with Kant's own means.

## *Similarities and Influences*

### Epistemological Influences

First, to start with the most obvious, there is no question that Kant is Schleiermacher's major inspiration in overcoming the traditional metaphysics. Schleiermacher sets his attitude toward Kant's achievement in this area already at the age of nineteen. "As for the Kantian philosophy. . . ," writes Schleiermacher in a letter to his father, "I have always had a very favourable opinion of it, because it brings back the reason from the desert wastes of metaphysics into its true appointed sphere."<sup>1</sup> As is also seen from the previous chapter, Schleiermacher fully endorses one of Kant's first *Critique's* main objectives: to restrict the operation of reason from passing the limits of possible experience. Following Kant, Schleiermacher restricts rational knowing to finite forms that are conditioned by space and time.

Second, even Schleiermacher's basic distinction of knowing, discussed in the previous chapter, can be traced back to Kant, namely, to the "central tenet of Kant's epistemology," which requires both intuitions and thoughts for knowledge to take place.<sup>2</sup> Schleiermacher not only accepts without reserve Kant's strife against rationalism, but also his opposition to pure empiricism or sensationalism when it is taken alone. Both seek the interdependence of these two sources of knowledge. Obviously, epistemologically both Schleiermacher and Kant intend the same; they only use different terms on different occasions. For example, Schleiermacher's distinction of organization (*Organisation*) or organic function of reason (*organische Funktion*) and intellectual function (*intellektuelle Funktion*) of reason means quite the same as Kant's distinction of sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) and understanding (*Verstand*). For both, the latter receives its content through the former, but the former – its form through the latter.<sup>3</sup> Reason as the source of unity and plurality determines the form of thinking, while organization as the source of

diversity furnishes the content. The former remains the same in itself, the latter is the openness of human being toward other being.<sup>4</sup> Likewise, Schleiermacher's differentiation between *Speculatio* and *Empirie* is equivalent to the distinction Kant makes between concept (*Begriff*) and intuition/sensation (*Anschauung/Empfindung*).<sup>5</sup> In this regard, Kant writes about the two "fundamental sources" of mind that originate all knowledge: (1) the capacity of receiving representations or receptivity for impressions and (2) the power of knowing an object through these representations or spontaneity in the production of concepts.<sup>6</sup> The first source gives objects to the mind, while they are thought in relation to that given representation (a mere determination of the mind) by means of the second. Kant concludes: "Intuition (*Anschauung*) and concepts (*Begriffe*) constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge."<sup>7</sup>

By the same token, another basic distinction of Schleiermacher between the organic and the intellectual functions of thinking can be paralleled to Kant's declared "two stems" of all human knowledge, that is, sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) through which the objects are given and understanding (*Verstand*) through which the objects are thought.<sup>8</sup> It is noteworthy that precisely the acknowledgement of the reciprocal indispensability of sensibility and understanding is followed by Kant's famous dictum: "Thoughts (*Gedanken*) without content (*Inhalt*) are empty, intuitions (*Anschauungen*) without concepts (*Begriffe*) are blind."<sup>9</sup> Understanding produces thoughts, but senses produce intuitions. Intuition, according to Kant, gives awareness of particulars, while thoughts allow the comprehension of those particulars under specific determination. Although intuitions and thoughts mutually reciprocate, they are irreducible to and irreplaceable by each other. They have different sources, namely, senses and understanding. As Kant writes: "These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing."<sup>10</sup> Precisely this

irreducibility is the reason for their mutual indispensability for having knowledge, as well as for their careful distinction.<sup>11</sup>

The following passage from Schleiermacher, and it is not the only one, bears clear resemblance to Kant's dictum: "Diversity without unity and plurality is indeterminate; determinate unity and plurality without diversity is empty. The function of reason in thinking is therefore determination, the function of organization is enlivening."<sup>12</sup> One can bring the quote closer to Kant, noticing that "diversity" in its first sentence stands for the "organization" that appears in the second sentence, but "unity and plurality," for "reason." So, one could also read the first sentence: "Organization without reason is indeterminate; (determinate) reason without organization is empty." Repeatedly, for Schleiermacher, empiricism alone cannot render knowledge in much the same way as pure speculation cannot provide true knowledge without experiential reference. Only by means of the critical activity of reason can the sensuous judgments be arranged and tested as to their truth. Otherwise, there is only endless chaos of random sense impressions not yielding any kind of analysis leading to knowledge.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, even experience, at least in the form in which one can be conscious of it, is itself the result of reason's activity of organizing the objects of experience.<sup>14</sup> The latter can only be recognized by virtue of the system of concepts. It is what Schleiermacher calls "general schema": sensory objectification of concepts. Without it, an individual form (*Gestalt*) of a given appearance cannot have meaning. The general schema itself, in turn, cannot have meaning without individual formation.<sup>15</sup> As Schleiermacher characteristically concludes, "both are simultaneous in oscillating procedure."<sup>16</sup>

Furthermore, it is also very likely that even Schleiermacher's effort to avoid the conflict between empiricism and speculation; piety and speculation; or subjective and objective functions of reason—at the level of consciousness, discussed in the previous chapter—is directly related to Kant's restriction of speculative reason. As Kant states, the



positive aspect of this restriction is that it gives way to the employment of practical reason beyond the limits of sensibility.<sup>17</sup> And it is precisely this fact that prevents the conflict between the two reasons. Kant continues: “Though [practical] reason, in thus proceeding, requires no assistance from speculative reason, it must yet be assured against its opposition, that reason may not be brought into conflict with itself.”<sup>18</sup>

As a matter of fact, one could even go further into the epistemological similarities between Schleiermacher and Kant, as Brandt does, and assert that Schleiermacher’s arguments bear a close similarity to Kant’s metaphysical deduction of the categories of understanding.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, Schleiermacher also insists that thought can only proceed by means of certain forms. Kant deduces these necessary forms or categories from the forms of judgment. Even if Schleiermacher does not proceed exactly in this way, he agrees that thought is somehow independent from the world. Schleiermacher looks for these forms through the analysis of both concepts and judgments. (I will return to these themes in much greater detail in the chapters below, especially discussing Schleiermacher’s distinction of intellectual and organic functions of reason, as well as his analysis of concepts and judgments.)

### Theological Influences: Philosophical Theology

There is another area of Schleiermacher’s thought whose similarity to Kant cannot be overlooked, and it is theology. It hardly needs saying that there is no place for speculative knowledge of God in the thought of both thinkers. Yet, precisely for this same reason, both propose the absolute, or God, as the limiting idea necessary for knowledge to take place. I cannot overemphasize that both Kant and Schleiermacher operate with the idea of God, but not with God as an objective reality. It does not appear conceivable that either Kant himself or Schleiermacher could deliberately trespass the limits of the first *Critique*.

Firstly, it is Kant's rejection of the knowledge of God in the form of the proofs of God's existence that compels him to hold on to the regulative idea of God, without which no theoretical knowing can be carried out. So, in a way, there is a place for God in Kant's thought even from a theoretical viewpoint. Although nothing can be known of God, God must be presupposed as the idea of the most real being that unites all reality. Secondly, God is also preserved in Kant's thought from a practical viewpoint, that is, as a postulate of practical reason. As such, God is conceived as a guarantor of the unity of the moral and the natural laws, or the unity of duty and happiness. But once again, it is a hypothetical presumption of practical belief, not a real object.

Schleiermacher also emphasizes that God must be presupposed for knowing as well as for acting to take place. Especially for the latter, it is through the final unity of contrasts, which is an equivalent to the idea of God, that the compatibility between reason and nature is guaranteed.<sup>20</sup> While God in God's self cannot be known, either in the form of concept or judgment, the idea of God is still a necessary condition of knowledge, the condition under which the unity of thinking and being can be conceived. The idea of God unites all metaphysical contrasts while God exceeds all contrasts and thinking that is based on them. Inasmuch as conceptual thinking cannot exceed the contrasts, it never reaches God. There should be a different faculty that mediates God, or the absolute. This faculty is *Gefühl*. Since it is a prereflective ground of both reason and will, it represents the unity of human being with the infinite being of God in self-consciousness.<sup>21</sup> Noteworthy, Schleiermacher's account of religious *Gefühl* is similar to Kant's view of the moral law "in that it accepts it as a given and denies that it can be derived from any more fundamental principle."<sup>22</sup> On this account, I would say, the idea of God in both Kant and Schleiermacher appears as an idea that overcomes metaphysics, or at least God appears there as a truly metaphysical entity, an entity beyond knowledge, whose idea is at the same time the presupposition of knowledge.<sup>23</sup>

Because of this transcendence of God or because of the transcendental character of its idea, all attempts to assert something about God, according to Schleiermacher, must be determined by world- and self-consciousness. This conviction is related to Schleiermacher's belief that thinking can never be pure, but rather must involve some organic element. And for this same reason, therefore, human God-talk is always inadequate and anthropomorphic—another implication of Schleiermacher's viewpoint that is very similar to Kant's conclusions. For the latter too, one cannot know God because there can be no sensuous intuition corresponding to God. But religion consists of generally valid practical content of reason, which is brought into religious life in the form of intuition. It is imaginative, sensuous demonstration of the spiritual. What is supposed to be understood spiritually is brought to intuition in the form of a sensuous symbol. This position obviously leads to anthropomorphism in religion, as Hegel had been quick to point out. Consequently, for both Schleiermacher and Kant, even if they arrive at this conclusion via different ways, the content of religion can only be presented anthropomorphically, by virtue of imaginative forms of intuition. Thus, the attributes of God are subjectively determined, and they do not belong to God in God's self.<sup>24</sup>

#### Theological Influences: Dogmatics

Kant's influence on Schleiermacher's theological thought extends even to his *Glaubenslehre*. As will be seen in the analysis of the chapter on Schleiermacher's dogmatics, the *Glaubenslehre* is full of philosophical influences even if it is supposed to be free of them.<sup>25</sup> Suffice it to say here that even some of its fundamental presuppositions can in fact be directly related to Kant's thought. When Schleiermacher does not allow anything in the *Glaubenslehre* that cannot become an object of experience, it may immediately be traced back to Kant's two indispensable elements of knowledge, that is, understanding and sensibility.<sup>26</sup> Kant's implicit influence also allows Redeker, for

example, to refer to the *Glaubenslehre* as “Schleiermacher’s modification of Kant’s critical transcendental philosophy,”<sup>27</sup> at least in the sense of grounding religion elsewhere than in rationality.

Even more important, it is precisely Kant who lays the foundation of religion in subjectivity. To repeat, Kant postulates God from practical reason. On Kant’s account, religion basically means to value and act out the moral law as divine command under presupposition that deity is attended to for the sake of harmony between the moral and the natural laws. Religion is also a form of subjective consciousness that serves the completion of pure moral consciousness.<sup>28</sup> Although Schleiermacher opposes Kant’s restriction of religion to morality, he also, to repeat, locates religion in *Gefühl*, or immediate self-consciousness. Paradoxically, this position appears to me at once similar and opposed to Kant. Schleiermacher locates religion in *Gefühl* precisely in opposition to Kant, and yet it is not far from Kant’s own position inasmuch as it also places religion in subjective consciousness.<sup>29</sup> *Gefühl* becomes an a priori principle for the sphere of religion similar to the categories for the scientific cognition and the categorical imperative for ethics.<sup>30</sup>

The fact that both Kant and Schleiermacher originate religion in subjective consciousness can also be illustrated from a different angle. For Schleiermacher, religious consciousness does not begin from God but from self-consciousness. Thus, God-thought is rather an objectification of world-consciousness. To repeat, this finitude of thought inevitably brings anthropomorphism into theology. There is a similar case with Kant: God is defined by means of self- and world-consciousness only through moral self-consciousness and the consciousness of dependence on the world or nature. Precisely for this reason, Kant posits God as the moral ruler of the world process or postulates God from practical viewpoint.<sup>31</sup>

By the same token, I would even claim that Schleiermacher's demand to separate piety from speculation in dogmatics may itself be grounded in Kant's expulsion of religion from the sphere of theoretical reason and its restriction to the field of practical reason. Admittedly, Schleiermacher does not follow Kant exactly, that is, once more, he does not link religion solely to morality. In fact, Schleiermacher assigns to religion a much broader, and from morality independent, significance.<sup>32</sup> But one thing is sure, that is, religion cannot be subjected to theoretical rationalization for either one. Religion belongs to the experiential realm, and the latter is unattainable to concept. The similarity is evident even though Schleiermacher locates this practical experience in *Gefühl* or immediate self-consciousness. Moreover, even the difference between Schleiermacher and Kant regarding the role of morality in religion is not as big as it may appear from the first glance, because religion in Schleiermacher's ethics is also morally productive insofar as it gives impulse to moral action.<sup>33</sup> Admittedly, there may be what has been called a "basic difference" between Schleiermacher and Kant, that is, while one puts the freedom of practical reason into the foreground, the other puts absolute dependence, therefore, also the activity of God.<sup>34</sup> But even this difference is not as deep as it may appear at the first glance. That is, Kant also conceives of practical reason as the manifestation of God in us. Consequently, one could say that the sovereignty of practical reason also establishes God's supremacy in us.<sup>35</sup>

### The "Hither-Side" Metaphysics

Regarding the subjectivity of religion in Kant and Schleiermacher, it should also be noted that it is not exactly the same. Rather, in the strict sense, it is only for Kant that religion has subjective validity. For Schleiermacher, even if religion is grounded in subjectivity, due to the nature of *Gefühl*, one could rather say that it is not so much subjective as "super-objective" (*überobjektiv*), in the sense of resistance to theoretical

objectification.<sup>36</sup> *Gefühl* is a kind of undivided, undifferentiated depth of the subject itself. It must be for this reason that Schleiermacher still calls it “subjective.” But in fact, this “subjective” depth “outgrows theoretical objectification just as much as religious-subjective “meaning.”<sup>37</sup>

Later on, in two separate discussions of Schleiermacher’s theories of *Gefühl* in the *Dialektik* and the *Glaubenslehre*, I will probe these issues deeper. In this comparative connection, mention might be made that even Schleiermacher’s choice of the word “subjective” can be traced back to Kant’s transcendental idealism, which ascribes the categorial system of validity to the “subject of reason” (*Vernunftsubjekt*).<sup>38</sup> In any event, in both “super-objective” or “subjective” cases, *Gefühl* lies at “this side” (*diesseits*) of theoretical objectification inasmuch as the divinity-conveying depth of the subject lies at “this side” of any particularization.<sup>39</sup> It is a “this side” metaphysics, metaphysics that does not so much reach “beyond,” but remains at “the hither side of being.”<sup>40</sup> It does not have anything to do with Kant’s noumenal self. Rather, Schleiermacher’s self is phenomenal self, the real, empirical self.<sup>41</sup> It is a difference, and it brings the discussion to the next point.

### *Differences: Schleiermacher’s Overcoming Kant*

In the beginning of this chapter, I gave some quotations from Schleiermacher’s letters in which he praises Kant’s revolution in metaphysics. But that is not the whole story. Rather, Schleiermacher’s relation to Kant is ambivalent, a “love-hate” relationship, I would say. Schleiermacher is also very critical of Kant. Again in letters, he even speaks of “the smoky crust” of Kantian philosophy that needs to be broken.<sup>42</sup> Without fail, there are significant points where Schleiermacher really differs from Kant. Even the previous discussions on the similarities between them encountered some differences. Now, I will concentrate on the differences particularly. It will be Schleiermacher’s overcoming Kant.

And this is particularly important, for although Schleiermacher's thought is unthinkable without Kant's influence, the most essential in it is still his own unique insight.<sup>43</sup> It is this unique insight of Schleiermacher that obliges him to overcome Kant.

### *Gefühl* Overcomes Kant

As I have already mentioned, perhaps the most important difference between the two lies in Schleiermacher's theory of *Gefühl*. It is one of the main points of Schleiermacher's overcoming of Kant. There is no question that Kant was mainly concerned with the apriori presuppositions and limits of knowing. *Gefühl*, in his opinion, belongs to a different area and it is non-cognitive. It is also commonly acknowledged that Kant assigned a merely subjective-arbitrary role to it. Although *Gefühl* has a positive meaning for Kant as the *Gefühl* of respect in the area of ethics and the *Gefühl* of the sublime in the area of aesthetic, it receives its significance only from the content of those realities it is directed toward.<sup>44</sup>

In contrast to that, for Schleiermacher, *Gefühl* has its own validity, which is independent from and not less important than the apriority of reason and its subject matters of science, ethics, and aesthetics.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, *Gefühl* for Schleiermacher is not just one faculty among others. Rather, it is the supportive ground of different other faculties, such as, theoretical, practical, and aesthetic.<sup>46</sup> Schleiermacher does not consider *Gefühl* as just noncognitive, like Kant. To him, it is even more than cognitive. It rather is a pre-cognitive ground of consciousness. In addition to that, *Gefühl* cannot be non-cognitive simply because theoretical reason also could not be cognitive if its ground was noncognitive.<sup>47</sup> Hence, *Gefühl* to Schleiermacher is not so much beyond than before rationality, because it precedes all distinctions, including those formulated by Kant, such as, theoretical and practical. *Gefühl* belongs to the "this side" metaphysics also from this viewpoint. But there is even more to it in regard of overcoming Kant.

## *Gefühl* Overcomes the “Gap” In Kant’s System

Kant is often criticized for failing to make an adequate connection between theoretical and practical faculties of reason. In fact, this critique may be grounded in Kant’s own acknowledgement of the problem of the “gap” in his system.<sup>48</sup> The two somehow remain cut apart and reason, consequently, becomes split. It is worth noting that Schleiermacher has already made a criticism of that sort from the viewpoint of his own search for the common ground of all domains of knowledge. A case in point is found, for example, in Schleiermacher’s *Outlines of a Critique of the Existing Theory of Ethics*. Schleiermacher’s intention there is to establish the “foundation” (*Fundament*) of the building of knowledge instead of erecting “partitions” (*Zwischenwände*) between its supposedly independent and self-sufficient parts—the characteristic oversight of philosophers, in his opinion, from the ancient times until Kant.<sup>49</sup> That is to say, whereas the former divided the sciences into logic, physics, and ethics, the latter divided philosophy into theoretical and practical. Schleiermacher wants to make possible a “transition” (*Übergang*) between the separated systems, to build a “bridge” between them.<sup>50</sup>

This bridge lies in Schleiermacher’s theory of *Gefühl* in his *Dialektik*. Inasmuch as *Gefühl* is conceived as a unity encompassing the contrasts of knowing and willing, it may indeed serve as a bridge that crosses the gulf between theoretical and practical reasons in Kant’s thought. As explained above, this transition between the separated parts of the system becomes possible because of the absolute, or the transcendent ground, as the condition of the unity. Therefore, *Gefühl* mirrors the absolute to self-consciousness. Religious *Gefühl* becomes a mediating element between the phenomenal self and its transcendent ground. To Kant, in contrast, the absolute is inaccessible to any faculty and always remains only a regulative ideal.



An attempt has also been made to approach the split in Kant's system from a different, but related, perspective. Thandeka argues that Kant lost the link between the noumenal and empirical selves in his theory of self-consciousness. The title of her book speaks for itself: *The Embodied Self: Friedrich Schleiermacher's Solution to Kant's Problem of the Empirical Self*. It seems that she tries to show that, in his system, Kant failed to actualize his own empirical requirement. In Kant's first *Critique*, the origin of the self, or I, is understood both in thinking, as an original, spontaneous act of understanding, and in self-consciousness ("I think"). While the first one is pure, unmediated, pre-conscious activity of thinking with no subject-object distinction, the second, as the representation of the first, refers to a self that is conscious of itself. It is the representation of the spontaneous act and it is self-consciousness, the awareness of the self as thinking.<sup>51</sup> Kant's problem here is, as Thandeka explains, that this "I think" representation (Kant's pure or original apperception) is empty of any sensible content. Consequently, in her opinion, Kant fails to demonstrate how the pure self-consciousness of the "I think" "leads to knowledge of the self as an individuated, sentient, empirical being in particular, or to knowledge of the objective empirical world in general."<sup>52</sup> Or, as Thandeka succinctly puts it, "the self embedded in nature slipped through the gap in Kant's theory and lost its body."<sup>53</sup>

Although Thandeka considers the gap in Kant's system differently, she finds the solution to Kant's problem in Schleiermacher's theory of *Gefühl*. She sees that Schleiermacher identifies the gap between the rational mind and the empirical world as the rupture in consciousness that cannot be known or intuited but only felt.<sup>54</sup> *Gefühl* is a precognitive state of the self that is expressed in the moment of reason's cancellation in its "null-point" (*Nullpunkt*), when the identity of knowing and willing, intellectual and organic functions of reason, takes place in the reciprocal transition between them. *Gefühl* as immediate self-consciousness differs from Kant's reflective self-consciousness, the I

of the “I think.”<sup>55</sup> Even if *Gefühl* may seem empty from the viewpoint of knowledge (“null-point”), it actually is full. It fills in the gaping void in Kant’s system, and gives the self its body back. It changes the whole perspective on the thinking-being relationship. Related to that, as I will show below, is Schleiermacher’s determination to establish the unity of thinking and being, while for Kant they remain separate insofar as the thing-in-itself (*Ding an sich*) cannot be known.

### Is Pure Apriori Synthetic Knowledge Possible?

Another point of overcoming is Schleiermacher’s critique of Kant’s not having achieved the necessary balance between reason and experience. It is noteworthy that Schleiermacher strikes into the very heart of Kant’s first *Critique*. That is to say, he does not believe in the possibility of pure apriori synthetic knowledge. He thinks that there can be either one or another, but not both at the same time. Schleiermacher does not believe that the system of knowledge can be deduced from the necessary first principles without reference to sense experience, even if these principles, according to Kant, concern sense experience. On this account, Schleiermacher considers the categories and forms of experience as artificial constructs in Kant’s system. For example, Schleiermacher asserts that the formulae of arithmetic and geometry, as well as the logical laws of identity and contradiction, can only be analytic judgments, or they have to involve reference to sense experience.<sup>56</sup> As mentioned in the previous chapter, according to Schleiermacher, even universal thought-forms, such as the formula of identity “ $a=a$ ,” must have an organic side, “insofar as it includes the form of the process or expresses the condition of the same; but if they contain no organic activity, nothing can be thought in them.”<sup>57</sup> The formula “ $a=a$ ,” Schleiermacher continues, “expresses either the identity of thought and being, therefore the form of knowing, or the identity of the subject, therefore the condition of knowing. Without the organic activity it is no more than mere repetition of

thought, therefore empty.”<sup>58</sup> To be sure, this position does not mean that Schleiermacher falls into sheer empiricism. As shown above, for him, very much like it is for Kant, the sense impressions can have meaning only by means of interpretation and organization by thinking. Experience brings about the activity of reason. The latter organizes the former into a system. Thinking defines substances, distinguishes the species in the genus, unifies appearances into objects, and so forth. It moves back and forth from system to experience in order to fit them to each other. Yet, it is only a partial resemblance to Kant, for the greater consequence of this Schleiermacher’s fundamental critique of Kant is that the possibility of pure reason itself becomes questioned. It happens on the grounds of language insofar as it also consists of formal and organic elements. It is precisely language that blocks the possibility of access to pure reason. The latter would require a purely formal or general language. But such a language does not exist. If it existed, how would one even be able to learn it?<sup>59</sup>

Moreover, with the rejection of synthetic a priori knowledge Schleiermacher denies Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments altogether. He asserts:

The distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments cannot therefore be maintained; and they indeed are not different, for identical judgments are not judgments but only empty formulae, if one does not base them on the (in)complete concept, in which alone that distinction is grounded.<sup>60</sup>

At the very least, as Schleiermacher says, the analytic-synthetic distinction is unstable or “flowing” (*fliessender*).<sup>61</sup> He thinks that it is very difficult to draw a clear-cut boundary between these two kinds of judgments. That is, the same judgment can be understood either analytically or synthetically. For example, the judgment “ice melts” is analytic when beginning with and passing through certain temperature relationships that are already assumed in the concept of ice. If that does not happen, the judgment is synthetic.<sup>62</sup> In a word, the truth about the relationship of Schleiermacher to Kant in regard

to the issue of reason and experience appears to be, as Scholtz says, that the very point of Schleiermacher's closeness to Kant at the same time marks their distance. For both, all determinate perceptions are already structured through reason's concepts, and all concepts have the content of perception and experience. Yet, for Schleiermacher, pure reason in a strong sense cannot be actualized.<sup>63</sup>

### Thinking and Being

Even if Schleiermacher at least partly agrees with Kant that thought can only proceed by means of certain universal forms, there is another related crucial difference between the two. This difference is dictated by Schleiermacher's modified metaphysical realism. It is this position that makes Schleiermacher, in contrast to Kant, not so much a critic as a mediator.<sup>64</sup> Schleiermacher wants to rectify Kant's polarized system in which knowing and being remain separated. Schleiermacher's *Dialectic* intends to develop a coherent and universal system under the presupposition, perhaps coming from Schleiermacher's Greek and Spinozian backgrounds, that being and knowing, although independent, are united. That is to say, for Schleiermacher, the thought forms must somehow conform to the structure of the real world. As shown in the previous chapter, this is the condition of knowing to Schleiermacher. Real knowing cannot take place unless there is a correspondence between thinking and its objects in being. Schleiermacher believes that there are real objects in the world and that they can really be known. The coherence of being informs the system of knowledge and the latter, in turn, captures being. Contra Kant and British empiricists, Schleiermacher asserts the possibility of knowing that independent being that causes perception. To add to that, Schleiermacher also believes that the sense impressions themselves must have an implicit order responsive to the forms of thought. That is, they are not passively receptive to the

imposition of alien forms upon them, as if they were utterly formless in themselves, as Kant assumes.<sup>65</sup>

### Thing-in-Itself

The foregoing difference is closely related to the contrary views of Schleiermacher and Kant regarding the thing-in-itself. As is well known, for Kant correspondence between thinking and being is not possible. This is because the world as it is in itself is not knowable insofar as intuition is bound to the subjective spatio-temporal conditions. However, while the thing-in-itself cannot be known, it can and must be thought, for it is the necessary presupposition of phenomena. In any case, the thing-in-itself always appears through the lens of the subject's manner of intuition as an appearance, a phenomenon. As a result, to Kant, the correspondence between thinking and being goes only in so far as the categories of thought conform to the phenomenal world, which itself is a construct of mind, appearances of the objects in the subject's consciousness.<sup>66</sup>

In contrast to Kant's subjective idealism, according to which we know only insofar as we apply our own concepts to the things as they appear, Schleiermacher thinks that there is always some independent fact or entity to which the thought adjusts itself and is able to correspond. In a word, the forms of thought must conform to the real being, that which is not appearance. Or, to be more precise, according to Schleiermacher, appearance conforms to the thing-in-itself. The combined being, bestowed through the organic function of reason and apprehended through the intellectual function of reason, is not an appearance of being, but is one and the same being.<sup>67</sup> As Schleiermacher states, "there is no separation of the essence of thing and its appearance."<sup>68</sup>

Schleiermacher also poses several questions in regard to this Kantian problematic of thing-in-itself in his lecture "Short Presentation of the Spinozian System." First,

Schleiermacher asks, “What determines the individuality of appearances?”<sup>69</sup> Is it the thing-in-itself? His answer is, “Obviously, nothing else than cohesion or the identical confluence of a certain quantity of powers in one point.”<sup>70</sup> Hence, in Schleiermacher’s view, the individuality of things has an imaginable (*vorstellbare*) ground. According to this point of view, Schleiermacher goes on, the ignorance about the plurality of noumena and the certainty about the plurality of phenomena cannot be referred to that individuality. Moreover, this certainty is amplified by the fact that a physical entity is divisible. Now, Schleiermacher continues, if every entity in the sensuous world is supposed to have one corresponding to it in the intelligible world, it would entail our ability to increase the number of things-in-themselves, which certainly is in contradiction to things-in-themselves by definition. So much for the viewpoint of the noumena of material things.

In addition to that, Kant has a second class of things-in-themselves, namely, those that ground reasonable beings. Accordingly, Schleiermacher proceeds to the next instance of transition from sensuous to intelligible worlds, which is human being itself. This phenomenological turn raises the second question: “Is it certain that every consciousness has its peculiar noumenon at its basis?”<sup>71</sup> Is this not an instance of the paralogisms of reason? In fact, Schleiermacher draws similar conclusions to those with regard to material things. Schleiermacher thinks that the individualizing consciousness is rooted in receptivity and, therefore, refers only to appearance. To be sure, reason is the individualizing factor, for it is most closely connected to what really exists in a human being. On the other hand, it is precisely the reflective activity or observation (*Betrachtung*) of reason that “even sooner leads one back from delusion of individuality.”<sup>72</sup> Therefore, Schleiermacher proceeds, if because of the phenomenality of individualizing consciousness one has no ground to claim a plurality of noumena, “then it

is already a presumption to express it differently, as *The noumenon, The world as noumenon.*”<sup>73</sup>

Schleiermacher accedes to Spinoza’s position of the positive unity of the world rather than to the dualism of Kant. According to the latter, the temporal development of human life is the consequence of intelligible and absolutely free acts of self-determination. Individuality comes forth from that. In effect, the individual subjects are independent. One can even say that they abide in a kind of “monadic seclusion.”<sup>74</sup> This is an inevitable consequence of Kant’s theory of thing-in-itself. Schleiermacher’s theory of thinking and its ground in being, in contrast, makes it necessary to consider individual subject as unity. What is behind its appearance is not noumenon, but higher power. Schleiermacher’s polarity is not that of noumenon and phenomenon, but power and appearance. This may even be a point where Schleiermacher comes close to Hegel.<sup>75</sup> Individual subjects are interconnected by means of the communal spirit. I will further elucidate this important aspect in the section about Schleiermacher’s intersubjective theory of language.

### Schleiermacher’s Early Critique of Kant’s Dualism

Even in his early years, Schleiermacher gives a programmatic critique of the much criticized dualism of Kant. First, the early Schleiermacher approaches it from the moral point of view. That is to say, according to Kant, the moral law is unconditionally binding, and yet one can never fully realize it. Schleiermacher rejects this dualism and argues that the moral goal cannot be other than that which can be actualized. For him, precisely the removal of the dualism between the real and the ideal in the ethical life is the highest good. Whereas for Kant happiness is included within practical reason, for Schleiermacher it must be of an experiential character and therefore excluded from practical reason. Kant’s notion of the highest good as related only to the moral law,

therefore to practical and rational life, simply does not take into account the sensuous aspect of human life. For this reason, Schleiermacher must reject Kant's "new metaphysical system," which is built on the practical postulates.<sup>76</sup>

Second, the early Schleiermacher's criticism of dualism in Kant's system addresses phenomenal necessity and transcendental freedom.<sup>77</sup> In contrast to Kant, Schleiermacher unites these two opposing elements. They become correlates: necessity belongs not only to theoretical but also to practical (moral) life, but whereas transcendental freedom as such is not possible, it is possible when referred to the theoretical area of experience. Moreover, Schleiermacher crowns his position by subsuming causal necessity under an absolute origin, the absolute (thing-in-itself).

Of course, the two former contrasts are but manifestations of the aforementioned primary dualism between phenomena and things-in-themselves in Kant's thought. The basic dilemma of this dualism is how to relate the appearance to the real object. In Kant's system, both the thing-in-itself and the synthetic unity of apperception determine the intuition. Yet, Kant never brings them together in any kind of unity. To perform this unfinished task of Kant's, the early Schleiermacher turns to Spinoza and his metaphysical principle of identity.<sup>78</sup> In Spinoza's metaphysics, the principle of causality does not apply to the noumenon-phenomenon relationship. The principle of causality is valid for the phenomenal world only, whereas the noumenon-phenomenon relationship is governed by the principle of identity. Hence, the absolute is no longer a thing-in-itself in Kant's sense; as object, it is included within the subject. The absolute is determined by the identity of subject and object that occurs in religious *Gefühl*. That is the only way the absolute receives real content. Otherwise it would remain an empty idea.



## Space and Time

A perfect example of the conformity of the forms of thought to being in contrast to Kant's inverse view in this regard is Schleiermacher's treatment of space and time. According to Kant, space and time are not concepts at all, but are the necessary pure apriori forms of intuition. As such, they cannot be the properties of things themselves. They are subjective forms of representation by means of which the subject matter of knowing is approached.<sup>79</sup> Schleiermacher only partly agrees with this account: space and time not only have apriori character but also belong to the real world. Although space and time are subjective schemata of thought, as for Kant, that is not the whole story for Schleiermacher. As he says:

Space and time pertain to the way and mode of things themselves, not merely our representations, [an insight] which follows from our main view of knowledge, because all real knowing is at the same time quantitative. Both forms are therefore in representation as well as in things, and the question, to which of both they pertain, is idle.<sup>80</sup>

Moreover, in contrast to Kant, Schleiermacher considers space and time to be mutual correlates out of which the real being as matter comes to being in its diversity. For Kant, both space and time stand apart, unrelated.

## The Truth of the Categories

Apart from all deliberations about Schleiermacher's metaphysical realism, his correspondence theory of truth is subtle enough from a different viewpoint as well. That is to say, it certainly is not metaphysically straightforward. In fact, Schleiermacher shifts to the coherence theory of truth when he further clarifies how the correspondence can be confirmed.<sup>81</sup> Of course, that can be done only indirectly, within the context of a whole system of knowledge that makes possible the organization of sense experience. In this sense, Schleiermacher's argument again resembles Kant's, for it turns out that thought can proceed only by means of the use of certain forms independent of the perceived

world. However, the upshot of Schleiermacher's argument, once more, goes against Kant inasmuch as it states that the structure of the real world as such, not merely appearance, conforms to the laws of thought. As one consequence, Schleiermacher, indeed, retains some of Kant's categories and forms, such as causality, space, and time, but only as the modes of being of the things themselves.

All of the issues above that basically deal with the relationship of thinking and being, such as knowing the thing-in-itself, phenomena and noumena, the reality of space and time, and the reality of categories, could be summarized with Hoyer's statement concerning the epistemological approaches of Kant and Schleiermacher: whereas Kant "annihilated the reality of knowing, Schleiermacher saved it."<sup>82</sup>

### The Idea of God: Constitutive or Regulative

To some extent, Schleiermacher's views regarding the impossibility of knowing God are very similar to Kant's. Yet, there are some differences even here. It has been argued that even if the idea of God is a necessary presupposition of knowing for both Kant and Schleiermacher, for Schleiermacher it is not so much regulative as constitutive, at least for the wholeness of reason.<sup>83</sup> I could agree, but with some qualifications. I would say that, to Schleiermacher, the idea of God is both regulative and constitutive. But going still further, perhaps this difference between regulative and constitutive in the thought of Kant and Schleiermacher should not be accentuated at all, for it is difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between regulative and constitutive. For one thing, Schleiermacher claims that the idea of the divine could not be regulative if it were not constitutive, "namely, constituting our individual being."<sup>84</sup> By the same token, Schleiermacher admits that Kant himself made the regulative ideas of theoretical reason constitutive for practical reason.<sup>85</sup> Noteworthy, this same suspicion against Kant is even stronger today. For example, as I have already noted in the first part, it is argued, very much as did

Schleiermacher, that the regulative employment of the ideas of reason implies their being constitutive as well. If they are not constitutive, they cannot be regulative either, for the use of the words themselves presupposes knowing their meaning.<sup>86</sup>

Putting aside this constitutive-regulative discussion for a moment, I would like to point out that Schleiermacher and Kant both assign different roles to the divine in their thought. While Kant, at least according to his own intent, postulates God only from practical interest, but theoretically considers it only as necessary regulative idea, Schleiermacher also seeks in the idea of the divine the postulate for knowing.<sup>87</sup> Accordingly, Schleiermacher criticizes both natural theology and Kant for their one-sidedness of grounding God-consciousness solely in one function—either of thinking or willing (practical reason)—while ignoring the other.<sup>88</sup> As a result, Schleiermacher thinks, “Kant failed to demonstrate the place of the idea of the divine as well as the connexion of its being in reason; instead, he took the idea as given, only not knowing how.”<sup>89</sup> I think, it is this “practical one-sidedness,”<sup>90</sup> while at the same time ignoring the cognitive role of the idea of the divine as the presupposition of knowledge, that allows Schleiermacher to assert that “Kant’s polemic against old metaphysics also is contaminated by misunderstandings.”<sup>91</sup> As a matter of fact, Schleiermacher elsewhere likens this polemic of Kant to that of the critical thinkers who inadvertently end up in atheism.<sup>92</sup> This problem, on Schleiermacher’s account, has its roots in confusing the didactic procedure of religious discourse with the dialectic or the transcendent procedures. The former is wrongly considered to be the latter and, as such, found inadequate. The atheistic conclusion of this misunderstanding is that the idea of the divine, which, due to the finitude of thinking, can always be expressed only inadequately and contradictorily, is in itself also regarded to be untrue. Schleiermacher cannot subscribe to this view, I think, precisely because, for him, the idea of the divine is constitutive as well. Schleiermacher believes that this same misunderstanding is at work in Kant’s strife against the special

metaphysics.<sup>93</sup> If I understand it correctly, Schleiermacher suggests that the language of these disciplines is also didactic or symbolic. Hence, the role of the divine in them is not constitutive, as Kant assumed, but rather regulative. Because of this misunderstanding, Kant discarded the baby with the bath water, rejecting the constitutive role of the idea of the divine in epistemology altogether.

Schleiermacher, in contrast, in a manner characteristic to him, tries to avoid any one-sidedness and finds the transcendent ground of being in the identity of both thinking and willing.<sup>94</sup> Whereas, for Schleiermacher, God can also never be known theoretically, the idea of God must necessarily be presupposed for the identity of both thinking and willing with being. Not that there can be knowledge of that identity. Rather, the idea of God is constitutively presupposed *as* that identity.<sup>95</sup> Hence, it is a limiting concept that Schleiermacher calls the “transcendent ground.”

### The Experience of the Divine

Schleiermacher not only conceives of God metaphysically, as the principle of identity and unity, as oppositionless unity of all contrasts, but also believes that this unity can be experienced in religious *Gefühl*.<sup>96</sup> Whereas one can argue about the idea of God in Schleiermacher’s thought in both metaphysical (the idea of *God*) and nonmetaphysical (the *idea* of God) ways, it is the possibility of the experience of God that makes a crucial difference between Schleiermacher and Kant. For the latter, the supersensible, including God, can never be experienced. Once again, Kant’s bifurcation of phenomenal and noumenal realms bans not only the knowledge but also the experience of the divine. Precisely the unavailability of the supersensible makes Kant’s ethics metaphysical in the sense of its independence of experience. Moreover, Kant does not trust to any kind of “religious experience,” for that can be taken as a substitute for morality. It can also be used for hidden power motives. That is, one can present one’s subjective fancy as a “real”

fact about the divine will in order to impose it on others. Notably, one can say that Kant was much more radical than were the older negative theologians (the Greek “fathers,” for example) who admitted the mystical experiences of the divine in the ecstasy of reason. For Kant, this way is no less closed than the speculative one.<sup>97</sup>

Although Schleiermacher agrees with Kant that God could not be known, in contrast to Kant, and like the negative theologians, he maintains that the divine could be encountered otherwise. He agrees with Jacobi and the romantics that this encounter takes place on some prereflective, intuitive level. A basic characteristic of religion, to Schleiermacher, is the immediate *Gefühl* of absolute dependence. Hence, the proper object of theology is the study of human states of religious experience in their individual and common expressions as indirect witnesses of the divine causality. Paradoxically, even if this aspect belongs to Schleiermacher’s overcoming of Kant, it is his theological analogue to Kant’s turn to the subject, Kant’s “Copernican revolution” in philosophy.

#### The Postulates of Practical Reason: Speculative?

In addition to these differences, in those same *Outlines of a Critique of the Existing Theory of Ethics*, Schleiermacher questions the very possibility of the postulates of practical reason. Once again, he tries to strike at the heart of Kant’s system—only this time at the second *Critique*. Remarkably, Schleiermacher argues that the assimilation of the ideas of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul in moral theory calls for a similar critique to the one Kant directed at theoretical reason.<sup>98</sup> Such a critique, Schleiermacher goes on, would show that these postulates are “unnecessary” for the theory of ethics and “forced there by misunderstanding.”<sup>99</sup> The problem is, in Schleiermacher’s opinion, that there is “a considerable right to imagine that they are produced upon speculative soil and properly belong there.”<sup>100</sup> Schleiermacher concludes: “And so the building transforms itself only into a child’s game, built with flimsy

materials, tossed back and forth from shore to shore.”<sup>101</sup> It means that Schleiermacher believes that Kant in his second *Critique* overstepped the very limits set in the first one. According to Schleiermacher, it turns out that Kant’s moral theory of the second *Critique* is grounded on speculative reason after all, even if it is pure practical reason. As Thandeka puts it, Schleiermacher believed that Kant, by relying on speculative reason to delineate moral consciousness, mistakenly filled with knowledge the place he had originally cleared for faith.<sup>102</sup>

### *Schleiermacher and Kant: Difference in Similarity*

I have shown several similarities and even more differences between Schleiermacher and Kant. Now I want to go further and claim that the differences, including the basic difference brought about by Schleiermacher’s theory of *Gefühl*, is at the same time based on similarities between them. This shows the ambiguity in Schleiermacher’s overcoming Kant. It is an overcoming that uses those same resources that are supposed to be overcome. It means that it is the overcoming without leaving. Thus, these differences in similarity will confirm my thesis of the overcoming of metaphysics without completely leaving the metaphysics that is supposed to be overcome.

In particular, there are several important traits in the thought of both Kant and Schleiermacher that may not only mitigate the crucial variance brought in by the theory of *Gefühl*, but even present it as affinity to Kant, difference in/from similarity, so to say. It can be viewed as Schleiermacher’s “Kantian” overcoming of Kant, the overcoming of Kant with Kant’s own means. As will be seen, there are instances in which Schleiermacher rationalizes *Gefühl*, while Kant himself, in turn, attempts to bridge the gulf between theoretical and practical reasons in a way not too unlike to Schleiermacher’s. The latter’s achievement of bridging the Kantian gulf or gap may be

inspired by some aspects of Kant's own thought quite neglected in Schleiermacher's time and even later.

### The Equivalents of Schleiermacher's *Gefühl* in Kant

To start with Schleiermacher, it is worth noting that *Gefühl*, according to him, is not some kind of third entity in addition to theoretical and practical reasons, but is, in fact, itself an instance of reason. This idea is very Kantian. As I will show later, Kant's overcoming of the breach between the two reasons, in a way, is grounded in reason itself. Schleiermacher ponders in his *Ethics*:

*What we call Gefühl is altogether, just like thinking, expression of reason in nature. It is an activity of life developing in nature, yet coming to be only through reason, and that applies not only to moral and religious Gefühl, but also to corporeal Gefühl, when it is posited only as human and as total impetus (Moment) of Gefühl. Moreover, Gefühl is not less an agent as thinking, because it returns pure in itself. It is therefore a more definite expression of the mode of being of reason in this particular nature. For Gefühl also always expresses from the lowest mode what reason does or does not effect in nature. . . . However, if it could appear that hereby the nature that is not united with reason was not at all in game, and therefore Gefühl was either overall not moral or at least not for itself, but was moral only together with other, then every Gefühl would always express what reason does or does not effect in nature united with it, according to the relationship in which this opposes the not united; and just this is the disturbance that necessarily belongs to every Gefühl. [Emphases added.]<sup>103</sup>*

There are several ways in which Kant himself speaks of the unity of reason. For instance, he presents practical and speculative reasons under a "common principle," because, as he says, "in the final analysis there can be but one and the same reason which must be differentiated only in application."<sup>104</sup> In Kant's opinion, it is only a human predisposition to distinguish concept and intuition that causes the difference between the two reasons.<sup>105</sup> The reason itself is one, and it is the plurality of faculties that requires the division.

Next, one cannot bypass Kant's cryptic remark about "perhaps a common, but to us unknown, root" of sensibility and understanding.<sup>106</sup> There is no question that, for

Schleiermacher, not only the two stems of knowledge, but all functions of reason rest on a “common root,” which in his case is *Gefühl*.<sup>107</sup> Heidegger’s most controversial interpretation of Kant’s passage is that the “common root” is imagination discussed in the “Transcendental Deduction” part of the first *Critique*.<sup>108</sup> Putting aside the question of whether Heidegger’s interpretation is accurate, it is worth noting that Kant’s “imagination,” very much like Schleiermacher’s *Gefühl*, is a term “for the unity of “activities” required, in addition to the objective principles of knowledge, to render intelligible the actuality of knowledge.”<sup>109</sup>

Furthermore, mention might also be made of Kant’s discussion of the unity of reason in the context of the regulative employment of the ideas of pure reason. This point again brings both Schleiermacher and Kant into contact with each other, even if not straightforwardly. The idea of the divine for Kant is the regulative idea par excellence, whereas for Schleiermacher, it comes into play together with *Gefühl* as the uniting factor of knowing and willing. In Kant’s opinion, although the transcendental ideas are “illusory,” “a *focus imaginarius*,” nonetheless, they are “indispensably necessary,” for they bring to the concepts the greatest possible unity combined with the greatest possible extension.<sup>110</sup> It is a metaphysical indispensability insofar as it directs understanding beyond every given experience. As Kant illustrates, it is like in the case of mirror vision, where illusion is indispensably necessary if one wants to see not only the objects before one’s eyes, but also those that lie at a distance behind.<sup>111</sup> But, Kant stresses over and over again, it is only a regulative, “hypothetical” employment of reason, including the case of its own unity regarded as objectively valid.<sup>112</sup> Kant writes:

The hypothetical employment of reason has, therefore, as its aim the systematic unity of the knowledge of understanding, and this unity is the *criterion of the truth* of its rules. The systematic unity (as a mere idea) is, however, only a *projected* unity, to be regarded not as given in itself, but as a problem only.<sup>113</sup>



Thus, the idea of the unity of reason itself is viewed as a regulative idea, insofar as it is based on the reduction of different faculties—such as, sensation, consciousness, imagination, memory, wit, pleasure, desire, and others—to one “single radical” or “fundamental power” (*Grundkraft*).<sup>114</sup> Note that contrary to Heidegger’s interpretation, precisely this “fundamental” “radical” or “power” may most likely refer to the controversial “perhaps (cf. hypothetical) unknown root (cf. *radix*)” phrase of Kant.<sup>115</sup>

In the next place, the aforementioned neglected aspect of Kant’s own effort to unite the two modes of reason is found in his *Critique of Judgment*. There Kant acknowledges “the immense gulf” (*unübersehbare Kluft*) between the realm of the sensible concept of nature, pertaining to understanding or theoretical reason, and the supersensible concept of freedom, pertaining to (practical) reason.<sup>116</sup> Kant himself feels uncomfortable with this gulf and, for one thing, proposes that the practical reason, nevertheless, is meant to influence the theoretical one, for the concept of freedom is meant to realize the ends proposed by its laws in the sensible world.<sup>117</sup> Thus, Kant’s effort to unite the two reasons, in a way involves subordination of the theoretical reason to the practical one. Furthermore, it is also here that Kant propounds the supersensible as the transcendental ground of unity of the two reasons, even if this ground of unity arises from the practical reason itself:

There must, therefore, be a ground of the *unity* of the supersensible that lies at the basis of nature, with what the concept of freedom contains in a practical way, and although the concept of this ground neither theoretically nor practically attains to a knowledge of it, and so has no peculiar realm of its own, still it renders possible the transition from the mode of thought according to the principles of the one to that according to the principles of the other.<sup>118</sup>

Here is how the transition between the two reasons actually takes place. To begin, supplying the apriori laws of nature, understanding provides a proof that nature can be cognized only as phenomenon. This same occurrence points to the supersensible, yet leaving it undetermined. Next enters judgment. By means of the apriori principle of its

estimation of nature's purposiveness according to its particular laws, it provides the supersensible with determinability through the intellectual faculty. What is left for reason, then, is to give determination to the same a priori by its practical law.<sup>119</sup> This proposition of the transcendental purpose of the supersensible bears resemblance to the role of the absolute in Schleiermacher's thought even if it has quite different functions in the systems of both thinkers.

### *Gefühl* in Kant

Even more important, to Kant, very much as with Schleiermacher, it is precisely *Gefühl* that turns out to be the uniting factor of the two reasons. It appears very striking to me, notwithstanding that Kant means a different kind of *Gefühl* from Schleiermacher's. This crucial insight appears in the chapter whose title speaks for itself: "The Critique of Judgment as a Means of Connecting the Two Parts of Philosophy (theoretical and practical) in a Whole." By the way, it is there that Kant for the first time calls judgment a middle term or mediating agent (*Mittelglied*) between (theoretical) understanding and (practical) reason.<sup>120</sup> Right after, Kant approaches this same issue from a slightly different perspective. That is, he distinguishes three irreducible "faculties of the soul" that correspond to three cognitive faculties of understanding, judgment, and reason as their determining ground. These faculties of the soul are knowing, the *Gefühl* of pleasure or displeasure, and the faculty of desire.<sup>121</sup> According to Kant, since the *Gefühl* of pleasure and displeasure is related to the faculty of desire (being prior to its principle, as with the lower desires, or supervening upon its determination by the moral law, as with the higher desires), "it will effect a transition from the faculty of pure knowledge, i.e. from the realm of concepts of nature, to that of the concept of freedom, just as in its logical employment it makes possible the transition from understanding to reason."<sup>122</sup> To add to that, although to Kant it is distinctive *Gefühl* of pleasure and displeasure, different from

Schleiermacher's notion of *Gefühl* as self-consciousness, it nevertheless puts both on a common ground of placing the transition from theoretical to practical in immediate consciousness. On Kant's account, the *Gefühl* of pleasure or displeasure in the aesthetic judgment of taste, in contrast to theoretical (logical) and practical (moral) judgments, represent its object immediately, without concept or precept.<sup>123</sup> In a word, *Gefühl* is immediate for both. Moreover, insofar as the purposiveness or teleology (*Zweckmässigkeit*) of nature is the peculiar apriori principle of this judgment, Kant's understanding of *Gefühl* cannot be merely subjective.<sup>124</sup>

As I will show in the chapters below, Schleiermacher's concept of *Gefühl* has some kind of unsettling character, that is, it causes disturbance because it does not properly "belong" into the metaphysical system, to either knowing or doing, but is a middle-term between them. Kant's concept of *Gefühl* also appears disturbing in the contexts of both his theoretical and practical philosophies. Kant excludes it from the *Critique of Pure Reason* as lying outside the whole faculty of knowledge only to return to it in the *Critique of Judgment* as a necessary condition of experience.<sup>125</sup> Similarly, Kant excludes it from the critical practical philosophy only to return to it in the form of the *Gefühl* of the respect for the law.<sup>126</sup> In any case, these considerations lead me to agree with Davidovich who writes:

*Gefühl* is one of Kant's most ambiguous and therefore fascinating concepts. Much of his writing may be read as the attempt properly to situate '*Gefühl*' with respect to theoretical and practical philosophy, with the concept shifting continuously between the margins and the centre of his philosophy.<sup>127</sup>

To be sure, after these deliberations, one cannot so easily accentuate this "basic difference" between Schleiermacher and Kant.

## Kant's Own Bridging of His Gap

My interpretation of the affinity of Schleiermacher and Kant in regard to the overcoming of bifurcation of reason can be empowered by means of work done on Kant's third *Critique* today. Davidovich, for example, draws out and further articulates the religious implications of Kant's bridging the theoretical and practical reasons with judgment. She interprets the *Critique of Judgment* as Kant's attempt to unite the two reasons on the basis of religious consciousness<sup>128</sup>—unquestionably, an approach just like Schleiermacher's. Davidovich links Kant with Otto and Tillich on this point, albeit without even mentioning Schleiermacher. In my opinion, this omission is not quite fair, because the influence of Schleiermacher's thought on these two thinkers was as significant as Kant's. Even more, I think that it was Schleiermacher rather than Kant who motivated the fundamental role of religious self-consciousness in the thought of Otto and Tillich. Be that as it may, Davidovich's interpretation of Kant is also very interesting from the viewpoint of Schleiermacher's relation to Kant.

Davidovich writes: "I contend that in his last systematic works Kant considered religion an essential bridge between the worlds of theory and praxis and elevated its status as such to that of a necessary principle through which alone the unity of reason is established."<sup>129</sup> I would say that this same sentence could as well apply to Schleiermacher's concept of *Gefühl* as religious consciousness in the *Dialectics*. The similarity of the essential role of religious consciousness in achieving the unity of reason is remarkable even if, according to Davidovich's interpretation of Kant, the unity of reason is not established in immediate self-consciousness, but in a moment of contemplative judgment about a moral designer of the universe guided by the idea of the Highest Good.<sup>130</sup> Indeed, it does not seem to be a coincidence that Kant himself concludes that this contemplative judgment leads to the possibility of theology and, subsequently, to religion.<sup>131</sup> Notably, the word "contemplative" is important, because it

itself overcomes the dichotomy between theoretical and practical inasmuch as it does not imply knowledge, but only a possibility of thinking; not that one could have knowledge of the unity of nature and freedom, but that it is at least possible to think of it.<sup>132</sup> It is a transcendental proposition of a hypothetically unified reason. That is to say, the contemplative judgment about the divine purposiveness of nature meditates on reality as it might be seen from the viewpoint of a reason that is unlike our bifurcated reason.<sup>133</sup> Once again, the limits of the first *Critique* are not transgressed.

### *Gefühl* and Transcendental Apperception

Furthermore, one can also approach the reminiscence of Kant's thought in Schleiermacher's theory of *Gefühl* from a different angle. Strikingly, for both Kant and Schleiermacher the union of intuition/empiricism and concept/speculation in knowing requires a unity which itself is neither sensible nor conceptual, but precedes both as their condition of possibility. Schleiermacher calls it *Gefühl*, Kant—transcendental apperception, which itself is a kind of *Gefühl*.<sup>134</sup> The term “apperception” originally appeared in Leibniz's thought referring to pre-reflective inner awareness as opposed to perception or outer awareness. Kant developed this notion further and understood it as the possibility to unite the experiences owing to the subject's ability to recognize them as his or her own. Even more important, although this apperception generates the representation “I think,” it itself cannot be accompanied by any further representation.<sup>135</sup> That is to say, very much like Schleiermacher's *Gefühl*, it is transcendental, because it cannot be derived either from intuitions or concepts, but rather precedes them as their apriori condition of possibility.<sup>136</sup> The transcendental unity of apperception is not just categorial. As Kant states: “We must therefore look yet higher for this unity [of apperception], namely in that which itself contains the ground of the unity of diverse concepts in judgment, and therefore of the possibility of the understanding. . .”<sup>137</sup> In short, as Kant puts it in the

heading of a chapter: “The principle of the synthetic unity of apperception is the supreme principle of all employment of the understanding.”<sup>138</sup> Putting aside the problem of the lack of empirical content of Kant’s apperception, this discussion, in my view, presents sufficient grounds for its correspondence with Schleiermacher’s *Gefühl*.

### *Summary*

In this comparative chapter, I first analyzed some elements important for the overcoming of metaphysics that Schleiermacher overtook from Kant. For example, among other things, I examined Schleiermacher’s agreement with Kant’s own overcoming of metaphysics, which requires the supplementation of sensibility and understanding, as well as the resulting rejection of the speculative knowledge of God and founding religion in the consciousness of the subject. Then, I continued with their differences—Schleiermacher’s overcoming of Kant—such as Schleiermacher’s rejection of apriori synthetic knowledge and the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments with that, his opposing views regarding the thinking-being relationship in Kant and the resulting knowability of the thing-in-itself, the constitutive epistemological role of the idea of God as opposed to the regulative ideal of Kant, and others.

But most important of all, in this process, I found something in the middle between these two, between the similarities and the differences. To use Schleiermacher’s vocabulary, there was a transition (*Übergang*) between them. There are instances where the overcoming could not be so easily distinguished from the influence. That is to say, it may indeed be an overcoming of Kant with Kant’s own means, an overcoming whose roots are found in Kant’s own thought, an overcoming of Kant without leaving him. Among others, the most distinct instances of this undecided condition can be found in Kant’s own counterparts to Schleiermacher’s attempt to bridge the gap in Kant’s philosophical system with his theory of *Gefühl*. In the same way as the transition between

metaphysical contrasts plays the most important role in Schleiermacher's overcoming of metaphysics and his own metaphysics, I estimate this undecided transitional part to be more important than the other two in which everything is clear. Hence, in a way, this chapter may also represent the element of the basic scheme that I apply to Schleiermacher's metaphysics. Admittedly, this chapter did not significantly touch upon Schleiermacher's overcoming of metaphysics in the sense of leaving it behind. Rather, it basically dealt with Schleiermacher's elaboration of, in his perspective, more adequate metaphysics than Kant's. Nevertheless, this chapter does illustrate the fact that, knowingly or not, every overcoming draws its resources from the source it tries to overcome. Hence, to a certain extent, it exemplifies the neo-structuralist strategy of reading in the sense of elucidating the elements of Kant's own thought that may have been suppressed by his readers. It is interesting, for example, that Kant's theory of *Gefühl* turns out to be no less unsettling to metaphysics than Schleiermacher's.

## NOTES

1. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *The Life of Schleiermacher: As Unfolded in His Autobiography and Letters*, trans., ed. Frederica Rowan, vol. 1 (London: Smith, Elder, 1860), 68.
2. W. H. Walsh, *Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 12.
3. Johannes M. Hoyer, *Schleiermachers Erkenntnistheorie in ihrem Verhältnis zur Erkenntnistheorie Kants* (Lommatzsch, Germany: Hobein, 1905), 68-69.
4. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 63; *Friedrich Schleiermachers Dialektik*, ed. Rudolf Odebrecht (Darmstadt, Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976), 140-41. Further *Dialektik* (Odebrecht).
5. August Dorner, "Schleiermachers Verhältnis zu Kant," *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* 74 (1901), 8.
6. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Humanities Press, 1950), 92 (A, 50; B, 74).
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, 61 (A, 15; B, 29), 93 (A51; B, 75).
9. *Ibid.*, 93 (A51; B, 75).

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 64. "Ohne Einheit und Vielheit ist die Mannigfaltigkeit unbestimmt; ohne Mannigfaltigkeit ist die bestimmte Einheit und Vielheit leer. Die Berrichtung der Vernunft im Denken ist also die Bestimmung, die Berrichtung der Organisation ist die Belebung." Organization (*Organisation*) to Schleiermacher means the organic function of sense experience in contrast (or in complementarity) to the intellectual function of reason.

13. Ibid., 31.

14. See also Richard B. Brandt, *The Philosophy of Schleiermacher: The Development of His Theory of Scientific and Religious Knowledge* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1968), 206.

15. Brandt (206) points out Schleiermacher's example (*Dialektik* (Jonas), 210) of a person acquainted with buildings seeing a tower for the first time. Sensations then derive their meaning from the known concept of building. The particular image becomes a sensory objectification of a kind of building. In this way, a new concept is formed—that of tower.

16. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 208. ". . . beides wird gleichzeitig im oscillirenden Verfahren."

17. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 26f (B, xxv).

18. Ibid., 27. Curran notices Schleiermacher's similarity to Kant in avoiding conflict within reason. See Thomas H. Curran, *Doctrine and Speculation in Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre* (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1994), 138.

19. Brandt, 210-11.

20. Dorner, 8.

21. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, trans., ed. H. R. Mackintosh and J. Stewart (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1986), 131 (§32).

22. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On the Glaubenslehre: Two Letters to Dr. Lücke*, trans. James Duke and Francis Fiorenza (Chico, Calif.: Scholar's Press, 1981), translators' Introduction, 26.

23. See the following discussion in Dorner, 14.

24. Cf. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 194 (§50).

25. Dorner, 12. Dorner also gives a very detailed account of Kantian influences in the *Glaubenslehre*.

26. Christoph Sigwart, "Schleiermachers Erkenntnistheorie und ihre Bedeutung für die Grundbegriffe der Glaubenslehre," *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie* 2 (1857), 274.

27. Martin Redeker, *Schleiermacher: Life and Thought*, trans. John Wallhauser (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1973), 111.

28. Dorner, 9.



29. My relating of *Gefühl* to subjectivity should be taken provisionally here. That is to say, *Gefühl* should be regarded subjective only insofar as it is grounded in self-consciousness. In fact, later on I will defend Schleiermacher against allegations of being a subjectivist. *Gefühl* is not just a subjective feeling to Schleiermacher; it is an immediate self-consciousness that exceeds subjectivity.

30. Redeker, 113.

31. Dorner, 11.

32. *Ibid.*, 6.

33. *Ibid.*, 11-12.

34. Dorner, 30.

35. *Ibid.*

36. Theodor Siegfried, "Kant und Schleiermacher," *Marburger Theologische Studien* 3 (1931), 28.

37. *Ibid.*, 29.

38. *Ibid.*

39. *Ibid.*, 30.

40. Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Hague, Netherlands; Boston; London: Nijhoff, 1981), 43.

41. Siegfried, 37.

42. Quoted in Hoyer, 97, from Dilthey, *Leben Schleiermachers*, 83.

43. Cf. Hoyer, 98-99.

44. See, e.g., Werner Schultz, "Schleiermachers Theorie des Gefühls und ihre theologische Bedeutung," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 53 (1956), 75.

45. *Ibid.*, 75-76.

46. Siegfried, 29.

47. Cf. Robert R. Williams, *Schleiermacher the Theologian: The Construction of the Doctrine of God* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978), 4.

48. See, e.g., Eckart Förster, "Is There 'a Gap' in Kant's Critical System?" *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 25 (1987), 533-55.

49. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Sämmtliche Werke*, part 3, *Zur Philosophie*, vol. 1 (Berlin: Reimer, 1846), 19ff.

50. *Ibid.*, 21. "... ein Übergang, eine Brücke. . . "

51. Thandeka, *The Embodied Self: Friedrich Schleiermacher's Solution to Kant's Problem of the Empirical Self* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), 31-32. Cf. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 152ff.

52. *Ibid.*, 1.

53. *Ibid.*

54. *Ibid.*, 2.

55. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 29.

56. Brandt (204) interprets Schleiermacher's passages on skepticism and the law of identity in *Dialektik* (Jonas), 32 and 59 in this way.

57. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 59. "Die allgemeinen Denkformen, deren Repräsentant der Satz  $a=a$ , haben auch eine organische Seite, sofern sie die Form des Prozesses enthalten, oder eine Bedingung desselben aussprechen; und sofern sie keine organische Thätigkeit enthalten, wird auch nichts in ihnen gedacht."

58. *Ibid.* " $a=a$  ist entweder Identität des gedachten und des Seins, also Form des Wissens, oder Identität des Subjects, also Bedingung des Wissens. Ohne organische Thätigkeit ist es nichts, als die blosser Wiederholbarkeit des Gedankens, also leer."

59. See Bowie's "Introduction" to Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings*, trans., ed. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), xxii. On this point, Bowie refers to J. G. Hamann's critique of Kant in *Schriften zur Sprache* (Frankfurt am Main, 1967), 224ff. I will return to the discussion on Schleiermacher and language separately below.

60. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 89. "Der Unterschied zwischen analytischen und synthetischen Urtheilen ist also nicht festzuhalten, und überhaupt keiner, da identische Urtheile keine sind sondern nur leere Formeln, wenn man nicht den (un)vollständigen Begriff zum Grunde legt, in welchem jener Unterschied allein begründet ist."

61. *Ibid.*, 563.

62. *Ibid.*

63. Scholtz, 107.

64. Hoyer, 92.

65. Brandt, 315.

66. Ultimately, as I will show in the discussion of thinking and being in the next chapter, even this is a difference in similarity. I have already referred and will refer to the passage from the *Dialectic* stating that knowing is "the congruence of thinking with being as what is thought" (*Dialectic* [Tice], 17). This statement conforms to Kant's position insofar as thinking does not correspond to being in itself but being as it is thought.

67. Hoyer, 87.

68. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 99. "... es giebt keine Trennung des Wesens der Dinge von ihrer Erscheinung."

69. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Geschichte der Philosophie: Aus Schleiermachers handschriftlichen Nachlasse*, ed. H. Ritter, *Friedrich Schleiermachers sämtliche Werke*, part 3, *Zur Philosophie*, vol. 4/1 (Berlin: Reimer, 1839), 299. "Was macht die Individualität der Erscheinungen aus?"
70. Ibid. "Offenbar nichts anders, als die Cohäsion, die identische Vereinigung der Kräfte einer gewissen Masse an einem Punkte."
71. Ibid. "Ist es denn gewiss, dass jedem Bewusstsein ein eignes noumenon zum Grunde liegt?"
72. Ibid. ". . . führt uns fast eher vom Wahn der Individualität zurück."
73. Ibid., 299-300. ". . . so ist es schon eine Anmassung, wenn wir uns anders ausdrücken, als *Das noumenon, Die Welt als noumenon.*"
74. Sigwart, 313.
75. Ibid., 314.
76. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Über das höchste Gut* (1789); in William A. Johnson, *On Religion: A Study of Theological Method in Schleiermacher and Nygren* (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1964), 12ff.
77. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Über die Freiheit des Menschen* (1792); in Johnson, 15-16.
78. See Johnson, 17-18.
79. Hoyer, 73. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 77-78.
80. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 335. "Raum und Zeit sind die Art und Weise zu sein der Dinge selbst, nicht nur unserer Vorstellungen, welches aus unserer Hauptansicht des Wissens folgt, weil alles reale Wissen zugleich ein quantitatives ist. Beide Formeln sind also in der Vorstellung sowol als in den Dingen, und die Frage, welches von beiden sie seien, ist leer."
81. Brandt, 203.
82. Hoyer, 92.
83. Paul Frederick Mehl, "Schleiermacher's Mature Doctrine of God as Found in the *Dialektik* of 1822 and the Second Edition of *The Christian Faith* (1830-31)," Ph.D. diss. (Columbia University, 1961), 297.
84. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 171-72. ". . . nämlich unser eignes Sein constituierend."
85. Marlin E. Miller, *Der Übergang: Schleiermachers Theologie des Reiches Gottes in Zusammenhang seines Gesamt Denkens* (Gütersloh, Germany: Mohn, 1970), 25.
86. T. E. Wilkerson, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: A Commentary for Students* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), 154ff.
87. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 282.
88. Ibid., 281-82; *Dialektik* (Jonas), 428.

89. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 172. "Allein Kant hat den Ort der Idee der Gottheit und den Zusammenhang ihres Seins in der Vernunft nicht nachgewiesen, sondern er nimmt die Idee nur als er weis nicht wie gegeben."
90. *Ibid.*, 436.
91. *Ibid.*, 171. "Kants Polemik gegen die ehemalige Metaphysik ist auch durch Missverständnisse verunreinigt."
92. *Ibid.*, 436.
93. *Ibid.*
94. *Ibid.*, 428., *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 282.
95. Schleiermacher, *Lücke*, 25.
96. Dorner, 6.
97. More on Kant's relationship to negative theology see Don Cupitt, "Kant and the Negative Theology," in eds. Brian Hebblethwaite and Stewart Sutherland, *The Philosophical Frontiers of Christian Theology: Essays Presented to D. M. Mackinnon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 55-67.
98. *Friedrich Schleiermachers sämtliche Werke*, part 3, vol. 1, 22.
99. *Ibid.* ". . . entbehrlich und nur aus Missverstand hineingedrungen. . ."
100. *Ibid.* ". . . mit grossem Recht vermuthen, sie möchten auf speculativem Boden erzeugt und dort eigenbehörig sein."
101. *Ibid.* "Und so verwandelt sich der Bau nur in ein Kinderspiel mit dem luftigen Baustoff, der von einem User zum andern hin und wieder geschlagen wird."
102. Thandeka, 19. I do not put the quote in quotation marks because I correct the original grammatical error: ". . . Schleiermacher believed that Kant, by relying on speculative reason to delineate moral consciousness, mistakenly filled in the place in knowledge he had originally cleared for faith."
103. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre: Aus Schleiermachers handschriftlichen Nachlasse*, ed. Alexander Schweizer, *Friedrich Schleiermachers sämtliche Werke*, part 3, *Zur Philosophie*, vol. 5 (Berlin: Reimer, 1835), 38-39. "Was wir Gefühl nennen insgesamt, ist ebenso wie der Gedanke Ausdruck der Vernunft in der Natur. Es ist eine in der Natur gewordene Lebensthätigkeit, aber nur durch die Vernunft geworden, und dies gilt nicht nur von dem sittlichen und religiösen Gefühl, sondern auch von dem leiblichen Gefühl, wenn es nur als ein menschliches und als ein ganzer Moment des Gefühls gesetzt wird. Organ aber ist das Gefühl an sich noch weniger als der Gedanke, weil es rein in sich zurückgeht. Es ist also bestimmter Ausdruck von der Art zu sein der Vernunft in dieser besonderen Natur. Denn das Gefühl auch von den niedrigsten Art sagt immer aus, was die Vernunft wirkt oder nicht wirkt in der Natur. . . Wenn es aber scheinen könnte, als ob hiebei die mit der Vernunft nicht geeinigte Natur gar nicht im Spiel wäre, und also das Gefühl entweder überhaupt nicht sittlich oder wenigstens nicht für sich sondern nur zusammen mit anderem ein sittliches wäre: so drückt vielmehr jedes Gefühl immer aus, was die Vernunft wirkt oder nicht wirkt in der mit ihr geeinigten Natur zufolge des Verhältnisses, in welchem diese steht gegen die nicht geeinigte; und dies eben ist die zu jedem Gefühl nothwendig gehörige Erregung."

104. Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. with introduction by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), 8.

105. See Dorner, 45.

106. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 61 (A, 15; B, 29).

107. Cf. Siegfried, 29.

108. Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 4th edition, enlarged, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 110.

109. Dieter Henrich, *The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant's Philosophy*, ed. Richard L. Velkley, trans. Jeffrey Edwards et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 39.

110. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 532-33 (A, 644; B, 672).

111. *Ibid.*, 533-34 (A, 644-45; B, 672-73).

112. *Ibid.*, 538 (A, 651; B, 679).

113. *Ibid.*, 535 (A, 647; B, 675).

114. *Ibid.*, 536 (A, 649; B, 677).

115. Henrich, 27.

116. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, vol. 5, *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, (Berlin: Reimer, 1913), 175, 195. English translation *Critique of Judgment*, trans. J. C. Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952), 14, 36.

117. *Ibid.*, 176.

118. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 14.

119. Kant, *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, 196.

120. *Ibid.*, 177.

121. *Ibid.*

122. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 17.

123. Kant, *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, 283, 285.

124. *Ibid.*, 181. I assert this notwithstanding that it is a kind of "subjective apriori" (177) in comparison to the apriori of understanding and reason.

125. Howard Caygill, *A Kant Dictionary* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1995), s.v. feeling. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 633; *Critique of Judgment*, 28.

126. *Ibid.* See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. Lewis W. Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1956), 76ff.

127. Ibid. (“Feeling” changed for *Gefühl* in the quotation.)

128. Adina Davidovich, *Religion As a Province of Meaning: The Kantian Foundations of Modern Theology* (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress, 1993), xiii.

129. Ibid., xv.

130. Ibid., xiv, 5, 57.

131. Kant, *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, 480-81; Davidovich, 119.

132. Davidovich, 62.

133. See *ibid.*, 135.

134. Cf. Michael Eckert as he writes: “Schleiermacher has overtaken Kant’s transcendental concept of self-consciousness—“the original synthetic unity of apperception”—as the subjective condition of the unity of intellectual and organic functions of thinking” (*Gott—Glauben und Wissen: Friedrich Schleiermachers Philosophische Theologie* [Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1987], 95). Scholtz also believes that Schleiermacher’s concept of “immediate self-consciousness, to which the ground and unity of being is present, has a similar systemic position as Kant’s transcendental apperception” (Gunter Scholtz, *Die Philosophie Schleiermachers* [Darmstadt, Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984], 110).

135. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 153 (B, 132).

136. Ibid., 136 (A, 107).

137. Ibid., 152 (B, 131).

138. Ibid., 155 (B, 136).

PART THREE

THE CONSTRUCTIVE METAPHYSICS OF SCHLEIERMACHER

## INTRODUCTION

Now this work finally reaches the stage where Schleiermacher's own constructive metaphysics is explicated. This metaphysics is overcoming metaphysics at the same time, at least in the sense of Schleiermacher's struggle to furnish a more proper way of approaching metaphysics in contrast to the supposedly inadequate previous attempts of other systems and thinkers. Admittedly, Schleiermacher does not render a finished metaphysical system himself. He did not manage to prepare an integral book from his lecture notes on dialectics, although he intended and even started to do it. His terminal illness halted these plans. To say the least, to systematize Schleiermacher's lecture notes is itself a formidable task, for those notes are extremely entangled, complicated, grammatically inexact, and sometimes even contradictory in content, as his thought develops over the years. Nevertheless, I will try for clarity's sake to be systematic, at least in the sense that, instead of giving a comprehensive account of the lectures as they are, I will select some important metaphysical topics that can be inferred from his lectures and that are relevant to the dissertation theme. In addition, although these topics will be clearly delineated, they will still implicitly touch Schleiermacher's epistemology, his understanding of reason, existence, the self, and other metaphysical issues. Particularly, in separate chapters, I will give accounts of Schleiermacher's grasp of the discipline of dialectics (chapter 6), his aggregate of contrasting metaphysical categories (chapter 7), and his attempt to overcome the metaphysics of contrasts by means of the idea of transcendental ground in his peculiar understanding (chapter 8). Schleiermacher's understanding of dialectics itself implies a non-foundational overcoming of metaphysics.



Importantly, metaphysical polarities play a vital role in Schleiermacher's dialectics; his thinking always evolves around or between them. Therefore, to repeat, I will probe some of these polarities. Most important in this regard, as I have already indicated earlier, is the overcoming of polarities, so characteristic to Schleiermacher's thought. As I will show, this overcoming also contains the seeds of overcoming metaphysics as such. Throughout this part, I will point out the ways in which Schleiermacher's metaphysics overcomes traditional metaphysics. But an even more important intention of this work is to demonstrate that Schleiermacher's metaphysics contains some truly "metaphysical" elements—the ones that lead beyond metaphysics into "meta-metaphysics." I will start the demonstration of this "meta-metaphysics" in this part, and continue the discussion in the part that assesses Schleiermacher's overcoming of metaphysics, as well as in the concluding remarks, where I sketch the contemporary relevance of Schleiermacher's approach to metaphysics.

CHAPTER 6  
DIALECTICS:  
TRANSCENDENTAL (METAPHYSICS) AND FORMAL (LOGIC)

*Nonmetaphysical Dialectics*

The main text of Schleiermacher's own metaphysics is his *Dialektik* lectures, which is the basic text of investigation for this work. First of all, one may ask, why did Schleiermacher call this course that in a great extent deals with metaphysical construction "dialectics"? Addressing this question in this chapter will give a further insight into Schleiermacher's understanding of metaphysics and its overcoming. In fact, the use of this title may itself be a sign of the overcoming of metaphysics. It is implicit even in the primary etymological definition of dialectics as the art (*dialektikē technē*) of discourse, conversation, argumentation, reasoning, disputation, etc. (*dia+legein*).<sup>1</sup> As will be seen below, this is also Schleiermacher's basic understanding of dialectics, and I think that he consciously chose to title the lectures *Dialektik*. According to this primary meaning as the art of discourse, dialectics apparently has more to do with rhetoric than metaphysics. If it deals with metaphysical concepts, it takes place on a formal, not ontological, level. Dialectics may employ speech about such metaphysical entities as God, world, and others. These concepts may be included in the dialectical reasoning insofar as they are related to the first principles of knowledge. But even if they are indispensable elements in the interconnected network of knowledge, the dialectical speech about them lacks any ontological truth-claims. Thus, to say in advance, one should not be deceived by appearances, seeing Schleiermacher's dialectics as metaphysics. Even if it contains metaphysics, it may also be a way of overcoming metaphysics, keeping in mind the

definition of metaphysics and its overcoming that I laid out in the first, general part of this work.

### *Dialectics as Transcendental Metaphysics*

In one sense, Schleiermacher's dialectics is still metaphysics. Like metaphysics, it deals with the supreme principles of philosophical knowledge. Schleiermacher first defines dialectics as "principles of the art of doing philosophy"<sup>2</sup> or, as his 1811 course announcement states, *Dialecticen s. artis philosophandi principiorum summam*.<sup>3</sup> Even more, according to Schleiermacher, dialectics includes not only the principles of doing philosophy, but also of all scientific construction. Schleiermacher himself classifies the sciences into two branches: the sciences of reason or the human sciences (*Vissenschaft des Menschen*, viz., ethics) and the natural sciences (*Vissenschaft der Natur*, viz., physics).<sup>4</sup> Dialectics provides an epistemological foundation for both of them. Here Schleiermacher holds on to the classical Platonic and neo-Aristotelian division of philosophy into dialectics, physics, and ethics.<sup>5</sup> But the first, dialectics, is the greatest of the three, because it provides the transcendental presuppositions of the other two, which means of all the existing sciences that they include. As such, Schleiermacher calls dialectics "the science of science" (*Wissenschaftswissenschaft*).<sup>6</sup>

Moreover, dialectics provides transcendental presuppositions for all knowledge, not only the scientific one, because, according to Schleiermacher, all kinds of knowledge must have the same common ground. Thinking processes must be the same to all thinking beings if knowledge is to be communicated. Schleiermacher maintains that one cannot attribute to philosophical knowing, which is supreme, transcendental knowing, "anything different than what the form of knowing is for any given knowing. . ." <sup>7</sup> And vice versa, one always finds the transcendently and formally supreme knowing in the ordinary knowing. As Twisten's notes say: "All knowing becomes knowing through entry of the principles of knowing, hence there is no instance of knowing to which dialectic would

not know how to assign its place, for everything belongs within the system of knowing.”<sup>8</sup> All kinds of knowing, whether it is philosophical (speculative) or scientific (empirical), takes place in accordance with common principles that dialectics provides.<sup>9</sup> Of course, in this sense, dialectics, as transcendental epistemological ground, may be considered metaphysics.

### *Logic Overcomes Metaphysics*

#### Non-Metaphysical Dialectics

On the other hand, it can be maintained that Schleiermacher’s dialectics is not metaphysics. At the very least, it should never be confused with substance metaphysics. Moreover, it also never deduces its propositions from speculative first principles. It does not establish knowledge. Instead, it can only be a never-ending heuristic trial-and-error process of discovery that never reaches complete knowledge. It is an asymptotic way to knowledge that is never reached but only appropriated as to its coherence. Although dialectics discovers the presuppositions of knowledge, according to Schleiermacher, it “does not produce information and is thus of itself empty in that respect.”<sup>10</sup>

It is noteworthy that, in Schleiermacher’s view, in the final instance, dialectics does not even produce the knowledge of knowledge in a transcendental sense. He writes, “We do not want even to seek the knowledge of knowing, but rather only the method of knowing, the rules of the production of knowing. . .”<sup>11</sup> As such, dialectics is very much like the Aristotelian “organon” of all sciences, and by means of it, every piece of information receives its place within the entire compass of science.<sup>12</sup> Accordingly, dialectics is, as Schleiermacher says, “the architectonic of all knowledge.”<sup>13</sup> As the organon and the architectonic, dialectics helps in such procedures as assigning to each individual scientific proposition its place within the system and finding which part of the

whole that proposition is. Nonetheless, it is only “a supplement to information concerning the whole.”<sup>14</sup> Schleiermacher’s apt summary of this science of science states that,

unlike particular sciences, it can only be thought as unable to base itself upon a highest principle; instead it can only be thought as a whole from which every part can take its beginning, and all individual parts, posited reciprocally, are only based on the whole, so that it can only be accepted or rejected, but not established and proved.<sup>15</sup>

Notably, all this is very similar not only to Aristotle’s understanding of logic, but also Descartes’ nonmetaphysical, orderly philosophy.

I have already mentioned the nonmetaphysical aspect of Schleiermacher’s understanding of dialectics conceived as the art of discourse. With this objective, Schleiermacher calls dialectics “the art to lead and conduct conversation.”<sup>16</sup> Inasmuch as conversation takes place with somebody, dialectics is the “art of the exchange of thoughts, art to remain in an ordinary construction of thoughts together with the other, the result of which brings about knowledge.”<sup>17</sup> In this respect, Schleiermacher intentionally pursues the classical Socratic-Platonic tradition of dialectics while adding his own non-metaphysical, discursive twist to it.

Note that Schleiermacher holds that this “other” partner in the process of dialectics may also be one’s own self. Dialectics as conversation also includes self-conversation, the development of thoughts through inner speech. The presence of the other is not required for dialectics to take place.<sup>18</sup> Hence, according to Schleiermacher’s other definition, dialectics is “the exposition of the principles for the correct conduct of conversation in the area of pure thought.”<sup>19</sup> Dialectics also is “the art to come from difference to agreement in thought.”<sup>20</sup> And, it is this same “art of conversation” that also provides “the highest principles for doing philosophy and for the construction of the totality of knowledge.”<sup>21</sup> Dialectics as the art of discourse plays this role because, as Schleiermacher states, “we can express metaphysical principles only in the form of

sentences that also are formed from the conduct of conversation.”<sup>22</sup> To repeat, it can also be an inner conversation.

As I will show later, in Schleiermacher’s opinion, thoughts can never be pure but are always linguistically conditioned. It is also the reason why the dialectical ground of all knowledge is simply inevitable. It means that there cannot be pure metaphysical principles. They are always linguistically conditioned. And since language is a finite system of signs, even the language of metaphysics can never bear the substantial weight that traditional metaphysics sometimes ascribes to it.

There is another nonmetaphysical aspect of Schleiermacher’s dialectics that I have already mentioned in the chapter on Schleiermacher and Kant. As the critical philosophy does for Kant, dialectics overcomes metaphysics for Schleiermacher inasmuch as it is critique in the sense of its being the analysis of the processes of knowing. As critique, it contains “the criteria by which one could recognize what was science and what was not.”<sup>23</sup> These criteria include, as shown in the chapter on Schleiermacher’s understanding of speculation, the necessary speculative and empirical or experiential elements. Therefore, as one author puts these two elements together, Schleiermacher’s is a “critical realism,” in which “the ideal-conceptual (*idealbegriffliche*) modus is realized as the intelligible factor in space-time reality (*ousia, forma*).”<sup>24</sup> The question of whether the concept can have such a realization is the task of dialectics as critique. And this is a very important aspect of Schleiermacher’s overcoming of metaphysics. But there are also other aspects of dialectics as critique. For instance, dialectics also is, as Schleiermacher states, “the art of philosophical critique of any given fragmented knowledge; therefore, the art of both forms of philosophy.”<sup>25</sup> I turn to these both forms now.

## Non-Metaphysical Dialectics: Logic Encompasses Metaphysics

These “both forms of philosophy,” to highlight, are precisely both metaphysical and nonmetaphysical aspects of dialectics. The first, or transcendental, aspect of dialectics is metaphysics, but the second, or formal, aspect is logic. These are supposedly different disciplines. “Metaphysics is science, logic is *Kunstlehre*,” states Schleiermacher.<sup>26</sup> Metaphysics is “the insight of the verification of interrelation between being and thinking overall.”<sup>27</sup> Logic is “knowledge of the ground of linking of thinking viewed for itself.”<sup>28</sup> Dialectics as logic is not the science of metaphysics. Logic, as “*Kunstlehre* of knowing,”<sup>29</sup> as non-speculative, dialectical, discursive praxis, overcomes metaphysics.

Corresponding to these two forms of philosophy, metaphysics and logic, Schleiermacher divides all sets of his *Dialektik* into two main parts. He calls them transcendental part and formal part. Now, does it mean that Schleiermacher deals with two different subjects of metaphysics and logic in the two different parts of his lectures? By all means no. Rather, they are different modes of the same pursuit of knowledge. The task Schleiermacher sets to dialectics as a whole “is simply to analyze the idea of knowing overall.”<sup>30</sup> As a consequence, Schleiermacher renders ineffective the distinction between the transcendental and the formal aspects of dialectics.<sup>31</sup> As a matter of fact, both these aspects in Schleiermacher’s dialectics move on together. They interpenetrate and complement each other. There are elements of one aspect in the other, and vice versa. Schleiermacher states: “Logic, formal philosophy, without metaphysics, transcendental philosophy, is no science; and metaphysics without logic can gain no other shape than arbitrary and fantastic.”<sup>32</sup> Hence, Schleiermacher’s fuller definition of dialectics, following the classical model of philosophy, must include both elements:

Dialectics. . . is a proper theory of thinking, according to which each thought should be formed so as to correspond with its object and to occupy a certain place

within the system of total thinking, and which therefore also presents in itself the rules of the linking of thoughts.<sup>33</sup>

Note that this middle position, uniting the transcendental and formal aspects of dialectics, annuls Kant's corresponding distinction between constitutive and regulative principles of philosophy. As shown earlier, Schleiermacher believes that they are the same.<sup>34</sup> He also believes that this position even helps to avoid the quandary of the vicious circle already known to the ancients: in order to know, one must have some prior knowing of that knowing. Schleiermacher's solution is simply to start from something that is recognized as real knowing and to seek in this knowing its principle.<sup>35</sup> To reiterate the first chapter's discussion, Schleiermacher rather infers principles from the given data than vice versa. It is precisely the untenable metaphysics that starts with the abstract principles and then applies them to particulars.

Surprisingly, Schleiermacher uses the expression so popular today, "the death of philosophy."<sup>36</sup> He thinks that this occurrence is caused by the isolation of the two aspects of dialectics in modern times, which was not the case in the classical period. It is this "death of philosophy," Schleiermacher believes, that has brought about the unsubstantiated "transcendent" metaphysics as well as logic that has lost its relevance.

This remarkable paragraph is worth quoting in full:

What have been called metaphysics and logic in modern times were nothing other than these two parts of dialectic in isolation from each other and, on this account, robbed of their proper life; for this reason, no bridge remained extending from metaphysics to physics and ethics, and thereby arose the error that people designate by the term "transcendent." In this separation metaphysics came to be something quite evanescent. On the other side, logic was just as vacuous and inconsequential, and so the result of this separation was the death of philosophy.<sup>37</sup>

Schleiermacher himself, not separating metaphysics and logic, transcendental and formal aspects of dialectics, wants to rebuild the destroyed bridge between metaphysics on the one side and physics and ethics on the other side. Schleiermacher wants to overcome the "death of philosophy," which is also "the death of metaphysics." Dialectics overcomes



this “death” as a new, legitimate philosophy or meta-metaphysics that lacks ontological or even epistemological foundations.

Why so? Because the logical aspect of Schleiermacher’s dialectics prevails over the transcendental one, which is the main reason why Schleiermacher’s dialectics is an overcoming of metaphysics. Although the following Jonas’ assertion may be overstated, it provides an ample support to my argument here. He goes as far as to purport: “According to its content, [Schleiermacher’s] dialectics by all means is logic and metaphysics, yet not as an aggregate of both, but both in the form of logic.”<sup>38</sup> This statement says something about Schleiermacher’s true intent and disposition. After all, Jonas was Schleiermacher’s student. And even if, keeping in mind the constant return of metaphysics in its every overcoming, it is impossible to fully accomplish his intent, one ought at least to agree with something like Thiel’s assessment of his dialectics:

The reader must ever be aware that the *Dialektik* is not first and foremost a speculative work but a heuristic one devoted to the formal regulation of proper thinking. Metaphysics does not achieve the status of a self-constitutive discipline in the *Dialektik* but functions instead as a partner in dialogue with logic.<sup>39</sup>

Strange as it may be, but the status of metaphysics in Schleiermacher’s dialectics turns out to be the “handmaid” of logic. It is no coincidence that Schleiermacher designates not only logic but also the whole project of dialectics as *Kunstlehre*.<sup>40</sup> Even if dialectics includes metaphysics, as *Kunstlehre* it overcomes metaphysics.

### *Dialectics in the Point-Zero between Science and Art*

Mention also might be made in this regard that the presence of the transcendental aspect in the formal one in dialectics brings about a subsequent ambiguity as to the status of dialectics. Corresponding to the two aspects, Schleiermacher designates dialectics both science and art (*Kunst*). Since the two aspects of dialectics are not separated, it also turns out that science and art in dialectic are in a reciprocal relation to each other. But I start

this topic mainly because there is an interesting moment in Schleiermacher's discussion of the origins of dialectics as science and art. I point it out because of an appearance of a specific term, of what Schleiermacher calls the "point-zero" (*Nullpunkt*). As it will be seen later, this term has an important role in Schleiermacher's overcoming of metaphysics. I consider it to be an indicator of a possible instance of the overcoming of metaphysics. Similarly to Derrida's approach to contrasts, an undecidability of the "point-zero" as the transition point between two states of affairs creates a space (or rather nonspace) outside metaphysics in several instances of Schleiermacher's dialectics. I think, the usage of this term is also not at all accidental here, and I want to probe if it, indeed, indicates the overcoming of metaphysics.

Here is Schleiermacher's paragraph: "If art and science run besides each other in philosophy, then their beginning is where there is a minimum or, properly, the point-zero of both, which means the point where philosophy is not yet independent but involved in something other."<sup>41</sup> Now, if my understanding is correct, Schleiermacher insinuates that dialectics in its twofold but united sense as both science and art has its beginning from the point-zero, say, with the classical period of philosophy (Socrates and Plato). Before that, before the point-zero, philosophy was involved in this something "other." What is this other? Perhaps the next paragraph may give a clue: "Philosophy is primordially mingled with the products of fantasy as the other form of highest principle, the blend in which there is neither science nor philosophical art."<sup>42</sup> Schleiermacher's use of such words as "primordially," "other," as well as the non-existence of science and art, implies that my interpretation may be correct. The other that philosophy is involved in before the point-zero, before Socrates and Plato, is fantasy, whose forms can only be trivial surrogates of the highest principles. Schleiermacher also calls this pre-Socratic philosophy "the mere caprice of poetic philosophizing."<sup>43</sup> Fantasy is philosophy out of its proper delineation, which dialectics would only accomplish later, at the "point-zero,"

when it attains real independence. But Schleiermacher also believes that this true Platonic spirit was lost with the Aristotelian separation between art and science.<sup>44</sup> And it was lost for a long time, up to Schleiermacher's own times. Schleiermacher, as pointed out above, wants to bridge the separation and bring philosophy as dialectics back to the original "point-zero" of overcoming of metaphysics.

Dialectics as combination of logic and metaphysics under the overall custodianship of logic overcomes the previous wrong metaphysics as fantasy, yet without falling into the equally wrong vacuity of previous sophistics without transcendental principles. As Schleiermacher sees it:

Dialectics, in its critical use, is in danger that it may be deemed for sophistics. However, it could only be if it lacked principles. In its constructive use, dialectics may be deemed for poetic. However, it could only be if it went beyond the rules of combination.<sup>45</sup>

Dialectics in its critical use is here meant logic, but in its constructive use—metaphysics. At any rate, I would say that the "point-zero," the undetermined transition point of dialectics, may be interpreted as a nonplace or quasi-place beyond metaphysics that gives birth to dialectics as proper metaphysics that overcomes wrong metaphysics. Schleiermacher wants to make "a step-back" into this "point-zero" as the condition of possibility of dialectics.<sup>46</sup> I call it a quasi-place because it is not a place of thinking itself, but an actually non-existing "place" that is not a place itself but that instead allows thinking to take place. It is in this way that I understand the following quote about Schleiermacher's dialectics:

Dialectics posits a system of the knowledge of reason, but it posits it for the purpose of its abolition, its putting aside, and in the moment when it is allowed to be put aside, it becomes silent and language is given up to a kind of thinking that does not originate in the realm of thinking, but in the realm of that for which this thinking has provided room.<sup>47</sup>

That is the quasi-place, the point-zero beyond metaphysics that provides room for metaphysics. Because of the methodological procedure of stepping back outside

metaphysics, of going back to the origins (*arche*) or conditions of possibility of knowing, dialectics is not metaphysics but archeology.<sup>48</sup> Dialectics as archeology overcomes metaphysics.

## NOTES

1. See, e.g., *A Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. Thomas Mautner (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996), s.v. “dialectic(s)”; *Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. Gagnobert D. Runes (New York: Littlefield, Adams, Quality Paperbacks, 1983), s.v. “Dialectic.”

There are many more meanings of the term developed in the history of philosophy: “(1) the method of refutation by examining logical consequences, (2) sophistical reasoning, (3) the method of division or repeated logical analysis of genera into species, (4) an investigation of the supremely general abstract notions by some process of reasoning leading up to these notions from particular cases or hypotheses, (5) logical reasoning or debate using premises that are merely probable or generally accepted, (6) formal logic, (7) the criticism of the logic of illusion, showing the contradictions into which reason falls in trying to go beyond experience to deal with transcendental objects, and (8) the logical development of thought or reality through thesis and antithesis to a synthesis of these opposites” (*The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards, vol. 2 [New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1967], s.v. “Dialectic”). Some of these meanings, especially 1, 3, 4, and 7, also apply to Schleiermacher’s dialectics.

2. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 8. “Principien der Kunst zu philosophieren.”

3. “Dialectic, i.e., the sum of the principles of the art of doing philosophy” (see *Dialectic* [Tice], 3). Also, I prefer to follow Tice in translating *zu philosophieren* here as “doing philosophy,” since “philosophizing” may have negative connotations, and Schleiermacher himself uses the phrase *die Philosophie machen* in his definition of dialectics in 1814 lecture (see *Dialectic* (Tice), 3f).

4. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 8.

5. In the same way, following classical philosophy, Schleiermacher does not separate between real sciences and philosophy. *Dialectic* (Tice), 5f; *Dialektik* (Jonas), 8.

6. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 20.

7. *Dialectic* (Tice), 10.

8. *Ibid.*, 1.

9. I should note that this discussion runs parallel to that of the relationship of speculation and empiricism expounded in the first chapter of this part, where speculation represents the transcendental aspect, but empiricism—the formal or real aspect of dialectics. The same parallelism takes place on the level of consciousness that always integrates both speculation and ordinary knowing, as also shown in that chapter above.

10. *Dialectic* (Tice), 1.

11. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 159. “Wir wollen ja nicht das Wissen des Wissens, sondern nur die Kunst des Wissens suchen, die Regeln ein Wissen zu produciren...”

12. *Dialectic* (Tice), 1, 7.

13. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 445. "Architektonik alles Wissens."

14. *Dialectic* (Tice), 7.

15. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Philosophische und vermischte Schriften, Friedrich Schleiermacher's sämtliche Werke*, part 3, *Zur Philosophie*, vol. 1 (Berlin: Reimer, 1846), 18. ". . . diese nun darf selbst nicht wiederum wie jene einzelnen Wissenschaften auf einem obersten Grundsatz beruhen; sondern nur als ein Ganzes, in welchem jedes der Anfang sein kann, und alles einzelne gegenseitig einander bestimmend nur auf dem Ganzen beruht, ist sie zu denken, und so dass sie nur angenommen oder verworfen, nicht aber begründet und bewiesen werden kann."

16. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 17. "Kunst ein Gespräch zu führen und zu leiten."

17. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 17; *Dialectic* (Tice), 6.

18. See *Dialektik* (Jonas), 569.

19. *Ibid.*, 568. "Dialektik ist Darlegung der Grundsätze für die kunstmässige Gesprächführung im Gebiet des reinen Denkens."

20. *Ibid.*, 18. "Dialektik ist die Kunst von einer Differenz im Denken zur Uebereinstimmung zu kommen."

21. *Ibid.*, 371. ". . . die höchsten Prinzipien des Philosophirens und die Construction der Totalität des Wissens. . ."

22. *Ibid.*, 443. ". . . indem wir metaphysische Principien auch nur in der Form von Sätzen aussprechen können, welche auch in der Gesprächführung eintreten."

23. *Dialectic* (Tice), 6.

24. Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen, "Schleiermacher als Realist und Metaphysiker. Versuche über seine philosophische Dialektik," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 49 (1936), 138.

25. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 20. "... Kunst der philosophischen Kritik für jedes fragmentarisch gegebene Wissen. Also die Kunst beider Formen der Philosophie."

26. *Ibid.*, 444. "Die Metaphysik ist Wissenschaft, die Logik ist Kunstlehre." Since it is very difficult to translate the term *Kunstlehre* into English, I leave it as it is. Literal possibilities could be "the doctrine of art" or "artistic theory." But Schleiermacher has a peculiar understanding of art. It appears that he understands art the way it has been understood since the ancient Greeks, namely, as "technics" (*technē*), as skill. Schleiermacher refers to art in this way as "craft" or "mechanical art" in his *Brief Outline* (Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Brief Outline on the Study of Theology*, trans. Terrence N. Tice [Richmond, Va.: John Knox, 1966], 93). He also defines art there in this "narrower sense" as "to every ordered production whereby we are conscious of certain general rules whose application to particulars cannot be reduced to still other rules" (*Ibid.*, 56). Dialectics also was this kind of art, *dialektikē technē*. I believe, this is the reason that allows Tice to translate *Kunstlehre* as "technology" in the *Brief Outline* (*Ibid.*). It is a very literal translation: *Kunst-lehre* = *techno-logia*. But I do not think that this translation is appropriate today, when the term "technology" has entirely different connotations.

27. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 7. "die Einsicht von der Bewährung des Zusammenhanges zwischen Denken und Sein überhaupt ist die sogenannte Metaphysik."

28. Ibid. “. . .die Kenntniss des Grundes von der Verknüpfung des Denkens für sich betrachtet. . .”

29. Ibid., 482.

30. *Dialectic* (Tice), 10.

31. Ibid.

32. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 7. “Also Logik, formale Philosophie, ohne Metaphysik, transcendente Philosophie, ist keine Wissenschaft; und Metaphysik ohne Logik kann keine Gestalt gewinnen als eine willkürliche und fantastische.”

33. Ibid., 8. “. . . ist sie eine eigentliche Theorie des Denkens, nach welcher jede Denken so gestaltet werden soll, dass ist mit seinem Gegenstande über einstimmt und einem bestimmten Ort in dem system des gesammtes Denkens einnimmt, und also auch die Regeln der Gedankenverknüpfung in sich darstellt.”

34. *Dialectic* (Tice), 5.

35. Ibid., 10-11.

36. Ibid., 6.

37. Ibid.

38. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 19. “Allerdings ist also Dialektik ihrem Inhalte nach Logik und Metaphysik, aber nicht Aggregat von beiden, sondern beides in der Form der Logik.” One can also understand here Jonas’ (and Schleiermacher’s) polemic against dialectics that unite both elements in the form of metaphysics.

39. John E. Thiel, *God and World in Schleiermacher’s Dialektik and Glaubenslehre: Criticism and the Methodology of Dogmatics* (Bern, Switzerland; Frankfurt am Main; Las Vegas, Nev.: Lang, 1981), 18.

40. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 8.

41. Ibid. 15., “Wenn also Kunst und Wissenschaft in der Philosophie neben einander gehen: so ist ihr Anfang da, wo ein Minimum, oder eigentlich der Nullpunkt von beiden ist, welches aber nur heissen kann, wo die Philosophie noch nicht selbständig ist sondern in einem andern involviert.”

42. Ibid. “Die Philosophie ist ursprünglich gemischt mit den Producten der Fantasie als der andern Form des höchsten Prinzips, in welcher Mischung weder Wissenschaft noch Philosophische Kunst.”

43. Ibid., 17. “. . . poetischen Philosophirens blosse Willkühr. . .”

44. Ibid., 444.

45. Ibid., 20-21. “Im kritischen Gebrauch ist sie in Gefahr für Sophistik gehalten zu werden, kann es aber nur sein, in wiefern sie principienlos wäre; im constructiven Gebrauch kann sie für poetisch gehalten werden, ist es aber nur, wenn sie über die Combinationsregeln hinausgeht.”

46. “Step-back” is actually Heidegger’s term.

47. Hans-Richard Reuter, *Die Einheit der Dialektik Schleiermachers: Eine Systematische Interpretation* (Munich: Kaiser, 1979), 266.

48. For the “going back” (*Zurückgehen*) to the *arche* as the original knowing (*Urwissen*) see Michael Eckert, *Gott—Glauben und Wissen: Friedrich Schleiermachers Philosophische Theologie* (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1987), 37, 91. For dialectics as “archeology” see Reuter, 87, 94, 247, 260.

## CHAPTER 7

### THE METAPHYSICS OF CONTRASTS

As I indicated earlier, and as it will also be seen in later chapters, Schleiermacher's thought always evolves around polarities, antitheses, opposites, or contrasts (*Gegensatz*).<sup>1</sup> The impression is that everything he thinks about is contrasted, be it speculation and empiricism, knowing and *Frömmigkeit*, understanding and *Gefühl*, epistemology and ontology, and so forth. It is the same with Schleiermacher's metaphysics. It unfolds around contrasts that are interrelated, hence, I would characterize Schleiermacher's metaphysics as "the metaphysics of contrasts." And, as I also indicated earlier, and will show in this and the next chapters, his overcoming of metaphysics consists of the overcoming of the contrasts. Here is a list of some of these contrasts: thinking and being, intellectual and organic, concept and judgment, God and world (chaos), knowing and willing, ideal and real, identity and difference, time and space, nothing and being, one and many. I start with a more comprehensive, separate account of the first four of these contrasts. I will refer to the others in the discussion of the four contrasts as well as in the rest of this work.

#### *Thinking and Being*

##### Epistemological Realism?

The task of Schleiermacher's dialectics is to reveal thinking that is knowing. As a reminder, for Schleiermacher, not all thinking is knowing. "Each knowing is thinking, but not each thinking is knowing."<sup>2</sup> With these words, the main part of Schleiermacher's



*Dialektik* begins. As shown in the chapter on Schleiermacher's understanding of metaphysics as speculation, for him, knowledge can only take place when it is real, that is to say, when real, empirical knowing complements rational knowing. Schleiermacher wants to avoid the one-sidedness of either rationalism or empiricism. As I also indicated in that chapter, this issue is closely related to one of the main metaphysical issues, that is, the relationship between thinking and being, between the thinking subject and the object of thought, the question of *adaequatio intellectus et rei*. To Schleiermacher, knowing is thinking that corresponds to being. To this extent, that part of *Dialektik* that deals with this issue may be considered ontology. At least it deals with being. Schleiermacher defends a kind of epistemological realism that, as also hinted in the chapter on speculation, may be viewed as the overcoming of that kind of transcendent metaphysics that does not require thinking to correspond with what is thought about outside it, with being. For Schleiermacher, thinking without being can never be knowing. But it also cannot be overemphasized that Schleiermacher does not inquire into the structures or categories of being. In this sense, his metaphysics is not ontology proper. Mainly, it is epistemology, and as such, it concerns being only insofar as its categories are related to and necessary for knowing.

### Correspondence Theory of Truth?

It also should be mentioned from the beginning that Schleiermacher does not have a naïve understanding of the correspondence of thinking with being. His requirement for the correspondence of thinking with being does not declare a simple correspondence theory of truth. It also involves a coherence theory of truth.<sup>3</sup> Schleiermacher is fully aware of the hypothetical difficulties of the correspondence position and addresses them.<sup>4</sup> As I mentioned earlier, he believes that thought is linguistically determined. But since language is finite, obviously, thought cannot elevate itself to a higher standpoint from

which the correspondence of thought with being could be verified. For that reason, as I will show later, Schleiermacher will make the knowledge of the correspondence only indirect, through the presupposed transcendental ground of the relationship of thought and being. And even this presupposition is a kind of overcoming of transcendental metaphysics itself, for it is not a proper ground. It is only a presupposed condition of that relationship.<sup>5</sup>

### Being in the Form of Thought

(Thinking-Being=Thinking-What Is Thought => Being=What Is Thought)

In the issue of the thinking-being relationship, Schleiermacher's initial questioning is, "How is an instance of thinking, insofar as it is knowing, thought of in relation to its object?"<sup>6</sup> His main answer is the proposition that I have already quoted once: "Knowing is the congruence of thinking with being as what is thought."<sup>7</sup> The answer may appear simple at first sight, but is it? I think it is yet another evidence that complicates Schleiermacher's "epistemological realism." It seems needful to remark that this sentence does not proclaim a simple congruence of thinking with being; it is the congruence with being "as what is thought."<sup>8</sup> What is it that thinking thinks of anyway? As will be seen below, it always has to be an instance of being. But can it be thought directly? Evidently, it can not, for the aforementioned statement suggests that thinking corresponds only to being as it is given to thinking, and thus itself is being thought. Paradoxically, it appears that, to Schleiermacher, an instance of being can only become a being or entity by means of its relation to thinking: "Thinking relates itself to being, and entity is above all the object of thinking, and thus by virtue of that, what is thought becomes entity for us in the first place."<sup>9</sup> Consequently, the correspondence of thinking and being is indirect insofar as being can be known as being only if it is being thought. Thought itself becomes being by virtue of thinking about being as itself. Or, one could

say, an instance of thought about being first of all corresponds to its own meaning or concept, while the correspondence to the real referent poses a different question, the question Schleiermacher answers by means of dividing thinking into intellectual and organic functions discussed below.

### Thought in the Form of Being

I have already mentioned an important point in Schleiermacher's epistemology that complements his conception of the correspondence of thinking and being. It is his belief that thought, insofar as it is linguistically determined, can only take place in the form of being. Both are inevitably bound together. It means that there cannot be pure thought. Schleiermacher asserts that even in such instances as fantasy and error, what is thought assumes the form of being, even if it is a mere form. Yet, the products of fantasy, such as fairies and centaurs, for example, even if they have the form of being, are just "specters of truth" (*Gespenster der Wahrheit*), not real beings that yield real knowing.<sup>10</sup> It means that thinking may predicate false attributes to being. The reverse procedure, however, is not possible; error can never proceed from being. In the instances of error and fantasy, thinking simply does not relate to its being as supposed in order for knowing to take place. Obviously, there is a lack of congruence of thinking with being here. It is clear that Schleiermacher does not hold the extreme idealist belief that appearances deceive.

### The Identity in Difference of Thinking and Being

Already the foregoing account shows that there is something more going on than correspondence in the relation of thinking to being. As a matter of fact, Schleiermacher himself asserts that both are identical, or the same, in the process of approximation to knowing. They are identical, only, as he says, "in a different way."<sup>11</sup> It means there is

identity in difference. This identity is so fundamental to Schleiermacher that he even declares that if there were something different in reason than in being or in being than in reason, “both the idea of the necessity and orderliness of being and the reality of reason would disappear.”<sup>12</sup> But difference between thinking and being is as important a presupposition of knowing as their correspondence.<sup>13</sup> Otherwise there would be no distinction between thinking and what is thought at all. That would result, I suppose, in pure and circular self-identity. As Schleiermacher says, non-contrasted being would be “bare negation of real thinking.”<sup>14</sup>

### Interdependence of Thinking and Being

Schleiermacher thinks that knowing is a reciprocal activity of thinking and being in which both endure. As he holds, at the basis of proper thinking lies “the presupposition of togetherness of things, comprising the totality of being, and the origins of concepts, comprising the scope of thinking.”<sup>15</sup> But what turns thinking into knowing is precisely the element of being that is able to enter thinking only through the filter of human organism, the organic element. As Schleiermacher states:

The correspondence of thinking and being is mediated through real relationship in which the totality of being stays together with organization, so that one can say that all thinking is a knowing that properly expresses the relationships of determinate being to organization.<sup>16</sup>

Also, the foregoing account and the mutual identity of thinking and being imply not only the correspondence of thinking to being (*adaequatio intellectus ad rem*), but also vice versa, the correspondence of being to thinking (*adaequatio rei ad intellectum*).<sup>17</sup> Inasmuch as there is no thinking without what is thought about, thus thinking inevitably becoming an instance of being, all being must be apprehended by thinking if it is to be real and known being.

Thinking is thinking that becomes alike to being, while being gives the universal impulse to thinking becoming the will to know (*Wissenwollen*).<sup>18</sup> The will to know is not given as thinking but rather as being.<sup>19</sup> This is also a reason why both thinking and being can be considered the same but in a different way, as identity in difference. In any case, according to Schleiermacher's system, the contrast of thinking and being seems to be identical to that of thinking and willing. I will return to this contrast when discussing Schleiermacher's theory of self-consciousness.

### The Ultimate Unknowability of the Identity of Thinking and Being

To recapitulate, on Schleiermacher's account, the correspondence of thinking with being is the main presupposition of knowing. Its importance for Schleiermacher cannot be underestimated. In fact, it is the precondition of dialectic itself. This is so because dispute (*Streit*) is the characteristic form of real conduct of conversation (*Gesprächführung*) in the area of pure thinking, which is dialectics, but the relation of thinking to being is the precondition of all disputes, and thus of dialectics.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, as I have already noted, Schleiermacher considers the correspondence of thinking and being as "the transcendent presupposition" of knowing. Here is Schleiermacher's paragraph: "The transcendent presupposition is the identity of positing and counterpositing = the identity of thinking and being for being, and the identity of being and thinking for thinking, both for us."<sup>21</sup> Once again, the correspondence is reciprocal, but ultimately, one cannot really know about it except as it is "for us," as it is presupposed. Also, as I have already mentioned, the transcendent presupposition by definition cannot be a part of thinking itself. As such, it can be presupposed, but it cannot be known. If one strives to achieve a proper clarified knowledge of it, one is bound to go astray from the way of dialectics into either poetic or rhetoric.<sup>22</sup> As Schleiermacher concludes, "We cannot

therefore say that we know the identity of that highest difference, but we instead only presuppose it for the purpose of knowledge.”<sup>23</sup>

### The Communal, Inter-Subjective Reason

All this means, as I indicated earlier, that Schleiermacher’s correspondence theory is not so unequivocal. Individual reason alone, to Schleiermacher, is no more than fantasy, for, as I said, it does not possess a higher position wherefrom one could account for the truth. But individual organization, letting being manifest itself through one’s personal perception, is precisely the cause of error.<sup>24</sup> Hence, and this is an important point, besides the correspondence of thinking and being, the second essential criterion of thinking that is knowing is that kind of thinking “in which the identity of thought-process is co-positd in all who think.”<sup>25</sup> In the same way, from the side of being as it enters knowing, it is required that there is a communal experience to all who think to know.<sup>26</sup> Knowing, according to Schleiermacher, is not that kind of thinking that is based on the plurality and differences of thinking subjects, but in their identity, sameness, and similarity instead.<sup>27</sup> It is all other thinking that is based on differences of those who think. But, to Schleiermacher, other thinking is not knowing.<sup>28</sup> In case of the identity of thinkers, the correspondence of thinking with being can be expressed in such a way that the entire being that thinks is posited in every thinking being.<sup>29</sup> For knowledge to take place, Schleiermacher requires some kind of universal reason to be applied to being in the process of knowing, universal thought forms that are the same for everyone. Reason, accordingly, as I already noted earlier, is not so much subjective as communal or inter-subjective. As Schleiermacher states, “Knowing is never simply a personal consciousness but is the totality of all personal existence and is therewith reason itself.”<sup>30</sup> Precisely this second criterion of knowing, the universality of reason, guarantees “the pure coinciding

of reason with being.”<sup>31</sup> This idea of inter-subjectivity is one of important points of Schleiermacher’s contemporary significance.

### Self-Consciousness in the Identity of Thinking and Being

Schleiermacher also addresses a hypothetical critique of his epistemological position regarding the relationship of thinking and being. I should note already here the importance of his resolving these possible criticisms referring to self-consciousness. As I will explicate later, self-consciousness—as something emerging from the oscillation of different metaphysical poles, including thinking and being—is also the place of the overcoming of metaphysics. At this point in this chapter, however, it is a step before the overcoming, where the two contrasts—thinking and being—just merge there in their identity in difference.

First Schleiermacher’s hypothetical criticism is that one could say that the notion of the correspondence of thinking with being is an idle thought because of “the absolute difference and incommensurability of both.”<sup>32</sup> Schleiermacher’s refutation of this criticism is that self-consciousness itself gives evidence that we are both thinking as well as being in terms of what is thought, and that our life proceeds in harmony (*Zusammenstimmen*) of both. This is an application of the presupposition of the correspondence of thinking and being to self-consciousness as comprising both. Second, one could say that it is “*petitio principii* to posit being outside of knowing.”<sup>33</sup> In this case, too, Schleiermacher answers his own posed critique saying that knowing itself is given in self-consciousness, however, as something different from it, in the form of being. The assumption of this difference is the very basis for the task itself to seek the distinctive characteristics of knowing. As Schleiermacher says a few paragraphs below, “our self-consciousness is only in the relative separation of thinking and being, for our consciousness first of all is the relation of thinking to what is thought.”<sup>34</sup> Being for

thinking is something relatively separated in general connection, while thinking for being is the production of determinate forms.<sup>35</sup> Again, one should keep in mind that it is not the principle of (simple) identity between thinking and being. It is identity in difference. Third: “One could say that it is in vain to relate thought to being, for both can only be absolutely separate.”<sup>36</sup> Once again, opposing such a view, Schleiermacher claims that there is a reciprocal formation of both through one another in reflection and willing given in self-consciousness. On this account, Schleiermacher thinks that it is impossible to believe that both could proceed side by side unrelated.

I would like to note that, in addition, Schleiermacher’s involvement of self-consciousness in this discussion suggests quite self-evident a fact, namely, that human beings carry in themselves the identity of thinking and being.<sup>37</sup> As Schleiermacher claims, human beings themselves are the “turning point only from which being can be viewed under the form of action of the ideal upon the real.”<sup>38</sup> To Schleiermacher, human self-consciousness as thinking being unites in an immediate identity the totality of thinking as ideal and the totality of being as real. As he nicely summarizes: “The totality of being that relates to thinking is the *real* (to which also thinking being belongs); the totality of thinking that relates to being is the *ideal*, to which also thinking being belongs, in which this identity is given immediately.”<sup>39</sup>

There are good reasons why Schleiermacher chooses self-consciousness as the key concept of his thinking. Even on the etymological level, the German word for self-consciousness (*Selbst-bewusst-Sein*) itself insinuates that identity: one’s self (*Selbst*) is the place of the identity of being (*Sein*) and thinking, which is knowing (*bewusst => Wissen => Denken*).<sup>40</sup> Schleiermacher points out how easy it is to relate thinking to being in one’s self-consciousness without even noticing. It simply happens in such an ordinary event as saying “we are.”<sup>41</sup> As Schleiermacher asserts accordingly, human beings themselves are being and thinking, that is, “thinking being” or being that is thinking



(*denkende Sein*) and “being thinking” or thinking that is being (*seiende Denken*) at the same time.<sup>42</sup> There is, in fact, a paragraph where Schleiermacher clearly relates this reciprocal identity of human being as thinking being and being thinking to self-consciousness:

. . . the nearest ground of the mutual relation of thinking and being lies in our selves. Namely, in our selves the identity of being and thinking is immediately given, which presupposes that we are just as conscious of our being as of the given being, that is, as something effective. Through that we can regard our being as a part of the entire being; we appropriate our thinking being (*denkende Sein*) as being thinking (*seiendes Denken*) in the unity of the highest power. That is exactly the content of self-consciousness.<sup>43</sup>

There is also the unity of the highest power mentioned in this paragraph. That already leads to the transcendental constitution of self-consciousness that I will discuss later. Suffice it to say here that even in this preliminary respect, for Schleiermacher, self-consciousness overcomes the duality of being and thinking or, say, of (Cartesian) *res extensa* and *res cogitans*. They both come to light in their reciprocally referring relation.<sup>44</sup> The identity of being and thinking in self-consciousness excludes the possibility of each in and for itself. One is only in the relation to another. I will return to these topics, but meanwhile there are several other contrasts of Schleiermacher’s metaphysics that need to be discussed before dealing with their overcoming in self-consciousness, which will be the theme of the next chapter.

### *The Intellectual and the Organic*

#### The Necessity of Two Functions of Thinking

Corresponding to both speculative and empirical aspects of Schleiermacher’s metaphysics, discussed in chapter 4, and corresponding to the restricted ontological relationship of thinking and being discussed above, he distinguishes two indispensable epistemological aspects or functions of thinking: the intellectual (*intellectuelle*) and the

organic (*organische*). These terms are Schleiermacher's substitutes for reason (*Vernunft*) and senses (*Sinn*).<sup>45</sup> The intellectual function represents thinking in the human being as the thinking that is being (*seiende Denken*); the organic function represents being in the human being as being that is thinking (*denkende Sein*).<sup>46</sup> One is formal, the other is material; one is mental, the other is physical. Without either of them, no thinking can take place. This division of the functions of thinking answers the basic epistemological questions of how thinking and being (of that what is thought) as two different conditions become related, and how yet they remain differentiated. Schleiermacher's answer is "that every thinking is a joint product of human reason and human organization."<sup>47</sup> It means that it is only by means of human organism and its senses that one can come to what is being thought, and it is only through the universal forms of reason that thinking always remains differentiated from the manifold of what enters thought, the objects.<sup>48</sup> These objects—keeping in mind the way how being enters thinking as thinking—are not necessarily material objects. The thought of another person, for example, can be an instance of being as well. It can also be a different faculty, though in the same thinking subject, that is related to being rather than thinking, such as, willing and doing, or even one's own previous thought in reflection. In a word, anything, as long as it is the other of one's thinking at that moment, can be the object of thought as being.

In any case, according to Schleiermacher, it is the organic function that effects one's being open to the outer, while the intellectual function—being open to the inner.<sup>49</sup> The organic function gives matter or content, while the intellectual gives form.<sup>50</sup> The organic function is passive, the intellectual, active. The organic function affects the real being, the intellectual function—the ideal being. Being corresponds to the real insofar as being as the object of thought becomes present through the organic function. Thinking corresponds to the ideal insofar as being becomes internalized through the intellectual function as that what is thought.<sup>51</sup> It is precisely the two functions that enable the same

being to be posited in its two different modes: the real and the ideal.<sup>52</sup> The organic function provides the obscure diversity of sense impressions and enlivens it.<sup>53</sup> The intellectual function, in turn, brings this raw material to “determination, division, therefore, unification, but also at the same time contrasting.”<sup>54</sup>

The organic function furnishes images for the reception of the impressions of the objects, the intellectual function formally determines that matter by means of concepts.<sup>55</sup> Knowledge can only take place if the organic images can also be represented by means of concepts. The impression of the objects on the sense organs as images constitute human experience. Definitely, these organic impressions take part in thinking, not just perception. After all, the organic function is a function of thinking. It is thinking insofar as it is will to know (*Wissenwollen*), which, in turn, results in the openness of the senses to being.

#### The Identity of Both Functions

Schleiermacher thinks that if real thinking that brings about knowledge is to take place, both functions must come to identity, or even to “being-there-for-each-other” (*das Füreinander*),<sup>56</sup> or “in-each-other-ness” (*Ineinander*),<sup>57</sup> or to “being-related-to-each-other” (*das Aufeinanderbezogensein*),<sup>58</sup> or “alternation-relationship” (*das Wechselverhältnis*).<sup>59</sup> Precisely these two functions, when they come to identity in one’s reason, originate the identity of thinking and being that is the first metaphysical presupposition of knowing.<sup>60</sup>

There is another Schleiermacher’s basic question concerning thinking and being: “How does thinking arrives at what is thought?”<sup>61</sup> I put this question here instead of in the previous section because the answer to it lies in the two functions:

Through spiritual life’s being open to the outer = *organization*, thinking arrives at its object or matter; through the activity which is always the same in spite of all

differences of objects = *reason*, thinking arrives at its form, due to which it [reason] always remains thinking.<sup>62</sup>

The intellectual function is the source of unity and plurality (*Vielheit*), the organic function, the source of diversity (*Mannigfaltigkeit*).<sup>63</sup> The diversity of organic sense impressions would be indeterminate without the unity and plurality that only the intellectual function can bring, while that determined rational unity and plurality would be empty without the organic diversity.<sup>64</sup> In their identity, both functions pass into each other in the “indifference of their priority.”<sup>65</sup> So, even more importantly, the unity of both functions is not settled; it is an “oscillating unity” (*schwebende Einheit*).<sup>66</sup> Both functions can substitute each other.<sup>67</sup> Both can alternately direct themselves to each other.<sup>68</sup>

### The Limits and Mutual Indispensability of Both Functions

Admittedly, Schleiermacher allows for some kind of knowledge to take place even from the independent activity of either organic or intellectual functions separately, because he thinks there is always some element of one in the other. Even if it is at a minimum, there is always organic function present in thinking, and intellectual function present in perception.<sup>69</sup>

Schleiermacher believes that purely formal thinking without any organic element is not even possible. That would be an instance of thinking about nothing, which, I suppose, Schleiermacher would reject together with the possibility of thinking about being as such.<sup>70</sup> Notably, notwithstanding Schleiermacher’s use of *Sein* not only in reference to being as such, but also to entities, that kind of being that is the necessary counterpart of thinking, according to Schleiermacher, is not being as such (*Sein*); it is rather being as entity (*Seiende*). In any event, inasmuch as thinking always takes place under the form of being, pure thinking also needs what Schleiermacher calls “the inner organization, namely, the inner ear and memory,” which are organic.<sup>71</sup> Schleiermacher even goes so far as to claim that thinking is just the same but “more inner process of

perception.”<sup>72</sup> As a matter of fact, the organic function, according to Schleiermacher, is present in the intellectual simply because thinking takes place by means of language (*Sprache*) and inner speech (*Rede*). Schleiermacher thinks that there is no thinking without it. But speech as the existence of thinking represents precisely the organic side of thinking.<sup>73</sup> Reason becomes the object for us only through organization, “namely through language.”<sup>74</sup> As Schleiermacher also points out, the organic function, as pure form, is even adherent in the illusionary thinking of free fantasy.

In a similar way, the intellectual function, as form, is adherent in hypothetical knowing or unscientific perception.<sup>75</sup> The intellectual function is present in perception as a result of the simple fact that a particular object is perceived at all, standing apart in its unity from the chaos of impressions. In any case, the objects of organizational experience always need to be compared, combined, and differentiated, and only the intellectual function can do it.

The proportions in which the two functions are involved in thinking are always different: one can be at a minimum, while the other at a maximum, and vice versa. In thinking in the narrow sense, which is furnishing the objects of perception with the forms of thought, the intellectual function predominates. In thinking as perceiving, which is at the same time effecting images of the objects of thought, the organic function dominates.

One can always start thinking with one of the functions at a minimum. If the intellectual function is at a minimum, is thought away (*heraus denken*), the organic function of thinking reaches its limit at chaos. It is precisely the limit of thinking, and as such it is not thought itself, for it cannot be either represented or attributed with concrete features. If, on the other hand, the organic function is at a minimum, the intellectual function reaches its limit at the concept of thing. Here the organic function is present only as potentiality, as the ability to affect organically.<sup>76</sup> The intellectual function becomes “only an empty form of the indifference of being and non-being.”<sup>77</sup> But if even this

potentiality is thought away, the final limit of thinking is reached from the intellectual side, which is the idea of “pure being without doing.”<sup>78</sup> In this case, the indifference is between object and non-object.<sup>79</sup>

Although there are elements of one function in the other, one side in isolation does not bring about proper thinking. There is no real thinking in either of these cases of the limits of thought, for the dominance of one function is too strong. If there is no proper twofold thinking involved, there is no real knowledge either. Knowing, to Schleiermacher, is that kind of thinking in which the contrast itself between both functions disappears.<sup>80</sup> “Knowledge,” states Schleiermacher, “meaning here foremost real [knowledge], is that kind of thinking that is posited not with the difference but in and with the identity of both functions, and that was originally based on its outside as being, in the same way for both functions.”<sup>81</sup> Perception of the organic function can only be considered as knowing if “the objects are fixed as proceeding from similar impressions referring to an identical system of thought-forms.”<sup>82</sup> Thinking of the intellectual function, in turn, can only be considered as knowing if “from similar thought-forms proceeding impressions are recognized as identical and become the basis of it.”<sup>83</sup> In any case, to recapitulate, Schleiermacher’s definitive conclusion is that all “real determinate thinking is, therefore, comprised in the coincidence of the activity of both poles.”<sup>84</sup>

### The Limits of Real Thinking

Indeterminate chaos and pure being were the ultimate limits of thinking. But there also are, according to Schleiermacher, four secondary limits of thinking that correspondingly occupy the lower and the upper ends of the intellectual and the organic functions. Inasmuch as chaos and being itself are the absolute limits of thought, as such they remain outside thinking. All real thinking takes place in the oscillation between the secondary limits.

The two limits of the intellectual function of thinking are the real and the ideal, the former, being the lower limit, is closest to the transition to the organic function, but the latter, being its upper limit, is closest to the absolute limit of being as such.<sup>85</sup> The more the intellectual function abstracts from all form and descends to more and more inclusive content, the more it “arrives at the absolute limit-concept of the infinite chaos of possible stimulations.”<sup>86</sup> This is the limit-concept of absolute difference, the idea of pure content, pure real being. The more the intellectual function abstracts from all given content and ascends to more and more inclusive concepts, it eventually “arrives at the absolute limit-concept of the coherent structure of being as a whole.”<sup>87</sup> This is the limit-concept of absolute identity, the idea of pure form, the ideal being. Whereas pure real being, that is pure content or pure difference, marks the unity of the lower limit-concepts, pure ideal being, that is pure form or pure identity, marks the unity of the upper limit-concepts.

The two limits of the organic function, in turn, are space and time.<sup>88</sup> Similarly, in this case, when the organic function descends to the most inclusive content-filled sensible form, it “arrives at the pure image of space.”<sup>89</sup> But when all content is abstracted from the form of the image of the organic function, and it is allowed to ascend to the most inclusive content-empty sensible form, it “arrives at the pure image of time.”<sup>90</sup>

Schleiermacher himself so summarizes the correspondence of these four limits according to the functions of thinking to which they belong: “Space is therefore the organic way to posit what in the intellectual function is posited as the real; and time is nothing else than the organic way to posit what we posit as the ideal from the intellectual side.”<sup>91</sup> The materialization of space and time (*die Raum- und Zeiterfüllung*) give the corresponding images to the concepts of the ideal and the real.<sup>92</sup>

## Intuition: The Anticipation of the Overcoming of Metaphysics

It is precisely the presence of both intellectual and organic elements in different degrees in all determinate thinking that differentiates thinking into three areas.<sup>93</sup> The first is the real thinking (*eigentliche Denken*), in which the activity of reason predominates the organization. It is mostly speculative thinking, concerned with universality. The second is perception (*Wahrnehmung*), in case of being-open to the outer, or sensation (*Empfindung*), in case of being-open to the inner, in which the organic function predominates the rational. It is mostly empirical perceiving of particulars. The third is intuition (*Anschauung*), in which both former elements—the intellectual and the organic—are in complete equilibrium or balance (*völligen Gleichgewicht*) in their continuous approximation from their individual one-sidedness to the achievement of their fulfillment in the unity of real thought. Inasmuch as the moments of complete balance are so elusive and intangible, Schleiermacher says that such a moment is only a passing, accidental thought (*Gedankending*).<sup>94</sup> So is intuition. It cannot even be located anywhere else except in “the point of indifference” (*Indifferenzpunkt*) between the intellectual and the organic functions.<sup>95</sup> Even more important, due to its being indeterminately suspended in the state of oscillation between the two interacting metaphysical poles of reason and perception on the way to knowing, in intuition the subject-object division disappears and metaphysics is overcome. I claim that this overcoming happens precisely because, according to Schleiermacher, knowing cannot really be achieved after all. The identity of being and thinking can only be progressively approximated, but the inner premise of this identity remains transcendental.<sup>96</sup> Intuition is outside the sphere of knowledge. It may be precisely because of their infinite asymptotic approximation that the coincidence of thinking and being as “thought-thing” (*Gedankending*) in intuition remains that inscrutable “accidental thought” (*Gedankending*) that cannot belong to proper thinking.<sup>97</sup>



## The Premonition of the Overcoming in Self-Consciousness

The unity of both intellectual and organic functions constitutes the transcendental presupposition for self-consciousness in the same way as it did for the unity of thinking and being, as something lying outside the area of thought. As Schleiermacher defines the latter: “Self-consciousness, apart from all determinate content, is nothing else but the consciousness of the being-one and the togetherness of both functions.”<sup>98</sup> The coincidence of both functions, to Schleiermacher, in fact, is consciousness itself: “the organic and the intellectual, posited identical, are self-consciousness, the self (*das Ich*), conceived from that which is posited there as historical.”<sup>99</sup> Moreover, Schleiermacher believes that togetherness of both functions in self-consciousness makes it possible for a human being to be the mediator of being, being as such that becomes divided in beings or entities as it proceeds through self-consciousness. At least that is the way I interpret the following passage: “When the activity of reason derives from the organic: then we are only the points of passage for the play of divided/fissured being.”<sup>100</sup> In this way, self-consciousness becomes the border outside metaphysics where the transcendent and the immanent meet.<sup>101</sup> I will return to this discussion in the next chapter on the transcendent ground of metaphysics. As it will also be seen there, Schleiermacher’s theory of self-consciousness is another instance in his dialectics in which metaphysics is overcome.

The metaphysical impulse of the will to know not only never ceases, but it also can never be fulfilled as real knowledge. Yet, as this section showed, it can be fulfilled in other non-metaphysical ways of (non)knowing, such as intuition and immediate self-consciousness, for example, that may be instances of the proper metaphysics that overcomes metaphysics sought for in this paper.

## *Concept and Judgment*

To the ontological contrast of thinking and being (ontological as far as it deals with the subject and being) corresponding epistemological contrast of the intellectual and the organic functions of reason from the logical point of view employs corresponding concepts and judgments. Inasmuch as all thinking, to Schleiermacher, is linguistically formed, that thinking that is knowing cannot take any other form than that of the basic linguistic units that are concept (word) and judgment (sentence or expression). The third, according to Schleiermacher, simply is not given because the syllogism (*Schluss*) is not an independent form of thinking that would add something substantive; it can only combine the two and their content.<sup>102</sup>

### Concept

A concept determines being as unity. It is a product of reason. Concepts basically consist of the combinations of the subject's attributes. A concept formally determines and brings to the unity the manifold material that has passed through the senses and the organic function. A concept is an oscillation between the universal and the particular.<sup>103</sup> A concept is a combination and distinction of characteristic marks of a subject into more inclusive genus and less inclusive specific difference.<sup>104</sup> A concept is related to sensation as the act that is not yet completed receptivity.<sup>105</sup> It is speculative knowing that dominates concept, and as originating from inner impulse, it is apriori.<sup>106</sup>

### Judgment

A judgment, in contrast, expresses something about the subject already determined by concept, thus ascribing a predicate to the subject. A judgment is based in sensibility. Judgments basically consist of concepts, of their combinations with reference to the given subject. They determine the concepts, contrasting them, denoting their

differences. A judgment is a synthesis of being and non-being, or the oscillation between both.<sup>107</sup> It happens as a result of the subject's not being that which is attributed to it, but at the same time remaining as being.<sup>108</sup> Thus, being is the subject and non-being is the predicate. Notably, what Schleiermacher basically has in mind here is synthetic judgment. The manifold predications of the objects in judgments add to knowledge. A judgment is a combination and distinction of the subject-concept, denoting an independent being and a predicate-concept, denoting a determination of being that is not already contained in the subject-concept.<sup>109</sup> A judgment is related to willing as the act that is not yet completed spontaneity.<sup>110</sup> It is changing historical knowing that dominates judgment, and, as originating from externally given organic affections, it is a posteriori.<sup>111</sup>

### The Interdependence of Concepts and Judgments

There is something in the concept-judgment relationship discussion that runs parallel to the contrasts discussed above. And it is, once again, their mutual interdependence and indispensability. Very much as it was with speculation and empiricism; thinking and being; the intellectual and the organic functions of reason; concepts and judgments, mutually presuppose each other.<sup>112</sup> Both concepts and judgments deal with the same being, only posited as power and appearance correspondingly.<sup>113</sup> One could even say that either concept or judgment is nothing without the other. As Jonas' summary records, "the absolute knowledge, the source of all real knowing, is the pure identity of both."<sup>114</sup>

Concepts need predicative determination given by judgments, but judgments for their determination need subjects that in turn require concepts for their determination. Precisely concepts, as the products of the intellectual function, provide the necessary universal unity of reason, whereas judgments, grounded in the difference of the organic

sensibility, give the concepts determinations and further qualifications. Inasmuch as concepts combine genus and specific difference, their unity can only be rendered precise by means of the predications that judgments contribute. But, to repeat, judgments themselves consist of the combination of concepts.<sup>115</sup> As Schleiermacher states about the interdependence of the two in their formation: “The more the concept is based on a system of judgments, the more complete it is.”<sup>116</sup> And vice versa: “Judgments accordingly become all the more complete, the more the concepts have already been formed.”<sup>117</sup> The more the judgment contains such developed concepts, the more complete it is. But the completeness of the concept is dependent on the completeness of the judgments that determine it.

It is noteworthy that, for Schleiermacher, precisely the mutual interdependence of concepts and judgments overcomes the individual one-sidedness of idealism and realism.<sup>118</sup> But it is also this same interdependence of concept and judgment in genuine knowing that causes the possibility to isolate one of them, for, repeatedly, the same knowledge of the same being can occur under either of these two forms. Idealism posits all knowledge exclusively in the form of concept, but realism exclusively in the form of judgment. The former considers the sphere of judgment, or the real being, as appearance that does not lead to genuine knowing. The latter considers the conceptual knowledge to be empty. Schleiermacher, in opposition to any one-sidedness, maintains that knowledge is possible only if both concepts and judgments are involved, in much the same way as it was with speculation and empiricism, thinking and being, the intellectual and the organic functions.

### The Limits of Concepts and Judgments

Schleiermacher also assigns the upper and the lower delimiting boundaries to concepts and judgments, just as he did for the intellectual and the organic functions of

thinking.<sup>119</sup> As in that discussion above, I will only be able to give a concise account of Schleiermacher's intricate and lengthy discussion of the relations between these limits.<sup>120</sup> The limits emerge in the formative process of concepts and judgments from indistinctness to clearness. At the lower limit, determination reaches its minimum, at the upper limit, its maximum. These limits also exemplify the interdependence of concepts and judgments insofar as their lower and upper boundaries are alike.

The lower limit of concept consists of the infinite multiplicity of possible separate judgments that are only minimally predicated, thus being supremely undetermined. The upper limit of concept unites that multiplicity into a singular concept of the highest being in which determination reaches the limit. It is the identity of thinking with being in which the contrast of thinking and what is thought is eliminated by means of subsuming it under the concept of the highest being about which nothing more can be predicated outside its own being. Thus, this limit is "the euthanasia of judgment in concept."<sup>121</sup> That kind of knowing, on the one hand, is transcendental; it oscillates between the ethical and the physical. On the other hand, it is the form of all knowing, for it unites concept and judgment without itself either being carried out as concept, or being built out of manifold judgments.<sup>122</sup>

The lower limit of judgment, in turn, consists of the infinity of indeterminate predicates without a determined subject. It is the absolute communality of all being. Again, that is the limit of indeterminacy. The upper limit of judgment consists of the multiplicity of predicates that have a single subject, the absolute subject, of which nothing more can be predicated. That is the limit of determination.<sup>123</sup>

As I mentioned, these limits are identical for concepts and judgments. As Schleiermacher himself summarizes:

The indeterminate multiplicity of possible judgments (the limit of concept) and the absolute communality of being (the limit of judgment) are the same. The

absolute unity of being (the limit of concept) and the absolute subject (the limit of judgment) are the same.<sup>124</sup>

In addition, it is this identity of the limits of concepts and judgments that makes possible the “transition” (*Übergang*) from judgment to concept, a term which will become crucial later, when I discuss Schleiermacher’s overcoming of metaphysical contrasts.<sup>125</sup>

In the first beginning of consciousness, concept and judgment are mingled in a state of indifference that can equally well become either concept or judgment.<sup>126</sup> But when the limits of concept and judgment themselves are reached, they cease to be part of thinking and thus cannot be either concepts or judgments. That is to say, both the absolute unity of being and the absolute multiplicity of appearance, instead of becoming thinking, become the transcendental roots of all thinking and knowing.<sup>127</sup> But the upper limits of concept and judgment, as also being the same in their unity, constitute the transcendent ground of all knowing.<sup>128</sup>

### The Epistemological Significance of the Identity of Concept and Judgment As the Transcendent Ground

Now, a question emerges for Schleiermacher: How can knowledge arise in this situation where concepts and judgments mutually presuppose each other? Is it not the case that this mutual implication of all knowledge creates a *circulus vitiosus*, a closed circle without any point of departure? The answer is no, and the answer is concealed in the identity of concepts and judgments: “There must be an identity of the two that itself must be the source of all real knowing, thus its absolute, and this source cannot be either concept or judgment but must be the pure identity of the two.”<sup>129</sup> Consequently, once again, the discussion of the identity of concept and judgment in these last paragraphs, as in the formerly discussed contrasts, point to the transcendent ground in which the metaphysical opposition is overcome. That will be subject of chapter 8. But first, I want

to make a point of something in regard to overcoming metaphysics that arises in the discussion of the interdependence of concept and judgment.

### The Irreducible Non-Metaphysical Linguisticality

What I want to point out is that the interdependence of concept and judgment, in fact, prevents any possibility of a foundational metaphysics. How so? It is because the conceptual terms cannot once and for all absorb their predicates into themselves.<sup>130</sup> Instead, they remain modifiable in their substance through constant changes brought about by the activity of the organic function and the judgments passed on them. As a result, the system of language always remains unstable and changing. There can be no stable foundation. Everything changes according to individual interpretative judgments. Hence, the linguistic system itself resists metaphysics, for it “never attains the manner of being of a foundational Idea which can shake off interpretation and comment from the outside.”<sup>131</sup> As Manfred Frank interprets Schleiermacher’s view of language, it is “the individual universal.”<sup>132</sup> And it happens in a great deal because of the interrelation of concept and judgment. Language exists as a universal conceptual system only on the basis of ever-changing temporary inter-subjective judgmental agreements.<sup>133</sup>

### *God and World*

#### The Two Roles of the Idea of God

As I indicated above, all contrasts of Schleiermacher’s metaphysics are interrelated. The last one I will discuss here is the contrast of God and world. All the previous contrasts culminate in this one. Before proceeding in this subsection, there is something that must be noted beforehand about the idea of God in this particular context, because it has another usage in Schleiermacher’s dialectics, and these two should not be confused. That another usage, in fact, may include the one under consideration here, and I

will examine it in the next chapter which addresses Schleiermacher's transcendental metaphysics. While here the idea of God is considered a part of the metaphysical contrast of God and world, in the other case, it is the ultimate presupposition of knowledge that transcends even this contrast. In that latter case, it is a truly metaphysical idea of God above God, if one may say so.

### World As the Totality of Being

It is equally important to note before proceeding that the idea of world in this context should not be confused with the earth. By world Schleiermacher means rather the universe as the totality of being in its diversity, whereas the earth, as a particular planet, a particular identity of substance and energy, is only one thing among others and not the whole world.<sup>134</sup> I think, it may also be noted in addition that in Schleiermacher's view, world as totality of being or universe is something more than it may appear. That is, world cannot be confused with inanimate nature. World, to Schleiermacher, means "in-each-otherness of nature and spirit."<sup>135</sup> The world is unfathomable not only outwardly, but also inwardly, for it is charged with spirit.

### God and World As Limiting Ideas

I would like to continue with the thought that the contrast of God and world further expresses the indispensability of both the ideal and the real for thinking that is knowing. The idea of God represents the former, but the idea of world the latter. This contrast, in fact, already appeared in the preceding discussion of the limits of concept and judgment.<sup>136</sup> That is to say, to Schleiermacher, the identity of the absolute unity of being and the absolute subject, the upper limits of concept and judgment, can also be named God. It is the primary unity that excludes all contrasts.<sup>137</sup> As such, the idea of God is the presupposition that provides the element of unity for thinking. But the identity of the



infinity of predicates and the multiplicity of judgments, the lower limits of concept and judgment, is the same as world. It is the final unity that includes the difference of all contrasts.<sup>138</sup> The idea of God as the identity of upper limits represents pure intellectual function, the primary principle of the formation of concepts. The idea of world as the identity of lower limits represents pure organic function, the final principle of the formation of judgments. The idea of God, as representing the upper limits in their identity between the highest genus and all particular genera, makes possible the combining of form with empty content. The idea of world, as representing the lower limits in their identity between highest being and the infinity of predicates, makes possible the combining of pure form with full content.

#### Transcendence of Both God and World

Insofar as both God and world in different ways belong to the domain of limits of thought, they do not constitute knowledge, and there cannot be knowledge of them. Instead, they are transcendental ideas that correspondingly constitute the primary and the final principles or presuppositions of knowledge. Therefore, I cannot reiterate too often that they do not belong to the sphere of thinking and knowing proper. This sphere is not ontology, but epistemology, for it does not deal with either God or world as such, but with the epistemic significance of these ideas. For Schleiermacher, this pair of contrasts is not related ontologically, but rather logically. This truth should be kept in mind in all further discussion. As he maintains, in regard to the formula of God as the unity excluding all contrasts and world as unity including contrasts, it does not express anything more in reality than that there must be some *x* in being that corresponds to this logical expression.<sup>139</sup> It does not express anything more positive in reality than a formula “being is,” for example.

## Transcendence of the Idea of God

As to the idea of God and its transcendence, Schleiermacher professes a kind of *via negativa*: notwithstanding that the idea of God can be hypothetically presupposed for the dialectical claim of the possibility of knowledge, not much can be known of God's being besides knowing God's unknowability. As Schleiermacher maintains, what one can have regarding the absolute is its "not-having" (*Nichthaben*).<sup>140</sup> It can be established only in a negative form.<sup>141</sup> However, it is a *via negativa* with some exclusions. Namely, Schleiermacher believes that there are two things that can be said of God in the area of knowing. Just two, and in the area of epistemology only, but nevertheless (1) God as transcendent being is the (material) principle of all being and (2) God as transcendent idea is the formal principle of all knowing.<sup>142</sup> Everything else besides this knowledge is what God is not. "Everything else," goes on Schleiermacher, "is only bombast or meddling of the religious, which does not belong here, but insofar as it appears here, has yet destructive effect."<sup>143</sup>

So, Schleiermacher's *Dialektik* gives two insights regarding the knowledge of God: the knowledge of God's unknowability and the knowledge of the impossibility of knowledge without God. Unknown but necessary: "The dialectics gives us no knowledge of God; yet it makes the claim: there is no knowledge possible without God."<sup>144</sup> Obviously, the author of this quote may refer to the following sentence of Schleiermacher: "The deity is just as surely incomprehensible as the knowledge of it is the basis of all knowledge."<sup>145</sup> I would claim that this dialectical knowledge of God turns out to be quite a metaphysical knowledge after all, even if it is the knowledge of non-knowledge. It still asserts something about God, even if it is God's incomprehensibility. Yet, it is a different metaphysics from that kind of speculative metaphysics that affirms the reflection of the divine in human reason, exemplified by Schleiermacher's

contemporaries, such as Schelling and Hegel. Schleiermacher's realism, which I have already doubted in his epistemology, does not apply to the knowledge of God either.

The arguments of the unknowability of God should be obvious. Although the idea of God is a necessary epistemic presupposition, it cannot be identical with the divine itself.<sup>146</sup> The concept of the divine, according to Schleiermacher, cannot exist outside the divine itself.<sup>147</sup> Human thinking can have the divine only insofar as it knows "the inadequacy of any image of deity we have in the identity of our being and our concept."<sup>148</sup> There can be no isolated perception of deity. There is no way for its concept in human thinking to reach the identity with its object, for by definition, there can be no organic grasp of the idea of God.<sup>149</sup> Proper knowing, on Schleiermacher's account, to remind, must involve the organic function. A human being would have to become God for the organic function to deliver the sense impression of God as such. It is very clear to Schleiermacher: "God's being as such cannot be given to us."<sup>150</sup> All representations of the idea of God—such as, the absolute, the highest unity, the identity of the ideal and the real, and others—can be schemata only. For those schemata to come alive, they must enter the domain of finitude and antithesis, as in the case when one thinks of God as *natura naturans*, or as conscious absolute I.<sup>151</sup> But these options are not for Schleiermacher. Therefore, to him, the idea of God and its representations do not really denote its referent, but rather, as Schleiermacher says, have symbolic value, in contrast to the real value of the idea of world.<sup>152</sup> Or else, as Schleiermacher admits, because human knowledge is finite and deficient, the idea of God is bound to remain mythical.<sup>153</sup> In contrast to the expressions of God that aim at knowing God, Schleiermacher's epistemic presupposing God does not go any further than naming God by its name, "God." It may be a nonmetaphysical naming in contrast to metaphysical expressing.

## Transcendence of the Idea of World

The idea of the unknowability of God is not uncommon in philosophy and theology. But Schleiermacher, in addition, draws similar conclusions regarding the idea of world. He maintains, "Of the idea of world, there is given to us neither its being in itself, nor being in contrast to God, rather only being in us and being in things."<sup>154</sup> It is interesting that one can replace the terms "world" for "God" and vice versa in this statement, and obtain a statement Schleiermacher would use about God. In fact, there are similar statements about God, and I will refer to them in the next chapter.

In any case, in Schleiermacher's opinion, inasmuch as belonging to the limits of thought, world partakes in thinking that is not proper thinking, it also partakes in transcendent being.<sup>155</sup> The first impression can be that the idea of world may be subject to knowing, for at least theoretically, world may become an object of sense experience. So, both functions of reason may appear to be involved, thus fulfilling the requirement of proper thinking. Yet, Schleiermacher thinks that it is not so. Human knowing is finite, and, despite its constant progression toward better knowing of world, toward better correspondence of world in thinking with being, it can never embrace the totality of being. It cannot happen precisely because human knowing is bound to a particular being, the earth. "We are bound to the earth," as Schleiermacher declares, and consequently so are all operations of thinking, the whole system of the formation of concepts.<sup>156</sup> Or, as Schleiermacher admits, world "cannot become for us intuition in which speculative and empirical, ethical and physical ways of knowing pervade, but it always remains an unfulfilled thought to which the organic element is related only in remote analogies."<sup>157</sup> Also, world as time and space can be infinitely divided into smaller parts, but it cannot be given in one act of perception.<sup>158</sup> Hence, world in its totality can only be thought, but it cannot be organically given in a way that gathers the continuous process of all experience.<sup>159</sup> Insofar as only one function of thinking is fully involved, the intellectual

one, the proper knowledge of world cannot take place. It can only be grasped as an idea with no perceptive counterpart. So, there can be no knowledge of the idea of world and it must also be transcendental.

Schleiermacher also summarizes his views about the transcendence of world as follows:

If world comprises in being what corresponds to the limits of thought, so it belongs to real thinking only from one side, yet it also belongs to real being just as much. It includes all being, at the same time never including it fully, for it is always in becoming. Thinking corresponds to the formation of concepts and its limits, being corresponds to the formation of judgments and its limits. As unity, world includes being in itself, as communality, it is only becoming.<sup>160</sup>

Whereas the idea of God represents unity only, in the dialectics of the one and the many, the idea of world represents “a quantitative third” that mediates both unity and plurality.<sup>161</sup> World is unity in plurality.

#### The Different Transcendence of God and World

Although both ideas are transcendental, the transcendence of the idea of world, according to Schleiermacher, is not to be understood in the same way as that of the idea of God.<sup>162</sup> If the transcendence of world is that of the “other” (*das Andere*) the transcendence of God is that of the “wholly other” (*der ganz Andere*).<sup>163</sup> Although the idea of world also belongs to the limits of concept and judgment, the idea of God is “more” transcendent. As Schleiermacher says, the idea of world is transcendent in a subordinated sense.<sup>164</sup> It is a subordinate, secondary unity binding the ideal and the real.<sup>165</sup> The idea of world can be conceived as unity in two ways: “as a unity pure and simple (*als Einheit schlechthin*), but also as a totality made up of a plurality of specially relativized unities.”<sup>166</sup> The latter unities have to do with what is given, while the former unity is necessary for thinking only. Nevertheless, the unity of world is unlike to the absolute unity of the idea of God. To remind, the former includes all contrasts, but the

latter excludes them. In any case, the idea of world, according to Schleiermacher, cannot be the transcendent ground. This privilege is reserved only for the idea of God which, being the principle of being, must be not only beyond world as the totality of being, but also include it.<sup>167</sup> But the idea of world, as shown above, is still transcendent, even if in its special, subordinated way. And it lies outside real knowing precisely because it is posited as the totality of being in its immeasurable diversity, in contrast to the unity of the idea of God.<sup>168</sup>

#### Different Delimitations of God and World: *Termini A Quo et Ad Quem*

Schleiermacher thinks that these considerations of the relationship of the ideas of God and world not only bring one back to the identity of transcendental and formal, but also ultimately take one in the direction of the never-to-be-reached limits of thinking that express what corresponds to the transcendent ground, or God, in being. In this context, Schleiermacher ascribes two temporal metaphysical properties to the ideas of God and world that once more underscore the difference of their transcendence. Those are formulae of Medieval theology *terminus a quo* and *terminus ad quem*.<sup>169</sup> “The formulae that express the *terminus a quo* are purely negative, therefore void, when related to the idea of world.”<sup>170</sup> For that reason, the idea of world thoroughly expresses only the *terminus ad quem*. But the idea of God, for Schleiermacher, allows itself to be related to both of these limits, *a quo* and *ad quem*, interrelated with each other.

While for Schleiermacher, in world is *terminus ad quem* and God both *termini a quo* and *ad quem*, eight years earlier he had proposed a different formula. I quote it, too, because it adds a few more nuances to the understanding of the God-world relationship in its mutual epistemological indispensability as presuppositions of knowing: “As the idea of God is the transcendental *terminus a quo* and the principle of the possibility of knowing in itself, so the idea of world is the transcendental *terminus ad quem* and the principle of the actuality of knowing in its becoming.”<sup>171</sup> Thus, first of all, both ideas

bring one back to the two functions of thinking—intellectual and organic—corresponding to God and world. The former has to do with the possible knowing and knowing as such, in its being, whereas the latter has to do with the actual knowing that is always in approximation, becoming. Whereas world as *terminus ad quem*, in contrast to God as *terminus a quo*, can only be an object of progressive inquiry, that inquiry cannot take place without God presupposed. Knowing world does not add to knowing God, the presupposition. At most, it can only add to knowing God as the transcendental presupposition.<sup>172</sup>

As a reminder, for Schleiermacher, real thinking must take part in the idea of world. But this thinking corresponds to the idea of knowing only through approximation, progression, becoming, by means of continual adding, through the interaction of speculative and empirical, but never completely. In contrast to that, the idea of God, to Schleiermacher, has no relation to such progression; it cannot be approximated. It has meaning only to and for each individual thought in itself, not to the interconnectedness of thoughts.

The differences between the two ideas go on. I will just mention some of them. As Schleiermacher also recounts, the idea of God is always posited in thought as unity without plurality, whereas the idea of world as plurality without unity. Moreover, world is space-and-time filled, whereas God is spaceless and timeless. Even more, world is the totality of antitheses, whereas God is the negation of all antitheses.<sup>173</sup> God is the absolute unity of the contrasts, world is their relative unity. God is necessary, but not directly given, world is conditioned and directly given.<sup>174</sup>

### Similarity between God and World

All of the above differences notwithstanding, Schleiermacher is convinced that there is no way to think the idea of world in opposition to that of God. Why so? The

answer already lies in the same foregoing discussion about the similar transcendence of both world and God. Very much like it is in the case of God, world's being in-itself is not given. And, Schleiermacher adds, not only because of the infinity of world-process, but also because one cannot really posit plurality itself without either apprehending it as mere aggregate that cannot correspond to the idea of world or reducing it to a determinate unity.<sup>175</sup> Schleiermacher recapitulates: "All presentations of world that are carried out really (as, e.g., the division of world in spiritual and corporeal) are just as inadequate and just as figurative as those of divinity."<sup>176</sup> Schleiermacher also thinks that the idea of world, analogously to the idea of God, is a driving force of thinking as well as willing.<sup>177</sup> The idea of world is also presupposed in things insofar as their essence is conditioned through their coexistence. As a result, the totality of everything finite as world is likewise posited in each individual thing.

#### Interdependence of God and World: The First Canon

As these similarities indicate, and as one can anticipate from the pattern of Schleiermacher's other metaphysical contrasts, ideas of both God and world must also be interdependent. I should remind again, that this interdependence is not to be understood essentially or ontologically, but only noetically or epistemologically.<sup>178</sup> It is a presuppositional correlation necessary for proper thinking to take place, thinking that involves both the ideal and the real, the intellectual and the organic, which both ideas represent. Schleiermacher's proposition is, "Both ideas of world and God are correlates."<sup>179</sup> It means that one cannot be thought without the other. Thus, Schleiermacher proposes his "first canon": "No God without world, in the same way as no world without God."<sup>180</sup> They both are equal presuppositions of real thinking that strives to become knowing: "God is the presupposition in origination, world is the presupposition in proceeding"<sup>181</sup> "Without the former, there is no unity in



moment, without the latter, there is no impulse for progression in thinking.”<sup>182</sup> God is the principle of construction, world is the principle of combination.<sup>183</sup>

### Untenability of One-Sided Separation

Again, as in the case of other Schleiermacher’s metaphysical contrasts, correlation determines in advance the rejection of any one-sided, separate epistemological usage of the ideas of God or world in which one could be eliminated at the expense of the other. Also from this perspective, it is precisely the similar transcendence of both ideas that permits the following dangers of one-sidedness: “If we thus think world without God, we come upon fate and matter as grounds of being; if we think God without world, God becomes the principle of non-being and the world becomes contingent.”<sup>184</sup> Schleiermacher believes that, if the first canon is not taken into consideration, in the case of its second part, the presentation of world without God remains inadequate, whereas in the first, God without world, there is no more the idea of God that remains, but “an empty phantasm” (*ein leeres Fantasma*).<sup>185</sup> “No world without God” because in that case its formula remains insufficient and wanting, and “No God without world, because one can only come to God from that which is brought forth in us through world.”<sup>186</sup> World without God remains accidental, and cannot be thought as unity. God can only be presented in worldly terms; there is no language that describes God directly. As soon as one thinks of God, God becomes related to world in the human mind. Thinking God can only take place in finite worldly terms. In separation of God from world, there is nothing either for knowing or willing.<sup>187</sup> Thinking world without God cannot yield knowledge, whereas thinking God without world gives only indistinguishable value to thoughts, eliminating the difference between truth and error.<sup>188</sup>

Schleiermacher also has several other explanations as to why neither of these ideas should be thought as self-sufficient, but only as interrelated. For example, thinking

both the transcendence of God above world, when there is something in God that is not conditioned by world, and the transcendence of world above God, when there is something in world that is not conditioned by God, appear untenable to Schleiermacher, for it violates the necessary interconnectedness of both ideas and their relative activity and passivity.<sup>189</sup>

Another related example is the dispute over whether God is within or beyond world, namely, the dispute between pantheism and deism.<sup>190</sup> The latter brings forth an antithesis between God's self-activity and receptivity, the antithesis that natural theologies, relying upon the theory of creation, are so full of. The God-world relationship is then construed in a way that God as the highest being is opposed to world as formless matter. It is very much like opposing the intellectual and the organic functions of reason. Pantheism, in turn, makes God *natura naturans* and world order. Needless to say, both such cases of one-sidedness are not acceptable to Schleiermacher.

In any event, when one of these fundamental ideas is ignored and the other overemphasized in the process of knowing, according to Schleiermacher, two kinds of misconceptions, or faulty metaphysics, happen. The overemphasis on the idea of world is the "philosophical" or the "worldly wisdom" (*philosophische oder weltweisheitliche*) misconception, while the overemphasis on the idea of God is the "theosophical" (*theosophische*) misconception.<sup>191</sup> In the latter, both minimum and maximum (*termini a quo* and *ad quem*) are equally posited for itself, and there is no progression found. When the idea of God gets isolated under these circumstances, it cannot but end, as Schleiermacher says, "in gymnosophistic navelgazing."<sup>192</sup> The "worldly wisdom," in turn, if isolated, forfeits the difference between knowing and arbitrary thinking, and consequently, if proceeding from thinking in the narrower sense, becomes "fantastic" (*fantastisch*). Or, in the case of forfeiting the difference between the organic way of realization, if proceeding from perception, becomes "atomistic" (*atomistisch*).<sup>193</sup>

To be sure, this untenability of separation of both ideas obliges one to think God and world as merging (*aufgehend*) into each other.<sup>194</sup> After all, that is what the first canon is about. But that is not all. As shown above, there are not only similarities, but also differences between both ideas. The first canon alone may lead to a different one-sidedness that should also be avoided. If the ideas of God and world were considered only identical, as the first canon proposes, it would lead, for example, to pantheism and the metaphysical formula of *natura naturans*. And it is no wonder that Schleiermacher has been endlessly implicated with pantheism. In addition, the difference of the transcendence and the difference of the limits of thought would disappear, that is, the transcendent would lose its primordially (*ursprüngliche*). Instead, it would be considered as originating from the unification of the contrasts.<sup>195</sup> But most important of all, if both ideas were identical, the chief dialectical task of establishing thinking that is knowing would itself be negated. The identity of both ideas would mean that the perfect knowledge is already attained, whereas for Schleiermacher, knowledge may only be an endless process of approximation. The idea of God as the final unity of the transcendent ground represents the goal of all knowing. Therefore, it is the condition of possibility of knowledge that can never be reached in actuality.

### Identity in Difference: The Second Canon

Knowing Schleiermacher's approach, it is clear that there is something required to correct this subsequent one-sidedness of the identity of God and world. As in the cases of the former contrasts, it must be identity in difference. And, indeed, Schleiermacher does not hesitate to add his second "canon": Both ideas of God and world are not the same, are not identical.<sup>196</sup> This second canon is a necessary correlate of the first canon. Neither the first nor the second canons can be taken by itself, for that would bring about other partialities. In the case of the second canon alone, if the divine,

the *terminus a quo*, is thought to be beyond everything temporal and never developing in time, and if the world always being the *terminus ad quem*, because always a partial formula which first needs to be filled-in, an unknown entity until all its individual areas are seen through and together, then the dialectical interest is satisfied. Whereas the operations themselves would be without any ground if they did not always come out of God and move to the construction of world; the same is the case if both were to be completely separated.”<sup>197</sup>

Only both ideas of God and world together provide the necessary middle way: neither their complete identification, nor complete separation.<sup>198</sup>

In addition, Schleiermacher opts for his characteristic middle way not only from the epistemological, but also from the logical point of view:

We can not really make both identical, because both expressions are not identical; we also can not completely separate them from each other, because they are only two values of the same claim; and also apagogically each definite relationship is untenable, and no true separation takes place without definite relationship.<sup>199</sup>

This quote also is a reminder not to forget that the identity and/in difference in the relationship between both the ideas God and world ultimately is not a definite expression. Even saying that they are correlates does not express anything definite. If it is a positive expression, then only to the extent of setting the limits always to interconnect both.<sup>200</sup> Therefore, a third proposition may be added to the two canons: the relationship between God and world cannot be positively expressed.<sup>201</sup> Accordingly, the debates of metaphysical theology, whether God is in or beyond the world, are needless. According to Schleiermacher’s way of overcoming metaphysics, both options are inadequate insofar as it is only correlation hypothetically presupposed for epistemological purposes, not having anything to do with reality as such.

### *The Relativity and Interconnectedness of the Contrasts*

It is also in the context of the relationship between God as the unity of all contrasts and world standing under the form of contrasts where Schleiermacher introduces another “canon” that applies to all his metaphysical contrasts. Therefore, I will

conclude this section with it. The canon states “that no contrast is absolute, but only relative.”<sup>202</sup> Thinking that does not take this canon of the relativity of the contrasts into account, “that isolates an absolute contrast, presents nothing real.”<sup>203</sup>

Similarly, in the formal part of the *Dialektik*, Schleiermacher formulates two logical rules: one of deduction, the other of induction. The former corresponds to the formation of contrasts: “No contrast may be so constructed that it has a positive and a negative side. In that case, one is out of the domain of life and there is no relative unification possible. That becomes empty abstraction.”<sup>204</sup> The latter corresponds to the construction of being related to the contrasts formed that way: “No being may be so posited that it would be determined only through one contrast. Rather, the identities of all other main contrasts must be given with it.”<sup>205</sup> I quote these rules here because they somehow summarize some common traits in the previous discussions of the four contrasts, at the same time interconnecting them.

Although those discussions were quite diverse, certain similarities characteristic of all of them emerge as quite obvious. First, the contrasts of each pair reached some identity between each other, at least to a certain extent. On the other hand, of course, that could not be a complete identity. They are contrasts after all, therefore different. Consequently, it was always the identity in difference. As one author points out in this connection, the appearance of the interconnectedness of contrasts, that is, “the polar duality in knowledge as well as in being, cannot be resolved into “simple identity” and “sheer difference.”<sup>206</sup> Identity and difference also are mere “boundary concepts” of thought, or as Schleiermacher calls them, the “asymptotes” of thought, pure abstractions but not thought proper.<sup>207</sup> It is precisely the identity in difference that makes thought proper.

The identity in difference, which requires the mutual interdependence of the contrasts of each pair, is important. It is because of this condition that no one member of

each pair of the contrasts can exist alone or separated from the other member. That is basically what the two rules quoted above show: the impossibility of separating the contrasts and the necessity of interdependence within each pair, and moreover, the inter-relatedness of all contrasts. Owing to the relativity and interdependence of the contrasts, both dualism and one-sidedness are avoided.

Even more important, as the above account shows, the interdependence of the contrasts leads to, as well as is conditioned by, their transcendental ground. Inasmuch as opposed also means related, it is the dialectical opposition of the contrasts that provides them with the opportunity of being united under the transcendental presupposition.<sup>208</sup> In all four of the above cases, the mutual interdependence of the contrasts pointed to their transcendental ground, which in turn not only makes knowledge possible, but also makes all of the contrasting pairs related and interdependent.

This chapter explored one level of Schleiermacher's metaphysics: the metaphysics of contrasts. The presence of the transcendental ground in that metaphysics already points to the next level of metaphysics, which overcomes even the metaphysics of the togetherness of the contrasts. That will be the theme of the next chapter.

## NOTES

1. I prefer to use the term "contrast," not "opposite," because the former conveys the interrelatedness of the contrasting elements better.

2. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 39. "Jedes Wissen ist ein Denken, aber nicht jedes Denken ein Wissen."

3. See Richard B. Brandt, *The Philosophy of Schleiermacher: The Development of His Theory of Scientific and Religious Knowledge* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1968), 203. I will return to this subject later.

4. See *Dialektik* (Jonas), 53. I will return to this discussion.

5. See Hans-Richard Reuter, *Die Einheit der Dialektik Schleiermachers: Eine Systematische Interpretation* (Munich: Kaiser, 1979), 45.

6. *Dialectic* (Tice), 15.

7. *Ibid.*, 17.

8. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 43. “. . . dem darin gedachten.”

9. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 135. “Denken bezieht sich auf ein Sein, und das Seiende ist überall der Gegenstand des Denkens, und so wird uns erst darin das Gedachte ein Seiendes.”

10. *Ibid.*, 138.

11. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 461. “auf andre Weise” See also 488. “auf verschiedene Weise”

12. *Dialectic* (Tice), 17.

13. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 55.

14. *Ibid.*, 408. “die blosse Negation des wirklichen Denkens. . .”

15. *Ibid.*, 497. “. . . liegt allem wirklichen Denken. . . zum Grunde die Voraussetzung der Zusammengehörigkeit der Dinge, in welchem die Gesamtheit des Seins ist, und der Begriffsanfänge, in welchem der Umfang des Denkens ist.”

16. *Ibid.*, 54. “Das Correspondiren des Denkens und Seins ist vermittelt durch die reale Beziehung, in welcher die Totalität des Seins mit der Organisation steht, und man kann sagen, das ganze Denken ist ein Wissen, welches die Beziehungen eines bestimmten Seins zur Organisation richtig ausdrückt.”

17. *Ibid.*, 487.

18. *Ibid.*, 488. I will also explore another contrast later on, the contrast between thinking and willing.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*, 588.

21. *Ibid.*, 499-500. “Transzendente Voraussetzung ist die Identität von Sezung und Entgegensetzung = Identität des Denkens und Seins für das Sein, und Identität des Seins und Denkens für das Denken, beides für uns.”

22. *Ibid.*, 78.

23. *Ibid.* “Also können wir auch nicht sagen, dass wir die Identität jener höchsten Differenz wissen, sondern wir setzen sie nur voraus zum Behuf des Wissens.”

24. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 48.

25. *Dialectic* (Odebrecht), 129. “. . . in welchem die Identität des Prozesses aller Denkenden mitgesetzt ist.” Cf. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 43.

26. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 65, 68.

27. *Ibid.*, 48, 451.

28. *Ibid.*, 451.

29. Ibid., 461.

30. *Dialectic* (Tice), 17.

31. Ibid.

32. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 53. “. . . absoluter Verschiedenartigkeit und Incommensurabilität beider.”

33. Ibid. “. . . es sei petitio principii ausser dem Wissen ein Sein zu sezen.”

34. Ibid., 55. “. . . so ist unser Selbstbewusstsein nur in dem relativen Getrenntsein des Denkens und des Seins, denn unser Bewusstsein ist erst das Beziehen des Denkens auf ein gedachtes.”

35. Ibid., 508. “Das Sein für das Denken ist ein relativ aneinandergetretenes in allgemeinem Zusammenhang, und das Denken für das Sein ist das Produzieren bestimmter Formen. . .”

36. Ibid., 53. “Man könnte sagen, Beziehung des Denkens auf das Sein sei leer, beides könne nur absolut getrennt sein.”

37. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 270.

38. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 149. “Der Mensch ist also der Wendepunkt, von welchem allein aus das Sein unter der Form der Thätigkeit des idealen auf das reale kann angeschaut werden.”

39. Ibid., 461. “Die Gesammtheit des auf das Denken beziehbaren Seins ist das *reale* (zu welchem in sofern das denkende Sein auch gehört); die Gesammtheit des auf das Sein beziehbaren Denkens ist das *ideale*, wozu also in sofern auch das denkende Sein gehört, in welchem daher diese Identität unmittelbar gegeben ist.”

40. Cf. this etymological breakdown to that in Reuter, 42ff.

41. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 55.

42. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 270; (Jonas), 397.

43. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 517. “. . . der nächste Grund zur Auseinanderbeziehung von Denken und Sein in uns selbst liege. In uns selbst nämlich ist unmittelbar eine Identität von Sein und Denken gegeben, und dies setzt voraus, dass wir uns unseres Seins eben so bewusst sind, als des gegebenen Seins, d.h. als eines wirksamen. Dadurch können wir unser Sein als einen Theil des gesammten Seins ansehen; wir nehmen unser denkendes Sein als seiendes Denken mit auf in die Einheit der höchsten Kraft. Das ist eben der Inhalt des Selbstbewusstseins.”

44. Hans Joachim Rothert, “Die Dialektik Friedrich Schleiermachers: Überlegungen zu einem noch immer wartenden Buch,” *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 67 (1970), 197.

45. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 413.

46. Ibid., 397.

47. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 139. “. . . dass jedes Denken ein gemeinschaftliches Erzeugnis der menschlichen Vernunft und der menschlichen Organisation sei.”

48. Ibid., 139.



49. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 57.
50. *Ibid.*, 72, *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 140.
51. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 177.
52. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 75.
53. *Ibid.*, 64.
54. *Ibid.*, 495. “. . . die Bestimmung, Sonderung, also Einheitsetzung, zugleich aber auch Gegensezung.”
55. *Ibid.*, 74.
56. *Ibid.*, 391.
57. *Ibid.*, 402.
58. *Ibid.*, 494.
59. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 149.
60. See *Dialektik* (Jonas), 47.
61. *Ibid.*, 387. “Wie kommt das Denken zum gedachten. . .”
62. *Ibid.*, 387. “Durch das Geöffnetsein des geistigen Lebens nach aussen = *Organisation* kommt das Denken zum Gegenstand oder zu seinem Stoff, durch eine ohnerachtet aller Verschiedenheit des Gegenstandes sich immer gleiche Thätigkeit = *Vernunft* kommt es zu seiner Form, vermöge deren es immer Denken bleibt.”
63. *Ibid.*, 63.
64. *Ibid.*, 66. Note that this text is also discussed above, in the chapter on Kant.
65. *Ibid.*, 67. “Indifferenz ihrer Priorität.”
66. *Ibid.*, 402.
67. *Ibid.*, 78.
68. *Ibid.*, 498.
69. *Ibid.*, 74.
70. For thinking about nothing, see *Dialectic* (Tice), 20. For thinking about pure being, see below. As the limits of thought, they cannot partake in the thought itself.
71. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 387. “. . . die innere Organisation, nämlich das innere Ohr und die Erinnerung.”
72. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 159. “. . . mehr innerlichen Prozess der Wahrnehmung. . .”

73. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 492. “Das Sprechen ist das Desein des Denkens.”

74. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 141. “. . . nämlich durch Sprache.”

75. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 52.

76. *Ibid.*, 388.

77. *Ibid.* “Die lehre Form der Indifferenz des Seins und Nichtseins.”

78. *Ibid.*, 389. “. . . das blosse Sein ohne Thun.”

79. *Ibid.*

80. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 162.

81. *Ibid.*, 52. “Das Wissen, und hier zunächst das reale, ist also dasjenige Denken, welches nicht mit der Differenz sondern in und mit der Identität beider Functionen gesetzt, und von beiden aus gleich ursprünglich auf das ausser ihm als Sein gesetzte bezogen wird.”

82. *Ibid.*, 392-93. “Wenn von gleichen Impressionen ausgehend in Bezug auf ein identisches System von Denkformen die Gegenstände fixirt werden.”

83. *Ibid.*, 393. “. . . wenn von gleichen Denkformen ausgehend für identisch erkannte Impressionen ihnen untergelegt werden. . .”

84. *Ibid.*, 388. “Alles wirkliche bestimmte Denken ist also in das Zusammentreffen der Thätigkeit beider Pole eingeschlossen.”

85. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 174ff.

86. David E. Klemm, “The Desire to Know God in Schleiermacher’s *Dialektik*,” in ed. Ruth Drucilla Richardson, *Schleiermacher on Workings of the Knowing Mind: New Translations, Resources, and Understandings* (Lewiston, N.Y.: Mellen, 1998), *New Athenaeum/Neues Athenaeum* 5, 137. Because of the chaotic nature of Schleiermacher’s own notes, I find Klemm’s summary on this subject excellent and use it in the elucidation of the secondary limits of the organic and the intellectual functions.

87. *Ibid.*, 136.

88. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 178.

89. Klemm in Richardson, *Workings of the Knowing Mind*, 137.

90. *Ibid.*

91. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 182. “Raum ist also die organische Weise, dasjenige zu setzen, was in der intellektuellen Funktion als das Reale gesetzt wird; und Zeit nichts anderes als die organische Weise, dasjenige zu setzen, was wir auf der intellektuellen Seite als Ideales setzen.”

92. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 79.

93. See the following discussion in *Dialektik* (Jonas), 61-62, 392, 498, (Odebrecht), 160.

94. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 159.

95. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 532.

96. Cf. *Ibid.*, 54.

97. Importantly, this discussion of the intuition here anticipates the discussion of *Gefühl* in the next chapter. *Gefühl* is also a similar oscillating middle term between two contrasts of thinking and willing. In fact, both terms are related, only that intuition belongs to objective consciousness, while *Gefühl*, to subjective consciousness (*Dialektik* [Jonas], 532). See also Thandeka, *The Embodied Self: Friedrich Schleiermacher's Solution to Kant's Problem of the Empirical Self* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), 92ff.

98. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 414. "Das Selbstbewusstsein, abgesehen von allem bestimmten Inhalt, ist nichts anderes, als das Bewusstsein von dem Einssein und der Zusammengehörigkeit von beiden Functionen." *Einssein* in this case most likely refers to the first aforementioned presupposition of real knowing: the universality of reason.

99. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 234. "die organische und die intellektuelle, identisch gesetzt, sind das Selbstbewusstsein, das Ich, abgesehen von dem, was als geschichtlich darin gesetzt ist."

100. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 77. "Denn wenn die Vernunftthätigkeit von der organischen abstammt: so sind wir nur Durchgangspunkte für das Spiel des gespaltenen Seins."

101. *Ibid.*

102. *Ibid.*, 316.

103. *Ibid.*

104. From Klemm's summary in Richardson, *Workings of the Knowing Mind*, 135.

105. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 81.

106. *Ibid.*, 467.

107. *Ibid.*, 316.

108. *Dialectic* (Tice), 24.

109. Klemm in Richardson, *Workings of the Knowing Mind*, 135.

110. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 81.

111. *Ibid.*, 467.

112. *Ibid.*, 82-83.

113. *Ibid.*, 510.

114. *Ibid.*, 316. "... das absolute Wissen aber, die Quelle alles realen Wissens, ist die reine Identität von beiden."

115. Klemm in Richardson, *Workings of the Knowing Mind*, 136.

116. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 83. “Der Begriff ist desto vollkommener, je mehr er auf einem System von Urtheilen ruht.”
117. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 82. “Urtheile sind daher auch desto vollkommener, mehr die Begriffe schon gebildet sind.”
118. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 95-96.
119. Schleiermacher discusses the similarity between these distinct limits in *Dialektik* (Jonas), 464-65.
120. Jonas’ summary from the lecture notes is helpful for this purpose. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 316.
121. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 421. “die *euthanasia* des Urtheils im Begriff.”
122. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 316.
123. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 91.
124. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 506. “Die unbestimmte Mannigfaltigkeit möglicher Urtheile (Begriffsgrenze) und die absolute Gemeinschaftlichkeit des Seins (Urtheilsgrenze) sind dasselbe. Die absolute Einheit des Seins (Begriffsgrenze) und das absolute Subject (Urtheilsgrenze) sind dasselbe.”
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid., 84.
127. Ibid., 92.
128. Ibid., 101.
129. *Dialectic* (Tice), 22.
130. Here I adapt Manfred Frank’s discussion in *The Subject and the Text: Essays on Literary Theory and Philosophy*, ed. Andrew Bowie, trans. Helene Atkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 16.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid., 17. One of his books on Schleiermacher is even titled *Das individuelle Allgemeine: Textstrukturierung und –interpretation nach Schleiermacher* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977).
133. Frank, *The Subject and the Text*, 10, 17.
134. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 161.
135. Ibid., 526. “das Ineinander von Natur und Geist.”
136. In the rest of this paragraph, I use a great deal of Klemm’s summary in Richardson, *Workings of the Knowing Mind*, 139. Cf. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 218ff.
137. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 433, 476.
138. Ibid., 433.

139. Ibid., 433.

140. Ibid., 153.

141. Ibid., 153.

142. Ibid., 328.

143. Ibid., 328. "Alles andere ist nur Bombast oder Einmischung des religiösen, welches als hierher nicht gehörig hier doch verderblich wirken muss."

144. Arthur von Ungern-Sternberg, "Die Begegnung von Theologie und Philosophie bei Schleiermacher in seiner Reifzeit," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 14 (1933), 294.

145. *Dialectic* (Tice), 31.

146. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 159.

147. *Dialectic* (Tice), 31.

148. Ibid.

149. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 158, 159, 163.

150. Ibid., 158. "Gottes Sein an sich kann uns nicht gegeben sein."

151. Ibid. *Natura naturans* literally means "nature naturing" in Latin. Natural theology applies this phrase to God as self-creating nature. The opposed term would be *natura naturata*, "nature natured," referring to creating things of the world.

152. Ibid., 432.

153. Ibid., 322.

154. Ibid., 165. "Von der Idee der Welt ist uns eben so wenig das Sein an sich und das Sein im Gegensatz gegen Gott gegeben, sondern nur das Sein in uns und das Sein in den Dingen."

155. Ibid., 476.

156. Ibid., 333. "Wir sind an die Erde gebunden."

157. Ibid., 161. ". . . sie kann uns nie als Anschauung, in welcher speculatives und empirisches, ethisches und physisches Wissen sich durchdrängen, sondern sie bleibt immer ein unausgefüllter Gedanke, zu dem das organische Element nur in entfernten Analogien besteht."

158. Ibid., 433.

159. Ibid., 432.

160. Ibid., 167. "Ist Welt das Zusammenfassen dessen im Sein, was den Denkgrenzen entspricht: so ist sie nur von einer Seite dem wirklichen Denken angehörig, aber eben so auch dem wirklichen Sein. Sie schliesst alles Sein in sich, und ist zugleich nie, d.h. sie wird immer. Jenes entspricht der

Begriffsbildung und ihrer Grenze, dieses der Urteilsbildung und ihrer Grenze; als Einheit schliesst die Welt das Sein in sich, als Gemeinschaftlichkeit ist sie nur werdend..”

161. Hans-Richard Reuter, *Die Einheit der Dialektik Schleiermachers: Eine Systematische Interpretation* (Munich: Kaiser, 1979), 252.

162. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 162.

163. Reuter, 251.

164. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 432.

165. *Dialectic* (Tice), 42.

166. *Ibid.*

167. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 526.

168. *Ibid.*, 161.

169. Latin terms *terminus a quo* and *terminus ad quem* in this case probably mean something like “the incipient limit” and “the terminal limit” correspondingly.

170. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 434. “Die Formeln, welche den *terminus a quo* ausdrücken, sind, auf die Idee der Welt bezogen, rein negativ, also nichtig.”

171. *Ibid.*, 164. “Wie die Idee der Gottheit der transcendentale *terminus a quo* ist, und das Prinzip der Möglichkeit des Wissens an sich: so ist die Idee der Welt der transcendentale *terminus ad quem*, und das Prinzip der Wirklichkeit des Wissens in seinem Werden.” One cannot say that Schleiermacher really developed from the earlier relationship (God—*a quo*; world—*ad quem*) to the later one (God—*a quo* and *ad quem*; world—*ad quem*). Already in the first set of *Dialectic*, Schleiermacher conceives the absolute as both the first and the last member of deduction. See *Dialectic* (Jonas), 64.

172. Gerhard Spiegler, *The Eternal Covenant: Schleiermacher's Experiment in Cultural Theology* (New York; Evanston, Ill.; London: Harper and Row, 1967), 122.

173. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 162.

174. *Dialectic* (Tice), 64.

175. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 165.

176. *Ibid.* “Alle wirklich vollzogenen Vorstellungen von der Welt sind eben so inadäquat (wie z.B. die Trennung in Geister- und Körperwelt) und eben so bildlich, wie die von der Gottheit.”

177. *Ibid.*

178. John E. Thiel, *God and World in Schleiermacher's Dialektik and Glaubenslehre: Criticism and the Methodology of Dogmatics* (Bern, Switzerland; Frankfurt am Main; Las Vegas, Nev.: Lang, 1981), 156.

179. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 162. “Beide Ideen, Welt und Gott, sind Correlata.”

180. *Ibid.*, 432, cf. 162, 476 et passim. “Kein Gott ohne Welt, so wie keine Welt ohne Gott.”

181. Ibid., 530. "Gott die Voraussetzung im Zurückgehen, Welt die im Vorwärtsgehen."

182. Ibid. "Ohne das erste keine Einheit im Moment, ohne das zweite kein Impuls zur Fortschreitung im Denken."

183. Ibid., 476. In the later sets of lectures, Schleiermacher changes this formula as follows: God in and for God's self is the principle of construction, God in relation to world is the principle of combination. See *Dialektik* (Jonas), 169.

184. Ibid., 167. "So wenn wir Welt denken ohne Gott, kommen wir auf Fatum und Materie als Grund des Seins; wenn Gott ohne Welt, wird Gott Prinzip des Nichtseins, die Welt zufällig."

185. Ibid., 162.

186. Ibid., 433. "Gott nicht ohne Welt, weil wir nur von dem durch die Welt in uns hervorgebrachten auf Gott kommen."

187. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 301.

188. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 168.

189. Ibid., 433.

190. The rest of this paragraph is a paraphrase from *Dialektik* (Jonas), 434.

191. Ibid., 435.

192. Ibid. ". . . das Gymnosphistische Brüten über die Nasenspize."

193. Ibid.

194. Ibid., 433.

195. Ibid., 168.

196. Ibid., 168, 169.

197. Ibid., 168. "Ist das absolute das gänzlich ursprüngliche in allem wirklichen Denken, der *terminus a quo*, immer jenseit alles zeitlichen liegend und nie als zeitliche Entwicklung zu fassen; ist die Idee der Welt immer nur *terminus ad quem*, weil zum Theil immer nur Formel, welche noch erst ausgefüllt werden soll, unbekannte Grösse, bis alle ihre einzelnen Gebiete durchschaut und zusammenschaut sind: so ist dem dialektischen Interesse vollkommen genügt, wogegen die Operationen desselben ohne allen Grund wären, ginge es nicht immer von Gott aus und auf die Construction der Welt hin, also wenn beide Ideen gänzlich getrennt würden."

198. Ibid.

199. Ibid., 433-34. "Wir können beide realiter nicht identificiren, weil die beiden Ausdrücke nicht identisch sind; wir können sie auch nicht ganz von einander trennen, weil es nur zwei Werthe für dieselbe Forderung sind, auch apagogisch jedes bestimmte Verhältniss unhaltbar ist, und ohne bestimmtes Verhältniss keine wahre Trennung statt findet." *Apagoge* in Aristotle's logic means establishing the validity of a conclusion by assuming its contradiction and showing that untenable consequences follow.

200. See Paul Frederick Mehl, "Schleiermacher's Mature Doctrine of God as Found in the *Dialektik* of 1822 and the Second Edition of *The Christian Faith* (1830-31)" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1961), 93-94.

201. See Mehl, 94.

202. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 335. ". . . dass kein Gegensatz absolut ist, sondern nur relativ."

203. Ibid. "Ein Denken, welches einen absoluten Gegensatz isoliert, stellt nichts wirkliche vor."

204. Ibid., 355. "Kein Gegensatz darf so konstruiert sein, dass er eine positive und eine negative Seite hat. Man ist dann aus dem Gebiete des Lebens heraus und keine relative Vereinigung ist möglich. Dies wird leere Abstraktion."

205. Ibid. "Es ist kein Sein zu setzen, welches nur durch Einen Gegensatz bestimmt wäre, vielmehr müssen die Identitäten aller anderen Hauptgegensätze mit darin sein."

206. Gerhard Spiegler, "Theological Tensions on Schleiermacher's *Dialectic*," in ed. Robert W. Funk, *Schleiermacher as Contemporary* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 16-17.

207. Ibid., 17.

208. Cf. Thomas H. Curran, *Doctrine and Speculation in Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre* (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1994), 62. Curran talks here, however, about the unification of the contrasts of metaphysics and morals under religion in Schleiermacher's *Speeches*. But I think it applies also to his metaphysical contrasts.



## CHAPTER 8

### METAPHYSICS OVERCOMING THE OPPOSITES/CONTRASTS

The previous chapter explored some of the principal contrasts of Schleiermacher's metaphysics. Now it is time to embark on those aspects of his *Dialektik* that overcome the metaphysics of contrasts. If I may say so, that would be the proper metaphysics, which brings its own overcoming to the next level. It is metaphysics beyond metaphysics insofar as it goes beyond metaphysical contrasts. It is meta-metaphysics. The previous chapter showed the necessary complementarity and interdependence of the contrasts within each pair as well as the inter-relatedness of different contrasts themselves. This chapter will proceed to the next step in which the oscillating interaction of the contrasts opens a gap or space between them in which, like it was for Derrida, a third element emerges that overcomes those contrasts. This third element will be related to Schleiermacher's theory of self-consciousness.

The discussions of Schleiermacher's metaphysical contrasts in the previous chapter, especially that of thinking and being, already elaborated on self-consciousness as the ground in which the correspondence between these contrasts can take place. It is precisely self-consciousness where thinking and being, the ideal and the real, the intellectual and the organic, concept and judgment, the idea of God and the idea of world come into view in their coincidence. As Schleiermacher states, it is self-consciousness that, apart from all determinate content, is nothing else than consciousness of being-one and belonging-together of the contrasts.<sup>1</sup>

Because self-consciousness is such a mediating element, the transcendental or transcendent ground of knowing comes into view precisely there.<sup>2</sup> It also remains for me to show how the transcendent ground, also conceived as the absolute, the idea of God, or the divine, comes to manifestation in self-consciousness. That is a very important part of Schleiermacher's metaphysics. It goes without saying that Schleiermacher does not interpret the transcendent ground in a metaphysical sense. For him, "the transcendent ground is not deduced from speculative principles but is presupposed in contrast to the relativity of knowing."<sup>3</sup> Presupposing does not state anything about the reality of the presupposed. As I explained in the chapter about Schleiermacher's understanding of dialectics, metaphysics in this understanding becomes a formal, methodological discipline that determines the principles that make thinking into thinking that is knowing. The presupposition of the transcendent ground is part of this project. The idea of God as the transcendent ground is in the basis of the possibility of knowledge insofar as it, inconceivable and unidentifiable itself, is the principle of unity in the game of oscillation of metaphysical contrasts.<sup>4</sup>

In any case, although, according to Schleiermacher, all knowledge depends on and must be related to the presupposed transcendent ground, although the transcendent ground always accompanies all gathered knowledge, this ground itself cannot be given in knowledge.<sup>5</sup> But it must come into view anyhow. The fact that it can be and is named at all stipulates it. To this extent, states Schleiermacher, the transcendent ground is "found," but found as something that cannot be achieved. He continues that there is "no expectation to find more of it. Yet, it makes it all the more necessary that we preserve it for us pure and watch that we, knowingly or unknowingly, do not substitute for it something that still lies in the area of knowing itself."<sup>6</sup>

I will show how it takes place for Schleiermacher, that is, how the transcendent ground comes into view, but not as part of knowledge. In the course of this discussion,

Schleiermacher's main meta-metaphysical terms will appear, terms that impel us beyond metaphysical knowledge. Here are some of them: *Gefühl*, transition (*Übergang*), oscillation (*Oszillation*), the point-zero (*Nullpunkt*). There also are others. However, I think these are the most important ones, and the first one, *Gefühl*, may be the most prominent of all.

### *Gefühl and Overcoming Metaphysics*

#### Different Accounts of *Gefühl* in the *Dialektik* and the *Glaubenslehre*

Before actually proceeding to Schleiermacher's account of *Gefühl* in the *Dialektik*, I would like to point out how it differs from the account given in the *Glaubenslehre*. Although the latter could supplement the discussion of the *Dialektik* here, I reserve it for the next part on Schleiermacher's overcoming of metaphysics in theology. The *Glaubenslehre* is restricted to its methodological commitment not to deal with anything other than, in Schleiermacher's words, what is "simply and straight forwardly empirical," not with "facts of consciousness prior to experience,"<sup>7</sup> whereas the *Dialektik* establishes the metaphysical, transcendental ground of knowledge.<sup>8</sup> And even if this distinction may be questioned, that is, even if, as I will show later, *Gefühl* in the Introduction to the *Glaubenslehre* may also be considered an abstract, metaphysical, or ontological concept, still the difference remains: while the *Glaubenslehre* intends to deal with specifically religious *Gefühl* of absolute dependence, the *Dialektik* considers it metaphysically, as the transcendent ground of the coincidence of the contrasts. So, *Gefühl* in the *Dialektik* is not qualified as that of "absolute dependence." For that reason, I separate these expositions. Nonetheless, the account of *Gefühl* in the *Dialektik* complements that of the *Glaubenslehre*. In fact, it is this complementation that helps to refute such notorious critiques of *Gefühl* of the *Glaubenslehre* as Hegel's. The latter taunted Schleiermacher that his theory binds one to the level of animal consciousness, not

allowing one to reach the true freedom of human spirit. Hegel alleges that, because of its *Gefühl* of absolute dependence on the master, a dog would be the best Christian!<sup>9</sup> This derision is groundless not only because Schleiermacher clearly distinguishes the animal and human consciousness in the *Glaubenslehre*, but also because of the way Schleiermacher relates the transcendent ground to *Gefühl* in the *Dialektik*. In the *Glaubenslehre*, *Gefühl* may appear to belong to the realm of receptivity and sensation, only affected by its “whence.” That is why Hegel is able to make his point. That impression can be precluded if the *Dialektik* is taken into account.<sup>10</sup> There the transcendent ground is beyond receptivity and activity, as it is beyond any other contrast.

#### The Contrast of Thinking and Willing and Its Overcoming in *Gefühl*

One more note before proceeding to Schleiermacher’s theory of *Gefühl* itself in the *Dialektik*. Schleiermacher mostly associates *Gefühl* with another pair of contrasts that was just mentioned above, but not discussed in detail. It is the contrast of thinking and willing. I just want to note once more that this contrast is equivalent to those of thinking and being, the ideal and the real, etc. Insofar as willing posits or effects human being in the being of things outside, it rather belongs to the organic, the real, etc., side of the contrasts.<sup>11</sup> The reason that these two terms are contrasts is that thinking internalizes the outside things as objects of our thinking, posits them in us according to our way, whereas willing, to repeat, posits our being in things, in outward being, according to our way insofar as we realize in things our purpose-concepts (*Zweckbegriffe*).<sup>12</sup> In the activity of thinking there is co-positing the consciousness of objects, but in the activity of willing—the consciousness of contrasts. Both complete each other, and their contrast is overcome in self-consciousness as *Gefühl*, the only instance where self-consciousness can be relatively pure, not dependent on the being of things, as all functions that are contrasts.<sup>13</sup> Although *Gefühl* is given in time and always manifests itself in another, that is, in

particular individuals and their finite, conditioned being, as such, in its essence, *Gefühl* is beyond change, beyond the finite realm of the contrasts, and beyond time—past, present, or future.<sup>14</sup>

### *Gefühl* As a (Quasi) Place of Overcoming Metaphysics

Schleiermacher gives a proposition that at once brings together such important terms as the transcendent ground, thinking, willing, and *Gefühl*: “. . . we have the transcendent ground only in the relative identity of thinking and willing, namely, in *Gefühl*.”<sup>15</sup> This proposition clearly states that the transcendent ground is found in *Gefühl*, immediate self-consciousness, which in turn emerges from the identity and difference of the contrast of thinking and willing (being). *Gefühl* conjointly emerges from both thinking and willing, thus being posited as both at the same time. Therefore, Schleiermacher thinks that there can be no other identity of both as in *Gefühl*, “which is the final end of thinking and the beginning of willing in fluctuation.”<sup>16</sup> And it is precisely this fluctuation from thinking to willing and vice versa that always makes their identity relative.<sup>17</sup>

Schleiermacher thinks that thinking is also willing and vice versa. “Each activity of thinking, viewed from another side, is also an activity of willing.”<sup>18</sup> When the distinction between thinking and willing becomes blurred in this way, *Gefühl* cannot be present exclusively in the point of their balance or equilibrium. If the identity of thinking and willing, in fact, takes place in thinking and willing separately as well, *Gefühl* must be constantly present disregarding the ratios of thinking and willing. As Schleiermacher states, “And so we find *Gefühl* as constant and always accompanying every moment, no matter whether thinking or willing prevails.”<sup>19</sup>

It also means that *Gefühl* is not only the ground of the identity of thinking and willing; in fact, Schleiermacher asserts that it is “the carrier of all other functions.”<sup>20</sup>

Neither of the contrasting functions can encompass *Gefühl*. It is impossible precisely because they are metaphysical contrasts, and, as such, they cannot grasp what is beyond contrasts, whereas *Gefühl* is beyond all contrasts and beyond metaphysics.<sup>21</sup> Hence, the constant oscillation between the contrasting functions has at least two effects. On the one hand, it makes all knowledge relative, including the knowledge of *Gefühl* itself. On the other, it constitutes the precondition for *Gefühl* to emerge. Of course, it is to emerge not in knowledge, but in experience, insofar as *Gefühl* cannot be a phenomenon of mind but is something that is felt, or something one may be conscious of on a deeper experiential level. The contrasts, being unable to reach beyond metaphysics themselves, create that beyond in their oscillating interaction. *Gefühl* occupies that space, and in *Gefühl*, accordingly, it also is experience that overcomes metaphysics. As one author puts it, *Gefühl* “oscillates between the poles of thinking and willing and constitutes the experiential point of conjunction between these poles.”<sup>22</sup>

Because *Gefühl* is beyond all other functions, is totally different from them, Schleiermacher states that it, also in accord with its oscillating emergence, “either always is or is not at all” at the same time.<sup>23</sup> The other functions are incited through something outward, and they have a tendency to disappear each moment.<sup>24</sup> *Gefühl*, in contrast, can never be evoked by something outward, “for it is not related to any outward affection.”<sup>25</sup> And it never disappears. As immediate self-consciousness, it is permanent, and it always accompanies all other states of human being, not only those of thinking and willing. Schleiermacher thinks that *Gefühl* may only seem to disappear during such other states as intuition and action, for example. There are always “traces of willing and sprouts of thinking” and, therefore, the possibility for *Gefühl* to be there.<sup>26</sup> Being always there in the background, *Gefühl* is a constant “supplement” (*Ergänzung*) even when the unity of life is being missed.<sup>27</sup> It always works as a supplement (*ein Supplement*) if there is a “defect” in some moment, that is, when the whole life is somehow not posited in thinking and

willing and the identity of their interaction.<sup>28</sup> Being such a supplement, *Gefühl* is beyond metaphysics. Insofar as it is the link of all moments pertaining to different functions, and insofar as it is the identity due to its being the link, it is, as Schleiermacher says, “the real being” (*das wirkliche Sein*).<sup>29</sup> In this case, it is not being as one part of the contrast of being and thinking. It is transcendent being beyond metaphysics and its contrasts. So, although here *Gefühl* is named the real being, in truth, it does not even have a name. These names are only provisional, for it is that hardly expressible third entity between the contrasts, “*das schwer sagbare Dritte*.”<sup>30</sup> “The circle circles perpetually in itself, without one of the two poles becoming the ground of that circle. Tertium datur?”<sup>31</sup> Difficult to answer, for that *datur* simultaneously is and is not given in some place between the contrasts. It is a quasi-giveness in a quasi-place that is and is not at the same time.

### What *Gefühl* Is Not

Schleiermacher also points out what *Gefühl* is not, what it should not be confused with. First, as immediate self-consciousness, it is different from reflective self-consciousness, which is identical to subjective “I” (*Ich*). In the latter, one becomes the object for oneself. Therefore, this reflective self-consciousness, unlike *Gefühl*, is not immediate, but is mediated. It only expresses the identity of the subject throughout the different moments. Second, *Gefühl* is also different from sensation (*Empfindung*), which, like “I,” is posited as subjective and personal in given moments. *Gefühl*—although it is something subjective inasmuch as it is a condition (*Zustand*) of subjectivity—unlike sensation, cannot be associated with subjective passivity.<sup>32</sup> The latter is characteristic to sensation, which is the reason it can never fulfill the identity of thinking and willing, and, therefore, cannot be an equivalent for *Gefühl*.<sup>33</sup>

## *Gefühl* and Subjectivity

In contrast to sensation, Schleiermacher defines *Gefühl* as “the universal form of having one’s own self.”<sup>34</sup> Not even the subject-object opposition is applicable to it.<sup>35</sup> *Gefühl* “dissolves in general self-consciousness just as well as in individual self-consciousness.”<sup>36</sup> Although *Gefühl* takes place in individual self-consciousness as having one’s own self, it is clear that it is not just subjective. *Gefühl* cannot be subjective because it carries the representation of the transcendent ground. As Tillich said in reference to Schleiermacher’s notion of *Gefühl* in a different context, “*Gefühl* may be subjective, but it is also the impact of the universe upon us and the universe is not subjective.”<sup>37</sup> One could say the same about the transcendent ground instead of the universe, insofar as this ground is always presuppositionally present in all functions of self-consciousness. In any case, if Schleiermacher sometimes calls *Gefühl* subjective, it is only because of “the context of the undivided, undifferentiated depth of the subject itself coming into question in it.”<sup>38</sup> Being such, this “subjectivity” is not really subjective, because these depths of the subject, brought about by *Gefühl*, by far outgrow not only theoretical objectification, but also subjective meaning. For this reason, I think that it is not quite fair to say that Schleiermacher does not overcome metaphysics insofar as he falls back into the metaphysics of subjectivity.<sup>39</sup> The claim being entered is that the subjective self is cancelled in the indecisive middle point, the indifference point between the contrasts.<sup>40</sup> So, Schleiermacher’s metaphysics overcomes the metaphysics of subjectivity as well.

### *Gefühl and Overcoming Metaphysics as the Übergang*

#### *The Übergang*

The aforementioned fluctuation between thinking and willing in self-consciousness also brings the discussion to another one of Schleiermacher’s very



important terms of overcoming metaphysics, namely, “crossing,” or “transition,” which I prefer to leave in German as the *Übergang*. Schleiermacher’s idea of the *Übergang* most likely comes from the fragment of Plato’s *Parmenides* where he speaks of some “queer creature” (*physis atopos*) and calls it “the instant” (*exaiphnes*), the instant taking place in the transition (*metabole, metaballein*) between any two contrasts, the instant that, just like *Gefühl*, “neither is nor is not, and neither comes to be nor ceases to be.”<sup>41</sup>

Insofar as immediate self-consciousness is always in the state of oscillation or fluctuation between the contrasts, and insofar as it represents the timeless unity of the temporal realizations of finite consciousness, it becomes the ontological condition of the possibility of the *Übergang*.<sup>42</sup> Since self-consciousness is something that always accompanies human being, Schleiermacher views life itself to be constantly involved in the *Übergang*. “If we look at life as a sequence,” maintains Schleiermacher, “it is an *Übergang* from thinking to willing and vice versa, both considered in their relative contrast.”<sup>43</sup> Based on this, the being of self-consciousness cannot be static, but rather is always in transition.<sup>44</sup> Being, at least conceived as existence (*Dasein*), and the *Übergang* are identical because this being does not arrive at the *Übergang* as something other.<sup>45</sup> Hence, the *Übergang* may be called the essence of existence.

Schleiermacher defines the *Übergang* as “stopped thinking and commencing willing” and thinks that both must be identical.<sup>46</sup> He states that the *Übergang* and the identity between thinking and willing are virtually the same, differentiated only through time-form, present in the *Übergang*, but negated in the identity.<sup>47</sup> Yet they are related. The *Übergang* is a never-ending back and forth process: as soon as one ends, the other must begin, and at that moment, there is no distinction between them. Therefore, it is equivalent to the moment of identity.

It is also important to distinguish fluctuation (*Wechsel*) from the *Übergang*. Schleiermacher thinks that both are necessary. If there were only the *Übergang* without

reciprocal fluctuation, zero could not be posited between both activities of thinking and willing.<sup>48</sup> It is interesting that although the *Übergang* itself is the consciousness of zero or nothing, Schleiermacher believes that it simultaneously is the condition of possibility of time. If there were no *Gefühl*, or self-consciousness or, the *Übergang*, as the linking point between each moment in time, then each moment itself would be negated for us, would be zero. “Each time without self-consciousness is zero,” states Schleiermacher.<sup>49</sup> Curiously, the *Übergang*, being itself the point-zero, is still needed for time to be something, to be something more than zero.

### *Gefühl As the Übergang*

*Gefühl* in its turn, in Schleiermacher’s view, is equal to the *Übergang*; it is “the *Übergang* between thinking and willing in us.”<sup>50</sup> So, *Gefühl* takes place in that elusive moment of transition, the *Übergang*, between thinking and willing, the indefinite moment that is no longer thinking and not yet willing. Rather, as “having-ceased one and not-yet-having-started the other,” it is a border between them.<sup>51</sup> Or rather, a border common to both of them, “the common border.”<sup>52</sup> In both thinking and willing there is consciousness of something. But the *Übergang*, being between them, is consciousness of nothing, or, as Schleiermacher calls it, “consciousness of zero” (*Bewusstsein von Null*).<sup>53</sup> Therefore, it may also be considered to be an a-spatial nonplace (*atopon*), the quasi-place of the queer creature (*physis atopos*), which is *Gefühl*.<sup>54</sup>

### *The Übergang, Gefühl, and the Transcendent Ground*

#### *The Übergang and the Transcendent Ground*

It should also be pointed out that even though I have concentrated here on Schleiermacher’s application of the term *Übergang* to the contrast of thinking and willing, he also uses it in regard to most other contrasts of his metaphysics. Therefore, it

is fair to say that the *Übergang* “is the embodiment of the movement of dialectics in general.”<sup>55</sup> Moreover, the *Übergang* even applies to Schleiermacher’s thought in general, for his thought always evolves around some contrasts, such as, religion and knowledge, ethics and physics, theology and philosophy, church and state, and others.<sup>56</sup>

In all cases, the *Übergang* is the way of interaction of the contrasts that transcends them into something qualitatively new. It means qualitative transformation. It “is something else than merely quantitative growth in time’s flow. . . the *Übergang* is exceeding (*Überschreiten*), transcending what exists, not merely a quasi-natural self-development from the existing.”<sup>57</sup> Accordingly, the *Übergang* between every contrast eventually hits the transcendent ground. As a matter of fact, it is in the *Übergang* where the transference (*Übertragung*) from the I to the transcendent ground takes place. Hence, Schleiermacher can even say that God is being-co-positing in each *Übergang*.<sup>58</sup>

Only that Schleiermacher’s understanding of dialectics should always be kept in mind. The transcendent ground can never be known; it can only be presupposed. Precisely the transcendence of the transcendent ground of knowing and being leads back to the inter-subjectivity of truth, where the subject is forced “to prove the validity of the evidence of its cognitions in the field of communication between persons.”<sup>59</sup>

### *Gefühl* and the Ungrounded Transcendent Ground

Due to the transcendence of the transcendent ground, *Gefühl*, according to Schleiermacher, is not itself the transcendent ground. Rather, in the *Übergang* between thinking and willing, there can only be, as Schleiermacher says, “the analogy with the transcendent ground,” insofar as it represents the elimination of the contrasts.<sup>60</sup> Even religious *Gefühl*, on Schleiermacher’s account, cannot be the transcendent ground itself. The latter, also called the highest being, the absolute, or divinity, cannot be known in *Gefühl*.<sup>61</sup> It can only be represented in *Gefühl*.<sup>62</sup>

Everything said about *Gefühl* applies to the transcendent ground as well, since the latter manifests itself in the former, or the former is transcendent because of the latter, or rather, their transcendence is mutually presupposed. Thus both are analogues. The transcendent ground, in Schleiermacher's perspective, is posited beyond all metaphysical contrasts, "beyond the beginning of all contrasts (the commencement of thinking) as well as beyond the combination of all contrasts (the endpoint of thinking in being)."<sup>63</sup> The transcendent ground is beyond both thinking and being. Schleiermacher maintains: "The transcendent ground always remains outside thinking and real being, but it always is the transcendent accompaniment and the ground of both."<sup>64</sup> "Therefore," he goes on, "there is no other representation of this idea as in immediate self-consciousness. . ."<sup>65</sup> Schleiermacher also holds that since the transcendent ground lies outside thinking, in any of its expressions we can have "only the way to the transcendent ground."<sup>66</sup> Presupposing does not yet mean having it. He asks: "What is that I presuppose in my thinking?"<sup>67</sup> The answer is simple: "Nothing other than what I deal with in my thinking accordingly."<sup>68</sup> Although thinking thinks about the transcendent ground, it does not reach it. Thinking remains thinking that is limited, "bound to the earth." Consequently, as regards the absolute, Schleiermacher's *Dialektik* cannot claim to be more than *docta ignorantia*.<sup>69</sup> The highest knowledge it gives about the transcendent ground, or the divine, or the absolute, is that it is unknown. The section on Schleiermacher's theology below will also show, there is a resemblance of Schleiermacher's perspective to Cusanus' "learned ignorance," to the extent that his *via negativa* is also combined with a positive theology based on religious experience.<sup>70</sup>

Schleiermacher maintains that the way of speaking about the relationship of *Gefühl* and the transcendent ground is analogical, or representative, or symbolic, for this speaking does not express the transcendent ground adequately.<sup>71</sup> Klemm illustrates this point, claiming that the relationship between *Gefühl* and the transcendent ground

provides “a non-arbitrary symbol or representation of the divine essence.”<sup>72</sup> It takes place in the interconnectedness of the formal “thinkable unthinkability” of God and the positive, experiential appearance of religious *Gefühl* in human self-consciousness.<sup>73</sup> This is another way to see how one simultaneously has and does not have the transcendent ground in *Gefühl*: in the relationship between religious *Gefühl* and the universal, necessary, transcendent ground of the contrasts. Klemm summarizes it so:

The lack we experience in thinking the unthinkability of the absolute ground, and the surplus we experience in actual religious *Gefühl* ... correspond to each other. The lack on the one side is reciprocally joined to the surplus on the other; taken together as the ideal and real, formal and material sides of the essence of God, the too little and the too much manifest all that can be manifest of the otherness of God.<sup>74</sup>

In any case, all these are “ways to” point toward the transcendent ground, but they cannot contain it metaphysically. Being ways to speak of the transcendent ground, they rather contain something figurative, although the more figurative, the less expedient the expression.<sup>75</sup> It is interesting that Schleiermacher thinks that the best, least figurative denotations of the transcendent ground are the classical “*to ontos on*” and the modern “absolute being” (*das absolute Sein*).<sup>76</sup>

Strikingly, Schleiermacher also ascribes a kind of “speculative” meaning to *Gefühl*, at least insofar as he calls it “mirroring” (*Abspiegelung*)—another term that could be added to analogical, representative, or symbolic. In Schleiermacher’s view, *Gefühl* mirrors being insofar as it overcomes the contrasts of thinking and willing.<sup>77</sup> For the same reason, it allows being to be mirrored in *Gefühl*. *Gefühl* belongs to both worlds—what is inside and outside existence—insofar as it transcends both while at the same time participating in both. As Reuter puts it, *Gefühl* “signifies that experience in which the self becomes one with the universe, because it discovers everything that is outside it as mirrored in itself, and sees everything that is in it in the mirror of its outside.”<sup>78</sup> Thus *Gefühl* is very similar to the Derridean tain of the mirror. In this regard, I would like to

quote a passage from Christ's book about Schleiermacher. The quote brings together this "mirroring" aspect of *Gefühl* with the way the transcendent ground manifests in it, aptly summarizing my following exposition of this relationship in which the transcendent ground comes into being through *Gefühl*, yet remaining concealed as such. The author imagines *Gefühl* as

pure mirror that first becomes so dimmed or altered through sensibility that it does not reflect the light purely, but rather ever different individually and concretely. The criterion of the purity of this reflection is not the light in itself—which is completely concealed to us—but the *approaching* light. The reflection that this light gives is humanized. Yet, just when we reflect the light, we have the moment of impact given to us, in which there is no humanizing. Schleiermacher calls this in the moment of impact approaching light the original notion of "God."<sup>79</sup>

Precisely because human being becomes the mirror of the transcendent ground or the divine, the latter does not become humanized, "so that the mirror would not become confused with the source of light."<sup>80</sup> The divine as the source itself always remains unavailable, behind the tain. What is left is only the human mirror, the lustrous side.

Now I proceed to more concrete details of Schleiermacher's understanding of the transcendent ground in the *Dialektik*. It is the transcendent ground of thinking and being arising in the *Übergang* between the contrasts that makes *Gefühl* God-consciousness, makes self-consciousness to be God-consciousness at the same time. I give a longer quote where Schleiermacher brings these elements together:

God-consciousness, insofar as we have it determinate, is the manner and way we have in our self-consciousness the transcendent ground of being and thinking, the identity of our being in the *Übergang* between one operation to another, and indeed in the similarity of its relation to both representative thinking and imaginary thinking in their corresponding relation to being.<sup>81</sup>

Note that this quote also shows the relationship of the transcendent ground to representative and imaginary thinking—corresponding to organic function, or judgment, and intellectual function, or concept—thus showing the way it comes into language.

Corresponding to this imaginary-representative distinction, elsewhere Schleiermacher speaks of the transcendent ground as the “supposed coincidence of both forms [thinking and being] in one act, or the presumed holding together of images and forms.”<sup>82</sup> One should only keep in mind Schleiermacher’s understanding of representative thinking in regard to the absolute. To repeat, representative for him still means indirect. Therefore, Schleiermacher’s resolving of the problem of the relationship of the transcendent ground to thinking ultimately remains ambiguous. Even thinking the transcendent ground apart from human consciousness necessarily brings it into relationship with consciousness.<sup>83</sup> As Schleiermacher himself states, the transcendent ground itself is not thinking, yet the fact that one expresses it at all makes it *eo ipso* a part of real thinking, inevitably leading back to its both forms, concept and judgment.<sup>84</sup>

Next, I would like to proceed directly to Schleiermacher’s question of what exactly the relationship is between the highest unity (the absolute, the transcendental ground) and *Gefühl*? His answer is:

The highest unity of the ideal and the real, merely presupposed in thinking and willing, is really actualized in *Gefühl*; there it is immediate consciousness, original, while the thought of it, insofar as we have it at all, is only mediated through *Gefühl*, is only a figure of it.<sup>85</sup>

This quote surpasses the previous one in that it shows how *Gefühl* overcomes thinking, which still played an important role in the first quote, referring back to the necessity of the anthropomorphization (*Vermenschlichung*) of the transcendent ground. Thinking knows the transcendent ground only as a figure, a representation, an image, a symbol, while in *Gefühl* it is, although also represented, but at the same time somehow available immediately, immediately precisely because it does not arise from “the condition of contentious consciousness,” like thinking. Although it may appear contradictory, Schleiermacher accordingly conceives the immediacy of *Gefühl* to be “mediated immediacy.” On the other hand, repeatedly, this immediacy does not mean some kind of

direct knowing. It only relates as the unconditioned to the conditioned, for it can only manifest itself in returning back to what has been and presupposing what is yet to come. Since the transcendent ground in *Gefühl* as the *Übergang* only precedes and follows all real, time-filled thinking, it cannot come to appearance in any determinate time.<sup>86</sup> The transcendent ground as immediate self-consciousness or *Gefühl*, as what pertains to humanity generally (*das allgemein Menschliche*), only accompanies the real thinking and the real being in a timeless way (*auf Zeitlose Weise*), itself never being able to appear in the consciousness of thinking.<sup>87</sup>

In the next place, how can the actualization of the transcendental ground, the ultimate expression of which is the idea of God or the absolute, really take place in that “persistent unity of the fluctuation of consciousness” between thinking and willing and *Gefühl* as their identity?<sup>88</sup> The answer is related to Schleiermacher’s *via negativa* as well as to the complementarity of the God-world relationship discussed in the previous chapter. Once again, the absolute cannot be given in-itself, as speculative metaphysical theology presumes. Insofar as the absolute cannot be known, for Schleiermacher, “a philosophy of the absolute would be a philosophy of nothing.”<sup>89</sup> It means that all “knowledge” of God is actually based in human projection and is “anthropoeidistic.” For Schleiermacher, to illustrate the transcendent ground means to “anthropoeidize” (*anthropoeidizirt*) it, even in the case where it is posited as the absolute thinking-will (*Denkend-wollen*) and willing-thought (*Wollend-denken*) in their identity in *Gefühl*.<sup>90</sup> The “anthropoising” (*Anthropoisierung*) takes place just because self-consciousness is always mingled with “the consciousness of the finite.”<sup>91</sup> Because of that, “a thoroughgoing humanization of the transcendent ground” becomes inevitable.<sup>92</sup> Consequently, as one author puts it, Schleiermacher’s concept of *Gefühl* “brings to expression the anthropological mediation between God and world and humanity.”<sup>93</sup> In *Gefühl*, human being becomes the mediation point—the point zero—where the divine comes into the



worldly being, at the same time always remaining beyond it. Schleiermacher states: “We only know about the being of God in us and in things, but not about the being of God outside world or in God’s self.”<sup>94</sup> He continues:

God’s being is given in things insofar as the totality, the transcendent ground, is posited in each individual through being and togetherness of being, and because of its agreement with the system of concepts, the identity of the ideal and the real, as well as the transcendent ground of it, is also posited in each individual.<sup>95</sup>

Since it is in each individual, God’s being is given in “an other” (*an einem andern*), which is “human consciousness of one’s own self, of certain human relationships, and so on.”<sup>96</sup> Based on this, *Gefühl* may indeed be called “the existential analogy” to the transcendent ground.<sup>97</sup> In Schleiermacher’s opinion, to inquire after a mode of existence of the absolute other than this worldly one, “means to go into the absolute nothing, which is the real transcendent,” the real transcendent beyond everything.<sup>98</sup> For Schleiermacher, being that is not for us, is not altogether, in the same way as God outside self-consciousness is contradiction and absurdity.<sup>99</sup> Speculative theology literally ends up in “consciousless brooding” when it isolates the idea of God from real, live human consciousness, “the fresh and living earthly consciousness,” as Schleiermacher puts it.<sup>100</sup>

It also seems necessary to remark that the way the transcendent ground comes into thinking is the reason that “it is absolutely impossible to think of it as dead.”<sup>101</sup> Since the transcendent ground manifests itself in immediate self-consciousness, it can only be presented as living. Inanimate or dead entities simply cannot have consciousness and, accordingly, cannot represent the transcendent ground or the divine. On these grounds, it seems to be wrong to say with one critic of Schleiermacher that the God of *Dialektik* is more like Kant’s postulate, “in all its objectivity and un-liveliness (*Unlebendigkeit*).”<sup>102</sup> The God of Schleiermacher’s *Dialektik* is not the God of speculation. While speculation claims the knowledge of God in and for itself, it is a kind of “dead” knowledge, for it has to do with dead formulae that are not related to living reality. Religion, in contrast to

speculation, conceives God not in knowledge of God in God's self, but in relationship to that "other" of God that is human reality, human self-consciousness.<sup>103</sup>

In effect, an interesting coincidence emerges. Human being is the "other" to the divine, but the divine, in its unknowability, is also, of course, the "other" to human being. In the situation of these two otherwise mutually exclusive "others," *Gefühl* becomes the ground where they meet. The divine is not really "other" anymore, for *Gefühl* becomes the human site of its manifestation as the "same."<sup>104</sup> Since the transcendent position of the divine is thus conditioned by the structure of subjectivity, as one author puts it, "there can no longer be any talk of one-sided "dependency."<sup>105</sup> Such a one-sided dependency, he goes on, "would reduce the instance of the other to a moment of hierarchical, bipolar structure and would indeed remove from this instance the sense of opening, the sense of inaugurating self-understanding as such."<sup>106</sup> The divine, at least in its manifestation, is also dependent on the human—an important insight complementing the position of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*. In a word, Schleiermacher's principle of oscillation and reciprocity applies to the contrast of the human and the divine as well. Spiegler, in his book *The Eternal Covenant*, could consider this aspect of Schleiermacher's thought before dismissing the possibility of the divine relativity in it.

In addition, conviction that the absolute can only be expressed in "an other" is also the reason that religious *Gefühl* itself can never be considered pure.<sup>107</sup> To repeat, it is always immediacy that is mediated. Precisely that makes *Gefühl* a suitable analogy of the absolute. Both are always mediated through world-consciousness. It is noteworthy that Schleiermacher thinks that that is the reason that *Gefühl* can mediate the absolute as posited in us in just the same way as perception posits outside things in us—yet another analogy.<sup>108</sup> That is precisely what makes the mediation of the absolute in *Gefühl* possible, including religious *Gefühl* as "universal *Gefühl* of dependence."<sup>109</sup> One ought only to remember how "the religious element" comes into self-consciousness. Of course, it does

not have to do with the earthly representations of the absolute. “The religious element” that causes the *Gefühl* of dependence still emerges *via negativa*, “originally as negation, thereupon as dependence on the transcendent ground, which is posited in thinking-willing self-activity.”<sup>110</sup> This dependence, based on the negation of all that can be known, brings about certainty beyond metaphysics, for it goes beyond the identity of intellectual functions, yet is co-posited in self-consciousness that overcomes metaphysics.<sup>111</sup> But this already is the theme of the next part dealing with religious *Gefühl* of absolute dependence and the overcoming of metaphysics in the religious and dogmatic contexts.

## NOTES

1. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 414. Although Schleiermacher talks here concretely about the intellectual and the organic functions, it applies to all other contrasts as well. There are other places where he refers to other contrasts in the same way.

2. Schleiermacher uses the terms “transcendent” and “transcendental” interchangeably. In fact, they are synonyms for him. In order to avoid confusions, I will use the term “transcendent,” because Schleiermacher himself uses it predominantly. It is clear, however, that when he uses the term “transcendent,” he does not just mean something that is beyond every possible experience, but the main ground and presupposition of knowledge, which is transcendental. See *Dialektik* (Jonas), 38.

3. Michael Nealeigh, “The Epistemology of Friedrich Schleiermacher from a Dipolar Perspective” in ed. Ruth Drucilla Richardson, *Schleiermacher in Context: Papers from the 1988 International Symposium on Schleiermacher at Herrnhut, the German Democratic Republic* (Lewiston, N.Y.: Mellen, 1991), 180.

4. Cf. Reuter, 261.

5. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 101.

6. Ibid. “. . . so haben wir auch keine Aussicht noch mehr davon zu finden. Desto nothwendiger aber ist es, dass wir ihn uns rein erhalten und uns hüten ihm wissentlich oder unwissentlich etwas zu substituieren, was noch im Bereiche des Wissens selbst liegt, schon um das formale Prinzip nicht zu verfehlen, das wir ihm gleichgesetzt haben.”

7. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On the Glaubenslehre: Two Letters to Dr. Lücke*, trans. James Duke, Francis Fiorenza (Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981), 45.

8. Cf. a discussion of this issue in Paul Frederick Mehl, “Schleiermacher’s Mature Doctrine of God as Found in the *Dialektik* of 1822 and the Second Edition of *The Christian Faith* (1830-31)” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1961), 98-99.

9. Gottfried W. F. Hegel, “Reason and Religious Truth,” Foreword to H. F. W. Hinrich’s *Die Religion im inneren Verhältnisse zur Wissenschaft*, in ed. Frederick G. Weiss, *Beyond Epistemology: New Studies of Philosophy of Hegel* (Hague, Netherlands: Nijhoff, 1974), 238.

10. See a similar discussion in Mehl, 109ff.
11. For how the contrast of thinking and willing goes back to the contrast of thinking and being, see *Dialektik* (Jonas), 425.
12. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 429; *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 291.
13. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 287.
14. *Ibid.*, 292.
15. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 151. “. . . haben wir auch den transzendentalen Grund nur in der relativen Identität des Denkens und Wollens, nämlich im Gefühl.”
16. *Ibid.* “. . . welches im Wechsel als das letzte Ende des Denkens auch das erste des Wollens ist.”
17. *Ibid.*, 154.
18. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 286. “Jede Denktätigkeit ist, von einer anderen Seite angesehen, eine Willenstätigkeit.”
19. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 429. “Und so finden wir auch das Gefühl als beständig jeden Moment, sei er nun vorherrschend denkend oder wollend, immer begleitend.”
20. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 291. “der Träger aller anderen Funktionen.”
21. *Ibid.*, 284.
22. Nealeigh in Richardson, *Schleiermacher in Context*, 197.
23. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 289. “. . . entweder immer ist oder gar nicht ist. . .”
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.* “. . . weil es nicht in Beziehung auf eine äussere Affektionen steht.”
26. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 429. “. . . Spuren des Wollens und Keime des Denkens. . .”
27. *Ibid.*, 430.
28. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 286-87.
29. *Ibid.*, 291.
30. Hans-Richard Reuter, *Die Einheit der Dialektik Schleiermachers: Eine Systematische Interpretation* (Munich: Kaiser, 1979), 86.
31. *Ibid.* Although Reuter refers to the contrast of thinking and being, I think it pertains to any other contrast, and most definitely to that of thinking and willing as the modification of the contrast of thinking and being.
32. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 287.

33. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 429.
34. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 288. "die allgemeine Form des Sich-selbst-habens."
35. *Ibid.*, 287.
36. *Ibid.*, 288. ". . . geht ebensowohl auf das allgemene wie auf das individuelle Selbstbewusstsein."
37. This reference is found in James C. Livingston, *Modern Christian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Vatican II* (New York: Macmillan, 1971), 100. ("Feeling" replaced with *Gefühl* in the quotation.)
38. Theodor Siegfried, "Kant und Schleiermacher," *Marburger Theologische Studien* 3 (1931), 29.
39. For this kind of critique, see Eduardo Mendieta, "Metaphysics of Subjectivity and the Theology of Subjectivity: Schleiermacher's Anthropological Theology," *Philosophy and Theology* 6 (1992), 281ff.
40. Thandeka, *The Embodied Self: Friedrich Schleiermacher's Solution to Kant's Problem of the Empirical Self* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), 104.
41. Plato, *Complete Works*, ed. with introduction and notes by John M. Cooper, assoc. ed. D. S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett, 1997), 388. The reference to Plato's *Parmenides* taken from Marlin E. Miller, *Der Übergang: Schleiermachers Theologie des Reiches Gottes in Zusammenhang seines Gesamt Denkens* (Gütersloh, Germany: Mohn, 1970), 31.
42. Michael Eckert, *Gott—Glauben und Wissen: Friedrich Schleiermachers Philosophische Theologie* (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1987), 123.
43. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 428. "Betrachten wir das Leben als Reihe: so ist es ein Uebergang aus Denken in Wollen und umgekehrt, beides in seinem relativen Gegensatz betrachtet."
44. Cf. Reuter, 213. "Das Selbstbewusstsein also entdeckt, dass sein Sein, sofern es nicht nur Denken, sondern auch Wollen ist, übergeht."
45. I amend Reuter's statement that ". . . being and the *Übergang* are identical." Reuter, 213.
46. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 429. "Der Uebergang ist das aufgehörende Denken und das anfangende Wollen, und dieses muss identisch sein."
47. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 286.
48. *Ibid.*, 286.
49. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 291. "Jede Zeit ohne Selbstbewusstsein ist Null."
50. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 152. ". . . das Gefühl, das der Uebergang in uns ist zwischen Wollen und Denken."
51. *Ibid.*, 524. "die Grenze zwischen beiden, ein Aufgehörthaben des einem und Nochnichtangefangenhaben des andern."
52. Thandeka, 87.

53. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 524.

54. Miller (220) also uses *atopon* in reference to the *Übergang*. It is not clear, however, whether he refers back to Plato's *Parmenides*, where the instant of the *Übergang* is named the queer, extraordinary, or strange (*atopos*) creature (*physis*) (see *Dialektik* [Jonas], 524). I use the primary etymological meaning of *atopos* here, which is "out of place" or, one could say, "a-spatial."

55. Reuter, 212.

56. See Miller, 220.

57. Reuter, 214.

58. ". . . das Mitgesetzte Gottes in jedem Übergang. . ." *Dialektik* (Jonas), 524.

59. Manfred Frank, *The Subject and the Text: Essays on Literary Theory and Philosophy*, ed. Andrew Bowie, trans. Helene Atkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 10.

60. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 429. ". . . die Analogie mit dem transcendenten Grunde. . ."

61. *Ibid.*, 322.

62. *Ibid.*, 430.

63. *Ibid.*, 534. ". . . jenseit des Beginnens aller Gegensätze (Anfang des Denkens) als jenseit der Gebundenheit aller Gegensätze (Endpunkt des Denkens)."

64. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 307. "Der transcendente Grund bleibt immer ausserhalb des Denkens und wirklichen Seins, aber ist immer die transzendente Begleitung und der Grund beider."

65. *Ibid.* "Es gibt daher keine andere Repräsentation dieser Idee als im unmittelbaren Selbstbewusstesein. . ."

66. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 432. ". . . nur den Weg zum transcendenten Grunde."

67. *Ibid.*, 509. "Was heisst das, ich seze bei meinen Denken dies voraus?"

68. *Ibid.* "Nicht anderes, als ich handle in meinem Denken danach."

69. Gunter Scholtz, *Die Philosophie Schleiermachers* (Darmstadt, Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984), 113.

70. Robert R. Williams, *Schleiermacher the Theologian: The Construction of the Doctrine of God* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978), 58.

71. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 432.

72. David E. Klemm, "The Desire to Know God in Schleiermacher's *Dialektik*," in ed. Ruth Drucilla Richardson, *Schleiermacher on Workings of the Knowing Mind: New Translations, Resources, and Understandings* (Lewiston, N.Y.: Mellen, 1998), *New Athenaeum/Neues Athenaeum* 5, 144.

73. Klemm in Richardson, *Workings of the Knowing Mind*, 144.

74. Ibid. ("Feeling" replaced with *Gefühl* in the quotation.)

75. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 534.

76. Ibid.

77. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 295.

78. Reuter, 241.

79. Franz Christ, *Menschlich von Gott Reden: Das Problem des Anthropomorphismus bei Schleiermacher* (Gütersloh, Germany: Mohn, 1982), 230.

80. Ibid., 228.

81. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 527. "Das Gottesbewusstsein, wie wir es bestimmt haben, ist die Art und Weise, wie wir in unserm Selbstbewusstsein die Identität unseres Seins in dem Uebergang von der einen Operation zur andern, den transcendenten Grund des Seins und Denkens haben, und zwar in der Gleichheit der Beziehung auf das vorbildliche Denken und sein Verhältniss zum Sein, und auf das abbildliche Denken und sein Verhältniss zum Sein." Cf. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 532.

82. Ibid., 503. "Das Zusammentreffensollen beiden Formen in Einem Act, oder die vorausgesetzte Gleichhaltigkeit der Bilder und Formeln."

83. Klemm in Richardson, *Workings of the Knowing Mind*, 145.

84. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 504.

85. Ibid., 152. "Im Gefühl ist die im Denken und Wollen bloss vorausgesetzte absolute Einheit des idealen und realen wirklich vollzogen, da ist sie unmittelbares Bewusstsein, ursprünglich, während der Gedanke derselben, sofern wir ihn haben, nur vermittelt ist durch das Gefühl, nur Abbildung desselben."

86. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 291.

87. Ibid.

88. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 155. ". . . die beharrliche Einheit. . . in dem fluctuirenden des Bewusstseins. . ."

89. Ibid., 353. ". . . eine Philosophie aus dem absoluten wäre eine Philosophie des Nichts."

90. Ibid., 475.

91. *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 297. "Bewusstsein des Endlichen."

92. Ibid., 296-97. ". . . eine durchgehende Vermenschlichung des transcendenten Grundes. . ."

93. Eckert, 108.

94. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 154. "Wir wissen nur um das Sein Gottes in uns und in den Dingen, gar nicht aber um ein Sein Gottes ausser der Welt oder an sich."

95. Ibid., 156. "Das Sein Gottes ist uns in den Dingen gegeben, in sofern in jedem einzelnen vermöge des Seins und Zusammenseins die Totalität gesetzt ist, und also auch der transcendent Grund

derselben mit; und vermöge seiner Uebereinstimmung mit dem System der Begriffe ist auch in jedem die Identität des idealen und realen gesetzt, und also auch der transcendent Grund derselben.”

96. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 153. “. . . an einem Bewusstsein des Menschen von sich selbst, von bestimmten menschlichen Verhältnissen, u. s. w.”

97. Spiegler, 161.

98. *Schleiermachers Dialektik*, ed. Isidor Halpern (Berlin: Mayer and Mueller, 1903), 223. *Dialektik* (Halpern). “Nach einer Anderen Art der Existenz des Absoluten fragen heisst in das absolute Nichts gehen, und ist das eigentlich Transcendente.”

99. Christoph Sigwart, “Schleiermachers Erkenntnistheorie und ihre Bedeutung für die Grundbegriffe der Glaubenslehre,” *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie* 2 (1857), 323.

100. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 153. “bewusstloses Brüten. . . and dem frischen und lebendigen Bewusstsein eines irdischen.”

101. *Ibid.*, 530. “so ist es schlechthin unmöglich, ihn als ein todes zu denken.” Spiegler uses texts like these for his argument about Schleiermacher’s implicit process theology, which is impaired by his persistence on God’s absoluteness. See Gerhard Spiegler, *The Eternal Covenant: Schleiermacher’s Experiment in Cultural Theology* (New York; Evanston, Ill.; London: Harper and Row, 1967), 83ff.

102. Arthur von Ungern-Sternberg, “Die Begegnung von Theologie und Philosophie bei Schleiermacher in seiner Reifzeit,” *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 14 (1933), 293.

103. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 529.

104. Cf. Vincenzo Vitiello, “The Otherness of God: Schleiermacher and Barth,” in ed. Sergio Sorrentino, *Schleiermacher’s Philosophy and the Philosophical Tradition* (Lewiston, N.Y.: Mellen, 1992), 141. “Just as the necessary, absolute cause to which one gets back when one starts from contingent beings is really neither absolute nor necessary as long as contingent beings are posited and maintained outside it, as long as the contingent is posited as condition of the Cause, so God is not really *Other*, the divine Word is not radically *other* than human language, as long as *Gefühl* remains the (human) *site* of divine revelation and the condition of this revelation.” (“Feeling” replaced with *Gefühl* in the quotation.)

105. Werner Hamacher, “Hermeneutic Ellipses: Writing the Circle in Schleiermacher,” in *Premises: Essays on Philosophy and Literature from Kant to Celan*, trans. Peter Fenves (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 59. Hamacher refers to Manfred Frank here.

106. *Ibid.*, 59.

107. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 152.

108. *Ibid.*, 153.

109. *Ibid.* “allgemeines Abhängigkeitsgefühl.”

110. *Ibid.*, 475. “. . . uhrsprünglich als jene Negation, demnächst als in der Selbstthätigkeit des denkend wollenden gesetzte Abhängigkeit vom transcendenten Grunde.”

111. *Ibid.*, 474-75.



## PART FOUR

### DOGMATICS OVERCOMES METAPHYSICS

## INTRODUCTION

Up to this point, I have examined and interpreted Schleiermacher's overcoming of metaphysics from a philosophical viewpoint. Now I would like to approach the same question from the point of view of church theology or dogmatics. It is especially pertinent to this investigation because Schleiermacher himself claims to exclude speculation from dogmatics. The *Dialektik* also deals with the question of God, but from a philosophical viewpoint. Speculation certainly plays an important role in it, even if it is speculation in Schleiermacher's peculiar understanding of that discipline. In contrast to the *Dialektik*, Schleiermacher wants to completely rule out speculation from dogmatics. At least, it is his intent to do so. Therefore, dogmatics is supposed to overcome metaphysics, to leave it behind.

Before embarking on closer analysis, I should point out that the contrasting pair of speculation and dogmatics in Schleiermacher's thought is related to other similar pairs, explicit or implicit, such as speculation and devoutness/religiousness (*Frömmigkeit*),<sup>1</sup> metaphysics and theology, philosophy and theology. Although these pairs are slightly different and distinguishable, they are interrelated in Schleiermacher's thought. My references to them may also not always be clearly differentiated in this chapter. They will mostly be determined by how they appear in the texts I will concentrate on. It hardly needs saying that the question of the relationship within the latter pair—philosophy and theology—has been a continuing issue in the history of theology. Schleiermacher's position regarding this issue will also be clarified below. It is not an easy task. As it is apparent throughout this study, Schleiermacher never chooses between contrasts, not

even between two contrasting views. But, as it also should be evident by now, this ambiguity is not a flaw. Just the opposite, the possibilities of overcoming metaphysics lay precisely there.

Although I will consult several of Schleiermacher's works, the principal text of this inquiry will be his programmatic Introduction to the *Glaubenslehre*, for there he methodologically elaborates his position. Therefore, in the chapter below, I will examine the parts of the Introduction pertinent to this inquiry. The other texts, referred to in the chapter 10, will reemphasize my points from different angles, drawing some distinct nuances. I should also remark that this will be more of an explicatory part. An assessment of Schleiermacher's overcoming of metaphysics in both philosophy and dogmatics will follow in the next part.

CHAPTER 9  
THE *GLAUBENSLEHRE* AND METAPHYSICS

*Nonmetaphysical Dogmatics As the Discipline of the Church*

It is amazing that Schleiermacher has been criticized so much for making his dogmatics dependent on philosophical presuppositions alien to Christian theology. That critique not only began among Schleiermacher's contemporaries, but also extended well into this century, particularly from such so-called dialectical theologians as Brunner and Barth.<sup>2</sup> The latter, even in his older days writes with his characteristic irony about "the symbiosis of theology and philosophy so characteristic of Schleiermacher" and about Schleiermacher's "philosophy" locating itself in the vicinity of Plato, Spinoza, and Schelling and mediating between logos and eros, "a philosophy indifferent as to Christianity and which would have wrapped itself only accidentally, extrinsically, and unauthentically in the garments of a particular theology, which here happens to be Christian."<sup>3</sup>

Charges like these appear to be at odds with Schleiermacher's own explicit separation of the field of dogmatics from that of philosophy. They would be more pertinent to the *Speeches*, where Schleiermacher tries to show the relevance of Christianity to its "cultured despisers" on their own philosophical and cultural grounds. But for Schleiermacher, dogmatics is exclusively for Christians, "for those who live within the pale of Christianity," as he says.<sup>4</sup> Any vindication of Christianity outside the church is irrelevant in this context. He declares: "We entirely renounce all attempt to prove the truth or necessity of Christianity. . ."<sup>5</sup>

Schleiermacher holds that a proper Christian theology or dogmatics constitutes a separate field of knowledge with its own rules, sources, and standards, which are grounded in particular Christian experience. As such, it is a particular, “positive” science. Schleiermacher opens his *Brief Outline* with the definition of this kind of theology: “Theology is a positive science, whose parts join into a cohesive whole only through their common relation to a particular mode of faith, i.e., a particular way of being conscious of God.”<sup>6</sup> Also in the *Glaubenslehre*, Schleiermacher explains that the term “positive” refers to the individual content of the religious life within one religious communion, “in so far as this content depends on the original fact from which the communion itself, as a coherent historical phenomenon, originated.”<sup>7</sup> This science is “positive” because it assembles its elements according to their indispensability “for carrying out a practical task.”<sup>8</sup> In sum, theology or dogmatics is “positive” insofar as it refers to the actual historical experience of the particular Christian way of being conscious of God within the given social relationship in order to serve a definite practical function for the domain it arises from, in this case, for the church and its management.<sup>9</sup>

This peculiar, “positive” discipline, accordingly, has nothing to do with speculative metaphysics that starts with preconceived ideas and operates on a totally different, analytical level. In the case of Christian theology or dogmatics, it means that one does not start with the idea of God, but with the description of how God is experienced within the Christian community. As Niebuhr puts it, the theologian’s task is “no longer to speculate about the supernatural and to seek to erect time-impervious ontological systems and hierarchies of being” that would provide eternal metaphysical justifications for the church.<sup>10</sup> Instead, the task is

to bring together in orderly fashion the elements of the community’s religious consciousness and so to fix in concepts and propositions the Christian identity of that community and its members, in order thereby the better to enable the church to give an account of itself both to its own constituency and to the world.<sup>11</sup>

Considerations of this kind lead Schleiermacher to his claim that “there scarcely remains any point at which speculation could force its way into the system of doctrine.”<sup>12</sup>

Schleiermacher contends that his approach will correct the previous error of conjoining pure speculation and dogmatics. As Schleiermacher maintains, his method “will most easily get rid of all traces of the Scholastic mode of treatment, by which philosophy, transformed as it was by the spread of Christianity, and real Christian Dogmatics were frequently mingled in one and the same work.”<sup>13</sup> Both philosophy and Christian doctrine, in Schleiermacher’s opinion, ought to be liberated from each other. He thinks that faith, returned to its original, experiential source, no longer has any need for the service of philosophy, even for the dogmatic formulation of the doctrine of the church. Commenting on his *Glaubenslehre*, Schleiermacher rejects even the best intentions of philosophy to help dogmatics to come to that “perfect self-understanding” that it alone can allegedly give.<sup>14</sup> If dogmatics is unable to understand itself in its own terms, “the fault must lie in something that philosophy cannot provide, so far as it presumes to be more than logic and grammar in the usual sense of those terms.”<sup>15</sup> Needless to say, the church, too, better informed of its own interest, is no longer supposed to exert any influence on philosophy. The idea of a Christian philosophy would be absurd to Schleiermacher. The non-coercive freedom of philosophy and dogmatics should be reciprocal. Their relation is that there is no relation.

If one reads these statements in isolation, out of context, an impression could arise that is diametrically opposed to the critiques charging Schleiermacher of placing theology under the alien philosophical tutelage. In that case, Schleiermacher would appear to fit in the camp of those thinkers who, like Barth, insist on the radical separation of the concrete teachings of the theology of the church from the abstract philosophical theology. Still, the picture is different in Schleiermacher’s case. In fact, there are enough reasons in Schleiermacher’s texts for Barth’s ironic statements quoted above. It is not that Barth did

not know Schleiermacher's dogmatic position regarding philosophy. It is a question of Schleiermacher's consistency in carrying it out. The *Dialektik* shows Schleiermacher honoring the possibility of constructing his own philosophical theology. So, he apparently does not think that the church's theology or dogmatics is the only way of doing theology. More than that, even in Schleiermacher's dogmatics, one should also investigate, as I will do, what he writes here and there between the strong statements that exclude speculation, like those mentioned above. A special case is the "philosophical" introduction to the dogmatics. At the very least, for Schleiermacher, neither of these two opposite approaches—philosophical and dogmatic—are sufficient by themselves. Eventually, philosophy or speculation will find its way into dogmatics. As the previous discussion showed, dialectics, after all, is supposed to ground all sciences. Dogmatics, as a particular, "positive" science of the Christian church, is no exemption. One should only keep in mind that dialectics is a "foundational" science that itself lacks metaphysical foundations.

Note that I do not have problems with Schleiermacher's inconsistency toward the relationship of philosophy and theology. If I mention criticisms like Barth's (there will be more in Part Five, chapter 11), it is not that I endorse them. Neither do I defend Schleiermacher against supposedly wrong criticisms. I bring these issues up only to underscore the undecidability in Schleiermacher's thought. For the project of metaphysical insideoutness, such indecisiveness and vacillation do not indicate a defect, but a merit.

### *Gefühl as the Reference Point for Nonmetaphysical Dogmatics*

#### The Differing and Related Understandings of *Gefühl*

In the previous chapter, I mentioned the differences between Schleiermacher's accounts of *Gefühl* in the *Dialektik* and the *Glaubenslehre*. The *Gefühl* of the former is

not yet the main presupposition of religion. It becomes possible only when *Gefühl* turns into the *Gefühl* of dependence. Whereas in the *Dialektik*, *Gefühl* is a universal, experiential, noncognitive point of coincidence of different contrasts resulting in their transgression, because of the “positive” nature of the *Glaubenslehre*, there *Gefühl* is a concrete experience of a particular community, the Christian church. According to Schleiermacher, it is the distinct *Gefühl* of absolute dependence that Christians experience toward the divine. The *Glaubenslehre*, or dogmatics, insofar as Schleiermacher makes all its statements measure up to this actual experience, is expected to be nonmetaphysical. In contrast to classical metaphysical dogmatics, Schleiermacher does not begin either with the concept of God or with metaphysical localization (*Ortbestimmung*) of the role of God-talk, but instead orients himself to experience.<sup>16</sup> Schleiermacher’s is a concrete historical, experiential, or empirical theology. So, the main roles of *Gefühl* in overcoming metaphysics are different in the *Dialektik* and the *Glaubenslehre*.

But as the exposition below will show, there are also aspects in these two accounts that overlap. In fact, I think that they are complementary. Each one of them contains some details not specified in the other. For instance, the immediacy of self-consciousness that Schleiermacher emphasizes in the *Glaubenslehre* is already familiar from the *Dialektik*. But the former account informs that the qualification “immediate” is added to self-consciousness in order to avoid the inclusion of unconscious, accompanying states, such as the objective-consciousness-like representation of one’s own self to oneself (the I or the ego), already known from the *Dialektik*. Schleiermacher thinks that although there are moments in which all thinking and willing retreat behind some determined form of self-consciousness, that same self-consciousness may also persist unaltered during a series of diverse acts of thinking and willing, “taking up no relation to these, and thus not being in the proper sense even an accompaniment of them.”<sup>17</sup>



Schleiermacher exemplifies what he means, differentiating such genuine states of *Gefühl* as joy and sorrow from self-approval and self-reproach, which, resulting from analytic contemplation, belong to the objective consciousness of the self.

### Schleiermacher's Theory of Immediate Self-Consciousness

Schleiermacher does not start the exposition of the *Glaubenslehre* with the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence. On the way to the latter, he first develops a theory of *Gefühl* as immediate self-consciousness, based on what he calls the science of "psychology." The *Gefühl* of dependence in the basis of the experience of the church is a "modification," or determination (*Bestimmtheit*), of that broader *Gefühl*.<sup>18</sup> It is this scientific account of self-consciousness that is complementary with the account of the *Dialektik*. But what is more important is that this theory of self-consciousness adds an important aspect to the "positivity" of the "science" of dogmatics. That is to say, Schleiermacher's dogmatics is elaborated upon "psychology," which from today's perspective appears to be a phenomenological portrayal of the states of human consciousness. It is phenomenology overcoming metaphysics in the field of theology, and it is so striking. Schleiermacher turns out to be a precursor—only in theology—of the twentieth century school of phenomenology overcoming metaphysics in philosophy. (I will return to this in chapter 12)

Schleiermacher comes to grips with the theory of *Gefühl* as immediate self-consciousness already in §3 of the *Glaubenslehre*. I have already referred to this proposition, but now I quote it in full: "The *Frömmigkeit* which forms the basis of all ecclesiastical communions is, considered purely in itself, neither a Knowing nor a Doing, but a modification of *Gefühl*, or of immediate self-consciousness."<sup>19</sup> This proposition is especially interesting now, after knowing the perspective of the *Dialektik*. It is significant that, as it turns out, Schleiermacher locates the *Frömmigkeit* of the church exactly in the

quasi-space of the transgression between the contrasts. So, it is neither knowing, nor doing, but the modification of that same *Gefühl* that was the point-zero between the contrast of thinking and willing/being in the *Dialektik*.<sup>20</sup>

If the states of *Gefühl*, knowing, and doing are applied to the Christian religion, the resulting triad consists of Christian *Frömmigkeit*, Christian belief, and Christian action. Now, if the “psychology” of those days teaches Schleiermacher that life alternates between abiding-in-self (*Insichbleiben*) and passing-beyond-self (*Aussichheraustreten*) of the subject, *Gefühl* and knowing pertain to the former, but doing to the latter.<sup>21</sup> However, provided that knowing only becomes real by passing-beyond-self, it is also, in a way, doing. Therefore, Schleiermacher concludes that only *Gefühl* belongs entirely to the realm of receptivity and is abiding-in-self proper. So, *Gefühl* is posited over against knowing and doing.

Yet, this uniqueness of *Gefühl* does not mean that it cannot be related to knowing and doing. Like the varying proportions of thinking and willing in *Gefühl* in the discussions of the *Dialektik*, it is also the case here that “the immediate self-consciousness is always the mediating link in the transition between moments in which Knowing predominates and those in which Doing predominates. . .”<sup>22</sup> Hence, *Gefühl* is a directing force by means of which knowing is realized into doing, so that different doing proceeds from the same knowing in different persons with different determinations of self-consciousness.

However, Schleiermacher goes on that the mediating role of *Gefühl* does not grant any influence of knowing or doing on the Christian *Frömmigkeit*. The latter belongs to the realm of *Gefühl* only. If the opposite were the case, then the amount or lack of knowledge or the successfulness or failure of action would measure one’s *Frömmigkeit*. The only relation that takes place, Schleiermacher believes, is that knowledge is explicated in virtue of the certainty inherent in the determinations of self-consciousness,

and that action is devout insofar as the determination of self-consciousness is such.

Schleiermacher's conclusion is that

there are both a Knowing and a Doing which pertain to *Frömmigkeit*, but neither of these constitutes the essence of *Frömmigkeit*: they only pertain to it inasmuch as the stirred-up *Gefühl* sometimes comes to rest in a thinking which fixes it, sometimes discharges itself in an action which expresses it.<sup>23</sup>

### The *Gefühl* of Freedom and Dependence

There is another “psychological” or phenomenological step on the way that will finally lead to the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence. This step elaborates “the double constitution of self-consciousness,”<sup>24</sup> adding other contrasting states related to the pair of “abiding-in-self” and “passing-beyond-self” discussed above. Their first part identifies with the phenomenon of the I or the ego and its objective representation in consciousness. The second part, however, involves something more besides the ego, namely, the consciousness of a variable state of being that does not proceed from the self-identical (the I). This state, instead, proceeds from something other (*das andere*), even if this other, in contrast to the ego, is not objectively presented in the immediate self-consciousness. This factor gives particular determination to self-consciousness in each moment of time. Otherwise the variable could not be distinguished from the self-identical. Schleiermacher gives two more designations to this pair of elements, which are present in every self-consciousness. They are (1) “a self-positing element” (*ein Sichselbstsetzen*) and (2) “a non-self-positing element” (*ein Sichselbstnichtsogesezthaben*) or (1) “a Being” (*Sein*) and (2) “a Having-by-some-means-come-to-be” (*ein Irgendwiegewordensein*).<sup>25</sup> As intricate as these terms are, their meaning is simple: “In self-consciousness there are only two elements: the one expresses the existence of the subject for itself, the other its co-existence with an Other.”<sup>26</sup>

Next, these two elements of self-consciousness correspond to (spontaneous) activity (*Selbsttätigkeit*) and receptivity (*Empfänglichkeit*) in the subject.<sup>27</sup> Both are related to particular kinds of *Gefühl*. It is the *Gefühl* of dependence that is common to all determinations of self-consciousness that express receptivity affected from the other outside, and it is the *Gefühl* of freedom that is common to those determinations that express spontaneous activity. Schleiermacher proceeds by showing that these two states make the subject and the other codetermined. Therefore, the *Gefühl* of dependence and the *Gefühl* of freedom may be thought as one insofar as the subject and the other may be the same for both. The total self-consciousness encompassing both *Gefühlen*, accordingly, is one of reciprocity (*Wechselwirkung*) between the subject and the other.

After that, Schleiermacher applies these insights to the subject's existence in the world. The outside other may also be thought as totality, as one, and—because of its containing other receptivities and activities related to the subject—as one together with the subject, that is, as world. Hence, self-consciousness, as a consciousness of the existence in or co-existence with the world, is a divided series of the *Gefühl* of freedom and the *Gefühl* of dependence. Neither of them can be absolute in temporal existence in the realm of the world, be it nature, society, etc. That is, neither absolute freedom without dependence, nor absolute dependence without freedom in relation to the co-determinant.

The former—the *Gefühl* of absolute freedom—is impossible in reference to the world because the spontaneous activity outwards must have an object that has somehow been given. That givenness could not have taken place without an influence of the object upon the subject's receptivity, therefore, without the *Gefühl* of dependence. Likewise with the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence in the realm of the world, there is no way for that *Gefühl* to arise from an influence of a given object. There would always be a counter-influence from the subject, therefore, the involvement of the *Gefühl* of freedom in a lesser or greater extent.<sup>28</sup>

## The *Gefühl* of Absolute Dependence

After situating *Frömmigkeit* in the realm of *Gefühl* as immediate self-consciousness, Schleiermacher distinguishes the religious *Gefühl* within the general account. It is this *Gefühl* that constitutes the bedrock of Schleiermacher's non-metaphysical dogmatics. Before dealing with it, Schleiermacher used "psychology" in order to differentiate the two states of self-consciousness—spontaneous self-activity and receptivity—related to the *Gefühl* of freedom and the *Gefühl* of dependence. He also showed that these two *Gefühlen*, applied to the subject's existence in the world, are interrelated and therefore self-relativizing, preventing each other to be absolute. That is Schleiermacher's last step before embarking on his account of the religious *Gefühl*.

Schleiermacher summarizes the religious *Gefühl* in proposition §4 as follows: "The common element. . . , the self-identical essence of *Frömmigkeit*, is. . . the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God."<sup>29</sup> Although the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence is not possible in the subject's relation to the world, it does not mean that it is not possible at all. Just the opposite, Schleiermacher declares that it is possible, and that it happens in the self-consciousness underlying all human existence and negating the *Gefühl* of absolute freedom. Schleiermacher thinks that

it is the consciousness that the whole of our spontaneous activity comes from a source outside of us in just the same sense in which anything towards which we should have a *Gefühl* of absolute freedom must have proceeded entirely from ourselves.<sup>30</sup>

It only remains for Schleiermacher to show how the absolute dependence identifies with relation to God, according to the proposition. This is easy for him because this "Whence" (*das Woher*) of the absolute dependence, being the "Whence" of all receptive and active existence, is already implied in the underlying self-consciousness. Since the "Whence" is

unconditioned and cannot in any way be identified with anything belonging to the realm of the world, it can also be designated by the word “God.”<sup>31</sup>

To make sure that “God” implied in the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence is indeed a non-metaphysical God, Schleiermacher rejects a possibility that this *Gefühl* could be conditioned by some previous intellectual knowledge about God. Moreover, this rejection is related to Schleiermacher’s view of the irrelevance of the knowledge of God that is original, and conceptual, and independent of any *Gefühl*.<sup>32</sup> He believes that such knowledge has nothing to do with *Frömmigkeit*. It seems that here Schleiermacher disputes Hegel, because he continues that such claims of the knowledge of God come close to the *Gefühl* of absolute freedom and, consequently, make the proponents of this view regard the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence “as something almost infra-human.”<sup>33</sup>

Following that, Schleiermacher anticipates a possible objection, namely, that the use of the word “God” itself implies at least some conceptual knowledge of it. After all, “word and idea are always originally one. . .”<sup>34</sup> Yet, Schleiermacher insists that even this idea cannot be anything else than the expression of the *Gefühl* of dependence. He maintains that “God signifies for us simply that which is the co-determinant in this *Gefühl* and to which we trace our being in such a state; and any further content of the idea must be evolved out of this fundamental import assigned to it.”<sup>35</sup> This is precisely the meaning of the proposition §4 stating that the consciousness of being absolutely dependent and of being in relationship with God is one and the same. In fact, Schleiermacher thinks that the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence only becomes self-consciousness simultaneously with the idea of God. It is in this sense that God is “given” in *Gefühl*, and this is Schleiermacher’s interpretation of the “original revelation.”<sup>36</sup> I put “given” in quotation marks because what Schleiermacher gave with one hand he immediately takes away with the other. It is pseudo-giveness because this giveness is actually impossible. It is the “giveness” of the one that cannot be given. It is because

anything objectively given must be exposed to the subject's counter-influence.<sup>37</sup> This once again leads back to the *via negativa*. God-talk is purely symbolic, and it is corruption to consider it as really referring to God. For this reason, again in accordance with the *Dialektik*, Schleiermacher maintains that *Gefühl* cannot be pure. It is only the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence this time. As §5 states, the highest form of self-consciousness, the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence, in its actual occurrence is never separated from the lower, sensible, worldly consciousness.<sup>38</sup> More than that, although there is no conceptual primacy of the idea of God, the *Gefühl* of dependence is not conceivable without the idea of dependence.<sup>39</sup> The latter immediately renders void the immediacy of this *Gefühl*. Hence, the anthropomorphic elements in God-talk are simply inevitable. Insofar as God-consciousness arises in togetherness with the particular formations of sensible consciousness, it also carries those determinations with it. They cannot be metaphysical because they never attain to their object.

### *Reason and Revelation:*

#### *Between Rationality and supra-Rationality of Christian Theology*

There is an interesting discussion in the Introduction to the *Glaubenslehre* related to the classical theological issue of the relationship of reason and revelation. I would like to introduce this discussion here insofar as it is, of course, related to the question of metaphysics (reason) and its theological overcoming (revelation). Since the Introduction does not belong to the body of the dogmatics itself, but is a philosophical prolegomenon, I think this discussion belongs to the genre philosophical theology, similar to that of the *Dialektik*. But, in my opinion, it is noteworthy because it exemplifies from a different viewpoint Schleiermacher's dialectical approach, which refuses to cleave to any one metaphysical contrast.

## The Naturally Supernatural Revelation

Corresponding to reason and revelation, Schleiermacher wants to overcome the one-sidedness of both rational, natural, metaphysical theology and supra-rational, orthodox, dogmatic theology of the nineteenth century German Protestant churches. Schleiermacher deals with this subject in connection with the theological problem of the appearance of the divine revelation in history, that is, in Christ as the Redeemer. His basic statement is that this revelation is neither absolutely supernatural nor absolutely supra-rational.<sup>40</sup> Schleiermacher begins to explain this proposition with a consideration that the starting point of every historical existence (*Dasein*), including that of a religious communion, comes from outside. That is to say, the emergence of such a historical entity, in Schleiermacher's view, cannot be explained by the condition of the circle in which it emerged and developed. Otherwise it would not be a starting point but just a product of the circular process (*Umlauf*). Thus, the revelation that initiates the Christian religion must come from outside; it cannot come forth from the being of the community itself. In this sense it is a supernatural occurrence.

On the other hand, that is not the whole picture for Schleiermacher; there is a dialectics of oscillation at work. So, he asserts that, notwithstanding the revelation's transcending the circle of its appearance, "there is no reason why we should not believe that the appearing of such a life is the result of the power of development that resides in our human nature—a power which expresses itself in particular men at particular points. . ."<sup>41</sup> Accordingly, Schleiermacher appears to allow a universal divine revelation whose power can manifest itself everywhere: in many places and through many different agents. Nevertheless, and the dialectical pendulum keeps swinging back and forth, the revelation in Christ is entirely unique, and it is so precisely because of its universality. "For everything else is limited to particular times and places, and all that proceeds from such points is destined from the very outset to be submerged again in Him, and is thus, in



relation to Him, no existence, but a non-existence.”<sup>42</sup> And yet another swing follows when Schleiermacher goes on to affirm that even the most radical difference of Christ from the rest of humanity “does not hinder us from saying that His appearing, even regarded as the incarnation of the Son of God, is a natural fact.”<sup>43</sup> Schleiermacher gives two reasons for this affirmation.

First, since Christ accomplished the divine purpose as a human being, there is no question for Schleiermacher that the capacity of assuming the divine is inherent in human nature itself. Therefore, the idea that the divine revelation in Christ is something absolutely supernatural, in Schleiermacher’s opinion, cannot be sustained. Second, Schleiermacher ponders that even if there had only been a possibility of the divine revelation that resided in the human nature, and its actualization had been a purely divine act, the temporal appearance of this act in one particular person would have to be regarded as an action of the original constitution of human nature in general and prepared by all its past history. It would only be the highest development of its spiritual power. Otherwise the revelation in Christ would be an arbitrary divine act. To admit that, for Schleiermacher, is to fall into an anthropopathic view of God, and he wants to avoid this view. Thus, once again, the only alternative for Schleiermacher is that the revelation in Christ is a natural occurrence. The fluctuation of the dialectic pendulum between the supernatural and the natural in the divine revelation finally stops on the latter pole, but, if one can say so, including in itself the difference of the former.

### The Rationally Supra-Rational Revelation

It is much the same with Schleiermacher’s treatment of the opposition between rational and supra-rational in the divine revelation. First, Schleiermacher concedes that Christ could not be the Redeemer if those elements in his life in which he accomplished redemption were explicable by means of the universal reason dwelling equally in all. In

that case, redemption would not be unique; anyone would be able to execute it by oneself. The states of mind of a redeemed person, for Schleiermacher, are not ingrained in the mind itself. On the contrary, they can only be invoked and formed by virtue of the influence of Christ. “Accordingly,” Schleiermacher concludes, “the supra-rational certainty has a place in the Redeemer and the redeemed, and consequently in the whole compass of Christianity. . . .”<sup>44</sup>

Yet, as one can already anticipate from the foregoing, this conclusion is not final; it ought to be dialectically counterbalanced by or subsumed into the other pole of the contrast. However great the difference between the supra-rational and the common human reason, Schleiermacher proceeds, “it can never, without falling into self-contradiction, be set up as an *absolutely* supra-rational element” simply because the goal of redemption is a new state of human being that can only be recognized by that same common reason.<sup>45</sup> There must be a pre-understanding of redemption, a consciousness of the need of redemption prior to the entry of the divine influences in it. Schleiermacher thinks that, ultimately, it is impossible to distinguish what is effected in the individual by the divine Spirit and what by the human reason. Moreover, Schleiermacher proceeds that insofar as the reason is completely one with the divine Spirit, the latter can itself be conceived of as the highest enhancement of the human reason, so that, finally, “the difference between the two is made to disappear.”<sup>46</sup> Hence, Schleiermacher’s final verdict is that if the human reason already contains that which is produced by the divine Spirit, the Spirit cannot be understood as going beyond reason. The revelation is rational though includes also the supra-rational.

#### Love: The Experienced Natural, but Supra-Rational, Rationality of Dogmatics

Following that, Schleiermacher analogously applies these two conclusions concerning the divine revelation in Christ to the understanding of theological propositions or dogmas.

First of all, he points out “the prevalent view,” holding that Christian doctrine consists of two kinds of dogmas: rational and supra-rational. Schleiermacher admits that he sees no way as to how these two can form one whole, how they can be connected. In like manner, this same incompatibility takes place with regard to natural theology, which is rational and, therefore, valid both within and outside Christianity, and supra-rational theology, valid only within the confines of Christianity. If taken in themselves, both systems remain separate.

Schleiermacher sees the solution of the problem in his own approach, which, as a reminder, dialectically unites the natural with the supernatural, the rational with the supra-rational. So, Schleiermacher proposes, “In one respect all Christian dogmas are supra-rational, in another they are all rational.”<sup>47</sup> Schleiermacher supports his argument, contending, and this statement is very important, that the dogmatic propositions are supra-rational in the same way in which “everything experiential is supra-rational.”<sup>48</sup> He seems to separate here the realm of experience from that of rationality. His distinctive solution to the problem is to pull down the supra-rational from some metaphysical realm in the beyond to the realm of experience and *Gefühl*. It is the supra-rational in the natural. Schleiermacher is convinced that proper dogmatic statements must be traced back to the inner experience, which, for him, is something given, and given outside of human reason. Henceforth, his method of dogmatics is completely different from that which deduces or synthesizes its postulates from universally recognizable and communicable propositions. Schleiermacher even deliberates that if the reverse were true, that is, if dogmatic propositions could be elaborated in a purely scientific or speculative way, then it would have to be possible to involve every person in Christianity without their having any Christian experience. As a result, what Schleiermacher believes to be true appropriation of Christian dogma can only be brought about by one’s aspiration to have the peculiar Christian experience. As a result, the proper entrance into theology is through “the love

which wills to perceive.”<sup>49</sup> Needless to say, love is supra-rational, and in this sense “the whole of Christian doctrine is supra-rational.”<sup>50</sup>

But, as one should already be accustomed to in Schleiermacher, he never gives one-sided conclusions. According to him, this supra-rational aspect of dogmatic propositions does not denote that they “are not subject to the same laws of conception and synthesis as regulate all speech. . .”<sup>51</sup> In view of this requirement, even a person who lacks the fundamental inward Christian experience must be able to understand what is thought and intended in dogmatics. Thus, Schleiermacher’s counter-statement goes as follows: “It must be answered that in this sense everything in Christian doctrine is entirely according to reason.”<sup>52</sup>

In conclusion, Schleiermacher summarizes the dialectic of the supra-rational and the rational in theology in the following way. Supra-rationality is the measure against which the dogmas are compared to determine whether they succeed in expressing the peculiarly Christian element, whereas rationality “is the test of how far the attempt to translate the inward emotions into thoughts has succeeded.”<sup>53</sup> The monopolar extremes should be avoided by all means. To assert that what goes beyond reason cannot be rationally presented is a subterfuge to cover the flaw in the dogmatic method, while to hold that everything in the Christian doctrine must be based on reason simply covers up the lack of one’s own fundamental religious experience. Both poles of the contrast are needed for a balanced approach.

### *Speculative and Dogmatic Theological Propositions*

#### The Nature of Dogmatic Propositions

Schleiermacher also discusses in the Introduction the relation of dogmatics to Christian *Frömmigkeit*. He begins with the deliberation that religious doctrines emerge when believers in any type or level of religion reach the point of development in which it

becomes possible for them to transcend their own selves and reflect on their affective states in order to comprehend these in idea (*Vorstellung*) and retain them in the form of thought, which also means in language.<sup>54</sup> When this procedure reaches such a point of cultivation that it is able to represent itself outwardly in definite speech, real propositions of faith (*Glaubenssatz*) can be produced. There is no question for Schleiermacher that Christianity has long since reached this stage of development. Hence, his main proposition states, “Christian doctrines are accounts of the Christian religious affections set forth in speech.”<sup>55</sup>

### Three Kinds of Dogmatic Propositions

Schleiermacher distinguishes three different types of speech in the Christian religion, which, correspondingly, provide three forms of doctrine: the poetic (*dichterische*), the rhetorical (*rednerische*), and the descriptively didactic (*darstellend belehrende*).<sup>56</sup> Whereas Schleiermacher evaluates the poetic form as purely descriptive and the rhetorical as purely stimulative, the highest form of religious doctrine for him is the strictly reflective descriptively didactic form, for only this form possesses the logical or dialectical perfection in which the depths of self-consciousness can be disclosed. Hence, Schleiermacher is convinced that only the statements of this form of doctrine are dogmatic propositions proper.

### The Dogmatic Propositions and Proper Speculation

Needless to say, Schleiermacher’s proposition is supposed to rule out the possibility for the doctrinal statements to originate in abstract, speculative thought. Now, the question arises: are not these highest doctrinal statements speculative inasmuch as they are expressed by means of logical and dialectical modes of thinking? Schleiermacher believes that they are not, or, more precisely, they only appear to be speculative. That is

to say, they are speculative only formally while materially remaining dogmatic. Schleiermacher maintains, “A proposition that had originally proceeded from the speculative activity, however akin it might be to our propositions in content, would not be a dogmatic proposition.”<sup>57</sup> Insofar as the task of purely speculative metaphysics is the contemplation of being (*Sein*), it either begins or ends with the Supreme Being.<sup>58</sup> For that reason, it is difficult to distinguish these speculative propositions from the corresponding ones that arise from the dialectical reflection upon the religious emotions. The idea of the Supreme Being in one or another way appears in the latter as well.

However, Schleiermacher holds that there is an indubitable criterion for sorting out the doctrinal propositions. It is the context of thought in which they emerge. Thus, according to Schleiermacher, the dogmatic propositions always emerge from the devout disposition (*fromme Sinnesart*) while the speculative propositions, even if they are of an ethical character, appear in purely logical or natural-scientific trains of thought. In any case, recalling the discussion on metaphysics as speculation, dogmatic propositions are in some sense speculative, but only in Schleiermacher’s proper understanding of this word. They inevitably involve reflection, but it is reflection on experiential religious affections.

Equally important, besides the ecclesiastical value of the propositions, which consists of its reference to religious emotions themselves, there is a twofold scientific value of the dogmatic propositions of logical and dialectical kind in Schleiermacher’s system. This approach clearly accords with Schleiermacher’s understanding of dialectic in the *Dialektik*. It hardly needs saying that this value is not ontological. It only has to do, on the one hand, with the highest possible definiteness and precision of concepts and, on the other hand, with the coherence of their interconnection, their fruitfulness in pointing towards other related concepts, their “intertextuality,” so to speak. The latter function, however, is not a heuristic one because no dogmatic proposition is based on another, but can only be discovered from contemplation of the Christian self-consciousness.

Conversely, it is a critical function that enables one to test how one dogmatic expression harmonizes with others.<sup>59</sup>

### Three Forms of Doctrinal Propositions

In the Introduction to the *Glaubenslehre*, Schleiermacher also gives an exhaustive classification of propositions that the system of Christian doctrine can contain. These propositions fall into three categories: (1) the descriptions of human states (*Lebenszustände*), (2) assertions about the constitution of the world, or (3) the conceptions of divine attributes and modes of action.<sup>60</sup> Schleiermacher's argument proceeds as follows. Since the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence can be actualized in time only insofar as it is aroused by another determination from the part of the sensible self-consciousness, every formula for that *Gefühl* is bound to be a formula for a definite state of mind (*Gemütszustand*) related to that lower form of self-consciousness. For this reason, first, every dogmatic proposition must be set up as such formula. Furthermore, the sensible determination always refers to a certain objective determinant outside self-consciousness. It is this determinant that modifies *Gefühl*. Therefore, any modification of the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence may become known by virtue of going back to the description of that element of existence. Second, the dogmatic propositions thus become assertions regarding the constitution of the world. Third, since the totality of being from which all determinations of self-consciousness proceed is comprehended under the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence, the modifications of higher self-consciousness may be represented by describing God as the basis of this togetherness of being in its various forms of expression.

Following this classification, Schleiermacher proceeds to establish a proper relationship between these types of propositions, to ensure that speculation does not find its way into dogmatics. This fear is not without reason. Obviously, only the propositions

of the first type are based on the inner experience of the subject, whereas those of the second type are obviously synthetic, scientific propositions about the world, and those of the third type may appear to be metaphysical speculations about God's nature.

Schleiermacher's ingenious solution of this hazardous problem is to put the latter two forms of propositions under the control of the first:

Hence we must declare the description of human states of mind to be the fundamental dogmatic form; while propositions of the second and third forms are permissible only in so far as they can be developed out of propositions of the first form; for only on this condition can they be really authenticated as expressions of religious emotions.<sup>61</sup>

Of course, there is another possibility of dealing with this problem, namely, to dismiss the two latter forms altogether. But Schleiermacher thinks that the time is not ripe yet for this radical step. In that case, the dogmatic work would appear isolated from any historical support. It would also appear lacking real ecclesiastical character and so could not fulfill the real purpose of dogmatics. As a consequence, Schleiermacher decides to carry out his system by means of all three forms of dogmatic propositions, though always keeping the two latter forms related to the immediate description of the states of mind.

### The Speculative Insideoutness:

#### New Meanings in Old Metaphysical Forms

Interestingly enough, Schleiermacher is of the opinion that the influence of speculation upon the content of dogmatic propositions in the earliest centuries, except that from the Gnostic schools, "may be placed at zero (*für nichts zu rechnen*)" or equals to nothing.<sup>62</sup> The situation changed in the Middle Ages, when the conglomerate-philosophy took shape within the Christian church, at the same time influencing the formation of dogmatic language. A mingling of the speculative with the dogmatic was inevitable. Fortunately, philosophy soon freed itself from the bondage of ecclesiastical faith and commenced many fresh starts. Because of this independence, for philosophy the



problem of ascertaining to which speculative propositions were taken to be dogmatic and which not was irrelevant. But not so for the Christian church. The church had to obtain this knowledge since it was not in a position to begin the doctrinal development anew. In Schleiermacher's view, the separation of the dogmatic propositions from the speculative ones is of utmost importance for the church. It is the issue of assurance "that speculative matter. . . may not continue to be offered to it as dogmatic."<sup>63</sup> Schleiermacher further expounds his position, at the same time even appealing to the authority of the whole Protestant church:

The Evangelical (Protestant) Church in particular is unanimous in feeling that the distinctive form of its dogmatic propositions does not depend on any form or school of philosophy, and has not proceeded at all from a speculative interest, but simply from the interest of satisfying the immediate self-consciousness solely through the means ordained by Christ, in their genuine and uncorrupted form.<sup>64</sup>

Schleiermacher proceeds that dogmatic theology will probably sometime be able to match philosophy in its certainty of standing on its own proper ground and soil. However, it is not possible until the separation between the speculative and the dogmatic propositions is so complete that a question of whether the same proposition can be true in philosophy and false in theology will no longer even be asked. The warrant for this claim is simple: a proposition cannot appear in one context in the same way as it appears in the other; "however similar it sounds, a difference must always be assumed."<sup>65</sup>

Schleiermacher complains that, unfortunately, this goal is very far away, for many theologians still take pains either to base and deduce dogmatic propositions in a speculative manner or amalgamate the products of speculative activity with the results of the study of religious affections into a single whole. The question, naturally, is whether Schleiermacher himself is so innocent as regards this latter flaw.<sup>66</sup> At the very least, the answer is not simple, for the language contaminated by speculation is retained to a greater or lesser extent. Otherwise that language could not even be identified as theological language.

Nevertheless, in my opinion, Schleiermacher goes in the right direction. I think that this is the most appropriate way of overcoming metaphysics in theology, the way in which the language of faith is consciously liberated from its speculative implications. Since the two meanings are historically so intermingled, the most careful analysis of speculative and dogmatic elements is necessary. Only then can one think of overcoming metaphysics in theology.

*Speculative Consciousness (Metaphysics) and Religious Self-Consciousness  
(Theology): Conflict or Complementarity?*

The Language of Dogmatics: Its Specificity and Boundaries

Another important place in the Introduction where the problematic of the relationship of metaphysics as speculation to dogmatics appears is the section in which Schleiermacher further elaborates his “scientific” theory of the dialectical character of the language and the systematic arrangement of dogmatics.<sup>67</sup> By the way, it is in this section that the above mentioned strong statement appears regarding the impossibility for speculation to force its way into Schleiermacher’s system of doctrine. He starts, however, with the meaning of the term “dialectical” in his system in order to further clarify the difference between his approach and that of pure speculation. Once again, in accord with the account in the *Dialektik*, he explains that the term is meant exactly in the ancient sense, according to which, the dialectical character of language consists simply in its being formed in a technically correct manner, so that it could be used for the communication and correction of knowledge in this particular field.

Significantly, now Schleiermacher restricts the field of the dogmatic language proper even more. He thinks that this dialectical understanding of language is inapplicable not only to the poetic and the rhetorical utterances but even to the descriptively didactic ones inasmuch as the latter ensue from the first two and, therefore,

cannot be quite separate from them. Schleiermacher's restricted statement is that the expressions of the doctrinal system, going back to the religious *Gefühl*, form "a special realm of language within the didactically religious, i.e. the strictest region of it."<sup>68</sup>

Most surprising of all, however, especially if one takes into consideration Schleiermacher's previous statements, which banish every use of philosophy in dogmatics, is Schleiermacher's pronouncement that in the questions of the differences in religious *Gefühl* and of its object of reference, dogmatics encroaches upon the subject matter of psychology, ethics, and metaphysics. This is the way in which the language of dogmatics acquires the affinity to the scientific terminology of these disciplines. This fact provides the ground for further distinction of the proper language of dogmatics even from the general usage of descriptively didactic language in the church, the usage that wants to know nothing of the scientific terminology.

The variety of views and their expressions in the aforementioned three disciplines makes the presentation of dogmatic language extremely difficult. Therefore, Schleiermacher determines the criteria of appropriateness for the terms borrowed from these sciences for dogmatic use. That is, the only inappropriate views for this end are those that (1) make no separation between the concepts of God and the world and (2) those that admit no contrast between good and evil, thus making no distinction between the spiritual and the sensible in a human being. Schleiermacher is convinced that these distinctions are the most significant presuppositions of religious self-consciousness because without them cannot self-consciousness be set in antithesis to God-consciousness, "nor could one speak of a distinction between a free and an inhibited higher self-consciousness, nor, consequently, of redemption and the need for it."<sup>69</sup>

## The Inherent Conflict between Speculation and Dogmatics

Even this selective usage of the philosophical disciplines notwithstanding, one is left wondering whether Schleiermacher has remained faithful to his initial allegiance to the exclusiveness of the dogmatic enterprise, even if he assigns to these disciplines a purely instrumental function in theology, and even if their terminology may acquire different meanings in the dogmatic use. Also, a suspicion may arise as to whether the experiential character of the dogmatic propositions is not finally lost in Schleiermacher's approach, at least insofar as he subordinates the immediate, poetic, and rhetorical forms of religious discourse to the refined, detached, critical, and strictly "scientific" descriptively didactic reflection, even if the latter is derived from the former two.

### Schleiermacher's Resolution:

#### Speculative/Objective and Religious/Subjective Consciousness

It is significant that Schleiermacher himself mentions this kind of critique in the context of some general problems related to the paradigm changes in philosophical disciplines and their impact in the formation of dogmatics. The critique is that the language of philosophy "is too abstract and too far removed from the immediate language of religion, for the sake of which alone Dogmatics exists."<sup>70</sup>

To admit the truth, Schleiermacher's initial refutation of this objection is rather awkward, if it can be considered a refutation at all. In Schleiermacher's view, this "complaint" is unfounded simply because only the scientifically educated in the church are expected to take their bearings from dogmatics in the realm of popular religious teaching. Accordingly, they are bound to have the key for this task, which can only be found in philosophical discourse. One is left wondering whether Schleiermacher is not affirming "the priesthood of speculation" here, the idea which he vehemently rejects elsewhere.<sup>71</sup>

Be that as it may, the apex of Schleiermacher's solution to the problem of the relationship between speculation and dogmatics in this section comes in the last subsection. I have already quoted it in chapter 4, on Schleiermacher's understanding of metaphysics as speculation.<sup>72</sup> Remember, that is where Schleiermacher divides consciousness into two functions: objective and subjective, related to speculation and empiricism. Speculative consciousness, according to Schleiermacher, is the highest objective function of consciousness, while the religious self-consciousness is its highest subjective function. Both functions are indispensable, and Schleiermacher thinks that their clash would destroy human nature itself. Consequently, the conflict between speculation and dogmatics is not only needless, but also detrimental, given the designated use and understanding of speculation. There is only one problem. As I have already said, and will repeat later, clarifying the relationship between speculation and dogmatics on the conceptual level seems to be different from distinguishing between the two functions of consciousness. It seems that Schleiermacher is not aware of that difference and, in effect, blurs the two approaches.

*Schleiermacher's Commentary on the Glaubenslehre in the Open Letters*

The Languages of Dogmatics and Philosophy

In his commentary on the revised edition of *The Christian Faith* in the form of the open letters to Lücke, Schleiermacher gives some significant additional remarks related to the discussions of the Introduction. Prompted by his critics, Schleiermacher gives special attention to the question of the relationship between philosophy and theology in his *magnum opus*. In the first place, a point of major interest appears in his reply to Fries regarding the status of the language of theology. Fries' viewpoint seems to be that every theological claim is by its very nature philosophical because of the philosophical

connotations of theological language itself. In his view, there are only two alternatives for a theologian: either to speak a language of some philosophical school or to use ordinary language. According to this scheme, Schleiermacher, certainly, fits the first alternative. That is, his dogmatics becomes dependent on the principles of his own philosophy, especially, the philosophical view that the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence is basic to every religious conviction.<sup>73</sup>

Although Schleiermacher agrees with Fries regarding the inevitability of philosophical content in theological terminology, he qualifies his agreement that this point of view is true for philosophical theology only. Schleiermacher completely denies that such philosophical dependence can take place in the dogmatics of some particular religious community. Of course, the *Glaubenslehre* is intended to be this kind of dogmatics. Schleiermacher's main point of contention against the charge of unconscious philosophizing is that Christian theology has its own distinctive language. In the first place, Schleiermacher offers a striking idea for his time, namely, that Christianity from its very beginnings has been "a language-forming principle" for both philosophical and ordinary languages.<sup>74</sup> It means that the distinctive linguistic expressions of the first churches, besides creating their own internal language, even including a transformed language of philosophy, have influenced not only the further development of ordinary language, but also that of philosophical schools.

In any case, the influence of theology and philosophy has been reciprocal. Schleiermacher thinks that philosophical language has likewise influenced the development of theological language. He admits that, since the reflective language of dogmatics is the sharpest and the most precise level in the linguistic field of Christian religion and is, accordingly, to a great extent formed by the reinterpretation of the already available terms, "certain elements of philosophical language could have been taken over and used for the religious field."<sup>75</sup> But, and now Schleiermacher delivers the crux of his

argument, “these elements are then cut off from their old stems and rooted in new ground so that the strict meaning of the school is not carried over.”<sup>76</sup>

Sacral priestly and juristic languages, for example, in Schleiermacher’s opinion, could be used with the same success as philosophical language. Juristic terms, though, can only be applied figuratively to describe the human-divine relationship. Priestly language also cannot be used in its original meaning. Consequently, the end product of this process of assimilation, according to Schleiermacher, is a language that, like a coin, has a double imprint.<sup>77</sup> There is a picture on the one side of the coin, but one needs to look at the other side to find out its worth.<sup>78</sup> One side of this language is metaphorical, but the other, dialectical. What remains from philosophical language in dogmatics is its dialectical coherence. The meaning is metaphorically transformed. Schleiermacher further maintains that this rule applies not only to the language of theology, but that even every new philosophical system is bound to create its own language in this way. In any event, one thing is completely clear to Schleiermacher, namely, that there is no way to return to the language of the Bible alone to write dogmatics.<sup>79</sup> The alternative of the ordinary language must also be ruled out. Hence, he assures himself and his readers that they can embark on the proposed path of pursuing the dogmatic task by means of an impartial appropriation of the philosophical terminology and conceptuality without any fear that the latter could somehow distort the distinctiveness of the former.

### The Relationship of Religion and Philosophy

In his *Sendschreiben* to Lücke, Schleiermacher also directly addresses the question of the relationship between religion and philosophy, or, to use the synonyms suggested by his challengers, between dogmatics and philosophy, or between the higher self-consciousness, where he begins, and the original idea of God. This time he alleges to do the job clearly and explicitly, not just with vague hints.

Schleiermacher starts with the last pair of these opposites and, just like in the Introduction to the *Glaubenslehre* itself, first deals with the religion-philosophy relationship, not on a conceptual level, but on the level of the phenomenology of individual consciousness, without pointing out the difference. He begins with the acknowledgement that such a discussion, of course, cannot be included in the *Glaubenslehre* itself for the reason that both its form and content are conditioned by the presupposition that the idea of God set forth in it is not original but, instead, develops from reflection on the higher self-consciousness. Schleiermacher reassures his readers that the original idea of God would lead into the realm of speculation. He goes on to say that the connection between the original idea of God and the original religious self-consciousness is the same as that between any other product of the various intellectual functions at the same level and relation. Therefore, Schleiermacher modestly concedes that he does not see how there can be any question about how he relates religion and philosophy. That kind of question is simply superfluous. It goes without saying that religion and philosophy can coexist very well in the same person.

Immediately following, Schleiermacher goes into some implicit polemics. So, on the one hand, he argues that philosophy does not need to raise itself above Christ, “as though *Frömmigkeit* were only immature philosophy and all philosophy were the first coming to consciousness of *Frömmigkeit*.”<sup>80</sup> “Rather,” Schleiermacher proceeds, “a true philosopher can be and remain a true believer, and, likewise, one can be *frömmig* with all one’s heart and still have and exercise the courage to delve into the very depths of speculation.”<sup>81</sup>

On the other hand, Schleiermacher admits that one can also exist without the other. Therefore, and here it hardly needs saying that Schleiermacher has himself in mind, “in some persons *Frömmigkeit* can come to complete consciousness even in the strictest form, that is, the form of dogmatics, without a granule of philosophy entering



into it.”<sup>82</sup> And, in reverse order, “some can empty the cup of speculation without discovering *Frömmigkeit* at its bottom.”<sup>83</sup> However, and repetitively, Schleiermacher’s point is that the same could be said of the relationship of *Frömmigkeit* and any other intellectual activity, and hence, there is no sufficient reason to concentrate just on this one relationship.

Following that, Schleiermacher turns to the relationship between dogmatics and philosophy proper and immediately confesses that he prefers to talk about that as little as possible. At the very least, these little utterances convey the same commitment of the Introduction to expel any philosophical speculation from the system. Once again, he appreciates the liberation of philosophy from its slavery to theology. But, the result of this liberation is that faith, returned to its original source in immediate self-consciousness, no longer needs philosophy’s services, even for the dogmatic formulations. As noted above, Schleiermacher declines philosophy’s help to theology in reaching its “perfect self-understanding,” supposedly unattainable without that help. If theology is unable to understand itself, philosophy cannot help either, particularly when it “presumes to be more than logic and grammar.”<sup>84</sup> Without doubt, the opposite is also true. The church, knowing its boundaries, does not claim to influence philosophy. Both dogmatic theology and philosophy have become completely free of each other. Although they must be in harmony on one level, on the other “they do not belong together and are not determined by each other.”<sup>85</sup>

## NOTES

1. *Frömmigkeit* is another German term I will from here on use untranslated to avoid connotations that the ordinary translation as “piety” evokes.

2. The best witness to the earlier criticisms of this kind is Schleiermacher’s own letters to Lücke, where he addresses and refutes them consecutively. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On the Glaubenslehre: Two Letters to Dr. Lücke*, trans. with intro. James Duke and Francis Fiorenza (Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981).

3. Karl Barth, "Concluding Unscientific Postscript on Schleiermacher," *Sciences Religieuses* 7 (1978), 125, 131.
4. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, trans., ed. Hugh R. Mackintosh and J. Stewart (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1986), 60 (§11: 5). I will mainly quote this edition. Sometimes, however, I will provide the original terms in parentheses.
5. Ibid. (60 (§11: 5) Paradoxically, the *Glaubenslehre* itself outlived Schleiermacher's intent and turned out to be exactly that in the history of Protestant theology, namely, the first systematic theology demonstrating the relevance of Christianity, taking into account the commencement of the age of science and the related crisis of religious epistemology and metaphysics.
6. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Brief Outline on the Study of Theology*, trans. Terrence N. Tice (Richmond, Va.: John Knox, 1966), 19 (§1).
7. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 49 (§10: Postscript).
8. Schleiermacher, *Brief Outline*, 19 (§1).
9. Cf. Tice, "Editor's General Introduction," Schleiermacher, *Brief Outline*, 14.
10. Richard R. Niebuhr, *Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion: A New Introduction* (New York: Scribner's, 1964), 153.
11. Ibid.
12. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 122 (§28:3).
13. Ibid.
14. Schleiermacher, *Lücke*, 87.
15. Ibid.
16. Gerhard Ebeling, *Wort und Glaube*, vol. 3. (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr, 1975), 116.
17. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 7 (§3:2).
18. Ibid., 5 (§3).
19. Ibid. (Translation modified, leaving *Gefühl* and *Frömmigkeit* in the original.)
20. Knowing is equal to thinking, but doing is equal to willing since it is the realization of willing in act. Schleiermacher also refers to the thinking-willing contrast in the explanations of the proposition.
21. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 8 (§3:3).
22. Ibid., 8-9 (§3:4).
23. Ibid., 10-11 (§3:4). (Translation modified, leaving *Gefühl* and *Frömmigkeit* in original.)
24. Ibid., 13 (§4:1).
25. Ibid. (Translation modified from "caused" to "posited.")

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., 13-14 (§4:2).

28. Ibid., 15-16 (§4:3).

29. Ibid., 12 (§4). (Translation modified, leaving *Frömmigkeit* in the original.) Please note that most of the previous explication is actually included in Schleiermacher's elaboration of proposition §4. I just separate the "psychological" preliminaries from the account of the religious *Gefühl* itself.

30. Ibid., 16 (§4:3). (Translation modified, leaving *Gefühl* in the original.)

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., 17 (§4:4).

33. Ibid. This may be a reference to Hegel's ridicule of the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence as more pertinent to a dog.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid. (Translation modified, leaving *Gefühl* in the original.)

36. Ibid., 17-18 (§4:4).

37. Ibid., 18 (§4:4). This, indeed, could be the case where Spiegler could be right about Schleiermacher's falling short of process theism.

38. Ibid., 18 (§5). In this section, Schleiermacher continues his extremely intricate explication of the phenomenology of consciousness. I do not go into those details here, for they do not add anything significant for my argument.

39. See Brian A. Gerrish, *Continuing the Reformation: Essays on Modern Religious Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 212.

40. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 62 (§13).

41. Ibid., 63 (§13:1).

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., 64 (§13:1).

44. Ibid., 65 (§13:2).

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., 67 (§13: Postscript).

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. See this discussion in Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 77 (§15:1).

55. Ibid., 76 (§15).

56. Ibid., 78 (§15:2).

57. Ibid., 81 (§16: Postscript).

58. It seems that here Schleiermacher is aware of the onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics even before Heidegger.

59. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 84-85 (§17:2).

60. Ibid., 125 (§30). I changed the sequence of 2 and 3.

61. Ibid., 126 (§30:2).

62. Ibid., 82 (§16: Postscript).

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., 82-83 (§16: Postscript).

65. Ibid., 83 (§16: Postscript).

66. I will resume this issue in greater detail below, in the subsection dealing with *Lücke*.

67. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 118ff (§28).

68. Ibid., 118 (§28:1).

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid., 119 (§28:1).

71. Schleiermacher, *Lücke*, 41.

72. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 122 (§28:3).

73. Schleiermacher, *Lücke*, 127, n. 54.

74. Ibid., 81.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Brian Gerrish, *Tradition and the Modern World: Reformed Theology in the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 32.

79. Ibid., 82.

80. Ibid., 86. (Translation modified, leaving *Frömmigkeit* in the original.) This is an allusion to Hegel, who holds that philosophy is a higher form of self-consciousness than religion inasmuch as the former surpasses conceptually the representative thinking of the latter.

81. Ibid. (Translation modified leaving *frömmig* instead of “pious.”) This is an allusion to Jacobi’s bifurcation of philosophy and *Frömmigkeit*. See the discussion on Schleiermacher’s letter to Jacobi below.

82. Ibid. (Translation modified, leaving *Frömmigkeit* in the original.)

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid., 87.

85. Ibid., 52.

## CHAPTER 10

### SOME REFERENCES TO OTHER WRITINGS

Although I regard the Introduction to the *Glaubenslehre* to be the key text for this part, I would also like to make brief references to some other texts that elucidate Schleiermacher's views concerning the relationship of dogmatics and metaphysics. Although these texts are different in style, and they approach the issue from different perspectives, they either confirm the Introduction's discussion or augment it with interesting nuances.

#### *The Brief Outline*

In his *Brief Outline on the Study of Theology*, Schleiermacher identifies three pillars of theological study: philosophical theology, historical theology, and practical theology. All three are indispensable and mutually correlated. Interestingly, Schleiermacher claims that the *Glaubenslehre* belongs to historical theology, the task of which it is "to exhibit every point of time in its true relation to the idea of "Christianity."<sup>1</sup> Therefore, it is both the foundation of practical theology and the verification of philosophical theology. Historical theology is the actual corpus of theological study, which is also connected to science through philosophical theology and with the Christian life through practical theology. Schleiermacher acknowledges that genuine knowledge of Christianity cannot be achieved with the empirical method alone. It is also necessary to understand the essence of Christianity in contradistinction to other churches and other kinds of faiths, as well as to understand the nature of *Frömmigkeit* and of religious

communities in relation to the other activities of the human spirit.<sup>2</sup> It is philosophy of religion that carries out these tasks. But the new discipline then, philosophical theology, in turn, utilizes the framework developed in philosophy of religion and offers general reflection based on these particular matters. As such, it mediates between faith and knowledge.<sup>3</sup> It is noteworthy that philosophical theology, being such individual reflection, is wholly subjective and personal, and every theologian, according to Schleiermacher, should produce his or her own philosophical theology.<sup>4</sup> The task of philosophical theology is to present (1) the perspective on the essence of Christianity, whereby it can be recognized as a distinctive mode of faith; (2) the form which Christian community takes; and (3) the manner in which these factors are further subdivided and differentiated.<sup>5</sup> The point of departure for philosophical theology, according to Schleiermacher, can only be taken “above” Christianity, but “above” in the logical sense, that is, in the general concept of a religious community.<sup>6</sup> In any case, it is clear that the mutual inter-relatedness of the branches of theology also makes dogmatics as historical theology connected to philosophical theology and its conceptual subject matter above Christianity. I would even say that, according to the tasks of philosophical theology listed above, the *Glaubenslehre* would belong to the latter as well. At least a clear-cut distinction is no longer possible.

As with empiricism and speculation in the *Dialektik* and to religious/subjective and speculative/objective consciousness in the *Glaubenslehre*, in the *Brief Outline*, Schleiermacher appeals again to the two functions of human spirit. But here he calls them “religious interest” and “scientific spirit.”<sup>7</sup> Apparently not without certain ambitions regarding himself, Schleiermacher puts forward his ideal of the church’s leader, called “a prince of the church.” This is Schleiermacher’s equivalent for the term “church father.” In this “prince,” these two functions “are conjoined in the highest degree and with the finest balance for the purpose of theoretical and practical activity alike. . .”<sup>8</sup>

## The Speeches

There is an intriguing discussion in the *Speeches* in which Schleiermacher directly touches the issue of the relationship between metaphysics and theology. It appears in the explanations to the second speech. There Schleiermacher, evidently with Hegel in mind, contends against the pretension of metaphysical speculation in theology to be the highest knowledge. He brings up as a case in point the Trinitarian speculations of philosophical theology. Schleiermacher maintains that the result of these speculations can not be the Christian Trinity because, “being a speculative idea, it has its origin in another part of the soul.”<sup>9</sup> Increasingly important, Schleiermacher claims that religion has nothing to do with knowledge at all. Otherwise it would be sufficient, in order to acquire *Frömmigkeit*, just to study religion with the scientific, speculative method. If that were the case, perfection in Christianity would proceed in the following three stages: from (1) philosophy to (2) the religion of laity as *pistis*, which would be an imperfect way of having the highest knowledge; to (3) theology as *gnosis*, the perfect way of having the highest knowledge. There is no question that Schleiermacher cannot accept this division, for it would entail what he elsewhere condemns as the “priesthood of speculation.”<sup>10</sup> Therefore, Schleiermacher admits that he “cannot hold religion the highest knowledge, or indeed knowledge at all.”<sup>11</sup> His conviction is that it is surely knowledge that the layman has in less perfection when compared to the theologian. But, it “is not religion itself, but something appended to it.”<sup>12</sup>

It should be noted that mostly the *Speeches* do not deal exactly with the issue of metaphysics and theology, but confront metaphysics in contrast to religion. Since theology ensues from religion, the following exposés will also not be off the mark. Throughout his *Speeches*, Schleiermacher contrasts religion to metaphysics and ethics or morality. So, in one place, he scorns what his contemporaries designate a “purified”



Christianity: “the ill put together fragments of metaphysics and ethics.”<sup>13</sup> In another place, he attacks a “common” tendency: to seek metaphysics and ethics in the sacred writings. Schleiermacher himself thinks that it is “time to approach the matter from the other end, and to begin with the clear cut distinction between our faith and your ethics and metaphysics, between our *Frömmigkeit* and what you call morality.”<sup>14</sup> In yet another place he speaks of the “original and characteristic possession of religion” which is to resign at once “all claims on anything that belongs either to science or morality.”<sup>15</sup>

The most detailed, and also the most expressive, discussion occurs in the first draft of the second speech. “What does your metaphysics do,” Schleiermacher asks to the cultured despisers, “or, if you will not have that antiquated, too historical name, your transcendental philosophy?”<sup>16</sup> It classifies the universe, ascertains the grounds of its being, deduces the necessity of the actual, and gives the laws of the world. Religion, on the contrary, has nothing to do with the grounds, deductions, and the first causes. What does ethics do? It develops a system of duties from human nature and its relation to the universe; it commands and prohibits actions. Religion, on the contrary, “cannot venture to use the Universe for the deduction of duties, or to contain a code of laws.”<sup>17</sup> Religion does not seek, as does metaphysics, to determine and explain the nature of the universe. Neither it seeks, as do morals, to advance and perfect the universe by the power of freedom and the “divine will of humans.” “It is neither thinking nor acting, but intuition and *Gefühl*.”<sup>18</sup> It regards the universe as it is. It is a reverent attention and a childlike submission to the immediate influences of the universe. Whereas to metaphysics, a human being is the center of all, the condition of all existence, to religion, s/he is, like any other finite being, but a manifestation of the universe. Whereas morals proceed from the consciousness of freedom and seek to expand it to infinity, “religion regards man as needing to be what he is. . .”<sup>19</sup>

Schleiermacher calls this unfortunate mixture of metaphysics and ethics in religion nothing but “a selection for beginners.” He ponders, if this “religion” were something more and had a principle of union of its own, religion would have to be the highest in philosophy, with metaphysics and ethics as its subdivisions only. Schleiermacher’s claim is distinctly different from this hierarchy. Notably, and quite surprisingly in this place, for him, “Religion, morals, and metaphysics are equals, different but complementary.”<sup>20</sup> “Practice is art, speculation is science, religion is sense and taste for the Infinite.”<sup>21</sup> As distinct, they cannot be amalgamated. Yet, being complementary, every one of them needs the others. To have speculation and practice without religion, for Schleiermacher, is “mad presumption.” “Without religion, practice cannot get beyond venturesome or traditional forms, and speculation is only a stiff and lean skeleton.”<sup>22</sup>

### *The Letter to Jacobi*

Perhaps the most interesting expressions of Schleiermacher’s attitude toward the philosophy-theology relationship appear in his letter to Jacobi. In that letter, Schleiermacher addresses Jacobi’s avowal that he cannot but remain a pagan in reason (*Verstand*) while being a Christian in *Gefühl*. For Jacobi, these two remain separated “waters.” Schleiermacher thinks that, in the field of religion, it is a contradiction in terms, since religion is a matter of *Gefühl*, but dogmatics is nothing else than reason’s reflective translation of that *Gefühl*.<sup>23</sup> When a person’s *Gefühl* is Christian, how then can her or his reason perform the task of interpretation of *Gefühl* in a pagan way? The only alternative Schleiermacher can accept for himself is to be just a philosopher in that place where Jacobi finds himself to be a pagan: “I am a philosopher with my reason; for that [being a philosopher] is the independent and original function of reason; but with my *Gefühl* I am

a totally pious person and, as such, am indeed a Christian. . .”<sup>24</sup> Schleiermacher thinks that, in this way, every possible paganism in him is completely overcome.

In a different, incredibly obscure, section of the letter, Schleiermacher turns to Jacobi’s alleged unwillingness to elevate reason over nature. Schleiermacher agrees with him, yet provided that there are no limits to the natural. In this connection, Schleiermacher explains that it is possible to keep a perfect balance between the two “waters,” religion and philosophy, in the same way as the balance between the “two Adams” in Christian understanding.<sup>25</sup> So, Schleiermacher eloquently says that when his Christian *Gefühl* is conscious of the divine Spirit in him, which is something other than his reason and, therefore, incomprehensible, in no way does he want to give up meeting that Spirit in the deepest depths of the nature of his being. And, similarly, when his Christian *Gefühl* is conscious of the Son of God, who is different from the best of other humans, not just in the sense of being “still better,” and, therefore, incomprehensible, it does not make him cease to meet the generating of that Son of God in the deepest depths of the nature of his being. Schleiermacher avers that these things do not make him cease saying to himself that he will grasp the second Adam just as soon as the first Adam or Adams, which he must likewise accept without grasping. It is a reciprocity in which the latter is elevated and the former lowered.

After that, Schleiermacher gives his famous analogy of the relationship of dogmatics and philosophy as an ellipse with two foci. He explains that even though oscillation is a universal form of all finite existence, there is an immediate awareness in him that this oscillation only corresponds to the two focal points of his own ellipse out of which also such a fluctuation proceeds. And it is in this undecided state of balance (*Schweben*) where Schleiermacher finds “the full abundance of his earthly life.”<sup>26</sup> Schleiermacher maintains that it is the reason his philosophy and his dogmatics are firmly resolved not to contradict each other, and, yet, even more important, precisely for that

same reason, both can never be accomplished either. So, he says: “. . . as long as I will be able to think, they will always have to be reciprocally harmonized and, thus, will more and more approximate to each other.”<sup>27</sup> But Schleiermacher would never allow it to become a circle with a fixed center. In an ellipse, such a center is lost, and everything proceeds from two focal points, indeed, corresponding to the *Übergang*, the middle as *athopon* between two contrasts.<sup>28</sup>

Furthermore, at the end of the same letter, Schleiermacher adds that, ultimately, these two “waters” do not unite. To repeat, the two foci of Schleiermacher’s ellipse, contrary to Barth’s charge, do not “draw relentlessly closer to one another,” do not tend to become a circle.<sup>29</sup> Jacobi, on the other hand, desires this unification and, consequently, has a deep regret because it does not take place. Schleiermacher, instead, offers another analogy, this time that of a galvanic battery—a popular invention of his time in which electricity was produced from two dissimilar metals combined with some fluid as a conducting agent. Thus, he states:

Reason and *Gefühl* for me remain beside each other; yet, they touch each other and form a galvanic battery; the innermost life of the spirit, for me, consists only in this galvanic operation, in the *Gefühl* of reason and in the reasoning of *Gefühl*, whereby both poles still yet remain turned away from each other.<sup>30</sup>

I think that this analogy is an excellent representation of Schleiermacher’s approach to the contrasting, and yet related, relationship of dogmatics and metaphysics, religion and philosophy, and the like. I will end this part on this note and give an evaluation in the next chapter.

## NOTES

1. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Brief Outline on the Study of Theology*, trans. Terrence N. Tice (Richmond, Va.: John Knox, 1966), 26 (§26).

2. *Ibid.*, 24 (§21).

3. Michael Eckert, *Gott—Glauben und Wissen: Friedrich Schleiermachers Philosophische Theologie* (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1987), 141.

4. Schleiermacher, *Brief Outline*, 39 (§67).

5. *Ibid.*, 25 (§24).

6. *Ibid.*, 29 (§33).

7. *Ibid.*, 21 (§9).

8. *Ibid.*

9. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers*, trans. John Oman, intro. Rudolf Otto (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), 102.

10. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On the Glaubenslehre: Two Letters to Dr. Lücke*, trans. with intro. James Duke and Francis Fiorenza (Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981), 41.

11. Schleiermacher, *Speeches*, 102.

12. *Ibid.*, 103.

13. *Ibid.*, 14.

14. *Ibid.*, 34. (Translation modified, leaving *Frömmigkeit* in original.)

15. *Ibid.*, 35.

16. *Ibid.*, 276.

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*, 177. (Translation modified, leaving *Gefühl* in original.)

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*, 278.

22. *Ibid.*

23. "Der Brief Schleiermachers an Jacobi," ed. with intro. Martin Cordes, *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 68 (1971), 208. ". . . was aber. . . Dogmatik ist, das ist nur die durch Reflexion entstandene Dolmetschung des Verstandes über das Gefühl."

24. *Ibid.*, 208-9. "Ich bin mit dem Verstande ein Philosoph; denn das ist die unabhängige und ursprüngliche Thätigkeit des Verstandes; und mit dem Gefühl bin ich ganz ein Frommer und zwar als solcher ein Christ. . ."

25. *Ibid.*, 209.

26. *Ibid.* ". . . und ich habe in diesem Schweben die ganze Fülle meines irdischen Lebens."

27. Ibid. “. . . so lange ich denken kann haben sie immer gegenseitig an einander gestimmt und sich auch immer mehr angenähert.”

28. Marlin E. Miller, *Der Übergang: Schleiermachers Theologie des Reiches Gottes in Zusammenhang seines Gesamtdenkens* (Gütersloh, Germany: Mohn, 1970), 226.

29. Karl Barth, *From Rousseau to Ritschl*, trans. Brian Cozens (London: SCM, 1959), 352.

30. Schleiermacher an Jacobi, 210. “Verstand und Gefühl bleiben auch mir neben einander; aber sie berühren sich und bilden eine galvanische Säule; das innerste Leben des Geistes ist für mich nur in dieser galvanischen Operation, in dem Gefühl vom Verstande und dem Verstand vom Gefühl, wobei aber beide Pole immer von einander abgekehrt bleiben.”

PART FIVE

SCHLEIERMACHER'S OVERCOMING OF METAPHYSICS:  
AN ASSESSMENT

## INTRODUCTION

In concluding this direct investigation into Schleiermacher's metaphysics, I would like to assess his overcoming of metaphysics from both philosophical and dogmatic viewpoints, according to the foregoing presentations. From Schleiermacher's philosophical perspective, in chapter 11, I will summarize and point out ways in which Schleiermacher overcomes the existing metaphysics with his own metaphysics, which is more viable. Next, as shown above, there are some elements in Schleiermacher's metaphysics that not only overcome the previous metaphysics with a different, more proper metaphysics, but also reach outside that endless game of one overcoming another. These are truly metaphysical or, better, "meta-metaphysical" elements that go beyond metaphysics as such. I will denote some of these once again.

In chapter 12, I will approach the matter from Schleiermacher's dogmatic perspective. I will first analyze some points in which Schleiermacher, despite his intentions to leave metaphysics behind, does not fully realize this intention, where metaphysics perpetually returns in spite of its overcoming. This issue will take more space, for it has always been both the main apple of discord as well as the stumbling-block of Schleiermacher research and is essential in a work of this kind. As a reminder, I do not consider this undecidability as Schleiermacher's flaw. Next, I will review some points at which Schleiermacher does overcome metaphysics by dogmatic means. Finally, I would also like to show how Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology may be interpreted as overcoming metaphysics in the true sense of leaving it behind. I do so through the prism of the general issue of the theology-philosophy relationship in Schleiermacher's work.



## CHAPTER 11

### PHILOSOPHICAL OR DIALECTICAL OVERCOMING OF METAPHYSICS

#### *A Better Metaphysics*

Throughout the parts of the dissertation that deal with Schleiermacher, I have showed different ways in which he overcomes the existing metaphysics. A very important point that set the tone for all further discussion was Schleiermacher's understanding of metaphysics as speculation (chapter 4). On the one hand, Schleiermacher rejected pure speculation. On the other, he maintained the necessity of speculation for scientific knowing, but not in its pure form. He had to reinvent proper speculation himself. It was an empirically grounded speculation that overcame pure speculation. It had to be speculation that grounds essence in existence, *Wesen in Dasein*.<sup>1</sup> In order for knowledge to be knowledge—not just abstractions of absolute identity or complete chaos—it must be related to life.<sup>2</sup>

After that, I showed many ways in which Schleiermacher built on the Kant's already existing overcoming of metaphysics (chapter 5). At the same time, Schleiermacher found Kant's own project metaphysical in several respects, so that it still needed overcoming. First and foremost was the split of reason because of its two disjointed parts: theoretical and practical. Schleiermacher overcame this "gap" in Kant's system with his conception of *Gefühl*. Also, corresponding to the aforementioned requirement of the togetherness of empiricism and speculation, Schleiermacher rejected the very possibility of pure apriori synthetic knowledge and, indeed, the possibility of pure reason itself. Schleiermacher's overcoming of Kant consisted in making

metaphysics more down to earth, where appearances are real and essences are known as corresponding to those same appearances.

Unlike Part Two, Part Three did not concentrate on Schleiermacher's relation to a particular system of metaphysics that would need overcoming. Nevertheless, insofar as it explicated Schleiermacher's own metaphysics, it also implied the overcoming of traditional metaphysics, especially in regard to metaphysical opposites (chapter 6). Some common traits of different kinds of traditional metaphysics are their one-sidedness, being rooted in one single opposite at the expense of its counterpart, or their dualism, in which the two are mutually exclusive.<sup>3</sup> Schleiermacher overcame such metaphysics with his metaphysics of contrasts, in which not only are the members of each pair interdependent and complementary, but also the different contrasts are relative, or interrelated among themselves. In this metaphysics, self-consciousness is that state of consummation, in which the oscillating, asymptotic identity in difference between the contrasts is reached.

### *Beyond Metaphysics*

Now I turn to what I defined as true overcoming of metaphysics in the sense of leaving metaphysics behind. As thus far revealed, there were indeed such elements in Schleiermacher's metaphysics. I would like to point them out once again, as well as add some additional elucidation.

### Dialectics beyond Metaphysics

The first and foremost of Schleiermacher's steps beyond metaphysics is his understanding of dialectics itself (chapter 6). Schleiermacher considers dialectics according to its original meaning, that is, not so much a metaphysical but rather a rhetorical discipline, the art of discourse, the art of conducting conversation, the *Kunstlehre* of the linking of thoughts. This understanding, moreover, is closely related to

Schleiermacher's view of the finitude and inter-subjective changeability of language, as well as to his pragmatist kind of agreement theory of knowing. Instead of the individualistic "I think" of transcendental philosophy, Schleiermacher offers a radical "we think" of changing inter-subjective and linguistic horizons.<sup>4</sup> Just as language is not individual, truth, for Schleiermacher, cannot be individual, but rather must be tested in a thinking community that uses a common language. True concepts cannot be verified metaphysically. Instead, they are "the normatively constituted aims of the activity of thought in a community."<sup>5</sup>

Consequently, although dialectics in its discourse employs metaphysical concepts, these concepts cannot have ontological value simply because language itself once and for all prohibits metaphysics. They have only epistemological value as tentatively assumed formal principles of the system of knowledge. Hence, even though, in his dialectics, Schleiermacher deals with the subjects of traditional metaphysics, such as human being, world, and God, he does not advance a body of metaphysical knowledge about them, but "rather attempts to justify the original presupposition of the transcendent ground."<sup>6</sup> Especially God, which Schleiermacher also identifies with the transcendent ground, cannot be known. And it is this transcendence that drives knowledge onto the dialectical inter-communicative path. The transcendent ground is not deduced, but is presupposed in contrast to the relativity of knowing, which it grounds. It is presupposed heuristically in order to establish the possibility of agreement between thinking and being, which, in turn, establishes the possibility of knowing. Thus, one could say that the metaphysics of Schleiermacher's *Dialektik* is a variety of Western-Christian metaphysics, which at least since Augustine, conceived God as the absolute unity and the ground for the correspondence of thinking with being.<sup>7</sup> Yet it is not the same metaphysics. It is the overcoming of that Western-Christian metaphysics insofar as it is based only on

provisional presupposing in order to make the system coherent. It is epistemological overcoming of ontology.

Thus, on the one hand, dialectics is the foundational science of all sciences, the science of sciences (*scientia scientiarum*) insofar as it provides their transcendental presuppositions. Yet, at the same time, paradoxically, it is a non-foundational foundational science, for those transcendental presuppositions are literally nothing more than tentative presuppositions. As Schleiermacher admits, the search for the metaphysical boundaries of thought may be accomplished only by way of fiction, through fiction.<sup>8</sup> In any event, they are hypothetically presupposed in and for the thinking that claims to be knowing. Thinking without these principles cannot become knowing. Thinking also cannot be knowing without being organized. Therefore, Schleiermacher calls dialectics the organon of all sciences. It follows that dialectics, ultimately, is not metaphysics but logic. On this account, Schleiermacher subsumes the transcendental aspect of dialectic under the form of logic. Dialectics as logic overcomes metaphysics.

### *Gefühl* beyond Metaphysics

The second aspect of Schleiermacher's overcoming of metaphysics emphasized his own metaphysics of contrasts, which overcame the one-sided metaphysics of mutually exclusive opposites. Schleiermacher achieved this by transforming the opposites into contrasts that are interdependent and interrelated. This was still one metaphysics overcoming another. But that was not all. This same overcoming also involves some elements that reach out beyond metaphysics (chapter 8). These are really meta-metaphysical elements, or perhaps, the elements of true metaphysics insofar as the meaning of metaphysics is to "go beyond."

The basic mediating element of all contrasts was self-consciousness. Since that can only be experienced before any reflection on it takes place, it is a case of experience

overcoming metaphysics. Self-consciousness overcomes the metaphysical contrasts insofar as it is the experiential point of conjunction between them. But then, in the depository of self-consciousness, Schleiermacher also finds several other elements, such as *Gefühl*, the *Übergang*, oscillation, the point zero. Precisely these are the elements that overcome metaphysics as such. The overcoming of metaphysics takes place from within metaphysics, when the metaphysical contrasts themselves, in their fluctuating reciprocation, create something like a place—although not really a place, for it does not exist—that accommodates these elements. All of them are interrelated, but the first and foremost is self-consciousness in its purest form, best expressed as *Gefühl*. It cannot be associated with anything metaphysical. *Gefühl* is the area of the transgression of metaphysical boundaries (*Grenzüberschreitung*).<sup>9</sup> If it has anything to do with being, the chief metaphysical category, perhaps the only being it can be associated with is existence (*Dasein*), for this kind of self-consciousness cannot exist without a being present who experiences *Gefühl*. In this sense, there is a rationale to the charges that Schleiermacher is bound to be trapped in a metaphysics of subjectivity. It cannot be denied that for this reason, Schleiermacher's appeals to an absolute ground, the absolute self-consciousness, "remain inextricably entwined in metaphysics. . . , [in] a metaphysics of subjectivity."<sup>10</sup> It is especially so, when the transcendent ground is only presupposed, and presupposed through the existential analogy to *Gefühl*. Yet, things are not so simple in this case, and I will return to the issue of subjectivity below.

### Beyond Metaphysics on Its Hither Side

Finally, I would like to recapitulate some crucial points in Schleiermacher's philosophical overcoming of metaphysics. As shown above, the oscillating interaction in the *Übergang* between the contrasts in their interdependency, "the inevitable beginning from the middle"<sup>11</sup> of this interaction, created out of that same "middle" some elusive and

hardly expressible third entity (*das schwer sagbare Dritte*)<sup>12</sup> that overcomes not only the metaphysical contrasts, but also metaphysics itself. This overcoming of metaphysics, in the words of Reuter, shows that

there is [*es. . . gibt*] something third between the contrasts, which does not “exist” [*‘gibt’*] in the same way as something exists [*gibt*], and which “is” [*‘ist’*] no definable “third”: the event [*das Sich-Ereignen*] of freedom, called “positing.” The domain of freedom is the mysterious between-“space” [*Zwischen,raum*] between the contrasts.<sup>13</sup>

In this between-space of the contrasts, metaphysics in its self-positing freedom leaps out of itself in a strange “*salto mortale*” that “puts aside” (*beiseitegesetzt*) its categories and carries out their “funeral” (*Beisetzung*) at the same time.<sup>14</sup>

To reiterate, in this bordering in-between space, which is not really a space, and is therefore a quasi-space, then, appears that third hardly expressible entity, which yet needs to be expressed. How can one do it? The words are only words and express what is expressible. But words need to be used in order to express something; immediacy must be mediated if it is to be expressed at all. So, Schleiermacher uses customary words that express human states, like “feeling” (*Gefühl*). Once this word becomes related to what happens in self-consciousness as the in-between meeting place of the contrasts, it assumes those same bordering and oscillating qualities.

Moreover, to restate this, since *Gefühl* is involved in this transgression of the contrasts in self-consciousness, it also becomes the mediating “point-zero” where the human being comes in touch with the transcendent ground or the divine. Only it is not an ontological contact. It is also never immediate, but always mediated, insofar as not only the transcendent ground or the divine itself can only be mediated, but also *Gefühl* can only be analogical, symbolic, mirroring representation of that inexpressible “queer creature” emerging in the in-between quasi-space beyond metaphysics.

Consequently, and this is the point I wanted to emphasize, in both cases, *Gefühl* and the transcendent ground, metaphysics is overcome also from the viewpoint of driving

concept into metaphor.<sup>15</sup> Conceptual, abstract, speculative metaphysics cannot endure if it is not related to real and live life. In this case, it is metaphor that transforms ontology into biology, speech about living realities, or into anthropology, speech about living human realities—realities not really metaphysical, on the contrary, realities that are physical.<sup>16</sup> So, although Schleiermacher, on the one hand, resists every obvious anthropomorphism, especially in his dogmatics, on the other hand, anthropomorphism is unavoidable according to his views. Insofar as thought already consists of words, thinking the divine will be anthropomorphic in one or another way.<sup>17</sup> Theological knowledge will always be “mediated and broken”; God will only be expressed as God is mirrored in human existence—as the presupposition of unity of self-, world-, and God-consciousness.<sup>18</sup> A mirror always remains a mirror, never itself becoming what is mirrored in it. And this is the case not only with expressing the divine, but also with *Gefühl*, and, for that matter, with every materialization of any idea of pure reason.<sup>19</sup> Schleiermacher’s view of the anthropomorphic constitution of language itself, although entailing a kind of metaphysics of subjectivity, ultimately prohibits metaphysics in the traditional sense. In fact, this constitution of language makes it the carrier beyond metaphysics, only beyond not on its other, but the hither side, maybe indeed the subjective, hither side of metaphysics.

## NOTES

1. See Richard B. Brandt, *The Philosophy of Schleiermacher: The Development of His Theory of Scientific and Religious Knowledge* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1968), 169.

2. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 389.

3. E.g., see Schleiermacher’s overcoming of the opposed one-sided metaphysics of Eleatics (the true being is static, while motion is only appearance) and Heraclitus (the truth of being is its flowing). *Dialektik* (Odebrecht), 254.

4. See Sergio Sorrentino, “Schleiermachers Philosophie und der Ansatz der Transzendentalen Philosophie,” in ed. Ruth Drucilla Richardson, *Schleiermacher in Context: Papers from the 1988*

*International Symposium on Schleiermacher at Herrnhut, the German Democratic Republic* (Lewiston, N.Y.: Mellen, 1991), 239.

5. Editor's Introduction to Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings*, trans., ed. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), xxii.

6. The discussion in this sentence and the rest of this paragraph is from John E. Thiel, *God and World in Schleiermacher's Dialektik and Glaubenslehre: Criticism and the Methodology of Dogmatics* (Bern, Switzerland; Frankfurt am Main, Las Vegas, Nev.: Lang, 1981), 29-30.

7. See Marlin E. Miller, *Der Übergang: Schleiermachers Theologie des Reiches Gottes in Zusammenhang seines Gesamtdenkens* (Gütersloh, Germany: Mohn, 1970), 25.

8. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 392. "durch Fiction," "fictionsweise."

9. Peter Weiss, "Einige Gesichtspunkte zur Problematik der Denkgrenze in den Verschiedenen Entwürfen der Dialektik Schleiermachers," in Richardson, *Schleiermacher in Context*, 213.

10. Eduardo Mendieta, "Metaphysics of Subjectivity and the Theology of Subjectivity: Schleiermacher's Anthropological Theology," *Philosophy and Theology* 6 (1992), 281.

11. *Dialektik* (Jonas), 250. "Das Anfangen aus der Mitte ist unvermeidlich."

12. Hans-Richard Reuter, *Die Einheit der Dialektik Schleiermachers: Eine Systematische Interpretation* (Munich: Kaiser, 1979), 86.

13. *Ibid.*, 227.

14. These metaphors are taken from Reuter, 227. He does not use them in exactly the same way as I do here, however.

15. Reuter, 275.

16. Cf. *ibid.*, 134.

17. Cf. Franz Christ, *Menschlich von Gott Reden: Das Problem des Anthropomorphismus bei Schleiermacher* (Gütersloh, Germany: Mohn, 1982), 86. For the ways in which Schleiermacher avoids anthropomorphism in dogmatics see Brian A. Gerrish, *Continuing the Reformation: Essays on Modern Religious Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 162.

18. Gunter Scholtz, *Die Philosophie Schleiermachers* (Darmstadt, Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984), 135.

19. This is another of Schleiermacher's Kantian influences. Cf. Christ, 85.



## CHAPTER 12

### DOGMATIC THEOLOGY OVERCOMES METAPHYSICS

#### *The Impossibility of Overcoming*

Before assessing how Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology overcomes metaphysics, I would also like to point out some problems inherent in this overcoming. Although I could omit enumerating the problems and the instances of implicit metaphysics within the thought of Schleiermacher that intends to overcome it, I feel the need to include such a discussion in this separate section. The context of this whole work requires it, because it basically deals with the problems, possibilities, and impossibilities of overcoming metaphysics. I only want to make clear once more that this section should not be understood polemically, as showing Schleiermacher's failure, but rather as reaffirming Schleiermacher's own insight. As noted several times above, Schleiermacher is not naïve in this regard, but knows perfectly well himself that there will always be implicit or explicit metaphysical elements in every overcoming. After all, there will always be some principles of knowledge involved; also, language as such is bound to betray the overcoming that can only be expressed in language, and so forth. But this endurance of metaphysics never stopped thinkers like Schleiermacher from attempting to overcome it. There are ways out as well. And that is the point of this work—metaphysical insideoutness—there are ways out from within, the ways out of metaphysics while remaining inside.

## Dogmatics: “Closed” or “Public” Theology?

To review, one of the basic claims of Schleiermacher’s Introduction to the *Glaubenslehre* was to establish the status of dogmatic theology as a separate discipline, executed according to its own peculiar principles. To use today’s terminology, one could say that this theology works within an autonomous “language game,” independent from other disciplines and thus exempted from entering in a public discourse to justify its truth claims.<sup>1</sup> Then, Schleiermacher put a special emphasis on the inadequacy of speculation for dogmatics. His advice for the church was to examine its dogmatic statements to purge the dogmatic propositions proper from the layers of speculation accumulated upon them during the long centuries of the misguided coexistence of theology and philosophy.

But, as has been seen, that is not the whole story. This seemingly closed discipline is also intended to be a “positive” science—similar to such sciences as biology and chemistry—only having its own peculiar datum, which is Christian experience. Moreover, to express itself, the science of dogmatics even affords to use such other disciplines as ethics, psychology, and, of course, dialectics. As a matter of fact, I would say that Schleiermacher is actually doing a kind of “public theology.”<sup>2</sup> This is also obvious from the section above dealing with reason and revelation. There is no question that Schleiermacher endeavors to conform theology to the modern epistemological presuppositions, requiring natural, scientific explanations for religious phenomena. Schleiermacher’s great achievement, his experiential theology, likewise emerges from his urge to do theology in a “public” way, namely, to create a “positive” theology also in the sense that it would address his contemporaries in terms of the prevalent presumptions of the day, in this case, those requiring the experiential verification of scientific proposals. His attempt to ground theological statements in the givenness of experience or *Gefühl*, that is, outside reason, which has lost its stakes owing to critical philosophy, is exceptional. His theory of *Gefühl*, indeed, established bond between theology and the

science of his day.<sup>3</sup> Schleiermacher is a pioneer in this regard, and the epithet of “father of modern theology” is fully merited.

Certainly, the use of the modern metaphysical principle of the experiential givenness in founding the dogmatic system can be questioned from a theological perspective. Already Hegel pointed out the formalism, relativity, capriciousness, contradictoriness, ambiguity, and plurality of feelings that, therefore, cannot form an adequate experiential basis for knowledge.<sup>4</sup> Yet, Hegel seems to have misunderstood what Schleiermacher meant by *Gefühl*. He did not mean contingent and always changing emotional feelings, but *Gefühl*, the immutable, immediate self-consciousness, constituting the basis for other functions of human spirit, such as knowing and doing.

#### Speculative or Empirical Theory of *Gefühl*?

To recapitulate another discussion from the previous chapter, according to Schleiermacher, the proper propositions of dogmatics are different from the poetical and rhetorical forms of religious language. The descriptively didactic dogmatic propositions are strictly reflective and, therefore, can belong to theoretical speculation. Schleiermacher’s astute solution in this dangerous situation was to specify that while the dogmatic propositions are formally speculative, materially they are dogmatic inasmuch as they are derived from reflection upon the religious *Gefühl*. Moreover, in this way, dogmatic propositions become truly speculative in Schleiermacher’s own understanding of the right speculation, that is, the one that includes the empirical element. However, there is a different dilemma. Schleiermacher’s central assumption about the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence, to which he relates the dogmatic propositions, ultimately, itself may turn out to be a speculative presupposition. Schleiermacher’s generalization of religiousness as the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence and its placement at the basis of his dogmatic system may, in fact, be a speculative procedure since it entails certain

metaphysical claims. As Curran also argues, “in establishing a concept of *Gefühl* and *schlechthinniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl* as the bedrock of Christian theology, it [the *Glaubenslehre*] takes a speculative, not an empirical stance.<sup>5</sup> The proposition of immediate self-consciousness itself becomes the new basic metaphysical axiom. In this sense, despite its claims of communality and inter-subjectivity, Schleiermacher’s approach presents a case of metaphysics of subjectivity.<sup>6</sup>

I would also like to add that Schleiermacher himself would want to see the theoretical basis of the *Glaubenslehre* to be consistent with that of the *Dialektik*. His own philosophy has inevitable influence on the *Glaubenslehre*. I already noted the congruity of the accounts of *Gefühl* in both works. Ultimately, the idea of God’s causation in Schleiermacher’s nonmetaphysical modification as the *Gefühl* of dependence on its “whence” is similar to the idea of God as the transcendental ground of being. It is plausible that Schleiermacher came to emphasize the *Gefühl* of dependence in religious experience chiefly for the reason that it enabled him to derive a theological doctrine that was congenial to his metaphysical theory.<sup>7</sup> It is still metaphysics influencing dogmatics, even if Schleiermacher’s own metaphysics.

Readers of the Introduction to the *Glaubenslehre* will be reminded of Schleiermacher’s attempt to elude all possible charges of the influence of metaphysics on dogmatics, denying that dogmatics itself is in any way based on the theoretical foundation of the Introduction—the principal place in which the metaphysics is not only dealt with, but also discerned. But I would question this claim, because it is absolutely certain that the *Gefühl* of dependence is the point to which the dogmatic propositions of the main body of the *Glaubenslehre*, must measure up.

## Speculation Tamed?

As it was seen throughout the previous chapter, Schleiermacher does not abandon philosophy and speculation altogether in the same Introduction that prohibits it in principle. Indeed, even the fact that Schleiermacher so emphatically stresses the distinction between the methods of philosophical speculation and dogmatics only makes one alert to a formidable complication, and, as Ebeling aptly notes, “only shows how difficult it is to make this distinction in actual practice.”<sup>8</sup>

One of the most problematic points is Schleiermacher’s claim of the innocent use of speculation. One may start, for example, with questioning Schleiermacher’s reference to the “golden age” of primordial Christianity, in which the influence of speculation was zero. As Pannenberg, for instance, indicates, in proclaiming the one God, Christianity appealed almost from the start to philosophy, at the very least, in the forms of Stoicism and Platonism, and to its criticism of the polytheistic beliefs of other peoples. In Pannenberg’s opinion, this appeal cannot be interpreted externally as an accommodation to Hellenism, but it reflects the condition for the possibility that non-Jews might come to believe in the God of Israel as the universal God. Therefore, Pannenberg concludes that

the connection between Christian faith and Hellenistic thought in general—and the connection between the God of the Bible and the God of the philosophers in particular—does not represent a foreign infiltration into the original Christian message, but rather belongs to its very foundations.<sup>9</sup>

Of course, these statements do not exclude the subjugation of metaphysics to the aims of Christian experience. Yet, I doubt that it is sufficient for the claim that the influence of speculation was zero. Is the fact of Christian “domestication” of metaphysics sufficient for its influence to be terminated?

Similar doubts could be raised against Schleiermacher’s allegedly “innocent” use of dialectics in its ancient sense. In fact, it was Hegel who already noticed that Schleiermacher’s use of dialectical arguments commits him to tacit positive claims of his

own about the office of reason and rationality. As Crouter reminds us, Schleiermacher “too uses reason systematically and constructively, even when he describes this use in his theology as merely didactic or rhetorical.”<sup>10</sup>

I would also like to return to Schleiermacher’s claim that the same proposition can convey a speculative meaning in philosophical context, whereas in religious context its meaning may well be dogmatic. I would repeat that it seems highly dubitable that the old meanings of the terms of speculative philosophy could be so easily abandoned and replaced by new ones. How can one determine the clear-cut difference? How can one be sure that the speculative content is not transferred to the religious usage? Referring to the *Open Letters*, it is a question whether Schleiermacher’s argument with Fries regarding the status of theological language can be so easily resolved in Schleiermacher’s favor. Notwithstanding Schleiermacher’s timely idea of Christianity as a “language forming principle,” the question is whether it is possible at all to “cut off” the old metaphysical meanings of theological terminology.

There are theologians like Paul Tillich who do not think so. I think that Schleiermacher would agree with the following, even if he would go further and claim that the old meanings can be cut off. Tillich starts with reference to non-metaphysical philosophy and observes that those who most confidently proclaim the demise of metaphysics usually propose just another variant instead. So, he mentions the pragmatic-naturalistic line of that philosophical strand which, in spite of its anti-metaphysical statements, expresses itself in definite ontological terms, such as, life, growth, process, experience, being.<sup>11</sup> Even more important, shifting the focus to the alleged metaphysically neutral biblical theology, Tillich indicates that even throughout the pages of the Bible, as in any other religious text, the categories and concepts of the structure of experience can easily be discerned: time, space, cause, thing, subject, nature, movement, freedom, necessity, life, value, knowledge, experience, being, non-being. Even the

ordinary everyday language is not free from these categories, for their philosophical understanding has influenced it for centuries.<sup>12</sup> These remarks also apply to Schleiermacher's dogmatics. But I would say that it is not a question of cutting off the old meanings. They can be acknowledged for what they are, and then their potential that transgresses metaphysics may be sought. Both moments are indispensable: the affirmation and negation of metaphysics, and Schleiermacher himself proclaims that. As Tillich again writes, most likely influenced by such texts of Schleiermacher as his letter to Jacobi: "To live serenely and courageously in these tensions and to discover finally their ultimate unity in the depths of our own souls and in the depths of the divine life is the task and the dignity of human thought."<sup>13</sup>

### The Metaphysical Encroachment of Dogmatics

Even a bigger problem is Schleiermacher's requirement for dogmatics, in figuring out the relationship of religious *Gefühl* to its object of reference, to encroach upon the subject matters of psychology, ethics, and, yes, metaphysics itself. For one thing, ethics, in Schleiermacher's understanding, is a science that gives speculative presentation of reason in all of its effects.<sup>14</sup> For another thing, this move appears to give the "green light" to metaphysics, even if it is a restricted metaphysics, which is not allowed to declare a separation between God and the world, a contrast between good and evil, or the distinction between the spiritual and the sensible in human nature. Although certain metaphysical schemes may be excluded, it is only in favor to the more appropriate ones?<sup>15</sup> By the way, pantheistic philosophy, under these requirements, would also be an appropriate candidate.

## Metaphysical Nature of Dogmatic Propositions

Likewise, Schleiermacher's determination of the three forms of dogmatic propositions used in his system is no less problematic. To review, Schleiermacher's range of the dogmatic propositions comprise the descriptions of the human states, assertions about the constitution of the world, and the conceptions of the divine attributes and modes of action. The latter two, to a certain extent, are determined to be propositions of speculative kind. In order to domesticate them, Schleiermacher attempts to put them under the mastery of the descriptions of the human states. But can they really provide such a stable criterion? The background permanence of *Gefühl* may be one thing. But the human states can also be contingent and contradictory, as I have already mentioned in connection to Hegel's critique of Schleiermacher.

Moreover, where is the guarantee that this control will work? In fact, I would question if Schleiermacher's dogmatic statements regarding God can be free of any metaphysical assumptions. In any case, it is not unreasonable to be convinced with Brandt that Schleiermacher's view of religion as based in the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence does "not rest merely upon empirical analysis of historical religion but upon the basis of his metaphysics, according to which God is the "source" of all finite being."<sup>16</sup> Very much like the God of metaphysics, it is the absolute undivided unity, the ineffable, and the absolute causality.<sup>17</sup> God, for Schleiermacher, is always the unconditioned and the absolutely simple. Even the claim that the attributes of God refer only to human states is a metaphysical claim.<sup>18</sup> Schleiermacher's avowal that it is only a semblance of metaphysics may not solve the problem of overcoming.

To enlarge upon this issue, one can go as far as to question whether the God that the *Glaubenslehre* represents can at all be "the God of faith," or is it rather "the God of philosophy"? Indeed, this God does not seem to have anything to do with the personal and individual Christian God. Although Schleiermacher acknowledges the inevitability of



anthropomorphism in the *Dialektik*, it does not appear in the *Glaubenslehre*. The “whence” of the religious self-consciousness appears, as Flückiger says, “impersonal” and “indifferent.”<sup>19</sup> The idea of God becomes absorbed by the metaphysical idea of totality. This God “is the unity, the absolute of the totality, the complete generality. . . This God is not the God of faith, but rather a God of definition, intellect, speculation.”<sup>20</sup>

There is also a related question as to whether Schleiermacher’s analysis of the human states in the *Glaubenslehre* has, as he claims, purely empirical basis. The theory of the *Gefühl* of dependence may be perceived as “ontological analysis of the inner depths of the human being.”<sup>21</sup> The suspicion that the concept of religious *Gefühl* is “a pure ontological construction” is not completely without reason because its object is also identical with the unity of being.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, Schleiermacher himself avows that the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence is only postulated, but not realized, self-consciousness.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, it can hardly be considered empirical-psychological fact.<sup>24</sup> Just the opposite, it is an instance of the classical tripartite *metaphysica specialis*, that is, a *psychologia rationalis*. Even if it is not exactly metaphysics in the classical sense, it is a case of Christian theology itself producing metaphysical implications of its own.

It leads once more to suspicion regarding successful separation of metaphysics and dogmatics, for Schleiermacher himself does not even acknowledge that his own philosophy could have its bearings on the *Glaubenslehre*. I think it is quite reasonable to suggest that the *Glaubenslehre* could only have benefited if Schleiermacher had applied to it his dialectical rule of complementing the empirical with the speculative. Since he did not, the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence, so related to the *Gefühl* of the *Dialektik*, may appear as being “cut off from the essence of immediate self-consciousness like a *caput mortuum*.”<sup>25</sup> The above discussed complementarity of the *Dialektik* and the *Glaubenslehre*, so useful for better understanding both works, remains useless when

Schleiermacher himself, trying to remain consistent with his claim to avoid speculation in the *Glaubenslehre*, does not acknowledge and does not allow their reciprocal influence.

### The Dogmatic Futility of Speculative Function?

Schleiermacher's corollary evaluation of speculation as the highest objective function of human spirit, but *Frömmigkeit*, as its highest subjective function, may be most problematic if it is used to clarify the relationship of metaphysics and theology. I have already pointed out the confusion between the conceptual clarification of the problem of the metaphysics-theology relationship and the phenomenological analysis of the functions of consciousness. This categorical mistake occurs frequently in different texts of Schleiermacher. A peaceful and complementary coexistence of religion and philosophy is affirmed on one level while their relationship is rejected on the other. That is to say, on the level of consciousness, there is agreement, even indispensability, while there is incompatibility on the level of theoretical appropriation of philosophy in dogmatics.

Furthermore, both elements are required for the fullness of human being. Then, some people may lack one or another (or, perhaps, both?), and hence, be somewhat inferior in their development in terms of reaching the full potential of humanity. Accordingly, some may be "dry," theoretical thinkers who "empty the cup of speculation" without any devout affections and, therefore, lack something essential. On the other hand, others may be exemplary Christians in *Frömmigkeit* without the faculty of speculative thinking, and likewise lack something essential. Be that as it may, the point is that, according to Schleiermacher's division, dogmaticians must be perfectly developed in both speculation and *Frömmigkeit*. One may ask, why so, if the fruits of speculation can not be used in dogmatics? Does it not then cause a dilemma for a dogmatician? To defend Schleiermacher, one could contend that the speculative-religious structure of

human spirit and the independence of dogmatics are two different things after all. And I think that they indeed are different. But if there is no relation, if they are different, why does Schleiermacher bring this discussion in everywhere he considers the relationship of theology and philosophy?

It is also worth noting that the theoretical ban on speculation appears exclusively in the *Glaubenslehre*. It is important to note that in the other texts examined above, Schleiermacher deals with the problem of the relationship of these disciplines on the phenomenological level only. Thus, the idea of the complementarity of the two functions of consciousness reappear under the idea of the “prince of the church” in the *Brief Outline*. But the radical separation between dogmatics and speculation does not emerge there at all. Philosophical theology, with its conceptual and critical foundations, has an essential role in all fields of theology, including historical theology. Inasmuch as the *Glaubenslehre* represents historical theology that reinterprets the idea of Christianity for Schleiermacher’s time, philosophical theology takes part there as well. And it is quite obvious from the Introduction. The *Glaubenslehre* also presents the essence of Christianity as a distinctive mode of faith, which is the first task of philosophical theology.

The *Speeches* show a similar pattern. Schleiermacher puts speculation and *Frömmigkeit* in different regions of the human spirit. Speculation as thinking, ethics as acting, and religion as intuition (*Anschauung*) and *Gefühl*, are three completely autonomous and equal spheres of human existence. In no way can the elements of these separate spheres be intermingled. Yet, they must complement each other and cannot subsist separately.

In the same way, the *Jacobibrief* treats the philosophy-religion relationship problem only on the level of consciousness. There is neither a conflict nor a convergence between these two functions; only a perfect balance on the borderline between the

undecided back and forth movements from them. They both are necessary for the richness of life. His analogy of grasping the Adams, in a way resembles the rational-suprarational and natural-supernatural discussion of the Introduction insofar as his “real supernaturalism” emerges again here. However, in this opaque fragment, he seems to invoke some third capacity of human spirit, the capacity that slumbers “in the deepest depths of the nature of human being or soul” (*in den tiefsten Tiefen der Natur der Seele*) and encompasses both *Gefühl* and reason (*Verstand*), *Frömmigkeit* and speculation. I believe that this third element refers to the same overarching faculty presented in the *Dialektik* and in the *Glaubenslehre*, the faculty that cannot be named, therefore only provisionally called the immediate self-consciousness or *Gefühl*, despite the fact that it surpasses *Gefühl* itself.<sup>26</sup> Perhaps it could be the conducting fluid of Schleiermacher’s “galvanic battery”?

#### The Relationship of the Introduction to the *Glaubenslehre* Itself

In discussing the *Glaubenslehre*, I put the main emphasis on its Introduction. It is a part of Schleiermacher’s main dogmatic book. Nevertheless, strange as it is, the status of the Introduction in regard to the main body of the work itself needs to be clarified. This issue is by no means simple. But it is very important for this work, for it also concerns the problem of the relationship of metaphysics and theology. On the one hand, Schleiermacher strictly determines the preliminary status of the Introduction in regard to the dogmatics itself. He explains that since the preparatory process of defining the methods and tasks of the science of dogmatics cannot belong to the science itself, none of the Introduction’s propositions have a dogmatic character.<sup>27</sup> So, the Introduction does not properly belong to dogmatics. In this way, Schleiermacher swiftly escapes the critiques that accuse his dogmatics of falling prey to the philosophical presuppositions incompatible with the Christian beliefs.

On the other hand, it is obvious that this same maneuver implies Schleiermacher's acknowledgement that the Introduction is a *prolegomenon*, and as such belongs to fundamental philosophical theology providing the principles of the science of dogmatics. From this perspective, it can never be unrelated to the main dogmatic text. As Curran points out, "apparently a *Glaubenslehre* cannot be written at all until philosophical theology has made the Procrustean bed into which it will fit."<sup>28</sup> Although that is true, I myself would not necessarily share the skeptical attitude of the quotation. In fact, the relationship of the Introduction to the body of the *Glaubenslehre* exemplifies just another instance of Schleiermacher's understanding of the complementarity of speculation and empiricism. He appears to hold this conviction, but without explicitly acknowledging it in the *Glaubenslehre*. The formal, theoretical schema of the Introduction "without the historical-empirical body is empty and dead and in turn the historical-empirical body would disintegrate into chaotic multiplicity without the introduction of schematic order. . . schemata and data delimit each other in testing each other. . ." <sup>29</sup>

### The Dogmatic Fulfillment of the Principles Stated in the Introduction

I would like to stop for a moment to examine whether Schleiermacher has unflinchingly carried through the principles of the Introduction into the dogmatics proper. The limits of my work cannot allow a detailed analysis of the text; I have to restrict it to a few observations in this subsection.

In the first place, it should be appreciated that Schleiermacher indeed makes a great effort to keep his promise of restricting his dialectic to the ancient usage. Most of the book consists of Schleiermacher's polemical arguments that, indeed, are masterpieces in dialectics, showing the inconsistencies and contradictions of certain doctrines of the church or teachings of theologians without recourse to speculative arguments. It is a non-metaphysical dialectics. I even think another element that adds to that is Schleiermacher's

irony. It is so entertaining to see how subtly he lampoons many traditional beliefs of both the church and the academy of his day. Thus, his non-metaphysical dialectics in the dogmatics even has some mark of sophistry when he points out the contradictions in these beliefs.

On the other hand, I would like to contend that Schleiermacher's main postulate in the dogmatic body of the *Glaubenslehre* has a metaphysical basis. That is, his whole demonstration rests on a modified ontological argument, the most speculative argument.<sup>30</sup> The constant reference to religious experience only covers the latter. Simplifying to the extreme, one could say that Schleiermacher uses the same pattern throughout the whole treatise. He starts with the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence as an indispensable Christian experience. Then, he stipulates that all dogmatic propositions must conform to this experience. But, in fact—and this, in my opinion, is the point that undermines Schleiermacher's whole attempt of overcoming speculation in dogmatics—this specific experience of the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence can only take place if God is conceived as *aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari potest*. Only then can God be the whence of the absolute dependence. The religious *Gefühl* presupposes such a God. It is the condition of possibility of the *Gefühl* of dependence. Subsequently, Schleiermacher just uses his dialectics in the doctrinal construction in order to arrive at the optimally consistent dogmatic propositions expressing the ultimacy of the divine as it is experienced in the religious *Gefühl*. Every dogmatic proposition in which a trace of contradiction in this regard can be shown must be discarded, since one's trust cannot be put in such a deity. Contradictions belong to metaphysics that has nothing to do with religious experience. Despite that, I think that precisely here all the metaphysical presuppositions about the divine reenter: unity, simplicity, causality, and so forth. Principally Schleiermacher's approach differs from Anselm's. Schleiermacher should reject the possibility of moving from concept to reality, and require just the opposite.<sup>31</sup> But it is so difficult to carry this

intention through. It is a question of primacy, i.e., the primacy of either *Gefühl* or knowing. It is not so easy to establish the primacy of experience over concept. I believe that experience cannot be independent of knowing. Or, to be more precise, both knowing and experience are mutually necessary and interrelated. Theoretical beliefs shape every concrete religious practice, and vice versa. Neither can be primary, but both are complementary. Schleiermacher claims to arrive at dogmatic propositions via reflection on experiencing the *Gefühl* of dependence. I would ask, instead, whether there can be such a religious experience without prior conceptual beliefs about, and knowledge of, God?

This difficulty also affects Schleiermacher's own theoretical treatment of the divine attributes. First, he indicates that in no way does his treatment of the attributes express the being of God *in se*. Yet, he must admit that all the divine attributes to be dealt with in dogmatics must go back to the divine causality, "since they are only meant to explain the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence."<sup>32</sup> To be sure, it is a qualified view of the divine causality, that is to say, causality referring to the relationship between the human and the divine; it is a relational causality. Could it be that Schleiermacher's operating with the concept of causality leads back into metaphysics with its idea of God as *prima causa*? Can Schleiermacher withstand the dangers from this quarter by holding on to the situation of the *experience* of absolute causality instead of the idea of *analogy*, as Ebeling suggests?<sup>33</sup> Or, is it rather the case that Schleiermacher lets his treatment of the divine attributes, beginning, to be sure, with the experience of absolute dependence, be shaped by the philosophical, speculative tradition?<sup>34</sup> As Ogden aptly remarks, the situation of experience of absolute causality cannot so easily be played off against the idea of analogy, since it is the latter idea that construes the character of that experience.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, Ogden may be right that the concept of absolute causality has its history, which can possibly be traced back to the combination of both emotion and immanence.

The notion of absolute causality as an idea of interpreting *das Woher* of the experience of absolute dependence, accordingly, can be arrived at only in juxtaposing a basic concept and a qualifier, that is, by simultaneously saying that God is the absolute cause and at the same time is the cause in some sense (“the whence” of the absolute dependence).

Schleiermacher’s interpreting this “whence,” as Ogden suggests, may thus be traced back to the philosophical, speculative tradition.<sup>36</sup>

Harvey, in his turn, maintains that it is Schleiermacher’s violation of his own methodological principle to rule out speculation that creates incompatibility between the two sets of God’s attributes, namely, between those abstracted from the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence (eternity, omnipresence, omnipotence, omniscience) and those from the Christian consciousness of redemption (love and wisdom).<sup>37</sup> Harvey also thinks that Schleiermacher cannot escape speculative metaphysics when assuming uncritically the idea of God as the unconditioned origin of being.<sup>38</sup> Precisely Schleiermacher’s own principles go against themselves by not allowing the *Gefühl* of dependence to tell anything about God *in se*, but only about the contingency of human being. Therefore, the idea of God cannot but have a speculative basis. Likewise, the idea of creation cannot be related to immediate self-consciousness, “since nothing in our self-consciousness has to do with a past creation of the world.”<sup>39</sup>

Thus, the investigation as to the consistency of the Introduction with the main text renders the same verity: despite Schleiermacher’s promises, there remain certain more or less explicit metaphysical elements, especially in the first part of the dogmatics itself. Once again, this result is inevitable insofar as Schleiermacher carries out his restricted use of speculation in the system. The problem lies in the impossibility of keeping the beast of metaphysics tamed within the walls of the cage determined by Schleiermacher. The old metaphysical meanings will inevitably break through.



As I ascertained earlier, the issues of the previous section by no means invalidate Schleiermacher's accomplishments of overcoming metaphysics in dogmatic theology. His dogmatics itself is overcoming metaphysics; it is supposed to be non-metaphysical. Although Schleiermacher uses philosophical categories there, it is only in order "to interpret the piety of Christian faith, not to establish it."<sup>40</sup> Dialectical interpreting is different from metaphysical establishing. The similar non-foundational legacy of the *Dialektik* is also applicable to the *Glaubenslehre*. But that is not all. There are other perspectives from which Schleiermacher's dogmatics may be considered non-metaphysical. I present some instances below, although they may not be exhaustive. I start with Schleiermacher's nonmetaphysical doctrine of God, but then continue with some expositions, on the way making Schleiermacher contemporary, which will culminate in the concluding remarks of the dissertation. While those will deal with today's philosophical context, the expositions in this chapter prepare their way in the sense that they put Schleiermacher within the context somewhere in-between his own time and today. I think that with the help of additional research it would also be possible to interpret Schleiermacher's dogmatics in the light of such overcomings of metaphysics as existentialism and pragmatism. The *Gefühl* of absolute dependence is existential occurrence. In the letters to Lücke, Schleiermacher denotes religious *Gefühl* "the original expression of an immediate existential relationship" (*unmittelbares Existentialverhältnis*).<sup>41</sup> I have already pointed out the pragmatic motives in the *Dialektik*. Similarly, the task of dogmatics as positive science, according to the *Brief Outline*, is purely practical. Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology is also defined not through its ontological object, but through its function.<sup>42</sup> Here, however, I will consider more closely only Schleiermacher's phenomenological overcoming of metaphysics.

## Nonmetaphysical Doctrine of God

Since Schleiermacher intends his dogmatics to be the expression of the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence, it overcomes traditional metaphysical theology. So, while the latter strives toward ever better conceptual knowing of God, for Schleiermacher, *Gefühl* does not belong to the realm of knowledge and, consequently, does not produce any proper concept of God.<sup>43</sup> Instead of that, Schleiermacher gives phenomenological description of the reaction to the idea of God in the consciousness of the believer. Hence, contrary to speculative natural theology, Schleiermacher's dogmatics overcomes the dualism between God hidden and God revealed, God's being and God's act.<sup>44</sup> Schleiermacher's interpretation of God's attributes, accordingly, are not like those of the essentialist natural theology. The dualism of the latter subordinates the worldly and historically determined elements to abstract speculation about God.<sup>45</sup> Schleiermacher does not derive the concrete from the abstract, but reverses this usurpation of metaphysics upon dogmatics. However, it is not a question of primacy. If the doctrine of God began with religious apriori, it would appear to be an instance of natural theology, whether it is derived from Christian religious consciousness or not. The historically determined elements would appear to be particular instantiations of the abstract generic scheme, and Schleiermacher's principle of positivity would be violated. On the other hand, the priority of the concrete would only appear as intraecclesial fideism. To repeat, both historical and universal elements complement each other in Schleiermacher's theology. The same with the God hidden and God revealed. God's hiddenness to Schleiermacher is not so much abstract transcendence as a phenomenological limiting feature of God's self-disclosure. The hidden God is a primary feature of "what appears" as God revealed. Consequently, God's hiddenness is experienced and is co-constitutive of the divine attributes.<sup>46</sup> In any case, it is not a complete reversal, but the coincidence of the contrasts in these cases as well.

## Dogmatics As Empiricism Overcomes Metaphysics

Schleiermacher is most famous for his empiricism in dogmatic theology. It is an instance of the empiricist principle of overcoming metaphysics, which, instead of asking metaphysically about some object of inquiry (being, God, etc.), approaches it from an indirect, non-metaphysical viewpoint of how it is presented in experience. In Schleiermacher's view, dogmatics, being derived from concrete religious experience, is independent of metaphysical speculations. Being a "positive" science and, thus, having its objective datum like all other positive sciences have their data, it cannot be more dependent on metaphysics than such positive sciences as chemistry or physics.<sup>47</sup> Dogmatics just describes and systematizes the given facts of religious *Gefühl* in its particular Christian historical manifestations. It could be called the science of "Christianness" (*Christlichkeit*), a term invented by the nineteenth-century church historian and friend of Nietzsche, Franz Overbeck, and taken over in the twentieth-century by Heidegger, who, strikingly, in his early lecture "Phenomenology and Theology" also considers theology as a positive, historical science that is absolutely different from philosophy.<sup>48</sup> Christianness is that which specifies the essence of Christianity, which is

a faithful way of being in the world, which arises in response to what is revealed in the event of faith itself. . . Theology arises when faith and that which is disclosed from within it are thematized and taken as objects (*Gegenstanden*). Christianness, the *positum* of theology as a positive science, is believing existence in its relationship to what is believed in.<sup>49</sup>

Theology then is theoretical description of the empirical datum of Christianness, and as such it overcomes metaphysics. If this theology can be considered speculative, then it is only in Schleiermacher's own understanding of the right speculation based in *Empirie*.

## Dogmatics As Phenomenology Overcomes Metaphysics

I have already clarified Schleiermacher's stance regarding the complementarity of empiricism and rationality in the discussions about Schleiermacher's understanding of speculation and his relationship to Kant. This same stance emerges in his theology, as well. Reformulated theologically, it is, once more, the relationship between immanent natural and abstract speculative theologies. He finds the way to sail between these Scylla and Charybdis, and this way is precisely phenomenological. "He can now boldly interpret the meaning of religions not propositionally but from their phenomenological point of origin."<sup>50</sup> The immediate self-consciousness becomes a locus of the divine immanence, at least to a certain extent. But dogmatics then reflects on the data of this consciousness.

There are several aspects of phenomenology to which Schleiermacher could be a precursor owing to his dogmatic theology.<sup>51</sup> The starting point of phenomenology, in Husserl's understanding, is in pretheoretical, prereflective intentionality, and its method is intentional analysis. Such analysis investigates the intended object (*noema*) and the consciousness-act through which the object is given and intended (*noesis*). It is important in this analysis that the consciousness-act and its intentional object follow the kind of act-object under concrete consideration. For this reason, phenomenological method is different if applied to different subject-matters, including religion, which is Schleiermacher's field of phenomenological application. And it is noteworthy that as early as the 1930s Schleiermacher was considered to have prepared the way to modern phenomenology in his dogmatics. As Wobbermin believes, in his theory of *Gefühl*, *noema* and *noesis*—the content and the act of thought—"are correlated, they mutually supplement and determine each other."<sup>52</sup>

Another closely related feature of the phenomenological method, as I explained in the first part, is phenomenological reduction, the suspension of all judgments, theories, and presuppositions, especially naïve or dogmatic ones, that obstruct direct seeing of

phenomena. That is the way to things themselves, prior to theories and anticipations. In Schleiermacher's dogmatics, likewise, direct phenomenological description precedes objectifying metaphysical formulation. As Williams—a Schleiermacher scholar who mostly works in the field of phenomenological appropriation of the *Glaubenslehre*—notes, predication and language about God cannot take place without a prior grasp of “religious experience through which God is given to consciousness in an original way.”<sup>53</sup>

In order to properly understand theological assertions, one must understand their pretheoretical foundations in religious experience, that is, both the object as it originally gives itself to consciousness, and the modes of consciousness correlative to its self-givenness.<sup>54</sup>

Consequently, Schleiermacher overcomes metaphysics by bringing it under the control of the phenomenologically given.

Husserl's later version of the return to the things themselves is the acknowledgment of the preconsciously and pretheoretically experienced “life-world” (*Lebenswelt*). By means of phenomenological reduction, the meanings of the life-world are not theoretically explained, as in science and philosophy, but are instead described as transcendental eidetic structures of lived experience. Thus, phenomenological reduction is not transcendental in either an a-historical or a-temporal metaphysical sense. Probably also implying a defense of Husserlian phenomenology against the critiques (Heideggerian, et al.) of his supposed a-historicism, Williams points out that concrete life-world presumes history and temporality that dissolves “all absolutistic, a-historical, dogmatic philosophizing.”<sup>55</sup>

At the very least, Schleiermacher's assignment of the locus of religion to *Gefühl*, or immediate self-consciousness, and his interpretation of religion as a concrete historical and social phenomenon breaks the metaphysical tradition of Cartesian idealism in the same way as Husserl's phenomenology.<sup>56</sup> Like Husserl's project, “Schleiermacher's “turn to the subject” is a summons back to the things themselves, a return to

pretheoretical lived experience, and a corresponding approach to theology through the intentionality of corporate religious consciousness.”<sup>57</sup> *Gefühl* may well be conceived as Husserl’s originary, pretheoretical mode of world-comprehension, but with the depth dimension double intentional structure of the life-world and the transcendent “whence.”<sup>58</sup>

### *Theology and Metaphysics*

Although the issue of Schleiermacher’s position with regard to the relationship between theology and philosophy, between dogmatics and speculation, is present in most of this chapter, now I would like to concentrate specifically on this “central problem of Schleiermacher-interpretation.”<sup>59</sup> And central not only in interpreting Schleiermacher’s thought in general, but especially in interpreting his overcoming of metaphysics. To be sure, no straightforward answer can be given about his position. As has been seen, besides the unwanted reappearance of metaphysics here and there, Schleiermacher’s “No” to the question of retaining speculation in dogmatics was partly undone by accepting metaphysics in a certain way and form. When Schleiermacher proposes independence of dogmatics from philosophy, the only certain thing it means is the independence from some particular philosophical system or philosopher. But, dogmatics learns its dialectical method of connecting thoughts, its discursive intelligibility as a science, etc., from philosophy. Philosophy lends to dogmatics its tools of universal articulation. In any case, Schleiermacher takes great pains to render the use of philosophical speculations in the *Glaubenslehre* as harmless as possible by impoverishing or neutralizing them to a technical utilization, or subduing them to the dogmatic principle, and so forth. But it is clear that he is unquestionably aware that it is impossible to evade them. Schleiermacher himself “knows full well that a rejection of metaphysics is itself a strange and inconsistent form of metaphysics.”<sup>60</sup> Even the fact that Schleiermacher has to stress so emphatically the distinction between philosophical and

dogmatic methods only shows how difficult it is to make this distinction in actual practice.<sup>61</sup> By the same token, the assertion of the independence from philosophy actually establishes just the opposite. One “must know what philosophy thinks it is and thinks it will become” even in achieving the aim of disentangling theology from it.<sup>62</sup> The distinction itself implies relation. And here Schleiermacher follows the great theological tradition of the Middle Ages, which similarly reacted to the skepticism of the new secular philosophical freedom by exercising expertise in the very modes of thought from which the Christian religion is supposed to be extricated.<sup>63</sup> I agree with Curran’s acknowledgement that the demand to “live in ‘two cultures,’ in two kingdoms, with two truths, each fully justified within its own sphere of competence begs the question of how we are to find their relation.”<sup>64</sup>

Anyway, I think that precisely this impossibility of avoiding metaphysics or the relationship to it is the reason for the aforementioned supposedly neutral uses of metaphysics. The question is, if there is no need of speculation, why then usher it back through the rear door as an *ancilla* of the dogmatic system at all, even in such a limited way, *usus philosophiae* instrumentally, as *usus organicus*?<sup>65</sup> In any event, it is clear that Schleiermacher’s good intentions to forbid speculation in the system of dogmatics are not, and cannot, be thoroughly realized. Yet, could it be done better under the condition that the cake of speculation be preserved and eaten at the same time? Schleiermacher did everything that was possible to such an outstanding mind as his. His “dialectical” solutions are clever to an eminent degree. His consistency in relating the dogmatic statements to the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence is remarkable even in the face of the insurmountable difficulties in performing this procedure because of the philosophical connotations of the language of dogmatics itself. These difficulties are inescapable inasmuch as Schleiermacher chose to retain speculation in a certain way. Perhaps, he could somehow escape some of the problems if he had chosen the option to retain only

the first form of dogmatic propositions. In that case, however, as Schleiermacher himself noticed, dogmatics would be deprived of any ecclesiastical content, and his main purpose of addressing the work to the church would be lost. If the doctrines of creation and preservation, together with the divine attributes, were eliminated, what kind of dogmatics then it would be?

In any event, it is time to bring together some conclusions about what Schleiermacher's overall position could be regarding the philosophy-theology relationship in his *magnum opus*, as also clarified by the references to his other writings. Again, it is difficult to give an unequivocal answer, especially given Schleiermacher's treatment of the problem on the two levels: theoretical and phenomenological. However, the other texts, which are not primarily dogmatic, show that Schleiermacher, in fact, derives his theoretical position from the presuppositions of his phenomenology of consciousness. So, Schleiermacher's overall attitude regarding dogmatics and speculation is that they do not conflict with each other, with the implication that dogmatic theology "is both independent from and dependent on speculation."<sup>66</sup> It is some kind of "dependent independence."<sup>67</sup> They are originally united despite their permanent difference.<sup>68</sup> On the one hand, they are two independent disciplines, irreducible to each other, so different that they cannot even either oppose or contradict each other.<sup>69</sup> They freely pursue their particular goals. But on the other hand, they are also compatible, complementary, and mutually supporting each other. They are not enemies, but allies and companions. Not only do they not clash, but they also cannot exist without being in conversation with each other.

Ultimately, Schleiermacher never chooses either/or between any contrasting elements, but always holds both/and. Hence, his principle of the complementarity of contrasts finds its expression also in the contrast of theoretical metaphysics and empirical, historical, descriptive theology and in the more ordinary contrast of



philosophy and religion, or *Frömmigkeit*. Both stand side by side. “The truth resides in their mutual interpenetration; it is not to be located either merely in the generality of philosophical studies or in the particularity of specific empirical investigations.”<sup>70</sup> What Sigwart wrote about Schleiermacher in 1857 regarding “duplicity between speculation and religion,” and “undecidability, suspension (*Schwebe*) between knowledge and faith,” is as true today.<sup>71</sup> In neither is there the whole truth in a supposedly more adequate form. Rather, both complement each other, but without equalization.<sup>72</sup>

Of course, the complementarity of philosophy and religion is not possible with the old-style pure speculation. It must be the proper speculation, which Schleiermacher could not find existing and, therefore, embarked on constructing himself in the *Dialektik*.<sup>73</sup> The importance of the epistemological presuppositions of the *Dialektik* for the construction of the *Glaubenslehre* cannot be overemphasized, especially as it is not obvious, for the former was not published in Schleiermacher’s lifetime, and, therefore, he could not refer to it. By all means, Schleiermacher’s own philosophical efforts, including his philosophical theology in the *Dialektik*, should always be kept in mind. That would help to avoid many criticisms, such as, for example, Crouter’s claim that Schleiermacher’s peace or “contract” between reason and revelation is rhetorical only, for it is based on the indifference of both sides not coming into contact, whereas philosophy has no right to think of the transcendent reality.<sup>74</sup> Also, the analogy of the engine moving down two strictly divided tracks simultaneously, where both are necessary for it to work but must always remain apart, does not appear to be viable in view of Schleiermacher’s own theological speculation. Many other examples could be given. But they clearly contradict Schleiermacher’s last foundation of the *Dialektik* in the idea of God. At the very least, it is not correct to say about Schleiermacher that as “theologian, he was not a philosopher, and as philosopher, he was not a theologian.”<sup>75</sup>

Definitely, the outcome may appear confusing from the first glance. David Friedrich Strauss has pointed out Schleiermacher's betrayal of both philosophy and theology to each other, which may be considered from the two sides as either "blessed curse or cursed blessing."<sup>76</sup> And it is small wonder that Schleiermacher has been the object of so much scorn, especially from theologians, regarding the seeming philosophizing of theology.<sup>77</sup> The influence of many philosophers on Schleiermacher has been recognized, such as Spinoza, Schelling, Fichte, not to mention Kant. Furthermore, the influence of philosophy upon Schleiermacher's dogmatic theology is not always regarded as faulty. Eckert, for example, calls it the "philosophical theology of the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence."<sup>78</sup> He considers it a great success of mediation between faith and reason.<sup>79</sup>

On the other hand, some accuse Schleiermacher of failing to meet the criteria of critical scientific rationality not only in his dogmatics, but also in his philosophical theology, which, being ecclesiastical, does not even raise the critical question of the truth of Christianity, for example.<sup>80</sup> So, these are two diametrically opposed allegations. It is also quite understandable that there are such different interpretations concerning the relationship of theology and philosophy in Schleiermacher's thought. At the very least, there are three types of interpretation: dependence, independence, and mediation.<sup>81</sup> All of them have some kernel of truth and find their basis in Schleiermacher's own thought.

The crucial question in all this ambiguity then remains: Why such Schleiermacher's adamant insistence that speculation be banished from the *Glaubenslehre*? The answer is remarkably simple. In the first place, one should always keep in mind that it is not the question of philosophy and theology in general, but rather the question of philosophy and dogmatics. Theology and dogmatics are not identical for Schleiermacher.<sup>82</sup> Philosophical theology is also a valid discipline, as Schleiermacher classified it in the *Brief Outline*. The term "philosophical theology" itself presupposes the

use of philosophy in theology. Philosophical theology, according to Schleiermacher, is a science that examines the permanent essence of Christianity, and does it by philosophical means. The Introduction to the *Glaubenslehre* obviously belongs to this science.

Dogmatics, on the other hand, probes the historical expressions of that essence in the concrete beliefs and practices of the church. Therefore, they cannot be opposed; they are just different. Knowing this, it is clear that the requirement to separate philosophy and dogmatics lies in Schleiermacher's conviction concerning the autonomy of these distinct disciplines: one is theoretical while the other is historically empirical. Moreover, in this context, the question about the relationship of philosophy and theology somehow becomes irrelevant. Within the larger system of sciences, it is a question of how any theoretical science is related to any practical science. It is noteworthy that philosophy is not the only theoretical science that dogmatics draws upon. The theologian has more "handmaidens" than one, even though becoming dependent on none of them.<sup>83</sup> In a word, the question of the relationship of philosophy and theology is not central anymore; it is only a side question within the larger context of the interrelationship of different kinds of sciences.<sup>84</sup>

At any rate, all Schleiermacher protests against is the use of one qualitatively different discipline as a foundation for the other. Speculation is not allowed to determine dogmatics substantially. It is solely formal, not material, dependence. Although speculation may regulate the "how" of dogmatics, it is not allowed to decide its "what."<sup>85</sup> The latter, the content, is under the qualification and authority of the ecclesiastical praxis alone. And it is not because of the supremacy of the latter, but because of the specificity of the dogmatic science. Speculation has its role, but it is kept under the control of pre-metaphysical phenomenological description of the theologically given object of religious experience and its correlative modes of consciousness.<sup>86</sup> Otherwise, his theology is neither anti-metaphysical nor noncognitive. As Williams maintains, inasmuch as

Schleiermacher locates theology in prereflective, lived experience, his phenomenological description of the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence “is neither for nor against, but prior to the objectifying metaphysical enterprise.”<sup>87</sup> I agree with the apt summaries that two theologians give concerning the whole issue. One is Birkner’s:

Schleiermacher’s often quoted programmatic explanations of the independence [of theology from philosophy] does not refer to the whole organism of theological disciplines, in which to ethics and philosophy of religion appealing philosophical theology has the function of a grounding discipline, but it rather clarifies his program of dogmatics: they mark the independence of the contents of the Christian religion and its presentation in religious speech and teaching from speculative grounding; however, they expressly presuppose the “accord” [“*Zusammenstimmung*”] of the philosophical thinking of God and the dogmatic unfolding of the Christian faith in God.<sup>88</sup>

The other is Gerrish’s:

Schleiermacher’s theoretical veto of speculative intrusion into dogmatics should not be taken as antimetaphysical; nor, on the other side, does his actual use of speculative categories betray an inconsistency. . . it is all a question of methodological uniformity. . . Speculation has its own legitimacy, but it belongs on the scientific tree at another point than dogmatics. And if the dogmatic theologians find it useful to appropriate speculative categories, they may do so only insofar as the content of the categories is determined by their own science, not by that of the philosophers.<sup>89</sup>

I would say in addition that the issue is not so much the relationship of theology and metaphysics, or theology and philosophy, as *Frömmigkeit* and speculation. The theology-metaphysics relationship should be derived from the *Frömmigkeit*-speculation relationship. According to Schleiermacher, they are two central aspects of human being. A theologian always works to overcome their opposition, while recognizing, as Schleiermacher admitted to Jacobi, “that their final reconciliation is something which forever eludes our grasp.”<sup>90</sup> In much the same way, Schleiermacher “does not expect to bring the relationship between philosophy and theology “to completion,” even while he strives “to overcome” the dichotomy between them.”<sup>91</sup> That was also characteristic of Schleiermacher’s own metaphysics of contrasts in the *Dialektik*. Like in the *Übergang* of

the *Dialektik*, there appears to be indeterminate, oscillating, suspended complementarity also between philosophy and dogmatic theology, but in no case one-sided dependence from one or the other side.<sup>92</sup> Ultimately, the usual schemes of theology-philosophy relationship, so often applied to Schleiermacher, do not, in fact, offer suitable clues to his thought, regardless of whether they are claims of their independence, dependence, or mutual independence.<sup>93</sup> Precisely the confusion itself in this case may be the blessing. As Curran asserts, exactly this point, namely, Schleiermacher's refusal of any claim to metaphysical finality, could be the reason for the continuous attractiveness of his thought.<sup>94</sup> And this undecidability is also the reason for the possibility of stepping outside metaphysics. I turn to it in the following final summary of this part.

#### *Outside of Metaphysics between Theology and Philosophy*

The summaries and assessments above recapitulate some points of Schleiermacher's both not overcoming and overcoming of metaphysics in his dogmatic theology. As I have repeated several times, there are instances in which metaphysics is not only present in its legitimate form, but also some old metaphysical elements lurk behind despite their supposed overcoming. I state once more that pointing out these instances of more or less implicit metaphysics is not meant to discredit or undermine Schleiermacher's endeavor. As I have maintained before, the return of metaphysics is inevitable in every case of its overcoming. There will inevitably be points of return of the metaphysics that was supposed to be overcome into the metaphysics which is supposed to overcome. As I tried to show in the general part of this work, this kind of overcoming metaphysics, where one metaphysics surpasses another, not only always draws from the resources of the previous metaphysics already containing the seeds of its own overcoming, but also always replicates in one or another way the elements that yet need to be overcome. It is an endless game of overcoming in which the principles of the new

metaphysics are in turn subject to their overcoming with different ones. Schleiermacher's attempt is no exception from this rule as long as he plays this game, no matter how successfully he does it. And Schleiermacher himself knows it very well. Therefore, the instances pointed out of Schleiermacher's not overcoming metaphysics are rather meant to show the ambivalence of his thought, his hesitation to bring the system to closure. To repeat, Schleiermacher never makes a clear-cut either/or choice. Also, regarding the question of overcoming metaphysics: it is an oscillating undecidability between the possibility and impossibility of overcoming metaphysics. In my opinion, it is much better than believing either that all attempts of overcoming would fail or that the overcoming could be accomplished once and for all. It is also here that the position I call metaphysical insideoutness emerges.

Another important point is that Schleiermacher's dialectical suspension of contrasts in the indefinite "between-world"<sup>95</sup> represented by *Gefühl*, may also be applied to the contrast between philosophy and dogmatic theology. The encounter of these different but complementary disciplines, similarly to the metaphysical contrasts, creates something beyond both of them. As Schleiermacher indicates in the *Dialektik*, the contrasting duality of knowing and being presuppose their transcendent ground. Contrasts cannot be resolved either in simple identity or in sheer difference. As Spiegler puts it, "the fundamental given phenomenon is the 'togetherness of opposites.' . . . The true paradox of actuality is not presented by the either/or of simple identity and sheer diversity, but by the both/and of the 'togetherness of identity and difference.'"<sup>96</sup> This ultimate mystery of identity in difference also applies to the relationship of philosophy and dogmatic theology that represent speculation and *Frömmigkeit*, the two main aspects of the human spirit. Here it may provide a non-metaphysically grounded premise for the entrance into "the deepest depths of the soul," the realm of immediate self-consciousness. This is the source of the innermost life of the spirit, the conducting fluid connecting the

two poles and encompassing the contrasts. The electricity is thus generated: the sparks of God-consciousness—immediate experience outside metaphysics and independent of any philosophy or theology.

It is worth noting that Thandeka also comes to similar conclusions, only in regard to the contrast of religion and philosophy. But dogmatic theology is closely related to religion, or *Frömmigkeit*, anyway. She writes: “The link between philosophy and religion in Schleiermacher’s work is the gap itself.”<sup>97</sup> The gap belongs to neither of the two contrasts. It cannot be philosophical element, for thinking is cancelled in it. It also cannot be religious element, for *Gefühl* as the middle ground between the contrasts is different from the *Gefühl* of absolute dependence. Instead, the “link between religion and philosophy is the unbounded *Gefühl* of life itself aligned with the mind’s unmediated openness.”<sup>98</sup> Hence, the source of Schleiermacher’s distinction between philosophy and religion is that which they both have in common and yet is neither the one, nor the other: “human nature as the state of subject-less/object-less awareness that is the fundamental referent for the conviction upon which philosophic and religious thinking reflects.”<sup>99</sup> I think that Thandeka legitimately relates this element to clearing space for religious experience, which, in turn, makes Schleiermacher “the father” of modern Protestant theology.<sup>100</sup> I believe that it is this situation of undecided tension between the two that makes genuine creativity possible. And perhaps that made Schleiermacher to be, as Biedermann says, the virtuoso of both reason and *Gefühl*.<sup>101</sup> One exemplary outcome of this creativity is Schleiermacher’s *Glaubenslehre* – the masterpiece of metaphysical insideoutness.

## NOTES

1. I use the expression “language game,” aware that its originator, Ludwig Wittgenstein, meant it in a much narrower sense, that is, concerning sentences rather than systems of thought.

2. Claude Welch also suggests that Schleiermacher pursues “a “public” theology, one whose warrants could be made clear and whose statements would be intelligible outside the bounds of believing

community. . . [which would not be] in conflict with other, nontheological claims to truth." *Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (New Haven, Conn.; London: Yale University Press, 1972), 62.

3. Martin Redeker, *Schleiermacher: Life and Thought*, trans. John Wallhauser (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1973), 110.

4. Gottfried W. F. Hegel, "Reason and Religious Truth," Foreword to H. Fr. W. Hinrich's *Die Religion im Inneren Verhältnisse zur Wissenschaft*, in ed. Frederick G. Weiss, *Beyond Epistemology: New Studies of Philosophy of Hegel* (Hague, Netherlands: Nijhoff, 1974), 239 et passim.

5. Thomas H. Curran, *Doctrine and Speculation in Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre* (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1994), 323; cf. 209.

6. Cf. Eduardo Mendieta, "Metaphysics of Subjectivity and the Theology of Subjectivity: Schleiermacher's Anthropological Theology," *Philosophy and Theology* 6 (1992), 281ff. However, Mendieta is mistaken in identifying Schleiermacher's theory of self-consciousness with speculative idealism (Fichte, Schelling). He has not taken into account Schleiermacher's own differentiation of his view from that of regarding self-consciousness as pure self-referentiality. Contrary to Mendieta's charges, Schleiermacher does explain self-consciousness, which for him cannot be "the mirroring of its own activity of mirroring" (282).

7. Richard B. Brandt, *The Philosophy of Schleiermacher: The Development of His Theory of Scientific and Religious Knowledge* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1968), 249. I should note that I do not share Brandt's scepticism concerning Schleiermacher's consistency in this paragraph.

8. Gerhard Ebeling, "Schleiermacher's Doctrine of the Divine Attributes," in ed. Robert W. Funk, *Schleiermacher As Contemporary* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 135.

9. Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Metaphysics and the Idea of God*, trans. Philip Clayton (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1990), 11.

10. Richard Crouter, "Hegel and Schleiermacher at Berlin: A Many-Sided Debate," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 48 (1980), 37.

11. Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 20.

12. *Ibid.*, 21.

13. Paul Tillich, *Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 85.

14. See Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 5 (§2: Postscript 2).

15. Cf. Robert R. Williams, *Schleiermacher the Theologian: The Construction of the Doctrine of God* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978), 52, 167.

16. Brandt, 252.

17. See, e.g., Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 132 (§32:2), 196 (§50:3), 200 (§51).

18. P. D. L. Avis, "Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Science of Theology," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 32 (1979), 24.



19. Felix Flückiger, *Philosophie und Theologie bei Schleiermacher* (Zollikon-Zurich, Switzerland: Evangelischer Verlag, 1947), 182.

20. Ibid.

21. Paul Frederick Mehl, "Schleiermacher's Mature Doctrine of God As Found in the *Dialektik* of 1822 and the Second Edition of *The Christian Faith* (1830-31)" (Ph.D. diss., New York: Columbia University, 1961), 283. For *Gefühl* as "the metaphysical-ontological foundation" of Schleiermacher's whole philosophy see Michael Eckert, *Gott—Glauben und Wissen: Friedrich Schleiermachers Philosophische Theologie* (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1987), 93-94.

22. Flückiger, 36.

23. Ibid., 39. See Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 134 (§33:1).

24. Flückiger, 39.

25. Mehl, 283.

26. *Gefühl* in the letter to Jacobi appears as a part of the contrast, not in the same meta-metaphysical sense as in some places of the *Dialektik*.

27. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 2 (§1:1).

28. Curran, 226.

29. Gerhard Spiegler, *The Eternal Covenant: Schleiermacher's Experiment in Cultural Theology* (New York; Evanston, Ill.; London: Harper and Row, 1967), 141.

30. Some other authors also notice the ontological argument in the *Glaubenslehre*. Williams, for example, thinks that "Schleiermacher presents a pretheoretical, reflexive version of the ontological argument" (Williams, *Schleiermacher the Theologian*, 5; cf. 44-45).

31. Cf. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 133f (§33).

32. Ibid., 198, (§50:3). (Translation modified, leaving *Gefühl* in the original.)

33. Ebeling, "Schleiermacher's Doctrine of the Divine Attributes" in Funk, *Schleiermacher As Contemporary*, 145.

34. Schubert Ogden's response to Ebeling in Funk, *Schleiermacher As Contemporary*, 164.

35. Ibid., 165.

36. Ibid.

37. Van A. Harvey, "A Word in Defense of Schleiermacher's Theological Method," *Journal of Religion* 42 (1962), 160.

38. Ibid., 161.

39. Ibid., 162.

40. Martin Redeker, *Schleiermacher: Life and Thought*, trans. John Wallhausser (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1973), 117.
41. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On the Glaubenslehre: Two Letters to Dr. Lücke*, trans. James Duke, Francis Fiorenza (Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1981), 40. Wobbermin also points out the possibility of tracing back Heidegger's and Kierkegaard's existential thought to Schleiermacher. See George Wobbermin, "Schleiermacher," *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, vol. 5 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1931), 177.
42. Martin Rössler, *Schleiermachers Programm der Philosophischen Theologie* (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1994), 203ff.
43. See Erich Schrofner, *Theologie als Positive Wissenschaft: Principien und Methoden der Dogmatik bei Schleiermacher* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1980), 146.
44. Williams, *Schleiermacher the Theologian*, 162, 10.
45. See Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 194 (§50); Williams, *Schleiermacher the Theologian*, 12, 81, 140.
46. Williams, *Schleiermacher the Theologian*, 83.
47. Today's "philosophy of science," which uncovers the metaphysical presuppositions of sciences, was not yet known in Schleiermacher's time.
48. Martin Heidegger, *The Piety of Thinking*, trans. James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo (Bloomington, London: Indiana University Press, 1976), 6. On Heidegger and Overbeck see Translator's Commentary to *Piety of Thinking*, 112ff. Although Heidegger does not refer to Schleiermacher, I think that his influence in this lecture is obvious. Heidegger must have read at least Schleiermacher's *Kurze Darstellung*, for he not only emphasizes the non-speculative character of theology, but also replicates the division of its disciplines. He also ascribes a purely functional role of philosophy to the positive theology: "If faith does not need philosophy, the *science* of faith as a *positive* science does. And here again we must distinguish: The positive science of faith does not need philosophy for the founding and primary disclosure of its positum, Christianness, which founds itself in its own manner. The positive science of faith needs philosophy only in regard to its scientific character, and even then only in a uniquely restricted, though basic, way" (17).
49. I think that these words about Heidegger also very well apply to Schleiermacher. William Portier, "Ancilla Invita: Heidegger, the Theologians, and God," *Sciences Religieuses* 14 (1985), 165.
50. Roger A. Badham, "World Spirit and the Appearance of the God: Philosophy of Religion and Christian Apologetic in the Early Schleiermacher," in ed. Ruth Drucilla Richardson, *Schleiermacher on Workings of the Knowing Mind: New Translations, Resources, and Understandings* (Lewiston, N.Y.: Mellen, 1998), *New Athenaeum/Neues Athenaeum* 5, 153-54.
51. See Williams, *Schleiermacher the Theologian*, 6ff.
52. Wobbermin, *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, vol. 5, 176.
53. Williams, *Schleiermacher the Theologian*, x. I mostly rely on Williams for Schleiermacher's phenomenological relevance.
54. *Ibid.*, 51.

55. Robert R. Williams, "Some Uses of Phenomenology in Schleiermacher's Theology," *Philosophy Today* 26 (1982), 172ff, 176.
56. *Ibid.*, 172.
57. *Ibid.*
58. *Ibid.*, 179.
59. Hans-Richard Reuter, *Die Einheit der Dialektik Schleiermachers: Eine Systematische Interpretation* (Munich: Kaiser, 1979), 15.
60. Williams, *Schleiermacher the Theologian*, 9.
61. Ebeling, "Schleiermacher's Doctrine of the Divine Attributes" in Funk, *Schleiermacher As Contemporary*, 135.
62. Curran, 81.
63. *Ibid.*, 326.
64. *Ibid.*, 326f.
65. See *ibid.*, 122.
66. Spiegler, 145.
67. Curran, 241.
68. Schrofner, 208.
69. Erdmann Schott, "Erwägungen zu Schleiermachers Programm einer Philosophischen Theologie," *Theologische Literaturzeitung* 5 (1963), 335.
70. Spiegler, 137.
71. Christoph Sigwart, "Schleiermachers Erkenntnistheorie und ihre Bedeutung für die Grundbegriffe der Glaubenslehre," *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie* 2 (1857), 270.
72. *Ibid.*
73. This is, by the way, a factor that Barth shares with Schleiermacher, but with the difference that Barth only admitted that he would gladly use philosophy in theology if there was a proper philosophy. Schleiermacher went further in actually doing the kind of philosophy he believed to be right.
74. Crouter, 39.
75. Schott, 334.
76. Hans-Joachim Birkner, "Beobachtungen zu Schleiermachers Programm der Dogmatik," *Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 5 (1963), 121.
77. The best evidence and summary of the criticisms from Schleiermacher's times is his own account in the *Open Letters*. Notably, the recurrence of these criticisms beg the question of unintended

philosophical influences on Schleiermacher. Maybe he was more dependent upon the philosophical categories and the spirit of his time than he realized? (James Duke and Francis Fiorenza, "Introduction" to *Lücke*, 23.)

78. Eckert, 155.

79. "Schleiermacher's philosophical theology finds its Archimedean point in the concept of God, and all lines of argumentation proceed from the concept of God and lead back to it. So Schleiermacher's philosophical theology takes on the basic condition and the point of convergence of faith and knowledge in the "Gefühl of God. . ." (Ibid., 170) (Eckert)

80. Duke and Fiorenza, "Introduction" to *Lücke*, 22.

81. Hans-Joachim Birkner, *Theologie und Philosophie: Einführung in Probleme der Schleiermacher-Interpretation* (Munich: Kaiser, 1974), 13. The first two of these interpretations are obvious in reaction to Schleiermacher, and I will not comment on those. As for the third, mediation, Biedermann, for example, writes: "Schleiermacher mediated between *Gefühl* and reason, religion and science, theology and philosophy. Therefore he has become the father of mediation-theology (*Vermittlungstheologie*)." Alois E. Biedermann, *Ausgewählte Vorträge und Aufsätze*, ed. J. Kradolfer (Berlin: Reimer, 1885), 199.

82. Birkner, *Theologie und Philosophie*, 38.

83. Brian Gerrish, *Tradition and the Modern World: Reformed Theology in the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 47.

84. See Birkner, *Theologie und Philosophie*, 43.

85. Thiel, 89.

86. See Williams, *Schleiermacher the Theologian*, 51.

87. Ibid., 48.

88. Birkner, *Theologie und Philosophie*, 44.

89. Brian A. Gerrish, *Continuing the Reformation: Essays on Modern Religious Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 154.

90. Curran, 77.

91. Ibid., 78.

92. Cf. Miller, 226n. Miller applies here the idea of the *Übergang* to the whole thought of Schleiermacher.

93. Schrofner, 58.

94. Curran, 77.

95. This term comes from Eckert who calls Schleiermacher's view of "religion as existential between-world (*Zwischenwelt*) of human being" (Eckert, 129).

96. Gerhard Spiegler, "Theological Tensions in Schleiermacher's *Dialectic*," in Funk, *Schleiermacher As Contemporary*, 17.

97. Thandeka, *The Embodied Self: Friedrich Schleiermacher's Solution to Kant's Problem of the Empirical Self* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), 109.

98. Ibid. (Quotation modified with *Gefühl* instead of "feeling.")

99. Ibid., 110.

100. Ibid.

101. Biedermann, *Ausgewählte Vorträge und Aufsätze*, 188ff.

CONCLUDING REMARKS:  
SOME SKETCHES ON SCHLEIERMACHER TODAY

In this conclusion, I will not so much summarize the points of my research and contentions, for I have already done that above. Instead, I offer just a few intertextual, resembling sketches, showing some parallels between Schleiermacher's thought and today—both in philosophy and theology.

*The Figures of Insideoutness in Derrida and Schleiermacher*

The apex of my presentation of Derrida's overcoming of metaphysics in the first part of the dissertation was his outwitting the metaphysical language with words that, although they originated in metaphysics, do not belong there anymore, but do overcome the discourse of metaphysics and its contrasts. These words were either borrowed from the margins of metaphysics, like *khora*, or, like *différance*, devised by means of altering metaphysical words themselves, in this case "difference." Being such, they belong to the inside of metaphysics. By virtue of originating in metaphysics themselves, these words are able to regulate and account for the play of the contrasts, one could say, to "ground" them. Yet, not in any metaphysical way, for they are timeless, abyssal, and groundless themselves. But neither they are groundless in any hyper-metaphysical sense, for they produce the outside of metaphysics from themselves, from inside. Or rather, they operate on the hinge or the slash between metaphysical contrasts, including that of inside/outside. Hence, the outside of this meta-metaphysics itself is not somewhere beyond metaphysics, but, like mirror's tain, between inside and outside, with the visible, lustrous side inside.

Through a fissure in the tain, the other, unopposed to the same, may be glimpsed, the other to philosophy and metaphysics.

I see Schleiermacher's *Gefühl* as a similar figure of insideoutness. It originates from within metaphysics and its contrasts, but belonging to neither of them, turns out to be outside/inside metaphysics. Although the individual contrasts cannot reach beyond metaphysics, the interaction between two related contrasts creates a non-metaphysical space in between them, on the slash between thinking/willing, for example. *Gefühl* takes up that space. Insofar as the contrasts are in constant oscillation, *Gefühl* is and is not at the same time. At least, it "is" not in any sense as something "is." Being inside, *Gefühl* grounds the contrasts of metaphysics in an abyssal, groundless way. It is even "the carrier" of all other functions of human spirit. It is "the most real" being. Yet, *Gefühl* is not even its real name; it is just provisionally given to the "hardly expressible" third entity in the oscillation of the contrasts. Its naming is symbolic, or analogical, or representative, mirroring. *Gefühl* mirrors being and allows being to be mirrored, but not behind the tain, for it is mirror's tain itself, it is not reflective itself. The tain does not belong anywhere beyond existence. Yet, the outside, the dark depths of the divine, or the nothing, touch the lusterless back side of the tain of *Gefühl*. On this boundary of immediate self-consciousness, the fissured *Durchgangspunkt* of being, the images of the totally other can be glimpsed. It is the meta-metaphysical other totally outside of the self-presencing of self-consciousness.<sup>1</sup> Yet, it is not a hyper-essential other, but the other arising from inside, from language, that should bring the other into horizon. One provisional name for it could be "God," "the utterly empty Other Side of the world's finitude."<sup>2</sup> And what if the mirror has no tain? What if it is another Derridean mirror, this time a tainless mirror, or a mirror whose tain lets "images" and "persons" through?<sup>3</sup> *Gefühl* is such a mirror.

Then, the *Übergang*, in which *Gefühl* actually takes place, the “queer creature,” the “point zero,” which neither is, nor is not, spatially, and neither comes to be, nor ceases to be, temporally, because being the “common border” of the contrasts, one of which is ceased, while the other not yet begun. Timeless, yet necessary for something to be something in time. Notably, it comes from Plato, like, reinterpreted by Derrida, Timaeus’ featureless “receptacle” (*khora*) beyond physical things upon which the forms imprint their patterns.

### *Schleiermacher and Language*

I have made several scattered references to Schleiermacher’s conviction of the linguisticity of all understanding in the *Dialektik* and the *Glaubenslehre*. They could be elaborated upon if I had space for a discussion of his hermeneutics. Even omitting such a discussion, I would like to make some more allusions concerning Schleiermacher’s contemporaneous understanding of language. In Derridean context, first of all, Schleiermacher’s view that there can be no thinking outside language, that the economy of language blocks the possibility of pure understanding, entails a similar renunciation of the transcendental signified, which is precisely that – meaning outside language. This position is opposed to the classical view that “the linguistic sign is only the external representation of something internal that is also able to perceive itself in an authentic manner without the detour via the signifier. . .”<sup>4</sup> Also, contra Heidegger, and with Derrida, Schleiermacher would not hypostasize the signifier into an objective force, would not claim that language speaks by itself.<sup>5</sup>

Next, quite unusually for those times, Schleiermacher also considers the autonomy of writing. “Writing,” states Schleiermacher, “has its own history. Changes take place in it independently of changes in spoken discourse.”<sup>6</sup> The interpretation of written texts, because of the absence of living voice, is different from that of speech, and



it can never be accomplished. Text contains structures, worked on by the “grammatical” interpretation before any attempts to arrive at individual meanings, which can be combined ever differently. Both Derrida and Schleiermacher would agree that “there is no law that limits, either in content or in quantity, the wealth of relationships that can be established in all directions between the individual elements of the text.”<sup>7</sup> In a word, the seeds of intertextuality are already found in Schleiermacher’s work.

Concerning metaphysics, it is precisely writing that slips away from the individual poles of all contrasts, “marks the difference from which each emerges, but it is a difference that at the same time stamps each one with the mark of incompleteness. Writing (de)generates the series of oppositions, including the one between writing and speech.”<sup>8</sup>

### *The Über of the Übergang in Schleiermacher and Heidegger*

Heidegger, in his letter to Jünger, “Concerning ‘the Line,’” also speaks of the *Übergang* and the point-zero (*Nullpunkt*), which I find fascinating. While in Schleiermacher these words first appeared in the discussion about the extra-metaphysical transition point of philosophy from fantasy to dialectics as the combination of science and art, Heidegger refers to the movement of nihilism on the undecided line between two eras: either ending in negative nothingness, or in the *Übergang* to the realm of the new turning of being.<sup>9</sup> Heidegger’s text focuses on the point-zero, or the line-zero, itself, where the *meta* or *über* of the *Übergang* signifies a nonspace or nonplace similar to Schleiermacher’s point-zero or *Übergang* of the birth of dialectics. That is why the letter’s title contains *über*, meaning both as “concerning” (as letter concerning “the line”) and “beyond” (as beyond “the line,” *Über “Die Linie”*).

I would like to bring up here only one example of an attempt to overcome metaphysics in theology with the help of Derridean deconstruction, which is so surprisingly close to Schleiermacher's position despite the lack of the author's acknowledgement of Schleiermacher's relevance.<sup>10</sup> The attempt I want to mention is O'Leary's book *Questioning Back*.<sup>11</sup> I think that if Schleiermacher were alive today, he would share O'Leary's claim to fight on a double front: against those who imagine they have left metaphysics behind by some hermeneutical shortcut and against those who shut out awareness of the questionability of metaphysics.<sup>12</sup> O'Leary wants to find "a delicate middle way between abolition and restoration" of metaphysics.<sup>13</sup> For one thing, like Schleiermacher, he insists on the strict separation of theological and philosophical quests. He maintains that the former totally differs from the latter and can be retrieved as the phenomenality of faith and revelation. For another thing, again like Schleiermacher, he believes that the language of faith has for so long been shaped by metaphysics that it cannot be simply left behind without conscious and critical struggle with it. Despite their historical intermingling, a careful questioning of both philosophical and theological concerns is required in order to undo the metaphysical amalgamations of philosophy and faith and open a space for a dialogue between the two instead.

On the other hand, in O'Leary's opinion, metaphysics ought to be overcome. It coincides with Schleiermacher's main contention in the *Glaubenslehre*. It is theology that accepts the critique of ontotheology as an element in the quest for an authentic language of faith. Yet, it is left to philosophy to follow through the implications of that critique in view of the question of being.<sup>14</sup> The language of being, of course, no longer serves as the vehicle of a topology of the biblical God. Instead, it shelters the unrecognized subversive force of the biblical images of God. "That force," O'Leary maintains, "is retrieved not by a relapse into biblicism, but by reopening the conflict between biblical and metaphysical

representations in such a way that we are impelled beyond both.”<sup>15</sup> “The true face of God,” he subsequently goes on, “emerges from the mutual deconstruction of the God of Abraham and the God of the philosophers.”<sup>16</sup>

So, for O’Leary, fully keeping in mind the prevalence of metaphysics, there still can be a hope to catch a glimpse outside metaphysics by virtue of conceiving religious and theological texts as confessions of faith which may subvert even their own metaphysical forms. As O’Leary claims, there is from the start a certain conscious or unconscious tension between the language of faith and that of metaphysics. He suggests “that it is by working along the fault lines this tension leaves in the classical Christian texts that we can hope to split the tradition open, allowing its repressed counter-metaphysical potential to emerge.”<sup>17</sup> The protest against metaphysical theology can be carried out in a new way since deconstructive criticism has taught a subtler philosophical grasp of the functioning of metaphysical language. This grasp, in O’Leary’s view, permits a more intimate deconstruction of the tradition, in which faith seeks out its own authentic voice in the texts of the past, overcoming the language of metaphysical reason which threatens to stifle it forever. I end this exposition with a longer quotation that delineates the strategy of overcoming:

A deconstructive view of the history of Christian theology need only take as its theme the constant, ever-varying tension between faith and the metaphysical horizons of thought in which it was forced to find expression, in order to reveal the secret splendor of this history as the history of faith maintaining its identity in exile. If one attends to the thread of faith running through its tapestry one finds that the history of Christian theology witnesses against itself. Tensions and contradictions in the text between the explicit statements and its implicit attitude of faith are what the deconstructionist looks for, *failles* or clefts which allow the apparently monolithic discourse of the classical theologian to be prized open so that two orientations may be differentiated in the text, one tending to construct a metaphysical edifice in which elements of faith lose their original contours under the mighty spell of the Greek Logos, the other representing a biblically inspired resistance to this development. Any Christian theologian who deserves to be called a classic may be expected to show this ancient tension between Athens and

Jerusalem in some form, and to show it textually, allowing wide scope for deconstructionist detective work.<sup>18</sup>

No doubt, Schleiermacher is such a classic Christian theologian.

## NOTES

1. Cf. Philip M. Merklinger, *Philosophy, Theology, and Hegel's Berlin Philosophy of Religion, 1821-1827* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993), 65.
2. Robert Roberts, "The Feeling of Absolute Dependence," *Journal of Religion* 57 (1977), 265. For the account of how from the speechlessness of *Gefühl* emerges the word "God," thus causing the immediate self-consciousness to become the consciousness of God, see Gerhard Ebeling, "Schleiermacher's Doctrine of the Divine Attributes," in *Schleiermacher as Contemporary*, ed. Robert Funk (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 146-47.
3. Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 314.
4. Manfred Frank, *The Subject and the Text: Essays on Literary Theory and Philosophy*, ed. Andrew Bowie, trans. Helene Atkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 12.
5. Cf. *ibid.*, 11.
6. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings*, trans., ed. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 176.
7. Frank, *The Subject and the Text*, 61.
8. Werner Hamacher, "Hermeneutic Ellipses: Writing the Circle in Schleiermacher," in *Premises: Essays on Philosophy and Literature from Kant to Celan*, trans. Peter Fenves (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 68.
9. See Martin Heidegger, *The Question of Being*, trans. Jean T. Wilde and William Kluback (New Haven, Conn.: College and University Press, 1958), 34 (German), 35 (English).
10. More than that, he even mentions Schleiermacher among those overcomers of metaphysics who failed to have an adequate historical and systematic grasp of what metaphysics is. Joseph Stephen O'Leary, *Questioning Back: The Overcoming of Metaphysics in Christian Tradition* (Minneapolis, Chicago, New York: Winston, 1985), 3.
11. Due to the lack of space, I will not go into details, but only sketch O'Leary's general position.
12. O'Leary, 5.
13. *Ibid.*, 32.
14. *Ibid.*, 16.
15. *Ibid.*, 21.
16. *Ibid.*

17. Ibid., 130.

18. Ibid., 131.

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