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EXPANDING BORDERS: COMMUNITIES AND IDENTITIES

ROBEŽU PAPLAŠINĀŠANA: IDENTITĀTES UN KOPIENAS

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Address by *H. E. Dr.* Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, President of Latvia at the International Conference Expanding Borders: Communities and Identities

Riga, University of Latvia
(Transcript)

Mr. Chairman,

Distinguished rector,

Distinguished guests and participants of this conference,

Welcome on behalf of the Republic and its President to this gathering. Great minds have decided to address the questions that seem to me at the moment of particular relevance.

It has been only 18 months since Latvia has joined the European Union and is now functioning as a full partner among the other nine new members and the 15 older ones, who, of course, did not join all at once and the same time. We had so-called mushrooming growth of the Union, starting with the very first core of the Coal and Steel Agreement between France and Germany, long bitter enemies, who had fought out on a battlefield the contentious issues of both their physical borders and the borders of their influence within the continent of Europe. They were joined right from the start by four other countries and this original core has then kept expanding to the current 25 and as far as we can tell there are others waiting at the door to be admitted.

A number of questions that Europe is facing now is how far can this process go, how far can we continue to expand and have we really developed an entity within the Union that is sufficiently homogeneous first of all to know how it can function in an efficient manner and that is also sufficiently homogeneous to give the feeling to each and every one of its inhabitants – no matter under which flag, under which national identity – can it give them all a sense of belonging to this common family of European nations, do they have at all a sense of being European and if so, what does it mean to be European.

And I think, to understand what the questions are all about right now when we are in the process of reflection that has been forced upon us by the resounding “no” that the populations of France and the Netherlands have pronounced to the Constitutional Treaty, this theory of reflection that is now upon us has not only involved the heads of government or state, it has not only involved the bureaucrats in Brussels, but it should involve scholars, scientists, but most of fall, the population at large.

We hear a lot these days about what Europe is about and what model it should follow. And I as President of that new member state get a lot of questions about where Latvia stands in terms of the model of Europe and what it envisages or would like to develop. And the questions are often put in a rather simplistically dichotomous way and they ask whether we are in favour of the social model of Europe or of the so called Liberal economy model.

And just as we, when were asked whether we would rather join the European Union or NATO in the early years, I have to give the same answer, that this is not the choice that we would like to make, no more than a child at divorce is happy at being asked whether they love mummy or daddy better and with whom they would like to live; it is even worse than that – it is rather like being asked whether you would prefer your right or left arm being cut off. Can you live without it? We cannot.

For a country like Latvia, with the history it has, we need the security of NATO and we need the potential of growth that the European Union offers to all of its members. And similarly to this false choice between different models. I sincerely rather think it is a matter of a multiple choice, test, where one can check off either A or B. It is one variant that we must be allowed to choose both and indeed to try and integrate the best aspects of the two models.

We have joined the EU with the idea of doing away with the borders that used to separate countries that fought for territory and that fought for influence. In the case of Latvia we have joined it to do away with remembrance of the sort of thinking that set the tone for the beginning of the Second World War when countries with sufficient military strength would make treaties among themselves and split up the rest of us as we were goods and chattels that belonged to them or toys that children divide among themselves when they are at play. We do not wish to be either toys or goods and chattels in anybody else's hands. Like all human beings the people in Latvia want to be sovereign masters of their fate within their country that is the sovereign master of its fate as a nation.

We have had it now for 15 years. Our sovereignty, our independence and our capacity to grow.

We have now for 18 months been part of the Union where the internal borders between the countries have been brought down, as low as you can bring them in terms of barriers between them.

But the question that you are addressing here at this conference is: has this truly given us what we had hoped, what our ancestors have hoped? Have it given us what those who were out on the streets at the French revolution had hoped, the peasants during the uprisings at Kauguri and elsewhere in the early 19th century? Have you obtained what our people had hoped for when they went here in the Old Riga on the barricades or gathered under flags on the banks of the River Daugava? Are people any happier than they were?

And that is an interesting question, because I think we can measure quite objectively the progress that has been achieved in this country on a wide variety of priorities. We have recovered our independence. We have our flag, our symbols, our institutions. We participate as full members internationally where decisions are taken. Our prosperity in macroeconomic terms has been growing in a spectacular manner. We have at the moment the very best indicators of growth. The question is, have all these objective and macroeconomic indicators, have they filtered down to the life of the everyday citizen? If so, how far? And what is their reception and the perception in the daily life of a person, who gets up in the morning and faces the day and at the end of the day goes to bed and maybe while they are brushing their teeth and looking in a mirror, can they say: Have I had a good day? Am I satisfied with what I am doing in life? And I do not have anything that I would like to be looking forward to tomorrow or the day after?

I am happy to see that sociologists have decided to single out the next year as the year of the study of the quality of life and I am particulary gratified to see that the Strategic Analysis Commission of Latvia has in a sense anticipated this event by addressing the question this year already and by devoting to it a number of serious scholarly and scientific studies. I look forward to seeing the results of these studies being made available to as wide a public as possible, various levels of society here in Latvia, the young and the old, the urbanised and people living in the country. I hope that other countries, both those of so-called Old Europe and those who still are outside the expanded Union but who are attracted by it like a beacon in terms of its achievements in precisely offering its inhabitants what seems to be after all a better quality of life. Have these countries as well looked to it to analyse these aspects and to see how they in turn can go about improving the life of the citizens in their country.

As somebody trained not in sociology but psychology, I would just like to touch upon two of a few basic ideas that psychologists have addressed in this context in advance.

It was an unheard of event in Canada, in the province of Ontario, to found an Institute for Child’s Studies and Dr. Blatz, whom I still had the chance to see as professor in my youth, was its founder, and he developed a most interesting theory about child psychology. And in essence it is very simple.

According to Dr. Blatz a child, growing up, as the first need, has the need for security. In other words, of course, the child needs to be tended, to be kept clean, to be kept fed, to have the opportunity to sleep and… But it needs security and the security comes from attachment to a person who is always there, a person whom they can trust. Usually it is the mother, it can be extended to others in certain cases, but there is a need: the ability for a child to grow depends on the security that is derived from the attachment to a care giver who is always around. At the same time, as the child grows up, they increasingly need the opportunity to explore. They need the opportunity to face challenges; they need the opportunity to affirm themselves, to acquire skills, to acquire competence and the satisfaction that comes from it. And if by an excessive preoccupation with security the mother or the care giver does not allow the child to stand on its own feet, to button its own buttons, to go out and explore, to fall and to get hurt and to climb trees, even though it is dangerous, then that person will not achieve the maximum of their potential.

If you do not have this security to retreat to when you fall or when you are hurt, it is harmful to development. But if you are not allowed to explore, and possibly to get hurt, then that too is not very good for development. And I think that when we talk about this antagonism between the model of free enterprise in Europe and the model of social security, too often we are thinking in Marxist terms, in terms of the struggle between the classes, these very outmoded 19th century divisions and that really, I think, should be by now rather put behind us. Because here again is a dichotomy that in a modern Europe really does not apply.

We do wish to have societies where people have security and the sense of absolute security nets and where basic necessities of life are available to all. And the basic necessities of life, of course, are not what they used to be when the tribes of North America just a little over 150 years ago. They are the modern priorities of the modern age. They need quality of lodgings and services and essential healthcare, care in the old age, access to education and all things that we do consider as the elementary requirements of life, but which, by the way, in so many parts of the world, even today each and every one of them would be considered as excessive luxuries that human beings would not hope to achieve.

So this is the basis from which we start. We set the standard very high as to what is and what must be the basics of a good and acceptable life in a society. But the question then is: what happens at the other end? How far must we climb and what must be done? And by increasing as it were the basket of basic necessities available to each citizen, are we truly improving the quality of their life? Are we adding to their happiness? Are we getting value for our money? Is each additional billion of billions that we are spending on certain social programmes actually paying off in terms of the results in the good it brings to society and even more importantly: are there results to each individual in their heart and in their mind? And many of them probably know the studies done some years ago by a Hungarian scholar now living in North America – and particularly his famous studies about the sense of happiness and what makes people happy. And those of you who are familiar with his work will recall that he had some very surprising results.

Far from finding a direct correlation between the level of income of a person and their satisfaction in life, it was almost a negative correlation in the sense that some of the happiest people that he was able to find were, for instance, goat-tenders in Sicily or farmers in Alpine regions, where by all objective standards, measurements and parameters you would have said that these people are having a terrible life, that they bear terrible burdens and that they have every right to be deeply unhappy. But quite the contrary, these were the very happiest people of all. They were radiant, even though wrinkled, they were happy, even though bent from the labour that they carried out each day and they expressed a deep sense of satisfaction with who they were and what they were doing. And I think that this is a very important lesson to learn. Because what seemed to be the key to their satisfaction is that they were living in an environment where they felt in control, they felt in power in everything that they did, they felt confident in all the skills that they had learned since childhood and every single day of their life, and every step on their way they were able to see the results of their labours and they were able to derive satisfaction from it. And the old woman going every morning to milk her goats by hand in the cold of the Alpine morning in winters, could be sitting there on her little bench and see the milk dropping in the pail and every drop that was running gave her satisfaction.

That is precisely the sense of happiness and satisfaction that we find in the Latvian heritage of the Latvian dainas, this vast body of folk-songs that at various times I have had the occasion to explore and to admire. And there too you see reflected lives of physically very heavy labour, of great dangers surrounding and uncertainties in terms of international political situations, but the direct sense of a feedback of the results of one's own efforts, the ability to build up, say when you weave cloth to see it grow row by row. When you are gathering flax, even as you are engaging in a back-bending gathering, you already visualise the fine linen cloth that would grow the long way up to the base, you will be able to reap. And that is the same sense of satisfaction that I think the modern studies have also revealed.

If around 16% of our population whose desire is to have more time to grow flowers in their life, I think what they are telling you is that they would like to be like the Little Prince. They would like to be able to grow some rose somewhere that is all their own that they can care for, that they maybe temperamental and maybe not be blooming as well like the ones that you see at expositions or in the wonderful colourful pictures in gardeners' catalogues. But what one has a deep need for is a rose that is all their own, temperamental as she may be. Because you need something and someone to love and to care for and to think at least, to think that what you are doing is making a difference in the world to someone somewhere, even if it is a rose somewhere on a far-away planet.

We all need our rose to care for and I think that Europe and every inhabitant of Europe has to be able to find that sense of satisfaction. Because we can increase the funding and we can increase the programmes and we can increase the political support but unless we are able to get people that feeling of empowerment, that feeling of making a difference, at the same time and sense of security that comes from somebody loving them and accepting them, and where there are no barriers to what they are not to do because these barriers should not be there because of refusal, of putting somebody beyond the pay-off.

Ultimately it is extraordinarily simple and at the same time it is extraordinarily difficult to achieve. But unless we understand what is the essence of what people need, it is futile to go about inventing ever new programmes, spending ever more money, because we would be going around in circles and the social models that we intellectually have constructed and that we are so attached to and so proud of, what risks to happen is that they would go up in flames all around us and we see that we are back to square 1 and better rethink what we had been thinking of all along.

Ladies and gentlemen,

You are here gathered, you are thinkers. And I wish you all to continue in your efforts. We need thinkers in our Europe and in our continent. We need thinkers in Latvia to guide us and to participate in that common effort, which after all is a civil society.

Thank you for being here and my best wishes to you all!

1. Globalization and its Effect on Communities and Identities

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Building Fences at Borders or Improving the Quality of Life for the Desperate?

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Introduction

The Berlin Wall has fallen and the Iron Curtain is down but new walls are being built and new fences are going up. In many places borders are being fortified. The United States is building barriers on its southern boundary to keep out those who want to enter illegally through Mexico, Israel is building an ugly wall to keep out Palestinians, and the states of the European Union are clashing with illegal migrants in several places along its extended frontier. In many other places the surveillance at borders is being increased. People from poor parts of the world who want to improve their lives often risk everything to enter the European Union, the United States and a few other places. Most of those who enter want only to enjoy the luxuries of freedom, economic opportunity and increased personal safety. A very small minority wants to do harm. On the other hand even terrorists, though their methods are deplorable, have a point if they are protesting the gross inequalities that exist around the globe.

The fences, the cameras, the walls and the guards will likely not be adequate. Desperate people in large numbers will penetrate the barriers and enter our countries. The pressures at borders seem to be on the increase. We can increase the surveillance and the armed guards but do we want war on our frontiers? There must be a better way!

Nobody wants to deny a good life to the poor and the desperate however it is probably much better to help improve their lives in their home countries rather than have an international Voelkerwanderung. The world does not need nor want a mass migration of people moving from the developing to the developed world. For this paper I am assuming that such a mass migration of people would probably not be in the best interests of either the rich countries or the poor ones. It is an assumption that I do not wish to discuss in this paper. My subject focuses on what can be done for the desperate in their home countries so that they do not make an attempt to migrate.

Programs for Development that Failed

There have been grand development programs designed in earlier years that have promised utopia and they have failed. There have been many that failed but let me mention two major ones from relatively recent times.

One of the great benefits to the world sixty years ago was the final and complete collapse of Fascism/Nazism. Imagine if there were still some countries trying to develop their economies and societies along a Fascist/Nazi model. Who would now be swallowed up by the holocaust? Who else would be considered Untermenschen in 2005? Which country would now have to fear being invaded by foreign armies? Thankfully nobody has to fear the Nazis any more. It has been a long time since Nazism was considered a development program. That particular scourge to humanity has been destroyed in the Second World War though its horrors have not yet been forgotten.

Allow me start again but a little differently. One of the great benefits to the world in recent years is the final and complete collapse of Soviet communism. At last developing countries are no longer adopting the disastrous Soviet model to try to solve their problems. For nearly one hundred years millions of people believed some version of Marxism/Communism to be the answer to development in poor societies. Now nearly everyone believes that it was a dead end street. I do not mean to offend anyone who might still have confidence in it but I am told that the real centers of Marxist thought today are not Riga, St. Petersburg or even Moscow but rather Havana, Pyongyang and some liberal universities in the West.

Let me hasten to add however that there were good reasons for placing faith in Marxism in the early years of the Soviet experiment. We know for example that the Soviet Union industrialized extremely rapidly in the 1930s. It was catching up to the West at an alarming rate (at least it was alarming from the western perspective). Credibility in the Soviet system was much enhanced when it defeated Fascism on the eastern front in the Second World War. We know that the Soviet Union sacrificed dearly to win that war. The word “Stalingrad” has become one-word shorthand for the Soviet defeat of Nazism. And when it comes to the space race even children know that the Soviets were in space before the Americans. But in the end the system collapsed. And unfortunately the collapse caused much additional suffering in this part of the world. Millions lost good jobs, the savings and pensions of additional millions became nearly worthless. It is a humiliation to see one’s own system collapse regardless of one’s feelings towards it. The myth of the Soviet model leading the world to utopia has been exploded and it exploded right under our feet. We are of course in Riga, Latvia one of the great cities of the former Soviet empire.

The germ of destruction seems to lie at the core of the Marxist/Communist system. Some form of Marxism/Communism has been tried in a variety of climatic conditions: from the tropics of Ethiopia and Nicaragua to the Siberian taiga. It has been tried in several cultures: from the primitive African to the advanced European. It has been tried in several religious traditions: Buddhist, Confucian, Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Protestant. It has not been successful anywhere. Yes, it is still surviving in Cuba, Laos, North Korea and a few other places. The Marxism of China and Vietnam is, however, no longer the real thing for their economies have already adopted many market features. According to Robert Gilpin "Marxism as a doctrine of how to manage an economy has been thoroughly discredited. Marxism survives as an analytic tool and a critique of capitalism."[1]

The developing world has benefited from the collapse of the Soviet system in a huge way because it is now known in all parts of the world that another application of Marxism will fail again. The people of China were among the first to see that their version of Marxism was a disaster. China's rapid economic growth in recent years is directly related to this understanding. They realized already in the 1970s which is the height of the Brezhnev era that the communist system would not work without serious revisions. The Chinese people dissolved their communes in 1978. (The Chinese communes are the approximate equivalent of the collective farm system in the Soviet Union.) The people did it on their own with local authority and often without any authority at all. They had seen how unworkable the communes were in the Great Leap Forward program. Instead of success it had produced a famine in which according to scholarly estimates between 16.5 and 30 million people died in 1958–1963.[2] After Mao's death in 1976 there was a power vacuum in Beijing so the people reorganized their communes into household plots with remarkable efficiency and fairness. When Deng Xiaoping was firmly in power he introduced other market reforms gradually and incrementally to great effect. Today China is an economic power house. It is still based on a dictatorial government but its economy is largely based on the market.

India never introduced Marxism as thoroughly as China and it was also slower to realize the futility of pursuing the Soviet model. The Government of India introduced market reforms only in the spring of 1991. Today however India's economy too is growing at a rapid pace. Other countries around the globe have also abandoned the ineffective Soviet model because their leaders know that it is a huge waste of resources and it will ultimately fail.

We look back today at the twentieth century and lament the great tragedies. We think first of the world wars and possibly the Great Depression. Actually as horrible as the wars were they are only a small part of it. According to calculations done by

R. J. Rummel of the University of Hawaii about 38.5 million people died in war, that is, in combat from 1900 to 1987.[3] That includes both world wars, Korea, Vietnam all the guerrilla fighting etc. Then he calculated the number of people killed by their own governments, specifically the number killed by communist and fascist governments forcing their respective development programs upon the people. When adding the number of people killed by the seven regimes that killed the greatest number the total is over 135 million people. Most of those died in the concentration camps of the Soviet Union, the Peoples' Republic of China and Nazi Germany. More than three times the number of people killed by their own governments in promoting their own form of development than died in combat in all the wars of the twentieth century! That puts a new perspective on the twentieth century! It puts a new perspective on development programs too!

Twentieth Century Democide [4]

Including genocide, politicide, and mass murder; excluding war-dead [a]

Regimes	Years	(000) [b]
USSR	1917–87	61.911
Communist China (PRC)	1949–87	35.236
Nazi Germany	1933–45	20.946
Nationalist China (KMT)	1928–49	10.075
Imperial Japan	1936–45	5.964
China (Mao & Soviets) [c]	1923–49	3.466
Cambodia (Khmer Rouge)	1975–79	2.035

[a] R.J. Rummel, *Death by Government*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004, p. 4.

[b] These are the most probable mid-estimates in low to high ranges.

[c] Guerrilla period.

There are other failed development programs but I will not expand on those here. There is a good book by William Easterly called the *Elusive Quest for Growth* which discusses them well. [5]

It is not easy to devise an effective development program for the poor parts of the earth. Above all else let's not design another one that requires the deaths of millions of people to implement it. Moreover it is now known that something very significant can be done at the local level that can make a huge difference to the quality of life to millions, maybe billions. It will not cost lives to introduce it. It will not bring immediate wealth to the poor and there are conditions that must be met before it can work at all. It cannot work, for example, if there is war or other significant civil unrest. And it works best in societies where women still hold the traditional gender roles of looking after home and family. The idea is universal education – specifically it is a scientific education of everybody with a special emphasis on educating the world's female population. The objective is to bring modernity through the schools to societies in which there is still much outdated superstition and much outmoded tradition.

A Benign Development Program: Helping without Hurting

The program that I want to propose to you is universal education. Let me hasten to add that education is not going to make the developing world rich. It has been demonstrated many times by William Easterly (mentioned above) and others that education alone will not lift countries out of poverty. On the other hand it will improve the quality of life of the desperately poor and it will form the basis of further change produced by the people themselves. Those changes can eventually lead to increased wealth. Jeffrey Sachs suggests that the first step toward prosperity is the "sweatshop."[6] My suggestion is that education of the poor is even one step before the sweatshop although some of these steps will blend together into one complicated process.

The objective that I expect to achieve through education is not primarily wealth but modernity. Wealth will come later but initially the poor will have a better quality of life in their poverty. Modernity is the application of science to human problems. In other words let's get modern, let's do things scientifically. Let's challenge the superstitions, the old wives' tales, the old habits and let's apply a little science. I submit to you that the simple scientific principles learned in public school will significantly improve life when used in the households of the poor, indeed to any household. It may seem counterintuitive but it appears that the education of women who manage their homes and their children is even more effective than the education of males.

- A woman in a household with a little knowledge of nutrition will use available foods to better advantage.
- A mother who understands the germ theory of disease will have less infection and sickness in her home.
- She will be better able to treat minor illnesses and injuries and better able also to decide when outside help is required.
- Girls who go to school generally have their first child later in life than those who do not.
- Educated women have fewer children in the course of their childbearing years.
- Education enhances women's self confidence making them more able to negotiate with the men in their lives for a better deal for themselves and their children.
- Educated household managers more often get together, and because they are more articulate, they are more effective in putting pressure on local authorities for:
  - a better water supply,
  - better garbage disposal,
  - better drainage of rain water and grey water,
  - better management of scarce communal resources like firewood.

People with an education are generally healthier, happier and more fulfilled which are some of the criteria of a better quality of life. I could go on to develop this idea further but I know that readers can imagine additional ways to use a little science to improve the quality of life in a variety of cultural and climatic conditions.

None of the things I have mentioned has of course made the household richer. In agricultural villages the females often also do most of the field work. Sometimes educated women can get paying jobs in the village rather than do field work. The men of course could do the field work and sometimes they do. The men could go out and get a paying job and bring the money home and often they do. Some fathers are very responsible and some are not. Some come home with HIV/AIDS rather than money earned at work. It is not to be assumed that all households are nuclear families. Many of the men in a household are not fathers of the family but transients of one kind or another and that complicates the household a great deal. Often the mother of small children is the most responsible person in the household and if she has an education she can make a significant difference to the quality of life. An educated mother is usually the strongest defender of the right of the next generation to get an education. From this perspective it is significant for the benefit to the whole society that the females are educated equally well. The practical benefits of girls going to school are very great yet in most societies females have fewer educational opportunities than males.

Illiteracy Around the Globe

Communist governments have been most exemplary with regard to educating the people in their countries. Most present and former communist countries have very high literacy rates. There is one major exception. As part of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Mao closed most of the schools of China in 1966 and many of them remained closed until his death in 1976. Moreover many of the best teachers were "sent down" to do manual labor while ideologically reliable peasants were brought in to teach at the universities.

According to the World Bank's statistics of 2001 cited below by Janet Momsen the worst illiteracy rates are in Sub-Saharan Africa and in South Asia. Sri Lanka's statistics are better than the rest of South Asia but India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and Afghanistan have the worst statistics of any large group of countries. The statistics show that 58% of female adults in South Asia are illiterate. Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa are not much better with illiteracy rates of 47% among female adults. It is not difficult to imagine that in these large geographic areas many household practices are based on superstition and tradition that are contrary to modern scientific knowledge.

Regional Patterns of Gender Differences in Education Rates, 1999 [7]

World Region	**Female adult illiteracy rate (%)**	**Male adult illiteracy rate (%)**
Latin America & Caribbean	13	11
Middle East and North Africa	47	25
South Asia	58	34
Sub-Saharan Africa	47	31
East Asia & Pacific	22	8
Europe & Central Asia	5	2

Obstacles to an Education in the Developing World

There are many reasons why education is not progressing well especially for girls in the developing world and they are mostly well known. There are issues like families not having enough money to dress their children for school, not having money for school supplies, in some jurisdictions there are tuition fees as well. The bigger problems are that in many places there are no schools at all or no teachers. Sometimes schools are too far from where students live. For female students there are additional problems. Some families and societies feel that it is more important for boys to go to school. Safety issues are more acute too. Girls will not go to school if there is serious danger that they will be molested on the way to and from school. That danger increases with distance. It increases if there are no female teachers at their school because girls often fear the male teachers as much as they fear the men along the road. Their security is diminished too if there is no separate latrine for girls. Studies show that a large proportion of girls stop attending school when they enter puberty.

One of the big problems relates to rewards that governments, philanthropists and Non-Governmental Organizations get for their donations to education. They are pleased to have their names associated with a river dam, or a big bridge, or a railroad line or an office tower in the city. Large structures serve as monuments to the donors. People like credit for their financial contributions. On the other hand it seems a little ridiculous to attach a bronze plaque to a school building that is nothing more than walls of concrete block and a metal roof with holes in the walls for windows and doors. The bronze plaque might cost as much as the whole building. And certainly no one would want a ceremony for building women's latrines even though they are essential. It also costs a lot of money to operate the schools year after year but there is little glamour in keeping an old school functioning. All this means that there are few incentives to invest millions in building simple schools and hire partly educated teachers.

Conclusion

Schools bring science to the community and a little science can significantly improve the quality of life of the people. If we hire teachers, and build schools in the developing world we probably won't have to build fences on the borders of the European Union to manage the migration of the desperate.

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Footnotes

[1]Robert Gilpin, *Global Political Economy, Understanding the International Economic Order*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) p. 13.

[2] Shaun Breslin, *Mao*, (London: Longman, 1998) p. 92.

[3] R. J. Rummel, *Death by Government*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004) p. 3.

[4] R. J. Rummel, *Death by Government*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004) p. 4.

[5] William Easterly, *Elusive Quest for Growth, Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).

[6] Jeffrey Sachs, *End of Poverty*, (New York: Penguin, 2005) p. 11.

[7] Janet H. Momsen, *Gender and Development*, (London: Routledge, 2004) p. 17.

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Location as Symbolic Capital in Agglomeration

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Geography in relation to the world economy is on an extensive research focus nowadays. The World Bank is currently studying this issue under the program "Globalization: Geography and Trade". Their main research question is **"**Why is economic activity concentrated in some places but not in others?"[1] Their research team initially proposed two presumptive reasons why location might be a geographical disadvantage:

1. Physical geography – topography, poor climate, propensity for disease.
2. Economic geography – the distance from established economic centres providing source for supply and market for output.

Valuing the two approaches proposed by World Bank research team, i.e. physical and economic geographies, we would like to propose adding also the cultural perspective to the issue in order to explore agglomeration and possibly gain an additional insight into the problem, as well as to show how the culture studies can supplement research agenda of the economic geography. It is common that economic activities are primarily concentrated in cities rather than in rural areas, therefore the primary focus of our research is the city.

The cultural perspective is going to be based on notion of symbolic capital, which we define as hierarchic position within information and attention realms, compressed by relationship of signs in discursive realm. The main research question: does the location in terms of symbolic capital have an effect on agglomeration.

Our intention to link symbolic capital with cities is connected to Short's observation that the cities compete to hold Olympic Games in order to grasp attention and represent themselves as world cities[2].

Information and attention are treated as resources similar to funds, labour, technology or knowledge in contemporary business and society due to their nature of scarceness. Thomas Davenport and John Beck have contributed the notion of "attention" to economic studies in their book *The Attention Economy*, Michael Goldhaber tags on their study and has published article *The Attention Economy* *and the Net*. They mainly focus on attention as source and direction of interaction among corporations and consumers. In contradistinction, we argue that attention constrains and reproduces information domain we live in and therefore recreates the collective semantic memory and shapes the information flow.

Theoretical Frame: Symbolic Capital and Agglomeration

Our perspective on agglomeration has risen from semiotics perspective on language, symbolic models to cognition proposed by cognitive psychology, discourse theory and communication science perspective on information diffusion. From these standpoints we derive the concept of symbolic capital and link it with transaction approach to business and economy.

Our theoretical frame on culture is based on F. Saussure notion that human beings cognise the world through the system of signs or language, where the sign is a signification between the signifier (the form which the sign takes) and the signified (the concept it represents)[3]. Y. Lotman, the representative of the Moscow-Tartu school of semiotics, developed this notion and defines culture as collective memory, which organizes information flow through hierarchical systems of signs, where they are built upon the principle of the negative relations. Therefore value of signs depends on their relation to other signs within systems of signs[4].

Due to human existence limited in time and space, human beings cognise the geographically large-scale spaces through myths or maps. In our research we focus on the concept of the map rather than on the myths due to the widespread and institutionalised use of various maps in education and geographical information systems. Therefore we derive our analysis from the map perspective to agglomeration around the world. Due to limitations in human existence signifiers can be attributed to the locations in maps. Therefore by a city we would understand the point in the geographical map, which has distinction signifier in a form of text or verbal expression.

There are four semiotic systems, which interact and form the cultural realm: center, periphery, non-culture, and outside-of-culture. Outside-of-culture is a substance that is not incorporated in language, but still exists. Center and periphery form culture by legitimating their existence in negative relationship with non-culture, therefore signs of non-culture appear in culture in the form of anomalies in order to maintain stability of culture as well as its superiority over non-culture. Center as the semiotic system is the main object of attention and description within the culture. Additionally, the sign system is tied to more intense rules than in periphery, but the position of center implies the appearance within text as a compulsory act of speech. Center and periphery relations are negative in the way that they compete with each other, thus making changes within culture, and forming its dynamic nature. The difference in organization of the sign system of center and periphery is less obvious than the difference between culture and non-culture[5].

As cognition is not an individual representation process, but rather emerges through physical, social, cultural, historical and institutional contexts, it always goes through communication in form of semiotic mediation[6]. This means that culture as the systems of signs reproduces itself through discourse or a set of hierarchal and structural rules to an act of speech. Centre, even if it is temporary, is a necessary condition for cognition process, because it restricts unlimited possibilities of sign combinations, by anchoring other sign systems to it, thus providing meaningful cognition and building grounds for communication. But discourse can shape change also through inclusion and exclusion of new signs and subjects within communication thus manifesting a dynamic change of culture and taking centre position.

As two or more signs in communication can stand in relation not following encyclopaedic order and hierarchy, then the network of signs with one signifier in centre of it can be denoted as a symbol. It provides symbolic value as it is located in the very centre of the system of signs or culture. As communication is medium for cognition, the cognition thus is realized through discursive realm (with this we understand a network of signifiers used and reproduced through use of the language or speech). Therefore, the value of symbols arises due to its origin in the centre that is reproduced or challenged through speech.

Human beings are taught to locate a point in the map by navigating through encyclopaedic categories such as continent, region, or state. Their navigation is always centre oriented in the way that centre is a referential point in any location activity. Thus our competence of the world is constructed through the discourse.

The discourse is mainly produced through information flow activated by education, a state, international organization and mass media. The network of mass media can be treated as the most significant vehicle for reproduction of discourse as it links all the other networks where discourse is produced. According to Paul Lazarfeld's Two-step Flow theory, media content is profoundly reproduced in the non-media communication within and across social groups[7]. Within our frame, it can be interpreted as attention producing diffusion of information. Through sign system relationship, signifiers gain their importance by compressing the value of information, which we recognize as signifiers, and their factorial combination measured in bits. By this we mean that the value of information is derived from the cultural realm and only because of that the bits of information become meaningful.

In psychology attention is defined as the act or state of applying the mind to an object of sense or thought[8]. As sense or thought in the cognitive psychology is denoted as category which in semiotic terms is called "signifier", then attention can be redefined as application of mind to the signs or to the network of signs. Rehearsal facilitates getting the signs from the short-term memory to the long-term memory[9]. The more frequently you encounter sign, the easier it is to access memory, since then it is located closer to the node and it can develop in its own node. At this point we can deduct that discourse creates memory and due to that culture realm can exist in collective semantic memory, which is center oriented. Because of this our collective behavior may happen and signifiers within the center of the cultural realm are located as nodes within long-term memory, thus forming density of other signifiers linked to them.

Nodes denote more competence for decoding a text and meaning of it is relational to centre and contains large network of signifiers linked to them. Therefore, combining the ideas of semiotics and the cognitive psychology, we would like to argue that attention constrains and reproduces information domain we live in and therefore recreates the collective semantic memory and shapes the information flow. It is due to the fact that the discursive or communication act primarily should be considered as an act of attention because it is a precondition for any communication. As communication reproduces discursive realm and attention is a scarce resource, some signs and their networks are used and reproduced through communication more than the others. Therefore, attention produces sign inequality within discursive realm and thus different presence, sign allocation and links among other signs in the long-term memory.

This cultural perspective suggests that the cognition forms informational asymmetry in both ways – by quantity of information, which relates to the city, and by its quality, which relates to its meaningfulness within the communication act. Both aspects arise through the functioning nature of the sign system. Beyond that, people tend to increase its superiority or dominance in communication by establishing any kind of communicational links with the signifiers from the center.

As the information is linked to our activities, it shapes the agglomeration as well. According to Stuart Planter, the amount and meaningfulness of information reduces risk in transaction that would otherwise be too uncertain or expensive[10]. As the transactions produce economic welfare, we claim that attention configures the information realm and thus creates welfare. Therefore companies tend to choose cities for their headquarters in the center, because it represents nodes within the collective memory where the information is processed, attention is recreated, and it is easier to gain an access to the attention realm (which is a scarce resource). Beyond that, relation with center forms additional reputation as the city signifiers increase the symbolic value of the company. But at the same time, the agglomeration can change the relationship between center and periphery, therefore changing the objects of attention. In this way, agglomeration has multiple relationships with the symbolic capital, but as the discourse is historically centered it may possess higher-level inertia than agglomeration.

We argue that attention within the discursive realm produces inequality within the symbolic value of signifiers and the information realm linked to the signs of the cities. Attention inequality produces the allocation of economical activities among particular points in maps and it may be explained by transaction approach to the economy as well as by access to attention and long-term collective memory.

Methodology: Ranking Symbolic Capital

In order to explore the research question: to what extent the location in terms of symbolic capital has a significant impact on the agglomeration of companies at the city level, we compare the data on agglomeration with the city signifiers' representation within the texts, and explore the semiotic study of hierarchic and structural relationships among them and other systems of signs. By hierarchic relationship we understand the difference in rank position within a list of city signifiers, by structural relationship – dissimilar appearance with other sign systems.

The text is our basic research element, as according to Lotman, text is an essential element of cultures because it represents and activates culture or collective semantic memory[11], but since texts compress different signs, studying them discovers relationship among diverse sign systems that form the discourse.

In order to develop a convenient methodology for our research, we follow three steps: create the data sets, conceptualise the research objects, and define how relationship among them are going to be explored.

Data Sets

For the purposes of the research we have created six data sets:

1. A list of the cities where the headquarters of the world's largest 2000 companies are located (according to Forbes 2000 list).
2. A sample of articles from the weekly magazines *Business Week* and *The Economist* during 2004.
3. A list of the agglomeration and non-agglomeration cities.
4. A data set on the web page count where the city signifiers are mentioned.
5. A data set on the quantity of books and publications relating to particular cities at The British Library catalogue.

The content analysis is the basic tool for data gathering whereas the content analysis software *PolyAnalyst 4.6* and *Nvivo* has been used for analyzing the data collection from the articles and histories of companies.

We have collected data on agglomeration from data base of Forbes 2000 list in the Internet by matching the companies with their headquarter locations. The collected agglomeration data should give us completely new insights about the agglomeration both due to its comprehensiveness and actuality of the data - this list of top performing 2000 companies during year 2004 has been created for the first time and it is the first Forbes attempt in creating the list of 2000 companies instead of 500 as it has been before. We believe that the small and medium size companies treat the world's largest companies as prototypes, therefore our data on agglomeration can show universal picture on the agglomeration around the world. Our method of revealing the agglomeration data is similar to the one P. J. Taylor has used in developing the density of the company headquarter locations within the city as a representation of the agglomeration[12].

We have chosen European editions of weekly magazines *The Economist* and *Business Week* in order to create a data set of texts because we want to bring in more local context in our research and investigate cognitive maps of the world from the point of view of the Europeans. The sample consists of 1927 articles: The Economist (990) and Business Week (937). The sample is randomly collected of 4 issues (or 5 in some instances) published every month. With the monthly selection of issues we avoid impact of business cycles and also seasonality patterns. We gathered the sample data via online archives of the magazines on the Internet.

Also the list of 163 cities was developed for various analyses throughout the research. The list has been composed from three sources: our list of 674 cities in agglomeration from Forbes 2000; 100 world largest cities by population from World Atlas website; 64 from pre-research within the data set of articles. Further 82 cities with five or more headquarters were selected, thus comprising the data set of agglomerations cities, and the list of 81 non-agglomeration cities was derived by extracting cities in agglomeration from the whole list. For creating lists concerning the information diffusion for 163 cities we used search engine Google to detect the amount of web pages the city signifiers are mentioned in. We limited our research to signifiers in English, since it is perceived as the international business language and also the gathered data are in English.

In order to collect the data concerning historical attention for 88 cities we browse The British Library integrated search catalogue entering "city signifiers" in subject field of the search engine.

Conceptualisation

We denote a number of headquarters of the world's 2000 largest companies in a particular city as agglomeration. Absence of headquarters in a city means no agglomeration.

With symbolic capital we understand the hierarchy of attention, information diffusion, and long-term memory, which produces discourse. Therefore we derive it from the concepts of attention, information diffusion, long-term memory and discourse presented below.

Attention is categorized as present attention and historically accumulated attention. With present attention we understand the count of articles in Business Week and The Economist, where any city signifier is mentioned, by historically accumulated attention – the number of publications and books found in the integrated search catalogue of The British Library.

Information diffusion we conceptualise as the amount of websites where there is a reference to a city signifier due to open and unstructured nature of Internet for creating the web pages and communicating the information.

By discourse we understand a hierarchic and structural relationship within culture. We conceptualize culture of world economy as a system that consists of centre, periphery, and non-culture. Hierarchal relationship is positions that are taken by centre, periphery, and non-culture within the ranks of agglomeration and present attention. Therefore centre is conceptualised as cities which take top positions within the agglomeration rank and the attention rank, periphery – middle positions within the attention and agglomerations rank, non-culture are not present in agglomeration lists and take a low position in the attention rank. Structural relationships are categorized as follows:

1. Centre, periphery, and non-cultural relationships in article appearance.
2. Centre, periphery, and non-cultural relationships with other semiotic systems.
3. Centre, periphery, and non-cultural relationships among institutions or persons, who qualify cities within articles.
4. Centre, periphery, and non-cultural relationships with the companies for appearance in their histories.

Divergence of appearance within the structural relationship is measured according to differences in percentage or rank positions relating to third variable – other semiotic systems, qualifiers, histories, or industries.

Relationship Design

In order to set the framework for analysing and answering the research question we have established four significant stages of our research.

We explore agglomeration by ranking the number of headquarters per city. The ranking denotes differences in agglomeration.

List of present attention and information diffusion was arranged and contrasted with the list of agglomeration. The linkages among agglomeration and present attention as well as information diffusion was tested using statistical software SPSS 12.0 in order to find out the Pearson correlation coefficients and its significance level. Thereby we try to explore the linkages of agglomeration and the attributes of symbolic capital.

After that we use lists of agglomeration and attention for selecting sample of centre, periphery, and non-culture. We select them basing on rank differences – the smaller is the difference the better it fits our sample as it suggests discrepancies among the lists.

In order to explore further the relationship among centre, periphery, and non-culture with historic attention, we analyse the ranking of historic attention by calculating average number of each sample and investigating changes within rank positions. The goal of this study is to discover hierarchical relationship of discourse in long-term periods in order to test its historical orientation.

In order to explore discriminative discursive rules for appearance that produce the symbolic capital, we plot centre, periphery, and non-culture among themselves in order to find out how cities relate to each other within the attention realm and how they differ in relation to different degrees of agglomeration. Beyond that we investigate how centre, periphery and non-culture differ in structural relationship within other semiotic systems. It shows how they are positioned in a broader spectrum of culture.

We develop categories for other semiotic systems with the help of content analysis of 100 articles from Business Week and The Economist by coding as well as using PolyAnalyst link analysis option for text studies. During this research stage we investigate institutions and persons who force the city signifier to emerge within the attention realm. It was done using Nvivo software. The analysis of these discursive rules is mainly based on rank difference.

Results: Cities and Symbolic Capital

Further we present findings in four parts according to the stages of methodology of our research.

Cities and Headquarters

The data on agglomeration show that there are 82 cities out of 674 where there are more than four headquarters located, and only 32 cities – with more than 9 headquarters. Data show that Tokyo is at the top of the agglomeration and it hosts 170 headquarters, which is almost three times more than London (77 headquarters) and New York (55 headquarters). In Paris there are 46 headquarters, Osaka – 38, Seoul – 36, Honk Kong – 26 headquarters, Houston – 22, Taipei – 22, and Madrid – 21.

More than 25 % of the 2000 largest companies in the world locate their main offices in these ten cities, and more than 56% of companies are located in 82 cities. If we compare our list with P.J. Taylor list created in 2001 based on the advertisements in The Economist, we deduce that our list contains all cities from that list; however 42 of our top 82 were not present in Taylor's list. Among the top 9 cities there are more than 10 headquarters – Houston (22), Atlanta (15), Calgary (13), Dallas (12), Hamilton (12), San Jose (12), Athens (11), Birmingham (11), and Cincinnati (11).

From these data we can anticipate that we have come up with more comprehensive list that P. J. Taylor has, as well as that in our list Asian cities dominate the top ten positions. One explanation for this can be that Asian cities gain their superiority in lower positions of rank, i.e. from 100 world largest companies 15 are located in New York, 7 in Tokyo, and 6 in London, but from 500 largest companies – 40 in Tokyo, 26 in New York, and 23 in London. It thus denotes that the density of agglomeration decreases for lower positions of rank, so it is obvious that most of the largest companies tend to locate their headquarters in the few biggest cities.

Agglomeration and Symbolic Capital

Data show that attention and information diffusion is four times higher for cities where the agglomeration persists – 85% of present attention for cities in agglomeration versus 15% for cities in non-agglomeration list. Similarly, information diffusion manifests the same result – 81% of cities in agglomeration and 19% cities in non agglomeration.

Table 1

Attention and information diffusion

	Cities in agglomeration	Cities in non-agglomeration
Attention	85%	15%
Information diffusion	81%	19%

In order to investigate relationship among agglomeration, information diffusion, and present attention, we perform Pearson correlation test. The result shows that all correlations are significant at 0.01 levels. It thus proves that there are linkages among information diffusion, present attention, and agglomeration. But the data also show that attention has more profound correlation with agglomeration than information diffusion with agglomeration.

In order to develop our argumentation, we divide the cities according to centre -periphery notion by ranking the cities both by top 47 ranks of agglomeration and attention. If we find no or insignificant difference in the ranks, we group them as cities in centre, or, to put it in other words, in the core of activities. Similarly, the remaining cities are grouped into periphery, non-culture. Rank difference shows that smaller differences in ranks are for non-culture cities where their ranks difference varies from 0 to 10, but for centre cities the variation is 0–16, for periphery – 0–28. Majority of cities in out-of-culture group are located in the non-agglomeration list, therefore they score equally worse in both lists.

At this point we can conclude that the centre and non-culture cities are more coherent in their characteristics than the periphery cities. The explanation can be that centre and non-culture is a main pair of opposition for maintaining centre position and sustaining the culture itself, and that there are cities that are not mentioned in the articles at all.

Table 2

The sample of cities sign system groups of world economy

Centre	Periphery	Non-Culture
Paris	Palo Alto	Andhra Pradesh
Zurich	Stuttgart	Hangzhou
Bangkok	Helsinki	Hyderabad
London	Cleveland	Rafah
Mexico	Johannesburg	Puebla
Minneapolis	Vienna	Pune
New York	Indianapolis	Qingdao
St Louis	Richmond	Salvador
Atlanta	St Paul	Karachi
Hong Kong	Denver	Panama
Milan	Columbus	Alger
Dallas	Hartford	Calcutta
Kyoto	Tel Aviv	Dhaka
Singapore	Phoenix	Hanoi
Chicago	Irvine	Kampala
Tokyo	San Antonio	Kinshasa
Seattle	Roma	Mombasa
Beijing	Milwaukee	Monrovia
Philadelphia	Rio de Janeiro	Novgorod
Munich	Kansas City	Riga
Delhi	Copenhagen	Wuhan

Data collected for the long-term attention (historically accumulated attention) illustrates that hierarchical position of centre, periphery, non-culture, – centre counts 85 % of all long-term attention, periphery – 8%, non-culture – 7%. Position ranks show that the hierarchy remains, but it is not as profound as suggested by percentage counts. It means that the attention realm changes over time, but still it maintains hierarchal order of sign systems. It thus implies that historic inertia of discourse exists. Data also suggest that centre and not mentioned cities are more fixed within a given time frame than periphery and non-culture, because still the majority (more than half of the cities from the sample) remain their rankings. Tokyo in the total ranking of present attention takes the 8th position, while within the other list only the 21st, and it performs far behind Delhi (18th position in present attention list) and Singapore (17th position attention list). This part of the research proves that agglomeration is linked to all attributes of the symbolic capital that we derived in the theoretical part. It means that there are relationship between agglomeration and symbolic capital, but in order to further investigate what form the attention takes we analyse structural relationship among sign systems.

Symbolic Capital and Discourse

Data on centre, periphery, and non-culture show that there is a big discrepancy among sign systems, since centre appears in texts without any relations to periphery and non-culture in 84.13% of articles, periphery – only 35.15%, and non-culture – 29, 82%. Periphery and centre simultaneously appear in texts in 60.44% of articles, but non-culture and centre – 56, 14%

Table 3

Structural relationship of attention for centre, periphery, and non-culture

	Centre	Periphery	Non-Culture
Centre	84.13%	12.29%	3.58%
Periphery	60.44%	35.16%	4.40%
Non-Culture	56.14%	14.04%	29.82%

It suggests that centre as a sign system holds the central position in the attention realm of appearance of other sign systems mainly through relational character to it. This evidence is supported by the fact that periphery appears only in 4.4% cases when put in context with non-culture. It suggests again that centre and periphery are the main relational axis for legitimating the culture itself, as well as there is a rule of the speech saying that appearance within text is mostly possible through comparison with centre. Noticeably agglomeration itself is not a precondition for sustainable attention because agglomeration happens in both centre and periphery samples, but attention is rather relational to centre. This nature excludes the economic argumentation because evidently agglomeration itself is not sufficient for city to appear in the texts and degree of agglomeration is not important for qualifying the centre. Therefore we may reinforce our argument that cultural mechanism prevails within the attention realm.

Data on other semiotic systems show that from top 20 categories all “time” categories are present: “nowadays”, “time”, “future” and “history” are present, as well as three “space” categories: “country”, “world”, and “market”. Only 6 categories are strongly linked with “business”. “Business” as a field of activities gets the top position within the rank, while “family” as an institution scores higher than business institution. This suggests that business semiotics signs alone are not sufficient for qualifying within texts, and that there are other non-business semiotic systems that push appearance of cities in texts.

Data on center and periphery comparison in relation to other non-city semiotic systems show that the center is positioned in relationship with technology and market in more superior level than periphery (rank discrepancies among center and periphery in these categories exceed 9 rank position in favour of the center). If reversed, periphery has relationship with state (19 rank positions superiority over center), house (12) and idea (11). Center is more connected to the notion of the world (8 rank positions) and periphery to region (6 rank positions). From the data we can also derive that knowledge (technology) creation may be the main attribute to the center. Furthermore center occupies more significant position in relation to the notion “world” and periphery is more related to “region” and “state institutions”.

We can explain as “knowledge” (technology) can be located in the same axis as “idea”, and “region”, so this may suggest that center occupies the position in relation to more profound semiotic systems as knowledge and world. Due to that it gains its symbolic power and maintains its position in the center.

Data on center and non-culture comparison shows that there are more discrepancies between these semiotic systems than in center and periphery case. Data illustrate amount of categories where rank positions exceed 9. Center is more related to “fund” – 33 rank positions, “money” (31), “market” (20), “reduction” (16), “technology” (13), “investment” (12), and “time” (11). Non-culture is largely related to the following categories: “cultural institutions” (46), “political institutions” (31), “war” (24), “culture” (19), “economy” (16), “pressure” (15), “politics” (10) and “region” (10).

From the data we can conclude that center and non-culture are substantially different within their structural relations with other semiotic systems. These difference my frame culture and sustain center position in it since non-cultural appears in the form of anomalies such as war and pressure. Center is more linked with the financial categories than with non-culture which links to “culture” and “politics” and their institutions. The significant discrepancies for culture ranks may signify that the culture difference is a mechanism for the center to differentiate it from non-culture and reinforce superiority of culture.

From both comparisons it can be concluded that culture and politics are not superior sign systems. Their ranking is 35th position within the category rank for “culture”, “state” – 38, “politics” – 44, “cultural institutions” – 44, “political institutions” – 53. In contrast, all center differentiation system ranks in the top 30. The results imply that institutional approach explanation fails because the center of agglomeration and attention differentiates itself by completely different set of sign systems – “knowledge” (technology) and “market”.

Data on periphery and non-culture comparison however show that there is a similar discrepancies level as between center and non-culture. Periphery is more related to “fund” – 31st rank position, “money” – 30, “state” – 28, “reduction” – 20, “house” – 14, “investment” -13, “market” – 20, “weakness” – 12, “idea” – 23, “time” – 13, “market” – 12. Non-culture is more related to “cultural institutions” – 48, “war” – 28, “political institutions” – 27, “economy” – 19, “pressure” – 17, “worth” – 13, “world” – 11, “law” – 10. It proves that periphery and center forms the culture due to similar structural relationships with non-culture. We can deduct from both comparisons that cities in agglomeration are less linked with cultural and political systems of signs.

Data concerning qualifiers – person or institution – locating the city signifiers suggest that person is not a significant source or that it does not make references to the cities – only 3.9% of all cases a person makes quotes to the center cities, only in 1.96% cases periphery cities are quoted, and none cases for non-cultural cities. It shows that mostly the city signifiers enter into discourse realm through the help of institutions.

Data also illustrate center, periphery, and non-culture differences in respect to institutional qualifiers. 57.96% of cases when centre cities appear are linked with companies and 42.04% of the cases are linked with organizations. For periphery cities the figures are 52% cases linked with companies and 48% linked with organizations, but for non-culture – 29.41% linked with companies and 70.59% linked with organization. It can be concluded that an axis center exists – non-culture where the center end means that a company qualifies the city signifiers within texts, but non-culture end of axis implies that a non-business organization qualifies the city signifiers in texts.

These findings are coherent with findings concerning center and non-culture difference in relation to other sign systems – center differentiates itself with more of the financial means in contrast to non-culture where culture and politics are more important means. Data reveal that there is no significant difference if looking at qualifiers for city signifiers in Forbes 2000 list: center – 9.31%, periphery – 8%, and non-culture – 3.92%. We reveal that there are different media routines relating to center, periphery, and non-culture. 25.83% of center appearance within texts is in the form of headline or section, in contrast to non-culture where it is only 11% and 20% in periphery. It denotes that media routines represent center as a reference point to attention and they facilitate rehearsal of center within the attention realm. Political organizations qualify non-culture appearance within texts in 37.5% of the cases, in contrast to 11.76% for center, and 15% for periphery.

Discussion of Results

Our research discloses that significant agglomeration levels persist only in 33 world cities suggesting that there is an important economic inequality among different cities, but at the same time it also provides that agglomeration is more widespread as previous studies by Taylor suggest.

The research suggests that agglomeration is heavily linked with the symbolic capital because we find that attention and information diffusion devoted to the cities with world's largest companies present is four times higher than for other cities.

Beyond that the developed attention list for cities is more in line with the lists of agglomeration than with the Forbes list "The Best places For Business". One explanation can be that world's largest companies attract attention themselves and not with the city they are in, but we find that companies in the Forbes 2000 list are not a significant source for bringing city signifiers in mass media. Instead, there are media routines of devoting media space in the form of section or separate article to cities that stand in the center of culture. As media routines or discourse has a historical inertia and changes slowly, it means that the source of attention is the city rather than the companies. With this we can explain why Tokyo is a less symbolic capital than New York and London, even though Short in 1999 found that for the period from 1960 to 1997 New York and London are declining in importance if compared to Tokyo according to his criteria of location of headquarters of the world's hundred largest corporation, global financial centers, and largest banks[13]. Therefore it is proposed that attention may force the agglomeration. Of course, significant agglomeration can change discourse turning a city into the center of attention and culture, however this may take decades just as the case of Tokyo suggests – it still has relatively low position in historically accumulated attention.

We find that symbolic capital is related to cities as positions of signifiers within the sign systems of center, periphery, and non-culture and their interrelations. The important evidence is that the city sign system is organized in the same fashion as other systems of signs which form culture through which we cognize the world. As city sign system corresponds fairly well with the economic concentration in cities, it is impossible to ignore culture perspective on economic geography. This perspective is exceptionally important in global environment where attention and information crosses borders thus creating information asymmetry (quantity and quality) that shapes our economic behavior. But at the same time it suggests that inequality among the world cities may not be produced only by inequality or scarceness of economic resources but through the culture as well because cities forming non-culture gain positions within historically accumulated attention, however to lower degree than the center. Therefore culture shapes our cognition of economic activities – there are cities which have strong roots in our collective long-term memory, and there are cities that have never been to our knowing even though they physically exist.

There is cultural logic for appearance of the signifiers – agglomeration itself is not a criterion for appearance in texts, but the appearance is relational to the center which is historically centered and agglomeration dense. This status of the center enhances superiority of centre cities over periphery cities thus maintaining the world-cities status. As noted by Dieleman and Hamnett in 1995, the world-city status is a guarantee of enhanced levels of prosperity in the contemporary world economy (the same suggestion reveals in our research) and that status is something to be covered and defended[14]. Consequently a wish to be at the center and benefits of it explains why New York and Hong Kong involve in city branding campaigns.

The research suggests that due to the center position within discourse, cities gain significant attention thus increasing economical activity there. Cultural logic can explain self – reinforcement observed by Krugman, representative of the monopolistic approach to economic agglomeration, and thus agglomeration appears as "path dependent", and this may be the case of New York appearance as the world city. It seems that capitalist social relations are reproduced through centre and non-culture relationship – culture and politics are the sign systems upon which the center reinforces its position within culture. It is possible thus that culture, government and political institutions communicate the anomalies upon which center creates culture superiority over non-culture. This may be an additional mechanism for search of means of social regulations and control in institutional approach to the economy.

If the case of attention that forces concentration of economic activities is present at the country level, then cultural perspective can bring new insights for studies of inequalities which are on the research agenda both in OECD and World Bank.

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What Latvian Public Administration has Learned from the World – Best Practice or…?

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The collapse of the communist regime paved the way for development of the new countries in the Central and Eastern Europe. The Central and Eastern Europe became a space for both: financial and political investments. At the end of 80ties and beginning of 90ties, international donors reviewed their support and aid policy in the developing countries, requesting beneficiaries to liberalize policies and improve public administration based on the principles of the New Public Management (further on – NPM) like accountability, client satisfaction[1]. Such policy by international donors was promoted by collapse of the USSR, crises of *welfare state*, development of *Asian tigers* and, of course, increase of humanitarian aid to the third world countries[2].

After May 4, 1990, when Latvia restored its independence, the main task for the country was to ensure operation of public administration according to the new situation. The law "On Council of Ministers" was approved on May 11, 1990, and the decision No.2 of the Council of Ministers "On operation of public administration apparatus in conditions of restoration of independence" was accepted on May 25, 1990. The decision No. 2. recognised that the country had survived radical strategic changes and there was an objective need to ensure coordination among all administrative units for achievement of the goals[3].

Policy transfer is the process where policies and practice of one political system are transferred to another political system[4]. Professor Dolowitz assures that policy transfer is cheap and easy to use because sometimes information and ideas are found at conferences, working trips and travels. The next popular stream of policy transfer is experts and consultants hired by international organisations. Therefore, if public administration has local or global pressure policy transfer will be the instrument used instead of adaptation of ideas and institutions. In addition, policy transfer is a result of globalisation and development of communication means and technologies. This result has been widely used by international organisations (e.g. World Bank, EU, and International Monetary Fund) offering similar policies to the developing countries[5].

Analysing administrative transformation in Latvia, one can notice that administrative ideas, institutional framework and experience for development of administrative policy is transferred from the first Republic of Latvia and foreign countries. This fact is proved by idea search in German civil service system and consultancies of UK and Australian experts. Thus, it is possible to affirm that external dimension of Latvian administrative transformation is related to global pressure on bureaucracy. The source of global pressure is international organisations, policy transfer and lesson drawing. The global pressure influences bureaucracy directly and indirectly through national political, social and economic systems. In this sense, the transferred idea can be introduced directly without analysis of national features. There is also the second alternative – to introduce ideas after the period of adaptation.



Picture No. 1 **Pressure to Bureaucracy**
Source: Wilson W., Welch E. "Public Administration in a Global Context: Bridging the Gaps of Theory and Practice between Western and Non-Western Nations". // *Public Administration Review.* 1998. January/February. Vol. 58., No. 1., p. 42.

Attributing the Dolowitz ideas to Latvia, we should discuss the country of origin. All ideas on structure and functioning of civil service were drawn from the first Republic of Latvia between World wars and Germany, but the first head of State Civil Service Administration was I. Tupesis from USA[6]. A lot of ideas were imported from Denmark – the former deputy state secretary of Ministry of Social Affairs in Denmark was the adviser to minister of state reforms M. Gailis[7]. The largest PHARE financed project (1998–2000.; 3.4 millions euro) in the sphere of public administration was managed by National Association of Danish Local Self-governments in cooperation with Irish Institute of Public Administration, European Institute of Public Administration in Netherlands, and Danish International Public Policy School[8]. In 2000, the former UK civil service secretary sir Robin Mountfield advised on possible development in Latvian public administration to Prime Minister. Suggestions on public administration reform strategy were received from D. Ives from Australia. In 2002, the tender on PHARE project "Public expenditure management" was launched. The tender was won by a consortium of the three companies – *FTI Finance Ltd.* (Ireland), *Nei B. V* (Netherlands) and *Burnett Swayne* (UK)[9]. This fact approves assumption on strong dominance of Anglo-Saxon ideas in policy transfer process. The ideas on internal audit and functional audit were found in UK, but World Bank vision on public administration structure was expressed by A. Schick, R. Ryterman and H. Sutch. Experts were invited to Latvia to share ideas on public administration development. Later on, these ideas were included in the draft project for laws and conceptual documents elaborated by Bureau of Public Administration Reform and Secretariat to minister on special assignment for public administration reform. Only ideas on management agreements were borrowed from New Zealand[10].

Latvia has started to build public administration based on the principles of Weberian bureaucracy. Under the pressure of international organisation and as a result of policy transfer, ideas of the new public management theory were introduced in public administration.

There are three stages in policy transfer process in Latvia. The first stage lasted to 1996. Looking on origins of ideas used in Latvian public administration, one can see that the first ideas of civil service and public administration structure were borrowed from Germany and the experience on legislation from the first Republic of Latvia. These ideas express themselves in Public Administration Reform Conception (March 28, 1995) and in the law “On state civil service” (April 21, 1994). Both documents emphasise Weberian principles like hierarchy and legitimacy as well as separation of policy formulation from policy implementation. The reinstituted legislation and Satversme of the first Republic of Latvia played a major role. The public administration was regulated by reinstituted and refined law of 1925 “Structure of the Cabinet of Ministers” approved on July 16, 1993. In addition, at the beginning of 90ties there was legislation in force approved at the times of Soviet Republic and in force before August 21, 1991 when the constitutional law “On status of the Republic of Latvia” came into force[11]. Therefore quite an interesting situation was formed. The legal norms of three different periods existed simultaneously – norms transferred from the first Republic of Latvia, norms from the Soviet period and newly approved laws. In the period to 1996, the legal framework of the first Republic of Latvia and German ideas were dominant expressing the traditional bureaucratic model and public interest.

The second stage (from 1996 to 2000) is significant with the fact that ideas came from traditional liberal countries – UK, USA and Australia. These were the NPM ideas like – agencies, performance contracts, client, performance evaluation, internal audit. The choice in favour of the NPM is natural because a rapid development of social and economical processes, impact of bank crises in 1995 and Latvia`s will to join EU shows on lack of public administration capacity in fulfilment of function entrusted. Actually this meant that public administration efficiency was on a very low level. Consequently, there was a need for the new impulse in development of public administration. Such and impulse was found in the new public management theory and its ideas.

The third stage for Latvia public administration started in 2000 where elements of system approach to administrative transformation can be identified. A lot of laws and the conceptions were approved. They were: the Concept paper on Corruption Prevention (August 8, 2000), Law on state civil service (September 9, 2000), Law on public agencies (March 22, 2001), Law on administrative procedure (October 25, 2001), Law on public administration structure (June 6, 2002).

During this stage both models – the traditional bureaucratic and the NPM exists and it is hard to identify the dominant one. Approval of the fundamental laws for public administration especially Law on public administration structure and Law on administrative procedure testifies that the balance could fall in favour of the traditional bureaucratic model. Furthermore, behaviour of Latvian politicians.

A. Šķēle and E. Repše shows that politicians would like to have more control over public administration which during the previous period (1996–2000) had ensured more private interests than public ones. A. Šķēle has invited well known foreign expert for development of public administration model, but E. Repše has proposed changes in the normative documents having more power for Prime Ministers to dismiss a civil servant during review of his/her disciplinary case. The author concludes that there is a hybrid model in Latvian public administration since administrative culture in Latvian public administration is different from that in the countries of origin of the new public management theory.



Picture No. 2 **Dynamic of Latvian Public Administration Development**

The analysis of governmental declarations in combination with activities performed shows the periods where the traditional bureaucratic model and where the New public management model was dominating. The period when traditional model was dominant is very short – from May 4, 1990 (approval of the Declaration on restoration of independence) to the end of 1995 when A. Šķēle became a prime minister. Ideas of performance contracts and agencies became obvious right after A. Šķēle became a prime minister. After 1995, both politicians and bureaucrats are using language from the new public management theory. In this context, the year 2004, when Law on administrative procedure came to force, is special. The law by its nature is contradictory to the new public management bureaucrat with initiative and enterprise and put the question, what kind of interest public administration represents and implements, on agenda.

The next question is – what the main actors involved in policy transfer were. In Latvian case we can talk about politicians, bureaucrats and foreign experts. Up to 1996 administrative transformation was an internal necessity and the main actors in policy transfer were politicians and bureaucrats (e.g., M. Gailis, V. Tērauda etc.). After 1996 and especially after 1997 the external pressure increased[12], and the key players for policy transfer were foreign experts, not politicians and bureaucrats. In 2000, the former UK civil service secretary sir Robin Mountfield came up with the proposal and evaluation of public administration to the Prime minister. Public administration reform strategy was advised by D. Ives from Australia. Recommendations of both R. Mountfield and D. Ives were significant for the start up of the third period of public administration development. Opinion on agency creation was expressed by World Bank expert A. Schick. Experts were invited to Latvia to share ideas on public administration development.

The shift of administrative system in Latvia after 1990, according to the author's opinion, can be characterised as reactive administrative policy. This policy was defined as spontaneous. The second feature of the shift, according to the author, was denial of all elements connected with the previous regime, thus Western *best practice* and policy transfer were used. In addition, policies were transferred from the West, as well as from times of the first Republic of Latvia (1918–1940) between the both World wars.

In case of external pressure, we should discuss the role of two actors – EU and World Bank. Recommendations and requirements of international donors were considered. For a new country it is easier to follow foreign and recognised recommendations rather than to defend its own position. By considering experts` opinions there was a possibility to ensure conformity of behaviour to the opinion of external actors. In Latvian case, the conformity was an essential factor. Latvia does not keep it in secret that some public administration reform documents were prepared because international donors requested it. Therefore sensitive questions touching upon public administration have been accepted without prior internal political discussions. The author concludes that the lack of internal political discussions in society, between politicians and bureaucrats is a very important factor determining comprehension or policy failure of public management model transferred. We cannot deny impact of the international donors on NPM transfer to Latvia, but still it would be better if Latvia could choose policy, programme transfer and theory transfer on conditions locally known.

Development of Latvian public administration was determined mainly by external pressure, less by internally changing view on role of public administration in the modern state. Low level of trust and low evaluation of public administration is a sign of the lack of legitimacy of public administration as an apparatus introducing decisions made by the government. Society did not feel at what moment the major turn in the public administration models happened. There is no clear borderline in the perception of society when public administration is being changed to public management. Researcher pointed out that NPM would influence legitimacy of public administration. In the Latvian case described by low level of trust inherited from the previous regime and low level of trust in NPM there might appear results requiring redefining the role of public administration.

We should not forget that administrative transformation in Latvia happened parallel to introduction of market economy. Transit to market economy was connected with decrease of production amounts, increasing unemployment and the social problems not faced before. Economic liberalization required not only a new type of thinking, but also new functionally defined requirements to public administration. This was one of the crucial factors determining policy transfer from so called liberal countries.

In order to explain how big the role of international organisations really was, their requirements should be analysed. The vision of World Bank on public administration in the developing countries was included in the term *governance* having strong NPM influence behind. EU saw the ideal public administration working under the principles of the European Administrative Space and supported by PHARE programme. International Monetary Fund and International Finance Corporation utilised purely financial instruments fostering liberalisation of economies in the developing countries. Such behaviour of the international organisations allows assuming that these organisations should be partly responsible for sold ideas and methods of administrative transformation to developing countries. This can especially be related to World Bank and International Monetary Fund which by assigning structural adjustment loans for economic liberalisation and stabilization brought forward a precondition to use private sector management elements for administrative transformation in order to ensure administrative capacity to manage loans[13].

Policy transfer in combination with financial adjustment loans marked coercive approach to the import of management ideas.

There is no acquis in the public administration area. The common understanding on public administration and its principles is included in notion *European Administrative Space* (further on – EAS). The principles of EAS like professionalism, objectivity, accountability, transparency, efficiency[14], were included in the Progress Report during accession period. The EU recommendations having strong NPM impact in the background are related to improvements of internal audit and public administration transparency[15]. Also the most practical feature of NPM – agencies – is in the centre of EU attention. Regarding agencies EU pointed out that agency proliferation is not controlled and agencies have neither clear accountability mechanisms nor remuneration system[16]. We should analyse EU concerns on agencies in the context of Latvian public administration capacity to approximate acquis. The same reason can be applied to civil service issue in all Progress Reports. Also, the slow speed of administrative transformation might create a risk that EU Structural Funds could not be absorbed. The consequences of such risk would be seen much earlier in comparison to the risk that slow speed of administrative transformation endangers even consolidation of democracy[17].

Latvia`s commitments to fulfil requirements of International Monetary Fund were included in the Memorandum of Economic Policy accepted by the government in April 2, 1996. By substance the Memorandum is a document expressing the main routes of economic development. However, issues of public administration were also incorporated in the Memorandum. The government decided to rationalize structure of public expenditures and employment in the public sector[18]. According to Memorandum, the government has to join similar functions performed by different institutions under one umbrella and to refuse special budgetary funds to ensure monitoring over the state budget. For public administration, Additional memorandum of Economic Policy accepted by the government on June 11, 2002, was more influential. Additional Memorandum emphasised governmental will to continue administrative transformation in order to „*increase efficiency and effectiviness of public sector*"[19]. Governmental promises given to International Monetary Fund on administrative transformation are connected with improvements in medium term budgetary planning and introduction of strategic management in the ministries. In addition, the government promised to review Public Administration Reform Strategy (accepted on July 10, 2001). However this task was not implemented by 2005.

OECD[20] did not have financial instruments to influence behaviour of Latvian government in opposition to World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The main instruments of OECD are consultancies, exchange of information and experience. SIGMA – OECD financed programme is very popular in Latvia. SIGMA was created as a special support programme for Central and Eastern Europe. The aim of the programme is to deliver information and technical assistance so that politicians and institutions responsible for administrative transformation could have a background for a decision according to situation. SIGMA advice is not meant to be implemented. The greatest support of SIGMA was in 1998. SIGMA experts S. Synnerström and F. Cordona delivered their recommendations on the new concept paper on civil service law and actively followed to elaboration of the law[21]. Guidelines for cooperation policy between OECD and the Republic of Latvia (approved on August 25, 2004 by the cabinet of Ministers) accentuated that participation in OECD forums might help to find solutions for public administration problems[22]. In this case, OECD would be consulting organisation and its recommendations would not be mandatory.

Finally, we should look upon requirements of World Bank on administrative transformation in Latvia. These requirements were highlighted as a precondition to receive structural adjustment loan. The first structural adjustment loan Latvia received at 1996 undertaking to decrease public expenditures equal to 39% from GDP at that moment[23]. Such proportion of expenditures was close to average proportion of similar expenditures in OECD countries in 80ties. The requirements of World Bank were connected with necessity to change tax administration system, social insurance system and to ensure monitoring over the state budget[24]. In 1999, World Bank and Latvian government agreed on the new structural adjustment loan (60 million US dollars). Latvian government justified a loan as necessity to increase efficiency and transparency of public administration, since combating corruption and improvements in public administration were preconditions for integration into EU[25].

In barter for loan government promised to strengthen legitimacy of public administration, to manage financial resources and personnel effectively as well as move towards public private partnership[26]. Provision for loan of 1999 foreseen World Bank financed functional audits in ministries as tools for increasing transparency. World Bank promised to deliver technical support to Latvia on development of personnel management system and introduction of single civil service remuneration system. Finally in 2004, the third structural adjustment loan for total amount of 40 million US dollars was approved. Conditions envisaged providing support to Corruption prevention and combating bureau, to introducing single remuneration system and developing medium term financial planning at ministries[27].

Table 1

Summary of Requirements and Recommendations of International Organisations on Development of Latvian Public Administration

EU (including principles of EAS)	International Monetary Fund	OECD (including SIGMA)	World Bank
Efficiency Accountability Internal audit Civil service Planning of expenditures	Efficiency Medium term planning of expenditures Strategic planning	Remuneration system in civil service Civil service monitoring Capacity of central coordinating bodies	Efficiency Trust Decrease of public expenditures Personnel management Civil service Corruption prevention

By reviewing of requirements and recommendations of international organisations, one can notice that all of them are concerned with efficiency, planning and management of public expenditures and civil service system development in Latvia. Efficiency for those organisations is related to rational use of resources and increase of results within limits of existing resources. In the middle of 90ties several parallel projects financed by PHARE, World Bank and SIGMA were implemented. However communication among project teams and financing organisations was on very low level, despite the fact that all projects dealt with public administration problems. In 1999, a private consultancy company "Berenschot EuroManagement" assessed the first phase of PHARE financed project for Latvian public administration. It recommended to European Commission Delegation in Latvia *„to take a leading role and to coordinate PHARE, SIGMA, World Bank, UNDP programmes and bilateral support, since Delegation was a larger donor for public administration reform"*[28]. However the suggestion was not taken into account.

Behaviour of World Bank and Internal Monetary Fund can be explained as a need to react to changes of 80–90ties because changes raised questions on functioning of those organisations and their role in the global processes. Therefore, in order to avoid uncertain future, international organisations were forced to prove that they were able to deliver not only financial aid, but also technical assistance to administrative transformation by using latest innovations of the West. The collapse of communist regime occurred at the time when NPM was extremely popular. Thus popularity of NPM determined export of NPM to developing countries as an instrument for public administration development in the framework of technical assistance contracts[29].

Wide spectrum of NPM ideas were interpreted by the developing countries through the perspective of local problems. In addition, wide spectrum and volume of NPM ideas allowed searching for the most appropriate solution according to local political and public administration traditions. Professor C. Hood assumes that administrative transformation should be considered as *mimetic process*[30], when organisations are imitating and/or trying to use lessons from the best practice to avoid uncertainty about their own future[31]. In such conditions relevant is the fact on transfer of best available practice, not utility or appropriateness of best practice to the particular conditions. In addition, researchers and academics called NPM as the best theory for policy implementation[32]. C. Hood asserts that World Bank, International Monetary Fund, SIGMA have used imitation strategy towards developing countries advising and recommending to use Western best practice (i.e. NPM) for public administration reforms[33]. However at the same time OECD refused to introduce NPM principles to its internal structure.

Administrative transformation process based on the new public management theory has foreseen introduction of private sector management techniques to public sector. Communist regime had its basic feature – the lack of private sector and private property. Therefore Latvian society and bureaucracy had no experience for private sector. In such a situation, precondition for the new public management theory – to evaluate methods to be transferred to public sector – could not be fulfilled. In addition, we should remember that Latvian choice of the new public management theory was determined by its positive characterization from internal donors and technical experts, not by effective use in the private sector. The New public management ideas to Latvia have been sold as the best practice of administrative policy fitting to Latvian search for the new type of instrument for public administration problems.

Recommendations by external actors for using the new public management theory for public administration development can partly be explained as their worries of *overloaded state* in Latvia already experienced in Western Europe. External actors did not have any experience for public administration development after a complete change of political regime, and experience of actors from Africa and Latin America, generally, cannot be applied to Latvia.

Developing countries usually are transforming and reforming public administration by policy transfer from Western countries. Policy transfer is easy to use since ready administrative models are available. For developing countries in transition it is much easier to exploit ready models, instead of investment of resources in adaptation of transferred models. Also developing countries in transition period are surviving insecurity and therefore transfer of recognised models helps to avoid insecurity. Therefore transfer of NPM is most common example of policy transfer; however NPM model has not been fully implemented in any of developed countries.

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Global Civil Society: Some Problems of the Current Discourse

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Speaking on globalization, German sociologist Ulrich Beck emphasizes the need to free our political thinking from the long tradition of "methodological nationalism", which confines society to the container of the nation-state[1]. There is a clear need for such reconceptualization: For almost four centuries political theory has occupied itself mainly with the problems of the modern, territorial, sovereign state, which increasingly became associated with the nation. Its basic concepts like sovereignty, democracy, and rule of law have been closely associated with the particular type of state. Discussions in today's politics show that these concepts have to be adapted due to the growing globality of political processes. Nevertheless, the task posed by Beck is not easy to perform. The concepts of traditional western politics cannot be easily translated to the transnational situation without at least partly losing their meaning. Therefore it can be inconsiderate and misleading to 'globalize' them without serious reconsideration of their content. In my paper I turn to one of the political slogans of the last decade, which has a wide currency in the political as well as in the academic discourse. It is the concept of "global civil society".

I

The concept of civil society is in everybody's mouth today. Mentioning civil society signifies a sympathetic attitude towards modernization, increasing democratic participation and growing cooperativity. Even despotic rulers start to employ the word. This often creates an impression that the idea of civil society is in itself new. Actually it is not – civil society has always been one of the key concepts of Western political theory since Aristoteles. One can even write a history of Western political thought as a history of the concept of civil society – as John Ehrenberg does[2]. Nevertheless the concept disappeared from the political language during the last century. The disappearance was telling. It suggested that values of civil society – as autonomous associations, free public sphere and separation between the state and society – have not been very significant during this period. As Sung Ho Kim writes:

> *"Civil society was a vision largely forgotten during the "short twentieth century." It sounded quaint and even irrelevant*

> *for the age of power politics, organized economy, and mass democracy, in which individual agency tended to be stifled by gigantic institutions and processes that operated beyond one's practical comprehension and engagement. This was a time when the centralized bureaucratic state, whether the totalitarian or the welfare variant, dominated public life, while the economy of scale, whether capitalist or not, was welcomed with little questioning."*[3]

The revival of the concept begins in the 80s, mainly due to the activities of dissident democratization movements in East Central Europe. The idea of civil society has become significant again – in many different manifestations.

The emergence of a "global" civil society can be regarded as one of the further developments of this "reinvention". Just as democratizing civil societies of the communist countries, the "global civil society" was born as a part of self-understanding of the civil movements. The Rio summit of 1992 has been widely regarded as the starting point of the really 'global' civil society. The wide activities of international peace, environmental, anti-globalization and other movements became rapidly associated with the term, and today it has already become a self-evident part of the political language.

The concept of global civil society has gradually become popular also among theoreticians. Authors like John Keane and Mary Kaldor tried to adapt this concept for the purposes of a normative political theory[4]. In these approaches one can identify a clear break with previous traditions in thinking about civil society. There are three paradigms in the tradition of civil society:

1. In the pre-modern tradition civil society is *synonymous* with the state . It is the classical Aristotelian tradition, but also of the early modern authors, like John Locke. It is opposed not to the state, but to pre-political society, to the state of nature. Civil society here is a good, ordered society, where the political power is exercised for the good of the people.
2. In modern political theory civil society works as an *opposite* and, at the same time, as a *supplement* for the state. This tradition begins with Hegel and through Gramsci reaches Habermas and other contemporary authors. This paradigm has been crucial for the liberal-democratic understanding of civil society. Civil society and the state are here two different types of social order, coexisting, interacting, and sometimes competing with one another. The one is based on individual rights, voluntary cooperation and economic freedom; the other – on the general norms of law and political power. These spheres may be conflicting, but it is dangerous to think that one of them should engulf or eliminate the other. In this case there will be no civil society at all.
3. The emergence of the "global" civil society can be regarded as the third stage here. It is a political entity which *transcends* the state. It is a separate political actor which acts on the same level with the state - among other states, but also among international organizations and economic corporations. The concept of civil society frees itself from the tradition of "methodological nationalism". Civil society becomes a free-floating political entity, which is not attached to any state or international organization.

The beginning of this third phase is commonly associated with the end of the Cold War and with the growth of different international civil activities. This growth has really been impressive. Citizens' initiatives and networks increasingly operate across the borders. Almost every significant international summit has its "civil society" counterpart. The "Global civil society" has already demonstrated its impact on world politics. Nevertheless I am going to argue that one should neither take the term for granted, nor ascribe to it all rich normative implications of the earlier tradition, *i.e.*, that of the national civil society. Global civil society is hardly civil society in the strong sense. Therefore it would be misleading to speak of global civil society in the same terms as about activities of 'national' civil societies. The modern idea of civil society is closely related to the legitimacy of the nation-state, presupposing constitutionalism, citizen rights and democratic politics. It is hardly possible to find parallel institutions on the global level, which would render the idea of global civil society credible.

Of course, one cannot deny the existence of a globally interconnected society – the concept of globality presupposes it. This theme is already developed extensively in social theory (Niklas Luhmann), as well as in international relations theory (the English school) and political theory (Raymond Aron). But the concept of "global" or "world" society cannot be easily translated into "global *civil* society". The 'civility' of a society refers to a particular type of relations between the political power and the individual, which includes the protection of individual rights, democratic participation and accountability of the political power to the dialogically structured public sphere. These elements belong to the ideal of the modern, democratic state. One can even hope that these elements could one day appear on the level of the European Union – although these hopes are quite vague at the moment. But it is very difficult to think of civil society on the global level – with its multi-polar political landscape and great variety of different actors and institutions.

In political theory the rise of global civil society has been discussed very widely. The interpretations have often been optimistic. They have welcomed the broadening of community, as well as renewed sense of political action – the end of "the End of History". Global civil society has been seen as a force for democratic and moral renewal in international politics, leading to cosmopolitan institutions and global democratic order. So, for example, Mary Kaldor argues, that the rise of global civil society leads to emergence of shared normative order in the world:

> *"What has happened in 1990s, [..] is that a system of global governance has emerged which involves both states and international institutions. It is not a single world state, but a system in which states are increasingly hemmed by a set of agreements, treaties and rules of a transnational character. Increasingly, these rules are based not just on agreement between states but on public support, generated through global civil society."*[5]

Global civil society is seen here as a 'societal' counterpart of the increasing political globalization and global governance. It counterbalances the tendencies of growing anarchy and unilateralism in the inter-state politics by demanding more democratic legitimacy. The activities of global civil actors build a background for the emerging international regime of human rights, democracy and peace.

Forms of civil self-organization across borders gradually create a dense network of communication and common action, which renders impossible irresponsible, secretive and self-serving attitudes in the interstate relations. Like in the Eastern Europe of 1989, the democratic activities of civil society leads in Kaldor's conception to the democratization of the 'official', professional politics.

Nevertheless this analogy is hardly plausible. Kaldor defines global civil society broadly, as "[..] the groups, networks and movements which comprise the mechanisms through which individuals negotiate and renegotiate social contracts or political bargains at a global level."[6] This definition tells nothing about the shape of this negotiation. It obviously includes every type of lobbying, protesting and advocacy, but also of threatening, blackmailing and backstage horse-trading. It must be noted that this approach is not at all compatible with the (classic) idea of civil society, which includes not every type of bargaining, but rule-regulated compromise and open discussion.

This broad definition allows Kaldor to include in the global civil society every kind of global association – including networks of religious fundamentalists or nationalist extremists. Nevertheless, she qualifies this inclusion:

> *"And to the extent that nationalist and fundamentalist movements are voluntary and participatory, i.e. they provide a mechanism through which individuals can gain access to centres of authority, then they have to be included as well."*[7]

The problem here is not only that such division is very difficult to perform in practice – even *Al Quaeda* surely is to some extent both voluntary and participatory. The real problem lies deeper. Global fundamentalist and nationalist networks often are global exactly because they want to be free from *every* kind of general political authority. Such networks want to operate freely among states, politics and business corporations without any reference to common norms and responsibilities. Let us be clear, that this is just the opposite attitude to what is meant by civil society, which controls and criticizes the democratic political authority without denying its very existence.

Not the voluntary and participatory character of an organization is the defining mark of civil society. In this case every type of revolutionary conspiracies (*e.g.*, Lenin's communist party during World War I or the Tamil Tigers) would also belong to civil society. It is a particular type of relations between society and political power that makes the society civil, and it is impossible to find such relations on the global level. Of course, one can agree with the normative desirability of Kaldor's vision of the global civil society:

> *"[..] an alliance against global terror and the war on terror would need to include a range of different groups; Israeli peace groups who oppose the occupation of Palestine; Palestinians who oppose suicide bombers; Kashmiri human rights groups who include both Muslims and Hindus; American 'cosmopolitan patriots' [..], who dare to challenge the 'geopolitical soap opera'; Europeans who campaign for greater commitments from their governments."*[8]

Neverheless it is unclear how the thin version of 'civility' proposed by Kaldor could sustain such an alliance. Moreover, it is not clear why exactly these groups are included, and not others. One can even argue that this interpretation of global civil society is just another type of some arbitrary and unilateral "Coalition of the willing", resembling one we find in the official inter-state politics of today.

The problem is that if one makes the global civil society a 'catch-all' concept, as Kaldor does, there inevitably rises a question about the 'bad' civil society. There definitely are forms of voluntary civil activism that are aggressive, fundamentalist and non-democratic. There are two possible solutions in this situation. First: to soften the normative status of civil society by saying that it is a way not only to human rights, democratic participation and accountability of political power, but possibly also to civil strife, intolerance and authoritarianism. This way is chosen by Kaldor and other authors, like John Keane[9]. Its implication is the "conceptual overstretch"[10] - a situation when a concept actually includes what it was intended to exclude. Second: to narrow the scope of the concept. One possible solution here is to limit civil society only to non-violent type of activism. This is problematic, because there is no unequivocal definition of violence – it is not clear whether it includes only physical violence to persons, or maybe also psychological pressure, or destruction of things. The better candidate is to scale down the civil society only to those forms that publicly question the political authority and legitimacy of its decisions without intending to replace the democratic institutions themselves.

There are authors that go further than Kaldor and interpret the global civil society along the lines of radical democratization. So Scott Turner argues that the rise of global civil society signifies an end of the Hobbesian, state-centrist tradition in international politics, represented by the realist school. According to this view,

> *"States may behave stupidly, or in ways that prove contrary to their interests – but they cannot behave immorally, for there is no world Leviathan to establish morality."*[11]

Turner argues that the emergence of global society changes this immoral understanding of politics. The global civil society consists of activities that are non-statist in their orientation. Civil associations, concerned with different issues, are increasingly involved in global networks that enlarges their influence. This produces a new type of participatory politics, different from the statist understanding of the realist school. Turner tries to broaden the usage of the term 'civil society':

> *"The concept of civil society, however, is not limited to those groups seeking to bring about specific changes in the policies of states or practices of corporations. Indeed, one of the most distinguishing characteristics of the new social movements is the attention they bring to problems that are not amenable to direct policy responses. Rather, they are oriented more toward general transformation of public consciousness, which in turn affects the parameters of legitimacy within which traditional institutions must operate."*[12]

This understanding of civil society is closely related to the vision of the global public sphere as a means of control and influence on political power. Nevertheless Turner's vision of non-statist, Kropotkinian understanding of political life underestimates the capacity of the democratic nation state. Following 19th century anarchists, Turner sees the state as the major source of threat to society, which creates more of profound violence and social disorder than commonly believed:

> *"Not only are states the prime perpetrators of international conflict, but they also are the most accomplished perpetrators of violence and human rights abuses within their own borders. [..] While much recent conflict has been intrastate rather than interstate, it nevertheless has remained fundamentally statist in its orientation."*[13]

Although these statements are true, Turner neglects the other side of the modern state. It has introduced not only violence and bureaucracy, but also the protection of individual rights, broad democratic participation and accountability of political power to the citizens. These elements must be taken into account, if we want not only to revive anarchist ideals of direct democracy, but also evaluate the contemporary perspectives of civil society.

II

Be as it may, these visions are stimulating and interesting. Nevertheless as visions they are open to different kinds of criticism. Is the global civil society a civil society at all? Yes, if we have very broad conception of what civil society is – every kind of voluntary, non-violent associations. But if we are going to have a more narrow and normative conception of civil society – and that is what most theoreticians want to – we see that the global civil society is very different from the national. The purpose of civil society is to question and strenghten the legitimacy of political power by means of civil participation and discussion in the public sphere. Its activities are directed to the constitutional and democratic state, which is responsible for its decisions. What about *global* civil society? There can be and there are several directions of influence:

1.)inter-state organizations (anti-globalist movements vs. *G8*)?
2.)separate states/regimes (*Amnesty International* vs. Serbia)?
3.)"Big business" (*Greenpeace* vs. *Shell*)?
4.)... (global civil society entities versus each other)?

It seems that all these options are equally plausible. International NGO's and civil movements can make impact on several types of political actors without being attached to some normative foundation. Global civil society is not a part of a political system, which renders the political power legitimate like 'national' civil societies do. It becomes unattached to any particular political authority by acting as a separate actor with its own agenda, methods and values. This type of global civil society belongs to the era of what John Keane calls the global "neo-mediaevalism"[14]. This term describes a situation with multiple, overlapping and constantly changing spheres of power and loyalty coexisting without any clear and predictable general structure – a situation commonly associated with the European Middle Ages. "Global civil society" – powerful INGO's, global networks, interest groups and movements – can act in such a situation as partners or adversaries of other, non-civil actors. But it would hardly be a civil society.

The point is that the concept of civil society in modern politics has been based on the separation between the political and the civil. The civil society is civil in the sense that it does not aspire to exercise political power itself. That is the reason why civil society is separated form the state. In the global civil society, however, this distinction becomes blurred. Was the victory of the "*Brent spar*" a political, civil or economic victory? Greenpeace is surely no state or interstate organization, but it still claims to have significant influence, which is not properly civil. If in the usual understanding the civil society is separated from official, professional politics and economy, in the so called "Global civil society" the situation is different. The borders between civil, political and economic societies are vague and confused. But let's remember, that democratic force of the civil society is built exactly on this division.

One could argue that this question is superfluous, because it affects only a problematic usage of the term, not the thing (namely, global civil society) itself, which is growing and developing steadily. It is hardly so. If we name something 'civil society', a term with a long and rich history, we implicitly assume not only the particular referent of the term, but also the strong normative connotations of it. Civil society means not only voluntary associations, as it is sometimes assumed. Civil society involves a particular type of relations between the individuals and political power, that are based on individual rights and accountability of political power to free public discourse. It is hard to find something like that on the global level, so the constant usage of the term becomes problematic, not to say misleading and ideologized. Besides, the question may be asked, what would be a precondition for global civil society in the strong sense – as a sphere of peaceful and dialogical beyond political and administrative imperatives. Such a civil society could lead to real democratic accountability also in international politics, where it is needed.

The answer to this last question is not new. It needs a global federation of the states and cosmopolitan rights for the individual. This could serve as a basis for a real global civil society, where the political power would be legally accountable to citizens. This is the vision of cosmopolitan democracy, defended by David Held[15]. There have been several significant movements in this direction – the establishment of the International Criminal Court in the Hague (1998) must be mentioned. Nevertheless today's tendencies give evidence for just the opposite movement. The War in Iraq and the rejection of the EU constitution are here the best (or maybe the worst) examples. The perspectives of global civil society in the proper sense are quite vague today.

Still, one could argue that even if there is no development today in the direction of international community of rights, the furher activities of global civil society can eventually lead in this direction. According to this view, the growing levels of participation and engagement testifies the consolidation of global civil society. This consolidation increases pressure on international organizations and states to establish a morally acceptable democratic order between the states. There is a growing value consensus between different actors of global civil society, and states and inter-state organizations become increasingly responsible to it.

Nevertheless one must be clear that this is at least partly a piece of wishful thinking. Empirical studies in the field of global association unfortunately show just the opposite. At first, there is not at all any value consensus in the global civil society, that could 'civilize' the international community. Volker Heins argues that not only national branches of global civil society often act openly against each other, for example, in the field of environment protection.

> *"Much more serious is the institutional weakness of a truly global consensus on negative moral universals like the evils*

> *of racism or genocidal mass murder, both in the world society and in the international NGO community. [..] At the UN World Conference Against Racism in September 2001 (in Durban, South Africa), a number of NGOs openly asked for Israel to be declared an apartheid state to be destroyed while at the same time fighting suggestions to include anti-semitism in the category of racism."*[16]

Like in national politics, organizations of global civil society are also increasingly moving "from membership to management". Influential international NGO's are mostly run not by elected members, but by skilled professionals, and they are using the same manipulative methods of "engineered consent", as political parties, states and interstate organizations do. The big actors of global civil society has very often little to do with actual self-organization 'from below'. They are often funded by states or big corporations and have pre-defined agendas, not questionable by participants. There is a close affinity and relation between the concentration of power in the central administration of the NGOs, on the one side, and the work of national or inter-state bureaucracies, on the other:

> *"The unfortunate tendency to look only at the global outreach of international organizations and the 'causes' of NGOs without giving much thought to how these institutions can be integrated into established democratic frameworks, leads to a supreme irony – that GCS discourse, very much against the grain of its liberal-democratic predecessors, is uncritically in favour of increasing the power of the states including international bureaucracies and bargaining systems."*[17]

Lastly, the so called "Global civil society" is undoubtedly characterized by mostly Western bases and patterns. The global civil society is today not really global; they are concentrated in the developed world. Most activities are actually based on local civil societies of Western countries. 60 % of secretariats and headquarters of the international NGO's are in North-western European countries[18].

III

Global civil society in the proper sense, with its own democratic agenda is an interesting thought experiment, but unfortunately it is quite far from reality. Nevertheless one should distinguish eventual emergence of global civil society from globalization of local civil societies. The second process is real and has deep impact. The example of Latvia is telling here. Latvia, like other post-Soviet countries, has a relatively weak civil society. The Soviet period has damaged civil competences significantly, and organizational imagination has been destroyed by the authoritarian party-state and its bureaucracy. People have forgotten how to organize themselves and how to assert their interests openly. Statistics show that associations in general are unpopular among the inhabitants. People do not believe in the meaning of their participation. In the year 2003 61,9% of the population had no associational membership[19]. There are 0,6 associational memberships *per capita*. To compare: in the US there are 3,6, in Finland – 2,5, in Brazil – 2,1 associational memberships. Most people (67, 9%) also do not believe their action could influence the government's decisions in any way. Political parties are small and distinctly elitist, and they also enjoy almost no trust from the population. The civil society in Latvia is relatively weak even by the standards of post-communist Eastern Europe[20]. Citizens' attitudes and participation more resemble those of Russia, Moldova or Macedonia, not those of the Czech Republic or Slovenia[21].

Nevertheless one can observe certain movement towards more active and civil attitudes in the last years. The participation is growing steadily, especially among young people. The actions of civil society become more visible in the public sphere. Society becomes more and more involved in the activities of trade unions, anti-corruption organizations and environmental movements. My suggestion is that this gradual reactivisation of civil society cannot be explained only by growing economic stability: there are citizen movements that directly challenge this stability. The influence of international NGOs and networks is also very important here – as *Transparency International, WWF for Nature* and other global or European civil networks. Although these activities are also often "engineered" to some extent, they can serve as a source of grass-root experience of civil action.

The impact of global networks on civil participation is stimulating for civil activities also in Latvia. It helps to overcome civic apathy by giving back to people "the pleasure of common action", prominently defended by Hannah Arendt. The global civil society is an important factor for future development not because it adresses global issues (e.g., environment, poverty or non-proliferation of nuclear weapons) in a relevant way – interstate politics still plays the leading role here. The global civil society is desirable because it helps to activate local civil societies and to make the national governments more responsible to their citizens. And this is still very much needed also in our country.

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Footnotes

[1] Beck 1997, pp. 115ff.
[2] Ehrenberg 1999
[3] Kim 2004, p. 1.
[4] Keane 2001, 2003; Kaldor 2003a, 2003b.
[5] Kaldor 2003a, p. 590.
[6] Kaldor 2003b, p. 78.
[7] *Ibid.,* p. 107.
[8] *Ibid.* p. 158.
[9] Keane 2003, p. 1-39.
[10] Heins 2005, p. 198.
[11] Turner 1998, p. 27.
[12] *Ibid.* p. 30.
[13] *Ibid.* p. 34.
[14] Keane 2001, p. 35.
[15] Held 1995.
[16] Heins p. 191.
[17] *Ibid.* p. 194.
[18] Anheier, Glasius, Kaldor 2001, pp. 283ff.
[19] Rozenvalds 2005, pp. 156, 227.
[20] Howard 2003.
[21] Anheier, Glasius, Kaldor 2001, p. 313ff.

National Identity of the Russian Minority (1995–2003)

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Identity, place and sense of place

At first, it should be noted that there has been an exponential increase of interest in the issues concerning identity (Figure 1). A steady increase in identity articles as a portion of all articles across time also exists. Jim Fearon analysed the changing frequency of dissertations in which "identity" appears in the abstracts from 1981–1995. He found that the number of dissertations mentioning identity grew at about 12% per year from 1985–1996 while the total number of dissertations only grew 4.4% per year[1].

Secondly, different authors have noted that the concept of identity has become decentred (e.g., Jameson 1991; Featherstone 1995; Busekist 2004, Orchard 2002, Hedetof 1999, Phillips 2002, Münkler 1999, Cerutti 2003)[2] and the largest part of scholars think that nowadays people have multiple, fragmented and often contradictory, conflicting but not unified and consistent identities (Hale 2004)[3].

Busekist thinks that analysis of the collective identity must be attentive to the following six traits:

- It is dynamic and consequently dependent on the context and on the individuals that compose it.
- It is constructed and consequently dependent upon entrepreneurs (individuals or institutions).
- It rests on a tradition or a collective, acceptable and legitimate statement of this tradition, and, as a result, it maintains a particular relation to history.
- It maintains a close relation to the system of (political) values in which it moves, whether that is a relation of approbation or rejection, in an internal or international system.
- It draws borders, and consequently has an interior and an exterior of common recognition, an in-group and an out-group, friends and adversaries (the degree of enmity is, of course, variable).
- Finally, it possesses a centre or a pertinent common denominator that permits individuals to recognize and articulate their attachment when it is conscious[4].



Figure 1. Cumulative Sum of "Identity" Articles in Social Science Journals (1988–1999)

Source: **Social Science Citation Index**[5]

The concept of place could be understood in different ways. The concept of place stands in a recursive relation to other social and cultural concepts - it is something more than just another independent variable[6]. Place could be understood only in the space–time framework of social relations and conflicts. Place has been seen as a spatial, social, psychological and political phenomenon. A place could be home, district, city, country, and continent. Place is a space occupied by people, objects, memories, and values, and places hold meaning for individuals and for groups. Places are networked by people's activities and relationships between selves, and places characterise not only individuals but also societies.

The value of the same place for different persons can diverge. Social groups may have different, even opposed and contested, perceptions of place. The meanings of place are flexible and continuously contested as places are not only contexts of lives but also represent social life. It characterizes people's well-being, their sense of security, emotional bonds and happiness.

The sense of place results from the people's individual and collective experiences. The longer people have lived in a place, the more rooted they feel, and the greater is their attachment to it[7]. The place attachment facilitates a sense of security and well-being, defines group boundaries, and stabilizes memories[8]. The sense of place is bounded with individuals' national identity[9]. To be without a place of one's own is to be almost non-existent[10]. Rose explains that "senses of place" develop from every aspect of individuals' life experience, and senses of place pervade everyday life and experience" (1995:88). Rose notes that while one's sense of place can be very personal, it is "shaped in large part by the social, cultural and economic circumstances in which individuals find themselves"[11].

Different authors demonstrate the importance for members of a place-based community to share a common identity. The sense of place, rootedness are a base for the sense of stability and is a source of non-contradictional identity. Attachment to place is an integral part of being in the world (Harvey, 1996:301). Self and place are not independent but rather overlapping phenomena. The questions "Who am I" and "Where am I" are inseparable[12] as places shape the social identity.

Identity is a field of competing self-projects, and successiveness or unsuccessiveness of these projects inevitably influence an individual's or group's sense of place. The sense of place is a product of society; this sense is a product of people's cultural interpretation and society's power relations. The sense of place includes the perception of one place opposite to "other place" or "ideal place". People develop their sense of place by comparing different places and people in them.

The attachment to place is an essential element of self identity, and most scholars recognize reciprocity between sense of place and self identity. The geographer Yi-Fu Tuan coined the term *topophilia* to describe "the affective bond between people and place[13]. He wrote that this bond may be stronger for some individuals than for others and can be expressed differently by people from different cultures. Topophilia is an affective and reflective response to place[14]. A sense of place characterises appreciation or unfavourableness to place. A sense of place features our belonging to a particular place and community and our sense of well-being.

Rootedness, being at home is experienced when people feel a sense of security; they can control their lives and can construct collective and self identities[15]. The place inevitably influences everyday life. Place is an emotive space, and the significance of emotions in understanding place could not be neglected[16]. Places bring people together, but this co-presence not always provokes togetherness, engagement[17]. The constitution of community depends on people's values, lifestyles, and the cultural beliefs they share[18], how they can adapt selves to places. To describe the rootedness of people and culture in their own territory, sometimes the concept of sedentarism[19] is used.

To investigate the sense of place and identity, sociologists often analyse such sentiment as pride of the state, its politics or culture[20]. Political national pride characterizes people's feelings toward state political institutions, political influence, army, state economy, and social security system. Cultural national pride describes people's attitude towards state history and its cultural achievements. National pride is more open to political and structural changes than national identity[21]. Academic interest in national pride stems from the willingness to investigate patriotism or unloyalty, links between feelings of belonging to a country (closeness) and feelings of pride[22].

Definitions of cohesion have emphasized attitudinal consensus (how attractive the group is to its members; their intention to remain in a group; their identification with a group; loyalty to a group – Jeffrey Alexander called it a sense of "we-ness"[23]), their behaviour uniformity and interpersonal ties (their density)[24]. Cohesion is "anchored in opinions" and attitudes have a reciprocal reinforcing effect. But frequently a person's loyalties openly contradict to one another[25], individual life projects do not serve the collective one or contradict them. The precondition for cohesion is people's loyalty to the place (as place is a symbolic border of the community) and the way of life it embodies, common referent points to the social world. People whose identities are configured to more than one nation-state, who left accustomed places and not adopted to a new one fuss with others. And community members who see it could ask: Are you one of us?

Historically, cultures have been thought of as being rooted in space, in stable patterns of interaction of people doing the same things in the same places[26]. A place or identity of belonging means that people feel themselves as being "at home". In his analysis, Bauman demonstrates how an increasingly insecure world provokes people to search for safety in ideas of community[27]. These defensive responses arise when people find their lives disrupted by the forces of globalization. Etienne Balibar (quoted in Nairn[28], 1993) called this process "identity panics" but Ulrich Beck wrote about place polygamy[29].

It is useful to distinguish between "voluntary" and the "involuntary" cosmopolitans of our era[30]. Sometimes different forms of territorial mobility are romanticized (in this discourse Peters called it the post-modern beatification of the nomad[31]). Sometimes these "others" are classified as a threat to the stability of the domestic order. The presence of the "strangers" will tend to disrupt the sense of 'being at home with oneself"[32]. Identities of immigrants are configured in relationship to more than one nation-state and it problemizes their sense of locality, people's social ties. Elaine Thomas identifies five distinct ways of understanding what it means to belong to a given polity (Descent: Belonging by Virtue of 'Blood'; Culture: Attachment to a Particular Way of Life; Belief: Citizenship in a Nation as Identification with its Founding Principles; Contract: Citizenship as Equal Rights for Equal Duties, or Living Together Cooperatively; Monetized Contract: Citizens as Those Who 'Pay Their Dues')[33]. But what happens if a person would not or cannot belong to the new polity?

To describe relationships between a person and the world, scholars widely use the notions of "outsideness" and "insideness". Relph called the strongest sense of place existential insideness[34] - a feeling of deep identity with place (place full of significances), without deliberate or selfconscious reflection. The opposite term - existential outsideness describes a sense of estrangement, alienation from place (the person feels separate from place; place perceived as unpleasant or oppressive). Place can be perceived with a dispassionate attitude (objective outsideness) or only as background for events or activities (incidental outsideness). In this case, people feel some sort of division between themselves and place (do not feel respect to place). According to Relph incidental outsideness is typical of people who identify themselves with another place-bound community. Existential outsideness is alienation from all places – an existential outsider is not at home anywhere – emotional attachment and feeling of belongingness to place are unfamiliar feelings for this kind of outsider.

The significance of places for the constitution of personal and social identities has been widely investigated[35] especially in academic literature devoted to national identity. A nation cannot be fully understood without taking into account the spatial dimension. Nations are not only political but also spatial units which bound together people and places, and the sense of place can be analysed as the sedimentation of relationships between people and place[36].

Sometimes chains that bind selves to place are unstable and to describe this kind of thinking the nomad concept is used. Nomadic subjects[37] cannot be integrated into established social structures; there is a large distance between them and place-bound community. “The nomadic subject is amoeba-like, struggling to win some space for itself in its local context”[38].

Recently, the concerns about these kinds of conflicts have been growing especially with the growth of immigration. Symbolic meanings of a place have very real consequences - political, cultural, and environmental. As noted in Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and The Council “alienation from both the country of origin and the host country can make it more likely for a person to look for a sense of identity and belonging elsewhere such as in a powerful extremist ideology[39] ... On a more individual psychological level, not feeling accepted in society, feeling discriminated against and the resulting unwillingness even to try to identify with the values of the society in which one is living, can also lead to feelings of alienation or low self-esteem[40].

MEASUREMENT AND DATA

Richard Sinnott found in the major comparative surveys that operationalisation of national and related identities in mass public opinion can be distinguished according to four features[41]: (1) the object of identification (national, sub-national or supranational), (2) the nature of the relationship envisaged between the respondent and the object. Relationship between respondent and object covers a wide variety of formulations that can be reduced to two kinds: a relationship of *identification* (“belong to”, “identify with”, “think of yourself as”) and a relationship of *proximity* (“feel close to”, “feel attached to”), (3) the nature of the response demanded by the question and (4) the nature of the scale used in measuring.

A team from the Weatherhead Initiative in International Affairs (at Harvard University) defined eight measurable dimensions of identity[42].

1. Recognition could measure the degree to which a group accepts a particular social identity; the degree to which outsiders recognize a social identity; and the degree to which a state recognizes a social identity.
2 Exclusivity could measures the degree to which a given social identity excludes the holding of another social identity.
3. Primordiality measure identities as being primordial or chosen.
4. Entativity measured the degree to which groups are perceived (mostly by outsiders) as being “real”, as cohering as a natural group, rather than an arbitrary one.
5. Status measures how the identity is evaluated (as positive, neutral, or negative; something to take pride in or something to be ashamed of). Again, this can be measured from the perspective of in-group and out-group members and the state as well.
6. In-Group Favoritism/Out-Group Hostility focuses primarily on the degree to which “groupness” leads to in-group favouritism and out-group hostility.
7. Claims measure the claims that membership in an identity group makes on an individual or what claims are made in terms of sacrifice of one’s economic or other interests.
8. Goals/Purposes measure group goals/purposes.

National identity can be analysed in different ways but, in many cases, scholars investigate closeness to a country, etc.; national pride; closeness to an ethnic group; attitude to in-group and out-group members, etc[43].

Eurobarometer (ECS, 1971) was the first major comparative survey which started measuring identity with a question: To which of these areas do you feel you belong most strongly? And which next?: city/locality, department, region, country, Europe. From Eurobarometer 36 (1991), the question is changed to: Please tell me how attached (very attached; fairly attached; not very attached; not at all attached) you feel to town or village, to region, to country, to the European Union (the European Community) or to Europe (as a whole)?

In Eurobarometer (57.2, 2002), a question was asked: How close (very close-quite close – not very close – not at all close) do you feel to the following groups of people.

1. The inhabitants of the city or village where you live/have lived most of your life;
2. The inhabitants of the region where you live;
3. Fellow (Nationality);
4. European Union citizens;
5. Fellow Europeans.

In Eurobarometer (EB) (from 1987 to 1991), respondents were asked: "Do you ever think of yourself as not only (nationality), but also European? (Often, sometimes, never) but from 1992 Eurobarometer (EB) question was: In the near future do you see yourself as …? ((Nationality) only, [Nationality] and European, European and [Nationality]).

In the European Values Survey and in the World Values Survey respondents were asked: To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong first of all (locality or town where you live; state or region of country where you live; nation as a whole; continent; the world as a whole)? And the next?

In ISSP National Identity Surveys (1995 and 2003) the respondent was asked to rate each object instead of being asked to rank the two most important. Secondly, the relationship specified in the question is one of proximity ("How close do you feel to…") rather than identification.

The largest cross- national surveys provide a wide range of attitudinal variables that are related to sense of national identity. Scholars who investigate national identity measure national pride also. To analyse respondents' national pride, scholars mostly asked similar questions. In The European Values Study (to date there have been three waves, the first carried out in 1981, the second in 1990 and the third in 1999/2000) respondents from 1981 were asked:. How proud are you (very proud; quite proud, not very proud; not at all proud) to be (nationality)? In Eurobarometer surveys from 1984, respondents were asked: Would you say that you are very proud, quite proud, not very proud, or not at all proud to be (nationality)? A new follow up question was added starting with Eurobarometer 54 (2000): And would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be European?

In World Values Surveys (1981, 1990-91, 1995-1996 and 1999-2001) respondents were asked: How proud are you to be (your own nationality; answers: very proud, quite proud, not very proud, and not at all proud). In 1981 WVS respondents also were asked: Do any of these things (scientific achievements, political system, sporting achievements, culture and arts, economic achievements, health and welfare system (in Spain and China also history)) make you proud of this country?

ISSP modules (1995, 2003) contain two multi-item measures of national pride. The first is a measure of National Pride in Specific Achievements. It asks how proud people are of their country in 10 domains (The way democracy works; country's political influence in the world; the country's economic achievements; its social security system; its scientific and technological achievements; its achievements in sports; its achievements in the arts and literature; the country's armed forces; its history; its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society). The second is a measure of General Pride variables which characterize respondent's attitudes toward the country's history, its contemporary role and place in the world and deal with patriotism, national superiority, and allegiance. Respondents were asked: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

a. I would rather be a citizen of Latvia than of any other country in the world.
b. There are some things about Latvia that make me feel ashamed of my country.
c. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the citizens of Latvia.
d. Generally speaking, Latvia is a better country than most other countries.
e. People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.
f. If my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud.

In this paper, changes in respondents' attitudes are examined, namely, their closeness to their country, people's national pride from 1995 to 2003. Furthermore, the differences in closeness and national pride among ethnic Latvians and the Russian minority are also examined. The data of two International Social Survey Program's modules "The National Identity" (1995, 2003) were compared.

The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is a continuing, annual program of cross-national collaboration[44]. The first ISSP survey was carried out in six countries (Germany, the United States, Great Britain, Italy, Austria, and Australia) in 1985. In 2005 39 nations are the ISSP members. Every member agrees to field a 15-minute long questionnaire (approximately 60 questions, not including the compulsory demographics) once a year. The questions are to be asked in a single block in identical order in each country. The module topics (Role of Government (1985, 1990, 1996), Social Networks (1986), Social Inequality (1987, 1992, 1999), Family and Changing Gender Roles (1988, 1994, 2002), Work Orientations (1989, 1997, 2005) Religion (1991,1998) Environment (1993, 2000), National Identity (1995, 2003), Social Relations and Support Systems (2001), Citizenship (2004)) are to be repeated at agreed intervals. Two-thirds of a questionnaire must be replicated for a module to qualify as a replication. Each research organization funds all of its own costs. The merging of the data into a cross-national data set is performed by the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, University of Cologne, in collaboration with the Analisis Sociologicos, Economicos y Politicos in Spain. Data from the modules from 1985 to 2002 are presently available from the Zentralarchiv and various national archives such as Essex in Britain and ICPSR in the United States.

Latvia's total sample size was 2000 respondents, but the final sample – 1837 respondents (distributed as follows: 1205 ethnic Latvians (1995 – 618; 2003 – 587) and 632 Russians (1995 – 317; 2003 – 315)) as respondents of other Latvian minorities were excluded from the sample.

CLOSENESS AND NATIONAL PRIDE

In both ISSP surveys, respondents were asked how close they feel to the country. Closeness to country was evaluated by a 5-item scale: very close – 1; not close at all – 5. This five item scale was summarized by the means (on the basis where: 'very close' gets 1, 'not close at all ' gets 0, with intermediate answers given scores at equal intervals: close – 0.75; can't choose – 0.50; not very close – 0.25)

Both groups – ethnic Latvians and Russians – demonstrated lower closeness to the country in 2003 than in 1995 (Table 1). At the same time, the decline was more pronounced among the Russians. Secondly, the gap between the evaluations of ethnic Latvians and the Russians increased twice during this time (from 0.07 to 0.16). In 2003, both groups – ethnic Latvians and Russians - demonstrated similar feelings of closeness to their town or city. In comparison to 1995, ethnic Latvians indicated a little bit more frequently that they feel closeness to their town, but Russians' attitudes did not change in 2003.

Table 1

Closeness to country, town, country, continent ('very close'= 1, 'not close at all ' = 0).

Closeness to country	1995	2003	Difference
Ethnic Latvians	0.80	0.76	- 0.04*
Russians	0.73	0.61	-0.12*
Difference	0.07*	0.16*	
Closeness to town			
Ethnic Latvians	0.63	0.70	+ 0.07*
Russians	0.69	0.67	-0.02
Difference	+0.06*	-0.03	
Closeness to county			
Ethnic Latvians	0.66	0.60	- 0.06*
Russians	0.62	0.49	-0.13*
Difference	-0.04	– 0.11*	
Closeness to continent	1995	2003	Difference
Ethnic Latvians	0.39	0.29	- 0.10*
Russians	0.39	0.25	-0.14*
Difference	-0.00	-0.04**	

* Differences are significant at the 0.00 level (2-tailed)

**Differences are significant at the 0.03 level (2-tailed)

In comparison to 1995, the feeling of closeness to continent decreased in both groups in 2003, but in 2003 the gap between evaluations of ethnic Latvians and Russians increased. The closeness of ethnic Latvians to their town increased a little bit, but Russians' attitudes to their town, city did not change.

The Closeness index was constructed from these four items and it ranges from 4 for those expressing only "placement sentiments" to 0 for someone who gives the extreme "anti-placement response" to each item. The Closeness index demonstrates that closeness in the Russian sample decreased more strongly than in the Latvian sample. The closeness index among Russians decreased from 1995 to 2003 in similar degree among the youngest and oldest respondents. In the Latvian sample, the closeness index significantly decreased among youngest respondents (from 2.41 in 1995 to 2.17 in 2003) and the decrease was less pronounced among oldest respondents (from 2.50 to 2.42). The mean differences between both groups increased four times (from 0.08 to 0.34).

Table 2

Closeness index (‘very close’= 4, ‘not close at all ’ = 0).

	1995	2003	Difference
Ethnic Latvians	2.49	2.35	– 0.10*
Russians	2.41	2.01	– 0.14*
Difference	– 0.08	– 0.34*	

* Differences is significant at the 0.00 level (2-tailed)

We analysed the answers of Russian citizens and non-citizens to the question: “How close do you feel to country” and found out that their answers differ statistically insignificantly (Table 3). T-Test for Equality of Means demonstrates that Russian citizens feel closer to country than non-citizens (0.64 and 0.57; sig. (2-tailed) is 0.04)). In 1995, the answers of Russian citizens and non-citizens differed insignificantly (0.75 and 0.72; sig. (2-tailed) is 0.37)). From 1995 to 2003, the percentage of citizens in the samples increased from 39% to 51%, but closeness to country in both groups declined approximately similarly (0.11 points for citizens and 0.15 points for non-citizens).

Table 3

Closeness to country (Russians, 2003)

	Very close	Close	Nor very close, not close at all
Citizens (160 resp.)	17%	54%	25%
Non-citizens(145 resp.)	8%	56%	36%

The comparison of ISSP Specific Achievements variables[45] in two surveys demonstrates that, in 2003, ethnic Latvians more positively evaluated country’s achievements in sports, achievements in arts and literature, economic achievements, and country’s armed forces (Table 4). The Latvians’ attitude did not change with respect to scientific achievements. At the same time, the evaluation of the following domains decreased: pride with social security system, how democracy works in Latvia, country’s political influence in the world, and country’s history. The most serious decrease was found in the attitude to fair treatment of groups in society.

In comparison to 1995, the survey in 2003 showed that ethnic Russians more positively evaluated only country’s achievements in sports (Table 5). The Russians’ attitude did not change to country’s economic achievements and country’s social security system. At the same time decreased pride with armed forces, how democracy works in Latvia, scientific achievements, achievements in arts and literature, country’s political influence in the world, and fair treatment of groups in society. The attitude to country’s history decreased most seriously.

If we compare the gap between Latvians’ and Russians’ evaluations in 1995 and 2003 we can see that Latvians’ and Russians’ attitudes toward country’s social security system became closer (Table 6). A little bit but insignificantly, the gap has decreased between Latvians and Russians attitudes toward fair treatment of groups in society and the way democracy works. At the same time, the gap increased between Latvians’ and Russians’ attitudes to country’s economic achievements,

achievements in sports, scientific achievements and achievements in arts and literature, and country's political influence in the world. The most seriously the gap increased between Latvians' and Russians' attitudes to country's armed forces and its history.

Table 4

National Pride in Specific Achievements (ethnic Latvians, 5-item scale: 1 – very proud, 0.75 – somewhat proud, 0.5 – can`t choose, 0.25 – not very proud, 0 – not proud at all)

Proud of:	Mean in 2003	Mean in 1995	Mean difference
achievements in sports	0.82	0.68	+0.15*
achievements in arts and literature	0.82	0.75	+0.07*
country's armed forces	0.41	0.34	+0.07*
economic achievements	0.35	0.31	+0.04*
scientific achievements	0.53	0.51	+0.02
social security system	0.17	0.21	–0.04*
way democracy works	0.43	0.48	–0.05*
its history	0.60	0.66	–0.06*
political influence in world	0.38	0.45	–0.07*
fair treatment of groups in society	0.22	0.37	–0.15*

*– differences are significant

Table 5

National Pride in Specific Achievements (Russians, 5-item scale: 1 – very proud, 0.75 – somewhat proud, 0.5 – can`t choose, 0.25 – not very proud, 0 – not proud at all)

Proud of:	Mean in 2003	Mean in 1995	Mean difference
achievements in sports	0.72	0.61	+0.11*
economic achievements	0.25	0.25	0.00
social security system	0.17	0.18	–0.01
way democracy works	0.34	0.37	–0.03*
country's armed forces	0.26	0.32	–0.05*
scientific achievements	0.37	0.43	–0.05*
achievements in arts and literature	0.57	0.69	–0.12*
political influence in world	0.26	0.39	–0.13*
fair treatment of groups in society	0.16	0.30	–0.13*
its history	0.40	0.59	–0.19*

*– differences are significant

The Specific Achievements index was constructed from these items (Table 6). It ranges from 0 for someone who is not proud at all of their country's role in each domain to 10 for someone who is very proud on all ten items. The comparison of 1995 and 2003 Specific Achievements indexes demonstrates that, in 2003, both groups – ethnic Latvians and Russians – evaluate Latvia's achievements even more critically than eight years before[46] (Table 7). At the same time, the decline is more pronounced (0.63) among Russians (in comparison with ethnic Latvians the Russians pride index decreased 5 times more). The total gap in the country's achievements evaluation between ethnic Latvians and Russians has increased 1.86 times during this period (from 0.59 to 1.1).

Table 6

Mean Differences between Latvians' and Russians' Pride in Specific Achievements

Proud of:	Mean Difference in 2003	Mean Difference in 1995	Gap between differences
its history	0.20	0.07	0.13
country's armed forces	0.14	0.02	0.12
achievements in arts and literature	0.13	0.06	0.08
political influence in world	0.12	0.06	0.07
scientific achievements	0.15	0.08	0.07
economic achievements	0.09	0.06	0.04
achievements in sports	0.11	0.07	0.04
way democracy works	0.09	0.11	–0.02
fair treatment of groups in society	0.06	0.07	–0.02
social security system	0.00	0.03	–0.03

Table 7

Index of Mean Differences between Latvians and Russians Pride in Specific Achievements

	1995	2003	Difference
Ethnic Latvians	4.62	4.74	–0.12*
Russians	3.52	4.15	–0.63*
Difference	1.1*	0.59*	

*Differences are significant at the 0.00 level (2-tailed)

We analyzed also a group of variables which is called the General National Pride variables. General Pride variables characterize respondent's attitudes toward country's history, its contemporary role and place in the world and deal with patriotism, national superiority, and allegiance. Respondents were asked: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

a. I would rather be a citizen of Latvia than of any other country in the world.
b. There are some things about Latvia that make me feel ashamed of my country.
c. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the citizens of Latvia.
d. Generally speaking, Latvia is a better country than most other countries.
e. People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.
f. If my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud.

For the evaluation, the respondents used a 5-item scale ranging from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5). This five item scale was summarised by the means calculated on the basis - where "agree strongly" gets 1 and disagree strongly" gets 0, with intermediate answers given scores at equal intervals: agree – 0.75; neither agree nor disagree - 0.50; disagree -0.25.

The analyses of General Pride variables demonstrate that, in comparison to the previous survey, ethnic Latvians more frequently agree with the statement "Latvia is a better country than most other countries" and less frequently agree with the statement "There are some things about Latvia that make me feel ashamed of my country" in 2003 (Table 8). These changes characterise an increase in pro-national sentiments towards Latvia. In 2003, Latvians evaluated the statement attitude "The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the citizens of Latvia" similarly as eight years before. At the same time, Latvians evaluated more critically other General Pride variables. The Latvians' attitude to the statement "I would rather be a citizen of Latvia than of any other country in the world" changed most significantly. These changes characterise an increase in anti-national sentiments towards Latvia.

Table 8

General Pride (ethnic Latvians, "agree strongly" gets 1 and disagree strongly" gets 0, with intermediate answers given scores at equal intervals: agree – 0.75; neither agree nor disagree – 0.50; disagree – 0.25)

	Mean in 2003	**Mean in 1995**	**Mean difference**
Generally speaking, Latvia is a better country than most other countries	0.51	0.46	0.05*
The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the citizens of Latvia	0.41	0.40	0.00
If my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud	0.84	0.87	–0.03*
People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong	0.38	0.43	–0.05*
There are some things about Latvia that make me feel ashamed of my country	0.63	0.73	–0.09*
I would rather be a citizen of Latvia than of any other country in the world	0.65	0.79	–0.15*

*–differences are significant

Compared to the previous survey, Russians less frequently agree with the statement "There are some things about Latvia that make me feel ashamed of my country" in 2003 (Table 9). These changes characterise an increase in pro-national sentiments towards Latvia. At the same time, Russians more critically evaluated all other General Pride variables. The attitude of Russians most seriously changed toward the statement "I would rather be a citizen of Latvia than of any other country in the world". All these changes characterise increasing anti-national sentiments to Latvia.

If we compare the gap between evaluations of both Latvians and Russians in 1995 and 2003, we can see that Latvians' and Russians' attitudes toward the statement "People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong" become closer (Table 10). At the same time, the gap has significantly increased between Latvians' and Russians' attitudes toward all other statements.

The General National Pride index was constructed of four items (Generally speaking, Latvia is a better country than most other countries; I would rather be citizen of Latvia than of any other country in the world; The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the citizens of Latvia; There are some things about Latvia that make me feel ashamed of my country) and it ranges from 4 for those expressing only pro-national sentiments to 0 for someone who gives the extreme anti-national response to each item[47]. The General Pride Achievements index (Table 11) demonstrates that the pride of Russian respondents decreased very strongly and the mean differences between both groups increased five times.

Table 9

General Pride (Russians, "agree strongly" gets 1 and disagree strongly" gets 0, with intermediate answers given scores at equal intervals: agree – 0.75; neither agree nor disagree – 0.50; disagree – 0.25)

	Mean in 2003	**Mean in 1995**	**Mean difference**
There are some things about Latvia that make me feel ashamed of my country	0.66	0.72	–0.05*
The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the citizens of Latvia	0.35	0.42	–0.06*
Generally speaking, Latvia is a better country than most other countries	0.40	0.46	–0.07*
If my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud	0.74	0.84	–0.09*
People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong	0.35	0.46	–0.11*
I would rather be a citizen of Latvia than of any other country in the world	0.46	0.69	–0.22*

*– differences are significant

Table 10

Mean Differences between Latvians' and Russians' General Pride

	Mean Difference in 2003	**Mean Difference in 1995**	**Gap between differences**
Generally speaking, Latvia is a better country than most other countries	0.12	0.00	0.11
I would rather be a citizen of Latvia than of any other country in the world	0.18	0.11	0.08
The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the citizens of Latvia	0.05	–0.02	0.07
People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong	0.03	–0.03	0.06
If my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud	0.09	0.03	0.06
There are some things about Latvia that make me feel ashamed of my country	-0.03	0.01	–0.04

Table 11

Index of General Pride

	1995	2003	Difference
Ethnic Latvians	1.92	1.93	–0.01
Russians	1.85	1.55	–0.30*
Difference	–0.07	–0.38*	

** Differences is significant at the 0.00 level (2-tailed)

In other similar surveys, the two national pride indexes were moderately correlated as both scales have clear conceptual differences. The Specific Achievement scales characterize positive feelings towards national achievements, but are not overtly nationalistic. The General Pride scales characterize how respondents place one's nation above other countries. In the ethnic-Latvians sample, the correlation between two indexes in 1995 and in 2003 was similar (Pearson correlation = 0,24 in 2003 and 0.20 in 1995 (in both cases significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed)). In the Russian sample, the correlation between two indexes was significant in the 2003 survey (Pearson correlation was 0,43 (significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed)), but not so strong in 1995 (the Pearson correlation coefficient was 0,22).

Ethnic Latvians and Russian answers to the question "How proud are you of belonging to Latvia?" differed significantly and the gap was more pronounced between younger respondents.

Table 12

Proud of Belonging to Latvia (2003, means, 5-item scale: very proud – 1; not proud at all – 0).

	29 years and less	30 years and more	Difference
Ethnic Latvians	0.72	0.79	–0.07
Russians	0.47	0.58	–0.11
Difference	–0.25	–0.21	

*Differences are significant at the 0.00 level (2-tailed)

The answers of Russian citizens and non-citizens to the question "How proud are you of belonging to Latvia?" differed moderately but statistically significantly.

Table 13

Proud of belonging to Latvia (Russians, 2003)

	Very proud	Somewhat proud	Not very proud	Not proud at all	Can't choose
Citizens (146 resp.)	17%	41%	26%	7%	9%
Non-citizens (128 resp.)	7%	40%	32%	7%	14%

Differences are significant at the 0.04 level (2-sided)

The two national pride indexes were moderately correlated with the closeness index in both Latvian samples but the correlation was stronger in 2003 (with Specific Achievement Pearson correlation = 0,31 in 2003 and 0.21 in 1995; with General Pride index Pearson correlation = 0,21 in 2003 and 0.08 in 1995 (significant at the 0,05 level (2-tailed)). The two national pride indexes were moderately correlated with the closeness index in 2003 in the Russian sample (with Specific Achievement Pearson correlation = 0,26 and with General Pride index Pearson correlation = 0,23 (both significant at the 0,00 level (2-tailed)). In 1995, both correlations were statistically insignificant within the Russian sample.

The acquired data indicate that the value gap between both communities increased and, in the Russian community, anti-national sentiments strongly increased. It is contrary to expectations that improvement of well-being and more inclusive citizenship policy will promote social cohesion between two ethnic communities. But maybe the decrease of closeness, displacement sentiments is not a risky trend?

Closeness and Citizenship

We also analysed Russian respondent's answers to two questions: "How close do you feel to country" and "How important for being truly Latvian is to respect political institutions and laws of Latvia" (Table 14). The data show correspondence between these variables. Although it is worth to note that 16% of the Russians who think that they are very close or close to country at the same time think that for being truly Latvian it is not important to respect political institutions and laws of Latvia (Table 14). Respect of political institutions and laws is significantly lower among youngest Russian respondents (29 years and less) compared to the oldest (0.60 and 0.72). In the Latvian sample, differences between generations are insignificant.

Table 14

Closeness to country and respect political institutions and laws (Russians, 2003)

	Very important, fairly important	**Not very important, not important at all**
Very close, close (202 resp.)	84%	16%
Nor very close, not close at all (98 resp.)	67%	33%

Differences are significant at the 0.00 level (2-sided)

We analyzed correlations between two questions: "How close do you feel to country" and "I would rather be a citizen of Latvia than of any other country" (agree – disagree). Although the data shows correspondence between the two first variables, it is worth noting that 29% of the Russians who feel close to the country at the same time prefer citizenship of another country. At the same time, Latvian citizenship is attractive to 11% of those Russians who do not feel close to the country.

Table 15

Closeness to country and Latvian citizenship as preferable (Russians, 2003)

	Strongly agree, agree	**Neither agree not disagree**	**Disagree, disagree strongly**
Very close, close (186 resp.)	33%	38%	29%
Nor very close, not close at all (92 resp.)	11%	37%	52%

Differences are significant at the 0.00 level (2-sided)

In 2003, the youngest respondents from both ethnic groups rarely agree with statement "I would rather be a citizen of Latvia than of any other country" (0. 11 in Latvian, and 0.09 in Russians sample, Table 16).

Table 16

I would rather be a citizen of Latvia than of any other country (means, 5-item scale: agree strongly – 1; disagree strongly – 0)

	29 years	30 years	Difference
Ethnic Latvians	0.56	0.67	0.11
Russians	0.39	0.48	0.09
Difference	0.17	0.19	

The paradox of the situation was very well illustrated by the fact that, in 2003, only 25% of Russian non-citizens preferred citizenship of Latvia and not of another country (5% gave answer strongly agree). At the same time, 33% of citizens-Russians think that the citizenship of other countries is better than Latvian.

Table 17

I would rather be a citizen of Latvia than of any other country (Russians, 2003)

	Strongly agree, agree	Neither agree not disagree	Disagree, disagree strongly
Citizens (150 resp.)	26%	41%	33%
Non-citizens(135 resp.)	25%	33%	42%

The acquired data indicate that Latvian residents have multiple, fragmented and often contradictiory identities. Closeness to country often does not encourage respect for political institutions and laws of Latvia or willingness to receive Latvia's citizenship. At the same time, a large part of citizens do not feel close to country and prefer to receive other country's citizenship. Such nomadic thinking and lifestyle are not community oriented. Nomadic subjects do not feel personal responsibility to place and surrounding community. They do not feel attachment to the local field and that creates tensions between persons with a nomad identity and a place identity. Ungrounded (unrooted) persons who would not like to adapt themselves to place and place-bounded community are perceveid as a threat to everyday routines and community spirit. Weak closeness to country does not facilitate formation of national identity. Deficit of rootedness, sense of instability, insecurity and contradictiory identity are correlated phenomena and they provoke disloyalty and destroy people's social ties.

Such situations can create serious internal problems and political cleavages. The National programme "Integration of Society in Latvia"[48] was oriented to development of mutual understanding and co-operation among individuals and different groups in the framework of Latvia's legal system and "the goal of integration is to form a democratic, consolidated civil society, founded on shared basic values"[49]. The survey data attest that society did not move toward this goal.

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Reconfiguration of Place and Space: A Case Study Related to Coverage of Regional Reforms in Latvia

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Time and space in Latvia have experienced important transformations and restructuring over the last few years. The entrance of new communications technologies into everyday life, inclusion into global information networks and the international arena – these have created a new geography of communications. The contemporary flow of human beings, cultures, transport, goods and information means that traditional and physical boundaries such as mountains, seas and vast distances are no longer important. Symbolic boundaries of language and culture, also known as the "transmission space" now have new meanings. This space ensures diversity in cultural identities.

B. Anderson, in analysing the emergence of modern nations, called them "imagined communities," arguing that national identity is constructed by symbols and rituals that are used in a specific administrative and territorial unit (while simultaneously participating in the creation of those symbols and rituals). A nation is an imagined community, because its members consider themselves to be part of the nation even though most of them are not mutually acquainted. The fatherland is the unifying force in this regard.

Communications processes are of key importance in an imagined community. Here we refer to the mechanised and everyday production and use of books and newspapers. Print works help in standardising and disseminating literary language, they have, in fact, *recorded* and *formatted* national languages and continue to do so now. The media also create a commonly held sense of time by presenting the synchrony of events in time and space. Anderson argues that the ritual of reading a morning newspaper has replaced morning prayers, thus bringing together those who belong to a nation not only in their everyday rhythm, but also in the time and space of their community.[1]

A sign of the times is the new formulation and articulation of international and local cultures, identities, time and space. Media researchers D. Morley and K. Robins indicate that the recent development of the media industry has been characterised by the "dual tendency towards globalisation and localisation of image spaces."[2] This has to do with spatial processes and structures, with the subjective side of space, the orientation within space and the experience of space. New relationships emerge, along with interaction between the global style of culture and the specific local or national situation that exists.

The dynamics of the new media space involve global image industries and the emergence and rapid development of a global market – one that offers audiovisual products that are not based on specific territories. On the other hand, local products and their dissemination networks are also developing very rapidly. According to Morley and Robins, a typical sign of the times is the tension which exists between globalism and localism, as well as the interaction between these. This means that answers to many questions are being sought. How do we position ourselves in the new and global cultural space? How does hyperspace or the virtual space of electronic networks exist in accordance with our local space and time? Does globalisation mean a crisis in identity? Is our community "re-imagining" itself, and if so, then how is it doing so? Is cultural identity undertaking new forms? How do these exist when there are tensions between globalism and localism?[3]

Our aim in this paper is to analyse Latvia's regional newspapers to see how regional reforms were reflected in these between 1999 and 2005. We will sketch out the role of local newspapers in the modern reshaping of cultural identity, also looking at their role in the presence time and space. Local newspapers were selected in accordance with existing planning regions – *Auseklis* (from Limbaži in the Rīga planning region), *Druva* (from Cēsis in the Vidzeme planning region), *Latgales Laiks* (from Daugavpils in the Latgale planning region), *Kurzemnieks* (from Kuldīga in the Kurzeme planning region), and *Zemgales Ziņas* (from Jelgava in the Zemgale planning region). Qualitative text analysis was the research method. A total of 152 articles were analysed. The articles were selected from the *Lursoft*[*] database on the basis of the keywords "regional reform."

Time, Space, Place

Any era has its own understanding of time and space. Globalisation in the modern age offers new combinations in the way in which time and space are organised, because there are new dimensions in terms of how these concepts are understood and applied.

Time and space are among the fundamental and material dimensions of human life. Time and space are not, generally, seen as individual realities. Instead, they are realities which have come together.[4] The Russian literature theorist M. Bakhtin has written that if we are to understand the time-space relationship, we must use a "chronotope." In writing about the relationship between time and space, Bakhtin argued that "elements of time are revealed in space, while time covers and measures space."[5]

According to Einstein's theory of relativity, time and space are existing entities which are mutually dependent. This idea has been picked up by sociologists, as well as students of media and culture. Time and space are seen as social constructs which shape the fundamental dimensions of social reality. D. Massey has explained that place is relationally, not absolutely defined, for at least two particles are required for space to occur. Time is constituted by the movement of these particles, which simultaneously establishes both time and space. The point is not that time moves across a static space, but instead that space and time constitute each other. This relationship can be called time-space.[6]

A. Giddens has stressed the need to keep space and place separate. "Place," according to Giddens, is specific, concrete, familiar, known and bounded. He argues that space and place can be understood through the terms "absence" and "presence." Space refers to an abstract idea, an empty or dead space which is filled with various concrete, specific and human places.

Giddens: "'Place' is best conceptualised by means of the idea of locale, which refers to the physical settings of social activity as situated geographically. In pre-modern societies, space and place largely coincide, since the spatial dimensions of social life are, for most of the population and in most respects, dominated by 'presence' – localised activities. The advent of modernity increasingly tears space away from place by fostering relations between 'absent' others, locationally distant from any given situation of face-to-face interaction. In conditions of modernity [..] locales are thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in terms of influences quite distant from them. What structures the locale is not simply that which is present on the scene; the 'visible form' of the locale conceals the distanced relations which determine its nature.[7]

Morley has said that "'place' marks the materialised idea of the relations that its inhabitants have with each other, with their ancestors and with outsiders of various sorts (expressed physically in community halls, graveyards and monuments to the battles fought against the enemy)."[8] As far as N. Couldry is concerned, "place" is a location in space that has significance for human agents. Places have both material and imaginative aspects, they are neither totally material nor completely mental. Places are a combination of the material and the mental and cannot be reduced to either. Couldry concludes that "the ways in which meanings become attached to place are themselves highly subtle, involving connections between many scales of action.[9]

In dealing with the relationship between time and space, Giddens points out that the extreme dynamism of modernity forces us to separate time from space. The concept of time-space distancing describes the stretching of social systems across time-space. Abstract clock time allows time, space and place to be separated from one another, creating the possibility of social relations among people who are not present.[10] Thanks to the time-space distinction, the development of technical media separates social interaction and the physical locale so that individuals can interact with one another without sharing a common temporal-spatial setting. Time-space distancing creates the context of co-presence and the extension of availability. This is important, too, in the cultural transmission of the mass media.[11]

In reviewing the role of modern communications in the reordering of space and time, J. Thompson argues that the sense of space and time is closely linked to the sense of distance – i.e., what is close and what is far away. Communications resources are of decisive importance in understanding distance. When communications depended on the physical transportation of messages, the sense of distance depended on the amount of time that was spent in travelling from one location to another. As the speed of transportation and communications has increased, distances have diminished and even disappeared. Transformation of the sense of distance is the cornerstone for understanding the concept of "time-space compression".[12]

Z. Bauman has analysed the globalisation, the flow of business and trade, the transformation of the elite and the process of social polarisation, concluding that time-space compression emancipates some people from territorial constraints, providing them with an unprecedented ability to move and to "act at a distance." For others, in turn, this means that there is little chance that they will ever escape from the locality in which they live – the forces which determine the nature of life in that locality operate from a further and further distance and are increasingly out of reach in terms of the ability of locals to influence them. Some people can leave the locality at any moment, while others simply have to watch as their locality, their only place of residence, disappears from under their feet.[13] In analysis of these processes, the concept of "time-space convergence" is of use. A more precise concept is "cost-space convergence," and within this concept, Massey speaks of "the power-geometry of time-space compression." The point is that differences in economic resources and in spatial resources are closely interrelated.[14]

Transformation of time, space and place – this is not a closed process. Under the influence of globalisation, the flow of economics and information and the effects of technologies, the geography of time and space is influenced. New and global network and locale relationships and interfaces are appearing.

Identity and Belongings

A great deal has been written about the issue of identity over the last decades – its permanence or malleability, its role in the lives of individuals and societies. The sociologist Bauman has written that "identity research" has become an independent area of study, one that is developing very rapidly. What is more, "identity" has become a prism through which many important aspects of contemporary life can be viewed.[15] In Latvia, too, there has been significant identity research over the last several years.[16] Interest in identities can also be explained through the rapid changes in time-space which began when the Soviet Union collapsed, political, economic and social transformations occurred, and Latvia became involved in the global networks of communications.[17] These processes rearticulated the self-determination of societies, communities and individuals. There were new dynamics in identities, and there were different spatial and temporal relations.

As was noted, modern-day restructuring and transformation of politics and economics includes changes in the historical system of accumulation and social organisation. These historical changes also include the process of spatial restructuring and reconfiguration. The spatial matrix of society and the spatial orientation of individuals are also changing. This, in turn, creates a re-imagining of community processes, the construction of new cultural identities. Referring to Anderson's performative concept, one can speak of the re-imagining of various communities in the world and in Europe – Latvia included. D. Stukuls-Eglītis, for instance, has analysed post-Soviet transformation processes in Latvia, and she associates the re-imagining of the Latvian identity during that period with a (re)construction of normality.[18]

In post-modern culture, there are differential and plural identities. Identities must be seen as malleable and dynamic. According to P. Schlesinger, "all identities are constituted within a system of social relations and require the reciprocal recognition of others. Identity [..] is not to be considered a 'thing,' but rather a 'system of relations and representations.' [..] The maintenance of an agent's identity is [..] a continual process of recomposition rather than a given one, in which the two constitutive dimensions of self-identification and affirmation of difference are continually locked [..] Identity is seen as a dynamic, emergent aspect of collective action."[19]

Both dimensions of identity – self-identification and determination of differences – are important in contemporary reconfiguration of time-space. Morley and Robins argue that the foundation of the issue of identity can be found in the fears and uncertainties that are caused by tensions between globalism and localism. These can exist at the individual or national level, and they can create various types of opposition, defence or dissociation.[20] They also define globalisation as a cause of identity crises. The audiovisual geography that is created by international media corporations and electronic communications networks cannot help but have an influence on the symbolic space of national cultures. Globalisation, in fact, has to be linked to new dynamics of re-localisation, new and intricate relations between global space and local space.[21]

According to S. Hall, national identities represent attachment to particular places, events, symbols and histories. They represent a "*particularistic* form of attachment or belonging. There has always been a tension between these and more *universalistic* identifications.," Hall argues that it would be too simplistic to think that globalisation simply destroys national identities – it is more appropriate to think that *new* "global" and *new* "local" identifications are being created. What is more, globalisation also creates resistance to globalisation and a "*strengthening* of local identities."[22]

The importance of place is special in this context. It remains fixed, and each individual has "roots" therein. In speaking of the changing nature of borders, Morley stresses that places create "stable patterns of interaction of the same people doing the same things, over and over again." Places can also serve as a "generator of cultural belongingness."[23] One's birthplace, moreover, is an important component of one's individual identity. People socialise and interact in their local environment – village, parish, town, city. That is where they establish social networks with others in the area. They try to become part of the way in which the community is organised. This creates the aforementioned feeling of belonging, and it also creates the identity of the community and its culture.

Since the collapse of Communism, there have been dramatic changes in Latvia, and these have also affected the identity and belonging of the country's residents. In the 1990s, it must be noted, millions of people in Eastern Europe suffered an identity crisis, because their geographic, spatial and political identities had collapsed, and new ones had not yet emerged. In many cases, the emergence of the new identities was a very difficult and contradictory process. The disappearance of Communist regimes meant the tearing down of old identities which, in most cases, had been created from above. Many of these proved to be nothing more than ideological myths. As professions disappeared and changed, so did social identities. There were unclear relations between "new Europe" and "old Europe" and their values. National belonging began to compensate for other lost identities.[24]

It is quite impossible to speak of Latvia's residents as a homogeneous community. Ethnic belonging, Soviet-era experiences, values, a focus on the past or the future, the social and material status of individuals – all of these shape various belongings and identities. The ethnic sociologist I. Apine has studied issues of Latvian identity, arguing that in the hierarchy of Latvian self-identification, state belonging and the attributes of the state are of minimal importance, as is religious belonging among Lutheran Latvians. Minimal importance is attached to the external and physical type. Particularly important in self-identification, by contrast, are the land and the traditional language,[25] the internal differentiation of the Latvian intelligentsia, the ability to preserve an ethnic micro-environment and a high level of national self-esteem, and the ability to establish a Latvian micro-environment even in multicultural cities.[26]

National identity also has local forms. Regional, local and place-related belonging can help in shaping identities. The historian E. Oberländer has written that regional identity can be defined as a sense of unity which, first and foremost, is focused on the region which one sees as one's personal life space. Secondly, this sense emerges from unified aspects between oneself and other people in the same region. Things which can bring people together can include origin, language, dialect, culture, religion, etc. History which people have in common, however, is often the key issue.[27]

It is the understanding of historical roots in the surrounding area and the remembrance of the values of the "motherland" help, despite the development of technologies and global information networks, in preserving more visual, symbolic and emotional points of reference in an individual's place, strengthening, too, his or her local identity and belonging. Human relationships with places – parishes, towns, districts or provinces – exist at various levels. These levels can be pragmatic and concrete, or they can be emotional and symbolic. Identity characterises these relationships, and it helps to establish a sense of belonging in the "imagined communities." A study that was conducted in 2005 showed that in Latvia, relationships between people and places are most powerfully understood in the context of feeling a sense of belonging to the country and to the specific place of residence of respondents. More contradictory and comparatively weaker is the sense of belonging to a region.[28]

That is why local newspapers are of key importance in local spaces. They help in shaping and mapping cultural identity. On the other hand, they are also a component of that identity. The idea of "our little newspaper" characterises the relevant community.

In 2004, there were 118 local newspapers in Latvia that were published in Latvian. Their total circulation amounted to 33,4 million copies. There were also 20 local newspapers in Russian, and their circulation was around 9,5 million copies. There was one newspaper published both in Latvian and in Russian, and its circulation was 387,600 copies.[29]

Regional Reform: A New Kind of Mapping in Latvia

It was in the mid-1990s that Latvia's politicians began to look at regional development in the country. Processes that were created marked out contradictions among the places and spaces that have been shaped by Latvia's historical and cultural traditions. Planned administrative and territorial reforms were aimed at consolidating resources and at promoting Latvia's balanced development. Between 1992 and 2001, there were six proposals on how the country should be split up into administrative territories.[30] The media reacted to these with some scepticism: "We have already forgotten who was the first to express the sacred phrase about the need for administrative and territorial reform, when and where that happened. We cannot comprehend the number of institutions, commissions, experts, specialists, companies and funds that have dealt with the reforms with a deep and endless conviction that the results will be seen soon, very soon. There are maps of regions, administrative regions, districts (and even communes, cantons and states) that have been imagined by experts and that might cover all of Latvia. Each of Latvia's more than 600 local governments would have to deal with one aspect of reform or another."[31] The victorious viewpoint was that historical traditions must be preserved in providing for regional reforms, but the fact is that regional reforms still have not been implemented. This is true even though a law was approved in 1998 to define the steps in pursuing administrative and territorial reforms and the schedule for taking those steps.[32]

What did the media have to say about this? Some illustrations – "Regional reforms – an endless soap opera";[33] "Reforms of administrative and other regions are hindered by the fact that the government wishes to centralise, not decentralise";[34] "Regional reforms continue to sputter";[35] and "As long as there is no strong political will in Latvia to implement regional reforms, the reforms will continue to move forward with the same pace and the same lack of clarity."[36]

Reasons for the failures of these processes have not been studied in any systematic way. No one has researched the causes or the dynamics of this process over the course of more than 10 years. Factors that have been discussed publicly include the idea that the reforms were not sufficiently prepared and that they were unclear and less than transparent: "Concerns are caused by the way in which regional reforms are being implemented – quickly, briefly, without arguments, without explanations, justifications, calculations or evidence. Without any public debate or even in opposition to debate. (We know that late last year there was a local government survey on the subject of regional reforms. Data concerning the results of that study have never been published.) The life agenda for two million people is being determined simply – this is the right option, because I think so."[37] There have been political and economic concerns: "No government has had the political desire or will to undertake responsibility for the fact that inadequate financial resources were provided for the reforms."[38] The national government looked at local government objections and interpreted them as the fear of local government leaders that they might lose their jobs. Opposition from major towns and cities was interpreted as fear that they might lose their influence.[39]

The media expressed the same criticisms about the fears that existed – writing about the government, one journalist wrote that it "became afraid of regional reforms and rejected the idea for five years. Why? From the very beginning, the main thing for the government was not to decide on the functions of regional local governments or to specify financing for them. Instead, the focus was on the number of regions. If the local government proposals were not useful, then there could, after all, have been a debate. The most important thing for local residents is not the number of regions. Instead, it is the benefits of the reforms."[40] Thus the content of the media reflected the phenomenon that was described in the theoretical concepts which were presented at the beginning of this paper – fears and insecurity based on tension. In this case, the fear and lack of security exist at the individual, the community and the national level.

Dissatisfaction among local government leaders was more rational in terms of its justification – the reforms were occurring too slowly, and there were debates about the way in which resources devoted to the reforms were being used – "too much money has been used on research work – it could have been invested in other sectors. What is more, the results are reportedly not evident."[41]

All in all it must be said that for local government leaders, local residents and media outlets, attitudes vis-à-vis regional reform have been positive, if we look at the issue on the basis of newspaper publications. There have been statements about the uneven development of Latvia's various regions, and about the dangerous consequences of this process: "Differences between Rīga[*] and the rest of Latvia are expanding catastrophically. In future years, this will happen even more rapidly. Unless the state intervenes with regulatory mechanisms, we will see an enormous gap in 30 years' time."[42] Another journalist wrote that "without regional reforms, the state will not manage to deal with problems of regional differences quickly and effectively. Only regional local governments can deal with these issues more energetically, because their motivation in work is quite different."[43]

More reserved attitudes among some local governments can, therefore, be explained to a greater degree on the basis of conscious or less than conscious understandings about the reconfiguration of individual and community-related time-place-space. There is a lack of clarity about how many of these expected changes will affect people's identities. The lack of clarity and a lack of successive processes in explaining the ideas and implementation of reforms in the local media can lead to cognitive dissonance among some individuals. What's more, regional reforms have been described in local newspapers in a very uneven way over the course of the years – of the publications analysed here, 13% were published in 1999, 15% in 2000, 20% in 2001, 11% in 2002, 20% in 2003, 13% in 2004, and 7% in 2005.

Analysis of the local media also presents a series of other factors which, presumably, have indirectly hindered the implementation of regional reforms and which can have long-lasting effects on social and cultural processes even once the administrative regional reforms are completed, at least in formal terms. What is more, the reforms will cause trauma in the human sense of identity and belonging, and this can even more greatly weaken already weak manifestations of the civil society. That is because the government can change the geometry of space, but it cannot ensure any re-imagination of the community. That is the central issue, and it is most important for human beings and communities so as to promote positive thinking and action.

The Concept of Belonging in Media Texts

"Belonging to Latvia is most explicit – the majority of people surveyed feel an average, close or very close belonging. [..] A close belonging to one's immediate place of residence – village, parish or city/town – is equally important (90% of the people surveyed indicated an average, close or very close belonging)."[44]

People in Latvia usually recognise their identity and belonging on the basis of space – they declare identity and belonging on the basis of their cultural or historical region. Kurzeme, Zemgale, Vidzeme and Latgale have had different historical experiences which have affected culture, lifestyle, language and specific places of residence. This is an important tradition in Latvia.[45] It is based on language – in various parts of Latvia (cities, districts, parishes, villages), there is a tradition of establishing nouns in the male or female gender when indicating an individual's place of belonging. Local newspapers use nouns that are based on place names (and irrespective of the relevant place's importance, size, etc.), thus indicating an individual's links to a place. This is one of the key ways in which people are attributed in the news.

Also common is the opposite kind of attribution – community activities and judgments are abstracted from the community as such and instead identified with the place name. For instance, one parish council had to consider a petition signed by 23 people who lived in the village of Ķēči. They wanted to join a new administrative territory. The headline in the news: "The Ķēči Wish to Remain in the Cēsis District."[46] This type of attribution, too, confirms the aforementioned idea of close belonging to one's immediate place of residence.

Various aspects of belonging involve the personal pronouns "we", "us" and "our" – "development in our territory will happen more quickly in future," for instance.[47] Another example: "All of our region will suffer losses"; [48] "Our parish will not suffer, Valmiera is closer to us than Cēsis";[49] "Increases in local government budgets are not directly dependent on their own activities in terms of territorial development."[50]

This represents the way in which the community's interests, positions, etc., are presented: "Because only one representative from three different parishes – the Nītaure, More and Zaube parishes – will be represented in the regional local government, it will be hard to defend our interests";[51] "After all, these things are being done on the basis of our tax monies."[52] Some newspapers have written about the sense of belonging to an existing or new communities: "A second issue which upset our local government leaders"[53] (the author of the publication wrote about many and possibly different local government leaders from a single district – people who, in this context, might mark out the community group which represents the community's interests); "Comparing the minister's choice – Valmiera and the offer made by our district's leaders"[54] (comparing the views of the central government and the local government). Local governments are distinctly positioned as true institutions of power, ones which provide benefits to local residents: "Local governments only serve their own residents."[55] Newspapers frequently present their local governments as legitimate authorities (the local government as an elected cohort of representatives), they emphasise the views of those who represent power ("our own parish leader")[56] and position those leaders as those who represent the community's interests. This strengthens the idea that those who represent community interests stand up against other types of authority (the state, ministries, ministers, the reforms as such, etc.). The other kinds of power are unclear, or else they represent interests which do not coincide with community needs and are, therefore, rejected by the community.

Of particular importance in understanding possible changes in place and space is the positioning of the local community (parish, city, district) vis-à-vis capital of Latvia – Rīga and Latvia, which is associated not with the concepts of place or space, but rather with the idea of the state.

First of all, cities and rural or provincial areas are depicted as spaces with different cultural, economic and social relations. Often the content of newspapers indicates offence or even jealousy about the level of welfare in Rīga. People think that Rīga and its metropolitan area have greater access to resources, and the subtext to this claim is that this is injustice that is faced by districts, regions and parishes: "Processes that have taken place over the last several years show that most of the financial resources are invested in the development of the Rīga region, and that means that it is basically the only place in which manufacturing is developing to a serious degree";[57] "This is particularly distinct in terms of rural elementary schools, whose graduates are in an unequal situation with their city peers."[58]

Secondly, there is dominance in relations between the state and local governments – in this case power is often associated with the city of Rīga: "It is not yet clear how extensively Rīga will have the right to decide on asking for and using EU monies or how much those decisions will be entrusted to the regions themselves. One doubts whether it will be taken into consideration that in regions, it is easier to see how the money should be used. Just as in the 'olden days,' people in the capital city have no desire at all to share the right to decide on how the money can be used most usefully. After all, the one who has the money has the power. We have always known that."[59] "The resources of the European Union may not remain in the hands of bureaucrats in Rīga, they must be spent in regions which, then, will be able to develop in a balanced way";[60] "The strong uncle is here. He will split us up and govern us. Four regions and Rīga – that is all. Governors will be appointed, and some of the functions of ministries will be given to them – that is all. Local governments will be able to come together in assemblies and express their views – I permit that. That is my democracy. Your democracy, with elected authorities at all levels, is too expensive. You poor people cannot uphold it – that is all. So listen to me, I know what has to be done."[61]

There is also the sense of distance that has been described by Thompson – the sense of whether something is near or far: "Does Latvia need regional reforms?";[62] "From the perspective of EU bureaucrats, all of Latvia is a single region";[63] "Why is our national economy sinking into a swamp instead of moving toward Europe?"[64] In the context of these statements, neither authors nor readers are linked to Latvia, which is distant and independent in its existence.

When it comes to the context of re-imagining the community, there is a fairly unusual presentation of the concept of "neighbours." This can mark out consolidation of the place so as to establish a new context of space: “At the conference we invited the leaders of local governments from neighbouring parishes, as well as businesspeople from several neighbouring parishes”;[65] “Yesterday in Madona, there was another meeting and discussion among representatives of neighbouring regions, as proposed by *Druva*”;[66] “We merge our financial abilities with those of our neighbours.”[67] Here we see the re-imagination of the community – the community is expanded, and its traditional or existing boundaries of place are lost. The new community is recognised on the basis of common interests and needs, perhaps also on the basis of its power in opposing external pressures. The idea of a commonly held place is no longer important. A new community can also emerge in a temporal aspect, one that is based on memories, identity of place, etc. This is a framework for belonging: “We invited people to the debate who have expressed an interest in local government operations – teachers, cultural workers, businesspeople and other public activists who live or used to live in our parish.”[68]

In many texts, the idea of “territory” clearly marks out place belonging. One of the important aspects of regional reform is the merger of parishes into larger units – “administrative regions”: “There will be territories of merged parishes – administrative regions”;[69] “There should be some clarity, too, about how territories will be divided up. There should be a unified option that is clearly understood by anyone.”[70] “Of great importance will be the names of the new territories.”[71] The concept of ‘territory’ is used in the sense of distance, too. A farmer was asked to describe the situation in the future: “Valmiera is not far from me, but Cēsis is closer. The larger the territory, the harder it is to uphold contacts with the government. This is particularly true in as risky a sector as agriculture, which particularly needs the help of the state.”[72] The leader of another parish has a similar interpretation of the new situation: “Our parish will not suffer, Valmiera is closer to us than Cēsis, but I still don’t understand why these regional reforms are needed in the first place. The existing structure is mobile, it is available to people. Perhaps there is a need to reorganise all of the sector’s administrative and control structures, there can be optimisation. That is a different issue, but we must remember the situation in Latvia, the capabilities of rural people. If the establishment of the centre of an administrative region is inevitable, then it has to be in Priekuļi, that would be logical.”[73] In the context of place, people try to imagine their living space, marking out new boundaries, distances and important points.

In local newspapers, people are rational in analysing the new communities and, accordingly, the new types of belonging. People analyse strengths, weaknesses, gains and losses in this regard: “Why are we defending the establishment of regional local governments? Administrative regions will not defend Latgale, because each region will think only about itself. This will be possible only for a stronger local government, one which has views concerning the region’s development that are held in common”; [74] “We have expressed our view clearly – Kurzeme cannot be divided up. We know the position taken by other leaders of local governments in Kurzeme. The cities of Liepāja and Ventspils think that these reforms are unnecessary. If it is implemented, then Kurzeme has to be split in half, because both of these cities wish to be centres. In Talsi and Saldus people understand that they have no chance of becoming the centre, and like others in Kurzeme, they think that if I don't get the benefits, then no one else should, either. They do not want Kuldīga to be the centre, but I think that it would be better for them if that were the true. It is hard to say why the people of Talsi want to join Ventspils in northern Kurzeme, while people in Saldus want to join Liepāja in southern Kurzeme. Are they hoping that there will be more money?"[75]

People also understand that the sense of belonging to a place and a space emerges over a long period of time. This sense is accustomed and so the rethinking of the community will be a complicated process: "The region is already a community of people with their own interests. It will be very hard to reorient ourselves."[76] In many places, the new administrative regions will mean the breakdown of links that have existed for years. New links will emerge as three or four parishes merge: "We'll see what kinds of administrative regions emerge after local government negotiations. A study conducted toward the end of the 1990s shows that the Ambeļi, Dubna, Višķi and Maļinova parishes will have to establish their own administrative region. There will be one for Biķernieki and Naujene, one for Nīcgale and Līksna, and one for Vabole and Kalupe. On the opposite bank of the Daugava River, Saliena, Vecsaliena, Skrudaliena, Laucesa and Tabore may merge. Demene, Medumi, Kalkūni and Svente may join together in a single administrative region."[77]

The process of establishing these administrative regions has been very slow, and quite often people think that it is violent: "The need to join Sigulda is dictated not by the Parish Council, but by regional reforms."[78] People do not think that there has been a sufficient framework of arguments in this area, and even though lots of time has been spent on the matter, the results are still inadequate.

There has also been a fairly extensive discussion of the advantages and/or disadvantages of regional reforms in the context of educational problems and opportunities – the chairwoman of one parish council was quoted as saying that it is hard for the parish to support its educational institutions, and she added that "right now the only hope lies in regional reforms. [..] The parish budget does not have the money to improve the educational institutions in line with all relevant norms."[79] The principal of one of the schools, however, thinks that this would be a loss to the community: "Everything leans toward Rīga, and I think that if we join the Rīga region, our problems will be forgotten. Lots of attention will be paid to problems at schools in Rīga, and those are very different from our problems."[80]

A second issue to be discussed quite often is the placement of state and local government institutions in the various regions, the extent to which they will be accessible for local residents. Government institutions say that the concentrated placement of institutions will save on resources, but the media have questioned this idea: "Experience shows that the further power is from the individual, the more bureaucratic it becomes. Perhaps in countries with ancient traditions of the civil service that have emerged from society, it goes without understanding that the governing stratum and the civil servants have a sense of respect vis-à-vis local residents. Perhaps the standard of living there is sufficient to ensure that the need to travel several tens of kilometres will not harm the pocketbook of the farmer. In such countries, this administrative model may be effective. Latvia, however, is a post-Soviet country, one in which normal relations between those who are in power and those who are local residents are still being organised. Will the gap not expand?"[81]

According to our analysis, local media texts reflect significant changes in the understanding of local residents (including journalists) when it comes to the place and space where they live. This is true even though the media outlets are found in various parts of Latvia. Local residents experience increased entropy as a result of the concepts, plans, projects, etc., of regional reforms. Many people cannot deal with this, because the locality which has always been their place of residence is disappearing from underneath their feet.[82] People are expecting changes, they think that they are necessary and inevitable, but at the same time they cannot find their place in the new space. They fear that their sanctuary, the place which they know, may disappear.

Analysis of the texts of local newspapers also shows, however, that the people of Latvia, as compared to those who represent the institutions of government, are far more realistic in recognising and communicating problems which have to do with the re-imagination of the community.

Footnotes

[*] http://www.lursoft.lv/latvian.html

[*] Capital of Latvia.

Endnotes

1 Anderson, Benedict (1991) *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* 2nd ed. London: New York: Verso. P. 9–36; 67–82.

2 Morley, David & Robins,Kevin (1995) *Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries.* London; New York; London: Routledge. P. 37.

3 *Ibid*, pp. 1-42.

4 Castells, Manuel (2000). *The Rise of the Network Society.* 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. PP. 407–409.

5 Bakhtin, Mikhail (1937–1938/2000) Formii vremeni i chronotopa v romane. In: Bakhtin, Mikhail. *Epos i roman (O metodologii issledovanija romana)*. St. Petersburg: Azbuka. P. 10.

6 Massey, Doreen (1994) *Space, Place, and Gender.* Cambridge: Polity Press. P. 3–11.

7 Giddens, Anthony (1990) *The Consequences of Modernity.* Stanford: Stanford University Press. P. 18–19.

8 Morley, David (2000) *Home Territories: Media, Mobility and Identity.* London; New York: Routledge. P. 174.

9 See: Couldry, Nick (2000) *The Place of Media Power: Pilgrims and Witnesses of the Media Age.* London; New York: Routledge. P. 24–25.

10 Giddens, Anthony (1984) *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration.* Berkely; Los Angeles: University of California Press. P. 181; Giddens, Anthony (1990) *The Consequences of Modernity.* P. 19–20.

11 Thompson, John B. (1995) *The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media.* Stanford: Stanford University Press. P. 168–171, 227–230.

12 *Ibid*. PP. 35–36.

13 Bauman, Zygmunt (1998) *Globalization: The Human Consequences.* Cambridge: Polity Press. P. 18–19.

14 Massey, Doreen (1994) *Space, Place, and Gender.* P. 149.

15 Bauman, Zygmunt (2001) *The Individualized Society.* Cambridge: Polity Press. P. 140.

[16] See, e.g.: Kruks, Sergejs (ed.) (2004) *Agora. 1. sēj.: Identitāte: nācija, sociālā grupa.* Rīga: LU Akadēmiskais apgāds; Ozoliņa, Žanete (ed.) (2005) *Politikas zinātne: Identitātes maiņa, pārklāšanās un mijiedarbība.* Rīga: Latvijas Universitāte (Acta Universitatis Latviensis. Vol. 680); Paklone, Inese (ed.) (2005) *Nomales identitātei: Rakstu krājums par Latgales kultūru,, literatūru, veltīts drukas aizlieguma atcelšanas simtgadei Latgalē un Rīgas latgaliešu biedrības Trešō zvaigzne 15 gadiem.* Rīga: Madris; Kursīte, Janīna (ed.) (2005) *Suitu identitāte.* Rīga: LU Akadēmiskais apgāds; etc.

[17] A discussion of changes in the spatial relations of Estonia in the 1990s is found in Vihalemm, Peeter (1999) Changing Baltic space: Estonia and its neighbours. *Journal of Baltic Studies.* 30(3): 250–269.

[18] Stukuls Eglitis, Daina (2002) *Imagining the Nation: History, Modernity, and Revolution of Latvia.* University of Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

[19] cf. Morley, David & Kevin Robins (1995) *Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries.* P. 46.

[20] For a discussion of the instability of the modern world and its "global disorder" – something that helps in understanding identity crises of various levels, see Hobsbawn, Eric (1994/1996) *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991.* New York: Vintage Books. P. 558–585.

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Europeanization of Internal Policies – the Case of National Administration in Latvia and Lessons for New Democratic Communities

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Introduction

The establishment and development of structures for the management of European Union (EU) affairs is rightly regarded as a very important issue for successful co-ordination of internal policies in the new Member States (MS) from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Developed and well **functioning model of EU integration coordination** has already served as a **critical factor for preparation for membership** in line with hard and cooperative work of the administration and good political will.

The membership process of Latvia to the EU has started in May 2004 and allows drawing initial conclusions about this new phase in the development of the state. Nevertheless the political relationship with the EU initially was defined already 10 years ago through the EU Association Process that led to a European Association Agreement (EAA), being the first step towards EU membership candidacy and finalised by Accession treaty signed together with other nine new member states in Thessalonica, Greece, April 2003.

European integration process (EI) sets the agenda on the political level and for the administration during the pre-accession period – and afterwards. The country and administration simultaneously, had to work towards applying the **criteria** established at the **Copenhagen** European Council in 1993 and **Madrid** European Council in 1995.

Accession to the EU puts new psychological pressure and facilitates structural changes of political process and particularly the national administration of Latvia. It means that discussion is no longer only about the application of earlier adopted EU directives but also about participation in the process of creating them. Therefore more relevant is the country's understanding of its priorities and well functioning structures of national administration supporting the strategy of their achievement. Additionally, as a member of EU Latvia has to participate in EU Neighbourhood policy and share the experience of good governance and democracy with EU neighbouring countries in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe.

New changes place an additional burden to the society in comprehension of the various new aspects of the Europeanization process in respect to the EU dimension – timely receipt of essential information and active intervention in the decision-making process, enlargement of the national networks also with nongovernmental institutions on the European level for definition of the relevant national positions.

As the key indicators of change after accession to EU has become the development of functioning institutional framework consisting of a number of important elements –

1) **functioning system for definition of national EU policy** and participation in the EU (or national EU policy),
2) **the co-ordination model for preparation of national positions** in EU related issues,
3) **information exchange system** in national administration and with society,
4) **the system of approximation and implementation of newly adopted EU legislation** binding to the member states,
5) **effective communication strategy** as a tool for active involvement of society in decision – making process. The last but not least important element is participation in developing co-operation policy and sharing democratic values and good governance with the Western Balkans and EU Neighbouring Eastern European countries that have stepped on the path of democracy and got closer to the EU.

The overall objective of the paper is twofold. The first one is to show that impact of Europeanization towards national administrations and internal policy co-ordination process is deepening and widening with accession of Latvia to the EU and requires strategic and co-ordinated approach to maximize the benefits for national administration and society. For this reason the author will deal with the Europeanization process of internal policies in Latvia by giving parallel insight in the existing system before accession and the post-accession period. Secondly, to show what kind of impact the process of Europeanization in the new member-states is leading towards good governance and state building in the Western Balkans and EU Neighbouring Eastern Europe.

The paper is organized so that it – 1) introduces with the theoretical background of Europeanization concept and its changes; 2) outlines Co-ordination of internal policies in national administration of Latvia – before accession and changes afterwards and 3) characterizes the impact of Europeanization towards democratisation and state building in the new democracies.

1. Theoretical Background

The process of European integration has raised ground and many debates in contemporary European studies regarding very complex process determined as *"Europeanization*" – the process of structural change, variously affecting actors and institutions, ideas and interests and response to EU policy.

Europeanization carries the idea that European integration has become so deep in terms of its influence, therefore making purely domestic processes as a part of wider-European level development. This also means that, in terms of breadth, states that are not EU member states are also adopting the same processes. It implies a convergence in the way things are done across Europe. Europeanization should be distinguished from the study of European integration, which in the academic literature refers mainly to efforts to explain institution-building, policy integration or policy outputs on the European level. The study of Europeanization in turn aims to explain the impact of European integration on domestic political and economic systems.

If we look at the way the concept has been defined by those writing about the Europeanization, we can see that there is a number of different interpretations:

- Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporaso define Europeanization as *'the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalize interactions among actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules'*.[1]
- Helen Wallace argues that Europeanization is *'the development and sustaining of systematic European arrangements to manage cross-border connections, such that a European dimension becomes an embedded feature which frames politics and policy within the European states'*.[2]
- Robert Ladrech defines Europeanization as *'an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making'*.[3]
- Claudio Radaelli defines Europeanization as *'processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies'*.[4]

We can see that there is a variety of concerns and different starting points. They vary in what they are looking for and where they would look for them. For example, Risse and Wallace are talking about **structures** but Ladrech and Radaelli are talking about **processes**. This immediately means that the two sides are looking at different (but closely related) things. This means that they might be expected to set up different research designs if they engage in empirical investigation of Europeanization. If we are to research institutions then this gives the idea that we can go 'somewhere' at one place and time and see these institutions, whereas if we are concerned with processes it implies that we will need to watch these processes over a period of time and perhaps in different places.

If we look more deeply into the definitions we can see that Risse is looking primarily at the European (by that meaning EU) level whereas Ladrech is explicitly referring to national (or domestic) levels, and Wallace and Radaelli seem to suggest that we will find Europeanization at both domestic and *"European"* levels. So we have three different approaches. One approach sees Europeanization as an international process (EU level) phenomenon. Other sees it as a domestic phenomenon (as a consequence of EU processes) and the last one sees it as a phenomenon on both domestic and international levels.

Europeanization studies in respect to new members of EU so far have mainly concentrated on the specific adaptive requirements associated with EU membership negotiations and eventual EU accession. Actually Europeanization in CEE was empirically investigated particularly from administrative point of view. According to Grabbe Europeanization has been so far more interested in examining the substance of adjustment effects than in the instruments and modalities of Europeanization.[5] Also Nunberg indicates that there have been few attempts at more comprehensive assessments, which go beyond the institutional arrangements for managing accession, to include broader concerns of personnel policy and policy formulation and implementation.[6] In the empirical assessments there has been focus also on the institutional arrangements that link executive and EU authorities and the institutional practices that have evolved at the national level to support the national – EU connections.[7]

Existence of narrower understanding of the term *"Europeanization" also* means that attention is focused on the domestic consequences of the need to adopt and implement the *acquis communautaire* and to prepare for so called *"European administrative space"*. Nevertheless impact of Europeanization in the pre-accession period should not be considered as development of modern bureaucracy for the traditional nation-state, but establishment of national administration allowing the new member states to act as effective players in the EU's multi-level governance system.

According to Grabbe there existed also number of Europeanization mechanisms already employed in institutional transfer in the CEE previously like gate keeping, benchmarking and monitoring, the provision of legislative and institutional templates; aid and technical assistance and advice and twinning.[8]

As the EU developed and deepened, the effects of Europeanization were increasingly experienced in the domains of national policies, politics, and more broadly, in the domestic politics of the new member states such as Latvia. Political scientists in the framework of Europeanization have mostly concentrated on the aspects of comparative politics, international political economics, theoretical policy analysis and systemic change. Therefore it has brought a variety of possibilities to analyse Europeanization through – **adaptation of institutional settings in the broadest sense** (rules, procedures, norms, practices on different political levels), **emergence of new**, cross – national policy networks and **communities, new strategic opportunities** available to domestic actors, **shifts in cognitive and normative dimensions** - discourse affecting policy in response to European developments, norms and values, political legitimacy, identities, state traditions and finally also the role of the pre-accession process in the continued **democratization** and "marketization" **of new democracies.**

2. Co-ordination of Internal Policies in National Administration before Accession to EU

Europeanization has had a deep impact upon the public policy functions of the member states as it can develop from different stages and forms of the policy process, e.g. policy formulation and putting policy into practice. **If Europeanization is about the impact of European policy within the member state, it leads to close interaction between the state and society in the policy process.** It thus entails two steps: adoption on EU level and then incorporation on the domestic level. The last step alone could be considered as characteristic to EU pre-accession phase.[9] Coordinated decision – making process and active society involvement after accession must ensure coherence in country's overall European policy – defining the policy and national interests in EU context and beyond in order to participate in decision making process on EU level and get benefits for society.

The sustainability of administrative systems and set-ups created and developed already for the needs of EU accession process should be coherent and easily adaptable to the needs in the later stages of membership. **Consistency** and **continuation** are valuable elements in the functioning of any administration and they should be present during the whole membership process to avoid confusion and waste of often very limited resources and time. The start of EU membership is extremely challenging for Latvia, as it requires significant coordination mechanisms on all the levels of Government and administration. **Decision - making and coordination process** must ensure coherence in the MS´ overall EU policy for getting benefits. Effective coordination can be achieved by establishing **effectively functioning working methods** to ensure high quality from the beginning, development of an **operational network** of officials from the ministries accustomed to active informal communication through personal contacts across institutions and building substantial **knowledge and understanding** of EU matters both with officials and politicians that quickly allows to formulate coherent and well-argued positions in communications with the EU.

Looking at the present EU MS they have all developed specific decision–making processes to promote their national interests in EU. The processes vary considerably from country to country as do the administrative and political systems and traditions. The final and optimum system for membership can and should be designed on the basis of **own experience** during accession – but inspiration and experience from MS´ choices should of course be taken into account.

With deepening of EU membership – both in terms of time of membership and the gradual expansion of EU competencies – MS seem to regard **EU** more as **internal affairs** rather than **foreign affairs.** Therefore requesting larger **involvement of the head of government** in EU business and shifting coordination of EU affairs closer to the centre of government and the "normal" national procedures for decision making.

Experience shows that both smaller and larger MS using a more centralized approach *(concentrating large capacities in the centre of government*) are generally more successful than those applying a more decentralized model. The system of co-ordination of EU related policy in the Latvian national administration was established in the middle of last decade. The system working most effectively should be regarded the one for the period from 1998–2004 *(till dissolution of the office in charge for European integration coordination)* when it was shaped in order to fit the best for the European integration needs straight after it became clear that Latvia and neighbouring Lithuania opposite to Estonia were not invited to the EU accession negotiations in the first round in 1998. The system should be regarded as rational and effective system of EI management notwithstanding existence of limited human and material resources. The key characteristic of the system was vertical link from Government to the level of expert groups in the process of decision-making. Especially for the needs of EI management when there were operating two institutions making good synergy in the EI decision making process: the Council of Senior Officials (CSO) as the highest level of management on the level of civil servants and the European Integration Council as the highest level of political management. The function of the secretariat for both institutions was delegated to European integration bureau (EIB), institution responsible for co-ordination of European integration process directly subordinated to Prime minister. EIB was responsible for preparation and update of National program for integration to EU (the planning, management and monitoring tool of EI process) as well as for coordination of institutional capacity building activities, public information on EI processes and evaluation of legislation correspondence with *acquis communautaire*.

Ministry of Finance was mainly responsible for EU pre-accession technical and financial assistance and was a key player together with EIB in the yearly State budget process when decisions in the Cabinet of Ministers were made on financing the relevant EI priorities. Ministry of Foreign affairs (MFA) was involved in internal co-ordination of European integration processes as far as it was related to ensure external functions (preparation of materials on progress of Latvia as input to European Commission's progress reports, preparation of Association Council and Committee). MFA was also in charge for co-ordination of specially established inter-ministerial structure – work of EU Accession negotiations delegation. Coordination also included support to negotiation delegation in preparation of official positions of Latvia, as well as technical support for negotiations (logistics).

During EI process the role of Parliament also increased. The amendments to the Rulebook of Parliament determined that European Affairs Committee decides on official positions of Latvia in EU issues before approval in government.[10]

In general it should be noted that existing system ensured regular and effective work in preparation of accession to EU that successfully resulted with Latvia's accession to EU together with other seven CEE countries. Europeanization process therefore allows identifying a number of critical factors that are critical for success:

- **Political priority** – highly important factor and precondition for Europeanization that should be regarded to prime minister, ministers and the parliament. This factor was present during all the phase of accession to EU by joint consensus to undertake the necessary efforts, in some stages less and some stages more active and successful. As a result that has allowed facilitating Europeanization process of internal policies, so it could be possible for the country to join EU.
- **Functioning model of EU accession coordination** – existence of clear vertical and horizontal coordination and effective working methods and active involvement of the partners both on administration and public level. Limitation of bureaucracy and formality are important factors for making coordination operational.
- **Quick information exchange** – existence of operational networks with limited, as much as possible, bureaucracy able to react fast to the various communications from EU.
- **Comprehensive system of planning, coordination and monitoring of the process** – capacity to be able to undertake approximation process of national law with EU law, implement the legislation and ensure its enforcement later.

- **Relation to Public administration reform** – co-ordination of public administration reform to cope with impacts of Europeanization and develop modern civil service able to act in the European administrative space.
- **Linking process with State budget possibilities and co-ordination of foreign technical assistance** – ability to allocate the financial resources for the most important priorities in the process of Europeanization and using foreign technical assistance where it is necessary.
- **Centre of professional information** – establishment and active usage of learning resource centre containing information databases, libraries and relevant documentation.
- **Capability to unite theory with practice –** active methodological usage of new knowledge and understanding of the process and wherever it is necessary supplementing it with training.

Sector policy related EU accession activities before accession basically were orientated to preparation for EU membership in the legal and administrative field. Therefore many institutions in the national administration regarded EU accession process related tasks as additional ones to regular daily agenda. Policy related to Europeanization process was often seen separately from other policies implemented by the government. Interlink between accession to EU related policy and other policies were happening as far as it was necessary that decisions on internal policies would not appear in contradiction with the aims of Europeanization.

3. Internal Policies and their Co-ordination after Accession to EU and Impact of Europeanization

With development and deepening of EU and impact on the related state policies, Europeanization of national administration demands the country to be an active recipient of EU policies and programmes simultaneously interacting in creation of results in Brussels and managing outputs towards national institutions and society. Therefore principal policy issue is successful organization of EU membership on national level and reaction to Europeanization effects on particular internal policies.

Government and the national administration is the driving force for political process with Europe and adds substation value to building wider comprehension and interaction on Europeanization process in the state and society particularly. European policy formation therefore is integrated dimension of the national policy process.

The change in understanding of foreign and internal policy in European co-operation happens very dynamically, therefore demanding permanent adjustment of the national administration system. The more flexible the state is the more guaranteed is the possibility to develop link between interests of society and decision making on EU level, keeping legitimacy and interest of the state.

The character of management of EU related issues on national level is basically influenced by changes in policy and regime in EU, changes of the system character on the national level and political changes on the level of national government. Europeanization also establishes impact towards availability of the human resources (political culture/administrative structures and impact of the size of state towards balanced protection of the interests), budget opportunities, professional wishes, interests and opportunities to defend the national interest on EU level and the change of role of parliament (marginalization of the role).

Comprehension about Europeanized national administration system is different in the old and the new member states, similarly there is a difference in their experience of administrative and political culture. The new member states are building the new system mainly on the basis of experience acquired during the European integration process. As the key initial challenges in Latvian case from the experience of the older members have become focus on changes of external issues into internal (psychological factor), necessity to optimise the institutional system for co-ordination of EU affairs and develop administrative capacity and formulate national EU policy, elaborate National development plan for 2007–2013 and effectively absorb assistance from EU Structural funds, organization of effective decision making process, strengthening the link between State and society and networking and lobbying (national/EU dimension).

Internal policy co-ordination system in Latvia faced major challenges in 2003, however it is still too early to estimate whether the undertaken changes will bring positive effects. The most obvious result is that with institutional shifts impacted by accession to EU and national political process, a number of skilled people have left the national administration for work in the EU structures or for private sector. As result the administration has faced disappearance of institutional memory of the knowledge accumulated during the EU pre-accession process.

The co-ordination system of internal policies after accession to EU in Latvia could be characterized as the system in formation. One of the key reasons for that is a lack of clearly defined national EU priorities. A year before and after accession to EU have not given clear evidence of the system that will operate for future several years securing effective co-ordination of EU related issues in the framework of national EU policy. First of all there is a lack of clearly stated understanding, the system of values and the definition of the role Latvia would be willing to play in the EU. The answer to this question most likely could provide the national EU strategy that should see the daylight from MFA at the beginning of 2006. Even more the relevant legal basis determining the EU co-ordination system was for a long time based on temporarily order[11] until its finalization in August 2005 when Cabinet of Ministers adopted *"Order on Co-ordination of Preparation, Adoption and Representation of the National Position on European Union Issues"*.[12]

The shape of the system was and is still driven more by comprehension of the particular political leader and less on the basis of comprehensive rational evaluation done by professionals. It is proved by the initiated reforms of the former Prime Minister Einars Repse (political party New Era) and later by Minister of Foreign Affairs Artis Pabriks (Peoples Party) supported by the party member Prime Minister Aigars Kalvitis.[13] MFA is presently holding functions that are not fully characteristic to it. EU issues should be regarded as a part of internal affairs where European practice shows that role of Prime minister is increasing. As, for example, in the countries like Finland, Sweden and Denmark where the co-ordination issues are more moved under the supervision of the Prime minister, taking into account that closer European integration process results in the increasing role of the head of government. The same should be said also about the neighbouring Baltic countries – Lithuania and Estonia where the centre of the government holds much stronger position in the European Affairs.

European Integration Bureau was initially the responsible institution for EI process co-ordination in Latvia and after reorganization – European Affairs Bureau.[14] In the period of time from the 1st of December 2003 to 31st of January 2005 EAB was a part of the Structure in the SC, directly subordinated to the Prime Minister. According to the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers EAO was reorganized and the functions moved to MFA.[15] The decision was justified that it will make the work of the Bureau more effective as the MFA has the necessary resources and diplomatic instruments.

It was opposite to the advice of the independent consultancy company which performed functional audit in the State Chancellery (SC) in 2004 and proposed to keep the EAB as an integrated part of the SC by explaining it with the importance of the European integration process as well as by necessity to ensure inter-ministerial co-ordination and linkage with long-term development plans of the state. Even more it was advised to separate the function of co-ordination of the positions and preparation by including that in the EAB.[16]

One of the basic tasks of the EAB was to wrap up and evaluate priorities relevant to membership of Latvia in the EU that are brought forward by the institutions in national administration, in order to develop single state policy. The work was carried out but not completed in respect to the baseline document that would determine membership priorities of Latvia to the EU. EAB was also managing the process of preparation of the position of Latvia in respect to Lisbon strategy and the financial perspective 2007–2013. EAB included representatives from the non-governmental and professional organizations, academics and others, as well as promoted involvement of non-governmental sector in the activities of national administration institutions in order to ensure successful development of the national EU policy.

CSO has important role in the coordination of EU affairs at the highest level of the civil servants in the national administration. CSO is a public institution that ensures co-operation of public institutions in the issues related to membership of Latvia into EU.[17]

The other process regarding challenges is the development of the system ensuring that the state speaks in one voice, that there is an effective national policy, convincing participation of the heads of governments in European Council meetings and ministers in the Council of Ministers meetings, communication within administration as well as dialogue with society and involvement of scholars in the process. To make policy more effective, it should be coordinated both with social partners and backed up by solid research in particular sectors that later could lead to effective determination and defence of position in Brussels.

Accession to EU indicates further challenges for Europeanization of the national administration. Membership to EU outlines new and more complicated tasks for national administration. From more reactive or passive phase of activity national administration enters into more proactive phase when national administration starts to participate in the process of decision preparation and decision-making process on EU level. Any of national policies of the state becomes an element of the related EU policy and increases demand for synchronization of decision-making process on national and EU level.

Synchronization of decision-making procedures means that Latvia should be ready for timely preparation of position and information of EU institutions about the position in all issues on EU agenda that are relevant to the country. The largest part of decision-making procedures in EU has regular character (Council of Ministries, COREPER, its committees and working groups basically have weekly cycle).

Substantial condition for effective decision-making in national administration is availability of resources. In the case of Latvia there are limited resources both financial and human. Due to internal policy motives government is resistible to increase of administrative expenses that would be regarded as strengthening of bureaucracy. At the same time it is clear that saving of resources might lead to low quality of taken decisions that in its turn would lead to substantial economical, social and financial consequences. Lack of financial resources has also direct impact to availability of human resources. Latvia has limited number of people that are in position to prepare quality proposals and opinions that are necessary in decision-making processes. There is also a limited number of capable administrators. Unfortunately the remuneration system and delay of salary reform in national administration hardly facilitate attraction and keeping qualified specialists that are leaving administration for work in EU institutions or private sector.

4. Impact of Europeanization during the First Year of EU Membership

Extent of impact of Europeanization and success of co-ordination system of internal policies could be better analysed in details by focusing on in-depth analysis of a number of key aspects:

a. Establishment of functioning system for definition of national EU policy and participation in EU

Probably the most tangible results in the first year of EU membership have been the development process of co-ordination system adjusted to the needs for EU membership. It has logically resulted in setting priorities of Latvia in the context of presidency of the Netherlands and Luxembourg and later focusing work on them. For Presidency of Netherlands it was financial perspective 2007–2013, implementation of Lisbon Strategy, EU external relations and Justice and Home Affairs but for the presidency of Luxembourg – financial perspective and Lisbon strategy.[18] Special working groups were operating and developing the position of Latvia in respect of Lisbon Strategy implementation and financial perspective 2007–2013 issues.

Work of CSO could be regarded as one of indicators that allow analysing the shifts in development of internal policies in the EU context as well as evaluate existence of strategy approach in the process. Therefore **Table 1** summarizes the issues that were discussed on the agenda of CSO during the first year of EU membership. In total there have been 41 meetings and 310 issues on agenda. The provided table is not reflecting 93 issues on agenda that were put under “Other” issues and cover broad range of issues mainly covering internal organization issues in administration, preparation of the meetings of Council of Ministers, implementation of acquis, notification process of adopted legal acts transposing acquis, translation issues, division of competences among institutions, public information, training, Latvian national position, etc.

The most valuable conclusion from this research is that the agenda has mainly been dominated by routine issues and to less extent by strategic ones. Much attention has been devoted to the preparation process for COREPER, Council of Ministers meetings and incoming proposals from EC in respect to the development of the new legal regulations (40%), 16% of issues have been related to internal organization issues of the EU membership process. These issues were dominating agenda a lot in the first half year of the membership and covered such questions as organization process of initial national positions and coordination of preparation of national positions and involvement of social partners, implementation process of acquis if that requests additional financial resources from the state budget, simplification procedure for transposition of acquis in the national legislation. 9% of attention in the CSO was paid to discussion preparation of particular national positions – how Latvia could react to White and Green Book published by the EC and involve society in order to formulate the position of Latvia before work on particular legal acts on EU level is started, priorities for Presidencies of Luxembourg and Netherlands, position in regard to EC's yearly policy strategy for 2006, position in respect to proposed "Better Regulation" regarding terminology adjustment, availability of consolidated version of documents and speeding up the legislation simplification process connected with a number of EU policy fields, position in respect to Genetically Modified Organisms, etc. A lot of attention was paid to different issues regarding transposition and implementation of acquis in the national legislation. This was closely related also to the process of EU starting infringement procedures against Latvia because of the delay in submitting notifications about transposed acquis to the EC. Only in 4% of cases discussion was raised about public information in the process of EU membership – it was mainly done due to the establishment of EU Information Agency responsible for public information work, publication of national positions in the homepage of Cabinet of Ministers therefore allowing to have interactive involvement of social partners in organizing society involvement in the EU decision making process.

Looking at the implementation process of Latvian priorities in the framework of EU ones, we should consider the Lisbon Strategy and its priorities – knowledge-based society, internal market (prevent hurdles for implementation of EU internal market for implementation of internal market directive in Latvia) business environment, labour market, infrastructure, environmental sustainability. It is possible to observe that during the first year of the membership the green light was given to developing and planning to develop a number of policy documents relevant to that.[19] As the most relevant steps there should be mentioned a number of Internal Policies elaborated in the framework of EU membership process – National Innovation program (2003–2006), Regional policy guidelines, State program for agriculture, Convergence program of Latvia for 2004–2007, Development program for the Small and Medium Size Enterprises (2004–2006), National action plan for decrease of poverty and social exclusion (2004–2006), Single Economic development strategy, National action plan for promotion of employment, Export promotion program (2005–2009) as well the others.

For short – term future preparation of a number of planning policy documents such as Market surveillance strategy, the Concept on State support for financing

Table 1

Issues on the Agenda of the Council of Senior Officials (May 2004 –May 2005)



of export deals, agriculture subsidies state program, waste management state plan (2003–2012) were considered as prior ones but National Strategic document for membership of Latvia to EU was missing opposite to Estonia which elaborated *“The Estonian Government’s European Union Policy for*

*2004–2006”*already in 2004. This document was a result of co-operation among different ministers, ministries and non-governmental organizations. Before being approved, the document was open for public discussion for social partners, public organizations and non-profit organizations that made their proposals and comments, and was under deliberation in the Estonian Parliament.[20]

For definition of national policy it is important to have close interaction among non-governmental sector, national administration and political decision makers. Knowledge accumulated on daily work, information exchange and relevant research base behind are important elements of success for that. It is essential that the “bottom-top” and not “top-bottom” approach is working in the process.

b. Co-ordination model for preparation of national positions in EU related issues

With MFA being in charge for this process, legal basis for EU membership co-ordination was established during the period before and after EU accession.[21] The regulations had to foresee effective participation of Latvia on all the levels of EU decision-making – working groups of European Commission and Council of Ministers, Committee of Permanent Representatives – meetings of ambassadors of EU member states, Council of Ministers and European Council.

One of the important indicators to assess the operation of the system would be the level of society involvement in EU decision-making process in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the system. Ministries have submitted to government of Latvia for decision making 254 draft positions for the EU Council of Ministers during the first nine months of EU membership

(May 2004–February 2005).[22] As the statistics in the **Table 2** shows, in 56% of cases consultations with society were recognized as unnecessary or were not held at all. There were only 4% of cases when social partners had objected to the prepared position. Therefore it is an important challenge in the process of developing policy further to develop involvement of representatives from society in EU decision-making process.

Table 2

Involvement of Society in EU Decision Making Process



Government institutions consider that activity from the side of social partners has not been substantial. The most common reasons as the example has indicated are a lack of knowledge and language skills.[23] The results prove the trend that from one point of view, the government organizes the consultation process irregularly; however the situation varies from sector to sector. If some sectors are less active in interrelation with the government, then others are just the opposite – quite active, e.g. agriculture, environment, social.

The national administration recognizes the need to identify social partners and the issues of their interest in order to improve mutual communication. One of the reasons of passive involvement of social partners is also recognized. It is the intensive agenda for preparation of national positions that does not allow for many social partners to react timely to the current issues, the usage of English language in the working documents, as well as the lack of comprehension about the EU decision making process.

c. Information exchange between administration and society

There is commitment to organize seminars for the non-governmental sector and make the relevant information available to the social partners by publishing relevant work plans of EU institutions and the planned drafts of legal acts on the websites of the institutions. Notwithstanding to this commitment made in the meeting of CSO on the 27th of September 2004, the initial desk research by the author in August 2005 shows that out of 17 central government institutions in 35% of cases only general information is available about the EU in relation to the field the institution is responsible for, 41% of institutions provide possibility of introducing with relevant EU documentation and just in 24% of cases it is possible to find also some elements of interactivity that allows representatives of society to follow respective work plans of EU institutions and the planned drafts of legal acts in the field.

Conclusion

Accession of new states to EU has changed the Europeanization concept itself and provides possibility to continue wider debate. So far it was mainly limited to analysis of national administration and its EU accession capacity.

In order Latvia could influence Europe to full extent; the state should have sound and professional government and parliament (escape from marginalization of EU membership process), strong and capable system of national administration with highly qualified civil servants. The last aspect is particularly important because large responsibility lies on national administration. The adoption to the new situation should be quick and permanent in order to participate successfully in solution of actual EU related issues. The new challenge is mainly related to the work on daily EU agenda. Like during the period before accession to EU also afterwards the issue related to administrative capacity building is one of the most important topics which Latvia has to face in line with growing information quantity that requires co-ordination.

Europanization process in the new EU member states has turned out to have also direct impact on **democratization and state building in the new democracies**. One of the key reasons for widening of democratization process is the development and the increase of life quality of people. If "the third wave" of democracy and the following Europeanization process most strongly influenced the new EU member states then at the same time many other former territories in Eastern and South Eastern Europe were mainly stagnating in their democratic development efforts and proved weakness and incapability in establishment of democracy and introduction of its values in the society. EU enlargement was accompanied by political changes in the Eastern Europe and Caucasus. As a result the second chance for their democratic efforts has been given to Georgia and Ukraine. Also countries of Western Balkans – Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia and Albania have stepped on the same path. The changes have touched also Moldova that has declared the change of political course towards the West.

Therefore one of the goals of EU Neighborhood policy is also to ensure that no new division lines between enlarged EU and the neighbors appear and offer them possibility to participate in various EU activities by using political, economical and cultural cooperation. Experience of Latvia should be regarded as useful to provide support to these countries in the future.

As a result of Europeanization process Latvia has also been involved in the development cooperation policy. By decision of Cabinet of Ministers[24] Latvia has adopted the guidelines for development cooperation policy as well as allocated for various initiatives 100 000 LVL in 2005 and 150 000 LVL in 2006. It means that the state from the assistance recipient country is becoming the donor state. In terms of money allocations Latvia is far from reaching the figure of 0.2% of GDP that is common practice for the developed countries.[25] Nevertheless as the key asset should be regarded people and their experience acquired during the transition process, so very relevant is the investment that could be used for introducing the principles of good governance in the Eastern European countries and their national administrations.

Transfer towards the status of donor state takes place step by step. So far Latvia has done financial contributions in the special funds and programs, providing human assistance for liquidation of different type of catastrophes as well as consulted transition democracies on implementation of economic reforms. As priority countries Latvia similarly to Estonia and Lithuania have defined Georgia and Moldova. Priority in bilateral and multilateral co-operation for development co-operation projects was given to promotion of bilateral and multilateral co-operation for the projects in the promotion of democratic and civil society*;* promotion of economic development, support for public administration and local-self governments reform process, environment protection, education, social development, health and justice and home affairs.[26]

The experience of national administration acquired during Europeanization process allows concluding that the key factors determining success of democratic changes, success of reforms and later also Europeanization of internal policies will be much dependant on such critical factors as political commitment, existence of comprehensive development strategy, public administration capacity enforcing reforms, ability to assess EU impact, lack of necessary education and knowledge, corruption, rotation of human resources in the public administration, legislation and institution building process, readiness of nongovernmental sector for professional dialogue and involvement in policy process, availability of financial resources, effective usage of foreign technical assistance and openness for co-operation with former transition democracies.

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[22] The full statistics for the full year of membership is not developed because since reorganization of EAO in 02.2005 there are no full versions of the national positions available any more, except the informative reports on the national positions. The analysis is made on the basis of available information in the data basis of policy document of Cabinet of Ministers, http://www.mk.gov.lv.

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pp. 111-125

Borders Vanish, and What Happens? A Norm Perspective on Local Welfare Policy and Citizen Participation in Baltic and Nordic States

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1. Focus of the study

"Border spanning is"– as we quote from the invitation to the conference – "the term that describes most accurately the process that will influence the development of individuals and communities in the future". This statement accords with standard theory of comparative politics that underlines, among many other influences, the role that inputs and demands from the international system have on every political system (Almond & al 2001). This fits well into the research design presented in this article.

An aspect of border spanning that so far has not been highlighted in literature are certain powerful norms that influence central characteristics of the Baltic and Nordic societies, in particular with regard to welfare policies and citizen participation at the local level. We will use a framework based on norm science as the basis for a comparative study.

The relevance of norm science to this research project will in this paper build mainly on cases drawn from the Swedish and Norwegian experience. At this time we must omit examples from the Baltic countries, due to lack of empirical input.

As Berglund (2003, 181) has noted: "East European local politics is in many ways a *terra incognita*." This is not to say that no research of interest has happened in this field, but that current documentation is limited (Soós et al 2002). Despite this imbalance regarding empirical evidence, we assume that there are significant differences regarding normative influences not only between the Nordic and Baltic countries, but also among each of these two groups.

Can one see indications of change in these norms as a result of–to put the question in the words of the conference–globalization, or regionalization (Baltic-Nordic), or alternatively as the result of ideological (democratic) influences? We hypothesize that such changes are numerous and important to understand welfare policies. We intend to find and explore such changes at the local community level. Finally, we also seek to determine whether or not these changes are pointing in the same direction.

The research effort concentrates on local communities and three kinds of activities: elderly care, disability policies and the role that voluntary organizations play as mediators of the state. These areas appear well suited for the study and analyses of norms regarding welfare service delivery and citizen participation.

In particular, what characterizes the norms that serve as the basis for elderly care, the care of disabled persons and voluntary neighbourhood organizations at the local level in the Baltic countries and the Nordic countries? Are these norms significantly different in these countries? If they are, how can we best explain these differences? These questions are important, not only theoretically, but also in the light of the substantive issues concerning the ageing populations of the Baltic and Nordic countries, as well as the increased interest in citizen participation in Europe.

2. Norm Science

Håkan Hydén (2002) establishes three constituent elements of a norm: *values, knowledge and possibilities*. The three concepts affect each other; they cannot be regarded as totally autonomous but as developed in dialogue with each other. Changes in legislation may thus lead to changes in knowledge as well as in values. It is therefore hard to predict the effect of such changes, since they depend on the dialogue and mutual influences between value, knowledge and possibilities.

Value is seen as a positive factor by actors (individuals) and structures (organizations). The value of, for instance, good welfare for the elderly may be referred to this category (this concept). Usually, the norm always stands in some relation to the value concept. In studies of municipal elderly care the value concept is of great importance, since the value of good welfare for the elderly can both be seen as a general overarching goal in all care of the elderly, be of benefit to the recipients of elderly care, as well as positive for the employees in their various work capacities.

Knowledge refers to the knowledge that affects how the norm looks like and which leads to the norm being effectuated and implemented. Knowledge is also of great importance to social action. If we do not understand the social interaction, we can neither understand the norms controlling the socio-cultural system. Nor do we understand the norms existing within the economic and political/administrative systems.

The rules of elderly care, consisting of overarching rules and other regulations of a framework character, need to be filled with material content for actors to be able to apply them. The knowledge of structures (organizations) is manifested in the various laws, regulations, prescriptions, municipal decisions, policy documents, statutes, collective agreements, and other documents that have been approved by those responsible at different administrative levels and in cooperation with employee organizations.

Possibilities relate to the outer frames within which norms are formed. Norm formation processes are often limited by economic factors. There can be instances when no actual funds have been allotted for to provide and develop elderly care for those clients who have obtained aid on paper. Even the very right to care in itself may be regarded as a limiting factor, because of its form or contents. The municipal organizational structure creates frames for normative development. The laws, regulations, application stipulations, etc. which control the elderly care of the municipality create frames for the norms controlling its activities.

To sum up, it may be said that the three concepts (categories) of possibilities, knowledge and values constitute norms in the following way:

• The *value* category is connected to driving-forces with links to different motivation systems: political ideologies, religion and other external macro-level influences as well as individual circumstances like micro-level morals and ethics. Other driving-forces may be egoistic motives coupled to economic conditions as well as solidarity with other people at the macro or micro level.

•The *knowledge* category can be said to correspond to the cognition concept. Depending on how we look upon the world, what is our starting-point, and also on gender, ethnicity and educational level – formal as well as tacit knowledge – and on power relations, the knowledge category acquires different values. All these parts of the knowledge category affect norm formation in society in general and the care of the elderly in particular. Knowledge in our study of elderly care means education, experience and various forms of policy.

•The *possibility* category is linked to the various systems (socio-cultural, economic, technical, and political/administrative) and the conditions of these systems. In our study of the care of the elderly, possibilities involve economic conditions, organization, management, and control.

•The three categories of value, knowledge and possibilities are linked to different prerequisites. Value is linked to driving-forces, the motives of human action. For knowledge cognition is the basic concept. Possibilities are tied to the system-bound conditions existing in the social context of social, cultural, economic, technical and political/administrative systems as well as in the biotic and physical systems of the environment. See further *Figure 1* below

(Hydén 2002:287)

As already mentioned, the three categories (concepts), *value, knowledge,* and *possibilities*, influence each other in a continuous dialogue. According to Hydén, the value affects what knowledge becomes relevant, what we are looking for. At the same time, knowledge is related to and dependent on the systems and the



Figure 1. **Conditions for the norm.**

system conditions. The circle is closed by the system conditions, which in turn have consequences for different values and driving-forces affecting society at large.

When the above reasoning is applied to the field of elderly care, value corresponds to the different views of elderly care as being good or bad, depending on motives and driving-forces. This viewpoint indicates what knowledge, or what type of knowledge, is relevant to the understanding of human action. Knowledge, depending on gender, ethnicity, education, power relations and other factors, forms the basis of possibilities and the system conditions for acting in the elderly care sphere. Possibilities and system conditions in their turn influence what values and driving-forces within elderly care affect society at large.

2.1 Norm Theory: Actors and Structures

Norm science encompasses action theories directed at actors, and system theories directed at structures. Values are created and articulated by individual and group actors. The same applies to knowledge: it exists in one or several actors and is developed by them.

The systems (socio-cultural, economic, technical, and political-administrative) are built up of different structures. In several cases these structures can function as actors. The actual possibilities inherent in the system for realizing the values one knows about and wants to implement depend on the conditions set up by the various structures or subsystems. System conditions are general limitations determined by the acting of the various subsystems.

Two issues are relevant in this context: What determines action? What lies behind the norm in the individual case?

The first issue: what determines action? The contents of normative theory are *action theoretical*, developed from an *actor perspective* in relation to relevant values and knowledge.

The second issue: what lies behind the norm in the individual case? This issue concerns the application of normative theory to contents that are *system theoretical* and developed from a *structure perspective*.

The Norm Theory is presented in *Figure 2*.



Figure 2. **What determines the norm? (Hydén 2002: 289).**

In the summary of his presentation of the Norm Theory, Hydén acknowledges that it does not in itself provide answers to all questions. “The function [of the Norm Theory] is to structure the knowledge process to make it take into consideration as much as possible of what is relevant in a certain case. What is relevant is determined by what is being studied” (Hydén 1998:68). We shall seek to apply Hydén’s scheme to the comparative study of particular welfare policies and citizen participation at the local level in the Baltic and Nordic countries.

3. Organizing welfare?

Does it matter how welfare is organized in our society and which norms control its organization, for instance in the care of the elderly? Elderly care, care of disabled persons, neighbourhood organizations and other local NGOs will be the empirical focus of the paper and of the study we are going to perform. Its aim is to study how elderly, care of disabled persons and voluntary organizations are organized, administered and how they implement their different policies at the local level from a norm perspective.

How welfare services are organized depends on the variables constituting the total organizational process: *Roles, procedures, culture, space* and *structuring* (Lundquist 1997). According to Agevall (Agevall 2002, 163), *roles* constitute units in organizational management based on the assumption that the actor acts as expected. *Procedures* are various methods for control, decision-making and coordination. *Culture* comprises the language, the views of reality and the more or less homogenous values of the organization members. *Space* can refer to the geographical location of an activity, either in different places or within one and the same place. It can also comprise the geographical boundaries of organization activities (under municipal, county, private or cooperative responsibility). Space may also, for example, include the architecture, design, furnishing of the localities where the activities take place. By *structuring* is meant how the organization variables relate to each other: Resources in the form of personnel, material, information, and preferences in the form of the views, thoughts, and pressures of different professions and the outside administrative control of the organization. Structuring allocates the resources and hence the distribution of power and influence over the organization.

What norms should be followed in the organization of welfare? We have chosen Lundquist's model "Our Public Ethos". Lundquist (1997, 1998) constructs the concept of *our public ethos* from different sources, which include the ongoing social debate, legislation, constitutional laws and the preparatory work preceding these, statements by leading politicians and political institutions as well as international conventions. Lundquist's concept of *our public ethos* contains *democratic values* and *economic values*, providing us with normative tools for analysis and assessment:

Democratic values	*Economic values*
Political democracy	Functional rationality
Legal rights	Cost efficiency
Public ethics	Productivity

Political democracy involves the demands of democratic processes as well as of its substance. The process demands include general elections, citizen participation in administration, administrative openness and information; citizen participation and citizen rights. The substance demands refer to the demands of the law: general goals or detailed regulations, the will of politicians and the choice and will of the people: public, special, and client interests. *Legal rights* entail equality before the law, predictability: protection against arbitrariness achieved through stable rules of the game and access to the law: the possibility to assert one's rights. *Administrative ethics* include general ethics, role ethics, relation ethics and branch ethics.

Economic values comprise *functional rationality*: choosing the measures really conducive to the goals set up. *Cost efficiency*: reducing costs as far as possible. *Productivity* refers to the relation between input and output and entails that as little money as possible should be spent on each measure (see e.g. Agevall & Klasson 2000, Lundquist 1997, 1998, Rothstein 1995).

3.1 Administrative Policy Changes in the Public Sector

Administrative policy changes in Norwegian and Swedish municipalities are of long standing. During the 1970s these changes chiefly involved municipal reforms – controlled from above – with the aim of creating municipalities with resources rich enough to implement the national welfare policy. More recent reforms have primarily been questions of different forms of local municipal experiments, often fairly comprehensive ones. A municipal administration policy was established on the national level in order to attain certain values and to improve efficiency.

The Swedish Local Government Act of 1991 (and its amendments, mainly from 1992–2002) and the Norwegian Local Government Act of 1992 enabled municipalities in both countries to develop their own organization. One important reform provided for municipal freedom to structure the organization of committees; another increased the authority to delegate. Delegation was allowed from the municipal council to the executive board, from committees to individual members and civil servants as well as from administrative heads to other employees within the domain of the committee (Montin 2002).

The opportunity to establish new organizational forms by abolishing committees and creating new administrative units was taken by most municipalities. In the early 1990s organizational changes took place in 70 percent of the Swedish municipalities. In Norway about 85 percent of the municipalities made such changes (Røvik 2000). New formal organizations, such as accountability and performance units, were set up as well as relatively independent agencies within the local administration. The role of external actors as entrepreneurs and other service producers and consultants increased. Further examples are the introduction of municipal neighbourhood councils and "purchaser-provider" models. In Sweden the former type of councils has already been abolished in many cases and the same goes more or less for the latter. However, in some metropolitan municipalities like Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö, the municipal district councils still remain, and a few large municipalities still apply the "purchaser-provider" concept. Certain reforms like performance units and decentralization have been widely accepted throughout both countries, even though Swedish municipalities, especially some large municipalities and those in the Stockholm area have been quicker to "jump on the bandwagon". There are great differences between one municipality and another and changes are taking place gradually. Certain common features, however, can be discerned in many municipalities; for instance, there is talk about "market orientation" and "copying the market" and adaptations are made to the local political municipality environment (see e.g. Bäck 2000, Rövik 2000, and Montin 2002).

The municipal system changes are mostly based on the extensively used philosophy of management and control of public activities called New Public Management (NPM). Examples of how NPM has been applied to Norwegian and Swedish municipalities and county councils are numerous (Christensen & Lægreid 1999).

The following characteristics can be discerned and summarized with regard to such changes:

- Emphasis on the citizen as customer-recipient or purchaser of welfare and other services.

- Market imitation: creating internal competitiveness and businesslike conditions.
- Privatization: especially as regards private entrepreneurs and the cloning of municipal units (or the equivalent).
- The separation of politics and production, thereby legitimating the independence of the professional teams as street-level bureaucrats.

All of these parts of the NPM concept clash in different ways with a number of values linked to municipal autonomy and to democratic values: political democracy, legal rights, and values in general (Montin 2002, Agevall & Klasson 2000, Lundquist 1997 and 1998).

3.2 Welfare Rule Systems and the Organizing of Welfare in Norway

In Norway local governments are given the responsibility for most of the nonhospital care for elderly, through laws and regulations decided by the Storting (parliament), the government, and the ministries. The number of people claiming social welfare benefits increased substantially throughout the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, but has since tailed off somewhat. In 1997, approx. 147,000 persons received social welfare benefits in Norway. In 1997, the annual costs of social welfare benefits amounted to less than NOK 4 billion (1997 value), for the first time since 1993.

The social welfare service is a responsibility of the municipal authorities. Many municipalities have re-organized their services and have greatly enhanced the expertise of the staff over the last few years. Even so, the quality of the services still seems to differ widely. For this reason, in spring 1998, the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Social Affairs introduced the "Plan of Action for the Social Welfare Service's Front Line: Knowledge and Closer Communication (1998–2001)". The aim of this plan is to:

- Improve the quality of the work and the skills of the social welfare service staff serving clients with complex problems, such as substance abusers. Improvement of after-care will be a major issue
- make the social welfare service more user-friendly and accessible
- Reduce the random disparity of benefit distribution.

4. Disability Policies in Sweden and Norway

4.1 Sweden

Organisation

In the forthcoming study we have chosen to focus upon care of the elderly, care of people with disabilities, and the role neighbourhood organizations as three different kinds of activities which are important in local communities. In a third of Sweden's municipalities the social service organisation of these groups is divided in separate organisations, more common is that care delivery is joined together in one organisation (Socialstyrelsen 2005). The municipal care of the elderly and people with disabilities is a public and politically controlled and managed organisation, i.e. politicians have the ultimate responsibility for creating the aims, the guidelines, and the overall decisions. Elections in Sweden are held every four years which means that the political state of affairs can change, including the aims and guidelines for the organisation. Part of the complexity of leadership in local authority care of the elderly and people with disabilities can be explained by the fact that the managers are working in a political organisation (Holmberg & Henning 2003; Wolmesjö 2005).

During the 1990s many of the local authorities have been forced to reduce expenditure on the care of the elderly and people with disabilities and many organisational changes have been carried out. Some major changes took place in the 1990s; The Elderly Reform of 1992, the Disability Act of 1994 and the Mental Health Reform of 1995. These reforms have caused changes in the organisation of care and also changed the relative position of the different professions working there.

In 2003 there were 235 400 persons working in local authority care of the elderly and people with disabilities, 90 percent of these persons were women. Of these people 9 111 were managers (Svenska Kommunförbundet 2004). This means that local authorities are among Sweden's largest employers. Even larger numbers of people will deal with this complex organisation as users and relatives.

Among the different professions, there are social workers, nurses, nursing assistants, occupational therapists, physical therapists, and others who need to cooperate in new environments. In addition users and professionals with different ethnic backgrounds and cultural identities also meet each other in the organisation. As a result of the Disability Act an entirely new profession has developed, called personal assistants. Organisations of relatives and volunteers supplement or sometimes replace the service provided by local authority organisations (Szebehely 1996). This has caused a demand for organisational support from the local authority for these groups.

The Mission

The mission of the social service organisations is to provide social and health care in residential homes, group living, and ordinary housing for people at different ages and with different needs. The mission is expressed in the Social Service Act, SoL (SFS 2001:453) and in the Act Concerning Support and Service for Persons with Certain Functional Impairments, LSS (SFS, 1993:387) as mentioned earlier in this paper. Most important in the Swedish disability policy is the principle of full participation and that everyone is of equal value and has equal rights. The policy objectives are in line with the United Nations' Standard Rules of the Equalisation of Opportunities for People with Disabilities. People with disabilities have the same rights as others to participate in community life. The aim, to offer good health and social and financial security for people with disabilities are shared by national, regional and local government. (Socialstyrelsen 2005). The services should be provided with respect for each person's autonomy and integrity (SFS 2001:453 1 chap 1 §) with the proviso that people with disabilities have the right to live an independent life.

Personal Assistant

The Act Concerning Support and Service for Persons with Certain Functional Impairments (known as LSS) came into force in 1994 and extended the rights of people with disabilities in Sweden. The Act is directed to 1) persons with learning disabilities, autism or autism-like conditions, 2) persons with significant and lasting learning disabilities after brain damage caused by violence or disease or 3) persons with other physical or psychiatric disabilities not occurred from natural ageing, if these are severe and are of considerable proportions in daily life situations and cause an extensive need of support and service. The law applies also to children, youths, and adults with lasting needs for habilitation and rehabilitation.

One of the most important elements in LSS is the right to personal assistance, a service which is part of, and effected by political, social and economical norm systems of the welfare society. The local authority appoints assistants or provides financial support for individuals, who themselves would like to employ their own assistant. In the beginning the right was restricted to people below the age of 65. Since 2001 the law has been changed; now you can receive assistance according to LSS as long as you have applied before the age of 65. If the need is for less than 20 hours a week, the local authority pays the costs. If the need is more than 20 hours a week, there is a special law: the Act Concerning Compensation for Assistance witch means the state defrays the costs. Other rights prescribed by LSS include consultation and other personal professional support, companion service, the possibility of brief stays outside the home in short term care, family homes or homes with special services for children and young people who need to live outside the parental home, and homes with special services for adults.

In 2003 about 48 000 people received support according to the LSS Act. About 21 000 received help under The Social Service Act, known as SoL (Socialstyrelsen 2005).

Personal assistance is provided in all of the Nordic countries, but the fashion in which the service is delivered and the criteria you have to fulfil to receive the service differ. In Norway the official term of personal assistance is “user controlled personal assistance” (Bengtsson & Gynnerstedt 2003). Users can decide or influence who should be their assistant, what to do, how to do it and the amount of working hours which are needed. Personal assistance has been available in Norway since 1994 and is from 2000 a complement to the Social Service Act a service that local authorities have to provide (Andersen 2000).

Administration

If you, as a person with a disability (or as an elderly) in Sweden have a need of social or medical care for support and service in your daily life, you (or your relative) make an application to the social services at your local authority. A social worker will make a home visit and discuss your needs and make the decision according to SoL or LSS. Managers and nursing assistants responsible for providing the care will arrange the services in cooperation with you as far as possible.

The number of persons, who receive support from SoL or LSS or both, differs from municipality to municipality. One explanation can be found in the way the municipalities organise their care. If care of elderly and people with disabilities are divided between separate units, on average more help is provided (Socialstyrelsen 2005). Other problems which have occurred can be related to how the investigation process is organised and administered. To secure the legal rights of the individual, the former profession as home help administrator has been split in two different professions; one as manager-director and another as administrator. This organisational form is influenced by NPM as mentioned above. To decide whether a user has rights according to the law has sometimes been a contentious issue. Another difficult decision, which the investigator-administrator has to take, concerns the assessment of fundamental personal needs. When decisions are made, there still remains to hire people as personal assistants. In many parts of the country this can be difficult.

“Bringing Out the Norms”

Who is responsible for “bringing out the norms”? And what norms will be brought out or can be found in the organisation? Responsible for the organisation are elected officials as mentioned previously above and professional managers at different levels. In their daily life the user is mainly met by nursing or personal assistants. What kind of educational background do we find among these professionals who care for the elderly and people with disabilities in Sweden? Training to become a manager-director in this field has expanded from a six-month course to a three-and-a-half-year university degree during the last decade. The focus on specialized knowledge has turned from a medical perspective towards a social perspective.

Today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the widely-shared management and ethical norms in this field seem largely brought about by training in social work, especially when we consider the educational background of managers. However, the most common education of staff members is a three-year college degree in health and social care. Since the educational background varies (due to different professions and according to educational changes during a long period), we can assume that different norms and ethical codes is frequent occurrence in the organisation.

In a study of the management profession in different organisations of care of the elderly and persons with disabilities (Wolmesjö 2005), the managers consider their role and how they act as important according to the values and norms that are prevailing in the organisation. Being the manager and leader was described in terms of being “a source of inspiration” and the person “changing the thinking”, i.e. give new perspectives that will lead to change and individual development. Organisational changes and economy measures have, according to managers and politicians, increased the need for discussing ethical issues according to common attitudes, norms, and how to approach to users in need of support and services from a social perspective. The increased demand for qualified home health care has raised the question whether the social care perspective has become less important and is about to change back again towards a medical perspective – or is it possible to combine them?

4.2 Disability Policy in Norway

Official Norwegian policy seeks to enable as many disabled persons as possible to live an independent life. Young disabled people are to be offered alternative housing and services rather than nursing homes and homes for the elderly. This requires that efficient schemes for practical assistance are provided to enable disabled persons to carry out their daily routines in a flexible manner.

A system of user-controlled personal assistance has been established to provide the disabled person with greater freedom of action. Politically, it is regarded as important to improve the scope of activity for the disabled, and that their surroundings are adapted as a natural part of social planning. By promoting efforts to design buildings, the external environment and products, so as to maximise the number of people who can use them, it is claimed that society will be far more open for everyone.

Policies for the disabled are the responsibility of the relevant sector. Ordinary services must be provided for the disabled in the same way as they are provided for others. Whenever necessary, public authorities are supposed to provide additional, special measures according to individual needs. How these policies are actually implemented varies considerably among municipalities (Andersen 2000).

5. The Neighborhood Association as a Mediator of the Welfare State

Traditionally public administration is seen as the linking pin between political decision-makers and the individual beneficiaries of welfare initiatives. According to Michel Crozier's (1964) classic description, isolated bureaucrats handle individual claims and enforce regulations in a rigid, standardized, and impersonal way. For adherents of democracy and welfare policy ideals, bureaucracy represents a threat that can be counteracted by a functioning civil society. Rather than having to act individually, civil society allows citizens to act collectively to express their interests in a public arena and to make demands on the state (Kjær 2004).

Neighborhood associations are interest groups based on territory. The members are usually homeowners and tenants within a narrow geographical territory smaller than most units of government. In the United States Robert Fisher (1984) found three historical types of neighborhood organizing based on social work, political activism, or neighborhood maintenance. The social work approach originates in problems of social disorganization and conflict. The activist approach concerns powerlessness and neighborhood destruction, while the maintenance approach deals with insufficient services and threats to neighborhood homogeneity and property values.

At this stage we know little about interest groups based on territory in the Baltic countries. What we know is that there are a number of transitional democracies with poorly developed civil societies – that is voluntary associations and organized interest groups – in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe (Berglund & Duvold 2003). Since the 1991 liberation, Latvia has shown a relatively low level of civil participation (Pabriks and Purs 2001). Grønningsæter (2003) reports that the role of NGOs seems limited at the local level. However, at the same time he sees them as important in caring for the most marginalized groups in Latvian society. This is in sharp contrast to the role played by trade unions with their massive network of social clubs during the Soviet period (Aasland, 1996).

In Norway and Sweden the situation differs from the Baltic countries, both with regard to NGOs in general, and to neighborhood organizations, which are the focus in this section.

In recent surveys, Norwegian neighborhood organizations generally respond that lack of services and environmental threats belong to their immediate concerns. These problems can sometimes be met by the joint efforts of neighbors coming together to build a playground or maintain a public footpath in the cooperative spirit of the "dugnad." More complex or costly problems must be solved with governmental help (Koht 1998). Most neighborhood organizations interact with local government to ask for help with traffic problems, street maintenance, kindergartens, housing regulations, and community buildings. On the other hand local government responds by providing money for a great variety of projects and by inviting neighborhood groups to participate in public hearings on planning issues.

Norwegian neighborhood associations challenge conventional norms regarding interest groups with respect to membership definitions and main target groups. While most local organizations operate with fee-based, voluntary individual memberships, there are some associations that include all home-owners within a clearly delimited housing tract as obligatory members, while a third category claims "open membership" with no formal members or annual fees. The two latter organizational forms challenge values of voluntarism and representativeness.

Although one would think that neighborhood groups are concerned with all inhabitants within their area, they tend to give priority to certain age groups, such as children or the elderly. This may indicate that these organizations are closely attuned to the most current concerns of their members. Together with the great differences in concerns and activities, variety regarding target groups contribute to what some observers may see as opportunism and NIMBYism ("Not in My Back Yard" attitudes). Others may well conclude that their flexibility concerning issues and targets makes neighborhood associations particularly effective participants in the evolution of civil society.

6. Method

How can changes in the factors such as values, knowledge, and possibilities that constitute norms in the provision of welfare services and citizen participation be studied? Our chosen method of study will be *abductive inference* (see Alvesson & Sköldberg 1994, Peirce and Matz 1990). We will develop tentative theories, hypotheses: "suggest a theory" to empirically study the implementation, organization and management of elderly care, care for the disabled, and citizen participation. Baier and Svensson (2004: 89–90) write:

> *If we depart from an action or a case that in some sense… …may be seen as surprising, we can start formulating the hypothesis (norm) whose aim is instead to explain the case. The hypothesis is then formulated with consideration taken to the contextual facts we know, but also to the relevant conformity to law. Since norms*

> *are not the same as mandatory conformity to law, but prescriptions for action with a much looser connection between prescription and action, we can regard norms as hypotheses. A norm is thus a hypothesis that can explain an action.*

The hypotheses then have to be tested by the usual methods: deductive or inductive. In this research there are possibilities for abductive as well as inductive and qualitative research approaches.

The analyses will be carried out by comparing the results form the interviews of local elite persons, and in the Norwegian case also by surveys, with the hypothesis of norm formation that is the outcome of studies of the literature. They will follow the general three-stage procedure: abduction, deduction and induction (Baier & Svensson 2004).

We consider this study as *abductive*, since the norm formation hypothesis has been arrived at by using the social science research method of *literature studies.* It is *deductive*, since facts can be derived from the hypothesis by comparison with research results from our chosen municipalities and *inductive* through the evaluation made of the comparison between the norm formation hypothesis and the results of our studies in the selected municipalities. We find support for this reasoning among other researchers such as Alvesson and Sköldberg (1994: 42).

7. Significance of the Norm Theory

How norms transform into driving-forces and actions which affect local welfare institutions and policies trigger questions of both theoretical and empirical interest for social science. What's more, we will argue that norm theory is well attuned to do comparative studies across borders, like the project we have outlined in this paper. To our knowledge, there are so far no studies that have built upon norm theory comparing old democracies with transitional democracies. This is a unique aspect of this research design. Our core argument is that norm theory can encompass differences in history, ethnicity, democracy and the economy. In addition, norm theory has a valuable interdisciplinary potential. Hence we can combine sociology (of law), political science (political theory and policy analysis) and economics. However, it remains to be seen what an empirical study can contribute to our understanding of norm science.

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The Democratic Development Process of the Former Communist Party in East Germany – a Role Model for Other Former Socialist Countries ?

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The Background, the PDS and the Political Culture of Germany

In this paper I focus on the successful democratic transformation of the former communist party of the Soviet dominated German Democratic Republic (GDR), aka East Germany. I regard this still ongoing transformation process as successful, because the successor of the communist party, the *Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus* (PDS) today is an active participant in the democratic development of the united Germany. In that respect the party literally deserves the word 'democratic' in its name 'Party for Democratic Socialism'. Since the unification of Germany in 1990 the PDS has been an important factor of the political culture in East Germany, but in spite of heavy efforts has never managed to break through in the political landscape of West Germany.

Before the German federal election in September 2005 the PDS decided to initiate negotiations in order to cooperate and eventually merge with mainly West German groups of protest voters gathered in opposition against the socialdemocratic-green government under chancellor Gerhard Schröder. These groups call themselves WASG (abbreviation for 'Initiative for work and social justice') and the foundation of these groups was strongly influenced by the personal rivalry of their leader Oskar Lafontaine against Mr. Schröder. I shall, with the exception of my outlines of perspectives at the end of the article, concentrate on the "old" East German based PDS in this presentation.

The PDS is definitely to be regarded as a left-wing party clearly advocating socialist views and positions, but in contrast to politics in many other countries, this is in no way against the political system of Germany and the ideals and philosophies behind it. Experiences with the nazi regime and the GDR-system have stressed the importance of a political culture characterized by a 'fight on words and attitudes'' which is seen as a value, not a deficit. The fight can also be described as the never ending process of constructing, defending and reconstructing positions and views that is going on between the ruling majority and its opposing minority.

The German term *Streitbare Demokratie* ('Fightable / struggling democracy') covers the content of this part of Germany's political culture. (Reichel. 1981 and Sontheimer. 1990) Therefore the opposition parties in Germany are encouraged to join the political process actively and constructively, because the critical feed-back on the goverment's work supports the further development and renewal of society.

In the shape of West German politicians moving to East Germany, the so-called, imports from the We*st*', representatives of this political culture interacted with the upcoming political voices of the new East German states (the 'Länder' as they are called in German) after the collapse of the GDR and the unification of the two German states in 1989/90. In my view, this process would probably not have been able to break through and succeed without the existence and influence of the West German political system.

Some political rivals argue that the PDS is just a bunch of frustrated East German protest voters who have been overrun by and haven't been able to cope with the new conditions within market economics. Shortly before the 2005 federal election the leader of the Bavarian conservative party Edmond Stoiber claimed that the federal election should not once more be decided by frustrated East Germans. In the 2002 election only 6000 votes separated him and chancellor Schröder from winning the election, and most probably the heavy floods in East Germany just before the election and Schröder's "stateman" handling of it resulted in extra East German votes in his favour. Ironically enough this claim influenced the 2005 election negatively for Mr. Stoiber and other conservatives, because it caused many East Germans to vote one more for social democratic candidates.

It cannot be neglected that the PDS voters to some extent can be categorized as protest voters, but statistics show that the PDS has developed a stable, serious, supportive group of core voters (Møller. 2002). This is also reflected in the fact that the party gets around 20% at most elections in East Germany, even more at local elections and, quite interestingly, it gained more than 30% of all votes in the state of Brandenburg in the last EU-parliamentary election.

This is especially interesting, because the PDS in its majority is a left-wing party *in favour of* the EU and the European integration, which is rather unusual for left-wing parties both in the West and in the East.

A Role Model for Other Left-wing Parties in New EU Member States?

Can the PDS transformation experience be a model or at least an inspiration for the political left in other former socialist countries? I think so, and in my opinion four partly interconnected arguments support this view.

1) The PDS has been open to, and *has had* to be open to argumentative confrontations within politics, since the political scene in East Germany ever since the unification in 1990 has been very much influenced by so-called 'West-imports', i.e. politicians from the Western part of Germany. They on their side represent a political culture, which has had the advantage of being able to mature over time, ever since the Americans, the British and the French in their occupation zones in Germany started the reeducation and the redemocratization of the German people (Thränhardt. 1996). That means that the East has had the benefit of encountering a consolidated political culture, which without doubt and in spite of all political rethoric has helped to mature the PDS and made it possible to take

political responsibility. Nevertheless the PDS is still a left-wing party that defends and, considering its actual politics in the state parliaments where it is in power, constructively incorporates parts of its socialist heritage that it considers worth preserving, for example, in the social and the work-related spheres.

2) The PDS supports the European development process in the framework of the EU. It must be emphasized, though, that this support is seen from a left-wing critical perspective against capitalism. The PDS works together with a number of leftist groups from the other EU-countries in the socialist-communist parliamentary fraction, in which not everybody is in favour of the EU-integration.
3) Internally in Germany the PDS has seeked and gained governmental influence. It works in stable coalitions with socialdemocrats in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Berlin, which are two of the sixteen German states. This fact reflects that political pragmatism, especially on a regional and a supranational (i.e. EU) level, has won over dogmatism and isolation.
4) Presumably this involvement and active participation in the political process has lead to a high degree of moral integrity in the PDS. To my knowledge there have been no corruption scandals etc. in the party, which in many other post-communist parties is definitely not always the case.

Is there a need for the impulse of a party like the PDS in other former socialist states? Many political observers see a tendency in many political parties, also on the left-wing of the political landscape, to isolatation within the borders of one's own country, whcih easily might develop into various forms of nationalism. As mentioned by Professor Thomas Lundén, keynote speaker at this conference, boundries should be seen as *opportunities* to inspire each other across national borders. In other words, borders and boundries must be perceived as a uniting, not a separating factor.

In my view, the development of the PDS to a constructive part of the political landscape could be used as a role model for other states that have been under the influence of the same political system. Of course the states in many respects have different historical and political backgrounds, but they are also characterized by many common features in the way socialism was uniformly forced upon the states in the interest sphere of the Soviet Union. Another common feature of these states, in contrast to many Middle East states such as Iraq, are their democratic roots in pre-Soviet periods that can be revitalised as has been the case in East Germany.

A Tendency Towards Isolation and National Orientation in 21st Century Europe

The Polish parliamentary election in October 2005 is an example of a tendency that can be observed in Europe in general, but in my view especially in many of the new member states of the EU and in other regions of the former socialist bloc.

The Polish newspaper *Polityka*, quoted in the Swiss paper *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (see Vetter. 2005), mentioned that they symbolize a mental change in the population:

- away from an open mind towards the world,
- away from tolerance and respect for non-conformity in the country itself,
- away from the acceptance of minority groups behaving differently and living their lives in other ways than the majority of the population.

The *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* adds that the left-wing parties in Poland, traditionally protecting and fighting for the rights of the weak and for internationalism, in recent years have deserted the Polish people and abandoned their traditional progressive ideals. In my view this tendency does not apply only to Poland. The scepticism against the common currency Euro in many new EU member states as well as in Denmark and Sweden can be interpreted as a sign of isolation, border-building and the stressing of nation-oriented goals and ideas.

This development is a potential and, in my opinion, a danger for the PDS as well. It has, as described above, until now been quite internationally oriented, but the cooperation with the WASG could promote and activate attitudes in favour of national orientation. Oskar Lafontaine's rhetorics against ”*Fremdarbeiter*” caught a lot of attention in the early stage of the 2005 election campaign. The word '*Fremd-*' means '*foreign*' but is connotated negatively in opposition to the neutral word '*ausländische*', which only indicates that the workers ('*-arbeiter*') are from abroad.

Perspectives for Future Development of the PDS

On a national basis internally in Germany

Until now the PDS has been an active player in the political landscape of Germany. It is East German rooted and has shown on numerous occasions that it is ready to take responsibility and that it is loyal to the democratic culture of the present and at the same time accepts and defends its socialist past by focussing on positive aspects of the GDR-system and integrating them in today's society. Many political opponents accused the PDS of naivety and downplaying of the totalitarian character of the GDR. The PDS was often claimed to be ”yesterday's eternals” (In German: ”*Die Ewiggestrigen*”) and there have undoubtably been such tendencies in the party, but they haven't managed to take influence over the main party line. As pointed out above, the PDS has, in dialectical relations with other political forces, moderated some of its formerly dogmatic and undifferentiated views upon the GDR.

The differentation of the picture of the GDR today also applies to the right-wing side of the political landscape. It was quite typical for the 2005 election campaign that many conservatives and right-wing liberals, for example, the chairman of the right-wing liberal party of Germany (FDP), Mr. Westerwelle, emphasized what he called the positive sides of the GDR within the childcare and education system.

After having started the cooperation and merging process with the, in its majority, West German WASG, I see two possible development ways:

- A positive development, in which the PDS takes adventage of the possibility to be more than an East German political power and to be active in and representing its left-wing attitudes in all parts of Germany.

- A negative development, where the PDS is dominated by the WASG and is slowly and steadily integrated in an overwhelmingly West German controlled protest movement with certain signs of anti-foreign attitudes that have been articulated on various occasions, but in the election campaign were downplayed presumably for strategic reasons.

On an international basis in the context of the EU

If the PDS is able to keep up its idealistic political ideas of social justice and solidarity across borders and if the positive attitude of the PDS towards the framework of the EU as a platform to make these ideas and ideals work, then one can expect a promising impact on other left-wing parties in the socialist-communist fraction.

In joint efforts also with more liberal fractions in the parliament it can be an active player in the efforts to stabilize, for example, for example, the work-market, which is one of the topics that creates fear and unsecurity among labour forces from the old EU-countries.

If, on the other hand, the PDS decides to join those who are rejecting the EU as an institutional platform to do this, I think that it is very likely that the PDS ends up in a situation where the socialist rhetoric of international solidarity among workers etc. is certainly often to be heard, but when it comes down to business, in most cases will be filled out with rather unvisionary political demands defined by short-sighted needs and limited by a narrow national orientation.

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Scientific Assessment on Human Development in the Circumpolar North: Main Findings, Success Stories and Gaps in Knowledge for Comparative Studies

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Where in the world is there a wide geographical region with 4 million people and an annual gross production of $230 billion? Indeed, it is the circumpolar North. These two facts are among the most concrete new information given by the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR). This article is on one hand, for introducing new information and knowledge on human development in the circumpolar North including interesting and relevant points of view to apply and gaps in knowledge waiting for further studies, and on the other hand, for describing an international research project as a process.

On the last page as almost the last point of the Report it is said that "The Sustainable Development Working Group [of the Arctic Council] should arrange for the production of one or more posters and pamphlets that would encapsulate the major findings of the AHDR and be available for display and distribution in a variety of forums"[1]. This article and my presentation in the conference is a small part of the follow-up activities, although the conference was not organized by the SDWG but by the University of Latvia. The article also gives information and knowledge for comparative studies of the Human Development Report on Latvia and the report of an international region like the AHDR.

Introduction

What is the Arctic Human Development Report all about? The report is a comprehensive scientific assessment including a per review referring, but not a research *per se* on the contemporary issues of the Arctic region like, i.e. a state of human development, well-fare and sustainable development. It is the first human development report on an international region. More than a final result the conclusion is rather a constructive start, which asks, even demands, follow-ups and continuity.

The Report, including main themes or trends, success stories and gaps in knowledge, is or should be valuable for both academic discourses and political discussions on relevant Northern issues and themes like, for example, sustainability and resilience. This is, however, only if it is used and utilized in education, research and decision-making. Indeed, it is for policy and decision-makers on different levels, scholars and other experts, activists of civil organizations and students (both master and post-graduate students) on northern studies.

The Arctic Human Development Report was done by an international group of about twenty northern researchers and experts as the lead authors. The work was done under the auspices of the Sustainable Development Working Group of the Arctic Council. The Report was very well taken, when it was launched in November 2004 as a pre-action of the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council in November 24, 2004 in Reykjavik, Iceland. Among the policy community many "were obviously impressed by the ability of the social science community to develop a substantial scientific assessment dealing with human development on a regional scale" even to say that the credibility of that community "in the eyes of the members of the policy community has risen substantially"[2]. Thus, the report is some sort of manifestation of an internationalization of the social science community dealing with Northern studies.

Further, the Ministerial Meeting accepts with appreciation the AHDR and recommends "that the Sustainable Development Working Group make full use of the report as a comprehensive knowledge base for the development of the Arctic Council's Sustainable Development Programme and **direct** Member States and the relevant working groups of the Arctic Council to consider appropriate follow up actions"[3]. Thus, and finally, the Arctic Human Development Report is an example of the social relevance of science.

Before going into the research findings of the Report, it is only fair to give a rough general picture on the Arctic region, or the circumpolar North, i.e. how the region can be described to the readers, especially to those who do not know so much about the Northern part of the globe. I do this by giving ten main features. They are based on my research and according to my understanding are useful features to describe the region, especially a state of the circumpolar North at the beginning of the 21st century.

The first feature is the Arctic as a frozen, extreme and exotic region. As a contrast to that, the second describes the region as a home land for indigenous peoples with long tradition, rich cultures and resilience. This is followed by the third one saying that the North is a sparsely populated frontier, even the wild North for settlers or new comers. If the fourth feature claims that the circumpolar North is metaphorically a 'Klondyke' emphasizing the rich natural resources and poor capital the region owns, then the fifth one argues that the Arctic is, or was in the Cold War period, a military theatre and a target area of military strategies. Further, the sixth feature describes the Northern regions and seas as a "sink of pollutants" meaning long-range sea and air pollution, and recently as the first victim of global climate change. Correspondingly, the circumpolar North is also an object, either a 'laboratory' or workshop, of the global scientific community.

These five last features emphasize that the circumpolar North is a periphery, although a strategic peripherial region from the point of view of the major Arctic unified states. Therefore, they are followed by the eighth feature arguing that the North is a multiple-use region for multi-functional and conflicting interests and fresh ideas and innovations. The circumpolar North can, however, be also seen or interpreted as a platform for international and inter-regional cooperation, and an area of region-building, which is my ninth feature. Finally, the tenth feature interprets these regions as the educated and modern North of the eight democratic and well-fare (arctic) states.

Some Main Findings

The starting point is that in the Arctic Human Development Report there are some main findings and new information, even knowledge, which is useful to know and to take into consideration on one hand. On the other, the identified gaps in knowledge are waiting for fulfilling and are thus both challenging and encouraging forth-coming research projects. In this article some main findings are included. The article will also highlight some relevant points of view, which might be interesting and fruitful for applying to further studies.

The two very concrete and relevant facts as concrete research findings of the Arctic Human Development Report are, first, that in the Arctic region there live approximately 4 million people, and second, that an annual gross production of the region is about $230 billion.

Population[4]

The most important human resource of the Arctic region is a population. In 2003 the total number of the population in the Arctic was exactly 4.058.000 people. Almost half of that, 1.980.000 live in the Russian Arctic, about 780.000 inhabitants live in North America (Alaska and the Canadian Arctic) and the rest, about 1.300.000, live in the Nordic Region, i.e. either in the islands of North Atlantic (Greenland, Iceland and the Faroe Islands) or in the Northern most counties of Norway, Sweden and Finland.

There is not an exact data of the number of the Indigenous population in the Arctic, because official statistics do not identify indigenous peoples specifically in some Northern countries like for example, in Norway, Sweden and Finland. The Report, however, gives an estimation of the number, and that is between 354.000–374.000. There is a big indigenous population in Alaska, the Canadian Arctic, Greenland and the Russian Arctic (especially in Nenetsia, Yamalo-Nenets and Yakutia), but no Indigenous people in Iceland or the Faroe Islands. The general understanding is that the Indigenous people mostly live in smaller communities, however, many of them live nowadays in big cities, also outside the Arctic region.

In the Arctic region there have been some major changes in the population after the Second World War. In the 1950s the population was increasing generally and in the whole region. In the case of Greenland, Alaska and the Russian North the increase was significant, and continued until the 1970s, due to migration. There was a change, when the population of the Northern most parts of Finland and Sweden started to decrease slowly in the 1960s and the same in the three Northern countries of Norway in the 1980s. In the Russian North the increase of the populations started in the 1990s as one of the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The main reason was that in the end of the 20th century the inflow of population was smaller than the outflow, thus there was a net loss due to migration. Unlike, at the turn of the 21st century the population is growing only in Alaska, Canada, Greenland and Iceland.

The fact that the circumpolar North is extremely sparsely populated is not a new finding, but the fact that the settling is contrasting including vast uninhabited territories and relatively big towns and cities, is not so well known. There is a big number of small towns, villages and communities (less than 100-few thousands).

Correspondingly, among the cities and big towns of the region (and the number of inhabitants) are for example Anchorage in Alaska (260.000–40% of the total population of the state), Reykjavik in Iceland (180.000–more than 60% of the total population of the country), Whitehorse in Canada (19.000), Tromsa in Norway (50.000), Luleå in Sweden (45.000), Rovaniemi in Finland (45.000). Almost a half of the population of the Russian Arctic live in the nine biggest cities (over 50.000 inhabitants each) of the region like, for example, Murmansk (340.000), Norilsk (135.000), Vorkuta (85.000) and Novy Urengoi (90.000).

Economics[5]

The Arctic Region is not only rich in natural resources but also in economic resources: the annual gross Arctic product, meaning the value of the production created on the region, of the year of 2001 was $230.156 million. If almost a half of the population lives in the Russian side, then about 67% (= $153.657 million) comes from the Russian North. In order to concretize the sum of $230 billion it is equal to 1/3 of the Canadian economy, 80% of the entire economy of Saudi-Arabia or the same as the whole Swedish economy.

The AHDR argues that this fact has two parts: The 1st part is, that the gross Arctic product is essentially based on the intensive exploitation of energy sources due to the known fact the North is used as an immense reservoir of resources to meet energy needs of developed countries and the centers of them. On the other hand, there is the 2nd part saying, that it is also known that consumption like e.g. public services is supported by transfer payments to regional governments. This is, however, a widespread myth of the North, since the northern regions produce much more than they will have from southern centers and taxpayers from outside the region.

In the Report there are three main characteristics to describe the economic situation. First, the North is used as an immense reservoir of resources to meet energy needs of the Northern developed countries, mostly the centers of them. This is especially the case in the Russian North, NWT of Canada and Alaska. They can be called as “the resources frontier regions”, like the Eurasian North can be seen as the “New Heartland of Energy”[6]. If earlier states and governments were important actors there, then now states and large corporations are together. These activities, and the main actors running these activities, are often totally separated from the regional socio-economic environment, i.e. carried out on an autonomous basis. And, benefits exclusively go for the rest of the world.

Second, consumption, especially public services, is supported by transfer payments to regional governments from central governments. The service sector is strongly developed in the circumpolar North, actually it is the second biggest industry (tourism is the biggest industry), and thus a state is a very important economic agent. Central governments do not, however, give transfer payments to the sub-regional governments, and the residents have little to say on this.

Followed from this is the above-mentioned widespread myth that the regions survive thanks to transfer payments from southern capitals and taxpayers from outside the region. That is not simply the case, since the reality is somewhat different, and northern regions produce much more than what they are supported by transfer payments. For example, in Russia the value of exports is greater than the $ 10 billion in public service costs, but still the living standards in the region are low. Further, the annual value of the electricity production of James Bay Basin is five times the cost of the public services.

Third, extensive resource exploitation like family-based commercial fishing or hunting, breeding and gathering continue to be important both for the economy and the identity. Fisheries form one of the backbones of the economy still today in Iceland, the Faroes, Greenland and on the coasts of Norway. Correspondingly, residents engage in food-producing activities, which play a significant role in contributing to the dietary intake of households and communities[7].

The main conclusions dealing with economic systems of the North are that, first, the role of the circumpolar North in the global economy is important, and has fundamental geopolitical importance; second, the situation is asymmetrical, since there are both massive exports of materials to satisfy energy needs and massive imports finished products for its own domestic consumption; third, in the name of free markets and globalization the state's withdrawal like, for example, in Russia, and privatization has contributed the situation making the economic future more uncertain; fourth, social policies could be a counterbalance to this uncertainly, but global trends seem to lead into another direction.

Societies, Civil Society and Community Viability[8]

The Arctic Human Development Report argues that extreme northern, or "arctic communities are not any more isolated from the rest of the world". And further, that they face several global trends with their specific expressions in the North like for example, urbanization, competition over declining natural resources and transfer of authority from central to local governments.

According to the Report there are four key themes, which are "principal strategies for human development by people in the Arctic". The first strategy is called "partnerships with outside actors": Although most of large-scale utilization is often totally separated, several communities have become involved in developing oil and gas resources in partnership with large corporation – this creates many challenges in how to convert economic compensation for use of the resources to productive and innovative local activities. The second one is "combining pre-industrial and welfare economies": In some communities there are no market activities, but a combination of government support and subsistence activities.

The third strategy is "negotiating for jobs" meaning that policies for regional development can be and have been used to create jobs. And the fourth one is "networking" Business and political networks are used and utilized to ensure access to international markets which has been a successful strategy for many fishing villages. All in all, common thing in community viability is on one hand, the increasing connections to global economic processes, and on the other hand, the key role of local government to find modern ways to cope.

Resource Governance[9]

The starting point here is that generally governance in the circumpolar North is fresh and innovative, and there are also success stories. One of them is the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), which entered into force in 2004. It was pushed together by Indigenous peoples and epistemic communities. If it is international, then another success story is national, i.e. Bill C-14 accepted by the Canadian Parliament in February 2005. Bill C-14, or the Tlicho Land Claims and Self Government Agreement is an agreement among the Tlicho, representing the Dogrib people, and the Government of the Northwest Territories and the Government of Canada.

Based on another report on governance in the North, "governance systems are socially constructed – that is, they reflect the diverse histories, cultures and ecological settings found in the North"[10]. They are also shaped by expanded interaction with the global economy and global phenomena and forces like for example, global markets, resource demands (such as energy), climate change, long-range pollution and non-governmental organizations.

Correspondingly, according to the Arctic Human Development Report the four key trends affecting the Arctic resource governance are first, the growing importance of property rights as a key to effective resource governance; second, the challenge of incorporating traditional or local ecological knowledge along with western science in decision-making; third, expanding political devolution and co-management as a step toward effective resource management regimes; and fourth, the widening involvement of the residents, at least in some regions, in ownership and development of lands and resources on one hand, and on the other, the implications of this for long-term sustainability and self-determination like for example, the Bill C-14 shows.

International Relations and Geopolitics[11]

Northern geopolitics has changed accordingly and moved from an exclusively state-dominated and militarized state to one that is more humanistic in definition, i.e. instead of confrontation –cooperation. Also Northern geopolitical discourse has changed allowing for greater participation and cooperation of new non-state actors, new forms of region-building, a new kind of regional dynamics, and new kinds of North-South relations. This change, although already underway in the 1980s, has become increasing relevant in the 21st century. New regional actors and the new regional dynamic are now focused not just upon military-policy security, but also upon other aspects of security such as the challenges and threats posed by long-range, trans-boundary pollution.

The Arctic Human Development Report identifies three main themes, or even trends, of international relations and geopolitics of the circumpolar North at the beginning of the 21st century. The first of them is the increased circumpolar cooperation by indigenous peoples' organizations and sub-national governments indicating on one hand the importance of inter-regional cooperation in the North, i.e. "North meets North", and on the other hand, that there are new international actors, which are both active and influential (see Transparent). The second theme underlines and emphasizes region-building with nations as major actors including, however, the traditional ‘Center-Periphery dilemma’. And the last one is the relationship between the circumpolar North and the outside world emphasizing North-South relations on the scale of the Northern Hemisphere and giving some ideas about the role of the North in world politics. The last one includes consideration of traditional security-policy and threats to the environment and human beings.

Success Stories

In the circumpolar North there are not only problems but also success stories; actually less and less problems, especially when putting things into the world-wide and global context. The three success stories, which the AHDR identifies, are in a nutshell: first, northern “cultures can remain viable even in the face of rapid and multi-dimensional changes”; second, northern residents are used and capable to apply “advanced technologies to address social problems”; and third, in the North there is a strong culture and habit “in the development of innovative political and legal agreements…without rupturing the larger political systems”[12].

One result followed from the last success story is devolution, and indeed, in the circumpolar North there are significant devolution events (see Transparent). This innovative point of view includes an idea that “the North can be seen as a distinct component of the diversity of life on the Earth”, and as a driving force for a new kind of governance and politics in the transition period of the world’s geopolitics. Finally, the North can be taken as a model for the rest of the world when trying to implement sustainable development based on, and through resistance, adaptive capacity, and good governance.

Gaps in Knowledge

The Arctic Human Development Report also includes several gaps in knowledge, both in each chapter and in the conclusion chapter, as potential research questions, which are waiting and challenging for further studies. The gaps in knowledge of the conclusion chapter are the following[13]:

First, there is a need “to collect more and better information on the Arctic’s residents”; second, there is also a need to have “a better understanding of the effects of cumulative changes on cultural and social well-being”; third, when Indigenous peoples’ issues and circumstances are and have been issues, dealing with other inhabitants has been neglected and therefore, “we need to learn more about the experiences of recent settlers in the Arctic and their interactions with the region’s indigenous peoples”; fourth, to deepen our understanding of “the roles that modern industrial activities play” on a regional level, and especially from the point of view of sustainable development; fifth, there is a need for more studies “to compare and contrast new institutions in the Arctic and to distil lessons relevant not only to the Arctic itself but also to other areas of the world”.

As an example of more specific gaps in knowledge I mention here those from the chapter on “Circumpolar international relations and geopolitics”[14]: first, “despite slowly increasing attention to regional cooperation in the literature on Arctic development, there is a need for more research adopting a comprehensive circumpolar approach that would complement the still dominant national perspective”. And second, there has been “little debate amongst scholars or other stakeholders over how human and environmentally sustainable regional development is facilitated or constrained by security policies and military activities in the region. Even though it might usefully inform our understanding of sustainable development in the Arctic, defining and addressing security from a regional perspective has been a difficult or even taboo issue“.

Follow-ups

As said, the AHDR is first of all a start, and therefore, open discussions and town hall meetings on its themes and findings, not only dealing with the AHDR but also the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) Report, are useful and needed. And, further also academic discourses and criticism are needed.

Among the follow-ups which the Report mentions are, for example, dissemination of the Report, monitoring of tractable indicators for tracking changes in human development by Sustainable Development Working Group of the Arctic Council, inputs by the International Polar Year 2007-8 and brainstorming seminars to identify the gaps in knowledge included by the AHDR[15]. The Reykjavik Declaration of the Arctic Council recommends that the SDWG “make full use of the report as a comprehensive knowledge base for the development of the AC’s sustainable development Programme” and asked the member states and the AC working groups “to consider appropriate follow-up actions”[16].

As a part of follow-up activities, the Northern Research Forum will organize and coordinate organizing of Town Hall Meetings on new and relevant findings and discussion on human development and climate change in the North. They are based on the research findings and other results including gaps in knowledge of the both AHDR and the ACIA report. These kinds of Town Hall Meetings would also implement inter-disciplinary discourse and interplay between science and politics, which is also needed in the work of the Arctic Council. The first one of these meetings took place in May 2005 in Inari, Finland as a part of the Calotte Academy 2005[17].

And there are several research (and book) projects, both international and national, going on concerning human development in the North. And further, possibly, there will be a process to make the AHDR II based on the research findings and follow-ups from the 1st AHDR. Finally, to my mind, it is important to emphasize that open discussion and dialogue between different stakeholders is the factor, which is much needed in our modern societies when facing new and complex challenges. This is very much the case when dealing with human development and climate change and reports on them.

Conclusion

All in all, how successful is the Arctic Human Development Report for the inhabitants and societies of the Arctic Region, both per se and when taking into consideration both the circumstances and expectations? When answering this question, we need to take into consideration that on one hand the expectations were high, and on the other hand, the circumstances where the work was organized, were regulated by many things.

First, there was a very limited and severe timeframe; second, the coverage of the report and its data is on the whole circumpolar North with regional points of view and special features; third, the political reality that the Arctic region is divided between the territories of eight unified states; fourth, to have a balance between the scientific integrity and the policy relevance of the report, for example, giving the legitimacy for funding; and fifth, the balance between Indigenous peoples and the rest, i.e. the settlers, of the North, which deals with the question: who owns / own the voice(s) of the North, if anyone?

All in all, on one hand, the result is a bit less, or quite modest, comparing to the high expectations. On the other hand, the report is a good start, actually very good, as in the face of severe time constraints it was successful to produce a volume that is both substantial in terms of content and handsome in terms of layout and design. The report will be most probably used and utilized by policy-makers and other Northern actors, referred by researchers, and studied by students. For young researchers and post-graduate students there might be a lesson to learn: It would be scientifically useful and personally exciting to be involved in a research project and process, which is multi-disciplinary, even a fore-runner in a field, with different points of view and methods. Especially, if the product(s) of this kind of project will be discussed and debated both among the scientific community and between that and policy-makers, and even become a scientific document to lead academic discourse on the field for a while.

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pp. 141-147

Coping with Aging of the Population

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Increase in proportion of elderly population or aging and eventual limitations in welfare caused by it is one of the most worrying issues nowadays in both old and new EU member states.

In 1st group of the countries aging is caused mainly by prolongation of human life, but in 2nd group – almost only by the decrease of fertility. That is why in CEE countries aging is already combined with depopulation while in other – it is to happen in years to come.

Latvia is among the countries with the lowest fertility rate and rather short life expectancy.[1] Due to the latter the proportion of elderly is modest, but due to fall in fertility during 90.ties decrease in proportion and numbers of working age population just after the 2010 is inevitable (Table 1).

Available means to enlarge the number and share of active age population or compensate aging in other ways differ as well. There are three approaches to confront aging:

a) immigration of working age population,
b) rise of fertility,
c) mobilization of other internal resources.

Rather rich European states since the 60.ties host quest workers from Asia, Africa and rather poor countries of Europe. Unlimited supply of immigrants from traditional sending countries is ensured by 2 main determinants: difference in employment and wages in sending and receiving countries, as well as high fertility in all the sending countries outside Europe. But this solution has several undesirable consequences.

- Continuous compensatory immigration adds to labour supply and because of it keeps wages at rather constant level. It is good for employers but not employees in receiving countries.[2]
- Immigrants were employed mainly in sectors unattractive to native workers – dirty, dangerous and degrading jobs. Such segregation and formation of large diasporas did not help to integration of these guest workers and their descendants. In spite of propagated tolerance to strangers of other race, ethnicity or religion several western countries have experienced conflicts between representatives of local community and immigrants.

- Nowadays new jobs are created mainly in the service sector with demand for skilled labour force. Due to this occupational disbalance immigration is going on in spite of unemployment in the receiving country.
- The mentioned 2 main reasons are making immigration from new-member states more appropriate than those of traditional flows. European migrants are on average better educated and alike to the population of host countries by their outlook and beliefs. It helps to minimize probability of eventual conflicts. Difference in level of income in the two groups of states within EU really causes migration from the new member states towards west, but their human resources are limited and emigration may well cause more rapid depopulation in the sending countries.

Table 1

Age Composition of Population in Latvia 1989–2025
Constant (Pessimistic) Variant

Year	Total, thou	at age			%		
		0-14	15-64	65+	0-14	15-64	65+
Actual							
1989	2666.6	570.9	1780.9	314.8	21.4	66.8	11.8
1994	2529.5	524.7	1667.2	337.7	20.7	65.9	13.4
1999	2424.2	432.2	1635.4	355.4	17.8	67.5	14.7
2004	2319.2	356.5	1587.3	375.4	15.4	68.4	16.2
Expected							
2010	2183.0	287.9	1513.8	381.3	13.2	69.6	17.2
2015	2091.2	293.4	1429.0	368.8	14.1	68.5	17.4
2020	1996.7	285.0	1350.1	361.6	14.4	67.8	17.8
2025	1896.7	257.1	1272.4	367.2	13.6	67.3	19.1

Avots: **Eglīte, P., Markausa, I. M., Gņedovska, I., Ivbulis, B.** *Population of Latvia: distribution and change of it in 1st quarter of XXI century. Studies of the Latvian Population. No 10.* **Rīga: Institute of Economics LASc, 2003, pp. 93–96.**

Regardless of the origin among the migrants young people prevail. They lessen demographic burden of elderly in target countries but only for a while. Austrian demographers have already proved it by comparable account.[3] Latvia is an example for it with experience of more than 50 years. Most of immigrants from other republics of the former USSR since the end of WWII have now retired or close to the age, while their fertility was less than that of the natives and accordingly does not compensate the aging.[4]

Regardless of eventual results of immigration CEE countries opposite to old member states of EU hardly have possibilities to become interesting enough for quest workers and to keep them on reasonable period – at least up to the moment when wages will be at the same level in the entire EU.

Alternative possibility without any ill consequences would be raising fertility by assistance to families with children in the most convenient for them forms.[5] Decisive is the possibility to reconcile work and family life which ensures for women stability of income and safety for future. Pity enough addition to number of active age population ensured by appropriate family policy could be expected only in some 18–20 years. It means that in the meantime some more actual measures to compensate aging and decrease of labour force are necessary.[6]

To cope with aging it would be wise to approach it as the next inevitable and quite normal stage of age-structural transition.[7] By the time being prolongation of life and decrease in fertility will cause aging in all the countries and compensatory migration as a solution on global scale will cease. In such situation the mankind will be forced to find some other kinds how to increase supply of labour force or minimize the demand for it. Countries surviving depopulation and having no real chances to attract immigrants in the nearest future are to pioneer in finding solutions to challenges of aging.

According to the current age composition of population in Latvia during the next 20 years number of active age population would diminish yearly by some 10–20 thousands or 1.2% even not taking into account eventual emigration to the old member states of EU.[8]

During all this period the inevitable decrease will amount to 300 thousands or 1/5 of active age population in 2000. This difference exceeds current number of registered unemployed more than 3 times. It shows, how important for Latvia possibilities to balance labour supply and demand are. According activities would be introduced from both sides.

There could be several sources to enlarge labour supply just in the nearest future.

1) Prolongation of working life by earlier start of schooling would add some 20 thousand employees and postponed retirement – appr. 60 thousand if employment rate of elderly at age 55 to 64 could increase from actually 48% to 70%; eventual demand for labour and higher proportion of qualified people among the sequent generations makes the rise of employment rate among elderly quite possible (Table 2).
2) Minimization of interruptions in working life because of unemployment could add some 80 thousands: shortened child care leave (if child care allowance is to be paid regardless of parent's employment and no one of them wish to stay at home a year or more) – up to 10 thousand; reduction in frequency of illnesses from average 15% of working days to 7–8% a year would be equal to more than 60 thousand of employees.
3) Elimination of labour force losses because of emigration – appr. 50 thousand.
4) Reduction of premature deaths by half only from external causes during some 5 years would add some 5 thousand of working age persons. Exclusion of working places in health care, education and other services proportionally to inevitable losses of population by some 5–7% would add some 14 thousand of employees for other branches. Similar structural changes are possible if current increase of employment in the state's administration is made reverse due to introduction of ITG, 1stop Agency etc.

5) Reduction in number of less productive kinds of employment, e.g., housekeepers, unpaid family members in farms etc.

Table 2

Educational Level of Active Age Population in Latvia, % in Group 2000*

Age	Men					Women				
	tertiary	second-dary specia-lized	compre-hensive	basic	primary	tertiary	second-dary specia-lized	compre-hensive	basic	primary
15–19	0.0	1.8	15.2	65.1	17.9	0.0	1.7	21.5	64.5	12.3
20–29	9.0	19.3	41.6	27.0	3.1	15.3	21.9	45.7	15.8	1.3
30–39	13.8	25.4	49.0	10.8	1.0	22.6	31,5	40.0	5.3	0.6
40–49	16.9	23.4	40.9	17.6	1.2	23.0	30,4	36.1	9.8	0.7
50–59	15.8	19.5	28.2	32.2	4.3	17.2	25,1	30.8	23.6	3.3
60–69	15.4	18.0	15.0	36.4	15.2	13.0	20,0	18.2	33.4	15.4
70+	12.7	14.5	12.8	37.3	22.7	7.6	10,2	14.6	37.0	30.6
Average	12.4	18.7	32.4	29.2	7.3	15.1	21.4	30.1	24.3	9.1

*** calculated without not indicated**

Source: *Results of the 2000 population and housing census in Latvia.* **Rīga: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, 2002, pp.** *188.–189.*

Total of potential addition to labour supply could be close to 300 thousand people (Table 3). This amount might well cover the losses in active age population caused by aging if the number of employed keeps constant.

It seems worth to evaluate whether it is necessary to increase number of employed above the actual level. Such permanent increase was immanent to extensive development at the initial stages of industrial economy as well as during the shortening of working time – normal day, week and year. Extensive development of Soviet economy with ever-growing demand for labour force was one of reasons for its low efficiency and collapse.

Since the knowledge-based economy is on the way further increase in number of employed seems to be at least doubtful. It is usually argued that additional labour will be demanded in services, but it seems to be limited by decrease of population and time available for each person to make use of a lot of offered services. So it is more likely that total demand of labour will not be on the rise.

To make the mentioned possibilities to enlarge labour supply come true some well – known means are to be used:

- rise of wages, starting with education and health care which ensure quality and working ability of labour force,
- life-long learning for all employees and job seekers,
- more jobs with flexible working time and those of distant work,
- development of public transport in rural areas for daily travels to working places,

- additional day-care facilities especially for the youngest children 1–1.5 years of age,
- the state's support to families in forms allowing different forms of combining work with family life and the parents' choice of mode for child care,
- reintroduction of compulsory secondary education, necessary to rise educational activity of young men,
- free of charge possibilities of sporting and art activities for school children to reduce use of alcohol, drugs and cigarettes, with corresponding impact on their health,
- the state's and municipalities' support for all initiatives to spread healthy life style among any age group and active aging.

Table 3

Possible Enlargement of Actual Labour Supply in Latvia, 2004

<table>
<tr><th>Age, activities</th><th>Population, thou</th><th>Employed, thou</th><th>Employment rate, %</th><th>Job seekers, thou</th><th>Non active, thou</th><th>Eventual addition, thou</th></tr>
<tr><td>Total</td><td>2319.2</td><td>1017.7</td><td>43.9</td><td>118.6</td><td>678.7</td><td>~280</td></tr>
<tr><td>at age:</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>15–24</td><td>357.0</td><td>108.9</td><td>30.5</td><td>24.2</td><td>223.9</td><td>~20</td></tr>
<tr><td>25–34</td><td>321.3</td><td>243.6</td><td>75.8</td><td>28.7</td><td>49.0</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>35–44</td><td>333.5</td><td>269.2</td><td>80.7</td><td rowspan="2">52.9</td><td>38.9</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>45–54</td><td>313.4</td><td>240.8</td><td>76.8</td><td>45.1</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>55–64</td><td>262.1</td><td>125.7</td><td>47.9</td><td rowspan="2">12.8</td><td>125.0</td><td>~60</td></tr>
<tr><td>65–74</td><td>227.8</td><td>29.5</td><td>12.9</td><td>196.9</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Total at 15–64</td><td rowspan="2">1578.3</td><td rowspan="2">a) 981.5</td><td rowspan="2">62.2</td><td>b) 117.3</td><td></td><td>~80</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>c) 481.8</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>Among them:</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>unpaid family members, housekeepers</td><td>-</td><td>34.3</td><td>..</td><td>..</td><td>57.4</td><td>~50</td></tr>
<tr><td>students</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>202.4</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>on child-care leave</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>22.7</td><td>~10</td></tr>
<tr><td>invalids</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>54.8</td><td>~10</td></tr>
<tr><td>other (abroad?)</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>-</td><td>50.5</td><td>~50</td></tr>
</table>

Source: *Labour Force Surveys: Main Indicators in 2004. CSB of Latvia,* Riga, May, 2005, P. 13, 21, 22, 37, 48, 49.

Implementation of these activities needs serious investments. But effect of this spending may well compensate avert losses otherwise caused by emigration. If it is not stopped investments in upbringing and education of émigrés done by Latvian state and people, will make profit not in homeland but in wealthier host countries.[9] No wonder these countries prefer compensatory immigration as a solution instead of raising fertility in spite of probability of sad consequences in further future.

In Latvia additional argument to improve quality of life and to put into use local resources of additional labour supply instead of simultaneous emigration and immigration could be the impact of emigration of young people on expectable rise of birth rate and correspondingly – further aging of the population.

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Patērētāju kopiena un tās robežas Latvijā – everyone is invited?[1]

Consumer Community and its Margins in Latvia – Everyone is Invited?

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Ievads. Ideju, vērtību un preču iegāde

Šis raksts ir tapis laikā, kad lielākā daļa Eiropas iedzīvotāju neatkarīgi no dzimuma, etniskās identitātes, konfesionālās piederības vai politisko uzskatu atšķirībām gatavojās sagaidīt Ziemassvētkus un jauno 2006. gadu. Jau vairākus gadu desmitus šie svētki ir viens no intensīvākajiem iepirkšanās periodiem gadā. To aktīvi izmanto reklāmas aģentūras, lielāko zīmolu īpašnieki, kredītiestādes un sabiedrisko kampaņu autori. Paralēli jauno smaržu sērijai vai mobilā telefona modelim ideju un vērtību "tirgus" Ziemassvētkos piedāvā jaunas iespējas ziedot tiem, kas ir trūcīgi, vai aizbraukt no ziemas aukstuma uz Āfrikas valstīm. Patērētāju sabiedrībā virmo un regulāri palielinās ideju, projektu un akciju skaits.

Pētot tādus žurnālus kā "Santa", "Cosmo" un citus glancētos žurnālus, veidojas priekšstats, ka to satura patērētājs ir tikai urbanizētas vides iedzīvotājs, kam trūkst laika sentimentālo jūtu izpausmēm pat svētku laikā un kam galvenā problēma ir seksuālās enerģijas nepārtraukta atjaunošana. Blakus pilsētnieka-patērētāja tēlam medijos ir arī daudzveidīgs *nepatērētāju* skaits: lauku reģionu iedzīvotāji, pensionāri, trūcīgas daudzbērnu ģimenes, cilvēki ar īpašām vajadzībām. Šīs grupas ir izslēgtas no patērēšanas procesa, uz viņiem neattiecas rūpes par pienācīgu dāvanu, pagājušās sezonas kolekciju atlaides utt. Tomēr šīs grupas nav pilnībā izslēgtas no reklāmu vēstījumiem, bet ieņem tajos marginālu vietu un ir sociālo reklāmu objekts. Ziemassvētku stress un garas rindas veikalā "Stockmann" var uz mirkli veidot iluzoru priekšstatu par pārtikušu sabiedrību, kas ar prieku un enerģiju, bet galvenais – ar nepieciešamajiem finanšu resursiem metas iepirkties. Bet, izejot no veikala, nevar nepamanīt, ka dažu metru attālumā pastāv arī cita realitāte – bezpajumtnieki, ubagi un pensionāri, kas simboliski sargā ieeju universālveikalā, paši tajā neieejot.

Tas, ka Latvijā un it sevišķi Rīgas centrā pastāv divas kopienas – patērētāju un izstumto kopiena –, ļauj uzdot jautājumu par patērētāju kopienas robežām, piederības kritērijiem un izstumšanas mehānismiem.

Latvijā pēdējos gados veidojas jauna sociāla grupa – patērētāju kopiena. Šis raksts ir mēģinājums aplūkot šīs kopienas izcelsmi un īpašības, paštēlu, kā arī piederības un izslēgšanas mehānismus. Raksta pamatā ir atzinums par patērētāju identitātes izšķirošo nozīmi mūsdienu demokrātiskās Rietumu sabiedrības locekļu individuālo un kolektīvo identitāšu veidošanā. Apzinoties, cik bieži identitātes jēdzienu izmanto, skaidrs, ka identitātei patērētāju sabiedrības kontekstā un šī raksta ietvaros ir nepieciešama definīcija. Identitāte patērētāju sabiedrībā, manuprāt, varētu būt *individuālo un kolektīvo vērtību kopums, kas izpaužas ārēji un apliecina indivīda piederību pie patērētāju kopienas, savukārt iekšēji izpaužas kā uzskatu, prioritāšu un rīcības motivāciju kopums*. Abi "līmeņi" – piederības ārējās iz pausmes un iekšējās pamatnostādnes – ir viena veseluma sastāvdaļas.[2] Tā kā, salīdzinot ar citām Eiropas Savienības valstīm, Latvijā patērētāju sabiedrība ir jauns fenomens, arī patērētāja identitāte katram no mums neatkarīgi no vecuma un dzimuma, etniskās piederības, ienākumu apmēra un izglītības ir jauns individuālās un kolektīvās identitātes slānis.

Šī Latvijas patērētāja identitātes īpašība ir izdevīga patērētāju sabiedrības pētniekiem, jo ļauj ieraudzīt, kā tiek uztvertas un adoptētas patērētāju sabiedrības formulas un tehnoloģijas (ieskaitot blakusparādības), kas ienāk Latvijā no citām valstīm.

Vietējo ražotāju mārketinga un zīmolu administrēšanas politikā vēlreiz parādās patērētāja identitātes starpdisciplinārais raksturs – nacionālisma un etniskās identitātes mītu izmantošana reklāmā, dzimtes studiju atzinumi un impulsi, popularizējot zīmolus, aktuālo politisko konfliktu simbolu izmantošana patērētāja uzmanības piesaistei.[3]

Jautājums par patērētāju sabiedrības hronoloģiskiem rāmjiem Latvijā līdz šim palicis neskarts. Tas daļēji ir saistīts ar to, ka sociālo un kultūras procesu hronoloģiskos rāmjus nav iespējams precīzi definēt. Pats patērētājs kā indivīds ir galīga būtne, bet patērēšanas process kā individuāla rīcība nav precīzi datējams, tas var būt viļņveidīgs un atkarīgs no daudziem mainīgajiem – algas, prēmijas, atvaļinājuma, ģimenes sastāva izmaiņām, situācijas darba tirgū, veselības stāvokļa, seksuālās, reliģiskās un citas identitātes izmaiņām. *Patēriņš* kā kolektīvs process arī ir atkarīgs no šiem un citiem faktoriem, jo viena indivīda maksātnespēja var būt nepamanāma kopienai, ja tai nepārtraukti pievienojas jauni dalībnieki. Tādējādi es neuzdrošināšos piedāvāt jebkādas skaidras laika robežas. Iespējams, ka patērētāju sabiedrības izteikta, pamanāma sākumfāze bija sākusies pēc bankas "Baltija" slēgšanas un tai sekojošā masveidīgā ekonomiskā šoka.

Kad Latvijā izveidojās patērētāju sabiedrība? Arī šeit es piedāvāju tikai vienu no vairākām iespējamām versijām. Kad ar banku "Baltija" vēsturē aizgāja finansiālo piramīdu virkne ar pasakainajiem procentu piedāvājumiem, nišu aizņēma Eiropas banku pārstāvniecības, kas īsā laikā atdzīvināja klientu uzticību bankas fenomenam, jo balstījās uz valdības garantijām, ka klientu uzkrājumi bankrotēšanas gadījumā nezudīs.

Kontu atvēršana, kredītkaršu (arī starptautiski atzīto karšu) izsniegšana sagatavoja pamatu nākamam ciklam – banku kredītu piedāvājumiem un sabiedrības daļas atsaucībai uz šo piedāvājumu, kas turpina augt.[4] Kopš 2000. gada dzīve uz kredīta, kas aptver visu patērētāju vēlmju spektru – no suluspiedes līdz jahtai un mājai –, strauji sāka mainīt ekonomisko stāvokli un preču pieejamību. Mentālās izmaiņas, kas ir saistītas ar izmaiņām priekšmetiskajā pasaulē (P. Burdjē), vēl nav intensīvi pētītas Latvijā, un ar šo rakstu es piedāvāju izcelt un analizēt dažus jaunus patērētāja identitātes avotus, kas ietekmē ne tikai materiālo pasauli, bet arī emocionālās un kognitīvās struktūras un var virzīt arī politisko rīcību un ietekmēt politiskās simpātijas.[5]

Piekrītot Džonam Fiskem (*John Fiske*), ka patērētāju identitātes saturā ietvertas arī politiskās domas, uzskatu un vērtību veidošanas potenciāls[6], uzskatu, ka patērētāju sabiedrībā noformulētās attieksmes, vērtības un prioritātes, komunikācijas struktūras var ietekmēt Latvijas pilsoniskās sabiedrības veidošanas procesu.

1. Patērētāju identitāte – Latvijas versija

Pastaigas pa Rīgas centru un rajoniem ļauj secināt, ka reklāmas pasūtītāju elite orientējas uz patērētāju pilsētas centrā, kur iespējams labāk integrēt reklāmas saturu telpā un uzrunāt vairāk cilvēku, piedāvājot jaunās preces un elitārus pakalpojumus, jaunus vai prestižus zīmolus, tā izraisot jaunas emocijas un liekot pamatus jaunām vērtībām, kas vēlāk nodrošinās patērētāju lojalitāti pret piedāvātajām precēm. Lielākā iedzīvotāju daļa nav pamanījusi, ka Rīgas ielās rit aktīvs, agresīvs zīmolu veidošanas ("brand-building") process.

Eiropas postindustriālo sabiedrību akadēmiskā kopiena nepārtraukti analizē patērētāju sabiedrības veidošanas mehānismus, kurus producē reklāmas industrija.[7]

Latvijā patērētāju sabiedrības kultūras veidošana notiek "šeit un tūlīt" – tiek veidota patērētāju kultūra, kuras uzplaukums ir vērtējams pretrunīgi, bet pašlaik tiek uztverts lielākoties ar sajūsmu kā Latvijas ekonomiskās izaugsmes pamats. Tikai pēdējos mēnešos naftas krīze pasaulē un inflācijas straujā attīstība Latvijā ļāva sadzirdēt arī ekonomistu skeptiķu viedokļus. Viņi uzdod jautājumus par Latvijas patērētāju sabiedrības spēju robežām un pamazām publiskajās debatēs piedāvā "pārkaršanas" efektu, kā arī jautā par ekonomiskās izaugsmes ilgtspēju.[8]

Arī zīmolu veidošana Latvijā un ārzemju zīmolu glokalizācija, ko piemēro Latvijas uzņēmēji un reklāmu uzņēmumi, pagaidām notiek empīriskā realitātē un tikai lēni un fragmentāri parādās teorētisko pētījumu līmenī. Brends un tā latviskotā versija „zīmols" vēl cīnās par ietekmi valodas telpā Latvijā.[9]

2004. gada decembrī universālveikala "Stockmann" skatlogos tika piedāvāts patērētāja ideālais tēls – baltās drebēs ģērbts pāris ar dāvanām un Ziemassvētku noskaņojumu, ko tas iegūst no iepirkšanās procesa. Šis pāris ir pateicīgs objekts ikonoloģiskai analīzei, jo ļauj izdarīt virkni secinājumu par patērētāja tēlu, ko veido uzņēmums, un attiecināt šo tiražēto tēlu uz patērētāja paštēlu. Pirmais secinājums – baltas, tīras krāsas dominante apģērbā nesaistās ar fizisko darbu; fizisko rūpju par ikdienas dzīvi nav, un dominējošā eksaltācijas un harmonijas izteiksme sejā liecina ne tikai par svētku noskaņojumu, bet arī par patēriņa procesu kā pozitīvu emociju avotu. Lietas veido emocijas. Emociju veidošanas process kļūst atkarīgs no lietu iegādes procesa. Sakāpinātā veidā rīdzinieki to piedzīvo ikgadējo "Trako dienu" akciju laikā, kad priekšmeta nozīme mazinās un dominē preču iegādes process *per se* kā emociju avots. Tādējādi patērētāju kopienas pamatā ir iepirkšanās process, kas ļauj gribēt ļoti plašu priekšmetu klāstu, bet gribēšana ir jaunas identitātes pamats.

Patērētāju sabiedrības veidošanās pamatā ir indivīda psihes uzrunāšana, kas notiek dažādos veidos, lai panāktu konkrētu reakciju – mudinātu iegādāties preces. Tiek aktīvi izmantotas vērtības, kolektīvā un individuālā pieredze, politiskās simpātijas, kas veidojas socializācijas procesā.

Analizējot patērētāja identitātes izpausmes, esmu izvēlējies aplūkot indivīda un kolektīva identitāti, kā arī patērētāja dzimuma identitāti. No dzimtes identitāšu atšķirībām zīmolu autori un līdz ar to patērētāju sabiedrība smeļas virkni patērēšanas stimulu, kuru pamatā ir arhetipiskie tēli – mīļākais, Dons Žuans, burve, kā arī zīmolu logo – ābols, krusts, aplis utt.[10]

2. Lauva, burve un citi – identitāšu piedāvājums

Manis izvēlētie piemēri ir hipermārketu tīkls "Rimi"[11], universālveikals "Stockmann"[12] un veikalu tīkls "Narvesen"[13]. Izvēles pamatā bija plašs preču un pakalpojumu klāsts un minēto tīklu zīmolu radīšana, kas akcentē patērētāju lojalitātes izveidošanu un kopienas veidošanu.

Minēto tirdzniecības tīklu materiālu analīze ļāva izdarīt šādus secinājumus un ilustrēt tos ar tirdzniecības tīklu piedāvātajiem pakalpojumiem:

1. Patērētāju kopiena netiek uzrunāta kā kopiena, bet kā indivīdi, kas kopīgi atrodas vienā procesā. Masveidīga iepirkšanās netiek stilizēta kā masu ieplūšana veikalā un kolektīvu vēlmju apmierināšana. Patērētājs nekad nav pūļa daļiņa, tiek uzrunāts viens indivīds vai indivīdu kopienas kodols – ģimene (pāris vai (un) bērni, šaurs draugu un (vai) kolēģu loks). Bieži universālveikala "Stockmann" reklāmās, kas sniedz padomus par drēbju kombinēšanas iespējām konkrētam notikumam, pircējus uzrunā kā draugus vai paziņas, izmantojot uzrunas formu *tu* ("Vēlies būt skaista? – nopērc …" – no "Stockmann" reklāmas sieviešu nodaļā). Veikala informācija par gastronomijas nodaļu kultivē gardēža tēlu, kas, neskatoties uz draugu un ģimenes klātbūtni, tomēr par slepenāko vēlmi uzskata apēst šokolādes torti vienatnē:

"Nopērciet gatavu ēdienu savai ģimenei, pārsteidziet draugus ar dāvanu grozu vai arī izbaudiet veselu šokolādes torti vienatnē! Aizmirstiet par gatavošanas rūpēm un izbaudiet augstas kvalitātes gardus ēdienus!"[14]

Iepirkšanās process ir nepārtraukts un cikliski sakrīt ar indivīda dzīves ciklu – no rīta līdz vakaram vienmēr var atrast laiku pirkumiem, jo katrā diennakts stundā iepirkšanās ir individuālās identitātes apliecināšanas process:

"Paņemiet ēdienu līdzi uz darbu, ienāciet pa ceļam uz mājām un izvēlieties ko garšīgu vakariņām vai interesantas uzkodas svētku mielastam."[15]

Ēdienu izvēle tradicionāli saistās ar individuālu garšu un gaumi, kolektīva tradīcijām un arī ar ekonomiskām iespējām. Tas atspoguļojas folklorā – dziesmās, sakāmvārdos un rituālos. Ēdienu patēriņš mūsdienās ir viena no patērētāja identitātes sastāvdaļām un atspoguļo postmodernas sabiedrības identitāšu mozaīku. Ja 18. gs. Francijā šokolādes dzēriens bija franču karaļa galma dzēriens, kas bija pakļauts stingrai ražošanas atļauju sistēmai, tad mūsdienās izsmalcināta šokolāde kā rituāls elements saglabā savu sociālā statusa noteikšanas un arī sociālo grupu norobežošanās funkciju – Emīla Gustava šokolādes veikala ekskluzīvie iepakojumi, izejvielas un "ambiente" veidošanās sašaurina patērētāju skaitu, bet arī ļauj apliecināt sev un citiem savu statusu un tā izmaiņas, patērējot Gustava zīmolu – kompleksu preces, pakalpojuma, emociju un statusa sintēzi – t. i., *patērējot identitāti*.

Mūsdienu Latvijas patērētāju sabiedrībā patērētāju sociālās stratifikācijas aģenti ir veikalu tīklu piedāvājumi pircējiem ar dažādiem ienākumiem. Pārtikas veikala sortiments (ja runa ir par veikalu tīkliem) ir „identitātes komplekts", kas tiek piedāvāts patērētājam, ienākot veikalā. Pārtikas izvēle vairāk nekā cenu atšķirības var papildināt individuālu identitāti ar sastāvdaļām, kas nepieciešamas vai iespējamas konkrētā brīdī.

Paplašinot pārtikas iegādes kulturoloģisko perspektīvu, var apgalvot, ka mūsdienu patērētāju kultūrā var konstatēt arhaiskai sabiedrībai raksturīgo un mūsdienu postindustriālajā sabiedrībā vēl joprojām esošo mītiskā laika dihotomiju. Robežas starp *sakrālo* un *profāno* laiku (M. Eliāde) patērētāju sabiedrībā savā pamatā saglabā senas struktūras – priekšmeti un rituāli ir *cita laika ieviešanas instrumenti* un simboli. Man ir zināmi gadījumi, kad cilvēks visu darba nedēļu iegādājas parasto maizi, bet izejamās dienās pērk tikai kruasānus vai franču bagetes, lai sajustu atšķirību starp sestdienas brokastīm kā profānā laika pārrāvumu un cita – sakrālā, tikai indivīdam piederošā – laika ieviešanu, kurā nav vietas parastai maltītei.[16] Franču maiznīcas piedāvājums nav tikai citu kvalitatīvu miltu un rauga savienojums. Tas ir cits statuss, vismaz uz brīdi tas sniedz citas emocijas, kuras saistītas ar Provansas bezrūpības stilu, kas tik plaši pārstāvēts interjera un dzīves stila žurnālos.[17] Sakrālais laiks patērētāju sabiedrībā nav tikai individuālas reakcijas vai tehnikas, bet tās tiek stilizētas kā bēgšanas tendences arī pārtikas ražotāju preču reklāmā.

Fabrika "Laima" savā jaunajā videoklipā "Saldie brīži – 2" rāda sievieti, kas nesteidzīgi bauda rīta sauli gultā. Aizkadra balss un sauklis akcentē sestdienas rītu kā sakrāla laika iestāšanos mūsdienu darba ņēmēja dzīvē.[18]

Minētie piemēri ir arī sociālās stratifikācijas ilustrācijas, kas paredz, ka reklāmā pasniegtais saturs uzrunā indivīdu, kurš spēj patērēt konkrētu preci kopā ar noteiktu dzīves stilu, kas apliecina viņa un (vai) viņas statusu. Spējas piederēt pamatā ir pirktspēja, kas ir izkaisīta reklāmā izveidotā telpā un netieši parādās arī priekšmetiskā vidē, kura veido patērētāja eksistences fonu – "Stokmann" pārtikas nodaļas pircējs ir intelektuāls, veiksmīgs darba ņēmējs, kas lielākoties strādā birojā un var ne tikai iztērēt 2–3 latus pusdienām, bet arī uzņemt viesus (parasti šauru draugu grupu). Arī šokolādes baudītajam ir nepieciešams laiks, kaut tikai nedēļas nogalē.

Avots: http://www.laima.lv/akcija.php?file=2204_laima2_lv.mpg

Šokolādes reklāma – saldie brīži un identitātes veidošana

Apkārtējā vide, kas lielākoties prezentē vai nu minimālisma vai klasiska interjera piemērus, ir patērētāja statusa apliecinājums un patērētāja–baudītāja piederības pie kopienas priekšnoteikums. Laiks kā vērtība un sociālā statusa noteicējs (Z. Baumans) pirkšanas procesā nav dominējošais piederības kritērijs. Nereti ir otrādi – laika trūkums ir uztverts kā statusa apliecinājums un uz laika trūkumu balstās ātri pagatavojamas pārtikas industrija.[19]

2. Reklāmās izmantotā tehnika, uzrunājot kopienu kā vairākus atsevišķus indivīdus, nedod iemeslu ignorēt arī kolektīvu iezīmju pastāvēšanu patērētāju identitātē. Neskatoties uz *tu* dominanti, veikalu tīklu preču reklāmās var konstatēt arī īpašības, kas apvieno indivīdus kopienā un uzrunā tos kā masu, grupu un kolektīvu bez individuālajām īpašībām: "Stockmann" mājas lapas saturs ir sadalīts pēc lingvistiskām kopienām. To paredz starptautiskā tīkla mājas lapa. "Rimi" portāls ignorē tos Latvijas iedzīvotājus, kas runā krievu valodā, piedāvājot informāciju tikai latviešu un angļu valodā. "Narvesen" tīkla piedāvātā informācija ir vienīgi latviešu valodā. Blakus lingvistiskai kopienai, kas ir atsevišķs patērētāja segments, tiek uzrunāta arī dzimte kā kopienas identitātes pazīme – patērētāju centri ir būvēti (tas vairāk attiecas uz daudzstāvu telpām), ņemot vērā pircēju dzimti un vecumu.

Jo elitārāka patērētāju kopiena, kas tiek uzrunāta, jo vairāk liecību par to, ka patērētāju kopiena tiek iedomāta kā kolektīvs, kas sastāv no indivīdiem, kam ir arī izteiktas un telpā norobežotas "apakšidentitātes", piemēram, dzimtes identitāte. Izveidotā individuāli kolektīva identitāte, kas balstās uz fizioloģiskajām pamatatšķirībām, sniedz papildu impulsus patērētāju sabiedrības galvenās funkcijas nodrošināšanai – nepārtrauktam patērēšanas procesam, kas nodrošina individu-alitātes pastāvēšanu. Sevišķi izteikti tas ir redzams periodikas iegādē, ko piedāvā "Narvesen". Veikalu tīkls, līdzīgi fabrikai "Laima", lielākoties uzrunā pilsētnieku, kas steigā pavada lielāko daļu savas aktīvās dzīves, par savu saukli izvēloties iluzoru priekšstatu par to, ka katra diena var būt neparasta: "Solis no ikdienas!".[20]

"Narvesen" misijas aprakstā tīkla zīmola pamatiezīmes var raksturot kā jaunās "Narvesen" klienta identitātes avotu – "Narvesen" klients, patērējot "Narvesen" piedāvātos produktus, ir pasaules pilsonis, viņa un (vai) viņas izteikta kosmopolītiskā pozīcija tiek papildināta ar kompetenci un informētību, plašu interešu un hobiju spektru. Kopumā "Narvesen" atbalsta kultūru dažādību, nedefinējot to detaļās.[21]

Interešu plurālisms un savstarpējā cieņa kultūru dažādības jautājumos ir viens no patērētāju kultūras vadmotīviem. Tomēr, kā trāpīgi atzīmējusi Naomija Kleina, būtu naivi domāt, ka indivīdu kultūru dažādība, kas redzama patērētāju sabiedrībā, atspoguļo veikalu īpašnieku pārliecību par labāku pasauli. To, ka idejas par kultūru dažādību tika uzreiz iekļautas mārketinga speciālistu darba plānos, Kleina raksturo kā patērētāju kultūras ēnas pusi.[22] "Narvesen" gadījumā uzņēmuma intereses ir primāras arī tad, kad runa ir par uzņēmuma cēlo mērķi veicināt lasīšanas kultūru.[23]

Sekojot Naomijas Kleinas zīmolu kultūru dažādības manifestācijas galvenajam mērķim – iesaistīt patērēšanas procesā pēc iespējas vairāk grupu, Latvijas gadījumā jāatzīmē, ka patērētāju sabiedrības identitāšu spektrā jūtama vietējā kultūras konteksta ietekme, kas bloķē iespēju attīstīt daļu no patērētāju identitātēm. Piemēram, Latvijā gandrīz nav manāma geju un lesbiešu patērētāju daļa[24], arī korpulenti un gados vecāki cilvēki ir liels retums veikalu skatlogos.[25]

Etniskā identitāte kā atšķirīgas kolektīvas patērētāju grupas uzrunāšanas līdzeklis Latvijā ir iedarbīgs mehānisms patērēšanas procesa uzturēšanai – „Ulmaņa desa" vai šķiņķis atrod savu vietu blakus „Doktora desai", ko labprāt pērk krievvalodīgie pircēji, kas izauga, ēdot gaļas salātus kā vienu no svētku pamat-ēdieniem (tas tika plaši izmantots padomju kino industrijas hitā filmā "Ironija sudbi iļi s ļegkim parom".

Šie un vairāki citi piemēri sniedz papildu apliecinājumu tam, ka patērētāja identitāte tiek veidota kā *iespēja pieredzēt preci* un ka pirkšanas process pārvēršas no ekonomiskā procesa akseoloģiskā procesā, kad tiek veidotas jaunas vai uzrunātas jau esošas vērtības, nostādnes, emociju pasaule, kurā *nostalģijai* ir liela nozīme kā vienam no efektīvākajiem mehānismiem, veidojot lojalitāti.[26] Patērēšanas process kļūst par kaislību un emociju pilnu piedzīvojumu, identitātes manifestāciju, tās maiņas procesu (uz augšu vai uz leju), pat par pilsonisko rīcību – pirkšana vai nepirkšana kā protests vai atbalsts konkrētam procesam politikā vai ekonomikā,[27] kā nacionālās identitātes un patriotisma izpausme.[28] Pirkšanas procesā ekonomiskā dimensija strauji mazinās, jo tā ir nesaraujami saistīta ar patērētāju sabiedrības svarīgāko, bet "nepatīkamo" spēju – *pirktspēju*. Kredītu reklāmas saturs, kas tiek veidots, cieši sadarbojoties ar pirkšanas procesa avotiem – veikalu tīkliem –, nevēsta par aizdevuma atdošanas procesu, bet uzrunā tikai patērētāja vēlmi tūlīt un tagad iegādāties. Noklusēšanai savstarpēji piekrīt trīs šī procesa puses – kredīt-iestāde, pārdevējs un aizvien vairāk pircēju.[29]

Palielinoties materiālo priekšmetu nozīmei indivīda un grupas identitātes veidošanā, reklāmu saturā patērētājvidē notiek vairākas interesantas antropoloģiska rakstura pārmaiņas. Viena no tām ir vides satura izmaiņas – *homo sapiens* aiziet no patērētāja vides un tajā arvien vairāk parādās citas būtnes un priekšmeti, kuri iegūst cilvēku vaibstus.

3. "Īstais draugs" – "Amilo" datori un citi

Mobilie telefoni uz skrituļiem, katrs modelis ar saviem sejas vaibstiem, atkritumu maisiņi ar ūsām vai sārtiem vaigiem, runājošas zobu birstes un dziedošie tualetes podi – visapkārt mums dzīvo, dusmojas un priecājas vairāki priekšmeti, kuriem reklāmu autori piešķīruši cilvēka vaibstus. Priekšmetu *antropomorfizācija* – cilvēka vaibstu un īpašību piedēvēšana nedzīvām būtnēm vai dabas parādībām – ir izsena cilvēku kopienas darbība. Patērētāju sabiedrības kontekstā netiek veidota jauna reliģija vai filozofiskas koncepcijas, bet tiek dehumanizēta patērētājvide, kurā indivīds atrodas divtulībā ar viņam domātiem un (vai) kārotiem priekšmetiem. Tas izriet no indivīda izvēles un ar to saistītām unikālām patērētāja īpašībām. Pieliekot klāt ideju par brīvas izvēles neierobežošanu, līdzcilvēka eksistence tiek izslēgta kā ierobežojošs faktors.

Savienojot patērētāju ar viņa kāroto priekšmetu, tukšums tiek aizpildīts, priekšmetam piedēvējot neeksistējoša līdzcilvēka īpašības – uzticību, prasmi saprast, kā arī tiek uzrunāti mūžīgie temati – nodevība, nepastāvīgas attiecības, gods, naids, skaudība. Mūs aicina atstāt aiz durvīm mūsu dzīvesbiedrus, jo mums ir interesantāk dzīvot kopā ar jauno sieru vai spēli, džemu vai putekļsūcēju.

Viena no antropomorfizācijas atgriezeniskās saiknes izpausmēm ir patērētāja īslaicīga pārvēršanās dzīvniekā, ar kuru, pēc zīmolu veidotāju uzskatiem, indivīds ir cieši saistīts savās psihes pamatstruktūrās, impulsos un vēlmēs. Nereti dzērienu un ēdienu, kā arī transporta reklāmā cilvēks tiek pielīdzināts dzīvniekam pēc šo preču patēriņa daudzuma vai saskarsmē ar tām. Tādi sižeti balstās uz totēmisma elementu izmantošanu zīmolu veidošanā – vīrietis pārvēršas lauvā, sēžot džipā, bet sieviete – panterā, pielaikojot jaunas melnas apakšbiksītes utt. Spektrs ir plašs, un katra prece, kas tiek antropomorfizēta vai izraisa cilvēkā dzīvnieciskus instinktus, tiek piedāvāta postmodernās estētiskas izvēles kontekstā – patērētājam tiek piesolīta ne tikai virkne preču, bet arī virkne dzīvnieku identitāšu – var kļūt par lauvu, dīvāna sunīti vai arī žurku, kas, saož svaigas "Jacobs" kafijas smaržu.[30]

Pēc tam kad esam aplūkojuši virkni piemēru, var sniegt dažus vispārēja rakstura atzinumus par mūsdienu patērētāju identitātes veidošanas īpašībām Latvijā:

1. Patērētāju sabiedrības idejiskais pamats veicina radikālas izmaiņas indivīda un kolektīva socializācijas procesā. Mainās ne tikai formas, bet arī socializācijas "nesēju" saraksts. Indivīds tiek atbrīvots no kontakta ar sociālajiem tīkliem, un šis stāvoklis tiek pasludināts par optimālo individuālai attīstībai. Prasības kreativitātes "piešķiršanai" ir krietni pazeminātas, un ikkatram tiek piedāvāts veidot savu identitāti.[31] Kreativitāte kā dzīves stils ir pietuvināta precei un loģiski kļūst par reklāmas un patērēšanas procesa elementu.
2. Indivīds tiek "nogādāts" lingvistiski un vizuāli vienreizējā "tikai jums" vidē, kurā viņam tiek piedāvāti gatavi identitāšu komplekti – no stilīga pilsētnieka – japija – līdz tropiski kaislīgam mačo, no biznesa lēdijas līdz mūžīgai un naivai skuķei.
3. Identitātes veidošana patēriņa procesā dziļi ietekmē arī patērētāju savstarpēju komunikāciju – veidojot identitāti, tiek konstruētas arī komunikācijas formas, stils un saturs.
4. Patērētāja identitāte, kas tiek stilizēta kā individuāla izvēle un spontāns process, tomēr ir "laboratorijas" produkts – mērķtiecīga mārketinga veidota identitāte.

Rakstā minētie un analizētie piemēri liecina par patērētāju sabiedrības strauju attīstību. Līdz šim Latvijā pretošanās patērēšanas procesa pievilcīgumam bija vāji attīstīta un reklāmas plūdiem gandrīz nebija nekādu barjeru, kas sekmētu kritiskākas refleksijas par patērētāja identitātes blakusparādībām.

4. Kas nepieder, tas ir izslēgts – patērētāju kopienas robežas un to pārkāpēji

Līdz šim Latvijā nav izpētīti tādi zīmolu un patērētāju sabiedrības mijiedarbības aspekti kā patērētāja identitātes ietekme uz viņa pilsonisko pozīciju, sociālo atstumtību un solidaritāti. Izstumšana no patērētāju vides ir interesants un maz pētīts Citādības, svešinieka un, iespējams, arī ienaidnieka tēla analīzes aspekts.

Citādības fenomens identitāšu pētniecībā ir viens no pamatelementiem, kas veido individuālo un kolektīvo identitāti. Es un Viņš, Mēs un Citi – šo kategoriju izpēte piesaistīja vairāku skolu un atsevišķu filozofu uzmanību. 20. gadsimtā

Bubers, Levinas, Bahtins, Halbvakss, Burdjē un virkne citu filozofu, sociologu un literatūrzinātnieku centās analizēt citādības ietekmi uz individuālo domāšanas un kolektīvu uzvedības saturu un formām. Neatkarīgi no tā, vai citādais pastāv kā intelektuālā alternatīva vai socioloģiskais fenomens, dominējošā citādības īpašība, manuprāt, slēpjas tās iespējā ietekmēt priekšstatu par Es. Citādības pamats ir tā atšķirība no Es raksturīgā dzīvesveida, ārējā izskata, vērtībām un rīcības. Kaut arī psiholoģiskā tradīcijā Citādais tiek bieži definēts kā iespēja pārnest uz to savas kopienas problēmātisko aspektu kopumu,[32] nevar ignorēt vēl vienu Citādības īpašību, kas ir saistīta ar jau minēto atbrīvošanos no savas kopienas "neērtām" īpašībām, proti, – Citādais uzsver un ļauj labāk saredzēt *pozitīvo* sevī un savā kopienā. Eiropas kultūrā Citādā kopiena ir nepieciešamā sevis definēšanas un sava pozitīvā tēla sastāvdaļa.

Nereti Eiropas vēsturē Citādais tika demonizēts, radīti priekšnoteikumi tā pārtapšanai par ienaidnieku. Citādais darbojas kā pasakainais spogulis, kas ļauj kopienai saredzēt Citādajā savas pozitīvās īpašības sevišķi spilgtā gaismā. 2005. gada oktobrī veiktā aptauja 3. kursa studentu vidū vienā no Rīgas augstskolām parādīja, ka Citādais pašlaik ir Austrumeiropas valstu iedzīvotājs, t. i., studentu uztverē Krievijas, Baltkrievijas un Ukrainas iedzīvotāji ir neparedzami, bīstami, emocionālāki nekā Latvijas iedzīvotāji.[33] Var konstatēt, ka kopš 18. gs. vidus, kad Rietumeiropa sāka vairāk iepazīt Austrumeiropas reģiona valstis un iedzīvotājus, Austrumeiropa kā emociju un īpašību kopums, Citādais, sliktākais nav pazudusi, bet tikai mainījusi ģeogrāfiskās atrašanās robežas.[34]

Mūsdienu sabiedrībā blakus priekšstatiem par Citādo pēc etniskām, reliģiskām un sociālām atšķirībām pastāv arī priekšstats par Citādo patērētāju kopienas robežās. Kā katrai kopienai, kas definē sevi, veidojot paralēli arī savas robežas un atdalot nepiederošos, arī patērētāju kopiena – pirktspējīgo indivīdu grupa – veido Citādo un norobežo sevi, izslēdzot nepiederošos. Aplūkosim dažus visizplatītākos marginalizācijas mehānismus, kas ir patērētāju kopienas ietvaros.

Pirmkārt, jāņem vērā, ka patērētāju kopiena savos vēstījumos ir izteikti egalitāra un ietveroša.

Iebildumi pret iepriekš minēto tēzi būtu tikai daļēji pamatoti: no vienas puses, patērētāju kopienai var piederēt jebkurš indivīds neatkarīgi no reliģiskās, seksuālās, vecuma un citām identitātes pazīmēm. Reklāmas industrijas pamatvēstījums un līdz ar to patērētāju kopienas vīzija ir trāpīgi formulēta lielizmēra sadzīves tehnikas kompānijas sauklī "everyone is invited!". Virkne līdzīgu lozungu aicina atmest jebkādas šaubas par savu kapacitāšu trūkumu vai ierobežojumiem, vai zināšanu trūkumu un uzdrīkstēties iesaistīties patērēšanas piedzīvojumā. Ieeja šajā imaginārajā pasaulē teorētiski nav liegta nevienam. Patērētāju kopienas teritorijas – lielveikalu halles – jau sen ir apsteigušas jebkuru valdību labklājības un integrācijas politiku un ierīkojušas liftus, trepes, kafejnīcas, kinozāles un tualetes, kas ļauj cilvēkiem ar īpašām vajadzībām pārvietoties tajās un tā piedalīties patērēšanas procesā.

Šie un vairāki citi piemēri nenoliedzami var sniegt argumentus patērētāju sabiedrības adeptiem. Piemēram, vienā mājas lapā tēžu veidā tika formulēti daži principi, kas aizstāv patērētāju sabiedrību un skaidro, kāpēc iepirkties un kļūt par patērētāju ir labi. Vairāku tēžu vidū minēšu tikai dažas, kas visaktīvāk cenšas atspēkot pretpatēriņa kustības pārstāvju kritiku. Informācijas lapā "Priekšlikumi patērētāju sabiedrībai" ("Propositions on the consumer society") tiek norādīts, ka patērēšana attīsta demokrātisko valdību, izplata Rietumeiropas vērtības, var palīdzēt trešās pasaules valstīm un ir vienkārši "laba, jo patērēšanu bauda visi tie, kas to var, un uz to cer visi tie, kas vēl to nebauda".[35]

Mājas lapa ignorē virkni rādītāju, kas parāda, ka patēriņa piekritēji kā neatņemamu priekšnoteikumu paredz piedalīšanos patērēšanas procesā – finansiālo kapacitāti. Vienlaikus tiek ignorēta virkne citu rādītāju, ko Naomija Kleina uzskatīja par „No Logo" stūrakmeni un kritikas esenci – trešās pasaules darba apstākļi, drošības trūkums, ekspluatācija un arodbiedrību niecīgā nozīme nodarbinātības procesā. 2005. gadā Lielbritānijā rīkota akcija „Fare trade" ir tikai viens atsevišķs projekts, kas nespēj jūtami ietekmēt lielāko zīmolu ražotāju nodarbinātības politiku.

Tātad var konstatēt, ka patērētāju kopienas egalitārisms balstās uz principu, kas paredz finansiālu priekšnoteikumu piederībai. Ja indivīds atbilst šim priekšnoteikumam, tad iedarbojas egalitārais princips, kas ļauj patērētāju kultūras ietvaros īstenot brīvu identitātes izvēli, kura pieminēta raksta otrajā nodaļā.

Paralēli iekļaušanai pastāv arī tehnoloģijas, kas paredz uzturēt indivīda saikni ar patērētāju kopienu un "piespiest" indivīdu saglabāt šo saikni. Visizplatītākā tehnoloģija ir reklāmas iedarbības pamatmehānisms – radīt indivīdam problēmas, draudus un nepilnības, ko var uzlabot, piedaloties patērēšanas procesā: mutes dobuma infekcija, blaugznas, iekaisusi āda, kāju sēnīte, celulīts un sviedru smaka – tas viss apdraud indivīda statusu mūsdienu patērētāju kopienā. Vienlaikus tieši patērēšanas aktā slēpjas šo problēmu risinājumi. Piemēram, patērētāju kopiena "piegādā" tās loceklim "grēkus" un tai pašā laikā sniedz "pestīšanu" – jaunu zobu pastu, šķidrumu pret pumpām un jaunu izskatu. Piedāvātie zīmoli var glābt indivīda vērtību un pašnovērtējumu, apliecināt viņa piederību.

Salīdzinot ar etnisko un reliģisko kopienu, patērētāju kopiena ir daudz atvērtāka arī tāpēc, ka zīmolu tapšana un attīstība vairāku valstu iedzīvotājiem asociējas ar citu reģionu, ar kultūru, kas atrodas ārpus nacionālās valsts robežām un paredz kosmopolītisku, pozitīvu attieksmi pret citām kultūrām: franču konjaks un smaržas, britu viskijs un žaketes, Ziemeļeiropas valstu mašīnas un tālruņi paredz labvēlīgu attieksmi arī pret šo valstu etniskajām kultūrām, kaut arī ir iespējami etniskie stereotipi – itāliešu siers var asociēties gan ar Toskānas reģiona romantiski saulaino ainavu, gan ar itāliešiem kā skandaloziem, skaļiem makaronu ēdājiem.

Vēl viens veids, kā saglabāt un stiprināt saikni ar patērētāju, ir nepārtraukti uzturēt tā interesi par preces pilnveidošanu un brīdināt par lietotas preces ātru novecošanu. Katru dienu mums tiek piedāvāts labāks margarīns, jaunāka automašīna, iedarbīgāka pretklepus mikstūra. Nepārtraukta pilnveidošana paredz veidot stabilu un noturīgu priekšstatu par to, ka patērētājs var iekarot savu sociālo statusu un paturēt to, veicot nežēlīgu ikdienas atlases darbu – izmetot veco un iegadājoties jauno. Jau minētā patērēšanas procesa apoloģija pierāda, ka patērēt nozīmē būt „zaļam" un domāt par vides saglabāšanu. Neminot ne vārda par atkritumu pārstrādes problemātiku, vides glābiņš tiek saistīts ar patērētāju vēlmi iegādāties lētākas preces un ar videi draudzīgāku ražošanas procesu.[36]

Apkopojot patērētāju kopienas "varas" un piederības tehnoloģiju izpausmes, var secināt, ka:

1) patērētāju kopiena ir tikai šķietami egalitāra. Kultūru dažādība, identitāšu izvēle un iecietība pret Citādību attiecas tikai uz kopienas iekšējo telpu un tās dalībniekiem – finansiāli nodrošinātiem indivīdiem;

2) piederība patērētāju kopienai ir regulāri jāatjauno, un atjaunošanas iespējas rodamas patērētāju sabiedrībā – reklāmas vēstījumā un zīmolu mīta saturā un to izplatīšanas tehnoloģijās. Patērētājs, kas neseko patērēšanas procesa likumiem, var izkrist no patērētāju kopienas. Šie draudi rodas, ja ir neatbilstība daudziem kritērijiem;

3) izmantojot indivīda socializācijas vajadzības un sociālās atšķirības, patērētāju sabiedrība veido mehānismus, kuru mērķis ir maksimāli paplašināt patērētāju kopienu. Patērētāju kopienas egalitārais modelis atspoguļo konkrētā sabiedrībā pastāvošo sociālekonomisko un kultūras hierarhiju. Tajā ir patērētāju elite (mūsdienu uzņēmēju aristokrātija), vidusšķira un arī "Penny Markt" auditorija – cilvēki ar zemu ienākumu līmeni. Viņiem ir veidota virkne vēstījumu, kas stimulē patēriņu: lēta prece ir gudra izvēle; pamatpreces bez izsmalcinājumiem ir vienkāršo cilvēku izvēle, un vienkāršība asociējas vai nu ar dzīvi laukos, vai arī ar "īstajām" vērtībām.[37] Tā tiek nodrošināta emocionāli komfortabla vide lēto preču patērēšanai bez elitārām patēriņa prasībām: bez veselības, samazināta kaloriju skaita, veģetāriem ēdieniem, dārgiem vīniem un ārzemju delikatesēm. Zemais ienākumu līmenis, kas Eiropas ekonomikas stagnācijas situācijā kļūs arvien aktuālāks, zīmolu "mītu industrijā" pārtapis par modes tendenci – lēti var būt stilīgi. „Versace" modes nama vadītāja Donatela Versače jau 1997. gadā paziņoja, ka "less money people" ir viņas modes nama jaunā prioritārā auditorija, jo tajā Donatela saskata zīmolu nākotni.[38]

Nobeigumā jāaplūko vēl viens aktuāls jautājums saistībā ar patērētāju kopienas robežām un norobežošanās tendencēm, proti, – kas notiek ar tiem, kuri sociālekonomiskā statusa dēļ nepieder patērētāju kopienai? Atbilstoši reklāmās kultivētajam egalitārisma principam atstumtie atklāti patērētāju sabiedrībā neparādās, jo „everyone is invited" un sapnis par jaunu dzīvokli, kā apgalvo „Nordea" ir "sasniedzams ikvienam"! Tomēr gan sociāli atstumtajiem, gan tiem, kas, ielūkojoties atstumto grupas tēlā, saskata savus panākumus vēl skaidrāk un spilgtāk, šovu industrija ciešā sadarbībā ar patērētāju kultūras ražotājiem ekspluatē pārvērtību fenomenu, kas arhetipu līmenī ir katras kultūras saturā. Stāsts par Pelnrušķīti, loto spēles popularitāte un TV šovi par nabadzīgo sieviešu pārvēršanos skaistās, pašpārliecinātās dāmās atražo mūsdienu sabiedrībā senus mītiskus vēstījumus par pārvēršanos, negaidīto un aloģisko laimi un vēlmju piepildīšanu. Šis mītiskais saturs tiek aktīvi izmantots arī Latvijas šovu industrijā – raidījums "Drosmīgās pārvērtības", kas 2005. gadā tika iekļauts LNT „prime time" (labākajā laikā), kopē līdzīgus raidījumus Vācijā un ASV. Īslaicīgas pārvērtības aicina arī izstumtos piedalīties patēriņa procesā. Kaut arī skaidrs, ka ārpus šova indivīds droši vien atgriezīsies atstumto realitātē un tikai ļoti ierobežoti varēs izmantot patērētāju sabiedrības piedāvājumu, tomēr demonstrētās pārvērtības noder patērēšanas procesa simulācijai. Šova fenomens neaicina izstumtos kļūt par patērētājiem un netematizē atstumtības cēloņus, neaplūko izstumto ikdienas dzīvi un rūpes. Izstumjot nepiederošos no patērētāju vides, tiek īstenota arī Pelnrušķītes stāsta otrā daļa – pārvērtības pēc pusnakts, bet jau ārpus TV šova. Manuprāt, tieši šajās iestudētajās pārvērtībās parādās patērētāju sabiedrības pretruna un robežas, kā arī marginalizācijas mehānismi. Analizējot patērētāju sabiedrību no tās kritiķu pozīcijas, var apgalvot, ka izstumtie netiek aicināti piedalīties patērēšanas procesā, jo nevar būt šī procesa dalībnieki. Šovu panākumi un labākais laiks ēterā ir izskaidrojams ar patērētspējīgo indivīdu vēlmi piedzīvot izmaiņas, ko sola patēriņa process. Nogurušas, bālas sievietes ar bojātiem un neglītiem zobiem un sliktu frizūru pārvēršas skaistulēs, pateicoties patēriņa pasaules spēkam un "maģijai", ko atkal un atkal piedzīvo tie, kas spēj nodrošināt savas pārvērtības. Droši vien nav pārspīlēts apgalvojums, ka nabadzīga, bāla sieviete ir spogulis, kurā ar pašapmierinātu smaidu ielūkojas pārticis patērētājs un saskata tajā nevis šīs sievietes rūpes un sociālo izstumšanu, bet sevi. Frizieri, kosmetologi un stilisti, kuru rokās izstumtie uz brīdi nonāk, bauda patērētāju sabiedrības Pigmaliona darbu. *Patērētāju sabiedrības patērēšanas procesa turpinājums un tā transcendēšana uz atstumtajiem nodrošina to, ka patēriņš kā process un pieredze piepilda socializācijas telpu, aizpildot tos tukšumus un vidi, kurā patstāvīga un nepārtraukta patērēšana nav iespējama. Līdz ar to veidojas totālas patēriņa simulācijas vide, kurā uz mirkli ir aicināti arī tie, kas ekonomiskā statusa dēļ nevar regulāri un patstāvīgi tajā piedalīties.*

Raksta nobeigumā vēlos aicināt turpināt pētīt patērēšanas procesu, jo Latvijas kulturoloģijā, kā arī antropoloģijas un komunikācijas pētniecības tradīcijā vēl joprojām nav analizētas sociāli atstumto indivīdu kultūras vides izpausmes, lai varētu informēt, kā veiksmīgāk pārvarēt atstumtību valsts un sabiedrisko organizāciju darbībā.

Summary

The main thesis of the presented paper is – Latvian advertising agencies use various techniques to establish a new consumer identity among well to do Latvians, ignoring the fact that there are marginalized groups. Among different techniques used for that process ad agencies use brandbuilding myths and create identity of independent individual who is not involved in various forms of socialization, but exists separately among non animated objects that make up his/her everyday experience as consumer. Gender, age and ethnic origin, as well as social strata are further efficient tools to establish consumer identity. To buy means not to exchange goods for money, but to consume new identity, values, new biography. The way one purchases food, drinks and perfumes, transmit wide spectrum of identities „ready to wear" – various masculinities or feminine characteristics can be put on and changed. There are deep changes that Latvian consumers undergo at present – their social networks, social responsibility and even political identity are being affected by advertisement and fashion industry. Until now there are no sufficient studies or deep analysis of such influence and its consequences for proactive civic society in Latvia, as well as phenomenon of marginalization of whose, who can not participate in the consumer culture.

Atsauces

[1] Visi ir laipni aicināti – tulk. no angļu val.

[2] Vienu no īsākām identitātes definīcijām atradu vēsturnieka, sociologa Vilho Harlē (*Vilho Harle*) pētījumā: "Atbilde uz jautājumu, kas patība ir un kam tā pieder". Harle, V. *The Enemy with a Thousand Faces. The Tradition of the Other in Western Political Thought and History*. – London, 2000. – p. 16.

[3] 2004. gadā interneta pakalpojumu reklāmā tika izmantoti t. s. krievu skolu štāba lozungi – „Reforme net" (vārdu spēle *net* – tīkls un *ņet* – krievu valodā vārda "nē" transkripcija latīņu burtiem); 2005. g. augustā–septembrī sociālisma laikmeta plakātu saturu transformācija no Ļeņina valsts elektrifikācijas perioda. 20. gs. 20. gadu formulas tika nomainītas uz "com – nisms ir visas valsts internetizācija". Šī reklāma izmanto padomju ideoloģijas un sadzīves artefaktu hronoloģisko attālināšanos no pašreiz ekonomiski aktīvām jauniešu grupām, piešķirot eksotiskas pagātnes ideoloģijas statusu.

[4] Nav jāaizmirst arī piespiedu iesaistīšana moderno banku pakalpojumu spektrā, piemēram, valsts budžeta iestāžu darbinieku, bezdarbnieku un pensionāru pabalstu un algu pārskaitīšana uz kontiem.

[5] Piemērs patērētāju sabiedrības izmantošanai politiskā aģitācijā var būt 2005. gada pašvaldību vēlēšanas, kad apvienība "Dzimtene" savam elektorātam solīja nojaukt tirdzniecības centrus „Domina" un „Alfa" un to vietā atjaunot rūpnīcas.

[6] Fiske, J. *Videotech*. In: Mirzoeff N. (ed.) The Visual Culture Reader. – Routledge, 1998. – p. 384.

[7] Kopš Naomijas Kleinas grāmatas "No Logo" izdošanas strauji palielinājies tādu pētījumu un sacerējumu skaits, kur rakstīts par zīmoliem. Ir pamanāma izteikta tendence – zīmolu veidošana tiek izņemta no mārketinga studijām un pietuvināta kulturoloģijas studijām un reliģijas pētniecībai. Zīmolu pētniecība tiek iekļauta starpdisciplināro studiju lokā, paverot iespējas vairāku nozaru pētniekiem piedalīties tirgus procesu izpētē. No pēdējām publikācijām kā izteiktu starpdisciplināru pētījumu piemēru sk.: Atkin D. The Culting of Brands: Turn Your Customers Into True Believers. – London: Portfolio, 2004. Tā izdota sērijā "Identitāte. Psiholoģija"; Sk. arī rakstu krājumu "Brands and Branding" (Clifton R., Simmon J. (ed.) – The Economist, 2003.

[8] Starptautiskas ekspertīzes, kas lielākoties nenonāk līdz plašākai Latvijas publikai, norāda, ka Latvijas ekonomika nav ar augstu konkurētspējas pakāpi un tai nav lielas izredzes globalizācijas apstākļos. Sk. Creating a 21st Century National Innovation System for 21st Century Latvian Economy. – Nov. 2004. – p. 5. http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/3457.html – pēdējo reizi skatīts 2005. gada 25. novembrī.

[9] Šajā rakstā autors dod priekšroku jēdzienam "zīmols", bet apzinās, ka tiek lietots arī jēdziens "brends". Izsenā valodas pūristu un relatīvistu cīņa valodas telpā ir skārusi arī brenda jēdzienu.

[10] Schmitt B., Simonson A. Marketing Aesthetics. The Strategic Management of Brands, Identity and Image. – Free Press. – 1997. – p. 84–87.

[11] www.rimi.lv

[12] http://international.stockmann.com/lat/index.html – šeit un turpmāk „Stockmann" mājas lapa pēdējo reizi skatīta 2005. gada 14. novembrī.

[13] http://www.narvesen.lv/?menu=4 – šeit un turpmāk „Narvesen" mājas lapa pēdējo reizi skatīta 2005. gada 10. novembrī.

[14] http://international.stockmann.com/lat/index.html

[15] Turpat.

[16] Intervija ar anonīmu respondentu, Latvijas Universitātes mācībspēku, 2005. gada 15. augustā.
[17] Sk. Homes and Gardens (2004., 2005. g. numurus, Maison Francais – 2004. g. rudens, Krievijā izdoto "Mezonin" vai arī Latvijā izdoto žurnāla "Deko" 2005. g. jūlija numuru. Vairākos žurnālos Provansas stils ir pastāvīgs satura elements.
[18] www.laima.lv – viens no videoklipa saukļiem "Sestdienas rīts – vienreiz nedēļā".
[19] Viens – divi – gatavs ("Stockmann" mājas lapa).
[20] http://www.narvesen.lv/?menu=4
[21] Turpat.
[22] Клейн Н. No Logo. Люди против брендов. – Добрая книга, 2003. – с. 155. Internetā ir mājas lapa, ko izveidojis Naomijas Kleinas fanu klubs, kurā tiek apspriestas globalizācijas sekas: www.nologo.org
[23] www.narvesen.lv
[24] Izņēmums šajā ziņā ir zīmola „Sisley" reklāmas plakāti, kas tika uzstādīti Rīgā 2004. gadā. Tajos tika atainoti divi rokās sadevušies vīrieši melnā uzvalkā un pusmaskā (www.sisley.com, 2004. gada kolekcija "Noir"). Autors šaubās par to, vai 2005. gada 23. jūlijā rīkotais geju un lesbiešu gājiens kaut cik piesaistīja uzņēmēju interesi un nākotnē sekmēs šīs patērētāju grupas "emancipāciju". Provokāciju kā zīmola identitātes sastāvdaļu aktīvi praktizē "United Colours of Benetton", kas Latvijā neizvietoja nevienu no provokatīvajām reklāmām, toties zīmols „Sisley" konsekventi izmanto viendzimuma (lielākoties lesbiešu) mīlestības motīvus. Parodijās uz izsmalcinātu ("glamour") zīmolu kultūru un tēmām, kas tiek izvelētas reklāmai, tiek groteski atainotas visas iespējamās erotisko sižetu kombinācijas, kas izraisa modes žurnālu sašutumu. Sk. Weisberger L. Devil wears Prada. – 2003. Latvijā ģenitālijas un citus intimitātes elementus reklāma izmanto lielākoties apavu reklāmās. Viena provokācija ar vidējā pirksta izmantošanu bija 2004. gada pavasara sezonā lielveikala "Barona centrs" noformējumā, kas vēlāk tika nomainīta ar neitrālāku saturu un žestiem.
[25] Nesen Rīgā tika atvērts jauns veikals korpulentiem cilvēkiem. Veikala skatlogā ir atainoti šie cilvēki.
[26] "Body Shop" tīkls 80. gados sasniedza lielus panākumus. Latvijā par analogu var uzskatīt Stendera ziepju fabrikas tīklu.
[27] 2004. gadā ASV iznāca filma „Zoolander" (latviešu un krievu tulkojumā – "Paraugtēviņš") ar Benu Stileru galvenajā lomā, kad manifestācija pret zīmoliem, kas ekspluatē bērnu darbaspēku Azijā, pārvērtās par zīmola atjaunošanas avotu – jaunās kolekcijas "Atstumtie" demonstrēšanu, uz kuru aicināja Indonēzijas prezidentu. Daļēji šajā antizīmolā var ieraudzīt Eiropas kultūras vēsturei jau pazīstamo rokoko kultūras interesi par nabadzīgajiem un "nekultivētajiem" zemniekiem, kas tika iekļauti elegantās pastorālēs, masku ballēs (sk. franču filmu "Ridicule" ar Faniju Ardānu titullomā vai "Bīstamie sakari" ar Džonu Malkoviču un Mišeli Feiferi.
[28]Akcija „Zaļā karote". Interesanta parādība – tirgus intereses un etniskais mantojums Latvijā konkurē. Šajā konkurencē valsts nacionālās identitātes saglabāšanas politika ir nekonsekventa. Piemēram, Barona dainu fragmentu atainojums Elizabetes un Barona ielas stūrī pēc atjaunošanas tomēr tika nomainīts ar „Adidas" firmas reklāmu.
[29] Hipotekāro kredītu nediskrētais šarms // Nedēļa 23/2005. – 14.–15. lpp.
[30] Reklāma bija atainota uz mājas sienas Brīvības ielā pretī Vidzemes tirgum. Tagad (2005. g. novembris) to nomainījusi "Audi" reklāma.
[31] Florida R. The Rise of Creative Class. – Basic Books, 2002. – p. 166.
[32] Harle V. The Enemy with a Thousand Faces. The Tradition of the Other in Western

Political Thought and History. – London, 2000. – p. 10.

[33] Aptauja, kurā piedalījās 50 studenti, veikta 2005. gada 7. novembrī Rīgas Stradiņa universitātē.

[34] Вульф Л. Изобретая Восточную Европу. Карта цивилизаций в сознании эпохи Просвещения. – Москва, Новое Время. – с. 202.

[35] http://www.richarddnorth.com/10_propositions/consumer.htm – pēdējo reizi skatīts 2005. gada 25. novembrī.

[36] http://www.richarddnorth.com/10_propositions/consumer.htm – pēdējo reizi skatīts 2005. gada 25. novembrī.

[37] Veikāla „Supernetto" reklāma LTV ataino korpulentu sievieti mazā virtuvē. Sieviete paziņo, ka viņas vīram patīk labi paēst. Netiek minētas nekādas citas kvalitātes prasības patērētajai pārtikai, izņemot daudzums un zemas cenas. Salīdzinājumam sk. 2004. gada „Stockmann" reklāmas klipu 2004. gada decembrī ar izsmalcinātu ēdienu karti un reklāmas tēliem – uzņēmējiem, turīgām emancipētām mājas saimniecēm.

[38] White N. Versace. – Phaedon, 2002. – p. 21. Šo tendenci 2005. gadā pārņēma arī Karls Lāgerfelds, piedaloties lēto apģērbu veikala „H&M" reklāmas akcijā.

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Cybergrrls and their Identity (Comunication of Feminist Identity on Webpages – the Case of Poland[1])

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The impact of globalisation and multiculturalism is seen not only in creating a common economic and political space for both old and new democracies but also in transgressing existing borders of cultural, social and psychological origins. It sensitises global citizens to the importance of as if mutually exclusive issues concerning all of us: on one hand a more and more strongly manifested tendency to become similar to one another and on the other a more and more acute need to communicate one's uniqueness. Hence in the last decades of the 20th century and in the first one of the 21st century we witness an unprecedentedly dynamic emergence of new identities. Many of their holders, so far marginalised or even ghettoised, often absent from or ignored in the public sphere, now mark their presence in an ongoing identity discourse. They cross mental and emotional borders created by empowering stereotypes, unjust and poorly motivated prejudice, simplistic clichés and biased assumptions to stop political manipulations and a socio-cultural and economic exclusion of individuals and whole groups on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, physical and mental ability etc. Both a growing need for a distinct identity which would be successfully communicated to the others and a unity in diversity and plurality constitute two extremes in the dialogue between the majority and the old and new minorities. It is also the most difficult challenge to be met by the dialoguing participants.

Let me stress it again that globalisation acts as a powerful factor inspiring all kinds of manifestations of differences because, according to John Hawks (2003)[2], the global and its members can be characterised by the presence of three Ts: Talent, Tolerance and Technology. As for talent, all of the minorities aspiring for their autonomous identity have enough of it to fight for and to promote their cause. Tolerance, in turn, resulting from an everyday multiculturalism, has been assigned the major role in cultural policies or policies *tout court* of all democratic nations and civic societies where it constitutes their important value and a piece of evidence of their democratisation. Let us hope that the series of terrorist attacks will not discredit the value of multiculturalism but strengthen its role in modern world. Furthermore, the most advanced technology and its most democratic invention, the Internet allows anybody to express freely their ideas, believes and concepts independently on where they live, on their political convictions, religion, education, economic and social status etc. It itself teaches tolerance and promotes it world-wide by encouraging debates on equality bases on difficult and socially controversial subjects. The anonymity of conversants allows for their fuller engagement and consequently for a more true, real and authentic communication where neither conversational topics are discriminated nor any point of view, any ideology are imposed. Moreover, no holder of even the most shocking and bold ideas is persecuted and socially ostracised. On the contrary, by offering many, often too many alternatives, the Internet gives a true choice to the message receivers, on the one hand, but on the other it also makes their choices meaningful and responsible enhancing thus global and individual sensitivity and awareness. Hence its value and power in creating a synergical polilog among holders of different identities and sets of values they stand for.

Considering the above properties of Internet, many new identity groups have chosen it as a forum for a wide public discussion about who they are. It helps them to emerge out of the margin of silence and to make stop the majority to talk about the minority problems from the majority perspective. Feminists, most of whom are active Internet users, have also chosen this medium as a form of communication. Especially visible are those who identify with the cyberfeminism of Donna Haraway and with her ideas published in the "Cyborg Manifesto"[3] as well as with the "Cyborgfeminist manifesto for the 21st century" of the Australian group VNS Matrix[4]. Cyberfeminists call themselves cybergrrls[5] and they constitute a female community in the cybernet and by means of it. Cybergrrlism consists of many different subgroups, e.g. guerrilla grrls, riot grrls, bad grrls but all of them have one thing in common: they deal with various issues which may be of any interests to women[6]. They edit netpapers and magazines, they fund chat groups, they write e-mails, they create and promote feminist netart through many netprojects. The topics of the webpages administered by women range from health and work to lesbian issues, from practical pieces of advice on various everyday topics to intellectually sophisticated philosophical, social, cultural, economic and political discussions focused on the role women have played or can play in numerous spheres of human activities. Some of the most radical groups want to co-operate only with women, others are more open. Luce Irrigay has formulated the main idea they all believe in and which serves as a guideline as far as the forms of communication are concerned[7]. She says that the exclusion of feminine imagination results in the women fragmentarily experiencing themselves on social margins which they share with other social outcasts[8]. Consequently, the language which suits the feminist ideology of Irrigay and is the most efficient and powerful means of its expression is the policy of parody. The Cybergrrls should deal with any picture of a woman as created by men and by exaggerating make fun of it. This is the only way for them to show how the male point of view and the male categorisation of the world distort reality, how false and limiting is the reflection of women in the male world, briefly how untrue and biased is the portrait of women from the male perspective.

Three other properties of the Internet have also made it an obvious communication forum for cybergrrls and their social space. Firstly, the use of the

Internet allows women to speak up for their rights more freely and successfully than in real life as the cyberspace is not genderised. The Internet user's identity is not verifiable and it is free from any kind of discrimination, be it age, gender, race, education, social and economic status etc. Anonymity and a lack of pressure to voice openly one's opinions and convictions work to the benefit of those who are still in search of their identity. It gives them the sense of security and time to solve their dilemmas in private before they are ready to voice them in public. Thus it prevents them from the fear of being publicly ridiculed or even stigmatised for their ideas, which is extremely important considering the still negative approach to feminism and feminist issues in many countries. Moreover, it also allows them to share their fears with those who face the same insecurity and suffer from the same socio-cultural categorisation.

Secondly, a relatively easy access to the Internet makes it reach a mass audience, much wider than in the case of less technologically advanced media and means of communication. It transgresses geographical borders and time zones and its immediacy facilitates a direct exchange of ideas and a quasi natural face to face conversation where both interactants actively and without any time delay play the role of a speaker and a listener. It can be used depending on an individual time management, which means that even those whose schedules are very busy can do it. Let us stress that its use is widespread among many women, even those who are housewives, who spend most of their time at home caring for their families and for whom feminism does not constitute an ideology to identify with. While surfing in the net, men may also visit by pure chance the feminist webpages and discover themselves their value. Thus, the educational role of the Internet is unquestionable and gives us hope that the young generation of well educated and entrepreneurial women will have more equal social opportunities as well as more self-esteem and self-confidence[9]. By diminishing efficiently the traditional intellectual, cultural and social divide imposed by the socio-culturally determined concept of male vs. female social roles women may be given new opportunities of inclusion and an active participation in the events happening in the social space. The same applies to the male feminists.

Thirdly, the use of the Internet demands some technical skills which often tend to be denied to many women, especially when stereotypes serve as a frame of reference for defining their talents and the fields of their expertise. According to the data from the research of the portal Altavista in 2003 as much as 80% of men claim that they are better at using the Internet than their female partners[10]. The fact that women constitute only 7.3% of the Internet operators[11] serves as another piece of evidence apparently supporting the previous unfavourable statement about technical skills of women. Moreover, the women who use the Internet for professional purposes are mainly secretaries, which serve as a self-fulfilling prophecy about the glass ceiling[12]. On the other hand the number of the Internet female users grows much faster than that of the male and following the prognostics of the analysts from Nielsen/NetRatings the male domination in the web is claimed to last only till 2010[13]. Considering the above cons and pros about women as the Internet users, the mere fact of becoming a webpage creator and then its administrator as well as the ability to surf in the space is meaningful. It breaks one of the traditional and most harmful profession-bound stereotypes of women and of their feminine identity.

Apart from professional and intellectual stereotypes, patriarchally understood motherhood, womanhood, female body and sexuality constitute other dimensions of a traditional feminine identity. The culture of consumption, of the cult of youth and body adds other images of a woman. She has become an object of the market and in order to meet its demands she constantly experiments with her body to be young, slim and fashionable. Anorexia and bulimia, from which more and more women suffer today is not only a signal that they do not accept their body. They also stand for their quest for autonomy as by controlling their body they want to prove that they have power over themselves and can be independent in their decisions from a man for most of whom a woman is merely a luxurious doll, a trophy, an aggressive business partner[14]. The question, which is basic to ask, is whether a contemporary woman has managed to gain an independent existence on her own or whether she has rather added new forms of her reification to the old ones.

The group of Polish cybergrrls founded in February of 2002 by Ewa Szczyrek, an artist and a single mother is aware of the impact of all the existing stereotypes on the contemporary female identity. She and her four colleagues and friends, also single mothers who are temporarily busy bringing up their children have decided to use the time spent at home to initiate a discussion about the female identity by parodying gender stereotypes. The Internet, as already shown, seems to be the most efficient means of communication to reach the possibly widest audience of women, both feminists and non-feminists. Hence the idea of the webpage www.grzenda.pl. Its name is very meaningful as in Polish *grzęda*, of which *grzenda* is a phonetic and graphic reminder, means a hen roost, and metaphorically a hen house or a house and a home *tout court*. Hens sit on the roost in their hen house and a hen, in turn functions within Polish culture as a pejorative synonym for a prototypical housewife, a homebody or a home-keeping woman. A hen, a home bird has overdeveloped motherly instincts, limited intellectual abilities (a canary brain) and a strong imperative for cooking and cleaning which overwhelm her whole personality. By defining themselves as *hens* the Polish Cybergrrls – Ewa Szczyrek, Monika Wysokrocka, Marta Firlet and Kasia Ignatiuk, all of whom are young, educated, professionally successful and economically privileged single mothers, defy the concept and try to change its semantics from a negative to a strongly positive valence[15]. Their webpage *grzenda* itself is thus a parody of one of the most powerful and socially deeply rooted stereotypes of a woman – namely that of a housewife. It sends two basic massages to all page visitors. Firstly, the feminine personality is complex and it contains rich potential of all kinds of abilities and talents, which the woman herself must discover and make use of independently on the social role, ascribed to her in the course of history. The second one is that even the time spent at home can be effectively used to bring that potential to surface and to transgress identity borders, especially of mental origins.

The *grzenda* netart project seems to fill up the gap in the Internet as far as women-oriented webpages are concerned. However, it must be stressed that apart from *grzenda* Polish women surfers can visit other webpages such as: commercial services "Wirtualny świat kobiet" ("The virtual world of women"), "Sekrety kobiet" ("Women's secrets"), "Female" which can be found on www.kobieta.interia.pl, www.kobiety.pl, and non-commercial services, e.g. http://www.forum-kobiet.com, www.feministka.pl, or else www.wiedźma.pl.[16]. As for non-profit organisations they also have their own services for women such as www.oska.org.pl, www.efka.org..pl, http://free.art.pl, and www.kobiecastrona.prv.pl of which the last two promote Polish feminist art. The feminine interdisciplinary perspective on two pages www.gender.uni.wroc.pl and www.amu.edu.pl. As Internet constitutes a meeting place for sex orientation minorities, two pages present lesbian issues: www.kobiety_kobietom.com and www.les.art.pl.

The strength of *grzenda* lies, first of all, in dealing with the hottest issues which recently have been a topic of public debates. Secondly, if other webpages are pragmatically oriented as they offer to women practical pieces of information on how to solve various everyday problems this one focuses on ethics. It is a comment upon the self-awareness of contemporary Polish society and an attempt to find a proper place for both the webpage creators and the receiver of its messages[17].

www.grzenda.pl is a typical netart project and its designer and webmamer[18] Ewa Szczyrek uses the Internet to ask, with a lot of humour and autoirony, the question how women, mothers and artists may successfully combine these two social roles: be good mothers and at the same time do not give up their professional career. Their voice openly the above ideas in their manifesto which is as follows: *we mix art and our household duties; we use our traumatic experience of housework (house, husband and children) in our art. This is how we want to promote a new race of a home bird, a computer bird*[19]. The most intimate and private of cybergrrls inspires them to redefine their social roles, free them from genderised stereotypes and through art give them a full expression. Thus the net seems to be the only solution for contemporary women, especially cybergrrls, to live fully and experience their personality as a whole. “Grzenda” exists only in the net although its fragments can also be shown outside the virtual space. Apart from more traditional and interactive forms of interpersonal communication such as a dialogue, blogs, e-mails, etc., it also uses multimedia art and its language such as video films, installations, interactive CDs, interactive simulation games.

So far “Grzenda” has realised around ten projects, but the most interesting and representative are the following: “The woman”, “Casting for a new better daddy”, “Intel Power”, “Reservists’ wraps (shawls)”. Let me discuss them and their value in the process of creating the feminist awareness of women and then a feminist identity.

“The woman” whose authoress is Ewa Szczyrek consists of a video film dealing with female roles, conventions and bourgeois-like perceptions of women as a mother. Thus motherhood is the leitmotiv of the film full of autoirony and parody to sensitise the potential viewer to the issue. The film is very personal as it shows the dilemma of the authoress herself who as a single mother had to experience many stereotypical opinions about her motherhood. As she says herself the film challenges the concept of a mechanically understood womanhood. The Woman has been reduced to a head which works as a computer which can be programmed to perform everyday duties and housework perfectly well. She reminds of the cyberwoman from the manifesto of Donna Haraway who is, however, limited in her activities to her household. The Head-machine performs various gestures and makes face grimaces. She also emits sounds and when she stops working properly she should be reset, which is a normal procedure applied to malfunctioning computers. The comparison of a woman to a computer is to make fun of the male opinion concerning low technical skills of women-computer users. The Woman-Head is also an automaton-like mother, a robot who finds neither joy nor satisfaction in the duties she is obliged to perform. That absurdity is communicated many times, when, e.g. motherhood is understood as mainly the obligation to feed and clean the baby, to wash its clothes. Cleaning, washing and washing up have become basic properties of the woman from the film of Ewa Szczyrek. Her home bird has been depicted as a washing machine. Even sex and love is only one more duty she has to perform. When Szczyrek makes the Woman make up her face to be beautiful to her husband, she makes her go to extremes. In her zeal to please him, finally, the Woman puts some bulbs on her head and looks like a Christmas tree. The message is clear: a woman needs an independent existence which would allow her to develop her rich personality. When limited to her house and household duties she looses the sense of discrimination to see what is important in life. She becomes intellectually empty and spiritually devastated.

The idea is rather unusual, not to say shocking as the computer birds participating in the project entitled “Casting for a new and better daddy” run a matrimonial agency. They look for a partner, a potential husband and a daddy for their kid. Each of the “Grzenda” artists and single mothers put her picture and the picture of her child with some humorous characteristics, e.g. “Bruno, 12 years old, he has twelve teeth and is very jealous of her mother”. The aim of the project is to break the stereotype of a woman who is rather passive in her search for a life partner. The situation is even more complex and works much more to the disadvantage of a single mother who is to be blamed for her broken marriage. If a man left her it is because she could not meet all his needs. Moreover, when another man offers to remarry her, she should be grateful to him and uncritically accept his generous proposal. The behaviour of cybergrrls does not follow the traditional script. First of all, they are active in searching for the right partner who should meet their expectations and the expectations of their child. It is thus them who arrange dates or rather castings for a new and better daddy because the previous one was not good enough. Thus it is not only the woman who is responsible for her broken marriage. The man has also his share in it although the traditional and patriarchal culture does not want to see it in this way. The single mothers from the game are difficult and very critical while making their choices. The fact that they not only make it in public but also have much fun makes us discover the forgotten or ignored truth that women have the right to decide themselves about their life. In this way they break one more stereotype about women who publicly deny that they hunt for men. The interesting thing about the project is that its strength lies in breaking the gender oriented stereotypes by at the same time functioning within them.

The project “Intel Power”, in turn, focuses on the stereotype of female identity as reduced to her body and her appearance. It is similar to two other projects “Majtkosoft Stringows” and “Podomki” (“Dressing-gowns”) where each respective piece of clothing stands for a certain aspect of female identity and functions as its *pars pro toto* metaphor. Both strings and dressing gowns are symbols of two traditional female roles: lovers and housewives, which definitely reduce and impoverish their personality and the wide spectrum of social roles they can perform. The artists laugh at the male reductionist picture of women and challenge its validity. But they also laugh at women themselves who often make the male stereotypes become a self-fulfilling prophecy. This is the aims of another project entitled “Intel Power”. Using the man-created technology the *Grzenda* artists want to make true the typical dream of all women to be beautiful, intelligent and wise to please the man, the charming prince all of them dream of. Following one of the most popular stereotypes of a woman, or at least of a gorgeous blond, she can be either beautiful but stupid or intelligent but ugly. Her strength is her body or her mind, her intellect, but never both of them. Making Marylin Monroe and Barbie two icons of modern culture strengthens such an understanding of a woman. Moreover, there exists a big number of jokes about a beautiful blondie who is totally helpless when confronted with easy everyday problems or a woman from commercials who is not able to do any of the routine housework, e.g. washing without the help of a male expert teaching her which washing powder to use or what to do not to damage her washing machine. The “either or” perception and evaluation of women is so strongly rooted even in the post modern societies, that many women themselves do not believe in a holistic approach to their personality and see themselves in the above categories. They do not believe, either, in being equal to man or in their ability to transgress the beauty-intelligence border on their own, without any supernatural (in the information epoch technological?) intervention.

“The Intel Power” is a satirical version of the dilemma. It is an attempt to combine the man-made technology and the woman-oriented fashion whose final product is an ideal woman, both beautiful and intelligent. How to achieve it? The solution is simple. The magical gadget is a bra. As the slogan advertises it, when you put the bra on “your breasts and your genial intellect become one”. The supernatural power of the bra consists in providing its user with perfect knowledge and genial intellectual skills (Intel stands for intelligence). The woman is thus physically attractive, beautiful and charming following the male criteria of a perfect female body but at the same time she can compete with him intellectually. Her mind reminds of the best developed male brain and has nothing to do with the common picture of a woman as an empty doll with a canary brain. Thus the project laughs at the fetishist perception of the female body and at her breast as the most powerful symbol of her femininity. Once more the artists are against the reduction of a woman to a sex object and a beautiful trophy, an ornament to the perfect male. By making fun of this concept they also break one of the most deeply rooted male and macho-culture pictures of a woman when her whole identity is reduced to her body. The project is not only a strong criticism of chauvinistic men but also of many women who not only accept their man made identity but also try to do their best to fit it. In many situations their behaviours validate the male opinions that women do excessive shopping as a pastime, a medicine when they are sad and down, a way to improve for themselves their self-image, an alternative to more challenging intellectual activities. They also tend to evaluate their appearance and physical attractiveness higher than their intellect, which is to be men’s domain. It is sad but women are often said to be their own enemies in the fight for respect and independence, which is strongly questioned by the Grzenda projects.

A strong cultural division of social roles into male and female ones has inspired another net project by the Grzenda artists, namely, “Reservists’ shawls” whose author is Katarzyna Hołda. In Poland, when boys leave the army and become reservists they celebrate that occasion in many different ways. Apart from farewell parties or welcome parties, on that very day they wear the reservists' shawls especially prepared for them by the next group which is going to become a reserve. The shawls are made of cotton, they look like big fringed triangles additionally decorated with colourful pompons on each corner of the triangle. They are covered with many coloured crayon pictures and slogans, simple rhymes as well as the emblem of the military unit they belonged to. The pictures usually show women, usually naked, sex symbols every soldier dreams about, at least following a stereotype. The attitude to women is clear – either sex objects or war trophies. The war ideology of violence is directly expressed by some drawings of guns or rifles. They function as symbols of the typical male world and their profession – fighting and killing in war battles. The male solidarity of soldiers excludes women from their world but at the same time treats them with rudeness, coarseness and disrespect.

Katarzyna Hołda protests against such an unjust treatment of women. She also wants to transgress the border between the male and female fighters. She has designed reservists' shawls for women where the symbols have been reversed. The half-naked figures of men have been replaced with the drawings of half-naked men. The shawls are decorated with flowery embroideries, ornaments such as e.g. pink roses, sequins, etc. which are taken from the feminine world. The women are soldiers/reservists like men. Their message is clear: they can also fight and the history has shown that they are not worse soldiers than men. On the other hand they will never accept the cruelty and the atrocities of the war and they refuse to play this game.

The Grzenda artists and their projects are found controversial and shocking by many men and women. From the point of view of cultural studies and cultural linguistic it is interesting to observe and to examine how the language of the new feminine identity operates, which rhetorical figures are used, how new communication patterns are created. It is important to notice that the non-verbal component begins to play a very important role, even dominating the verbal message. Irony, laughter and self-mockery serve to ridicule the values proper to the male world and its system of values. The artists challenge not only the traditional thought patterns of men but also of women who are not able to look at themselves with their own eyes to discover their value as independent and full human beings.

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Footnotes

[1]The aim of the present article is to present and discuss a new phenomenon of the cybergrrls' identity as a kind of a feminist identity but it should not be read as any kind of its authoress's private declaration of the underlying ideology.

[2]See the book by John Hawks, *Culture is the third pillar of sustainable community*, 2003.

[3] The main idea of D. Haraway is that in the post-modern reality all of us are cyborgs, a hybrid of a machine and a human being, a fictional construct and a product of a social reality. The cyborfeminism is a new coalition of women and machines to defy the traditional power and domination of men. Cyborfeminists are to start a revolt of slaves against their masters. Cf. D. Haraway, *Cyborg manifesto* as published [in:] *Magazyn Sztuki*, 17, 1998, pp. 204–213.

[4]The feminists group VNS Matrix was founded in Australia in 1991. Its members see cyberfeminism as a kind of a virus which has attacked science, culture and art thus making a new world emerge which challenges all traditional values and is in opposition to the old system. Humour, aggression, language full of the Internet terminology and sexual metaphors are the means of expression as illustrated by the "Bitch Mutant Manifesto" from 1996. See www.livjm.ac.uk and www.magazyn sztuki.home.pl as available 14.01.2005.

[5]The use of the name *grrls* to define the group of feminists is significant. It is itself a protest against reducing women to their girlishness.

[6]This is the definition of cybergrrls by the Old Boys Network group, cf. FQA_ Frequently Asked Questions [in:] www.onbn.org. and also Radkiewicz, M. (ed.), *Gender. Konteksty*. Kraków: Rabid, 2004, s. 141.

[7]L. Irigaray [in:] Putman Tong, R. *Myśl femininstyczna* (*The feminist thought*), Warszawa: PWN, 2002, p. 268.

[8]L. Irrigary, This sex, which is not one, [in:] A. Jakubowska, *Na marginesach lustra* (*On the margins of a mirror*), Kraków: Universitas, 2004, p. 4.

[9]The largest percentage of the Internet everyday users applies to the age group 16–25 and in 2003 it reached 60% of the population. Czubaj, M. Homo internus, czyli jak sieć pochłonęła człowieka (Homo intermus or a man entangled by the web), [in:] *Polityka*, 37 (2521), 2005, p. 4.

[10]The same tendency is visible in Poland, cf. www.biznesnet.pl, as available 8.03.2004.

[11]Zieliński, J. Nadzieja w kobietach informatykach? (The hope is in the women-informatics?) [in:] www.winter.pl/internet as available on 11.12.2002.

[12]The concept of the glass ceiling is a very useful metaphor to show the distribution of top positions within the world of business among men and women. Certain regularity can be observed in this respect: the lower the position within the work hierarchy the more women occupy it. Despite the same skills and formal qualifications fewer women are promoted to higher, more responsible, prestigious and better paid jobs. At a certain point women can see, through as if a glass ceiling, their male colleagues climbing up the career ladder while they cannot move further up.

[13]cf. www.biznesnet.pl, as available 8.03.2004.

[14] *Identity and difference*, K. Woodward (ed.), California: Sage Publications, 2002.

[15]An identical procedure was adopted by Afro-Americans in the USA in 1968 when they purposefully called themselves the Black to change the semantics of their name from a negatively stigmatising and degrading one to a positively marked form of address, cf. the slogan Black is beautiful. By means of changing the value of language they aimed at changing socio-cultural attribution and prejudice.

[16]I. Kowalczyk, *Projekty kobiece w polskim internecie* (*Women oriented projects in the Polish Internet*), http://free art.pl/konsola as avalable 5.09.2005.

[17]U. Czartoryska, *Od pop-artu do sztuki konceptualnej* (*From pop-art. to conceptual art*) Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Artystyczne i Filmowe, 1976, p. 7.

[18]Webmamer is a term coined by feminists to replace its masculine counterpart – a webmaster. It is an example of a new politically correct and non-genderised language free from fallogenic associations.

[19]www.grzenda.pl as available on 10.10.2004.

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About Forming European Identity in Estonia: Study Through the Method of Identity Structure Analysis

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Introduction: visions of societal integration

Today the Estonian population can be described as relatively diverse by several indicators: by ethnic background (Estonians, Russians and other Slavs, Finns, etc), by language use (mainly Estonian or Russian), by income differences (in 2004 Gini index ~ 0,363), by citizenship (more than 85 thousand permanent residents are Russian citizens), and by political preferences (six parties are represented in the Parliament).

How can we now characterise the situation – has the social, political, and cultural divergence made the society more fragmented, introducing more disintegration in society? Even if so, this can also be described as new circumstances for the development of democracy, evolving new challenges for social integration of the society on the new level. The process of social integration can perhaps be analysed in terms of redefining a conception of common national identity of Estonian people including Estonians, Russians, Finns and other groups.

In the post-communist countries the construction of democracy inevitably means the use of political instruments for integrating ethnic elements into a new political system, making special provisions for ethnic minorities. Since 1988-1989 the core of national identity of the Estonian people has been mainly concentrated on the basis of an ethnic-cultural dimension (common language, common culture and traditions, common ancestry).

In the early period of the newly independent state, the attributes of the state were weak and the main essence of the identity of people was accepted as an ethnic and cultural (very often only lingual) dimension. The civic-political-economic dimension – a common political and legal system, the national economy, a common system of social security, etc. – was subordinated to the ethnic cultural dimension (Kirch, Kirch 2001:134) of the collective identity construction process.

Developing democracy and state structures during the past twelve years have changed the circumstances. We propose that the existence of the newly independent Estonian state will diminish the importance of the ethnic dimension in people's self-definition and increase the social-political dimension. This will be manifested by all people – Estonian ethnic minorities as well as mainstream Estonians – a common civic dimension becoming upper-most in people's identity reconstructions. In the sociological literature, societal integration is predominantly considered to be the best developmental model for societies in central and eastern European countries (and in Estonia) as suggested, for example, in the general conceptions by Münch (1998) and Beck/Grande (2004), and in the special analysis for Estonia by Löfgren and Herd (2000) and Lauristin and others (2004).

We conceive successful integration as a process of societal co-operation aimed at forging a new community of people to a higher qualitative level. In Estonian society it is important in this context to distinguish integration from assimilation and segregation since, on the one hand, it is important for the Russian minority to maintain its original cultural heritage, and, on the other hand, it is important that minorities will be able to prosper in their double cultural circumstances. While it is one thing to express support for the idea of integration, it is quite another matter to ensure its realisation. In reality, many instances of segregation and separation persist in Estonian society. Likewise, some minorities have chosen to integrate their children thorough voluntary assimilation (e.g., some Russian parents in Estonia choose to send their children to Estonian-language kindergartens and schools).

The differentiation between many levels and segments of integration means that the process of forming new well-functioning structures in the society is much more complicated than just the basic understanding of integration which focuses only on the two different language groups in Estonia: Estonians and Russians. It is possible to define the current situation in Estonia as the realisation of the first stage of the integration process – namely, the acknowledgment of common social problems instead of specific inter-ethnic problems, and the enhancement of tolerance between the Estonians and the Russian-speaking population. Estonia is entering into the next stage in the integration process, which should entail the efficient cooperation between Estonians as an essentially Estonian ethnic majority in the context of the European Union.

For Russians in Estonia, the integration is a continuous process in which they step by step became closer to Estonian society without simultaneously losing their Russian cultural heritage, e.g. Russian language. For many people, however, language barriers still exist. Most Estonians (68 percent) have a good knowledge of Russian (Census 2000: 10) but only 40 percent of Russians (having Estonian citizenship) have a good knowledge of Estonian. Only 5 percent of Russians with citizenship of the Russian Federation or individuals of undetermined citizenship *(Integratsiooni monitooring 2005: 32)* are able to communicate in the local language.

Recent situation: attitudes towards the European Union and NATO

Estonia's hopes for security guarantees related to accession to the EU and NATO were undoubtedly clearly defined. Estonians see military security as a guarantee of the protection of national independence, which is also the precondition for national identity security.

Estonian Russians' attitudes towards NATO membership have been rather different. In 2000 57 percent of Estonians and only 25 percent of Russians supported Estonia's joining with NATO (see Fig. 2).



Fig. 2. **Support of Estonian NATO membership***
* Results of the Research Centre *Faktum* (May 2005)

However, positive attitudes of local Russians towards Estonia's NATO membership have grown and in May (2005) 88 percent of Estonians and 42 percent of Russians supported NATO, as one can see from Chart 2. If we could relate a process of national identification with practical security matters, then readiness to defend the homeland (Estonia) would be one of the national loyalty indicators. According to study results of the Research Centre *Faktum* (May 2005) most Estonian people are ready to defend the country should there be any kind of need for real defense actions. More precisely: 74% of Estonians, 62% of non-Estonians who are Estonian citizens, and 58% of non-citizens are ready to participate in defense actions. Estonian ethnic identity is perceived as being endangered mostly by imminent globalisation or trends of de-population.

Public support for the European Union in Estonia increased from 48% in 2003 (people who answered "definitely support" and "rather support") to 68% in September 2005. The proportion of opponents to the EU clearly diminished: from 44% in June 2003 to 26% in 2005 (*EMOR, EL Seire*).

During the debate which took place in the first year after Estonia joined the EU, the majority of citizens realised that EU membership did not mean the unconditional loss of Estonia's ethnic and national identity, but provided new possibilities for defining the country's position on Europe's political and cultural map. The new international context gave new opportunities for local ethno-national integration. *Eurobarometer* Study (Studies 62, 63 and 63) in 2004 reported that the proportion of Estonian people who answered that "EU is a good thing" had grown strongly. In March 2004 this was 31%, in October-November 2004 52%.

Chart 3. **European Union** *Eurobarometer* **Study (Studies 62, 63 and 63)**



Identity structure analysis – before and after the EU Referendum

Although being indisputably a part of Europe, Estonia's position there has not been always conclusively defined. Today there are rather tendencies towards identification with Estonian well-fare neighbours, i.e., referring to similarities with Nordic countries. One tendency is that Estonian regional identity in the European Union could become similar to that of the Nordic countries. On the other hand, Estonian identity has some specific features, which allude to the possibility of belonging to the group of Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). Furthermore, according to some popular formulations of certain politicians, Estonia tends to be more similar to Ireland and the United Kingdom. However, the population of Estonia cannot be treated as a carrier of a single new ethnic and national identity.

A problem might arise with those social factors and mechanisms that ought to assure the continuation of inner-state cultural integration (in terms of the formation of a multi-cultural society) and national integration (in terms of Estonian citizenship).

Will young Russian-speakers turn into a multicultural population group? Will the national (state-determined) identity become of significant value for them? Professor-emeritus Sergei Issakov from Tartu University has expressed the opinion that Estonia is already half way towards significant integration. According to his views, an interesting process of the formation of a new ethnic group and a new ethno-cultural community – Estonian Russians – is evidently underway. This is a group with its own subculture, in some aspects similar to the French-speaking population in Canada, or Swedish-speaking Finns (Issakov, 2004).

We understand European identity as a social construct – the shared sameness of people belonging to the same group, with a common narrative and broadly matching attitudes, beliefs and values. The formation of the new European identity in Estonia – related to the process of accession to the European Union - as an incorporation of a new dimension in collective identity, started at the beginning of the 90-ies. The European identity is a notion which is rooted into the EU applicant countries‘ social discourses. The European Union is first and foremost an economic union, applying regulation to the Common Economic Area. This Common Economic Area acts as a tool for the transforming of national identities of the member countries, causing similarities and differences. This process is most clearly observable in the accession countries.

The European past contains complex paradigms, which could be presented as a common European cultural background. Western ideas of personal values, liberalism, rule of (written) law, principles of human rights and human equality are good examples. Having in mind these more or less largely shared ideas and paradigms, one can define the historical and cultural closeness to Europe as the affinities of people sharing common experiences of European history.

In the study of certain national identities, the historical aspect is important. National and sub-national identities also remain one of the cornerstones of the EU. But at the same time, we can follow the ethnic demobilisation. Demobilisation encourages the political and economic unity of the country, the feeling of sameness with Europe. European integration does not necessarily contain a shared cultural homogeneity. It is first and foremost the formation of political institutions with their normative and political identity and the formation of a common market. However, cultural communication and education could in their turn promote the identification and unification of European political space, as expresses Michel Foucher. Communication can encourage the consolidation of the collective dimension, living national communication space at large untouched, at the same time leaving the question about political space open and finding from national culture and history more justification for a common Europe *(Foucher, 1998/ 2000).*

Facing the EU-accession according to the first study from 2000 (Kirch, Rull, Tuisk, 2001: 328-330), significant agents such as Euro-optimists and Euro-sceptics, rather than the Estonian Government, Estonian cultural elite or business circle, were influential in the development of the identity of our target groups. The question was whether these entities remain “significant others” in 2003 and 2005?

The author used the Identity Structure Analysis (ISA) conceptual framework to investigate these issues. The method was developed by Prof. Peter Weinreich in order to study the structure of personal and collective identity changes (Weinreich, 1989; Weinreich & Saunderson, 2003). The data were gathered in the following Estonian cities: Tallinn, Tartu, Viljandi and Narva (N=174 persons) before the accession of Estonia to the European Union in April-June 2003. Further data were gathered during the referendums on the European Union Constitutional Treaty in European states and the contract establishing the Estonian-Russian Border Treaty in May and September 2005. The data were gathered in Tallinn's two universities.

The study's identity instrument consisted of 10 bipolar constructs and 11 entities (in Appendix 1). The constructs reflected personal attitudes towards different economic strategies, the free movement of people, the role of EU-legislation in comparison with national legislation, minority rights protection, etc. The individual psychological level reflects some social tensions and conflicts that sometimes get anchored to EU-accession issues. Respondents were able to construe themselves (their self-images) in different contexts, and appraise significant others and groups in terms of the characteristics expressed by way of each particular bipolar construct, one at a time, on a 9-point scale. The eleven entities included "Me as I would like to be" (ideal self), "Me as I am now" (current self 1), "Me in 2003, Year of EU-referendum" (past self), "Person whom I honour and admire" (admired person), and "Person whom I don't like at all" (disliked person) as mandatory entities required by the ISA method. "Me when representing Estonia at EU negotiations in Brussels" (current self 2), allowed respondents to appraise themselves in their imagination as an agent directly involved EU matters. Further entities included - "Estonia's business circles," "Estonia's cultural elite," "Euro-optimists in Estonia," "Estonian Government," and "Euro-sceptics in Estonia". These represented significant others and agents in Estonian society.

The indices *idealistic identification* and *ego-involvement* were computed using the Identity Exploration (IDEX) computer software. The definitions of i*dealistic identification* is as follows: degree of similarity between the qualities one attributes to the other and those one would like to possess as part of one's ideal self-image. The *idealistic identification index* has a parameter range between 0 and 1. Magnitudes are considered high when above 0.70 and low when below 0, 50.

Entities (significant others) towards whom the Estonian "yes to EU" group aspire are: "Estonian Government," and "Estonian business circles" (see Fig. 4).

The Russian pro-accession group aspire towards the entities "Estonian business circles," and "Estonian cultural elite" (having the highest magnitudes). These findings show that the Estonian accession supporters seem to be hesitant to identify themselves with the cultural elite, as concern about preservation of Estonian culture and language after accession had been mostly expressed by intellectuals and people engaged in the sphere of culture. At the same time the Russian pro-accession respondents' index magnitude is 0.66, showing that their identification level with the Estonian cultural elite is stronger than that of Russians "against the EU", and even higher than among Estonians themselves. The latter finding is probably based on these Russians' broader perception that culture is not subject to change when a nation joins the EU. For Estonian pro-accession Russians, therefore, the EU is more of a political project than it is for Estonians. The Russians'



Fig. 4. **Idealistic identification with "important others" by Estonians and Russians in 2003 before EU-referendum period**

lower idealistic identification with the Estonian government can be explained by the fact that it represents an authority associated with strict demands concerning the Estonian language, law and citizenship policy (although during the last decade several of these requirements in respective legal acts have been loosened).



Fig. 5. **Estonians idealistic identification with others in 2003 and 2005**

A comparison of the study results from years 2003 and 2005 broadly refer to the growing positive trend of identification with EU dimensions – people see among positive “important others” people and institutions related to the EU.

Concerning the results from the latest study we can say that people who in general support Estonia’s belonging to the EU identify themselves largely with the Estonian Government, more than with local business circles or with the cultural elite. During the EU referendum debate in 2003 it was rather different – people who were critical of the Estonian Government also tended to be critical of the EU accession decision. All people, whatever their views on Estonia’s place in the EU integration process were, strongly identified with people ‘representing Estonia at EU negotiations in Brussels’. Even people against the accession identify their views now more with the Estonian Government and cultural elite. These findings suggests that, instead of simple identification with European optimists or pessimists, respondents equate their views more with those of state institutions and significant social groups (“the Government”, business circles, the cultural elite) that are real actors in EU integration process. Magnitudes of the index increased for both groups – those who are pro- and who are against the integration – indicating that acceptance of EU ideas increased during this short period between the two studies.

Ego-involvement – shows how important is some entity to the respondent. *Ego-involvement* index (computed using the IDEX software) makes it possible to estimate the relative impact of others in the development of one’s own identity. The index has a parameter range between 0 and 5, and the magnitudes are considered high when above 4 and low when below 2.



Fig. 6. **Ego-Involvement among Estonians in 2003-2005**

After the EU referendum slight increase of scepticism was visible among young people and black-white polarisation of views towards the EU than in 2003. [Change is demonstrated in Fig 6]

According to assessments of *ego-involvement* in 2005, respondents' attitudes towards the EU are most exercised by debate between European-sceptics and European-optimists. Respondents' high ego-involvement with Euro-optimists and Euro-sceptics demonstrates the significance of a democratic political environment and openness in Estonia as both of these entities represent alternative perspectives. This balanced situation should benefit the orientation of today's changing society. One year EU membership diminished peoples' emotional attitudes towards European identification.

When Estonian society was facing the EU-referendum, the share of those who voted in favour of the European Union was 66.8 per cent, while the percentage of those who voted against the membership was 33.2. The overall participation rate in Estonia was 64.1 % *(Estonian National Electoral Committee, 2003*). By the end of 2004 the societies of the Nordic and Baltic countries have reached the phase where increasing international communication, economic and cultural ties and the legal-administrative pressure from the EU side have initiated the strong shift towards the creation of a new *"borderless"* identity. In their everyday life people value more and more modern arrangements and post-industrial values, which has created a certain contradiction between their identity structure archetypes and these new values. The new opportunities create the ground for the reception of the new set of values.

The identity structure analysis data (from 1993–1995 and 2002–2005) demonstrate common trends in the changes of the identity of Estonians and Estonian Russians. The status of the European citizen should help form a valued national identity for Estonian Russians and other ethnic minority groups, very likely influenced by European values. This change means that one cultural environment will not just be replaced by another, but will be seeded into wider economic, cultural and political space.

The Institute for European Studies proposed a network for comparative studies on identity structure analysis. The main purpose of the project is the creation of the network for comparative study, which deals with social integration including the dimension of emerging common European identity of the Nordic-Baltic region. Research questions will be related to the convergence from the side of the EU, pressures of modern globalization,change of traditional values to new, influence of the "borderless" Europe as well as the segregation and alteration of cultures.

Conclusion

European enlargement has influenced the self-definition of the Estonian people. Transition will give the opportunity to re-define "Europeanness" from the viewpoint of new European identity components incorporated into Estonian identity. It is possible to define the current situation in Estonia as the realisation of the first stage of the integration process. Estonia is entering into the next stage in the integration process. The Russians' lower identification with the Estonian government refers to some integration problems associated with strict demands concerning the Estonian state language necessary for citizenship. For Estonian Russians, therefore, the EU is more of a political project than it is for Estonians. According to our analysis, efficient cooperation between Estonians and Russians as a national minority in the context of the European Union could be more productive in the framework of the common scope of international institutions, in the broader European context.

Acknowledgements

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Appendix 1

Questionnaire of the study (2005)

Each page of the questionnaire had one of the 10 bipolar constructs in the top. The entities on the left side expressed facets of respondent's world-picture. He/she had to cross one position for each entity of the scale (see the example below)

	1L	**1R**
Me as I am now	- - - - 0 - - X -	
Estonia "s business circles	- - X - 0 - - - -	
Person who I honour and admire	- - - - 0 - X - -	
Me in 2003 (year of EU-referendum)	- - - - 0 X - - -	
Estonia"s cultural elite	- -X- - 0 - - - -	
Euro-optimists in Estonia	- - X - 0 - - - -	
Me as I would like to be	- - - - 0 - - X -	
Estonia"s Government	- - - - 0 - - X -	
Me when representing the state in Brussels	- - - X 0 - - - -	
Euro-sceptics in Estonia	- - - - 0 - - - X	
Person who I don"t like at all	- - - X 0 - - - -	

The constructs. The following constructs were used at the top of each page while the list of the entities remained unchanged throughout the instrument.

1L EU laws are liberal enough in regulating a market economy	1R EU laws are too tough for a liberal economy
2L New member states cause extensive changes in EU policies (especially in agriculture)	2R New member states adapt the existing system, and EU policies do not change very much as a consequence
3L The EU is under way to a bureaucratic organisation, unable to reform itself	3R The EU retains ability to develop and reform
4L The EU is capable of guaranteeing peace, stable development, and security	4R The EU is not able to cope with conflicts and guarantee security in every member state
5L Free movement of employees between the member states gives better job opportunities for people	5R Common labour market causes many problems due to migrants
6L In the EU protection of human rights is guaranteed well enough	6R Protection of human rights in the EU has turned into an empty cliché
7L EU-accession endangers the development of the Estonian language and culture	7R EU membership promotes and encourages the development of the Estonian language and culture
8L Most important are the liberties and welfare of EU citizens	8R Most important are the aims of the EU as a supranational body
9L The EU is a supranational formation that in a certain degree restricts decision-making and independence of the states themselves	9R The EU is a voluntary union, originating on common decision-making and rights delegated to the Union

10L The Estonia-Russia border treaty should not be undersigned, this is going to weaken Estonia's sovereignty	10 R Border treaty with Russia should be signed, this grants sovereignty and security

185.-208. lpp.

Krievvalodīgie Latvijā: diasporas kultūras atmiņas saturs un veidošanas tehnoloģijas

Russians and Russian – Speaking Population in Latvia: Diaspora and Technologies Cultural Memory

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Ievads. Kolektīvā (kultūras) atmiņa – kopienas politiskās rīcības atslēga

Pētījumos par Latvijas krievu akulturācijas un krievu kopienas veidošanas un pašidentifikācijas procesiem līdz 1993. gadam vienlaikus pastāvēja vairākas pētījumu objekta definīcijas: Latvijas krievi, krievu etniskā grupa, jaunā diaspora, jaunais subetnoss. Valsts valodas likumu un Pilsonības likumu var uzskatīt par sākumpunktu jēdziena „krievvalodīgie" veidošanā. Boriss Cilevičs 1993. gadā, pētot Latvijas politisko un sociālo struktūru, izmantoja jēdzienu „nekorennije".[1]

Analizējot pirmsvēlēšanas situāciju 1995. gadā, toreizējo politisko un etnisko telpu, B. Cilevičs jau izmantoja jēdzienu „krievvalodīgie" [2]. Šī jēdziena „leģitimizācijas" procesu noslēdza protesta akcijas pret izglītības reformu rīkotāji, kuri publiski uzstājas pret krievu kopienas esamību Latvijā un aktīvi veido jaunas krievvalodīgo kopienas tēlu.[3] Arī Krievijas ārlietu ministra vietniece E. Mitrofanova 6. Vispasaules krievu preses kongresā pasludināja, ka piederība krieviem definējama tikai pēc valodas.

Būtiski ir uzsvērt, ka vēl joprojām nav vienotas izpratnes par Latvijas krievu identitātes elementiem un pazīmēm. Līdz ar to ir jārunā par tendencēm. Pēdējo trīs gadu laikā īstenota virkne pētījumu par krievu vai krievvalodīgo kopienu Latvijā. Te var minēt I. Apines pētījumus par mainīgo identitāti, E. Vēbera vadītās etnopētnieku grupas apjomīgos darbus,[4] Baltijas Sociālo zinātņu institūta pētījumus[5]. Īpaši jāmin Latvijas Universitātes Sociālo zinātņu fakultātes maģistra O. Pisarenko darbs „Latvijas krievu diasporas identitātes" (2004). Šī darba galvenais mērķis bija izpētīt, vai var pamatoti runāt par Latvijas krieviem kā par integrētu jaunu diasporu vai subetnosu, kas atšķiras no Krievijas krieviem pēc dažām savām vērtībām un uzvedības modeļiem.

Latvijā veiktie pētījumi, kas analīzē mazākumtautību nostāju attiecībā uz Latvijas politiskās kultūras elementiem – latviešu valodu, valsts neatkarību, tās dalību ES un NATO, kā arī attieksmi pret latviešu nāciju[6] –, konstatē etnisko plaisu starp latviešiem un cittautiešiem (bieži ir lietots jēdziens „krievvalodīgie"), kā arī nošķirtas informācijas telpas pastāvēšanu.[7]

Analizējot sabiedrības šķelšanās cēloņus, dominējošais skaidrojuma avots ir meklēts latviešu politiskās elites rīcībā un Latvijas likumdošanā.[8] Nenoliedzami, tie ir būtiski faktori, tomēr pastāv virkne citu faktoru, kas atkarīgi no krievvalodīgo kopienas īpašībām un darbības Latvijas sabiedrībā.

Tas, ka skaidrojums jeb „vainīgais" sabiedrības šķelšanā ir identificēts politiskās elites vidū, mūsuprāt, būtiski sašaurina situācijas skaidrojuma telpu, ignorējot tādus faktorus kā etniskās kopienas pašizolācija un viktimizēta kopienas kolektīvā identitāte, kas izpaužas konkrētā politiskā rīcībā. Pētījuma autori aicina aplūkot sašķeltas sabiedrības fenomenu Latvijā kā vairāku dalībnieku mijiedarbības vai tās trūkuma rezultātu.

Sākot ar 2003. gada maiju līdz brīdim, kad tapusi šī analīze[9], Latvijas sabiedrībai bija daudz iespēju novērot cittautiešu nevalstisko organizāciju un iedzīvotāju masveida aktivitātes saistībā ar izglītības reformas oponentu darbību. Tās iezīmēja jaunu Latvijas cittautiešu pilsoniskās aktivitātes līmeni un veicināja jaunu tendenču rašanos kopienas attīstībā:

1) etniskās (krievu) identitātes dominējošais īpatsvars krievvalodīgo kopienas politiskās rīcības pamatā. Izglītības reformas opozīcijas argumentācijā etniskās kultūras apdraudētība un saglabāšana ir galvenais protestu rīkošanas iemesls, kas pausts sabiedrībai;
2) situācijā, kad kopienā valda priekšstats par tās etniskās identitātes apdraudēto stāvokli, tās saglabāšana kļūst par kopienas paštēla pamatelementu (raksturojumu) un pārtop par pašizolācijas pamatu.

Pašizolācijas procesa noturīgumu uztur virkne mūsdienu Latvijas politiskās kultūras faktoru, kuru vidū ir jāizdala:

- liels nepilsoņu skaits un lēni naturalizācijas tempi;
- centrisko supraetnisko politisko apvienību trūkums[10]; vēsturiskais konteksts, kas piedāvā plašas iespējas veidot ienaidnieku tēlus; dažādu etnisko kopienu radikālo vienību aktivitātes;
- Krievijas Federācijas ārpolitikas pastāvīgais elements – pret Latvijas valdību vērsta kritika par krievvalodīgo jeb *sootečestvenniku* tiesību neievērošanu. Tas liecina par starpetniskā dialoga trūkumu un citas kopienas stereotipisko uztveri Latvijā.

Minētie faktori nozīmē arī to, ka Latvijas politiskajā kultūrā trūkst mehānismu, kas spētu izplatīt politiskās integrācijas „filozofiju”. Situācijā, kad trūkst minētās ideoloģijas kanālu, var apgalvot, ka mūsdienu Latvijā pastāv priekšnoteikumi tālākai etniskās identitātes dominantei kopienu rīcībā un nacionālās identitātes izstumšanai no politisko prioritāšu saraksta.

Pētījuma teorētiskie pamati – kultūras atmiņa

Pētījumā autori analizēja krievvalodīgo kopienas etniski motivētās politiskās rīcības saturu, faktorus, kas to ietekmē, un iespējas pārveidot politiskās rīcības saturu, lai nodrošinātu krievvalodīgo kopienas integrāciju Latvijas pilsoniskajā sabiedrībā.

Līdzšinējā situācijas analīze sabiedrības integrācijas jomā, mūsuprāt, nepietiekami pievērsa uzmanību cittautiešu jeb krievvalodīgo politiskās identitātes *kultūras* avotiem[11]. Situācijā, kad krievvalodīgo kopienas kā politiskas kopienas statuss ir būtisks Latvijas ārpolitikas un Latvijas kā ES dalībvalsts efektivitātes faktors, kultūras analīze ir aktuāla.

Pētījuma ietvaros kopienas **kultūras** jēdziens ir saprasts un lietots primāri kā **kultūras jeb kolektīvās atmiņas** jēdziens. 20. gs. pirmajā pusē sociologs Moriss Halbvakss (*Maurice Halbwachs*) ir pievērsies kolektīvās pieredzes analīzei, konstatējot, ka pastāv pieredze, kas vieno un arī nošķir konkrētu kolektīvu no citiem.[12] Nošķiršanas process izpaužas simboliskā praksē, kurā manifestējas konkrēta jēga, nostādnes un vērtības. Kolektīvā pieredze, kas pārtop par grupas kopējo atmiņu – šo Halbvaksa atzinumu turpināja attīstīt franču vēsturnieks un sociologs Pjērs Norā (*Nora*). Pētījumam par Latvijas krievvalodīgo kolektīvo identitāti ir svarīgs Norā atzinums, ka vēsture un atmiņa nav sinonīmi, bet pretpoli, jo atmiņa ir emocionalizēta refleksija par kolektīvo pieredzi, savukārt vēsture ir zinātniskā diskursa priekšmets, kas ideālā gadījumā norisinās politiski sterilā, apolitiskā telpā.[13] Kolektīvā atmiņa nav „objektīva”, tā balstās emocionālā realitātes recepcijā un līdzinās mītiskās domāšanas īpašībām, kas mūsdienu politiskajā vidē saglabājas politiskā mīta ietvaros.[14]

Norā ieguldījumu kopienas identitātes izpētē turpināja vācu kulturologs Jans Asmans, analizējot kultūras atmiņas tapšanas procesu un pētot tādu kopienu identitātes saturu, kuras ir izstumtas no dalības politiskajā procesā vai atrodas zemākā sociālā statusā, kas ir nostiprināts likumdošanā vai kultūras tradīcijā.

Asmans akcentē kultūras atmiņas izšķirošo nozīmi izstumto kopienu pašsaglabāšanās procesā – kolektīvā atmiņa var kļūt par kopienas pamatinformācijas glabātuvi, par opozīcijas un arī pašizolācijas pamatu.[15] Kolektīvā atmiņa, pēc Asmana uzskatiem, spēj veidot kopienas pretošanās potenciālu pret mēģinājumiem to asimilēt, atņemt vai vājināt kopienas paštēla sastāvdaļas – valodu, reliģiju, svētkus, rituālus, kā arī kolektīvā atmiņā eksistējošo pagātnes interpretāciju.

Izmantojot minētās teorētiskās pamatnostādnes, pētījums bāzējas noteiktajos pieņēmumos, kas veido tā kontekstu:

1. Latvijā pastāv cittautiešu kolektīvā identitāte, kuras pamatā ir kolektīvās atmiņas saturs.
2. Cittautiešus apzīmē ar jēdzienu „krievvalodīgie”. Tas ir izplūdis jēdziens, kas apvieno vienā kopienā tos Latvijas iedzīvotājus, kuri nav etniskie latvieši – tie pārstāv dažādas etniskās kopienas, bet par primāro

komunikācijas mehānismu izmanto krievu valodu un informāciju plašsaziņas līdzekļos utt.

3. Jēdziens „krievvalodīgie" Latvijas politiskajā diskursā ir iekļāvis virkni papildu īpašību, piemēram, liels nepilsoņu skaits šajā sociopolitiskajā un lingvistiskajā kopienā, liels to cilvēku skaits, kuru ģimenes pēc Otrā pasaules kara ir apmetušās uz dzīvi toreizējā Latvijas Padomju Sociālistiskā Republikā un pēc neatkarības atgūšanas ir palikuši Latvijā.
4. Krievvalodīgo vidū ir noteikts (mazāks) Latvijas pilsoņu skaits, kas ietekmē to pilsoniskās līdzdalības iespējas.

Šie un vairāki citi pieņēmumi ir „neskaidras" un „nedefinētas" kopienas iezīmes – izcelsme, vēsturiskā pieredze, izglītība, kultūras tradīcijas. Ir svarīgi atzīmēt, ka līdzās šīm kopējām iezīmēm krievvalodīgo vidū pastāv arī identitātes elementi, kas veido „apakšgrupas" kopienas sastāvā – krievvalodīgie pilsoņi un nepilsoņi; Krievijas vai citas valsts (piemēram, Ukrainas) pilsoņi; krievvalodīgo grupas, kas nonākušas Latvijā migrācijas dēļ; grupas, kas attīsta savu etnisko identitāti, un tās grupas, kas turpina attīstīties krievu kultūras ietvaros, samazinot savas etniskās identitātes nozīmi.

Krievvalodīgo kopienas statuss mūsdienu Latvijā ir pielīdzināms diasporas statusam. Pētījuma autori uzskata, ka dažādība, kas ir pašreizējo krievvalodīgo iedzīvotāju sastāvā, vēl nav izveidojusies vairākos politiskajos institūtos un nav redzama politikas veidošanas procesā – piemēram, nav politisko apvienību, kas ieņemtu dažādas vietas politisko partiju spektrā, nevis tikai tradicionālajā kreisajā spārnā.

Latvijas krievvalodīgie iedzīvotāji kā diaspora pievieno tās analīzei vēl vienu būtisku elementu – tās kultūras un politisko saikni ar Padomju Savienību un Krievijas Federāciju. Kopienas analīzes ārpolitiskā dimensija pētījuma ietvaros tiks attīstīta kā krievvalodīgo situācijas interpretācija Krievijas Federācijas politiskajā un zinātniskajā elitē, plašsaziņas līdzekļos. Analizējot krievvalodīgo kopienu kā diasporu, pētījums sniegs autoru versiju par šādiem jautājumiem:

1. Kādi ir kopienas kolektīvās atmiņas elementi?
2. Kādas ir kopienas pilsoniskās aktivitātes, un ko tās liecina par kopienas identitāti un kolektīvo atmiņu?
3. Kā krievvalodīgo kopiena tiek uztverta Krievijas Federācijas zinātniskajā, mediju un politiskajā diskursā?

Pētījuma hipotēze:

Latvijas krievvalodīgo kopienas kolektīvās atmiņas pārveidošana var pārtraukt pašizolācijas tendences, vājināt izstumtas kopienas ietekmi paštēla veidošanā un palielināt dalību pilsoniskās sabiedrības darbībā.

Jo aktīvāk krievvalodīgie Latvijā piedalās kopīgās pilsoniskās sabiedrības darbībā, jo mazāk kopienas nostāju ietekmē ārpolitiskais radikālisms un retorika, kuri izmanto izstumtas diasporas paštēlu. Līdz ar to krievvalodīgo kopienas pilsoniskās darbības kvalitātes izmaiņas ir Latvijas iekšpolitiskas un ārpolitiskas efektivitātes un stabilitātes būtisks faktors.

Autoru optimālais kopienas attīstības virziens un vīzija ir Latvijas pilsoņi, kas saglabā un attīsta savu etnisko identitāti un vienlaikus piedalās kopējās nacionālās identitātes veidošanā Latvijā.

1. nodaļa. Kādi ir kopienas kolektīvās atmiņas elementi?

Analizējot krievvalodīgo kopienas kolektīvo (kultūras) atmiņu, tiek sniegts priekšstats par kompleksās kopienas identitātes elementiem. Pamatojoties uz Jana Asmana tēzi par kolektīvās atmiņas veidošanu kā kolektīvās atcerēšanās procesu, Latvijas krievvalodīgo kopienas gadījumā jādefinē atcerēšanās jeb *mnemotehnikas* 1) procesa subjekti; 2) atmiņu saturs un formas.

Mnemotehnikas procesa subjekti ir atmiņas satura autori. Pie tiem pieder indivīdi, politiskās partijas, sabiedriskās organizācijas, kas rada noteiktu realitātes izpratni, vēstures interpretāciju un izplata to etniskās kopienas ietvaros, nosakot kopienas atmiņas attīstības virzienu.

Atmiņas saturs un formas ir mnemotehnikas procesa rezultāts – nozīmes, kas veido kopienas priekšstatus par pagātni, aktuālo situāciju (tagadni) un kopienas attīstības prioritātēm. P. Norā attīstītā „atmiņas vietu" (*lieux de memoire*) teorija sniedz papildu skaidrojumu arī Latvijas krievvalodīgo kopienas mnemotehnikai. „Atmiņu vietas" ir materiālās un nemateriālās kultūras elementi, kas „uzglabā"[16] kopienas pagātnes saturu, piemēram, priekšmeti, kas satur patriotisku informāciju, liecina par triumfiem un katastrofām vai atdzimšanu, saglabā informāciju par izcilām vēsturiskām personām. Karogs, grāmata, sižets, filma, piemineklis u. c. var būt par „atmiņas vietu", ja priekšmets sniedz kopienai politiskas rīcības orientierus, uztur vērtības, definē kopienas nostāju un veido tās kolektīvu patību, kolektīvu Es.

Ņemot vērā to, ka Latvijas krievvalodīgo kopiena ir etniski, sociāli, reliģiski un citās kolektīvās identitātes dimensijās izteikti heterogēna, būtiski ir izdalīt tādus mnemotehnikas elementus un saturu, kurā „piedalās" heterogēnas kopienas vairākums.

Interesantā mūsdienu krievvalodīgo kopienas kolektīvās atmiņas īpašība liecina par to, ka krievu kultūras un politikas vēsture pirms 1918. gada ir izkritusi no kopienas kolektīvās atmiņas kā saturs, kam trūkst komunikatīvas „uzglabāšanas" jeb spējas būt nodotam nākamai paaudzei tiešas komunikācijas procesā – mutvārdu tradīcijā, mediju materiālos, masveida pasākumos. Latvijas krievvalodīgo atmiņa pašlaik tiek uzturēta kā *komunikatīva atmiņa*[17] jeb atmiņa, kas pastāv triju paaudžu ietvaros. Mēģinājumi iekļaut atmiņā Pirmās Republikas Krievu kopienas pieredzi ir ierobežoti, fragmentāri, nav efektīvi un tiks aplūkoti 2. nodaļā.

Atbilstoši krievvalodīgo kopienas komunikatīvās atmiņas robežām kopienas vairākums var piedalīties atmiņas veidošanā, uzturēšanā un attīstībā tikai kopš 40. gadu otrās puses, kad PSRS iekšējas migrācijas ietvaros Latvijā radās krievvalodīgo kopiena. Nepietiekama Pirmās Republikas krievu kultūras izpēte neļauj paplašināt kopienas atmiņas robežas, iekļaujot tajā abu kopienu mijiedarbības pozitīvo pieredzi.

Latvijas PSR laikā krievu valoda un kultūra bija komunikatīvie kanāli, kas tika izmantoti PSRS ideoloģiskām pamatnostādnēm – sociālisma, plānotas ekonomikas, PSRS ārpolitikas un politisko ienaidnieku apspiešanas ideoloģiskam saturam arī Baltijas valstīs. Līdz ar to latviešu kopiena krievvalodīgo kopienu uztvēra galvenokārt negatīvi. Krievu kultūra Latvijā latviešu kopienas uztverē lielākoties veidojās kā PSRS un mūsdienu Krievijas ārpolitikas turpinājums. Tādos apstākļos gandrīz nav pozitīvas krievvalodīgo kopienas recepcijas, jo arī pati krievvalodīgo kopiena nesniedz konkurētspējīgo alternatīvo saturu sevis uztverei citās kopienās. Baltijas republiku vēsturiskā attīstība kopš 1940. gada veidoja svarīgas krievvalodīgas kopienas „atmiņu vietas", kas atrodas gan Latvijas teritorijā, gan ārpus tās. Pie tādām pieder Latvijas un PSRS vēsture pēc 1940. gada – Otrais pasaules karš, kas Padomju Savienībai un tās tautām bija Lielais Tēvijas karš, un ar to saistītā PSRS vēsture (PSRS sastāvā vēl pirms 1941. gada 22. jūnija bija arī Latvija kā LPSR). Lielais Tēvijas karš ir mūsdienu krievvalodīgo lielākā vēstures traģēdija, kas pārtapa triumfā un tika sakralizēta kā nācijas glābšanas notikums. Pēc 1991. gada, kad tika atjaunoti Pirmās Republikas institūti un vēstures interpretācija, Latvijas 20. gs. vēsture kļuva par divu kopienu – latviešu un krievvalodīgo – simboliskām robežām. Atmiņu saturs par kopienu vēsturi laikā no 1940. gada līdz 1991. gadam ir krievvalodīgo kopienas „pagātne" komunikatīvās kolektīvās atmiņas ietvaros.

Pagātnes uzturēšanai krievvalodīgo kopienai ir vairākas „atmiņas vietas": Latvijā ir „atmiņu vietas", kas ir sakrālās vietas – padomju karavīru kapi, pieminekļi un arhitektūras ansambļi, kuri veido atmiņu teritorijas.[18] Kā atzīmē Jans Asmans, kopienas kolektīvās atmiņas saturs eksistē kā mūžīga pagātne, kas satur tagadnes aktuālos mērķus. Piemēram, Uzvaras pieminekļa ansamblis satur sevī atmiņu „glabātavu", kurā atspoguļojas kopienas priekšstats par tās varonīgo pagātni. Pie tā pulcējas Lielā Tēvijas kara veterāni un jaunāka paaudze, bet kopš 2003. gada, kad izglītības reformas diskurss kļuva par masveida akcijām, piemineklis kļuva par telpu, kam ir protoinstitucionālās telpas statuss.[19] Pieminekļi un vietas Rīgā un citur ir simboliskā teritorija, kur notiek jaunu ideju veidošana, tiek formulēti rīcības virzieni, tātad notiek krievvalodīgo kopienas politiskās darbības institucionalizācija – top telpa, kurā krievvalodīgo kopiena var iegūt politiski aktīvas kopienas statusu.[20]

Latvijas krievvalodīgo 20. gs. vēstures galvenais notikums – karš kā PSRS un visas cilvēces atbrīvošanas un atdzimšanas process – tika pārnests uz Latviju PSRS laikā un pēc 1991. gada regulāri nonāk simboliskā konfliktā ar Eiropas vēsturnieku atzinumiem un Latvijas (lielākoties etnisko latviešu) vēsturnieku un arhīvu materiālu informāciju. Līdz ar to Latvijas krievvalodīgo kolektīvajā atmiņā veidojas papildu saturs, kas galvenokārt ir vērsts uz kopienas simbolisko norobežošanos. Pēc sava satura un mērķa priekšstati par PSRS pozitīvo ietekmi uz Latvijas ekonomiku un kultūru vai civilizāciju kopumā – industrializācija, kolektivizācija, servisa un medicīnas kvalitātes uzlabošana, kas nereti izskan vecākās paaudzes krievvalodīgo iedzīvotāju intervijās (raidījums „Panorāma" 04.05.2005. sk. www.tvnet.lv), – veicina norobežošanos no latviešu nācijas. Pašlaik krievvalodīgo politiskās elites diskursā šie shematizētie paštēli vēl nav instrumentalizēti, bet radikālajos vai neinstitucionalizētajos krievvalodīgo diskursos kibertelpā tādi priekšstati pastāv un tie var kļūt par būtisku paštēla saturu etniskās izolācijas radikalizācijas procesā.

Situācija pēc 1991. gada

Kopienas komunikatīvā atmiņa noteiktos apstākļos var pārtapt vai tajā var būt virkne īpašību, kas raksturīgas kultūras atmiņai, kura ir „ilglaicīgāka" par komunikatīvo atmiņu. Asmana atzinums par abu kolektīvās atmiņas veidu dihotomiju, mūsuprāt, prasa korekcijas attiecībā uz situāciju Latvijā, kad krievvalodīgo kopienas statusu noteicošie faktori – notikumi un procesi – ir „notikuši" pirms 15 gadiem, kas ir ļoti īss laiks un Asmana teorijas ietvaros ir viennozīmīgs komunikatīvās atmiņas ilgums.

Mēs uzskatām, ka notikumi 90. gadu sākumā, kad kopienas statuss Latvijas sabiedrībā īsā laikā pieredzēja virkni radikālu izmaiņu, **paātrināja kultūras atmiņas veidošanu**, ļaujot notikumiem komunikatīvajā atmiņā pārtapt par „ilgstošās" jeb kultūras atmiņas saturu. Notika paātrināta notikumu un procesu „arhivācija". Pie atslēgas notikumiem un procesiem, kas veido kopienas paštēlu un pašizolācijas tendences pašreizējā Latvijas sabiedrībā, pieder:

Pilsonības likums, nepilsoņa statuss un politiskās līdzdalības iespējas, ko pašlaik izmanto ierobežots kopienas pārstāvju skaits. Pētījuma autori analizēja šo fenomenu ietekmi uz kopienas kultūras atmiņu.

Pilsonības likums[21] pētījumā tiks analizēts kā kopienas vairākuma statusa un paštēla izmaiņu tiesisks un simbolisks sākums. Lai gan likums vairākas reizes tika papildināts, tomēr tā pamatu veido skaidra sabiedrības sadale starp pilsoņiem un nepilsoņiem, izmantojot Pirmās Republikas PSRS okupācijas faktus kā simbolisku un tāpēc nepārvaramu robežlīniju starp dažādām Latvijas iedzīvotāju grupām. 1940. gada 17. jūnijs, kas ir galvenais latviešu kopienas 20. gs. traģēdijas datums, 2005. gadā lielākajai daļai krievvalodīgo kopienas ir zināms, bet masveidīgi nav uztverams kā kopienas vēstures (vēsturiskās vainas) sastāvdaļa, drīzāk šis datums kā citas kopienas atmiņas īpašums ir šo kopienu pamatatšķirība.

Pilsonības likums, kura saturu lielā mērā ietekmēja 90. gadu sākuma politiskie diskursi un etniskā nacionālisma renesanse, juridiski līdz 2005. gadam piedāvā virkni iespēju nepilsoņu kopienai pārtapt par pilsoniski aktīvu kopienu. Naturalizācijas process ir viens no mehānismiem, kas ļauj pievienoties Latvijas pilsoņu kopienai un īstenot politiskas līdzdalības iespējas. Tomēr pastāv ievērojamas atšķirības starp Pilsonības likuma *juridisko* saturu un tā *simbolisko* saturu. Kolektīvās atmiņas veidošanā normatīvu aktu saturs ir mazāk efektīvs nostājas veidošanas instruments nekā likuma simboliskais metasaturs (likuma „aura", pamatvēstījums, tajā koncentrētās vērtības un attieksmes pret citām grupām). Pilsonības likuma un nepilsoņa statusa satura simboliskajā nozīmē slēpjas līdzšinējās integrācijas politikas efektivitātes lēno tempu, naturalizējamo skaita un naturalizācijas motivācijas trūkuma skaidrojums, kā arī Latvijas sabiedrības t. s. etniskās balsošanas, divu mediju telpu un citu politisko kultūras izpausmju skaidrojums.

Tas fakts, ka no 432 869 Latvijas nepilsoņiem 430 749 jeb 99,5% ir krievvalodīgo kopienas dažādie etniskie segmenti, kas uz dzīvi Latvijā apmetušies pēc 1945. gada, veido ne tikai statusa juridiskās atšķirības, bet arī primāri simbolisku Latvijas etnopolitikas saturu.[22] Var izdalīt šādas Pilsonības likuma metasatura simboliskās funkcijas:

1. Pastāv etniskā dihotomija: mēs un viņi (latvieši *versus* krievi/krievvalodīgie). Tā veido šķēršļus Latvijas kā daudzkultūru valsts un politiskās nācijas uztverei. Mazākumtautību jēdziens, kas paredz etnisku dažādību, vēl nav izplatījies masu diskursā. Jēdziens "alien", kas ir nepilsoņa pases tulkojums angļu valodā, ir pārtapis par stigmatizētas kopienas pieņemtu pašapzīmējumu. Paralēli izolācijas tendencēm krievvalodīgo mediju materiāli par nepilsoņa statusu 2005. gadā liecina, ka pilsonība ir ceļš uz pilsoņa tiesībām ietekmēt

politisko kultūru. Šī atziņa, kas šķietami varētu pavērt iespējas paātrinātai integrācijai pilsoniskā kultūrā, tomēr saglabā etniskās pašizolācijas tendences un mediju diskursā ir nokrāsota revanša krāsās: „Krieviem ir tikai viens veids, kā tikt pie varas Latvijā – izmantojot naturalizāciju un vēlēšanu tiesības."[23]

2. Likums operē ar pagātnes notikumiem un neatvieglo priekšnoteikumus kopīgas vēstures, t. i., arī kopīgas tagadnes, veidošanai. Tās pamatā būtu likumdošanas, vēsturnieku un politiķu diskursi, kas piedāvātu krievvalodīgo kopienas iekļaušanas nosacījumus.
3. Likums ir krievvalodīgo neformālo politisko institūciju popularitātes pamats. Štāba popularitātes fenomens un spēja mobilizēt fragmentāru kopienu izriet no *institucionalizētas politiskās līdzdalības deficīta*, ko pieredz krievvalodīgo kopienas vairākums. Stigmatizēta identitāte neizslēdz, bet bieži veicina nepieciešamību pēc politiskās līdzdalības „aizstāvformām" – izstumto alternatīvām institūcijām, kas spētu vai nu reāli kompensēt līdzdalības trūkumu, vai to stimulēt.

Kopienas vairākuma kolektīvās atmiņas saturs ietekmē arī krievvalodīgo kopienas pilsoņu daļu. Situācijā, kad vienā ģimenē var būt krievvalodīgo kopienas pārstāvji ar dažādām iespējām piedalīties valsts politikas īstenošanā, var notikt pilsoņu „inficēšanās" ar diskursu, kas dominē nepilsoņu kopienā. Tas savukārt var novest pie situācijas, kad pilsonis balso, pamatojoties uz politiskām simpātijām un emocijām, kas dominē nepilsoņu vidū.[24]

Minimālās tiesiskās atšķirības, kas pastāv starp Latvijas pilsoņiem un nepilsoņiem, neder par motivāciju naturalizēties un saņemt iespēju kļūt par ierēdni, advokātu un citu „pilsoņiem rezervēto" profesionālo grupu pārstāvjiem. Šajā gadījumā veidojas pretējais efekts, kad simboliskā nošķiršanās no politiski aktīvas pilsoņu daļas piesaista pie krievvalodīgas kopienas diskursiem un attālina no latviešu un pilsoņu kopienas diskursiem. Līdz ar to var notikt atsvešināšanās, rasties neuzticēšanās valsts institūcijām un veidoties priekšstats par to, ka valsts saistības un prasības nav leģitīmas. Šeit politiskās līdzdalības deficīts apvienojas ar tā pamatkritēriju – etnisko izcelsmi (vairākums nelatviešu) un vēsturisko nozīmi (mūs uzskata šeit par svešiem un okupantiem).

Var apgalvot, ka valsts programmas „Sabiedrības integrācija Latvijā" pamatnostādnēm un naturalizācijas procesam jākonkurē ar jēdzieniem "alien", "ņegri" ("negraždaņe" – nepilsoņa statuss) un atšķirīgu izpratni par 1940. gada 17. jūniju. Kopienas politiskā elite un mediju satura noteicēji kultivē priekšstatu par kopienas apdraudētību Latvijā, par nestabilo tiesisko statusu un barjerām iekļaušanai Latvijas sabiedrībā.[25]

Kopš 2003. gada Latvijas sabiedrībā ne tikai spilgtāk iezīmējās etnisko dažādību „šķirojošais" efekts[26], bet arī virkne pozitīvu tendenču, kas liecina par spēju pārtraukt pašizolācijas tendences.

Kā pirmā jāmin t. s. krievvalodīgo un atsevišķi krievu kā lielākās mazākumtautības pilsoniskā darbība viņu dibinātajās sabiedriskajās organizācijās. Kopienas paštēla veidošanas papildu faktors ir tās uztvere ārpus Latvijas, lielākoties Krievijas politiskajā elitē, plašsaziņas līdzekļos un zinātniskajā analīzē (diasporas pētniecībā). Paralēli vēl joprojām daļa kopienas pieskaņo savu dzīves ritmu Krievijas politiskajai kultūrai – Jaunā gada svinēšana plkst. 23.00 vai 9. maija svinības ir tikai daži piemēri, kas liecina, ka daļa krievvalodīgo kopienas simboliski dzīvo Krievijas teritorijā, pieņem tās iekšpolitisko ritmu un dzīves ciklu par savu. Būtisks ir jautājums – vai tā ir tikai ritualizēta saikne ar t. s. etnisko dzimteni, vai arī atvērtība ārpolitiskai retorikai un Krievijas politisko subjektu manipulējošām darbībām diasporas ietvaros.

Atbildi uz jautājumu par Latvijas Krievu kopienas identitātēm pēdējo gadu laikā aktīvi meklē ari Krievijas pētnieki. Analizējot jauno krievu diasporu veidošanās procesa gaitu, grūtības un neveiksmes, Krievijas pētnieki 90. gados galvenos skaidrojumus meklēja Latvijas un Krievijas politiskās elites rīcībā, ārpolitikas īpatnībās un valdību un partiju darbībā. Pēdējo gadu pētījumos tiek aplūkoti pašas diasporas „kvalitatīvie" rādītāji, tai skaitā arī kolektīvās (kultūras) atmiņas ietekme. Politisko zinātņu doktore un diasporu pētniece Tatjana Poloskova (Krievija) uzstājas par nepieciešamību pētīt diasporu kultūras un ekonomikas potenciālu vienlaikus ar ideoloģisko saturu un vēsturisko atmiņu, ko uzskata par svarīgu un reizēm pat izšķirošu attīstības vektoru.

2. nodaļa. Diaspora – skats no Krievijas. 1993. – 2005. gada jaunās tendences

90. gadu sākumā Krievijas pētnieki krievus ārpus Krievijas galvenokārt uzskatīja par krievu tautas neatņemamu sastāvdaļu. Programmas „Sociālās un politiskās situācijas analīze valstī" 1993. gada apaļā galda materiāli[27] sniedz pazīstamu krievu zinātnieku – A. Hutina, J. Lavrinas, B. Komocka, J. Sokolova un citu – viedokļus par krieviem bijušajās padomju republikās. Dominēja raksturojumi „krievvalodīgo iedzīvotāju traģiskā situācija", „krievu tautas iznīdēšana" u. tml. Kā visreālākā tika gaidīta situācija, kad „sāksies stihiskā, masveidīgā aizrobežu krievu pārceļošana uz Krieviju" (A. Hutins). Otrais piedāvātais scenārijs bija vēl dramatiskāks: „neizbēgama permanento karu un asiņaino konfliktu posms" (J. Lavrina). Netika pat apspriesta krievu diasporas veidošanās iespēja. B. Komockis teorētiski pieļāva, ka var būt trīs krievu pastāvēšanas varianti ārpus Krievijas: 1) repatriācija, 2) asimilācija un 3) savas etniskās identitātes saglabāšana citu valstu pilsoņu statusā ar Krievijas atbalstu. Tomēr pētnieks konstatēja, ka reāli notiek ceturtais variants: „krievi aiz Krievijas robežām ir vienkārši pamesti likteņa varā"[28].

Desmit gadus vēlāk situācija Krievijā ir mainījusies. Mainījušies arī priekšstati par krieviem ārpus Krievijas.

2003. gadā tika izdota krievu sociologa Renalda Simonjana grāmata „Krievija un Baltijas valstis"[29]. Pēc kritiķu atzinumiem, pētījums „ne tikai apgāž daudzus esošus mītus, bet arī aplūko varas elites un mediju nozīmi šo mītu kultivācijā"[30]. R. Simonjans izveidoja savu Latvijas Krievu kopienas un katras tās daļas sociālpolitisko raksturojumu. Pirmā grupa – pamatiedzīvotāji ir krievi (15–17% no visas Krievu kopienas). Viņi dzīvo Latvijā kopš seniem laikiem. Tā ir vislabāk integrētā sabiedrības daļa. Viņus biežāk uztver kā „savējos". Viņi saglabā savas tradīcijas un dzīves veidu, bet zina latviešu valodu, ir toleranti un pieņem vietējo kultūru. Otrā grupa ir radošā inteliģence (1–2%), kas atbrauca uz Latviju pēc 1945. gada, meklējot vairāk brīvības un pašrealizācijas iespējas. Vietējie iedzīvotāji neuzskata viņus par „savējiem", tomēr izturas pret viņiem ar cieņu. Trešā un ceturtā grupas veido 6–8% no Krievu kopienas un ir inženieri, ārsti, žurnālisti, zinātniskā inteliģence. 10–12% ir kvalificēti strādnieki, kuri pēc kadru sadales atbrauca uz

Latviju. Šo krievu daļu vietējie iedzīvotāji uztver vairāk vai mazāk neitrāli. Piektā grupa – padomju armijas virsnieku grupa (15%) – izmainīja situāciju. Šīs kategorijas iebraucējus un zemāka statusa obligātā karadienesta atvaļinātos karavīrus, kā arī nekvalificētos strādniekus, kuri iebrauca pēc tā saucamā „orgnabora", latvieši viennozīmīgi uztver kā migrantus. „Uz tā fona paši krievvalodīgie centās joprojām pozicionēt sevi kā lielās „Puškina, Dostojevska, Čaikovska nācijas" pārstāvjus, bet lielā marginālā slāņa īpatsvara dēļ latvieši uztver visu Krievu kopienu kā totalitārisma pēctečus un padomju internacionālistus."[31]

R. Simonjana secinājumu apstiprina arī O. Pisarenko savā pētījumā: „Elites esamība palīdz uzturēt kopīgas intereses un saglabāt savu identitāti. Latvijas Krievu kopienas vēsturiskā attīstība noteica, ka tā sastāv galvenokārt no urbanizētā proletariāta un ka starp tiem esošā intelektuālā slāņa pārstāvji ir galvenokārt saistīti ar eksaktām zinātnēm un tehnoloģijām, inženierzinātnēm. Viņi ir parasti mazāk nodarbināti ar etniskās kultūras saglabāšanu nekā kultūras inteliģence. Starp Latvijas krieviem ir salīdzinoši maz kultūras un mākslas inteliģences pārstāvju, te ir arī jānorāda, ka lielu daļu no tiem, kas varētu apvienot Latvijas krievus un palīdzēt saglabāt tradicionālās etniskās vērtības, iznīcināja Staļina represiju laikā. Jauno līderu elite nav izveidojusies, jo spējīgākie jaunākās paaudzes Latvijas krievu pārstāvji visbiežāk darbojas biznesā un arī tik daudz neuztraucas par etnisko identitāti un krievu kultūras attīstību un saglabāšanu."[32]

R. Simonjans tomēr pauda viedokli, ka Latvijas un Baltijas krievu diasporas pārstāvji dažādu ekonomisko, politisko un kultūras spēku ietekmē ir distancējušies no Krievijas krieviem, pakāpeniski izveidojot savu identitāti, kas atšķiras no Krievijas krievu identitātes. Savā grāmatā „Krievija un Baltijas valstis" viņš raksta: „Jaunais krievu izcelsmes Baltijas iedzīvotājs jau sen nav tāds pats krievs, kura vecāki vai vecvecāki pirms 25 vai vairāk gadiem atbrauca uz turieni no Pleskavas vai kāda citas Padomju Savienības apgabala. Tas ir pilsētnieks, kas jau no bērnības ir apguvis savas vides, piemēram, Viļņas, Rīgas vai Tallinas, uzvedības un intelektuālās prasmes. Saviem radiniekiem no Pleskavas apgabala ciemata viņš ir pavisam svešs cilvēks. Viņiem viņš nav īsts un pareizs krievs. Tajā pašā laikā viņš nav arī lietuvietis, latvietis vai igaunis tādā mērā, kādā ir vietējie lietuvieši, latvieši un igauņi. Ievērojama viņa personīgās pieredzes daļa viņu etniskās kopienas, vecāku un vietējo nacionālradikāļu naidīguma ietekmē atšķiras no titulētās nācijas vienaudžu pieredzes. Tas ir jaunais Baltijas reģiona iedzīvotājs, kas pārstāv jaunu subetnosu." [33]

Baltijas valstu krievu diasporu iespējamo likteni analizēja savā darbā „Язык и этнический конфликт" arī Maskavas "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace" centra speciālisti: „Pētījumos, kuri bija veikti krievu iedzīvotāju grupās bijušās PSRS republikās, noskaidroja divas tendences identitātes veidošanā. Viena tendence balstās uz biokulturālo orientāciju, otra – uz monokulturālo orientāciju. Pirmā galvenokārt ir raksturīga krievvalodīgo iedzīvotājiem Baltijas valstīs, otrā – Vidusāzijas iedzīvotājiem." [34] 90. gados Dž. Berija (*Berry*) akulturācijas modelī bija noskaidroti četri psiholoģiskās adaptācijas tipi – asimilācija, separācija, marģinalizācija un integrācija – un pēdējā bija pasludināta kā demokrātiskās sabiedrības tālākās attīstības modelis jaunajās neatkarīgajās valstīs.

Diasporas un integrācijas institūta (bijušais NVS valstu institūts) direktors Konstantīns Zatulins ir cita, gandrīz pretējā viedokļa piekritējs. „Krievi

Kazahstānā, Latvijā, Igaunijā un Ukrainā neatzīst sevi par mazākumtautību, kam ir savs pamats." Un tālāk: „Tautiešu kongress atbalstīja tādu definīciju: „Par Krievijas tautiešiem tiek atzītas personas, kas uzskata sevi par tādiem un pieder pie tautām un tautībām, kuras nekur, izņemot Krievijas Federāciju, nevarēja iegūt savu nacionālo un valstisko pašnoteikšanos." Izskatot krievu diasporas attīstības scenārijus, Zatulins apgalvo, ka pastāv tikai „dilemma: vai emigrēt uz Krieviju, vai brīvprātīgi piekrist asimilācijai". Zatulins konstatē: „Mēs no Krievijas varam iedarbināt mūsu diasporas pašnoteikšanās un konsolidācijas mehānismu un sākt pašapziņas atjaunošanu, lai palīdzētu viņai kļūt par politiski un ekonomiski aktīvu. Bez savstarpējiem sakariem krievi un Krievija neizdzīvos."[35]

Tatjana Poloskova, strādājot par Krievijas Ārlietu ministrijas Diplomātiskās akadēmijas Pasaules diasporu sektora vadītāju, secināja, ka diasporu par konflikta vai tuvināšanās faktoru veido politiķi un diasporas līderi. „Starp krievu diasporām tuvajās ārzemēs ir milzīgs skaits organizāciju, kas bija radītas tikai tāda konkrēta līdera dēļ, kurš veido sev politisko publicitāti. Mēs pārdzīvojam katastrofu mūsu politikā attiecībā uz ārzemju krievu diasporām tāpēc, ka likām savas cerības nevis uz konstruktīviem cilvēkiem, bet uz viņu „andergraundu", uz autsaideriem, kuri rūpējas nevis par krievu likteņiem, bet tikai par sevi." Vienlaikus „diaspora var veidoties tikai tad, kad par acīmredzamu kļūs diasporas vēlme nerīkot valsts apvērsumus uzturēšanās valstīs un neveidoties tajās par „piekto kolonnu"".[36] Pirms pieciem gadiem Poloskova piedāvāja trīs sadarbības modeļus: 1) repatriācijas modeli, kas bija raksturīgs postkoloniālās vēstures periodam, 2) tautiešu tiesību un brīvību aizsardzību un 3) paternālisma modeli – diasporu potenciāla izmantošanu starptautisko sakaru attīstībai un nacionālo interešu aizstāvībai.[37] Pēc Poloskovas domām, Krievijai ir svarīgi precīzi noteikt pieeju diasporizācijas procesam. Pirmā pieeja – uzskatīt, ka diaspora ir vēsturiskās netaisnības sekas, neizbēgama traģēdiju. Otrā pieeja – diasporizācijas procesu uztvert kā apzināti izvēlēto dzīvesveida alternatīvu.[38]

2004. gadā pēc Krievijas Federācijas valdības komisijas tautiešu lietās ārzemēs pasūtījuma Maskavas un Pēterburgas ekspertu grupa Tatjanas Poloskovas vadībā veica bijušo PSRS republiku krievu diasporu situācijas monitoringu. Grupas sastāvā bija M. Lazutova, A. Koluto, M. Kurtovs, J. Kuzņecovs, A. Dokučajeva u. c. Monitoringa rezultāti bija apkopoti grāmatā „Положение российских соотечественников в странах СНГ и Балтии"[39]. Īsumā monitoringa rezultātus var sadalīt divās daļās: 1) diasporu raksturojums, atšķirības un attīstības modeļi, ka arī 2) Krievijas mēģinājums izstrādāt diferencētu pieeju dažādu diasporu atbalstam. Pētījums liecina, ka Krievijas palīdzības programmas tautiešiem vai nu netiek īstenotas, vai izrādās mazefektīvas. Izskatot daudzas diasporu pastāvēšanas dimensijas, autori konstatēja veselu virkni atšķirību starp dažādām diasporām – Latvijā dzīvojošie krievi vairāk izjūt psiholoģisko diskomfortu. Krievu sociālais un ekonomiskais stāvoklis šeit ir labāks nekā krieviem Vidusāzijas vai Aizkaukāza valstīs: tikai 21% (kas krietni mazāk nekā, piemēram, Gruzijā) Latvijas krievu atzīst sevi par mazturīgiem, bet vienlaikus 44% atzīst, ka dažreiz saskaras ar diskriminācijas izpausmēm. Lai gan Latvijā dzīvojošiem krieviem piemīt liels protesta gars un cīņai par savam tiesībām viņi biežāk nekā citur izmanto mītiņus un pat bada streikus, tomēr situācija liecina par to, ka krievu diaspora Latvijā ir sadrumstalota. Daudzas krievu sabiedriskās organizācijas ir vājas, nevarīgas, to līderiem trūkst kvalifikācijas un tiesisko zināšanu, bet pašai kopienai trūkst iekšējo sakaru. „Zinātnieki secināja: vairākums krievu nonāca pie secinājuma, ka ir atmesti uz zemāku līmeni sociālpolitiskajā hierarhijā, salīdzinot ar titulnācijām. Atšķirībā no daudzām citam tautām, krieviem nav pašorganizācijas un kointegrācijas kvalitātes."[40]

Vēsturiskais ekskurss – skats no Latvijas. Diasporas ģenēze Latvijā

Latvijas pētnieki bieži pievēršas Latvijas krievu pašapziņas attīstības vēsturei un uzskata, ka kopienas statusa radikālās izmaiņas 19.–20. gadsimtā veidoja sarežģīto, pretrunīgo kopienas identitāti, kurā vienlaikus pastāv, sadzīvo un konfliktē pašizolācijas un atklātības, viktimizācijas un heroizācijas tendences. Pēc I. Apines un V. Volkova domām, pirms Latvijas teritorijas iekļaušanas Krievijas impērijas sastāvā krieviem šeit nebija bagātas pieredzes savas nacionālās dzīves attīstībā un tā notika attīstītu vietējo nacionālo kultūru, vispirms vācu un latviešu kultūras, bet Latgalē – arī poļu kultūras, klātbūtnē.[41] Līdz ar to krievu nacionālā apziņa ietvēra sevī priekšstatus vienlaikus par savu un citu tautu identitāti – tēlu „mēs" un „viņi". Atšķirībā no Krievijā dzīvojošiem krieviem, Latvijas krieviem divu gadsimtu laikā nākas pārdzīvot, pieņemt šo divu tēlu hierarhijas politiskās, varas, ekonomikas, valodas izmaiņas un iekļauties tajās vai arī būt opozīcijā.

19. gadsimta vidū parādījās pirmās krievu autoru publikācijas, kuras mēģināja definēt vietējo krievu identitāti. Latvijā tajā laikā izdotās krievu avīzes un žurnāli reproducēja ideju par krievu pārākumu pār citām tautām un jēdzienu „krievu politiskā nācija". Tā bija atbilde uz sarežģīto problēmu „krievi Baltijas guberņās" jeb „Baltijas jautājums". Krievu nacionālisma ideju paudēji, Krievijas varas pārstāvji, slavofilu ideologi J. Samarins, I. Aksakovs, izdēvēji un žurnālisti I. Visockis, V. Ščukins u. c. aizstāvēja un propagandēja krievu kā impērijas etnosa statusu. Piemēram, avīzes „Rižskij vestņik" redaktors I. Visockis aktīvi propagandēja krievu politiskās nācijas ideoloģisko triādi: „patvadība, pareizticība un tautisks patriarhālisms"[42].

Tomēr tolaik Latvijas krievi nekad nebija pilnībā identificējuši sevi ar impērijas, valdošo etnosu. Diezgan spilgti tas izpaudās krievu liberālisma ideju izplatīšanā Latvijā. Krievu liberāļi uzskatīja, ka dažādu tautu apvienošanas un attīstības pamatā Krievijas impērijas reformu laikā ir atteikšanās no nacionālā faktora fetišizācijas[43]. Atšķirībā no krievu konservatīvajiem nacionālistiem, liberāļi uzskatīja, ka valsts aizbildnība pār Baltijas krievu iedzīvotājiem kaitēs pašiem iedzīvotājiem, jo pieradinās viņus pie pasivitātes. Pēc krievu liberāļu domām, krieviem bija visas politiskās un juridiskās tiesības, lai ekonomikas un kultūras jomā konkurētu ar visām novada tautām kā līdzīgi ar līdzīgiem. Tāpēc liberāļi bija pret krievu kolonizāciju Baltijā, pret krievu iedzīvotāju īpašu pārstāvi Valsts Domē un citās valsts pārvaldes iestādēs[44].

Savukārt zināma krievu inteliģences daļa Baltijā 20. gadsimtā sākumā mēģināja rast vidusceļu starp krievu konservatīvo nacionālismu un liberālismu. Šie mēģinājumi izpaužas idejā par nepieciešamību izstrādāt Baltijas krievu iedzīvotājiem stingrus principus nacionālās apziņas stiprināšanai[45].

Krievu sabiedrisko organizāciju (krājaizdevu kasu, krievu tirgotāju un atvaļināto karavīru palīdzība kasu, labdarības biedrību, kultūras un profesionālo apvienību, studentu korporāciju) rašanās liecināja par krievu vēlmi arī Krievijas impērijas ietvaros pašiem risināt savas dzīves problēmas.

19.–20. gs. mijā Latvijā dzīvojošie krievi pakāpeniski sāka attīstīties kā nacionālā grupa. Tomēr Krievijas impērijas apstākļos vietējo krievu kā nacionālās grupas attīstība daudzos gadījumos noritēja ar lielām grūtībām tieši tāpēc, ka krievu tautai bija galvenais statuss impērijas tautu vidū. Pat visliberālākie krievu pilsoniskie spēki – konstitucionālie demokrāti – nevarēja apstrīdēt impērijas nedalāmības principu. Impēriskai idejai krievu nācijas apziņā, kā to parādīja PSRS valsts vēsture, piemita ievērojama inerce [46].

Šis vēsturiskais ekskurss bija nepieciešams, lai pārliecinātos, ka vēsturiskas paralēles skaidri saskatāmas arī mūsdienu Krievu kopienas attīstības posmā, un līdz ar to pierādītu kolektīvās kultūras atmiņas nozīmi kopienu pašsaglabašanās un tās jaunā statusa veidošanās procesā.

Visi Krievu kopienas pētījumi, kā arī diskusijas plašsaziņas līdzekļos liecina par to, ka pašlaik norisinās Latvijas krievu identitāšu meklējumi. Pēc Olgas Pisarenko domām, Padomju Savienības sabrukums ļoti spēcīgi ietekmēja krievu pašapziņu Latvijā, daudzos gadījumos izraisot savas etniskās un valstiskās piederības un identitātes krīzi. Protams, šis process skāris arī latviešus. Tomēr latviešiem tagad ir sava nacionālā valsts, "sava etniskuma patvērums", bet Latvijas krieviem nav šī kompensējošā mehānisma. Viņi tikai pēc Latvijas neatkarības atgūšanas aptvēra, ka ir minoritāte tajā valstī, ko visu savu mūžu uzskatījuši par dzimteni un savām mājām.

Pēc Padomju Savienības sabrukuma Latvijas krievi saskārās ne tikai ar ekonomiskām un politiskām, bet lielākoties arī ar psiholoģiskām problēmām. Padomju laika vēsturiskie apstākļi ir stabilizējuši un izplatījuši specifisku krievu tautības apziņu, tas ir, lielvalsts iedzīvotāja, majoritātes, dominējošās grupas pārākuma pašapziņu, kas bija sākusi veidoties jau cariskās Krievijas laikā, tomēr nebija tik plaši izplatīta. "Tādēļ arī vēl ir izplatītas tieksmes prasīt savai minoritātei īpašas, pamatnācijai piemītošas tiesības, piemēram, valodas statusa jomā."[47] Padomju režīms izmainīja krievu cilvēku pašapziņu. Krievu cilvēks pārvērtās par *homo soveticus* ar savu specifisko dzīves redzējumu, morāli un apkārtējo vidi. Tāpēc Padomju Savienības sabrukums īpaši spēcīgi ietekmēja to Latvijas krievu, it īpaši vidējās un vecākās paaudzes cilvēku, pašapziņu, kas visu savu apzināto mūžu dzīvoja Padomju Savienībā[48].

Veidojas jaunā identitāte „Latvijas krievs". Pēc Ilgas Apines domām, "veidojas jauns vietējo krievu psiholoģiskais tips – cilvēks ar tipiskām krievu rakstura iezīmēm, bet ar skaidru piederības apziņu Latvijai. Viņš ir iedzīvojies Latvijas vidē un ir gatavs veltīt savus spēkus Latvijas valsts attīstībai". [49]

Krievu kopienas identitātes Latvijā

Daudzi pētnieki ir izstrādājuši identitāšu tipoloģiju. Pēc P. Kolsto shēmas, ir iespējamas dažādas krievu diasporas identitātes[50]: 1) tāda, kas balstās uz vēlmi atdalīties un veidot savu valsti („Piedņestras sindroms"); 2) tradicionāla padomju identitāte; jauno kazaku identitāte (sevis apzināšanās un atšķirība no Krievijas krieviem, jaunās kultūras identitāte); 3) asimilētas diasporas identitāte; integrētas jaunas diasporas identitāte u. c.

1997. gadā B. Cilevičs, aprakstot iespējamos „nepilsoņu uzvedības modeļus”[51], piedāvā četras tādas „uzvedības” jeb identitātes modeļus: emigrācija (repatriācija Krievijā), asimilācija, segregācija (sava veida „Piedņestras sindroms”), integrācija.

Izskatot visus modeļus, gan B. Cilevičs, gan O. Pisarenko uzskata, ka nekas neliecina par Latvijas krievu vēlmi atdalīties un veidot savu valsti. „Savukārt Latvijā veiktie pētījumi un aptaujas rāda, ka starp Latvijas krieviem ir daļa, kas vēlētos, lai Latvija pievienotos Krievijai NVS sastāvā. Tas zināmā mērā liecina par iredentisma tendencēm viņu vidū. Tomēr atbildes uz citiem jautājumiem parāda, ka bieži vien šī vēlme ir tikai nostalģija pēc bijušiem laikiem, kā arī noteiktu politisko notikumu Latvijā vai Krievijā sekas un nevis Latvijas krievu stingra nostāja. Šo ideju vairāk atbalsta tieši vecākā Latvijas krievu paaudze.”[52]

Asimilācijas tendences, pēc B. Cileviča domām, piemīt ne vairāk kā 10% Latvijas krievvalodīgo iedzīvotāju. Šis secinājums 1995. gadā tika izdarīts pēc netiešiem pierādījumiem – krievu vecāku vēlmes sūtīt bērnus latviešu skolās. Ņemot vērā, ka 2005. gadā tādu vecāku skaits daudz reižu palielinājās, tomēr nevar apgalvot, ka lielākai daļai krievu piemīt asimilācijas tendence. Taču vairāki pētnieki ir izvirzījuši hipotēzi, ka Latvijas krievi varētu asimilēties.

„Viens no tiem bija arī D. Leitins (*Laitin D.,* 1998), kas savā pētījumā „Identitāte veidošanās procesā” apgalvo, ka tieši Latvijas krieviem ir vislielākās prognozes tikt asimilētiem, ja salīdzina ar Igauniju, Ukrainu vai Kazahstānu. Savu apgalvojumu viņš pamatoja ar to, ka Krievu kopiena Latvijā drīzāk pieņem nekā noliedz pamatnācijas kultūras prakses, pieaugušie mēģina sasniegt valsts valodas standartus, ko nosaka valdība, un arī iedrošina savus bērnus mācīties valsts valodu. Un var paredzēt, ka jaunākā paaudze zinās valsts valodu tikpat labi kā krievu valodu.[53] Tomēr Latvijā veiktie pētījumi neliecina par Latvijas krievu asimilācijas tendencēm. Asimilāciju Leitins definē kā „dominējošās sabiedrības mainīgo kultūras prakšu pieņemšanu, lai pārvarētu plūstošo kultūras robežu starp minoritātēm un sabiedrības dominējošo daļu”[54], un kultūras asimilāciju pielīdzina reliģiskai konversijai – tas, ko viena paaudze uzskata par vienkāršu pragmatismu, otra var uzskatīt par kaut ko dabisku un līdz ar to asimilēties. Tomēr Leitina asimilācijas definīcijā nekas nav teikts par Latvijas krievu kultūras saglabāšanu.

Savukārt Cilevičs saskatīja integrācijas modelī dažus apakšmodeļus: „Restaurācija” – vēlme atražot Krievu kopienu eksistēšanas formas, kuras pastāvēja pirms 1940. gada; „Diaspora” – Krievu kopiena izjūt sevi kā Krievijas pilsoņus trimdā, ārzemēs. Vairāk vai mazāk pastāv lojalitāte pret Latviju kā dzīvesvietu; „Ebreju modelis” – Latvijas krievi atrodas tāda pašā stāvoklī, kāds bija vēsturiski raksturīgs ebrejiem, proti, bez politiskām un īpašuma tiesībām, kas piespiež meklēt efektīvus izdzīvošanas mehānismus. (Te var minēt arī R. Simonjana pētījumu: krievi 1993./1994. gadā bija 59,5% no visiem uzņēmējiem, citas tautības cilvēki – 20,3% un latvieši – tikai 20,2%. 1996./1997. gadā situācija jau sāka mainīties – latviešu īpatsvars pieauga līdz 31,5%, krievu skaits attiecīgi samazinājās līdz 53,8% un citu tautību indivīdu proporcija līdz 14,7%.)[55] Vēl viens modelis – „Eiropas modelis”. To izvēlas tādi pragmatiski, izglītoti cilvēki ar daudzveidīgu identitāti, kuri pieņem Eiropas liberālas vērtības pēc idejiskās un pragmatiskās izvēles. Tāds modelis veido katra cilvēka statusu nevis pēc etniskās izcelsmes, bet pēc dotībām, spējām un kvalifikācijas. B. Cilevičs atzina, ka tieši „Eiropas modelis” ir pievilcīgs lielai daļai krievu[56].

Modeļu daudzveidību uzsver Latvijas Krievu kultūras biedrības priekšsēdētājs Jurijs Abizovs: „Esmu krievs tāpēc, ka par tādu sevi apjaušu un pazīstu sevi kā kultūrvēsturisku objektu. Mana identitāte nav iedota man gatavā veidā, bet prasa pacietību un darbu. Būt krievam nozīmē uzņemties atbildību par vēsturi…”[57]

Latvijas Krievu kopienas pārstāvniecības: sabiedriskās organizācijas. Attīstības modeļi un pieredze

Latvijas Krievu kopienas pašorganizācijas process vēl gaida savus pētniekus. Mēs raksturosim krievu sabiedrisko organizāciju attīstības retrospekciju, darbības prioritātes, atvērtības vai pašizolācijas tendences.

Latvijā eksistē arī atsevišķi pētījumi par mazākumtautību sabiedrisko organizāciju (tālāk tekstā – MT SO) funkcionēšanu Latvijā. Tie pēc savas būtības ir vairāk aprakstoši un neizskaidro saikni starp organizāciju dibināšanas mērķiem un socioekonomisko transformāciju Latvijā.

2004. gadā veiktais Rīgas Stradiņa universitātes zinātnieka Ģirta Račko pētījums piedāvā MT SO dibināšanas mērķu analīzi, kurā ir pievērsta uzmanība tam, cik lielā mērā organizācijas mēģina noslēgties no apkārtējās sociālās vides vai arī piemēroties sistēmtransformācijas izraisītajām pārmaiņām, iekļaujoties sabiedriskos un politiskos procesos.

Vecāko organizāciju dibināšanu galvenokārt noteica etnisko grupu pārstāvju pašorganizēšanās uzplaukums 80. gadu beigās. Vieni no galvenajiem šo organizāciju mērķiem bija celt tautas etnisko pašapziņu un saglabāt etnisko identitāti; uzturēt kultūras un ekonomiskos sakarus ar dzimtenes varas iestādēm un tautiešiem ārzemēs; nodarboties ar jaunākās paaudzes izglītošanu, dibinot pamatskolas, vidusskolas un svētdienas skolas; kopt dzimto valodu, literatūru, veidojot bibliotēkas un nodarbojoties ar izdevējdarbību; atjaunot tautas kultūru, dziedot, dejojot un kopīgi svinot nacionālos svētkus; informēt sabiedrību par savām aktivitātēm. Šīs organizācijas lielā mērā tika dibinātas, lai apvienotu un solidarizētu etniskās grupas pārstāvjus Latvijā vai nu pēc to “tīrasinības”, vai arī pēc interesēm par attiecīgā etnosa kultūru. 2003. gadā dibinātās (jaunās) MT SO visumā bija tendētas vairāk interpretēt sociālpolitiskos procesus no multikulturālisma pozīcijām un mazāk no sava etnosa vērtību pozīcijām.[58]

Krievu organizāciju specifikai ir raksturīgi divi dominējošie virzieni:

1) kultūrizglītība,
2) interešu (tiesību) aizstāvība.[59]

Var secināt, ka 90. gados daudzām krievu organizācijām bija saskatāma separatīva tendence (pēc B. Cileviča – segregācija, pēc P. Kolsto – „Predņestras sindroms”), bet nebija neviena veiksmīga mēģinājuma izstrādāt reālo, dzīvotspējīgo separātisma modeli. Krievu biedrību Latvijas asociācijas (LARO) bijušais priekšsēdētājs S. Mirskis sava referātā rakstīja: „Nosaukums „nacionāla minoritāte” nav pieņemams attiecībā uz krievu iedzīvotājiem Latvijā. .. Ir jāatšķir procesi, kuri attīstās Latvijā, – divkopienu sabiedrības attīstība un divkopienu valsts tendences parādīšanās.”[60] Tomēr ne Latvijas Krievu biedrību asociācija, ne Krievu kopiena tā arī nepiedāvāja reālu autonomas Krievu kopienas eksistēšanas, finansēšanas, strukturālas veidošanas un vadības modeli. Vienlaikus, kā uzskata Latvijas etnopētnieki, „krievu etniskās grupas nav spējušas vienoties par savas minoritātes kopīgas kultūras pārstāvniecības nodibināšanu".[61] Gan T. Poloskova, gan R. Simonjans secina, ka galvenā Latvijas Krievu kopienas problēma ir nespēja apvienoties. „Problēma tā, ka krieviem grūti būt vienotiem – viņus vienmēr saplosa pretrunas."[62] "Krievu diaspora Baltijas valstīs ir tik ļoti neviendabīga, daudzkārtaina un pretrunīga kā neviena cita diaspora pasaulē."[63]

Dažām organizācijām bija vērojama tieksme pēc darbības uz kultūras autonomijas pamata un mēģinājumiem radīt darbības ideoloģiju uz vēsturiskās atmiņas elementiem (pēc B. Cileviča – „restaurācijas modelis"). Krievu sabiedrība Latvijā dibināja sarežģīto pārvaldes sistēmu, kurā ietilpst tādas institūcijas kā „Sobor" un Dome. LARO un Krievu kopiena Statūtos akcentēja uzticību pareizticības normām. LARO, SO Krievu nacionāla skola „Kitež", Latvijas integrācijas kustība „RUNA" mēģina izmantot I. Visocka 1901. gadā piedāvāto ideoloģisko triādi: patvaldība, pareizticība un tautisks patriarhālisms. „Ir nepieciešams esošām krievu skolām piešķirt valsts nacionālās skolas statusu ar pareizticīgu ievirzi, kā tas bija pirmās Latvijas Republikas laikā." [64]

„Pareizticība ir krievu nacionālās idejas kultūras kods… Nepieciešama vesela sistēma, ar kuras palīdzību atdzims krievu nacionālā Tradīcija. Lai tas notiktu, vajag atkal vērsties pie Pareizticības un tādas pasaules uztveres, kuru dod tikai Pareizticība."[65]

Dažām vecām un jaunām organizācijām (Latvijas Krievu kopienai, Latvijas Krievu biedrību asociācijai, Krievu klubam, Krievu sabiedrībai Latvijā, Latvijas–Krievijas sadarbības asociācijai, Liepājas Krievu kopienai) ir raksturīga sadarbība ar politiskajām partijām, kuras pozicionē sevi kā „krievu aizstāvjus": „Līdztiesība", Krievu partija, PCTVL, Tautas saskaņas partija, Sociālistiskā partija. Tomēr krievu organizāciju Statūtu analīze liecina par to, ka tajos ierakstīto mērķu un uzdevumu hierarhijā politiskās rīcības komponenta gandrīz nav. Latvijas Krievu kopiena un Krievu sabiedrība Latvijā skaidri norāda uz krievu iedzīvotāju sociālo, demogrāfisko, profesionālo, reģionālo struktūru un akcentē interešu aizstāvības un savstarpējās palīdzības uzdevumus. Krievu kopienas Statūti paredz arī līdzdalību likumdošanas pilnveidošanā. 1.7. punktā akcentēta sadarbību ar nepolitiskām organizācijām. Kopumā par galveno mērķi visas organizācijas izvirzīja krievu garīgā, tikumiskā, kultūrvēsturiskā mantojuma un krievu valodas saglabāšanu un attīstību. Dažas organizācijas pat Statūtos atsevišķi atzīmēja, ka to darbība nav saistīta ar politisko mērķu sasniegšanu.[66] 2000. gadā Krievu kopiena asi uzstājās pret partijas „Latvijas ceļš" biedra D. Nikolajeva izvirzīšanu Latvijas–Krievijas sadarbības asociācijas viceprezidenta postenim tieši sakarā ar viņa partejisko piederību. [67] Līdz ar to T. Poloskova secināja: „Desmit gadu laikā NVS un Baltijas valstīs, izņemot Latvijas PCTVL, nav izdevies izveidot nevienu kaut cik nozīmīgu politisku kustību, kas aizstāv krievvalodīgo iedzīvotāju intereses." [68]

2003. un 2004. gada protesti pret mazākumtautību izglītības reformu iezīmēja jaunu posmu Krievu kopienas eksistencē. Pirmo reizi tika mēģināts izveidot jumta organizāciju, kas apvienotu Latvijas krievvalodīgos iedzīvotājus. Tika reģistrēts Latvijas Krievu kopienas apvienotaiss kongress (OKROL). Kaut gan OKROL sevi pieteica kā nepolitisku apvienību, tomēr par mērķi tā pasludināja krievvalodīgo interešu aizstāvību dažādās jomās, tai skaitā ekonomikā, politikā un kultūrā. Dibināšanas kongresā izskanēja prasība piešķirt krievu valodai oficiālas valodas statusu un citas, arī politiskas, prasības. Kongresā izskanēja doma par nacionālās idejas novecošanu un tika izvirzīta tēze par krievu valodu kā krievu apvienošanas vienīgo pamatu. Nozīmīgi, ka jau kongresā veidojās iekšējas cīņas un nesaskaņas. „OKROL ir dibināts, bet valdē nav neviena galvenā PCTVL pārstāvja. Aizskaroši? Kādam – noteikti. ... Nav pat svarīgi, ka divi no trīs OKROL līdzpriekšsēdētājiem un viena trešdaļa no tās valdes ir PCTVL biedri. Kongresa politiskā programma praktiski pilnībā sakrīt ar PCTVL programmu un ir pretrunā ar citu partiju programmām. .. OKROL ne tikai pārņēma PCTVL politiskos principus, bet arī faktiski ir partijas produkts.”[69] Bet 2. OKROL kongress 2005. gada oktobrī nolēma neizvirzīt politiķus vadošās institūcijās, lai „nekļūtu par kādas partijas satelītiem”. Reģionos jaundibinātās Krievu kopienas allaž uzsver, ka nevēlas sadarboties tikai ar vienu partiju. Jūrmalas Krievu kopienas priekšsēdētājs V. Kupčiks paziņo, ka „dibinātai kopienai nav nekādu sakaru ar politiku”[70]. Ir skaidri novērojama pretrunīga tendence: rīkoties politiski, bet publiski paziņot, ka nav politiķis.

Ne visas krievu organizācijas atbalsta OKROL ideoloģiju. LARO priekšsēdētājs M. Gavrilovs: „Kāpēc mēs ar Favorsku un Altuhovu, kā arī Krievu kopienas apvienoto kongresu esam, kā mēdz teikt, *uz atšķirīgiem ceļiem*? Viņiem ir kopēja slimība – „krievvalodība”. Mēs ar skaidru sirdi apgalvojam, ka esam krievi.”[71] Pret OKROL mēģinājumu runāt „visu krievvalodīgo, visu slāvu vārdā” asi uzstājas Latvijas Ukraiņu biedrība, vecticībnieku organizācijas u. c.

Interesanti, kā ir mainījies priekšstats par etniskās identitātes apdraudēto stāvokli. Vecākās organizācijas bija vairāk tendētas saskatīt draudus etniskai identitātei tieši no citu etnosu puses, savukārt jaunākās organizācijas draudus vairāk saistīja ar pašu cilvēku inertumu. Jaunāko organizāciju vidū dominēja uzskats, ka draudu etniskai identitātei nav, savukārt vecāko organizāciju līderi bija vairāk pārliecināti par to, ka draudi etniskai identitātei ir reāli. Turklāt jaunāko organizāciju vidū draudu avoti tika vairāk saistīti ar apkārtējo vidi: cilvēku kultūras pieaugošo vienveidīgumu, globalizāciju, brīvo informācijas plūsmu, profesionalizāciju vai politiskā spektra polarizāciju Latvijā, kas, piemēram, tika skaidrota ar radikālo politisko spēku reakciju pret nacionālistisko ideju nozīmes nivelēšanos. Turpretī vecākās organizācijas, runājot par draudiem, izteikti lietoja terminu “asimilācija”, tādējādi uzsverot to, ka draudi vairāk izriet no dominējošās etniskās grupas[72].

Organizāciju pozīciju maiņu, atvērtību vai pašizolācijas tendences var ietekmēt arī finansēšanas avoti. „Kopumā finanšu resursu ieplūdumam MT SO segmentā ir divējāda ietekme uz organizāciju pastāvēšanu. No vienas puses, finanšu trūkums ierobežo organizāciju iespējas sasniegt izvirzītos mērķus. Taču, no otras puses, zināma daļa biedrību līderu arī norāda uz finansējuma disfunkcionālo nozīmi attiecībā uz organizāciju pastāvēšanu, radot augsni “cīņai par varu un naudu”.”[73] Piemēram, Krievu sabiedrība Latvijā, meklējot finansējumu, pieņēma lēmumu piedalīties Eiropas Komisijas projektu konkursā 2000. gadā. Projektu izstrādāja toreizējs Krievu sabiedrības Latvijā valdes loceklis V. Vasins. Projekts „Sabiedrisks informatīvi konsultatīvais naturalizācijas birojs” tika atbalstīts un saņēma finansējumu. Organizācijas valde bija gandarīta un labprāt izmantoja grantu tehniskas bāzes uzlabošanai. Tomēr projekta mērķis – veicināt krievvalodīgo Latvijas iedzīvotāju naturalizāciju – izraisīja lielu neapmierinātību no dažu radikāli noskaņotu organizāciju aktīvistu un vadītāju puses, lai gan organizācijas Statūtos bija definēti mērķi „dzīves līmeņa un kvalitātes uzlabošana, realizējot humānas, sociālas un ekonomiskās attīstības projektus; Latvijas krievu iedzīvotāju sociāli kulturālas vides uzlabošana Latvijā”.[74] Lekciju laikā viņi apmeklēja auditoriju un griezīgi aģitēja pilsonības pretendentus nepieņemt Latvijas pilsonību. Tas radīja sašutumu projekta īstenotāju, pasniedzēju un dalībnieku vidū. Pēc skaļiem protestiem organizācijas līderi 2000. gada februārī naktī slepeni izveda no auditorijas Maskavas ielā 68 visas mēbeles un pārtrauca projekta īstenošanu. Pēc mūsu rīcībā esošās informācijas Krievu sabiedrība Latvijā tā arī neiesniedza projekta atskaiti. Projekta vadītājs V. Vasins bija spiests aiziet no organizācijas. 2000. gada 7. martā viņš ar domubiedriem dibināja sabiedrisko organizāciju „Pilsoniskā iniciatīva – XXI”, kura veiksmīgi īsteno un attīsta biroja darbību jau piecus gadus, saņemot Sabiedrības integrācijas fonda, programmas PHARE un citu „donoru” resursus.

Neskatoties uz savu biedru ideoloģisko noskaņu, organizācijas „Krievu sabiedrība Latvijā” priekšsēdētāja T. Favorska 2003. gadā iniciēja aktīvu sadarbību ar tikko dibināto Īpašo uzdevumu ministra sabiedrības integrācijas lietās sekretariātu (turpmāk tekstā – ĪUMSILS). Bet pēc gada tā attieksme strauji mainījās: T. Favorska publiski paziņoja par sadarbību ar Maskavas valdību. Tas faktiski nozīmēja finansiālo atbalstu. Avīzēs „Čas” un „Vesti segodņa” organizācijas vadība uzsāka asu uzbrukumu ĪUMSILS un tā atbalstītiem pasākumiem, aicinot, piemēram, boikotēt ikgadējas mazākumtautību bērnu Sporta spēles, neņemt no valsts budžeta līdzekļus.[75] T. Poloskova vienā no intervijām bija sašutusi par to, ka dažkārt Latvijā tika dibinātas krievu organizācijas ar vienu mērķi – iegūt tēlu „Latvijas ienaidnieki”, lai vieglāk saņemtu finansējumu.[76]

Tomēr, vērtējot krievu organizāciju pašizolācijas tendenci, var konstatēt, ka tā samazinās. To apliecina krievu organizāciju skaits, kas izteica vēlmi sadarboties ar ĪUMSILS, apmeklēt seminārus, piedalīties kopējos pasākumos. Pēc ĪUMSILS datiem, tādu organizāciju kļūst arvien vairāk: datubāzē ir reģistrētas 45 organizācijas, 14 no tām tika dibinātas pēdējo trīs gadu laikā. Īpaši aktīvas dialogā ar valsti ir lielas, ietekmīgas krievu organizācijas: Latvijas Krievu kultūras biedrība, biedrība „Meļetija Kaļistratova nams” (Daugavpils), Latvijas Krievu sabiedrības savienība, Latvijas Krievu mācībvalodas skolu atbalsta asociācija, Latvijas vecticībnieku biedrības. Šīm organizācijām ir raksturīga tendence aktivizēt krievu etniskās identitātes saglabāšanu un pilnveidošanu sociālo izmaiņu procesā. Reģionālas veco organizāciju nodaļas tiecas reģistrēties kā neatkarīgas juridiskas personas, jo tās neapmierina vecās darba metodes, darbības programmas, noslēgtība. Piemēram, Krievu kopienas Jelgavas nodaļa 2004. gada februārī pārreģistrējās par patstāvīgu biedrību, aktīvi sadarbojas ar Jelgavas Sabiedrības integrācijas centru, piedalās starpetniskajos projektos, veiksmīgi rīko kultūras pasākumus visai pilsētai. Vēlmi sadarboties ar ĪUMSILS un citām krievu organizācijām izteica Rēzeknes Krievu kopiena, kā arī Valmierā, Cēsīs un Smiltenē dzīvojošo krievu iniciatīvas grupas. To organizāciju darbība, kuras bija orientētas uz atvērtību, bija „sabalansēta ar cilvēku pašdarbību, iespējām iegūt pozitīvu pieredzi no paveiktā un pašrealizēties. Jaunāko organizāciju līderi saikni ar valsts iestādēm bija izteikti vairāk tendēti definēt kā “sadarbību” vai kā “dialogu”, savukārt vecāko organizāciju līderi vairāk koncentrējās uz “atbalsta” vai “palīdzības” saņemšanu no Latvijas vai dzimtenes valsts iestādēm”[77].

Secinājumi un priekšlikumi situācijas maiņai – ceļā uz atvērtu Latvijas Krievu kopienu Latvijā

Kvalitatīva datu interpretācija ļauj apstiprināt izvirzīto hipotēzi un paredzēt optimālo Krievu kopienas attīstības scenāriju. To apliecina arī O. Pisarenko pētījuma secinājumi. „Tātad Latvijā var runāt par jaunās integrētās diasporas veidošanās tendencēm... Šāds skatījums uz Latvijas krieviem palīdzētu to akulturācijai Latvijas sabiedrībā, integrācijas stratēģijas izvēlei, piederības un lojalitātes pret Latvijas valsti stiprināšanai.

Latvijas krievi mēģina veidot savu identitāti, pamatojoties uz elementiem, vērtībām, kas ir aizgūti no abām kultūrām — krievu un latviešu kultūras. Tātad notiek nevis asimilācija un latviešu vērtību aizvietošana ar krievu vērtībām vai nodalīšanās, bet gan latviešu vērtības papildina Latvijas krievu vērtības līdz līmenim, kas ļauj Latvijas Krievu kopienu uzskatīt par jaunu subetnosu (Simonjana izpratnē) vai jaunu integrēto diasporu (Kolsto izpratnē)."[78]

Mūsdienu Latvijā pastāv politiskie mīti, diskursi un Latvijas vēstures interpretācijas, ko par savu simbolisko īpašumu uzskata dažādos etniskos segmentos pastāvoša lingvistiski simboliskā krievvalodīgo kopiena.

90. gadu sākumā valsts atjaunošanas procesā netika veidoti priekšnoteikumi simboliskai sabiedrības saliedētībai. Līdz šim t. s. politiskās nācijas jeb nacionālās identitātes saturs un rāmji nav definēti politiskās elites rīcībā, tikai fragmentāri pastāv nevalstisko organizāciju darbībā un nepastāv Latvijas medijos. Latvijas krievvalodīgo kopienas nākotne vēl „nav notikusi" – nav notikumu, ideoloģisko konstrukciju, likumdošanas iniciatīvu, mediju kampaņu vai citu iezīmju, kas liecinātu par jaunā attīstības posma rašanos krievvalodīgo kopienas atmiņā. Var konstatēt, ka krievvalodīgo kopienas kolektīvā atmiņa liecina par ilgstošas tagadnes esamību – situācija pēc 1991. gada vēl joprojām ir kopienas politiskās rīcības dominējošais fons. Šajā situācijā valsts etnopolitikas nedaudzās izmaiņas kopš referenduma par Pilsonības likuma izmaiņām nav ietekmējušas kopienas rīcības pamatu. Kopienas pašizolācija smeļas saturu pašreizējā politiskās aktivitātes deficītā.

Tomēr paralēli saspīlējuma konstatācijai Latvijas krievvalodīgo kopienā ir potenciāls simbolisko saspīlējumu mazināt. Likumdošanas izmaiņas, sabiedrisko attiecību kampaņas par naturalizācijas priekšrocībām vai t. s. krievu partiju veidošanās un to panākumi var vai nu ļoti maz veicināt kolektīvās atmiņas atbrīvošanos no pašizolācijas tendencēm, vai arī – kā gadījumā ar t. s. etnisko balsošanu – šķietami plašākā politiskā līdzdalība var tikai pastiprināt etnisko pašizolāciju.

Pamatojoties uz krievvalodīgo kopienas kolektīvās atmiņas satura analīzi, var sniegt rekomendācijas kolektīvās atmiņas transformācijai, kam var sekot arī izmaiņas kopienas politiskajā rīcībā. Pēc autoru domām, lai uzlabotu situāciju, ir nepieciešams:

1) iekļauties kopējā Latvijas politiskajā komunikācijā un sabiedrības prioritāšu izstrādāšanā,
2) veidot kvalitatīvu kultūrpolitiku, kas rada priekšnoteikumus etniskās kultūras attīstībai kā Latvijas pilsoniskās sabiedrības neatņemamam elementam,
3) aktivizēt politisko līdzdalību un politisko spēku pieaugošo dažādību,
4) palielināt pilsonisko darbību un uzlabot tās kvalitāti.

Tas veicinātu saturisku un finansiālu neatkarību no politisko spēku vai citu faktoru ietekmes. Ja minētie četri mehānismi, kas nepieciešami, lai notiktu kopienas iekļaušanās Latvijas sabiedrībā, tiks veiksmīgi īstenoti, tad tiks izveidoti priekšnoteikumi kopienas kā stabilas un rīcībspējīgas diasporas pastāvēšanai Latvijas sabiedrībā. Tādas kvalitatīvas izmaiņas stiprinās „diskursīvu imunitāti" pret iespējamiem politiskās ietekmēšanas mēģinājumiem un nodrošinās pozitīvā tēla veidošanu citu etnisko grupu vidū Latvijas sabiedrībā, kā arī mazinās etniskus stereotipus, popularizēs krievu kultūras pozitīvo tēlu Latvijā un normalizēs starpetnisko komunikāciju Latvijā.

Kopienas pašizolāciju var pārvarēt, ja kopienā izplatās kvalitatīvi jaunais kultūras atmiņas saturs, atšķirīgā informācija, mērķi, prioritātes un pilsoniskās līdzdalības formas. Kultūras atmiņas saturs ir „modificējams" ja:

1) tiks formulēta kopienas attīstības vīzija, kurā politiskās emancipācijas potenciāls var kļūt pievilcīgāks par pašizolāciju viktimizētas kopienas tagadnē; mazināsies izstumtās kopienas simbolu lietošana kopienas kultūrpolitikā un komunikācijas procesā. Šis process būs veiksmīgs tikai tad, ja tas veidosies kā abpusēja iekļaušanās politika un paredzēs arī latviešu politiskās elites attieksmju, pozīciju un Krievu kopienas tēla tematizēšanas principu maiņu, pozitīvā tēla iekļaušanu komunikācijā ar velētāju auditoriju;[79]
2) kopiena kļūs par Latvijas pilsoniskās sabiedrības pilnvērtīgu elementu, tematizēs savā darbībā arī tādus diskursus, kas veido vispārēju Latvijas sabiedrības stratēģisko attīstību (cilvēktiesības kā visas sabiedrības un visu etnisko kopienu vērtība, nevis stigmatizētas krievvalodīgo kopienas ekskluzīvais ideoloģiskais īpašums un opozīcija latviešu politiskās elites etnopolitikai);
3) politiskā elite un Latvijas plašsaziņas līdzekļi atbalstīs jauno starpetnisko attiecību diskursa valodu, veidojot politkorektāku valodu un izvairoties no tādiem jēdzieniem, kas var turpināt attīstīt etniskus stereotipus.

Summary

Russians living in Latvia are in search of their identity and their cultural memory is being created at the moment, influenced by variety of factors and influences. Basic elements of diaspora`s cultural memory are ethnic identity, collective values and idejas shared by the majority of the group. Contemporary Russians feel double influence and pressure – two cultures – Russian and Latvian play an important role in creating modern Russian identity in Latvia. Authors would disagree with common idea of assimilation of Russian population. It is rather transfer of cultural values and priorities of Latvian ethnic identity that influences Russians in Latvia. Latvian values add to the traditional Russian identity and give meaning to current position of Russian speaking population in Latvia, their political and economic status. New values and priorities do not create an substitution or suppress traditional values, but open new dimensions of Russian identity and create what can be defined as sub – ethnic group – a unique phenomenon in Latvian society.

Transition of cultural memory and new elements of identity do not exist without political mythology and rhetoric. New Russian identity has got its own myths, that reflect tragedies and victories, ups and downs in contemporary Latvian political history. Mainly political myths reflect a rather short period of time and for Russians in Latvia it is the period of post War Soviet Latvia. The regained independence of Latvia was accepted by the Russian diaspora and stimulated different scenaria of re- defining Russian community in transformed Latvian society. These scenaria include acceptance of minority status and active *civil participation (naturalization, political parties etc.), but also political indifference and escapism in past memoirs on Soviet regime. Russian NGOs in Latvia reflect the whole spectrum of political tendencies and values in contemporary Russian speaking society in Latvia. Russian identity in Latvia is not homogenous and is highly influenced by the state of affairs in Russian Federation.*

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[20] Simptomātiski ir tas, ka uz pētījuma "Latvija: ceļā uz demokrātiju 1987.–2003." vāka ir liela formāta melnbalta fotogrāfija ar skolēna vecuma bērniem, kuriem uz jakas un galvas ir uzraksts "alien". Ikonoloģiskās interpretācijas ietvaros šī bilde būtu traktējama kā autoru priekšstats par kopienas stāvokli kā demokratizācijas rezultātu laikā no 1987. līdz 2003. gadam. Paralēli pretrunā ar šo vīziju ir Latvijas ārpolitikas ekspertu un politiskās elites iesniegto rakstu saturs. Iespējams, ka pētījuma provocējošais vizuālais vēstījums ir diskursivitātes attīstības priekšnoteikums etnopolitikas analīzē, kas līdz šim attīstās dažādu etnisko kopienu telpās.

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Ministri un to nozīme lēmumu pieņemšanā LR Ministru kabinetā

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Politikas zinātnes literatūrā lēmumu pieņemšanas problēmai Ministru kabinetā (MK) nav veltīta liela uzmanība. Plašāku popularitāti līdz šim ir ieguvusi 1993. gadā publicētā Žana Blondēla un Ferdinanda Millera-Romela grāmata "Governing Together", kas veltīta sistemātiskai Rietumvalstu MK darbības izpētei. Protams, ka bez šīs grāmatas ir atrodami arī dažādi raksti, kas veltīti dotajai problemātikai. Arī šajā rakstā par teorētisko bāzi galvenokārt tiks izmantota Blondēla un Ferdinanda Millera-Rommela atziņas. Latvijā, līdzīgi kā citās Centrāleiropas un Austrumeiropas valstīs, ir izveidojusies un nostiprinājusies parlamentārā sistēma un parlamentārā pārvalde, un izpildvaras kolektīvais un koleģiālais princips ir šīs sistēmas pamatā.

Blondēls [3, 8] uzsver, ka Centrāleiropā un Austrumeiropā MK ir lielāki nekā Rietumeiropā. Tas nedod iespēju pilnībā iesaistīties visu diskutējamo jautājumu būtībā. Sociālo un ekonomisko strukturālo pārkārtojumu nepieciešamība nosaka, ka kabinetā tiek diskutēti daudzi fundamentāli jautājumi. MK parasti darbojas 15–20 ministri. Kabineta lielums bieži vien ir atkarīgs no tā, cik liela ir koalīcija, kas veido valdību un sadala ministru posteņus. Reizēm atkarībā no valstī nozīmīgām problēmām tiek veidotas atsevišķas ministrijas, kas gala rezultātā apgrūtina diskusijas kabinetā. Nozaru ministri ne vienmēr ir spējīgi iedziļināties visos jautājumos, kaut gan ir jārisina fundamentāli ekonomiski un valstiski jautājumi. Jaunās valdības no iepriekšējā režīma saņēmušas smagu sociālo, ekonomisko un finansiālo mantojumu, kuru nav iespējams atrisināt dažos gados.

Pirms lēmuma iesniegšanas MK lēmuma pieņemšanā procesā piedalās daudzi politiskie aktieri – birokrātija, interešu grupas, politiskās partijas. Līdz ar jautājuma nonākšanu MK diskusijā iesaistās konkrētās nozares ministrs, kā arī citi ministri. Taču problēmas apspriešanā jāuzsver finanšu ministra īpašā nozīme – neviens cits ministrs nav tik plaši iesaistīts kabineta lēmumu pieņemšanā ka finanšu ministrs. Šīs īpašās attiecības finanšu ministram ir ne tikai ar pārējiem kabineta locekļiem, bet arī ar premjerministru. Premjerministram attiecības ar pārējiem kabineta locekļiem ir tikai konkrētā nozarē, kuru pārvalda ministrs, bet finanšu ministra gadījumā attiecības veidojas pilnīgi visās nozarēs, t. i., finanšu ministrs līdzīgi premjerministram „spēlē pa visu laukumu". MK kā koleģiālas institūcijas darbības pamatā ir pieņēmums, ka visi valdības ministri ir līdzīgi un vienādā mērā piedalās tā darbā – kā kolektīva formālā lēmumu pieņemšanas institūcija. Analizējot ministra funkcijas, ir jāņem vērā vairāki pienākumi, kurus pilda konkrētais indivīds kā ministrs, un dažādu faktoru ietekme. Protams, ka realitāte ir ļoti dažāda. Parasti praksē ministri ļoti atšķirīgi savā kabineta darbībā. Kaut arī formāli ministri ir vienlīdzīgi, tomēr jāatzīmē ministru dažādais stāvoklis, jo viņi vienlaikus pilda divus svarīgus uzdevumus – viņi ir gan attiecīgo ministriju vadītāji (izņemot ministrus bez portfeļa), virza ministriju sagatavotos jautājumus un aizstāv savas konkrētās ministrijas intereses, gan arī vienlaikus piedalās MK jautājumu risināšanā kopumā, t. i., piedalās diskusijās un pieņem lēmumus, kas ir ārpus konkrētās ministrijas jautājumu loka. Blondēls uzsver, ka ministrijas un kabineta aktivitātes ir atšķirīgas, t.i. tās ir daļa no ministra darba, nozīmīgas un papildus (Blondel 1993: 182). Šī raksta uzdevums ir noskaidrot kā katrs ministrs individuāli darbojas uzticētās kompetences ietvaros, pildot šos sarežģītos un atšķirīgos uzdevumus un izprot savu lomu lēmumu pieņemšanā. Ministru dažādā loma lēmumu pieņemšanā ir atkarīga arī no konkrētās ministrijas, tā piemēram, it īpaši būtu izdalāma finansu ministra loma. Finansu ministra īpašo lomu MK dzīvē nosaka tas apstāklis, ka viņš līdzīgi kā Ministru prezidents (MP) ir kontaktā ar katru atsevišķo ministru, jo nākas kopīgi risināt ministrijas budžeta un nozares attīstības jautājumus.[1]

Šajā rakstā uzmanība tiks pievērsta šādiem aspektiem: kādā mērā ministri iesaistījās MK darbā, kādi faktori noteica ministru darbību, kādas iemaņas bija nepieciešamas u. c.

Ministru iesaistīšanās MK darbā

Pētnieki cenšas analizēt un klasificēt ministru pienākumus. Piemēram, Blondēls (1993) atzīmē divus veidus, kā ministrs var iekļauties MK darbā – gan kā konkrētās ministrijas vadītājs, kas cīnās par tās interesēm, gan arī kā "daudzcīņnieks", kas gatavs piedalīties diskusijās, kuras skar citu ministru izvirzītos jautājumus. Pirmajā gadījumā ministra līdzdalība aprobežojas tika ar cīņu par savas konkrētās ministrijas jautājumiem. Otrajā gadījumā ministrs pilnā mērā piedalās MK lēmumu pieņemšanas procesā un ir iesaistīts kolektīvajā lēmumu pieņemšanā, kas pēc būtības atbilst ministra pienākumam. Blondēls izdala divus ministru tipus: "departamentālisti" un "daudzcīņnieki". Gadījumos, kad lēmumi tiek pieņemti kolektīvi, ministriem patiesībā nākas būt "daudzcīņniekiem", t. i., piedalīties diskusijās par savu ministriju tematiku, kurā viņi lielākā vai mazākā mērā ir eksperti, kā arī lemt par jautājumiem, kas skar citas ministrijas. Tomēr arī šādās situācijās ne visi ministri vienmēr iesaistās kabineta diskusijās. Tas var būt atkarīgs no ministra profesionālās pieredzes, darbības ilguma ministra postenī (vai ministrs ilgstoši ir bijis vienas valdības ministrs vai arī darbojies vairākās valdībās). Šajā pētījumā galvenokārt runa ir par ministriem, kas darbojušies ne vairāk kā trijās valdībās. Tomēr jāatzīmē, ka tika intervēti arī ministri, kas bija darbojušies piecās un pat sešās valdībās. Vairāk nekā puse aptaujāto ministru (23) varēja salīdzināt darbu divos MK, un savukārt gandrīz ceturtā daļa (11) varēja salīdzināt darbu trīs kabinetos. Protams, ka ministri ar ilgāku valdības darba pieredzi biežāk iesaistījās kabineta diskusijās, kaut gan iepriekšējai valdības darba pieredzei nebija galvenā nozīme. Bieži vien pieredzējuši ministri, strādājot vairākās valdībās, daudzreiz uzstājās tāpēc, ka labāk zināja konkrētā jautājuma vēsturi – kad jautājuma risinājums prasīja vairākus gadus. Analizējot koalīcijas valdību sastāvus, novērojama likumsakarība, ka gandrīz visās koalīcijas valdībās ir galvenokārt tikai labēji orientētas politiskās partijas ar dažiem izņēmumiem, kad dažādu iemeslu dēļ atsevišķas labējās politiskās partijas netika pārstāvētās koalīcijas valdībās. Tāpēc, piemēram, Latvijas ceļš (LC) bija pārstāvēts visās 1993.–2002. g. koalīcijas valdībās. Līdzīga situācija vērojama TB/LNNK un Tautas partijas gadījumā. Šis tendences vērojamas 1. tabulas datos, kas liecina, ka līdz ar pieredzi pieaug ministru aktivitāte diskusijās.

1. tabula

Piedalīšanās kabineta diskusijās, %

Diskusijas	Ministru kabineti		
	Pirmais kabinets	Otrais kabinets	Trešais kabinets
Ļoti bieži	27,5	61,9	60,0
Bieži	55,0	33,3	40,0
Reti	17,0	4,8	---

Kā netiešu faktoru, kas var ietekmēt diskusijas un lēmumu pieņemšanas efektivitāti MK, ir jāatzīmē kabineta darbības ilgums. Parasti literatūrā kabineta darbības ilgumu atzīmē kā indikatoru, kas norāda uz kabineta efektivitāti un demokrātiskā režīma stabilitāti. Laiphārts uzsver, ka īstermiņa kabineti tiek uzskatīti kā neefektīvi politikas veidotāji, jo nav pietiekama laika, lai attīstītu pamatotas un saskaņotas politikas, kā arī tiem nav pietiekamas varas, lai tās plaši īstenotu, jo notiek leģislatīvā iejaukšanās. [6,165]. Vienas Saeimas darbības laikā pēc neatkarības atjaunošanas ir darbojušies trīs MK, kas diezgan negatīvi ir ietekmējis politikas veidošanu un ieviešanu. Kā viens no šādiem neefektīvas politikas veidošanas un ieviešanas cēloņiem ir minamas biežās MK demisijas un jauna MK veidošana. Bieži vien jauno MK veido tās pašas politiskās partijas. Jaunas valdības veidošana parasti tiek uzticēta citai politiskai partijai ar jaunām prioritātēm un atšķirīgu ministru posteņu sadalījumu partiju starpā, iesaistot MK darbā jaunus ministrus. Tas savukārt prasa laiku, kas nepieciešams, lai pilnībā izprastu konkrētās ministrijas darbu. Laiks, lai iepazītos ar konkrētās ministrijas darbu, ir atkarīgs no politiķa iepriekšējās profesionālās pieredzes un politiskās pieredzes. Frogniers, pētot konfliktus vienpartijas un daudzpartiju koalīcijas valdībās, ir konstatējis, ka kabineti, kas darbojas ilgstoši, ir ne tikai efektīvāki, bet arī mazāk konfliktē [7, 48].

2. tabulas dati liecina, ka ministriem bieži nākas būt “daudzcīņniekiem”, kas iesaistās diskusijās par visiem MK sēdes darba kārtības jautājumiem. Blondēls un Malova, pētot Austrumeiropas un Centrāleiropas ministru kabinetu darbu un diskusijas, atzīmē, ka bieži vien ministru līdzdalība ir plaša, iespējams, emocionāla [5, 9]. Pētnieki atzīmē, ka Ministru kabinetos ir “hroniski debatētāji”, kas gatavi uzstāties par jebkuru jautājumi vai nu lai iebilstu, vai arī lai vienkārši apmierinātu nepārvaramu vēlēšanos uzstāties. Aptaujātie ministri līdzīgu tendenci bija novērojuši arī Latvijas MK darba praksē. Viņi gan uzsvēra, ka visbiežāk tie bija pieredzējušie ministri, kas labi pārzināja jautājuma vēsturi un kam bija vērā ņemamas zināšanas par konkrēto darba kārtības punktu. Tomēr intervijās tika arī minēts, ka reizēm kāds ministrs uzstājās debatēs tikai, lai izteiktos. Arī šīs tendences ir vērojamas 2. tabulas sniegtajā informācijā. Šajā sakarā jāuzsver, ka ministriju darbinieki dažādi bija sagatavojuši informāciju par darba kārtības jautājumiem. Ministrijas, kurās bija labāki resursi, šos jautājumus bija sagatavojušas labāk, un līdz ar to ministriem bija lielākas iespējas uzstāties debatēs.

2. tabula

Piedalīšanās diskusijās par jautājumiem, kas nav ministrijas kompetencē %

	Ministru kabineti		
diskusijas	Pirmais kabinets	Otrais kabinets	Trešais kabinets
Ļoti bieži	27,5	61,9	60,0
Bieži	55,0	33,3	40,0
Reti	17,0	4,8	---

Intervijās tika uzsvērts, ka zināmu ietekmi uz diskusiju raksturu atstāja MK kopējā darba atmosfēra, jo iesaistīšanās diskusijās nav atkarīga tikai no ministra individualitātes. MK atmosfēra var gan veicināt diskusijas, gan arī mazināt vēlmi uzstāties. Kabineta diskusijās bija vērojami arī konflikti, kad darba kārtības jautājums netika atrisināts un tika pārcelts uz citu reizi. 3. tabulā parādīti visvairāk izplatītie konfliktu risināšanas veidi un redzama tendence galvenokārt konfliktus risināt konsensa ceļā. Ļoti nozīmīgu jautājumu risināšanā talkā tiek aicināta koalīcijas padome, kad tiek pieņemts risinājums, kas apmierinātu koalīcijas valdībās iesaistītās partijas.

3. tabula

Konflikta risināšanas veids, %

	Ministru kabineti		
Konflikta risināšanas veids	Pirmais MK	Otrais MK	Trešais MK
Konsenss	51,3	47,6	45,5
Koalīcijas padome	23,1	42,9	54,5
Ministru prezidents izlemj	5,1	9,5	--
Kabineta komiteja	10,3	--	--
MP un ministra diskusija	2,6	--	--
Diskusija starp ministriem	7,7	--	--

Intervijas un 3. tabulas dati liecina, ka, darbojoties savā pirmajā kabinetā, ministri izmanto plašākus konflikta problēmu risināšanas veidus, kad jautājumi tiek vēlreiz skatīti kabineta komitejā vai arī tas tiek risināts starp Ministru prezidentu un attiecīgo ministru, vai arī ministri savā starpā vienojas. Pieredze rāda, ka, darbojoties otrajā un trešajā kabinetā, vairs netiek izmantotas diskusijas starp MP un ministru, starp ministriem un kabineta komiteju. Iegūtā ministra darba pieredze liek strīdīgo jautājumu risināšanu atstāt nevis uz MK sēdi un izvirzīt to vispārējai apspriešanai, bet gan censties tos risināt pirms MK sēdes, t. i., jau iepriekš tiekoties ar citiem ministriem, kuriem, iespējams, varētu būt iebildumi. Tādējādi jau iepriekš notiek zināma "kaulēšanās" par strīdīgo jautājumu risinājumu: iegūstot atbalstu no pārējiem ministriem, konkrētais atbildīgais ministrs var apsolīt savu atbalstu citam ministram aktuālo jautājumu risināšanā.

Tomēr 3. tabulas dati parāda arī kādu nevēlamu tendenci MK darbā – daudzi jautājumi tiek lemti koalīcijas padomes sēdēs. Tas apliecina faktu, ka MK netika diskutēti visi svarīgie jautājumi un lēmumi tika pieņemti ārpus MK, kad dažādas ekonomisko interešu grupas varēja izdarīt spiedienu. Uz šādu faktu intervijās norādīja arī ministri, kad viņiem nācās būt tikai izpildītājiem, nevis galīgajiem lēmējiem.

Ministriem darbojoties MK un lemjot savas ministrijas jautājumus, ļoti bieži nākas saskarties ar finanšu ministru. Šajā sakarā var atzīmēt, ka atsevišķas ministrijas vēlas saņemt un tērēt no budžeta vairāk līdzekļu nekā citas. Šeit ir pamats konfliktam, jo ministrija vēlas saņemt vairāk līdzekļus no budžeta, bet savukārt Finanūu ministrija cenšas pasargāt valsts budžetu no pieaugošajām izmaksām. Tas noved pie savstarpējām diskusijām un kaulēšanās. Blondēls uzsver, ka finanšu ministra ietekme ir saistīta ar iepriekšējo nodarbošanos un darbošanās ilgumu MK un ka viņa autoritāte balstās uz zināšanām un iepriekšējo plašo atpazīstamību sabiedrībā. Parasti finanšu ministriem bija specifiskas zināšanas par pārvaldāmo sfēru, kas neapšaubāmi veicina ministra autoritāti pārējo ministru vidū. Pārejas periodā no totalitārā režīma uz demokrātiju Centrāleiropas un Austrumeiropas valstīs bija ļoti aktuāli veikt ekonomiskās reformas, privatizāciju, pāriet no komandekonomikas uz brīvā tirgus ekonomiku. Tādēļ šajās valstīs tika izveidots nozīmīgais ekonomikas ministra postenis, kas arī zināmā mērā ir saistīts ar finanšu jautājumu risināšanu. Šo svarīgo jautājumu risināšanas nepieciešamība noteica to, ka līdzās finanšu ministriem arī ekonomikas ministrs tika atzīts par nozīmīgu personu. Šāda situācija var radīt zināmu konfliktu starp finanšu un ekonomikas ministru.

Tika norādīts, ka finanšu ministra amata svarīgumu nosaka „ministra būtība" un „oficiālais postenis", kā arī tika atzīmēts ministra „statuss". Šie divi rādītāji pēc savas nozīmes ir diezgan tuvi un tāpēc dažreiz var tikt saprasti kā līdzīgi. "Ministra būtība" uzsver ministra kā personības raksturojumu, savukārt "oficiālais postenis" un "statuss" uzsver šī ministra pārvaldes sfēras nozīmi visu makroekonomisko un mikroekonomisko jautājumu risināšanā.

Nozaru ministriem bieži nācās konfliktēt ar finanšu ministru. Risinot konfliktus, tika izvēlētas dažādas stratēģijas: autoritārais ceļš – "griezties pie MP pēc palīdzības" – 14,3%, demokrātiskais – "cits" – 76,2%, vai arī jautājuma noņemšana no darba kārtības – 2,6%, kas liecina par ministra nespēju sagatavot un aizstāvēt savas nozares intereses. Kā liecina intervijas, ministri nelabprāt izvēlējās tieši izvirzīt jautājumu kabineta sēdē. Kopumā ministru vidū nebija plaši izplatīta prakse, kad ar konkrētu jautājumu griezās tieši kabineta sēdē, jo vispārpieņemtā lēmumu pieņemšanas prakse ir jautājuma iepriekšēja detalizēta apspriešana. Intervijās ministri nelabprāt izvēlas konfliktu ar finanšu ministru risināt tieši kabineta sēdē, jo nav prognozējama pārējo ministru attieksme un risināmā jautājuma finansiālo izmaksu ietekme uz citu ministriju darbību. Tieša jautājuma izvirzīšana kabineta sēdē liecina par jautājuma nesagatavotību, kas savukārt var iespaidot pārējo viedokli par ministru kā vāju personību un vadītāju. Kā redzams, šādu stratēģiju izvēlējās tikai daži. Stratēģijā "cits" konflikta risināšanas ceļš bija jautājuma individuāls risinājums, to pārrunājot ar finanšu ministru un citiem ministriem. Autoritārais konflikta risināšanas ceļš ir saistīts ar premjerministra varu un ietekmi kabinetā, tā darba kārtības jautājumu noteikšanā, kā arī ar sfērām, kurās viņš tiek uzskatīts par visietekmīgāko. Praksē bieži MP tiek iesaistīts ārlietās un ekonomisko jautājumu risināšanā [8, 226]. Ministri savās atbildēs norādīja, ka MP visvairāk ir iesaistīts „vispārējā valdības darba organizācijā" un "ekonomiskajos jautājumos".

Tātad, ņemot vērā MP intereses un ietekmi jautājumu risināšanā, viņš var palīdzēt atrisināt konfliktu starp valdības ministriem. Tomēr šis konflikta risināšanas ceļš ir atkarīgs no MP pozīcijas kabinetā. MP vara un efektivitāte variē, piemēram, Baltijas valstu premjerministrus vairāk varētu raksturot kā "pirmais starp līdzīgiem". Protams, ne visiem premjerministriem ir šādas tiesības un reāla kontrole pār kabineta darba kārtību, kas zināmā mērā ir atkarīga no Konstitūcijā noteiktajām pilnvarām un MP personības. Koalīcijas valdībās, ja Konstitūcijā nav noteikta stingra MP pozīcija, it īpaši izceļas premjerministra kā vidutāja loma starp koalīcijas partneriem, līdz ar to viņš nedrīkst atļauties pārāk atbalstīt atsevišķu nozaru ministrus pat tad, ja tie ir no viņa pārstāvētās partijas, jo tas var ietekmēt koalīcijas stabilitāti. Turklāt jāatzīmē premjerministra un finanšu ministra specifiskās savstarpējās attiecības, jo finanšu ministrs līdzīgi premjerministram „spēlē pa visu laukumu", šajā sakarā finanšu ministrs reizēm tiek saukts par „otro premjerministru".

Ministra personiskās pieredzes ietekme

Intervijās ministri atzīmēja dažādas zināšanas un iemaņas, kas apgūtas iepriekšējā politiskajā un biznesa pieredzē. Kaut gan tajā pašā laikā ministri minēja, ka ir grūti izdalīt, tieši kura pieredze (iemaņas vai zināšanas) ir noderīgākā un palīdz veikt ministra darba pienākumus. Pēc iepriekšējās pieredzes ministrus var iedalīt vairākās "darba" grupās: eksperti, menedžeri un politiķi. Starp visnozīmīgākajām personiskajām pieredzēm var izdalīt šadas: iepriekšējās zināšanas par nozares darba būtību – 80,0%, indivīda kā administratora tehniskās spējas vai zināšanas – 15,0%, MP pieredze – 2,5%, parlamentārā pieredze – 2,5%. Latvijas gadījumā vistipiskākais ministrs ir eksperts, kam ir iepriekšējās zināšanas par uzticēto nozari (to uzsvēra 80% aptaujāto ministru). Ministrs menedžeris, kā arī ministrs politiķis ir vērojams tikai 2,5% gadījumu. Ministra iepriekšējā politiskā pieredze ir iedalāma: politiskā funkcija – 67,5%, pašvaldības loceklis – 35,0%, parlamenta deputāts – 77,0%, parlamentārais sekretārs – 10,5%.

Tomēr šāds iedalījums zināmā mērā ir nosacīts, jo parasti ministrs eksperts ir kādas politiskās partijas biedrs vai arī ieņem nozīmīgu posteni politiskajā partijā pirms izvirzīšanas ministra darbam. Daudzi ministri pirms norīkošanas bija Saeimas deputāti. Līdzīga diskusija izraisās par ministra eksperta un ministra menedžera savstarpējām attiecībām.

Secinājumi

Darbojoties kolektīvajā un koleģiālajā lēmumu pieņemšanas institūcijā – MK –, ministri veic divējādu funkciju. Viņi ir gan savas nozares vadītāji, gan arī iesaistās kolektīvajā lēmumu pieņemšanā – MK diskusijās un tādu lēmumu pieņemšanā, kas neattiecas uz viņu nozari. Pēc pētījuma datiem var secināt, ka valdībās pēc neatkarības atjaunošanas ministri galvenokārt ir bijuši aktīvisti, lemjot par savas nozares jautājumiem un aktīvi iesaistoties arī kolektīvajā lēmumu pieņemšanas procesā, nevis tikai formāli balsojot. Ministri aktīvi darbojas savas nozares interešu aizstāvēšanā, ļoti retos gadījumos noņem izvirzīto jautājumu no darba kārtības un ir ļoti neatlaidīgi pozitīva rezultāta sasniegšanā.

Pildot savus pienākumus, ministrs plaši izmanto iepriekš iegūtās zināšanas un iemaņas, īpaši eksperta zināšanas. Kopumā vērtējot MK darbu, ministri atzīst, ka MK ir vieta, kur galvenie jautājumi tiek diskutēti un pieņemti.

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Footnotes

[1] Dati par ministru nozīmi Ministru kabineta lēmumu pieņemšanas procesā tika iegūti, tieši intervējot 40 ministrus, kuri bija strādājuši Latvijas Republikas Ministru kabinetā laika periodā no 1993. līdz 2002. gadam. Interviju laiks bija 2004. gada janvāris–marts. Intervijas tika veiktas pētījuma "Cabinet Decision Making in Central and Eastern Europe" Žana Blondēla un Ferdinanda Millera-Romela vadībā. Pētījuma ietvaros tika veiktas 320 tiešās intervijas ar bijušajiem ministriem. Zināmā mērā respondentu atbildes nav pilnīgi drošas, jo ir pagājis noteikts laiks pēc ministra aktīvās darbības MK un cilvēka atmiņa ir selektīva, ir zināms subjektīvisms svarīgo notikumu uztverē, jāņem vērā konkrētā laika politisko spēku samērs u. c. Tomēr, neskatoties uz iepriekš minēto, pētījumā tika pieņemts, ka bijušo ministru atbildes atspoguļoja realitāti, attieksmes un kabineta locekļu uzvedību.

2. Europea Neighbourhood Policy: New Chance for Democratic Communities

pp. 218-231

The Prospects of 'Physical' Border-Spanning at the Neighbours of Europe (the Case of South Caucasus) and the Role of NATO in that Process

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The Southern Caucasus is a region of growing strategic importance. With the collapse of the USSR, new geopolitical conditions have profound security implications. In the republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the great powers have conflicting and even incompatible interests. The response of the Caucasian republics to these new demands, and their interests in NATO and its enlargement, are the focal points of this article.

The region has great importance due to its strategic location and its energy resources. Its strategic location between Russia and Iran and connecting Europe to Asia, as well as its energy resources has led to increased geopolitical attention to it. But it is due to those increased international interests that the region suffered and suffers most too, as we have witnessed sharpened polarization of regional politics and as a corollary to that further deterioration in the stability or prospects of stability in the South Caucasus.

Here we want to ask and answer questions like; 'what strategic role has NATO played during the past decade for the regional cooperation and integration, i.e. physical border-spanning?'; 'did NATO show any comprehensive or solid approach in its policy towards the South Caucasian republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia?'; 'what expectations have the South Caucasian states nurtured in relation to and from NATO when cooperating with the latter and it member states?' and 'what could NATO do further to make it possible at least the 'physical border spanning' in this region?'. We are not asking questions of cultural integration yet as we need to solve most prime questions such as peaceful co-existence and mutual toleration in the first place.

The three states of the South Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, are NATO partners. They became the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) members in 1992, joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994 and along with other partner countries, founded Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997. All of the above-mentioned republics signed the PfP Basic Document in 1994. In April of the same year in Belgium the Partnership Cooperation Cell was opened for the purpose of the implementation of the military part of PfP. Georgian, Azerbaijani, and Armenian Liaison Officers are currently working there. All those states are also currently working on their respective Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP).

Expectations from NATO

Azerbaijan together with Georgia has been actively cooperating with NATO and member states right as soon as the USSR collapsed, and during the mid 1990s that cooperation has been most active. Indeed not only in Azerbaijan but also in other former USSR states the role of NATO in general has been somewhat misperceived. From earlier statements of Azeri officials, it becomes clear how NATO could be perceived in such republics. Shortly after the first visit to the region of the NATO General Secretary Javier Solana in 1997 February, Azeri foreign minister Hasan Hasanov told Itar Tass that 'the issue of Azerbaijan's possible membership of *military blocs* is not being discussed *so far since the country wants to resolve all its problems by political means'*. [1] It is clear that as of 1997 NATO was viewed amongst Azeri elite circles as a military bloc and that if Azerbaijan decided to join NATO it would mean that Azerbaijan wanted to solve its conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh by military means and with the help of NATO.

After NATO's campaign in Kosovo in 1999 such a signal was sent to NATO by President Aliyev's foreign policy advisor Vafa Guluzade. Opening a session of NATO's consultative group council on Euro-Atlantic partnership, Guluzade said that 'Azerbaijan wants to join NATO as a full-fledged member'.[2] NATO did not express its attitude to such a proposal and until 2001 the Azeri leadership was more cautious in such statements. Yet, after 9/11, Aliyev affirmed his government's intention to join NATO. Amongst NATO members Turkey has supported this approach. In April 2003 at a meeting with the chairman of US-NATO Committee Bruce Jackson, President of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev reaffirmed his government's desire and goals to join NATO. [3]

Research shows that the Azeri society has been positively inclined to NATO. Thus, according to a report by Dr Tair Faradov in 2002/03 more than 60% of the questioned Azeris generally accept the idea of future membership of Azerbaijan in NATO structures.[4] Thus around 58% of the respondents replied that Azerbaijani-NATO collaboration would help to restore territorial integrity and resolve the regional conflicts [5] such as Nagorno-Karabakh.

Thus, what we have seen is not a pure desire to join NATO as part of European integration or as part of regional integration. Just the reverse has been the springboard for some of the leaders in the South Caucasus. 'Getting NATO to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue has been a major incentive for Azerbaijan' in its NATO aspirations. [6] The leadership of Azerbaijan has emphasized issues such as 'the Russian threat', Iranian fundamentalists' takeover possibilities, possible pipeline attack by Armenians, and international terrorism in order to receive the much expected western security guarantees. Nevertheless the core reason for Azeri-NATO cooperation for the Azeri side has been the restoration of its territorial integrity.

The conflict with Armenia for Karabakh began in 1988, when the Parliament of the autonomous region of Karabakh declared the independence of the region from Azerbaijan. Soon a full-scale war erupted, resulting in tens of thousands deaths as well as hundreds of thousands refugees on both sides[7]. Armenia won the war and a cease-fire was arranged in 1994. Until now, no political decision has been reached over the status of Karabkh.

Already in 1994, Aliyev had noted that ‘we hope that *our participation in NATO PfP program will allow us to* achieve in the future just peaceful settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, *liberate occupied Azerbaijani territories* and liquidate all the consequences of war. The high authority of NATO may become an important factor in ceasing this bloody war’.[8] As of that statement, paragraph 8 of PfP framework document must have inspired the Azeri leadership in nurturing hopes of NATO involvement in the conflict. That paragraph states that ‘NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceived a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security’.[9] The reference to consultations had been misinterpreted as something more (i.e. more active NATO involvement in partners’ security affairs).

In the Prague Summit in 2002, Aliyev forcefully endorsed his ideas of NATO activities in the region. ‘Any [NATO] regional initiatives and proposals must, in the first place, be aimed at the liquidation of consequences of wars and *restoration of internationally recognized borders* between states’.[10]

In 2003 the Azeri officials were trying to arouse NATO’s interests in solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In a meeting with NATO Secretary-General George Robertson, Azerbaijan’s parliamentary Speaker Myrtuz Alasgarov even called on NATO ‘not to remain inactive towards the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict’.[11] The logic behind those wishes is more or less clear. As a security analyst pointed out, by trying to make its forces correspond to NATO army standards, ‘Azerbaijan’s military would get stronger’ which as a by product may play a crucial role in ‘getting the lands from the Armenians’. By reforming its armies and making belligerent statements, Azeri leadership has tried to get NATO reaction too. ‘If Azerbaijan felt that NATO was on its side, then it might get involved in a war’.[12] So one of the purposes has been retaliation, something which NATO is doing everything to avoid.

There has been a contradictory element in Azerbaijan perceptions of NATO’s role. As we saw, Azerbaijan wanted to join NATO in order to solve the ethnic and border problem. It would be unthinkable to imagine a membership of Azerbaijan or, say Armenia, in NATO without first of all the solution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. ‘Failure to resolve Nagorno-Karabakh is against Azerbaijan’s membership in NATO… but that does not mean that Azeri leaders see no interconnection between NATO and Nagorno Karabakh’. [13]

One should not ignore the fact that NATO’s highest officials on various occasions noted that NATO would not get involved (which would be an *entrapment* of the alliance) in conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus in 2001, when meeting president Aliyev in Baku, George Robertson said that NATO ‘did not expect to be a peacemaker in the Karabakh conflict’. He added that ‘NATO would support any international settlement efforts and may take part in the peacekeeping after the conflict is settled… The Karabakh settlement primarily depends on parties of the conflict’.[14] The November 2005 the statements of the NATO General Secretary too make it clear that there has not been any change from NATO’s perspectives.

After those statements Azeri participation in PfP exercises became inconsistent. There is a widespread popular frustration or disappointment with the lack of progress in resolving the Nagorno-Karabkh conflict, particularly with NATO and their strategic ally Turkey for not doing more to support Azerbaijan.

So the policy of PfP which was initially designed by its architects as an alternative to membership (short of article 5 guarantees) was perceived by some of the South Caucasian leaders as a means of achieving full membership (ignoring the political nature of the alliance). On the other hand statements in NATO such as "all doors remain open", etc have raised the hopes of Azeri and Georgian leadership of a quick membership process.

Among the Caucasian republics, ***Georgia*** has been most actively cooperating with NATO. Geopolitically, as the gateway to the Caucasus and a key transit state in energy transportation projects, it has been important for NATO member states as well as for Russia. Georgia became a NACC (EAPC) member in 1992, signed the PfP Basic Document in 1994, joined the PARP process, contributed platoons to KFOR in 1999, and hosted several seminars, meetings, exercises. If in 1998 Georgia participated in 120 PfP activities, among them conferences, seminars, training meetings and multinational exercises, one year later, in 1999 it participated in 220 such activities, 15 of them multinational exercises.[15] Those activities culminated in two major PfP exercises held in Georgia in 2001.

In the second half of 1990s Georgian officials hinted that the country should join NATO. In 1999 the Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze said that if he were elected president in the 2000 elections, then by the end of 2005, "Georgia will be knocking on NATO door".[16] Georgia officially stated its wish to join NATO at the November summit of NATO in Prague in 2002.

Three main factors drove Georgia closer to NATO after its independence.

The *first and most imminent factor* as in the case of Azerbaijan has been the *border conflicts* in Georgia. Those were two intrastate conflicts. South Ossetia was an Autonomous region while Abkhazia was an Autonomous republic of the Soviet Republic of Georgia. In 1990 the Ossetians declared the Autonomous Republic as a Sovereign Republic which resulted in a conflict with Georgia. Later, in 1992, Abkhazia attempted to secede from Georgia. In 1993 a large-scale war occurred and with the help of Russians the Abkhazians prevailed. Although there was 45.7% Georgian population in Abkhazia, it was forced out during the conflict. Overall 300.000 people became refugees from South Ossetia and Abkhazia.[17]

Disappointed on the lack of movement in resolving those conflicts the Georgian leaders repeatedly have insisted that international community should take on a greater role. A NATO role in resolving the conflict has increasingly become a topic of discussion in Georgia. At the 'NATO Expansion Summit' in Madrid in 1997 Shevardnadze even broached the idea of introducing Ukrainian peacekeepers in private talks with his Ukrainian counterpart. Shevardnadze reportedly asked dispatching peacekeepers to Abkhazia as part of a NATO-sponsored peacekeeping force.[18] During his July 1997 visit to the USA, Shevardnadze made the subject of UN or NATO intervention a key part of his US agenda. US officials though advised him to pin his hopes on a UN sponsored effort to resolve the Abkhazian conflict.[19]

The *second factor* that contributed to Georgia's willingness to be more involved and eventually become member of NATO was the *threat from the north*. 'For Georgia NATO plays a definite role. It creates balance *against Russia*'.[20] Russia considers Georgia, first and foremost as a safety valve that, if under control, would allow Russia to prevent penetration of Turkey's political influence into the North Caucasus, as well as further to the East of Central Asia. Also, control over Georgia provides leverage for Russia to rule out any possibility of future NATO expansion from Turkey into the Caspian Basin. Additionally, a subdued Georgia would ease Russia's goal of obstructing the progress of the East-West corridor, as well as hindering the entrance into the Caspian Basin of Western corporate interests. Meanwhile, Turkey views Georgia, as well as the rest of the Caucasus, as a gateway to Azerbaijan and Central Asia.[21]

Georgia's relations with NATO have increased dramatically year by year. But at the same time the speed of that rapprorchement was proportionate to the speed at which relations with Russia worsened. It was only with great difficulties and western pressure that the Russians agreed to move out their military bases from Georgia. Russia has exploited the problem of Pankisi Gorge in the past to put pressure on the Georgians. It has also supported the Abkhazians and the Ossetians in their attempts to become independent of Georgia.

The third factor, which pushed Georgia to NATO and other institutions, was *value-driven.* NATO has been viewed as 'part of a package'[22] (NATO-EU and other international organizations). 'Georgia's aim is to integrate in all of the major institutions of the European and Euro-Atlantic communities'.[23] The values identified in the document 'Georgia and the world' are *independence, freedom (human rights, democracy, etc.), prosperity, peace*. Like in the case of Eastern European countries, Georgian leadership has partly considered NATO as an organization, the membership of which 'would ease Georgia's integration into Euro-Atlantic community… Georgia is and has been part of Europe and it would like to *go back* to Europe… Georgia is ready to live according to those European values (democracy, human rights, stability, integration, cooperation, etc.)… and NATO should be interested in exporting and expanding those values, the world would be much better if those values were spread through bigger area'.[24]

Clearly, since the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict may remain unresolved for a long time and provided the Georgian ethnic conflicts are resolved and the economy and democracy moves forward, Georgia would not be happy for not being included in Euro-Atlantic institutions, because the approach towards the South Caucasus is a unitary one. That's why Georgia, like Azerbaijan quite often have underscored their regional variety (South Caucasus, Black Sea region, the Caspian Basin). In spite of that NATO decision makers have emphasized the South Caucasian unitary context and even recently that was done by Robert Simmons, the special representative of NATO General Secretary in the South Caucasus and Central Asia in November 2005 too.[25]

Armenia is the only Caucasian republic which has been moving in the direction of European structures without ever expressing willingness to NATO membership. Its relations with NATO in the early stages of its independence were not developing as fast as those of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Year by year those relations improved. Yet two factors were determinant in those relations: (1) Armenia's relations with

Turkey, which has the second largest NATO army, and (2) Armenia's strategic cooperation with Russia.

Like Georgia and Azerbaijan, Armenia became a NACC member in 1992, joined the PfP in 1994 and along with other partner countries, founded EAPC in 1997. In signing this or that important NATO/partner document Armenia has always lagged behind Georgia and Azerbaijan and has been less active in cooperation generally. Thus, if Georgia and Azerbaijan joined the Planning and Review Process (PARP, a framework for advancing interoperability and increasing transparency among Members and Partners) in 1999, Armenia started that military aspect of its partnership only in 2002. And if Georgia had already held several NATO conferences and seminars as well as two major PfP exercises in its territory Armenia held its first ever military exercise with NATO partner and member countries only in June 2003 (Cooperative Best Effort, 2003). Armenian Parliament ratified the multilateral PfP Status of Forces Agreement (PfP SOFA) in early April 2004, while Georgian and Azeri legislative bodies had ratified that agreement in 1997 and 2000 respectively.

Armenian leaders of the 1990s showed a clear preference in terms of security, which was Russia, and because NATO aspirations would contradict that 'alliance', therefore Armenia did not show any enthusiasm in NATO programmes. Similarly, the Georgians and Azeris were thinking that strategic alliance with or aspirations to NATO membership are incompatible with similar cooperation with Russia. Therefore they got closer to the west and NATO particularly to the detriment of their relations with Russia. The idea of balancing orientation was not yet developed in the Caucasus, as each side was thinking of solving the conflicts as soon as possible with a clear support from outside.

Armenia's comparatively lukewarm relations with NATO should be explained by two important factors. One is the Armenian-Turkish relations, the other, greatly determined by the latter, is the Armenian-Russian strategic relations.

In late 19th and early 20th centuries Armenians witnessed a Genocide when 1.5 million Armenians were massacred by the Turkish authorities. [26] Turkey until now has not recognized that Genocide was committed in 1915, it does not open its border with Armenia, conditioning it with Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, does not establish diplomatic ties with Armenia. In 1993 there were talks of attacking Armenia in the Ozalist Turkey. The pan-Turkic element has been ever present in Turkey since 1860s until now. This has been a direct threat to the existence of Armenia. Armenia has divided the Turks from their '*natural borders with ethnic brothers*'.[27] It is rather interesting, though ominous, to note that with the cyclic and repetitive nature of history it is feared that if the Turks fail an EU entrance now, they would be more tempted to enforce themselves in the Caucasus and the Central Asia. 'Whether there will be Ozal-type of leaders depends on Europe'.[28] Let us not forget that it was the losing of Turkey's European territories, particularly the Balkans that Turkey at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century did everything to enforce itself in Asia Minor, thus getting rid of Christian minorities. Either Europe or Asia…

Turkish-Armenian relations history and presence have had determining influence on NATO-Armenian relations. On the one hand in order to guarantee its security against possible Turkish threats Armenia has strategically cooperated with Russia, which has been one of the rivals of the USA and allies in spreading influence, at least in the South Caucasus. So, not directly and without having an intention to counter NATO per se Armenia has been the main ally of Russia which ‘even does not discuss any of the former Soviet republics being strategically cooperating’ with the west.[29] But this was dictated by the security dilemma of the Caucasus. Armenia had no choice. Neither NATO nor any of the key allies could have any influence on Turkish decision-makers in softening or changing their policy in relation to Armenia. The USA particularly has tried hard in that direction, but so far without any ostensible success.

This fact of Turkey being a key ally and at the same time not changing its tough line towards Armenia has negatively affected the alliance’s image in Armenia.

Hence it is not accidental that Armenia became dependent on Russia and joined the CIS Collective Security Treaty for its security guarantees. Armenia also willingly accepted the presence of Russian military bases on its territory.

It is likely that the Russians have been exploiting the card of Turkish-Armenian relations history to even more enforce themselves in Armenia and bind the security of Armenia to Russia only. But it would be an over-exaggeration to say that ‘as the Russians are reimperializing the region in general they are using the Armenians’ and that Armenia is a prisoner of 1915’.[30]

NATO in the Region

It is not NATO that has interests, but rather the member states that jointly create a common military and security policy toward the East. [31] All decisions in NATO are made on the basis of consensus. But certain allies have been more involved than others in the region, and particularly in Azerbaijan, and the differences among them sometimes result in a solution which is not always optimal for every actor.

The United States and Turkey have given deep geoeconomic and geopolitical significance to the Caspian. Their common interests in developing the oil resources of the region and in safeguarding its transport across the Caucasus has rapidly escalated the geopolitical importance of the region for them, as some analysts acknowledge. [32]

The focus of American interests has been the 40 percent American-owned Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC), 34.1 percent shares of which belong to British Petroleum. American (Amoco, Exxon, UNOCAL, Conoco, Mobil, Pennzoil, Chevron, Amerada Hess) and other western oil companies which have contracts with Azerbaijan (British Petroleum (UK), Statoil (Norway), Deminex (Germany), Petrofina (Belgium), Elf Aquitane, Total (France), Turkish Petroleum (Turkey), Agip (Italy) underscore that energy diversification away from the Middle East has extreme importance for the energy security need of NATO allies, due to its ability to insulate Europe, as well as the US, from future oil shocks caused by instability in the Persian Gulf.

Nevertheless many think that it is not the oil which enhances the geopolitical importance of the region. In 2001 Terry Adams, the founding President of AIOC Consortium in Baku presented a briefing paper in Chatham House where he claims that ‘industry wisdom has placed Azeri-West Turkmen oil reserves in the range of 7–12 billion barrels, with a projected recoverable 20 billion barrels yet to find. The latter claim is now being questioned. Analysts and politicians in Washington agree that 'oil is not the crucial' factor in the region's importance to NATO members. 'If oil plays any role, then Russia would have more priority for us' as it has more oil. [33]

The question would then be: If energy security is not at stake in the Caspian for some NATO members, what is? The idea that the US and/or NATO could and should play a military role to 'replace' or at least to 'coexist with' Russia and 'guarantee the freedom' of the Central Asian (thus approaching the borders of Iran, Russia and China) and Caucasian countries from the 'Russian grip', would seem impractical, but it was a possibility in the late 1990s, which became more realistic after 9/11. Military involvement in Central Asia and the Caucasus would require significant numbers of ground troops. This would mean that the US people, Congress and NATO would have to be supportive, and that the stake would have to be high enough to justify the cost in terms of human lives and material. It would be a challenge for American Russophobes to create those stakes without the allure of the oil-rich myth. Oil is surely still important to US and NATO policy and is interconnected with members' geopolitical interests so much that a great confusion has been noticed in many analyses over the role and place of those interests. But energy became the 'means' of US and some NATO allies' strategy in the region. By late 1997, Washington began to see pipelines as the key to achieving its strategic goals in the Caspian region. *East-west pipelines linking Caspian oil and gas to Turkish ports and markets were seen as a way to support Turkish ambitions while also blocking Iranian influence and most importantly preventing Russia from re-asserting hegemony over the region.* [34] Thus, the conduct of the US could be better understood in terms of the *realpolitik* of international affairs: power, prestige and influence. Geopolitical pluralism has been about those three notions.

'Geopolitical pluralism' has been the US policy in relation to the region throughout the last decade. No state in the region should ever be 'allowed to dominate the region, politically or economically'. [35]

Indeed in addition to keeping geopolitical pluralism and hindering the region from falling under a complete Russian dependence NATO has followed other purposes as well. In addition to Russia, such a dominating player with less chances of success could be Iran. The creation of an 'Azerbaijan barrier' has been directed against *Iran's influence* and its encroachments in the Caspian Sea too. [36] As the 1998 US National Security Strategy says, 'The United States will not allow a *hostile power* to dominate any region of *critical importan*ce to our interests'. [37] In 1998 House of Representatives' Committee of International Relations hearings Federico Peňa, the Secretary of Energy affirmed that the region 'is both vital and important'. [38] Iran, though, has somewhat over-reacted to the western strategic involvement in the region for a number of reasons. First, there has been a split in NATO over Iran. The European members of NATO, especially the continental Europeans advocate an engagement policy with Iran rather than containment. 'The US is still pursuing a policy to isolate Iran. The Europeans are less concerned about Iran to the point to be galvanized to action. Again there is a lack of cohesiveness in NATO in terms of what kind of policy to adopt'[39] and a consensus would hardly be reached. Second, NATO has been on the border of Iran for decades (i.e. from Turkey) and this factor did not threaten Iran's security. Third, Iran only needs security on its northern border, since it 'is not expanding northward'.[40]

Another determining factor after 9/11 has been terrorism elimination issues. As weak states, Azerbaijan and Georgia had been areas of activity for the terrorists. US-NATO involvement in Azerbaijan and Georgia and the PfP programmes directed at strengthening civil-military ties, interoperability of partners and allies are partly directed at containing the reappearance of terrorist elements in those countries. NATO has not so far adopted a counter-terror clear policy toward the South Caucasus, although the US has been providing Azerbaijan with maritime security and other border control support. It is a 'fact that there had been terroristic activities in Azerbaijan and Georgia. And it is still a problem'.[41]

Nevertheless it would be very difficult to argue that NATO members showed any consensus in their approach to the South Caucasus. The differing interests of NATO members still remain unchanged and it is hard to get NATO as involved in the regional security as Azerbaijan and Georgia would like to see. Different levels of investment – both strategic and commercial – have created different national preferences. NATO members worry that the Alliance could be pulled into the region because of one member's interest. Denmark, the US and Italy have been key supporters of developing a regional focus for the PfP, whereby one or more NATO countries form stronger ties with certain PfP countries. Other allies, sceptical of such an arrangement, worry that this could lead certain states to secure a hegemonic position under the cover of the programme.[42]

The US has actively supported a strong role for Turkey, but the European states have not been as supportive. Half a million Kurds now live in Europe – mostly in Germany, which has been hesitant to back militarily-strong Turkey. European states have been worried that Turkey would draw NATO unexpectedly into the region's conflicts. As Graham Fuller pointed out, 'several NATO states, especially Germany, are concerned about the implication of potential 'new' NATO borders on such trouble spots as Azerbaijan, Georgia and Iraqi Kurdestan'. [43]

Speaking of NATO states' interests in the region, one should not ignore British interests. British interests though begin and end with oil. As 'a senior official' explained to Baroness Cox, the Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords, that Britain 'has oil interests in Azerbaijan'. [44]

According to Russian analysts ' in France Russia has a counterweight to US influence in the Caucasian affairs, although Paris is at the same time a serious rival to Moscow in the diplomacy for influence in the Caucasus'.[45] France has been a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk group, together with Russia and the USA. In spite of its oil companies presence in Azerbaijan, France has the largest Armenian diaspora in Europe (around 180.000–200.000) and has been supportive of Armenia. Despite the pressures from the US, France as well as Germany have been in touch with Iran and developed strong economic ties (in 1996, 1.6 billion dollars of commerce between Germany and Iran). [46]

Thus, there have been disagreements among NATO member states about the level of their involvement in the South Caucasus. Lacking a consensus about the region's importance, we have seen NATO involved in the region only in very limited spheres of security questions within the programme of PfP.

Recommended Policy

Surely there are still problems in the countries of the South Caucasus which still hinder those countries from integrating the western institutions and more particularly NATO. There are still powerful bureaucratic hindrances, bureaucracies which are against any changes within the countries, democratic evolution and reforms. Corruption is still rife in those three countries to a more or less extent.

As noted before the border ethnic conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan and S. Ossetia and Abkhazia bordering Georgia are probably the greatest of the hindrances to a faster integration of the region after which integration into the European structures could only become possible.

Nevertheless what NATO could do for somehow facilitating some progress in that integration when there is so much rivalry and potential threats in this region? The **first** most important thing is that NATO should keep its policy of not getting involved in the region's conflicts. NATO member states should beware not to be dragged into the regional conflict and then entangle the alliance after themselves into the conflicting areas. For example, Georgia has been willing of NATO participation in its conflicts resolution. Currently Georgia after successfully settling its problems with the autonomous region of Ajaria and getting an agreement of the Russians to move out its military bases is now more vigorously trying to solve its territorial integrity issues. Any green signs from powerful NATO countries have the potential of reactivating a war with more threatening results. Therefore NATO should encourage the Georgian and Azeri governments to refrain from embarking on a military solution of their respective conflicts as in wars all are potential losers. Although individual members of NATO have more interests in the region than the rest they should take into consideration the fact that by trying to use the NATO as a Trojan Horse into the South Caucasus thus trying to achieve their ends may result in a catastrophe of a world scale.

Secondly, despite IPAPs, NATO should make it clear to the region that it is viewed as one entity, and any improvement with one or the other of them can not be at the detriment of the other, as in NATO zero-sum game policies are not encouraged. Also, it must make it clear to the regional countries that as Washington Treaty shows, states with unspecified or unsolved borders can not become members of NATO. Only after such a solution is reached, those states may nurture hopes of joining the alliance. But that in itself can not be the basic requirement, as, **third**, NATO is first of all a political organization and it should encourage more and more the democratization of the region. Many in the region view it as purely a military bloc. It has indeed carried out and by IPAPs is in the process of establishing improved civil-military relations, of heightening the level of and depoliticizing armies. It is true; OSCE, EU and Council of Europe are greatly involved in the democratizing and conflict resolution issues in this region. But NATO should also be involved in such processes as it would not be contradictory to the named organizations' efforts. One thing is very much clear, that NATO has been highly appreciated by all the three states in the past, as it has been the most successful 20th century political bloc. Therefore more active NATO involvement short of Article 5 guarantees and in cooperation with the Russians will enhance the chances of regional peace.

Those democratized and demilitarized states would be less viable to terrorism and would be more inclined to peaceful coexistence and eventual regional and then European integration.

Fourth, as already noted, this process must be done in cooperation with the Russians. Nay efforts at isolating the Russians will not bring any successful results. Russians have very powerful military presence in the region, and it should be made clear that NATO does not want any involvement to the detriment of Russia. Despite the fact, that some NATO countries, such as Turkey, have carried out policies which made the Russian presence in the region even stronger, but a possible Turkish movement to the west will probably lessen its drive for joining Turkic brothers in Central Asia and the Caucasus, thus making the Caucasus a more peaceful and less threatened place to live in. Also Turkey's as NATO member's selective policy in establishing alliances in the South Caucasus by isolating Armenia are not helpful and even more, are very menacing. That enhances the alliance politics run up and even more militarization of the region.

Fifth, actively continue its policy of joint exercises or other undertakings, but with a very strict policy of three-partite participation. Otherwise, in the past Azeris rejected participation in such undertakings held in Armenia whether they were conferences, seminars or exercises, or Armenian officers get entrance rejection for participation in such events held in Azerbaijan. Such moves do not serve the purpose of establishing peaceful intentions and vice versa are often exploited by politicians to aggravate mutual hatred. Therefore any such steps by any of the parties should not be left unnoticed. Also for the regional cooperation it would be an excellent idea to establish some regional Defense or Military College after the example set by BALTDEFCOL. Would NATO support an establishment of such a college, say, in Tbilisi, where Armenian, Azeri and Georgian officers would together pass various courses in English, that would indeed enhance the respectability towards one another and indeed would heighten the chances of founding officers corpses in the vein of NATO. Otherwise, currently when Armenians are attending Russian and Greek Military Academies, and when Georgians are attending Turkish or German courses and Azeris attending Turkish and American Academies it merely delineates alliance orientations and does not help the purpose of establishing a more peaceful Caucasus.

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The Cross-Border Area of Good Neighbourhood – "Integrated Filter"in Securing the Borders

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"The attachment to the principle of intangibility of borders as a landmark element for the international law shall be marked by the need to overcome, within a framework of recomposing the relationships between states, in a way that shall not have the significance "without borders", but "beyond borders."

Michel Foucher

The phenomenon of legal migration and especially that of illegal migration has gradually taken over all Romania, reality that requires a new approach to the phenomenon and a new legislative framework. We are currently assisting to a harsh action of severing the administrative measures of surveillance and control of these phenomena, the fact which determines Romania to align itself to both the requirements and the standards imposed.[1]

These aspects are in Europe's focus of attention and on several occasions the necessity of cooperating and working together at a supra-national level has been outlined; however, we aim at approaching the phenomena in the so-called "operative" space constituted of legislative systems and different norms of each state as well as the aspect deriving from the different organization of the forces with responsibilities in the field, area in which we are of opinion that the greatest effort is made in counteracting the *migration* phenomenon.

The relationships of neighbourhood and good neighbourhood, as well as the cross-border relationships are among the oldest and most significant aspects vised by the international relations.

In our endeavours referring to the cross-border area of good neighbourhood as an important filter in fighting migration, we start from the certitude formed all along the research made, that the international law as well as within it, the cross-border relationships play an important role in providing for the securing of borders, the cross-border area representing the place where the relationships between states are manifested most poignantly, and the migration phenomenon alike, with all its negative effects.

The good neighbourhood involves the states into action, they maintain their attributes of sovereignty, the defining character concerning their identity, the modality of engaging themselves in the international relations; the states must therefore be aware of the wide spreading of the globalization and mondialization phenomena leading to the interdependence and rethinking of the new world order.

The European construction process, nevertheless, brings over an unknown practice in history, by the approaching between sovereign states up to the point in which there is raised into discussion the idea of suspending the borders.[2]

The borders, however, will not be abolished, they will continue to exist, even if the interior border controls shall be reduced and further on suppressed, at least in the European area of free movement (the Schengen area) in the European Union. Until the ceding of all prerogatives, that keep to the national sovereignty, towards a super-state body (this ceding implying the abolishing of one more part of what the attributes of the frontiers represent), approaching the framework within which the relationships at the common borders of two sates poses a particular importance. The states – the common border – in the European space build up their policies of securing the borders based on the *good neighbourhood concept*, they estimate that the relationships can be continuously improved, as relationships existing for a long time in their contact area – *the border.*

Taking into account the multiple implications of the *border* phenomenon a realistic and secure perspective would consist in creating the necessary conditions so that the borders should become areas of peacefulness and peaceful exchange of values. **Robert Schuman** referring to the future of European frontiers [borders] asserted that *they were born out of a respectable historical and ethnic evolution, by an effort of national unification and thus they cannot disappear under subjective impulses.* If in the past the border could be changed by conquests, violence of beneficial joining, now it would be possible to devaluing them by ignoring the significances they have for the human communities. It is in this direction the current efforts of spiritualizing or increasing the border transparency are headed to. So, the border phenomenon shall be maintained for a long time, even if it shall modify its contents and the manifestations. If in the past the border represented at times a survival problem, it began to become a factor involved in economic competition, in the ideological and cultural confrontations but also in the exchanges between the large populations.

The way **Michel Foucher** remarked, the attachment to the principle of intangibility of borders as a landmark element for the international law shall be marked by the need to overcome them within a framework of recomposing the relationships between states, *in a way that shall not have the significance ”without borders”, but “beyond borders”.* [3] One of the ways of achieving such a perspective is preserving the border trajectories as landmarks for overcoming them possibly by a multi-state re-grouping of the type of the European Community. The essential thing in this process consists in the effort of not letting the borders turn into “fronts”, in confrontation places.

The Romanian professor **Iftenie Pop**, referring to the cross-border area of neighbourhood, asserted that *the entire problem or rather the entire drama of international relations is comprised within the relationships with its neighbours.*

Anything can be said against the neighbours, except for the reciprocal indifference[4]. We can say that the practicing of relationships starts and ends up within the cross-border area.

After Romania's accession to the EU, Romania shall represent at its external border, an important segment (25% of the Eastern European border). At the same time, the European Union, in the relationships with its neighbours shall become the EU outer border and thus has the obligation to secure this segment, becoming an important filter in diminishing migration. Further on, in its evolution towards the European area of free movement, (the Schengen area) important changes in outlook, attitude and also in the structures in the field shall occur, while in the expression of the world order of the third millennium generally and the European one especially, the good neighbourhood in the cross-border area shall manifest itself much more actively and shall equal the strict representing of the norms of general international law and its basic principle, even if these shall be insufficient sometimes, in order to avoid conflicts and promote cooperation in the idea of achieving a filter of migration a more active counteracting of cross-border criminality in the area of the general competences of the state.

Out of the practice of securing borders there results that the main effort of securization is and shall remain as the main task of the states *the external limit of the European Union*, these being compelled to solve all the problems specific to migration (the asylum right, the right to work, stay and especially re-admission) with particular effects, sometimes in the economic, social and the security field whilst at the same time to stop the migration towards the centre of Europe.

We thus support the idea that the borders must not be abolished, as landmarks, they have to continue to mark the territory of the state, their sovereignty, but everything should be done in the context of securing the European external borders but also of ensuring the fundamental freedoms (the free movement) The states at the external limit of the European Union must achieve real *integrated filters* in front of migration and the cross-border area should turn into an *integrated filter*, a real one having the same aim – that of diminishing migration, fighting terrorism and the cross-border migration, the control and surveillance being performed in a much wider area, but not deprived of the area marking the state territory. Out of the practice of performing the surveillance and control of borders, there results that such a filter cannot retain generally, more than 50% of the migration (it is considered that a border can be called secure when it retains minimum 50%); we thus estimate that the setting up of integrated filters which should diminish the migration phenomenon to the centre of Europe is highly needed on much wider areas so that the free movement should not be disturbed (this is valid especially for the second and third filter).

Another instrument used in fighting migration is the regional authority in the international dimension, in which an active cross-border cooperation is taking place, with notable results[5] the success of the model being convincing enough for the states that have got out of the socialist camp to take it over, both crossing the ex-delineation East-West but also among themselves.

Regionalism by means of good neighbourhood is in the opinion of political and geo-political analysts, both an alternative and a viable solution in working out scenarios and strategies that ground the new security architecture on the European continent and why not of migration, having in mind the particularly important role of administrations in overcoming the confusion states at the border, in promoting certain links to the communities “beyond the borders”, leading to overcoming resentments, establishing direct links, so that what previously represented a “*front*” would turn into *relationship[connection, link]* certainly also in the field of cooperation for counteracting the migration phenomenon.

The most important role incurs on the Border Police, as being the exclusive competence structure, which is the core of the matter, the closest to the neighbours and the first one by which the communities establish contacts among themselves of all kinds; the border police, however, must be aware of the fact that it represents a force of ensuring the public order and that it has to make a united body with border institution of the neighbouring state in the fight against infractions, “*without borders*” and thus to place itself in the service of the citizen who needs this protection, in its relationships with the citizen of the neighbouring state but also with the migrant arrived in the cross-border area.

We might say that the border policeman must become an equal partner to the cross-border citizen, partner who ensures but also contributes to the development of cross-border relationships. In the future, the police forces which would make up this entity must necessarily be represented for the whole European area, reflecting the particular features of each country who has adhered to the EU, particular features at times sensitive to a common solution and thus it would not limit itself solely to the protection of the terrestrial and maritime borders at to the border control, to exercising the rights of the state in general, but also to extend the external control upon all subjects of mutual interest as well as upon the areas of competence. Any activity carried out in the context of competence might have its own institutional body, which besides the other EU bodies, could set up the European Border Police in the matter, under the influence of the federal model. The future in this respect holds a vision of the internal organization as well as geographic extension of the European space; a solution which we propose might be a *pyramid structure,* at the top of which, placed at the level of the European Council, there could have access initially both civilians and military coming from the police and gendarmeries of the member states, in the spirit of the latest community laws.

All these arguments enable us to approach the problems of the border by means of changing its role.

In the perspective of integration or after integration, Romania will have to proe that it is capable of efficiently controlling its borders, particularly the external borders of the EU; the basic rule is that the *principle of free movement no longer enters into force at the end of the ratification period,* but also when it is considered that the respective country is ready to apply all the provisions of the Schengen Convention (there is the need for instituting new rules of accessing the area of free movement. We believe that the actual Schengen area is easy to be overcome, by an evolution in a much faster rhythm of extension, but also by the will of states to integrate).

However, the border control and surveillance must be approached by all means in close connection to the right to free movement. The effective achieving of the free movement implies both a harmonization of the individual's interests with those of the society and compatibility between the internal regulations and the international ones in the field.

We appreciate that beyond the juridical dimension, the freedom of movement gains a wider significance – representing the real bridge between states, thus enabling each citizen to travel [move] freely abroad.

There is the tendency that certain states, among which is Romania as well, impose themselves, by internal regulations, restrictions related to the movement across the border, conditions at times imposed by certain European states to the extra-community citizens especially to those in the countries in the course of accession. These measures are as a rule regarded to be the "disguised" traffic of persons, the migration of the labour force and last but not least an improvement of the image of states by behaviour and attitude of its own citizens in the European space (the case of Romania in this field). Thus the states do not sufficiently analyse those responsible for the causes and effects produced in the space of the freedom of movement; they do not sufficiently put the responsibility on the European states with relation to the obligations each of them has in this respect.

We are of opinion that the cross-border cooperation can and must play a more active role in the field of international security of the so called non-conventional risks – the international terrorism, extending the instability generated by the inter-ethnic and religious conflicts, illegal migration and cross-border offence, which cannot be counteracted or fought against, except by means of international cooperation.

The cooperation is manifested on three grounds: *institutional, operational and technical*[6] and here the role of the border police is most significant in achieving the statute for integration within the inter-state organizations, the European Community inclusively, and also for applying the norms devolving from the good-neighbourhood principle.

As efficient policies in fighting migration, we appreciate that controlling the fluxes and the cooperation among the destination countries, the cross-border areas and the countries of origin, remain a priority in the field of migration's policies.

Romania, as a future member of the European Union, by the policies in the fields of migration and asylum, capitalized into the *national Strategy,* has started the process of implementing the mechanisms and ways of administering a global management of migration fluxes, at a regional, European and world level.

Conclusively, we can assert that the majority of the initiatives of administering migration could be found in the areas where the most significant efforts are made – the area of good neighbourhood – which is the area that marks the economic integration, administration of the migration fluxes, important component of deepening the commercial changes, of regionalization of the production activity and the transforming of the relationship between the state entity, represented by the structures having competences in fighting the migration, as well as the private ones.

There are more and more obvious attempts in the international law at codifying certain new concepts, necessary in the cooperation between states in the field of administration of migration, the fact that in the not too distant past seemed unconceivable, on the one hand because of the prerogatives of the states on the matter of border control and on the other hand, because of the important differences between the states, with regard to the needs and strategies of control of international migration.

On national level, the efforts regarding the regularization of the movement of persons fall within a complex strategy supervising the security, economic integration and transformation of the juridical support of the citizen, whereas on the world level, one talks more and more about a world governing of migration.

The proceedings and efforts made by Romania in this field are constantly and coherently aligned to the concepts, standards and good practices which the European Union has stipulated in the community *acquis.*

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Footnotes

[1] At the beginning of the 21-st century, one can notice that an inhabitant of the planet out of 35 is an international migrant. The total number was estimated to 175 million persons (2.9 of the world population), Europe with 56.1 million, Asia with 49.7 million and North America with 40.8 million. In Africa the migrant population sums up to 16.2 million, i.e. 2.1 of the total population of the continent, in Latin America and the Caribbean 5.6 million, 1.1 of the population Oceania – the

Pacific is situated on top of the list with 19.1, followed by North America 13.1 and Europe 7.7. – Closca, Ionel, Suceava Ion // *Treaty on Human Rights,* Europe Nova Publishing House, Bucharest 1955, p. 372.

[2] To be seen Horga, Ioan, *Constructie europeana [European construction],* Ed. Universitatii din Oradea, 1998, p. 107.

[3] Foucher, Michel, *Fronts et frontieres. Un tour du monde geopolitique*, // Ed. Fayard, Paris, 1991, p. 83.

[4] Pop, Iftene, *Vecinatate si buna vecinatate in dreptul international[Neighbourh ood and Good Neighbourhood in the International Law], //* Ed. Stiintifica si Enciclopedica, Bucuresti 1986, p. 37.

[5] Ever since 1934, N. Titulescu asserted: „From national through regional, to universal. This is Romania's word of order". To be seen N. Titulescu , *Politica externa a Romaniei [Romania's Foreign Policy], Fundatia Europeana Titulescu,// Ed. Enciclopedica Bucuresti,* 1994, p. 17.

[6] The *Frontiera* Review, publication of the General Police Inspectorate, No. 5/ 2001.

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Regional Cross-Border Cooperation and National Minorities in Border Regions − a Problem or an Opportunity?

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This article will discuss regional cross-border cooperation in ethnically diverse border regions. To assure relevance to actual cross-border cooperation issues within Europe, ethnically diverse shall be understood as border regions, which are residential areas of one or several national minorities. National minorities are understood as autochthonous minorities as in the definition in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe's Recommendation 1201 (1993) on an additional protocol on the rights of national minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights. This recommendation has never been adopted by the Council of Europe, but offers a suitable definition in this case. Here, the expression "national minority" refers to a group of persons who:[1]

- reside on the territory and are citizens of the specific state
- have longstanding, firm and lasting ties with that state
- have distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics
- are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number
- have a concern to preserve what constitutes their common identity

Cross-border cooperation is here understood as direct cooperation between regional authorities and private actors on different issues across an international border without the interference of the nation state and its foreign policy institutions. The most common form for this kind of cross-border cooperation in Europe is the so-called Euroregion. A euroregion does not have a specific framework, and euroregions can be very different in size, structure and competences. In general, a euroregion consists of several sub-national administrative units that have entered a cooperation agreement across an international border. The more advanced euroregions drive a cross-border secretariat and have an advisory cross-border assembly appointed by the members' representative assemblies.

National minorities – an asset to cross-border cooperation?

A common theoretical approach to cross-border cooperation within the EU is the idea that borders have negative consequences for border regions and their inhabitants. These are both economic and social. Periphery regions have difficulties to attract investments, jobs and higher educated people. At the social level, borders divide people and hinder them to come together because of visa regimes, lack of cross-border transportation, lack of border crossings or expensive communication costs. Nationalising processes since the 19th century have furthermore alienated border region populations. A metaphor to describe these phenomena is the characterizing of borders as 'scars of history': History has divided previously united cultural, social and economic landscapes into nation states, where development focussed on the national centres, while the peripheries suffered from lack of development, out-migration etc.[2] The existence of national minorities in border regions illustrates that borders can divide a people by separating previously united cultural landscapes. The presence of national minorities in border regions is a sign of ethnic diversity. It illustrates at the same time that the ideal of the nation state's congruency of nation and state is difficult to achieve in practice.

Today, discourses among politicians and researchers centre on terms like 'the end of the nation state', globalisation, a world economy and global culture. Increasing European integration can be quantified empirically and must be regarded as a fact. In the year 2000, Euroregions covered about all land and sea borders within Europe. Some euroregions have set up impressive cross-border institutions and networks. The European Union has supported regional cross-border cooperation through the Interreg-programme since 1991 and will continue to do so in the future. There also exist funds to support cross-border cooperation within the PHARE- and Tacis-programmes. Regional cross-border cooperation will thus become an increasingly important issue in European border regions.

Contrary to the 'old' EU-15, most border regions of the new member states are characterized by ethnic diversity. Very often national minorities live in border regions next to their kin-state. Thus we can ask the questions:

- Are national minorities to become an avantgarde to reunite landscapes by cross-border cooperation?
- Are national minorities preconditioned to be a decisive factor in cross-border cooperation because of their knowledge of their (neighbouring) kin state's culture, language and political system?

I will try to illustrate possible answers by telling two stories of cross-border cooperation in ethnically diverse European border regions, one within the EU-15 and one at the border between the EU-25 and a candidate country:

- Sønderjylland-Schleswig at the Danish-German land border on the Jutland peninsula
- Baranya-Baranja at the Croatian-Hungarian border (Osijek-Pécs)

Region Sønderjylland-Schleswig

The Danish-German border region has a common history within the former Duchy of Schleswig, which, as a territory, was divided only in 1920 after two referenda according to the principle of national self-determination. Voting was not unanimous, though: about 25 % of the voters north of the new border had voted for Germany, about 20 % of the voters south of the border had voted for Denmark. In consequence, a German national minority remained north of the border and a Danish one in the south. The minorities, in addition to a small Frisian minority without a kin-state, visualize the historic and present ethnic diversity within the border region. In history, no clear ethnic and cultural boundary could be recognized in the region after the Viking Age. Then the hitherto vast lands between the Eider River and the Schlei inlet were settled mostly from the south, leading to a meeting and intertwining of the populations. Since then what we today would call a cultural struggle between Danish and German can be ascertained, mainly visible through the shifting of the use of languages in the scarce, early sources. During national awakening, both a Danish and a German national movement laid claim on Schleswig for their nation state projects, using mainly legalistic and dynastic arguments to base their claim. Two Danish-German wars on the territory were fought in 1848-51 and 1864, resulting in a shift of ownership and (failing) policies of national homogenisation. In 1920, the question was settled by a division according to the principle of self-determination as in other contemporary European border regions.

Today, the minority settlement in the Danish-German border region is regarded as a ”European model”.[3] There is a principle of individual, national self-determination. Every resident of the border region may decide for her- or himself, whether they want to belong to a national minority and send their children to a minority school. The authorities are not allowed to check or question that decision. A border revision is no longer on the agenda of any serious politician. The minorities are an accepted part of civil society and enjoy positive discrimination with regard to political participation. Good minority – kin-state relations ensure the maintenance of a highly developed cultural autonomy with own schools and other cultural institutions. So actually the minorities are no longer threatened by a specific assimilation policy of their state of residence, but rather from within. Today, a voluntary, passive assimilation to the majority population can be seen widely, through mixed marriages, the influence of the electronic and printed media as well as social contacts with neighbours and specifically at work, which usually is in a majority surrounding. Additionally, a clear national identification is no longer popular among youths and middle-aged people, where a kind of double-identity is becoming the standard, while the old generation with their clear national identification is about to die out. At the same time, the majority population opens up for contacts to the minority by sending their children to minority schools out of ‘European’ (bilingual education, necessity when living in a border area) or merely material (possibility to have their children at a Danish university and eligible to student grants) motives. The principle of self-identification actually puts a veil on the sociological characteristics of the minorities: It is not possible to conduct research with scientific, empirical methods as there is no statistical data whatsoever on who is a minority member and who is not.

1945-1997: From alienation to cross-border cooperation

Even though the national minorities today seem to be an integrated part of civil society, historic research reveals that the minorities both as subject and as object have had a specific function with relation to the border and cross-border cooperation. The Danish-German border region actually underwent a rather continuous process of development since the end of World War II, where several levels of cross-border cooperation evolved over time. Prospects for successful future cross-border cooperation were not promising in 1945. At that time, the Danish-German border region can be characterized as alienated borderland according to the American border studies’ researcher Oscar Martinez’ dynamic four-step model on the development of cross-border regions from alienated borderlands, where cross-border contacts and exchange are almost non-existent because of the borders closure function, to integrated borderlands, which Martinez defines as border regions, where all political, economical and social barriers have been removed and the border regions' population has melted together.[4] Danish-German relations were at a low point. Five years of German occupation had caused some physical and severe psychological harm in Denmark, while Germany suffered from total defeat, destruction, refugees, famine and uncertain perspectives for the future. At the same time, a large popular movement in hitherto German South Schleswig demanded for the region to be unified with Denmark. The movement had support in parts of contemporary Danish politics as well as in influential parts of Denmark's population. Thus, after World War II the status quo of the Danish-German border region can be characterized by the following points:

- Separateness instead of integration
- Alienation instead of cooperation
- Border struggle instead of bridge building
- Cross-border activities exclusively on behalf of material and cultural support of the respective national minorities through their kin-state
- Kin-state support to a national minority across the border was regarded suspiciously by the majority population fearing separatism or a border revision

The open outburst of the East-West conflict and its consequences as the establishment of a democratic, West German state in 1949, her membership in NATO in 1955 as well as the beginning economic and political integration of Western Europe stabilized the situation at the Danish-German border. The overall situation at the Danish-German border during the 1950's was a return to normality, but not more. Here, it was actually Denmark setting the agenda. Danish politicians were well aware of the necessity to integrate West Germany into NATO and a West European system. They were also interested in finding a solution to the question of the Danish minority in South Schleswig. Attempts to enter into cross-border cooperation or integration were not on the political agenda, though. Denmark wanted to preserve the border's protective function, and there should be no treaties giving Germany the possibility to interfere in Danish domestic affairs. The latter resulted in the rather special way to guarantee the national minority rights through two similar, non-binding government declarations in 1955.[5]

By the mid 1950's, the situation at the Danish-German border can be characterized as normalised. According to Martinez' dynamic model, by 1955 the Danish-German border region had developed from an alienated borderland to a coexistent borderland: The border conflicts had been reduced, there were limited contacts and exchange, but no recognizable development towards cross-border integration. Hereby the Danish-German border region represented the contemporary "average situation" of border regions between sovereign states. Even though Denmark could not accede to the European Community immediately after the first application in 1961, cross-border contacts at the governmental and non-governmental level became more common from the 1960s. For some years, the Schleswig-Holstein government was enthusiastically involved in promoting German-Danish friendship, hoping for a bilateral agreement after the model of the German-French agreement which provided for generous support especially for youth exchange activities. Here, the Danish side was much more sceptical and reserved, though. There was no special interest to conclude a formal, bilateral friendship-treaty with Germany at that time. It was clearly visible, too, that the Danish popular interest for people-to-people meetings with Germans was much lower than vice versa.

In 1973 Denmark joined the EC. The Land government of Schleswig-Holstein, political parties, other social groups, and the German minority in North Schleswig were immediately pressing their Danish counterparts for increasing cross-border cooperation and establishing cross-border institutions, sometimes not very diplomatically. The Schleswig-Holstein government's action plan on cross-border cooperation in the beginning of the 1970's aimed to create an integrated, cross-border region comprising the three German border counties and the Danish county of Sønderjylland. The German advances on formal cross-border cooperation aiming at an integrated cross-border region met considerable reservations on all political levels in Denmark, though. The Danes declined to all propositions moving to an abolishment of the border and had general difficulties in seeing possible practical results in the, in their eyes, ideological German approach to cross border cooperation and refused institutionalisation as empty-handed principle. The main reason for Danish reservations was that the Danish Foreign Ministry still considered the national balance in the border region too sensitive to engage in an institutionalized cooperation with Germany or Schleswig-Holstein at that time.[6] Cross-border cooperation evolved very slowly in the 1970s, concentrated on loose informative contacts and a few cross-border issues that required cooperation.

This changed only, when the EC developed a new regional policy in the late 1980s. The prospect of obtaining financial support from Brussels led to a common action programme for cross-border cooperation of Schleswig-Holstein and Southern Jutland County presented in February 1988.[7] Only four projects of the programme, with a total volume of 3 million ECUs, that is 10% of the original amount envisaged, were accepted and funded under article 10 of the European Regional Development Fund. Nonetheless, Schleswig-Holstein and Southern Jutland continued to cooperate in the following European Community initiatives Interreg I-III. In spite of the Danish decline to enter institutionalised cross-border cooperation, the German side continued to propose more fixed frames for regional cross-border cooperation in the Danish-German border region. In the 1980's, the four administrative units of the border region consecutively joined the Association of European Border Regions; not as a single member, though, as the German side had preferred. Inspired by the Interreg-cooperation, Schleswig-Holstein's minister for European affairs, Gerd Walter, introduced plans to establish a Euroregion Schleswig at the first German-Danish borderland conference in Aabenraa in 1995. Flensburg mayor Olaf Cord Dielewicz became a fierce supporter of the plan stressing the historical dimension of the reunification of Schleswig. A joint Danish-German working group prepared an outline framework acceptable to politicians on both sides of the border following the typical Euroregion-model with a staffed regional office and a political council. When the plans were revealed to the public, a fierce public debate started on the Danish side of the border. People feared German interference and dominance and the loss of Danish sovereignty over Southern Jutland, should the plans be carried out. County mayor Kresten Philipsen was accused of running the Germans' errand and to have forgotten Southern Jutland's history. Cross-border integration was set as equal to cross-border annexation. The opponents of the plan stressed the necessity of a clear, marked and visible border between Germany and Denmark to assure good cooperation. In 1997, Region Sønderjylland-Schleswig nonetheless was established after the euroregion-model.

Altogether, the presence of national minorities and the history of a cultural struggle in the border region have rather been a barrier to the development of cross-border cooperation, at least until the 1980's. There was a wide-spread fear in Denmark, that the Germans had a hidden agenda in their attempts to develop cross-border cooperation, like a border revision or the quest for 'Lebensraum'. The German minority's positive attitude towards European integration was seen suspiciously. Historical experience strengthened fears of a hidden agenda, of German immigration, of annexationist plans and German dominance. Maintaining the national balance in the border region was important for Denmark, and there were fears that cross-border integration would lead to new national struggles. Within the minorities, the advocated idea of an integrated, cross-border region as well as increased cultural cooperation induced the fear of a possible loss of the specific minority identity, especially in the Danish minority in Germany. As individuals, minority members have profited from cross-border cooperation, though, because of their bilingual education and because they are bi-cultural. They are specially qualified in a regional labour market that increasingly operates across the border, and their opportunities for higher education are better, as they can choose between the German and the Danish university system.

Today, the level of cross-border cooperation in the Danish-German border region can be described as advanced cooperation. There have been regular cross-border cultural events since the 1950's, exchanges at the official level since the 1960's, regular political contacts since the 1970's, and the first Cross-border development plan was presented in 1988. The region has participated in the Interreg-programme since 1991, and was institutionalised as a Euroregion in 1997, with a cross-border secretariat and a cross-border assembly meeting twice a year. Since then, a wide range of cross-border networks and activities has been developed. Still, most activities depend on external financing, mainly through the Interreg-programme. Compared to West-European development, the region is a late-comer, but has reached an average contemporary level of regional cross-border cooperation within the "old" EU-15.

Baranya - Baranja

The border in the Hungarian-Croatian border region was drawn in 1920. It mostly follows the river Drava as a natural line and had already been an administrative boundary within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The ethnic diversity in the region is very high. There is a Hungarian minority in Croatia as well as a Croatian minority in Hungary. Here we have symmetry, although the Croatians in the Hungarian part of Baranya only amount to 1.13% of the population according to official data, whereas the Hungarians in north-east Croatian Baranja comprise between 10 and 50 % of the population. Besides, there are numerous other minorities living in the area. Germans and Roma are the largest minorities in Hungarian Baranya, while the other 10 registered minorities do not number more than 500 persons according to census data (Self-identification).[8]

The minorities' degree of formal organisation varies, as well as their degree of social integration. Roma's social integration is difficult both in Croatia and Hungary. Their level of education is considerably lower than average. In consequence, their unemployment rate and appearance on criminal statistics are higher. The Serbs' (re-)integration into Croatia is problematic because of the civil war in the early 1990's. Many Croats have left their homes after the reintegration of the north-eastern territories into Croatia and have not yet returned fearing repressions from their former neighbours. Both in Hungary and Croatia, the number of minority members has declined considerably in census data. These data are based on self-identification, so they do not necessarily reflect objective criteria, but still they indicate a trend to assimilation into the majority population. In general, it can be concluded that the different national minorities are participating rather actively in civil society and enjoy material support from public sources. There is a clear distinction, though, between socially integrated minorities (Hungarians, Croatians, Germans) and 'outcast'-minorities (Roma, Serbs). Minority-majority tensions are not visible with regard to integrated minorities. Minorities are not regarded with suspicion, agendas for border revisions do not seem to be existent.

The level of regional cross-border cooperation in the Hungarian-Croation border region is low. It is almost exclusively dominated by minority – kin-state relations, where the Hungarian minority in Croatia is cooperating with Hungary and the Croatian minority in Hungary is cooperating with Croatia. This kind of cooperation is based on the necessity to maintain dense cultural contact with the kin-state to ensure the survival of the minority's specific identity. Very little cross-cultural cooperation exists in the border region. There are loose contacts between local administrations though, which have existed since the 1970's and have resulted in limited exchange activity and some rather irregular cross-border cultural events. The Croatian and Hungarian minorities play a central role in cultural contacts because of their language competence. Cross-border cooperation between the majority populations is difficult because of a high language barrier characterized by an almost complete lack of knowledge of the neighbouring country's language and the lack of knowledge of a common foreign language usable for cross-border communication. Out of this reason, the municipality of Pécs actually has delegated all cultural cross-border cooperation initiatives to the Croatian minority and its cultural centre. In general, interest in regional cross-border cooperation within the administration and within the population is low, too. Actual, tangible, economic benefits are difficult to estimate for possible actors, although these are conscious about the border region's periphery position. Here, attention is focused on improvement of the border region's infrastructure rather than increased cultural cooperation. There is a low level of economic integration in the region. External financing for cross-border activities has not been available yet.

Conclusions

From these two stories we can learn that the level of cross-border cooperation in ethnically diverse border regions can be very different, and that it has both risks and opportunities. Opportunities are grounded in the existence of a bi-cultural population that might well fit into what the American border researcher Oscar Martinez defines as 'transnational borderlander', people who see an advantage in living in a border region and use all opportunities to live, shop, study or work on the other side of the border, in contrast to the majority of 'national borderlanders', who are not able or interested in looking for opportunities on the other side of the border.[9] Here, members of the national minorities as individuals profit from opportunities offered by cross-border cooperation activities. Research on cross-border cooperation also reveals that bilinguality and biculturality are preconditions for successful cross-border cooperation at an equal level.

Both cases show, though, that we have to be careful not to put too much emphasis on minorities as bearers of future regional cross-border cooperation. The presence of national minorities does not automatically lead to intensive cross-border cooperation. On the contrary, it might actually prevent the majority population from engaging in cooperation and instead focus on the importance of the border and its protective function. National minorities in ethnically diverse border regions can be connected to national irredenta, actual or supposed aims of border revision or other threats to the sovereignty of the nation state. This can be a barrier for the state-bearing majority population to engage in cross-border cooperation, as there may be fears of a hidden agenda behind advances to engage in cross-border cooperation coming forth from a national minority or a neighbouring country. There may also be a clear conflict of interests on cross-border cooperation. While national minorities predominantly are interested in good cultural relations to their kin-state, majorities are interested in tangible financial gains when engaging in cross-border cooperation.

These risks can be overcome by full integration of the national minorities into civil society, which I would call a necessary precondition for constructive minority-majority cross-border cooperation. It can also generally be ascertained that cross-border cooperation intensifies, when a financial incentive is given to the majority population to engage in it.

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Building a Crossborder Community? Expectations and Pursuits of the Polish-German Euroregions

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1. THE SCENE IN 1989

The quality of relations at the Polish-German border has long provided one of the most sensitive barometers to gauge the state of bilateral relations. It was in jointly inhabited provinces such as Pomerania or Posnania that harmonious relationships became most meaningful. Disproportionately affected by the often-difficult shared history, however, crises like great power conspiracies, assimilation policies or territorial disputes usually made themselves felt immediately in the minds of the border region residents.

In 1989 and 1990, the years of substantial political change in Central and Eastern Europe, Polish-German citizen relations were at a comparatively low point, with disobliging opinions prevailing in the borderlands most of all.[1] Largely due to insecurities over the border's finality, on the occasion of German unification, the Polish public felt much more apprehensive and fearful than any of Germany's western neighbours. Corresponding suspicions prevailed on the German side: when the border was opened for visa-free travel in 1991, the first Polish visitors to cross into the German border town Frankfurt (Oder) were greeted by stone-throwing right wing extremists. Hostility and distrust of the neighbour were deeply entrenched.

Such a verdict is unsurprising, as the previous forty years had been spent stifling any debate on the guilt incurred during and after the Second World War. The experience of Germany's ideologically motivated war of extinction and the cruel occupation period had produced an abhorrence of everything German in Poland. Moreover, Poland's consequential westward 'shift', the expulsions and forced resettlement of millions of Germans and Poles left open the question of whether the rivers Oder and Neisse would constitute the definitive Polish-German border until 1990.

Despite the fact that these historical burdens caused enormous resentment on both sides of the new border, they did not undergo any open debate during the Cold War and genuine attempts at reconciliation were kept off the agenda. Official contacts between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the

People's Republic of Poland were excellent, underpinned by the shared communist ideology. Antagonism was seething underneath the surface of cordial relations, however. The communist leadership gladly exploited Polish feelings of distrust and detestation towards Germans,[2] while the government of the GDR declared itself not responsible for German history before 1945. At the same time, a subtly anti-Polish stance could intermittently be detected among the echelons of the German communist leadership, especially on the subject of the Oder-Neisse border.[3]

The border was as a rule closed to citizen exchange and special restrictions applied: not everybody was allowed to settle in the border region, and residence went hand in hand with many interdictions and harassments.[4] An eight-year period of permeability followed the unexpected decision to open the border for visa-free travel on 1 January 1972. To a great extent, however, the ensuing citizen contacts took the shape of shopping expeditions that added to existing antipathies rather than reducing them. Overall, the politics of ideology prevented any critical review of the past comparable Western Europe, a fact that perpetuated the damage done to Polish-German citizen relations during and immediately after the Second World War.

2. EUROREGIONS AS COMMUNITY-BUILDING INSTRUMENTS

A normalisation of Polish-German relations became possible with the collapse of communism and the introduction of democratic political systems in Central and Eastern Europe. A new era of Polish-German relations was hailed, where a sincere dialogue as to the painful mutual past would be opened. The hope was that cordial relations would develop, not only between governments but also – at last – between citizens. The preamble of the Polish-German Treaty on Good Neighbourliness, as a prominent example, expresses the goal of realising "both peoples' long-held wish for lasting agreement and reconciliation".[5]

The border region in particular was singled out as the scene where such new citizen relations should materialise. The opening of the border and introduction of visa-free travel in April 1991 was crucial to this end. The logic read that the geographic proximity of the neighbouring country would allow citizens from both sides to engage freely with each other. Such personal contacts would help to explode distrust and prejudice, to be replaced by a sense of trust and affection. Ultimately, private and regular exchange across the border would become the norm rather than the exception. In this view, the border region would function as a bridge between Poland and Germany:[6] the borderlands would constitute the area where the two countries 'fade into' each other in the citizens' perception of the cultural and social landscape.

This line of reasoning was derived from the positive experience made in Franco-German or Dutch-German regions, where open borders had promoted free citizen exchange and contributed to the growth of greatly entwined and often bilingual crossborder communities. Indeed, Western Europe offered the Polish-German border region an institutional model for cooperation. This took the shape of so-called Euroregions, i.e. voluntary associations of border municipalities with the goal of promoting the economic and social well being of the border region residents. Long-established examples include the Dutch-German 'Euregio' or 'Euregio Maas-Rhein' between Dutch, Belgian and German municipalities.

Due to the pre-existing template for institutional design, the objectives of cooperation and their realisation, the Polish-German Euroregions were able to benefit from the long experience of their western counterparts when founded in the period from 1991 to 1995. Moreover, the legal and financial underpinnings of crossborder cooperation were already firmly in place at the European level. The Polish-German Euroregions Neisse-Nisa-Nysa, Spree-Neisse/Nysa-Bóbr, Pro Europa Viadrina and Pomerania[7] were, therefore, eligible almost immediately for EU financing of crossborder cooperation in the shape of Interreg and Phare CBC funds.

They set themselves the same two overarching tasks: firstly, they aim to promote the material development of the border region. Next to the primary goal of stimulating economic growth, development entails such aspects as infrastructure improvement, entrepreneurial crossborder cooperation and environmental consolidation. Secondly, crossborder initiatives are devoted to the promotion of good neighbourly relations, which takes the shape of stimulating trust between the citizens on both sides of the border. For example, the goals set out for Euroregion Spree-Neisse/Nysa-Bóbr stress partnership and mutual empathy:

International understanding, tolerance and reconciliation shall be furthered in order to extend a broad peaceful partnership on both sides of the border. The divisive effects of the border shall be reduced and joint crossborder potentials shall be made more utilisable.[8]

The Euroregions' action priorities are guided by the insight that material improvement and crossborder community-building are to a great extent reliant on each other. To take the example of Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina, the target of "boosting regional identity" envisages a stronger attachment of the Polish and German residents to the border region, not least in order to halt the declining demographic development.[9]

At the same time as promoting the growth of a crossborder community, Euroregions claim to function as 'laboratories of European integration', since the perforation of borders and bringing together of peoples constitute some of Europe's least contested normative underpinnings. For example, spanning the border triangle between Poland, Germany and the Czech Republic, Euroregion Neisse-Nisa-Nysa – though itself hesitant to romanticise the border region - is often regarded as a vehicle for communicating the virtues of European integration.[10] To be more precise, preparations for Poland's accession to the European Union on 1 May 2004 constituted a very tangible example of conveying this 'European idea'.

The EU primarily encourages the perforation of borders and rapprochement of citizens financially. Two different funds derived from the EU Community Initiative Interreg[11] mirror the twin goals of material development and construction of crossborder communities. So-called 'hard projects' that are concerned with the material development of the region are co-funded by the EU. Joint steering committees comprising Polish and German officials from all governmental levels administer them. Examples include very costly projects such as the erection of a wastewater treatment plant in the twin towns of Guben and Gubin or the construction of new border crossings in the shape of bridges.

Conversely, the Small Projects Fund is of particular importance to the promotion of good neighbourly relations and to the construction of a crossborder community. It subsidises cultural events and activities designed to stimulate daily cultural and leisurely contacts across the border. The medium-term objective of such people-to-people projects is the improvement of mutual perceptions through personal contacts. The Small Projects Fund is administered in the Euroregion bureaux themselves and offers up to 75% of funding to such diverse event as a workshop 'Jazz without Borders' in Euroregion Neisse-Nisa-Nysa or an 'Eco Youth Camp' in the Pomerania region. Although the fund constitutes only a small share of Interreg resources, the comparatively inexpensive nature of people-to-people projects allows for hundreds to be financed.

3. BARRIERS TO CITIZEN EXCHANGE

In response to innumerable such people-to-people projects, academic scholarship swiftly realised the social potential of crossborder cooperation, holding that contacts across the border would be crucial to overcome prejudice and build real crossborder communities. Thus, once initiated crossborder cooperation is expected to lead to the growth of a crossborder identity:[12] "Official policy on both sides emphasises the potential of the border region as a 'bridge between East and West'. The plans culminate in a vision of a tightly interwoven unitary region in which the border looses its divisive effect".[13] The West European experience above all raised hopes that the belated reconciliation at the Polish-German border would facilitate a greater normalcy of citizen exchange:

> The highly successful Dutch-German [crossborder cooperation] has not only brought economic development to the region, but has gone some way to "deepen" integration between the states, thereby breaking down the distrust between the two nations. The Polish-German relationship too could become crucial to the successful expansion of the EU, and CBC could become the means of building trust between the two countries as it meshes the formal with the multiplication of informal, socio-economic interaction.[14]

If characterisations of Dutch-German or Franco-German crossborder cooperation sometimes overstress the degree of integration achieved, strong normative inflictions downright clash with the realities at the Polish-German border. Empirical research on the Euroregions at the Polish-German border provides a mixed picture regarding what crossborder cooperation has achieved fifteen years after the launch of the first regional and municipal initiatives.

Some progress has been made. For example, disproportionately high levels of distrust of Germans recorded in Poland in the 1990s have since diminished considerably and given way to the possibility of reconciliation.[15] Cooperation among the expert coordinators is by now well established and, owing to the beneficial aspects of mutual neighbourship, some normalcy of daily citizen exchange has taken root, even where this exchange is entirely commercial.

At the same time, in comparison with the optimism of the 1990s, one can detect some disillusionment with the slowness of progress. Apprehension and prejudice are in some cases higher in the border region than elsewhere in Poland and Germany. The proximity of the neighbour does not render a majority of the border region residents more likely to actively engage in substantive crossborder activities. Contacts across the border are mostly related to the business-related or formal environment and the types of informal personal contacts necessary to the creation of social networks are still a long way off.[16] German residents of the region bordering Poland display a higher fear of crime and often are less likely than their countrymen from other parts of Germany to find their neighbours likeable. Especially on the German side, one can detect outright rejection of the neighbour, as manifested in the proliferation of right wing attitudes.[17]

As Scott argues, "border region policies have maintained an administrative, top-down and bureaucratic character that as yet has not sufficiently encouraged citizen action".[18] Even the benefits of the Small Projects Fund, however large generally, have been questioned in some cases. For instance, occasionally, the availability of funding has stimulated a hypocritical demand for neighbourly exchange rather than satisfying a genuine one. Considering the example of Euroregion Neisse-Nisa-Nysa, Krzysztof Kociubiński points out that the Polish interest in cooperation with Germans is not always reciprocated. Moreover, "Both the Polish and the German side develop their own borderland programmes, and then present them jointly as transfrontier ones".[19] Cooperation, though designed to stimulate citizen contacts, often misses the target group and reveals a gap between the regularised exchange between elites and the more sceptical and closed citizen frame of mind.

The question of perspective lies at the root of the discrepancy between the rhetoric of community-building and evaluations of lacking citizen engagement. As pointed out above, the Dutch-German example, where interaction and mutual interaction are more advanced is conjured up as an ideal in the discourse on the Polish-German border. However, the projection of a rose-tinted Western model to the more complex Central European case is simplistic, as it risks overlooking the fact that the Polish-German border constitutes a much harsher barrier to citizen exchange than anywhere in Western Europe. The obstacles are geographic, economic, linguistic and mental in nature.

The Oder-Neisse line constitutes a geographic barrier not to be underestimated. With Poland's accession to the EU and to the customs union in May 2004, the bottleneck situation for car traffic has been eliminated. Additionally, the fact that Poland is not yet part of the Schengen area with no internal passport controls pales in comparison with the straightforwardness of visa-free travel. But only where there are border crossings do citizens have the opportunity to cross freely into the neighbouring country. The number of bridges across the two rivers is still only a third of pre-war times, while the costly construction of new bridges requires dedication and rigorous joint planning efforts, which until today are largely absent.

The borderlands are an area in deep structural decline. Suffering from the peripheral location, investment is particularly low in rural areas; capital tends to skip the borderlands in order to do business in thriving big cities such as Poznań or Berlin.[20] As a result of the structural economic transformation, unemployment rates are disproportionately high. To make things worse, there is a huge welfare gap. On the Polish side, wages, tourist and other infrastructure development tend to be much lower than in the bordering German regions, even though Poland is slowly catching up. Contrarily, the German side suffers from population decline due to the fact that the youngest and brightest who have few employment prospects, migrate to the larger cities such as Berlin or to western parts of Germany.

In comparison to Western Europe, language competence, or lack of bilingualism, constitutes a major barrier. German as a second language is much more widespread on the Polish side than vice versa. While German and Polish youths increasingly make use of English as Europe's burgeoning lingua franca, most German border regions have been slow to respond to pressures for increasing Polish language instruction. The problem with this asymmetry lies not only in hindering communication. In the Polish perspective, German disinterest in the Polish language – prevalent even in areas just across the river – constitutes a sign of indifference if not dismissiveness.

Psychologically, even leaving aside the fact that West European border regions had a headstart of forty years, their foundation for building post-war mutual relations was of a higher quality than applicable to the Polish-German case in 1990. The sheer number of Polish victims of Germany's ruthless attempts at their extinction was disproportionately higher than anywhere in Western Europe, as was the bitterness caused in Poland. In addition, due to the post-war border changes and population movements, only the smallest percentage of border region inhabitants had had any experience with mutual neighbourship at all. Naturally evolved historical-cultural interlinkages, as one witnesses at the Franco-German border, are largely absent in the Polish-German case.

Over the decades under communist rule, there were not only no attempts at rebuilding such ties and fostering reconciliation. Certain policies had the effect, if not the intention, of fuelling resentment. On the subject of the eight-year period in which the border was open, for example, arguably the GDR leadership had been able to foresee the sell out of certain goods on the German side that produced a lot of anti-Polish sentiment.[21] Forty years of silencing people's concerns aggravated the animosity and entrenched it much more deeply in the psyche of those concerned. The for the most part sealed border symbolised those subtly unsympathetic relations, which not only perpetuated the damage done during the Second World War but also augmented it.

These manifold barriers generate much more challenging background conditions than prevailed in Western Europe when crossborder cooperation was initiated in Western Europe. The goal of creating a tightly interwoven crossborder community comparable to frequent citizen interactions across the Dutch-German or Franco-German border may provide some long-term vision to aspire to. In the short and medium term, however, it is unsuitable as a yardstick because the Polish-German border is disproportionately harsher than any of its West European counterparts. The simple comparison with West European citizen relations does not do justice to the cooperation efforts in the region because it belittles their achievements.

4. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DILEMMA

Euroregional crossborder cooperation drives the piecemeal reduction of that which divides Poles and Germans geographically, linguistically and mentally. Especially in the shape of cultural encounters and language instruction, a lot of valuable efforts are made through the people-to-people projects financed by the Small Projects Fund. There is general consensus that cooperation is most effective in the areas of culture and education: in comparison to economic interests such as negotiations over minimum wages or competition for jobs, which are of a zero-sum nature, popular or high culture is an uncontroversial area. Whereas entrepreneurial cooperation affects the inhabitants of a border region to a lesser extent, it holds the potential of stimulating interest in what the neighbouring country offers culturally. However, these activities are often geared towards the same type of clientele, namely multipliers such as teachers or members of dedicated clubs and networks, the young, and the culturally interested. As such, they are part of a group that is anyway more susceptible towards neighbourly exchange.

To illustrate this point, the Collegium Pontes 2004 found that there are three broad cognitive categories in the German border town Görlitz, namely (1) the citizens actively involved in exchange with neighbouring Zgorzelec, featuring a high degree of intercultural competence, (2) ‘detached’ citizens who seldom cross the border and are more sceptical of Polish-German integration, and (3) dismissive citizens who connect the Polish side with feelings of insecurity while maintaining a sense of German superiority.[22]

There is some recognition in the Euroregions that crossborder encounters and references to ‘the European idea’ per se are insufficient in order to reach the most obstinate. If the goal is to reach as wide an audience as possible, the attention must focus on the indifferent and uninformed. People-to-people projects increasingly seek to engage the group of detached citizens. Culture alone seems to constitute no vehicle that appeals to this group. It is necessary instead to take into account the diverse interests of potential target groups, material or otherwise.

In this context, however, the economic and developmental problems prevalent in the border region constitute a major hindrance to reaching this target group. In stark contrast to the occasional Euroregional “self-promotional rhetoric”,[23] some of the material hardships that the inhabitants of the Polish-German border region have to cope with leave little room for the widespread cultural and social activism that would be necessary to build a genuine crossborder community. To put it bluntly, a majority of the border region inhabitants have other worries than the development of good neighbourly relations. Such socio-economic problems are probably the obstacle that poses the greatest challenge to the building of a crossborder community.

> Disparities between both states are much larger than have ever been experienced between border regions in Western Europe … There are totally different problems compared to Western Euroregions. Income disparities are extreme between both sides of the border, as are disparities in infrastructure and access to subsidies.[24]

One major problem stems from the continued welfare gap between the Polish and the German side. In the absence of funds comparable to, for example, the German transfer payments to the former GDR, predictions hold that it will take decades to close this welfare gap. The superior power of the German economy has tended to cause Polish fears of economic domination or a sell out of land and estates in the border region. The rhetoric of ‘living in the heart of Europe’ rings hollow in the face of the fact that this heart is in deep economic crisis.

Moreover, material hardships are easily translated into competitiveness over scarce resources. For example, the transition periods for free Polish access to the German labour market that were negotiated by the German government before EU Enlargement bespeak fears that are prevalent in the border region. They are anxieties about migratory pressures and the incursion of foreign labour. Rightly or wrongly, the German border region residents are alarmed about Polish competition on the strained labour market, a fear that often leads to a rejection of neighbourship as beneficial. While the improvement of infrastructure, environmental protection or the fostering of entrepreneurial cooperation through Interreg funds constitute welcome inputs in the border region as a whole, they are merely a drop in the ocean and cannot compensate for a lack of crossborder investment in the region.

According to Marzenna Guz-Vetter, EU enlargement holds the potential for an "economic activation of the German-Polish border region, which could be transformed from its present peripherality into a dynamic core region in an enlarged Europe."[25] However, she also points out the psychological barriers to the development of vital economic contacts in the border region. For example, there are hardly any joint development initiatives. The one-sidedness of such distinctly German-centric initiatives as the Stolpe-Plan is usually received coolly in Poland,[26] while the Polish side itself remains largely passive. Such passivity is to a great extent due to a lack of sensitivity in Warsaw towards the special conditions in the border region but also a lack of local attachment among regional actors.

But the suspicion among citizens other than entrepreneurs also ties in with economic background conditions. Narrow-mindedness continues and deficits in dialogue and communication between continually estranged citizens exist. German craftspeople and merchants fear the cheaper services and goods available on the Polish side. Regional entrepreneurs from East Germany suffer from relatively stable prejudices against the Polish neighbours and are reluctant to invest on the Polish side. Conversely, such popular resentment discourages Polish investment on the German side.[27]

A mere glimpse at some of these interlinkages between the socio-economic hardships in the border region and the mental barriers that separate Polish and German citizens from both sides illustrates the dilemma of the Polish-German border region: a more widespread willingness to engage across the border and the build up of the region precondition each other. On the one hand, stereotypes and wariness hinder the development of the border region by its residents. On the other, this development is a precondition to the economic growth that would detract from the variety of social problems these residents are forced to deal with. In the absence of trust and a sense of regional identity, any regional self-help remains illusory. This stalemate is likely render crossborder cooperation difficult for some time to come.

5. CONCLUSION

If citizen relations across the border between Germany and Poland provide any indication of the overall state of Polish-German relations, they illustrate the fact that normalcy is being approached rather more slowly than anticipated in 1989/90. Normative expectations of a crossborder community tend to clash with the practical achievements of the Polish-German Euroregions. In the light of what has been accomplished in West European border regions, the fact that the Oder-Neisse line constitutes a comparatively harsh barrier is often overlooked. Regions across Germany's western borders, though sometimes idealised themselves, are not suitable as a medium-term vision, nor as a short-term empirical yardstick.

Particularly the mutually reinforcing developmental and mental setbacks constitute an unparalleled challenge. At the same time, the Euroregions and other cooperation initiatives are making a valuable contribution in addressing both problems simultaneously. Through the two funds, there are attempts to make a start at two fronts, namely by promoting regional development and by fostering good neighbourly contacts. Reconciliation, rapprochement, and community-building are processes likely to last decades. The fact that progress has been much slower than initially anticipated reflects on the hopeless optimism of the early years much more than it does on the effectiveness of crossborder cooperation itself.

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Regional Programs as the Tool of a Good–neighbourhood in a Context of Relations of Russia-EU[1]

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The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union brought about the collapse of certain post-war structures and for a while, the collapse of the bipolar world complicated international relations. This change not only affected international relations, but internal relations as well, which in the case of Russia chose a federalist path for its internal constitutional order. In addition, regardless of the bloc that individual countries belonged to during the Cold War, many of Russia's neighbors were put in this choice. The adjusted geopolitic perception of the states was transformed by years.

Why does interest to external connections of regions recently grow? Interests of our country on continent are realized not only through wide bilateral relations, but also through channels of multilateral diplomacy, one of which is the European Union. Such European organization should take into account wishes and needs of the important and influential neighbor. Plans of the European integration include also a strong federative state what, undoubtedly, Russia is, or from the point of view of the western experts, becomes fast. The special role is removed to cooperation with regions of the Russian Federation and in particular with the North-West district.

The defense guarantees for the countries of Northern Europe and the Baltics require a change in the geopolitical situation in region and thus, with the diminished chance of nuclear war, ecological change and the conservation of North European resources must be considered security issues which require coordination and decision by the EU[2]. It is within this context that we can divide «hard» security versus «soft» security but increasingly they cannot be divided and will soon be interchangeable[3]. With this agreement and many more to come, including Tvomas Fersberg, believe that «hard» security objectives can be achieved with soft power[4].

The effective resolution of these problems could be concluded through the cooperation of the various states of the region. Thus, members of the EEA (European Economic Area) and the Baltic States and Poland and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia (which entered into force in December 1997), became one of the primary legal agreements which the EU based its relationship with the Baltic, North European and Artic regions[5].

How successful all this could have been remains a hypothetical question due to Russia's internal situation. Since its founding in 1991 the Russian Federation strived to establish partnerships of an equal nature within the international system. This historical task was fraught with many seemingly insurmountable problems though as first and foremost the very unity and territorial integrity of the state was endangered in face of the new freedom which strengthended the powers of Russia's regions. Thus, today more or less most of Russia's regions have established some sort of official contacts with foreign governments. Nonetheless, as recent developments have shown the strengthening of regional authority has gone hand in hand with the strengthening of the federal government's authority and the rise of Russia's prestige on the international scene. Thus, the increasing foreign contacts of the Russia's regions should be looked through the prism of constitutional developments within Russia that are not necessarily negative as previously thought to the centre's authority. In fact, they strengthen each other.

The federal government's policy stems from the policies of the first president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, whose first goal in the wake of the USSR's collapse was to preserve the unity of the nucleus of the USSR which was the Russian Federation and to solve its numerous economic problems. Meanwhile, the premier foreign policy goal of the new government was to fully integrate Russia into the world economy and the leading international economic institutions. Both the domestic and foreign policy goals of the government were not only based on necessity but also from the standpoint of national security, whether it was of a political or economic nature. Thus, Russia saw the strengthening of her national security through the altering of Russia's foreign policy goals from primarily geopolitical concerns to economic concerns which tied in Russia's foreign policy with its economic progress. Thus, Russia had a dual task. One was to reestablish its leading role in international affairs through the development of its economic potential which would inherently lead to the strengthening of the state. The second task was to coordinate, through the program of EC, the development of Russia's regions and their relationship with foreign states that would enhance Russia's strength and not diminish it.

An unavoidable question that the Russian government had to answer was should the new Russian Federation be modeled according to the «federal» model of the USSR where everything was decided by the centre or should a new federalist model which would see the regions participate actively in both domestic and foreign affairs be adopted. The answer to this question lay in the fact that although the burden of economic reforms came from the centre the burden of implementation lay with the regions and this included foreign economic issues. Thus, for the first time in its history Russia foreign relations became somewhat dependent on the behaviour of its regions in this sphere.

Could President Yeltsin be certain of his liberal position vis-à-vis the regions? The conclusion of the Federal Treaty in 1992 created an asymmetrical federation where the ethnic republics obtained far greater constitutional powers then the regular administrative-territorial divisions. The ethnic republics were granted sovereignty over determining residence of their citizens, on adopting their own constitutions, on the election and their rules of selecting their leadership and the theoretical right to leave the Federation. In addition, and potentially the most critical was the right that the ethnic republics won in controlling their own natural resources and revenues stemming from their exploitation. It should be noted that the ownership of those resources legally remained with the federal government. On the other hand, although the non-ethnic territorial-administrative regions were also allowed to enact their own constitutions their constitutional powers were limited to enacting regional decrees while their leadership was selected from the federal government[6]. In addition the federal government preserved the mechanical structures of implementing federal law upon the non-ethnic territorial-administrative regions.

It should be noted that the conclusion of the Federal treaty not only strengthened the state it also influenced foreign economic relations. This is because the Treaty allowed Russia's republics, territories, oblasts and autonomous districts along with the two historical capitals of Moscow and St. Petersburg an unprecedented array of powers in international and foreign economic affairs[7].

In December of 1993, with the passage of the new constitution of the Russian Federation relations between the centre and the regions and the regions with each other were further refined. As far foreign relations are concerned, relations can be divided into three categories-one where the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction, two where the federal and regional governments have concurrent powers and finally according to article 73 of the Russian Constitution: «.. the subjects of the Russian Federation have all the state authority» in relation to certain aspects of foreign relations. In addition, article 2, subsection 3 of the Federal Treaty allows the republics, territories, autonomous territories and the municipalities of Moscow and St. Petersburg to have «independent foreign and foreign economic relations as long as these do not violate the Constitution and laws of the Russian Federation.» Finally, article 72 of the Russian Constitution states that although subjects of the Russian Federation have great jurisdictional powers in their foreign relations, these relations must be coordinated with the centre[8].

It must be noted though that neither the Constitution nor the Federal Treaty has covered all the possible legal aspects relating to the foreign relations of Russia's regions. In the beginning of this process the regions even dictated to the centre and forced the centre to compromise as many of the federal subjects passed various legislation dealing with their individual foreign relations. In fact, it could be argued that in the 1990's Russia could have reestablished some role on the international stage if it were not for the perception that the state was not fully united. These internal problems soured Russia's potential with her foreign partners both in the economic and political sphere.

The search for alternatives brought about an agreement system between the centre and the regions in which agreement on various issues was sought between the centre and the regions and for the Federation as a whole. This system allows for multiple but similar agreements with numerous regions. There are of course pluses and minuses in the agreement system. On the one hand the agreement system allows solving the problems consensually and mutually for the benefit of the federal system. On the other hand, especially according to the federal government's point of view, agreements with the regions should be strictly adhered to the regions in order that they do not seek greater independence or violate the Constitution and/or the Federal Treaty. Over half of Russia's regions have concluded these agreements with the center and often each of these agreements contain their own unique features. Although at first the federation bowed to many of the region's demands, there has been some correction in the balance in recent years and thus Russia's federalism is more balanced now. This is not to say that the process is over. Russia's development as a federalist state is far from over. Nonetheless, we can safely say that the agreement system has become a cornerstone of regionalism in Russia. The agreement system has in fact produced results between the centre and the regions.

Another critical development occurred on March 12, 1996 when President Yeltsin issued Decree No. 375 which ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to develop a coherent and united foreign policy for the Russian federation as a whole. The decree ordered the Ministry to coordinate with «other federal organs the international relations of the Russian Federation and this include the international ties of the subjects of the RF»[9]. But this position of Russia directed on strengthening of integrity of the country till now is not stacked in representation of EU about the integration regional processes based on democratic principles. Agencies of EU preferred to go on an establishment of direct communications with local authorities, in attempt as they considered, bypassing the so-called «bureaucratic-administrative structures»[10]. And of course it cannot be said that some of Russia's regional leaders in the first few years of federalism truly desired a preeminent role in formulating their own foreign policy.

After the 1996 presidential elections and the strengthening of President Yeltsin's position there were both internal and foreign policy changes. The Russian Government under the influence of Prime Minister Primakov the «voluntary dependency» model of the Kozyrev vis-a-vis the West and instead opted for the «altenative» model which called for the defense of Russia's interests, prestige, moral authority in the face of US and the Atlantic Alliance in regards to crucial international and regional questions and crisis (Iraq, Kosovo, Bosnia). In the meantime, Russia' economy became more open to inflows of foreign capital and international trade. Even after the financial crisis of 1998 the economy did not collapse. It is within this context that the North-West region of the Russian Federation began to participate in the «Northern Dimension» program.

The year following the financial crisis in 1999 saw increased competition between the federal government and its subjects in the sphere of international relations. The federal government responded with passing a special law that called for the coordination of foreign policy with the regions in order to have a cohesive foreign policy for Russia as a whole. The first situation that needed to be clarified was the plethora of legislation passed by regional governments and relating to foreign relation and foreign economic relations and if they conflicted with federal legislation.

The new federal law called for the coordination of international and foreign economic relations between the subjects of the RF and the federal government[11]. The new law also disallowed certain preconceived notions that some of the regions had developed in the early stages of Russian federalism such as considering themselves to «sovereign» subjects of international law. Nonetheless, the law preserved the right of regions to open up delegations abroad, using the premises of Russian embassies and consulates but without diplomatic functions. The law while tightening the political rules of the game gave the regions a free hand in foreign economic relations. The law on coordination between the Russian federation and her subjects in regards to foreign and foreign economic relations was passed on February 4, 1999[12]. The law did seem to have its desired effect with the number of «uncoordinated contacts» between regional governments and foreign entities falling to 14 at the end of 1999 compared to 40 in 1998 and 100 in 1997[13]. Nonetheless, Western partners, within the context of EU, expanded their ties with the regions.

The main task of the state which president B.N.Yeltsin put before the government was maintenance of the mutual coordination of interests of the center and places, creation of a reliable basis for the decision of problems the country faces. Obviously, for realization of all economic and political potential of the Russian Federation updating not only the elected rate, but also the political leader was required. The decree of the President of the Russian Federation B.N.Yeltsin «About execution of powers of the President of the Russian Federation» from 12 o'clock 00 minutes on December, 31, 1999, had stopped execution of powers of the President of the Russian Federation as the head of the state became V.V.Putin[14].

The accession to power of President Vladimir Putin brought about strengthening of the levers of vertical power. On May 13, 2000, President Putin radically altered the constitutional map of Russia in a decree by creating 7 federal districts[15] with each district being coordinated by a presidential envoy who was a «supergovernor» reporting directly to the President. In a televised speech on May 17, 2000, President Putin called for the strengthening of state structures and a little afterwards introduced various legislative projects to that effect[16].

This decree and its televised explanation can be considered the official beginning of the strengthening of vertical state power. In order to understand why President Putin chose a rather harsh method in dealing with the regional question it is necessary to understand that Russia's transition to federalism was rather chaotic and only a balancing of the relationship between the center and the regions would have a positive effect for the economic and political development of the whole country while preserving the individual spheres of jurisdiction for both the centre and the regions whether it concern foreign or domestic affairs. Nonetheless, if one disregards Putin's harshness in settling the imbalance that developed in the 1990's between the regions and the center it should be noted that Putin's actions were not arbitrary but law-based and within the context of the Russian Constitution. Thus, the principles of federalism were not violated as all changes were achieved using legislative means and not coercive means which bodes well for Russia's constitutional development. At the same time the regions do have the right to have separate foreign and foreign economic relations from the centre and this time within the context of specific laws but those relations must serve the advancement of the political and economic interests of the state as a whole.

After collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost the status of a superpower though. It was necessary for the country to find the niche in the international affairs. Construction of new mutual relation in the world depends on a choice of the partner for Russia. The agreement on partnership and cooperation between EU and the Russian Federation has made probable mutually advantageous peaceful development of relations between our country and Europe. The difficult way through which this cooperation has passed, even after ten years shows that both partners frequently proceed from various positions. For Russia it is, first of all, the attempt to solve economic problems, having kept its specificity17. For EU it's a desire to transform the country according to its own image of the western model including the European treatment of democratic freedom and values. We can observe this by looking at the last events connected with authority vertical strengthening (power strengthening) in Russia. So the small countries of the EU mainly having entered EU in May, openly criticize president's offers. They consider that if the reform comes into force Putin's control on the Russian legislature and the regional governments will become stronger. The former Communist countries want EU to develop more distinct, if not much stricter policy in relations with Russia18.

What can Russia do in the given situation? It is impossible to underestimate or overestimate the opinion of the West always giving the extremely ambiguous estimation to our country. But in any case it is better to use the checked up recipes. One way for Russian integration acceleration in the European Union, and also strengthening of cooperation is the usage of external connections of regions.

Practice shows that to solve international problems is much easier when there are adjusted connections at a regional level. Integration process between the Russian regions and EU will help to overcome the contradictions at the state level.

No doubt that the work with regions for a long time being a priority direction in the European Union is a good luck for Russia, which tries to prove the sound federal choice. Necessity of process of regionilisation was registered in many documents of the organization. The Committee of regions created for these purposes continued the traditions. However if on the one hand external Russian regions' connections could strengthen positions of the country in dialogue with EU on the other hand it was necessary to take into account some pluses and minuses.

The important point in cooperation of Russia and EU, undoubtedly, became attraction of the Russian regions to work on programs of the European Union, in particular, such as INTERREG and TACIS.

In 90th years the special program «INTERREG» aimed at frontier cooperation between members and non members of EU was developed and initiated. In frameworks INTERREG IIC projects with participation of regions of Northwest – Kaliningrad, Saint Petersburg, Leningrad region, republic Karelia and Murmansk area were developed[19]. In November, 1999 at an informal meeting of 11 countries which were taking part in initiative INTERREG IIC for region of the Baltic Sea, the opportunity of continuation of similar cooperation in frameworks INTERREG IIIB within 2000–2006 years was discussed. The new initiative has expanded a zone of cooperation, having included the Pskov and Novgorod areas. The overall objective of these programs is directed on increase of efficiency of measures and tools of regional development and achievement of the coordination by means of regional interaction.

With the same effect another program of EU - TACIS has engaged in maintenance of steady development of regions. TACIS is one of the programs of the European Union within the framework of which financial assistance can be rendered to cooperation of partners in various joint projects. The basic contents of the projects with North-West are submitted in the following directions: support of development of a private sector, frontier cooperation, an environment, public health services and education. It would be quite complicated to list all examples of work within the framework of the given program, thus it is necessary to pay attention to the most typical figures for regions.

So the Arkhangelsk area participates in projects supported by TACIS since 1997. In 2002 the area had nine such projects, the most part of which is already completed, another will be completed this year. The big plan on development of tourism in area is realized. Any tourist of the world can open for itself a new destination – the Arkhangelsk area.[20] through INTERNET.

There is a realization of TACIS projects in Murmansk area on water treating in the river Kola. It is about restoration of ecological equilibrium of territory around of combine «Pechenganikel», construction of boundary transition in Salle.

Since 1991 the European Union has allocated significant financial assets for Kaliningrad, having given assistance TACIS for the sum of about 40 million euro within the framework of the national program for Russia. This sum includes financing of assistance in 2002–2003 to an infrastructure of the boundary and customs control for simplification of issue of visa and moving of the goods, cooperation in acceleration of economic development of region for overcoming its backlog from neighboring countries of candidates into EU, and also interaction in sphere of transnational questions.

In Karelia in settlement Tel'mana, in 2001 by means of EU the water-purifying station was put into operation. Besides the European commission has approved nine «small» projects TACIS, transbordering cooperation with total amount of external financing more than one and a half millions euro on development of cooperation in sphere of ecology, tourism, power engineering, an agriculture and a municipal services. From last large projects TACIS in Karelia financing of the project «Electronic Karelia».

In the Pskov area 11 projects TACIS have already been carried out, there are 8 projects in work connected with improvement of qualities of potable water, development of frontier tourism (tourist route Izborsk – Vastseliina), struggle against AIDS, improvement of ecological conditions in region.

In the Vologda area program TACIS projects on a total sum of more than 10 million US dollars have been carried out.[21]

Program TACIS approves financing due to means of the European Union for seven projects in Leningrad region under the program «Small Baltic projects» for the sum of 1.4 million euro.

From 1992 within the framework of the program for technical assistance of European Union TACIS there have been carried out more than 200 projects in Saint Petersburg. In spite of the indubitable advantages of teamwork in programs it is necessary, to recognize, that subjects have got to accept the European rules. It doesn't promote the increase of chances for an advance of investment projects favorable to the country. The initiative proceeds from countries – participants of EU. Regions should choose from offered "assortment". And though it is various, wishes of regions are not always included. Also it is necessary to note, that, first of all, programs are directed towards more attractive to Europe regions of Northwest and the North Russia.

The most typical example of discrepancy of interests is «Northern Dimension». Some Russian researchers see in «Northern Dimension» «first of all, aspiration of EU to get access to the Russian source of raw materials (to gas, petroleum, the cheap electric power, a wood and so forth)»[22]. EU is interested in development of an infrastructure of the Russian Northwest, the investment in economy of this region only so far as it promotes the decision of an above-mentioned task. In the political point of view, they believe, Russia is considered to be the younger partner of EU[23]. Some political scientists «name this initiative as the political declaration which is not supported by a strong economic platform»[24].

What was included to the first «Plan of Actions» of « Northern Dimension» that gave the basis for such criticism? The program covered such spheres as preservation of the environment, cooperation in the field of power, Kaliningrad, business cooperation, justice and internal affairs, social development etc. Special attention was concentrated on development of oil-and-gas and mineral deposits, wood stocks, etc.; development of a transport infrastructure, nature protection activity, nuclear safety were included there. Soon the shortages of the program became obvious. That did not cause objections on the general orientation of the project. They appeared when business began to concern particulars. So St. Petersburg was offered to emphasize on development of a pulp and paper industry while the region was interested in development of high technologies in woodwork, increase of an output of finished products from raw wood. Karelia constantly declared the necessity of modernization of a timber industry complex for the region has not constructed any pulp-and-paper enterprise[25] for the last 10 years. But while the Republic Karelia, Novgorod and Vologda regions simultaneously struggled for construction for a large pulp-and-paper enterprise, partners in «Northern Dimension» Finns began to speak about an opportunity of construction of such pulp-and-paper enterprise in Khabarovsk region[26]. When, at last, Northwest projects on foundation of completely identical pulp-and-paper enterprises were offered to three regions, governors were ready to begin construction. However a question arised – what was the use of developing identical enterprises in rather small territory in Northwest of Russia?[27] Similar contradictions were on the questions of development of a transport infrastructure and tourism. Finnish researcher Hiski Haukkala mentions: «To understand the real common strategy for Russia – and according to this the best way to estimate progress in its realization, – it is necessary to analyze this strategy in the right context»[28]. That fact that «Action Plan – 2» for 2004–2006 has appeared, speaks about the interest of Russia and EU in partnership in these regions. It is only necessary to understand how to use the strategic benefit that natural resources of Northwest of Russia, including petroleum, gas, coal, a wood and mineral raw material gives to Russia. And it is possible to make them accessible to Europe only in exchange for recognition of equal positions. Such work is already in progress. According to the official representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Russia Alexander Jakovenko: «We recognize the importance of Northern Dimension. The core is that the countries – members of the Eurounion, the states entering the Eurounion, other countries – partners, and also the various subregional organizations existing in this zone, a zone of Northern Dimension, built the further actions on the basis of collective partnership in concrete regions of cooperation. Such partnership would be created on principles of equal participation and collective responsibility of the involved countries»[29].

Also we cannot help revising the successes of the program: such as the foundation of the fund «Environmental Protection Partnership» in «Northern Dimension» (NDEP). Despite of the primary statement of no creation of new structures, institutions and tools of the European Union for the initiative of «Northern Dimension», the Special fund of Environmental Protection Partnership of Northern Dimension was created[30]. In the frameworks of NDEP there have already been 13 concrete projects for the total sum of 1.3 billion euros. One of the priority projects is the reconstruction of southwest purifing enterprises in St. Petersburg[31]. Realization of this project will also prove practical benefit of «Northern Dimension». It also becomes an example of how it is possible to solve one of the most important problems – financing of projects in the framework of «Northern Dimension». These problems are solved by Northern Investment Bank and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development with attraction of TACIS, and also national means. For example, Finland allocated 10 million euros to this project. In September 22, 2005 the South-West puryfirg systems were opened.

The decision of European Investment Bank (EIB) has got basic significance for financing ecological projects in Russia. The Bank has already allocated 100 million euros[32]. To summarize the idea there is a question on the contribution of Russia in NDEP activity. Also it is necessary to take into account a very interesting fact – the guarantee to the European banks for the regions are given by the state. Therefore the fact of power vertical strengthening as the state guarantor for regional international connections will probably be perceived much quieter by the European public.

Taking into consideration the importance of telecommunications and information technologies for economic growth and all spheres of public life, it is possible to welcome the acceptance of the program «Action Plan» of «Northern Dimension» in the area of information technologies («Northern e-Dimension Action Plan», (NeDAP)[33]. Concrete directions and projects, realization of which is designed up to 2004, are determined. According to this plan Russia acts as the coordinator for such cooperation directions as electronic commerce and creation of high-speed networks for research works[34]. One more positive example, undoubtedly, is the achievements in the sphere of public health service - the program on struggle against AIDS and tuberculosis in the region of «Northern Dimension»[35].

In this respect the actuality is represented by studying the interests of EU, the member-countries of EU and the Russian Federation in EU Northern Dimension. But this position of Russia can change because of forthcoming presidency in EU of Finland (in 2006) and positive changes in the Action Plan-3[36].

Nevertheless if we speak about the present conditions of «Northern Dimension of EU» the purpose of the program remains the achievement of stability, safety and positive interdependence between EU and the partner-states of EU. Successful realization of the given factors should prevent from possible complications and problems in development of Northern Dimension region in the future. In this case a necessary condition of stability of development of the European Community is the export of natural resources from Northwest region of the Russian Federation, and also the development of bilateral cooperation with Russia on terms of ecology in the Baltic and Arctic regions. The decision of security issues in Northern Dimension region is connect with the achievement of mutual understanding and successful cooperation with Russia, and also with realization of the soft security at a regional level. Positive interdependence is achieved by means of development of regional cooperation in social and economic sphere. And the EU is considered as the main factor of involving of the EU partner-states (including Russia) in social and economic space of EU. Priority and long-term interests of EU in the concept and policies of Northern Dimension are those concerning Russia, reflected in official documents of EU on Northern Dimension. The EU Northern Dimension concept and the Action Plan of 2000–2003 year, and also the Action Plan of 2004–2006 shows, that the EU has got all necessary means for realization of these interests[37].

Thus, it is possible to approve, that the Russian Federation, especially Northwest region with water areas Barentseva, White, Karskoe and the Baltic seas, becomes a priority direction of EU. The future of the regional programs concerning the Russian Federation will be determined by the character of realization of mutual interests between EU and Russia, participation of regions of Northwest federal district in definition and realization of the EU programs, presence of the effective administrative, legislative and economic institutions appropriate to criteria of Russian regional cooperation of EU, and external investments of Northwest region.

Thus, summing up the cooperation of Russia and EU at a regional level, it is possible to ascertain one important fact. At the present stage it is already impossible to imagin the international relations of Russia without the European participation, and development of the international activities of regions not focused at the continent.

In the difficult international situation external connections of regions should become the cement which will create a strong basis for partnership relations of Russia and the EU and regions programms are necessary to realize this purpose.

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Footnotes

[1] Article is written on the materials prepared during the research grant in The Chair Interbrew-Baillet Latour at KULeuven.

[2] *These questions have been accepted in the agenda of EU and finally authorized in the report of the Commission of EU only in 1999 – A Northern Dimension for the Policies of the European Union*, COM/1998/589 (25 November, 1998), III.12–24.

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[11] On November 19, 1997 the third reading of this bill which had come to the end with an establishment of an original record of unanimity has taken place in the State Duma: 340 pro and only 3 contras. Co-authors and developers of the bill which was born in bowels of Committee on the international communications of the State Duma became representatives practically in all influential fractions. But attempts of the state to pass this law failed, when business was cunning up to «wishes» of regions. The future law established strict game rules which promised appreciable loss of former freedom of carrying out of independent external actions for subjects of the Russian Federation. On December 3, 1997 the Council of Federation did not approve the bill approved by the State Duma. The result of voting in the Upper chamber of Federal assembly appeared depressing. Only 12 senators supported the statement of the law, the others- a 100, participating in session, were against. Presidential structures, the Federal Government and conducting fractions of the State Duma to avoid acceptance of the future law «through a head» Council of Federation, have gone in the blazed way of the conciliatory commissions.

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21 928 471 had voted for him (29.21 %) Archive of the journalist // http: // www.dosye.ru/dosye/ru_bio299.htm.

[15] The central federal district, the North-Western federal district, the North-the Caucasian federal district, Privolgskii federal district, Ural federal district, the Siberian federal district, Far East federal district

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The role of NATO and EU in the developing security in the wider Black Sea region

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1. Introduction

This intervention aims to discuss the role of two major organizations, namely NATO and European Union in enhancing stability and security in the three South Caucasus countries, Moldova and Ukraine or the wider Black Sea region. The region that got closer to the borders of those two organizations after 2004 Enlargement. The paper will try to assess how those two major political players, namely, EU and NATO respond to the challenges of the region. My goal is not so much to focus on the countries but rather on the international organizations' policy responses to this strategically important region. The paper intends to fix a status quo of this momentum when there is a certain degree of uncertainty on both sides: partners and also international organizations' side. Now when more than a year has passed there are quite many questions to be asked about those policy responses and one of the most important ones is what are the interests of the international community in this wider Black Sea region and does those two international organizations and international community at large has a clear strategy how it wants to achieve those goals? As for the first part, the answer is rather clear – international society wants to see stable, reform capable states, in control of their own borders, safe from the external military or economic pressures or externally-inspired secession, secure in their function as energy transit routes, and capable of supporting US-led or NATO coalition operations. Those interests can be sustained if countries develop good governance, with functioning democratic institutions and political processes resistant to corruption or hostile manipulations and if they are protected by international law and Western-type security arrangements[1]. However, the answer to the second question is somewhat unclear.

2. The Neighbors

It has been argued that for quite a while this region has been off the radar of the international organizations. Asmus and Jackson outlines four main reasons for that: first, lack of Western Strategic studies, a rather noticeable ignorance of mainstream experts, secondly, a little political energy left after the reform process of Central and Eastern Europe, thirdly, there was a little push from the region for a closer relationship with the West and, fourth, lack of familiarity with the region, its people, its problems, its rich culture, and its contribution to the spread of Western civilization[2]. The Enlargement of NATO and EU in 2004, brought the region closer physically and mentally to the frontiers of what traditionally has been perceived as Europe. All of the countries have declared their aspirations to join EU and, with exception of Moldova and Armenia, they also aim for the NATO membership.

Double enlargement brought closer also security threats and challenges that the wider Black Sea region contains. One can identify substantial hard security threats such as four frozen conflicts (South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Karabakh and Trans-Dniester). Russian troops and bases are also present. The Western Europe has been rather slow in addressing those security concerns. For instance, in some of the countries foreign troops are present against their will and despite international obligations to withdraw them. Some positives signs towards resolution of this situation can be witnessed: for instance, the Joint Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of Russian Federation and Georgia on the closure of Russian bases and other military facilities[3] was signed on May this year. Recently political steps are taken in resolving frozen conflict in South Ossetia.[4] The Ukrainian and Moldovan governments have taken the initiative and requested EU to assist in border monitoring and customs control. And, in fact EU for the first time will send its mission to the post Soviet territory[5]. This is better than in case of Georgia when EU refused to puts its EDSP arm 'on the test'. The contribution to assist in solving Transnistrian conflict could serve as a valuable investment for stopping illegal trafficking and smuggling that is a major concern at the moment for EU. Russia's policy, on the contrary, consists of freezing not the conflicts as such but rather the negotiations process, which Russia itself dominates. The UN and OSCE are left largely to their own security devices, have merely conserved these conflicts[6]. The region also contains the soft security threats in the region as it is widely and correctly believed that these unresolved fragments of Soviet Empire now serve as shipping points for weapons, narcotics, and victims of human trafficking, as breeding grounds for transnational organized crime, and last but not least, for terrorism[7]. It is also very important to note that the region provides westbound transit route for Caspian energy supplies which is key to Europe's energy balance in the coming years.

Almost all of the identified security threats[8] in the European Security Strategy can be noted in the neighboring region and only few of them have caught attention of EU and NATO. Why? Because for now the threats that concern those countries do not have much relevance in Europe. EU as a soft power in its essence is not very much concerned with hard security threats. NATO, on the contrary, is all about hard security in its essence but again is not very much concerned as it has other issues on the agenda.

In some of the countries the revolution time is over and international organizations and international society at large await visible signs of progress, stability and democracy. The expectations of the countries themselves, especially of Ukraine and Georgia, are rather high. In some cases, there exists a rather risky linkage that envisages that every step that brings the countries closer to NATO and EU will facilitate resolving the frozen conflicts. That might seem right but it is also one of the main reasons why the international organizations use careful rhetoric calling for performance based progress, especially in the case of NATO integration process for Ukraine and Georgia. One of the possible solution to this situation could be found if the neighboring countries will be able to deliver everything possible from their side in resolving those conflicts, so that these problems do not serve as an obstacle when the issue of closer membership will be on the international organization's agenda.

3. EU and NATO Policy Responses

The experts have stated that the region is crowded with different kinds of international actors, ranging from international organizations and states to multinational corporations. The United Nations and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have become deeply involved in seeking to advance the settlement of the region's conflicts. The list is more extensive than this, one has to mention the Minsk Group, the Group of Friends of the UN Secretary General and the New Group of Friends that involve also the Baltic States. However, the involvement of these organizations despite being quite extensive and multifaceted has not been successful in catalyzing the settlement of the frozen conflicts in the region[9]. The December 2004 vote in the OSCE when Russia blocked extension of OSCE border-monitoring mission in Georgia shows that the hands of those organizations are sometimes too short to play a substantial role in settling the conflicts of the region.

If we turn to NATO and EU – these organizations have very recently undergone the major enlargements in organizations history therefore they have their own internal transformation or constitutional issues on the agenda. Those internal issues will remain present for quite some time. That also means that disparity among the members might grow. The international security environment has changed and it is natural that in such circumstances organizations take a holistic approach for internal changes. Responding to the new security environment NATO seeks the ways how to make its forces more capable, deployable and ready to respond to threats in shorter time, therefore NATO has transformation on its agenda[10]. Also EU has launched a number of initiatives aiming at improving its capabilities in the security and defence area. EU is now involved in seven out of area operations but, on the other hand, 25 member states combined controlling the second largest force in the world, is still struggling to sustain less than 5% of its overall military manpower on vital peace support tasks, a sign that a number of key shortfalls remain[11].

i. Response of EU

The European Security Strategy calls for the need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary robust intervention[12] and to merge EU member defence resources to become more effective[13]. At the same time, the European Security Strategy makes its commitment unclear by emphasizing that it increasingly depends on an effective multilateral system and declares that the United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security[14]. It also states that conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early[15]. Therefore it seems that the ESS offers more liberal engagement rather than realist balance of power. The message the EU is sending to its neighbors is rather benevolent, promising to engage rather than coerce[16]. The most obvious geo-strategic implication is the political involvement which already has started to face the alternative between acting effectively to refuse crisis and solve conflicts in the sphere it wishes to stabilize or witness the weakening of the co-sphere and the enfeebling of its own security[17].

Up till enlargement became virtually certain, the EU chose not to systematically address the interdependence between the security and integration considerations in its neighborhood[18]. EU responded to the new situation, turning its attention to the region by developing European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in May 2004 that covers countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States and all the Mediterranean countries of the Barcelona process. ENP as the most recent foreign policy effort that aims to strengthen its security with respect to its neighbors has very evident territorial ambitious. That partly explains why the document largely consists of general principles, calling for comprehensive single strategy towards enlarged EU which former EU Commission's President Romano Prodi called 'ring of friends[19]'. The EU declares that it will 'share the enlarged EU's peace, stability and prosperity with (..) the neighbors'[20]. ENP also states that it aims to address one of the strategic objectives the European Union set in the European Security Strategy in December 2003, that of building security in our neighborhood[21]. It has been argued that the action plans so far envisages a rather vague response to the real interests of the neighboring countries[22]. In more practical terms ENP offers gradual access to the single market, financial and technical aid, in exchange for reforms bringing them closer to the Union's political and economic models. As Romano Prodi coined it 'everything but the institutions'[23]. However, if there is no 'carrot' at the end of the tunnel, one cannot expect 'everything' from the neighboring countries. The experience with the recent enlargement proves that the EU spreads its values most effectively through peer-pressure for change, linked to hopes of accession[24]. Without such hopes, governments do tend to loose motivation to reform. Grabbe argues that ENP needs to make it clear that countries will gain rewards if they meet various conditions and that the rewards will be denied or withdrawn if they lapse back to bad habits[25]. She also rightly points out that (if we exclude Russia's factor) EU could incorporate its neighbors into foreign and security policy cooperation more easily than into the other parts of its institutional and policy making frameworks, as CFSP is currently quite flexible. But the weakness from the neighbors' point of view that it is often fragmented and has no obvious result[26].

So – is EU's goal too ambitious? Can it actually fulfill its goals or will they be lost among the national interests of EU member states. The Netherlands Foreign Minister Bot visiting Riga in March this year gave a very frank and good description of the current situation. He argued that EU already has too many issues on the plate in order to involve deeper in assisting its neighbors in solving its frozen conflicts and 'soft security' problems[27]. EU must have a more coherent, consistent and ambitious policy for the wider Black Sea region and failing to do so might lead later to the crisis management which will be a much more expensive and difficult alternative. So let's turn to NATO's extent of involvement in the region.

ii. Response of NATO

It seems that NATO has been proactive in developing relations with the countries in the region as it is also the Alliance which needs closer cooperation with partners, not only vice versa. Partner transformation is important and Partnership

Review Process and Partnership for Peace has proven useful in developing partner capabilities. Partner cooperation also secures broader coalitions in international operations. Before the 2004 Enlargement, NATO offered institutionalized but distant relations to all the countries. Partner nations were members of Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council – a key body for consultations between NATO and Partner countries and the Partnership for Peace program that was designed to develop practical military-to-military cooperation between NATO and Partners to increase interoperability. The main purpose was and still is to bring them closer to the Euro-Atlantic values. NATO established partnerships with nations focuses especially on political dialogue, CBM and defence reform. Mechanisms have evolved to this end. With over 10% of troop contributions to NATO-led operations stemming from non-NATO nations, a focus on increasing interoperability and military cooperation has been of utmost importance.

At the Prague Summit in 2002, NATO came forward with the Individual Partnership Action Plan and Partnership Action Plan initiative that sets political, economic and security sector reform goals that countries need to achieve in order to get closer to the Alliance. At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the Allies agreed to put a special focus in the regions of South Caucasus and Central Asia by assigning Special Representative and two liaison officers to the regions. So far about the practical steps taken by NATO. However, there are various visions on the NATO's mindset as outlined by Skonieczka[28]. He argues that there are two options: first, he mentions that the geographical proximity to the Central Asia, similar transformation problems (…) and the importance of both regions for NATO's operations in Afghanistan would encourage the construction of a "Caucasus-and-Central Asia" entity with the Caspian Sea at its center. The Black sea would be the frontier between "Europe proper" and "greater Asia" and, as such, would mark the limits of NATO's integrationist ambitions. The second vision that Skonieczka outlines draws upon the Black sea as the conceptual and geographical link necessary to complete the continent's political map. Which vision Allies would be ready to see? Various answers could be provided at this stage but a more realistic vision probably could be drawn after the some three to four years when some of the internal transformation issues will be resolved.

4. What limits EU and NATO capacity for cooperation?

Post-NATO and EU enlargement brought new neighboring countries closer to those two organizations. It is obvious, that from the perspective of NATO and EU, cooperation with neighboring countries is a vital element to stability and security in a wider Euro Atlantic area[29]. Neighboring regions do require involvement of international organizations and international society has to recognize that we are dealing with very different set of countries. However, at the same time we are facing a lack of common political will at the international organization level to provide substantial involvement. Having said this, it seems that with all its internal discussions on the nature of transatlantic relations, NATO has for the last decade been an institution that has been able to respond to new realities quicker and more effective than the European Union. It is the Alliance that has developed special relations with Ukraine, has approved Intensified Dialogue and has established an effective Liaison Office in Kiev to assist the reform process. It is Alliance that during the Istanbul Summit has stepped forward to develop closer relation with the countries of South Caucasus and Central Asia by creating a position of Special Representative and a permanent Liaison Office in the region thereby fostering political, economic and military reforms. However, the question – what is Europe's and North America's real intention still remains open? Do we want those countries really become members of the club or just have good relations but to keep them at a distance? If the latter is true and the goal is just to have stable and friendly countries, NATO's response probably is adequate. If the first is true, there is a lot still to be done from both sides. Let me outline some of the major stumbling blocks that limit further assistance and cooperation.

Firstly – global agenda. Western Europe is used to it that the United States usually deal with the hard security threats but there are more global problems on the agenda for the United States and it is engaged in other parts of the world. Let me just mention some of them: Iran, China, Middle East, terrorism, globalization and failed states. The list could be made rather extensive. And yet again the European countries do not have enough political will to show substantial pre-emptive engagement in the neighboring region to fight the problems which hold actual and potential threats.

Secondly – Russia. Vladimir Socor argues that the region forms a hub of an evolving geo-strategic and geo-economic system that extends from NATO Europe to Central Asia and Afghanistan[30]. The reason I wanted to mention geopolitics is because the major stumbling block – Russia - is very much related to the assigned significance (by the older NATO an EU member countries) to the bilateral relations with Russia. Close European neighborhood means also close neighbors of Russia, or, let me put it even more straightforward – traditional Russian sphere of influence. Both NATO and EU have special partnership with Russia. In the case of ENP, Russia declined partnership; instead of giving preference to the development of more 'equally' based cooperation, it has left a big hole in the middle of the policy[31]. In the case of NATO, 1997 – Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security declared reciprocal commitments to shared values, norms and commitments. Relations based on equal partnership. It is the special cooperation aimed at Russia's great power ambitions through the special status. As one recalls, Russia also wanted to conduct separate talks with new member countries on privileges joining NATO Russia Council (NRC) but failed to achieve this. The lack of internal changes in Russia, controversial and suspicious military-to-military contacts, and circumnavigational character of Russian foreign policy is a result of the fact that NATO Russia Council has not focused on the essential cooperation projects which has lowered the efficiency of NRC which aims to give impetus for democratic transformation of Russian Armed forces and political institutions. One can look at the current work of NATO Russia Council as preparatory work which could be enhanced when political will and need arises. That leads to the different perceptions among old and new members of the North Atlantic Alliance and European Union about what is required to be done to assist the neighboring countries. One can note a lack of political will among Allies to deal with any unpleasant issue that regards Russia. For instance, the issue of fulfillment of 1999 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and Istanbul Commitments regarding the Russian troop withdrawal from the territory of Moldova and Georgia. This question has never been raised outside of NATO Russia Council. The Allies at the other formats of

NATO meetings do not discuss issues that regard Russia exactly because they are supposed to discuss all the Russia related issues at the NATO Russia Council but it fails to do so. That leads to the fact that the Allies cannot form a joint opinion on that. In the light of the current discussions that NATO has to become more political, a unified policy response to such issues could serve as a testing ground but there is a very clear lack of political will. Russia's engagement is vital and for now, let us be clear, sometimes managed at the expense of some Partner countries.

Thirdly – both EU and NATO are reluctant to take away traditional roles of other international organizations and therefore are very careful in deciding where it will involve its forces. That is no surprise if we look at the wording in the European Security Strategy. But what happens when a country from the Black Sea regions turns to the EU for assistance? The most recent illustrative example is Georgia's border monitoring case and how this issue was dealt within OSCE and then EU. Even though EU is engaged in the large number of operations, there is a lack of political will to extend the policy responses to sometimes rather complicated issues what our neighboring countries are facing. One can observe that there is much bigger willingness to respond to the problems in Africa than to those in the close neighborhood. In March 2005 after the mandate was not prolonged at the OSCE, the EU decided to send 3 people[32] to work in Tbilisi and not at the border. The mandate for strengthening border monitoring capacity that was provided in reply to the Georgian government to assist with border monitoring mission shows that EU rather prefers provide policy responses for the sake of providing response not for solving the problems. This mission should be broadened and made more substantial to address the real challenges that Georgia is facing in border monitoring.

Fourth –there is a lack of clarity of the future vision of EU and to a lesser extent of NATO because their agenda is overburdened with other issues. It is rather logical that it would be too much to expect a clear vision in regards to the neighboring countries when EU discusses its future and Alliance does the same in regard to its transformation. Both EU and NATO have documents that serve as strategic guidance: NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept and EU's 2003 Security Strategy. Both documents have a rather vague vision of the two organizations' future goals, roles and missions; each member state is left on its own for interpretation[33]. There are a lot of questions about what regions international organization see as their responsibility for engagement and what type of threats they are ready to combat. By drafting its 'comprehensive political guidance' NATO has moved a step forward and EU most likely will need to address these issues in order to know how the capabilities that EU is working so hard to develop will be used in the future.

Fifth – in the case of EU, there are no clear benchmarks or future perspectives as to where the relationship will lead. NATO is much more constructive in this regard. Individual Partnership Action Plan, Intensified Dialogue and Membership Action Plan are the benchmarks the candidate has to engage in order to receive invitation to join the Alliance. The membership is the strongest foreign and security policy tool that both organizations hold. Therefore international organizations should not create wrong illusions about the timing of membership.

5. Conclusion: a way ahead?

Summing up, let me make some general remarks of the situation. Both international organizations have their own issues on their agenda, therefore division in 'insiders' and 'outsiders' is inevitable at the moment, no matter how much focus or partnership will be offered. Today neighboring countries that I talked about are looking towards EU and NATO and hope that they will address hard security threats. At the moment, both organizations (taking into account the current global agenda) are able to provide short-term solution but for the neighbors' clarity and strength, the international organizations vision is vitally important as they are an object of gravitational attraction for its neighbors[34].

That makes me come to the conclusion number one that currently **rhetoric exceeds its grasp**. Existing mechanisms are not enough and more are being required. If EU wants to gain a ring of friends, it also must acknowledge that friendship is a two way street: in order to gain a friend, something must be given. And that 'something' is a clear strategy or policy. Policy as we know is a sum of practical actions to be taken. If EU wants to gain this ring of friends, it must pay greater attention to the hard security threats that worry many of the countries that have expressed interest to develop closer relations with NATO and EU and follow the course of democracy. Today they do face issues of internal instability created by outside factors and the Western Europe has been slow in addressing those security concerns. Addressing soft security threats is not enough and can be perceived as a policy that countries cannot rely on. Therefore one might wish that both organizations should be more proactive in shaping future relations with the region they are interested in.

Close coordination and cooperation are essential. Maybe the organizations could think of some kind of 'Berlin Plus' concept to make international presence more efficient. More comprehensive and transparent joint cooperation among the main players would only benefit the security and stability situation in the region. Certainly there are also tasks on the list for those countries who aspire to receive the membership invitation. There should be not only change of leadership but also change of habits. Defence transformation can be successful only if it is supported by a functioning market economy. Corruption and traditional clan deals, black market and illegal trafficking are first targets to combat. There is no difference in this regard between NATO and EU membership. Geo-strategic position of any particular country cannot be an excuse for not applying the same standards to all countries that have intentions to become members of these organizations.

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[2] Asmus, R. D., Dimitrov K., Forbrig J. *A New Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region*, Washington D.C.: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2004, page 18.

[3] The Joint Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation and Georgia was signed on 30 May 2005.

[4] Georgian officials carried out a series of intensive diplomatic efforts in late October 2005 in an attempt to defreeze the stalemate in the South Ossetian conflict: an

Action Plan was presented at the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna on October 27. Before that Nogaideli visited the United States on October 21–26 in an attempt to secure U.S. support for this plan. On October 24–25 the quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) gathered in Moscow, where the Russian side, as well as the South Ossetian side, expressed support to the three-stage conflict resolution plan, which has triggered cautious optimism in Tbilisi. Source: http://www.civil.ge/eng/detail.php?id=11069, Last viewed on 6 November 2005

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[27] Bot B. *Latvia and the Netherlands: The EU, Russia and our common neighborhood*, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands speaking at the Stockholm School of Economics in Riga,
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[28] Jaroslaw Skonieczka is Director of the Euro Atlantic Integration and Partnership Directorate in the NATO International Staff. The two outlined visions are described in the article "The Black Sea Region: A Role for NATO?" in Asmus, R. D., Dimitrov K. and Forbrig J., *A New Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region*, Washington D.C.: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2004, page 100.

[29] European Security Strategy of December 2003 mentions South Caucasus region stating that 'We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems if the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighboring region', page 8.

[30] Socor, V. *Advancing Euro-Atlantic Security and Democracy in the Black Sea Region*, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs, 8 March 2005.

[31] Smith, K. The outsiders: the European Neighborhood Policy// *International Affairs*, 81:4, 2005, pages 759.

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[33] Flourny M. & Smith J. *European Defence Integration: Bridging the Gap between Strategy and Capabilities*, Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005, page 67.

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Formal and Non-Formal Instates in Russia: Institutional Approach

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1. Background. Institutional approach in political science

Important changes in the history of Russia started in the second part of 80-ties, when transition of the history of Russia into the new direction took place. The collapse of Soviet Union and the creating of new independent states, including Russia, became the realities of modern politics. Processes of development of democracy, as experience of the last years shows, promote development of democratic institutes and consolidation of democracy in the countries with uncompleted modernization and uncompleted democratic transition, where with complete basis it is possible to attribute Russia. A number of works show, that globalization results not only with internalization and closer interaction of different countries and civilizations, but also simultaneously is a cause of various sorts of crisis phenomena in less advanced countries and regions, strengthening the tendencies to their isolation, growth of national and self-consciousness. These tendencies earlier outlined by Samuel Huntington in his work "Clash of civilizations and Remarking the World Order?" play an important role in the modern world, rendering essential influence on processes of democratization[1].

Institutional approach will be used in the process of political analysis of Russia. Institutional theory teaches that institutions have a rather large capability to adapt themselves to changing conditions in their internal organization or in their external relations[2]. The institutional approach focuses on the rules, procedures and formal organizations of government. Institutional approach gives us the possibility to formalize political process; in this case the institute is "the rules of game". Institutional approach's specialists describe the political processes through the change and regulation of institutes.

Institutional approach is criticized though, because of formalization of political processes and denial (not accepting) of political position's and political behavior types spectrum[3]. Institutional approach is not able to explain non-formal institute's role in political processes: for example, analyzing the structure of political power, institutional approach operates with the categories of parliament, political parties and fractions, president, institutions of judge, but does not pay any attention to non-formal institutes. For further research the combination of various political science approaches will be valuable and may allow investigating research problem from different points of view.

2. Institutional system in Russia: the powerful president

The core of the institutional system of state is Constitution. Russia's current constitution was ratified in a national referendum in 1993. This Constitution establishes a hybrid of presidential and parliamentary forms; it is a mixed one, establishing a semi-presidential republic in which there are efforts to balance a powerful institution of executive authority with the parliamentary control over the activities of government. In the widely used typology proposed by M. Shugart and J. Carey, Russia's is a "presidential-parliamentary" design[4]. Such type of design typically corresponds to the following characteristics: 1) The president is elected by the citizens; 2) The president can appoint and give the sack to ministers; 3) Ministers require the confidence of Parliament; 4) The President has the right to give the sack to Parliament.

Other states with a presidential-parliamentary institutional system include the Weimar Republic, which prevailed in Germany between 1919 and 1933, as well as the Belarus Republic after 1996. It was the factor of constitutionalism in Russia in particular which influenced the structuring of the Belarusian institutional system most.

The president of Russia is the head of state and a guarantee of the constitution, as well as of human and civil rights and freedoms. President is popularly elected, neither has a vice-president. The president oversees a number of important issues. President can organize referendums to deal with specific issues, can decree a state emergency, can sign international treaties, and can pardon criminals. The Russian president is given the right to influence the work of the executive branch of government. President can appoint a new head of government, but this requires the agreement of the lower house of Parliament (the Duma). The structure of government is partly based on proposals from the prime ministers. President has the formal right to chair government meetings, although neither of the mentioned has been done very often. Russian president can sack the government. President also has specific authority in the area of legislation. The head of executive office can issue normative acts, which include *ukazi* and instructions. President has the right to initiative legislation and to veto laws. The President can sack Parliament – this is related to the work of the government. President of Russia can summon Parliament to emergency session; it applies to the lower chamber (house) – the Duma. President also has rights to send Epistles to Parliament. The president of Russia has authorities in the formation of the judge system: president can recommend candidates for posts on the Constitutional Court for approval to the upper chamber (house) of Parliament, the Federation Council.

The semi-presidential or "presidential-parliamentary" character of the institutional design has given the presidency a dominant position but not exclusive power over policy making. Executive power is divided between presidency and government, and checked by the Constitutional Court and parliament. As M. Shugart and J. Carey remark, the presidential-parliamentary institutional design is dangerous because of possible conflicts between the institutions; the reason is double legitimacy: both president and parliament are elected by citizens, so both of them are able to make reference to "people's choice, support and opinion"[5].

3. The problem of efficiency of institutes in Russia

Besides introduction and adaptation of such institutes as president and parliament in Russia, a serious problem is the maintenance of their efficiency and dynamism. Taking into account that during democratic transit in Russia the democratic institutes were spread from above, not basing on strong agreement (pact) of the basic political forces, the probability is great that in a crisis situation these institutes can show low effectiveness. Thus there is a certain contradiction: the new democratic political institutes cannot become effective enough if they do not use necessary support from the part of mass and elite groups of the society. To receive support and legitimacy for institutes is not effective in the eyes of the majority of the population capable to help with the decision of problems arising before the society.

Thus, the main question in transition to democracy is not so much the existence "of cleanliness of principles" of the basic political institutes, but how many can work for efficiency. However acknowledgement of the valid efficiency of the basic democratic institutes is the most difficult problem both in theoretical and in empirical fields. It concerns Russia first of all with its small experience in functioning of institutes of democracy. At the same time the key question consists of how the national traditions could be combined with efficiency of democratic political institutes. It is possible to assume, that effective democratic institutionalization in Russia can be made with a support of existing traditions and traditional institutes. Otherwise social changes would lead to the split of society, to the growth of social and political intensity, i.e. to instability of political and economic system, to strong steps back.

The analysis of laws of the statement and development of a democratic mode in Russia allows asserting, that the entered democratic political institutes become really effective only in a combination to values and norms of a society. From this point of view there are often statements about basic incompatibility of democracy and democratic institutes with traditions and norms of the Russian society which are at least incorrect. That fact, that democratic institutes can only gradually become adapted and effective, explains all zigzags both in the statement and in the functioning of the Russian political institutes.

Besides that Russian democracy is too often judged from the positions of modern democracy of the advanced countries, implicitly meaning, that Russia should copy institutes of these countries and should be guided in all matters by their experience. According to such an approach the processes of legitimacy of given social institutes are ignored. The achievement of legitimacy in the statement of democratic institutes can be accompanied by breaks, moving back to the political past. Such processes actually characterize the imperious attitudes in Russia: under the tsars, government was by despotic rule, occasionally enlightened but more often not[6]. The acuteness of a problem of efficiency of institutionalization is explained by difficulties of adaptation of many new institutes in the system of state management, their non-adaptiveness to conditions and traditions of the Russian society, insufficient support to democratic institutes by political elite and mass layers. At the same time, there exists a deep structural and values gap between political elites and mass society. All this, certainly, has an effect on efficiency of functioning of political institutes. In this relation, while the trajectory of movement of political system is not quite predetermined yet, various variants of further development are possible.

4. Non-formal institutes in the political processes of Russia

As for interrelations between the power institutions in Russia – executive and legislative, we are able to explain possible conflicts by institutional approach – institutional conflict is inside of the constitution, president-parliamentary system is the reason of instability (for example, on the one hand – president can initiate the dismissal of the parliament, and on the other hand – parliament can start the procedure of impeachment of the president): this explanation was correct for Yeltsin presidency time. But such approach is not productive for the presidency of Putin. The formal circumstances for conflict (the same constitution and legislation – except some amendments) don't work in different situation. Constitution is valued like formal scheme, within the bounds of which, formal institutes interact. This approach is correct for the science of law – for instance, constitutional law discipline, but it is not possible to explain some phenomena of political science using this approach.

Two points are important in this relation. Firstly, the personal characteristics of executive office's holder are important also as research components, which explain and compensate shortages of formalization of the political processes. Secondly, outside of such formalization of the institutional approach stay a lot of elements of political reality (such as so called "family", oligarchy groups, mafia, corruption, networking, non-official relations and attitudes etc.), which in some cases are more important than formal ones.

For the description of this phenomenon outside of institutional approach, we should use such definition as non-formal institutionalization. The non-formal institutionalization is an actual characteristic of post-authoritarian states. Non-formal institutionalization's core is the fact that non-formal institutes and rules displace the formal ones. The factors of non-formal institutes development in Russia are related mainly to: (1) patriarchal traditions in Russia; distance between society and state; (2) population (nation) of Russia as the object of governance; (3) negotiation and decision-making process is closed; backstage negotiations are prevalent; (4) close relations between power institutes and economical groups.

The domination of non-formal institutes does not allow creating the rule of law. This truth is universally acknowledged that the criteria of the rule of law are:

- Stability and transparence of legislation, laws; absence of reverse power of the law.
- Openness, steadiness, clearness and universality of rules and procedures on the basis of which the legislation can be accepted.
- Independence of the judgment system.
- Honest, opened and impartial cessions in courts.
- Possibility to repeal (cancel) non-legal laws.
- Accessibility of courts.
- Non-possibility of the power institutions to pervert the law[7],[8].

The enumeration of those criteria testifies that the rule of law is not possible with non-dominance of formal institutes. In the case of Russia it might be called as “unrule (deficit) of law”.

Discussing the perspectives of non-formal institutes in Russia, the specialists of Russia’s politics have different positions on the following: (1) the dominance of non-formal structures has principle long-term character (Gel’man[9]); (2) the dominance of non-formal institute made the foundation of Putin’s presidency possible. In the future two ways are possible – dominance of non-formal institutes or equalization of non-formal and formal institutes (Schevtsova[10]); (3) non-formal institutionalization is an important factor of Russian politics. It could be valued both as positive and negative. Positive – multi-polarity, competition between the non-fromal institutes. Negative – scorn of citizen’s interests, own aim’s realization[11].

5. Personal factors of the Russian presidency

In addition to institutional characteristics of the system it is necessary to take into account the psychological factors of leadership to preview how institutional system might be changed depending on personal and behavioral components. The personal factors of presidency of Russia could be explained by the process of comparing of two Russian presidents: Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. There are two different political styles, behaviors and types of president’s personality, each of them have turned the official scheme into specific direction. Putin is the politician, oriented to success, who never denies his ambitions and aims. Simultaneously Putin is able to make a step back, but only with the aim to achieve the planned result choosing a different way. Meanwhile president Yeltsin’s characteristic was his striving to feel his own power, but actually gave discretion to the member of so-called “family”. Yeltsin started to act in case of danger to his own authorities only. If Yeltsin determines the common direction in governance, Putin tries to investigate all matters thoroughly. Yeltsin`s appearance is tsar-type and sluggish (usual display of it is “work with documents”), Putin’s political style is active, lively, dynamic, and energetic.

Personal skills of Russian presidents express in the methods and ways of solving political conflicts. President Putin`s style of decision-making is rational, pragmatic and thrifty; he uses the machiavellianism[12] widely. He tries to solve the conflicts with the help of diplomacy and legitimate methods; for example, he neutralized ex-opponents Yuri Luzhkov and Yevgeni Primakov and modified the relations with them in the direction of “friendship”. As for Boris Yeltsin, he had no intention of playing the second fiddle on the political scheme; he was interested in keeping his own general direction of processes. Yeltsin usually tried to neutralize political opponent with the help of power. The attitude of command, what Yeltsin expected was personal loyalty and obedience. The problems, related to structural asymmetry and institutional potential of conflict between president and parliament increased by the personal skills of president. In many cases Yeltsin made decision to start the confrontation with the political opponents and not to discuss or negotiate. For example, in the behavioral conflict between president Boris Yeltsin and vice-president Alexander Rutskoy (which resulted with the armed resistance and the fire of Parliament in autumn, 1993) president Yeltsin played a role of “righteous victim”; in the last moment the tactics was changed into the powerful.

After the crisis, the strategy of president was changed to the "main guarantee of law and rule". However this strategy resulted just contrary to president's and his command's expectations: the political support started to weaken. Such tendency, which arose after autumn of 1993 became the main factor or Yeltsin's regime before the president's dismissal at the end of 1999.

6. Conclusion

Thus, a sign of a mixed, presidential-parliamentary institutional system is a powerful presidency, one that has extensive authority in the executive branch of government. In such countries governments face dual responsibility – before the president and before the parliament. In short, the analysis of the authority that is set out for the president of Russia in the state's Constitution (in some cases the president is authorized to take decisions in place of the government and the Duma, and in many other cases the government and the Duma are directly dependent upon the president) make it clear that the president has a leading role in the institutional system of Russia. This is made clear by those norms in the Constitution which place the president in a higher position than it is applied to any other participant in the process of national governance. It is necessary to remember, within the framework of formal scheme – Constitution – interrelates autonomous political actors – individuals and groups, which act according to their own interests and requirements. Except formal institutes and organizations, non-formal institutes are active in influencing of decision-making processes: non-formal institutes are as important for analysis of politics in Russia as the formal institutes are. Political processes in Russia couldn't be analyzed using institutional approach only; it is productive to use it in combination with the behavior approach in political science.

The main conclusions of research are: (1) the position of the presidential power in Russia is explained by structural asymmetry among constitution, parliament and presidency; (2) the efficiency of the institutes in Russia is based on unsolved democratic regime transformations; (3) the personal characteristics of power institute's headers and political elite's closed relations with the non-formal institutes explain the political processes in Russia.

For future research the combination of various methods will be used. For instance, behavioral approach uses the methods of psychology widely in political science. In the framework of behavioral approach, political behavior is understood as political subject's spontaneous interaction with the environment[13]. Political analysis is dealing not only through political institutes, but also through the human content, not only analyzing norms, but also reality. David Easton noted, the study of just rules or institutions is not able to explain the politics because relative values are not studied[14]. The combination of both institutional and behavioral approach can give valuable fundament for research, which allows to analyze the phenomena of political science from different positions: not only formalizing political processes through "rules of game", but also paying attention to the concrete political subjects and situations. In the framework of this research it means that the interrelation between the power institutions in Russia will be analyzed not only through the official scheme – Constitution of state, but also through explanation of the role of concrete "players" on the political scene; a special attention will be paid on the personal characteristics of decision-making process's actors and different non-formal institute's place and role in the domestic politics of Russia.

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Between “Soft” Europeanization and National Cultural Legacies: Democratic Discourses and Political Elites in Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and the Czech Republic

Presentation of a new research project at Uppsala University, Sweden

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Introduction

It is often stated in the literature that an important mechanism by which the EU and its institutions and informal networks influence the integration process is through elite socialisation (Pridham, 2005, Laffan, 2004, Lewis, 2004). Sometimes called a “soft” form of Europeanization as opposed to the “harder” forms of policy and institutional transfer, it refers to “ a psychological process, a process of framing and socialization” (Vermeersch, 2005, 76). “Soft” mechanisms of Europeanization should be particularly crucial in enlargement processes involving states with authoritarian legacies who are going through not only institutional transformation but, even more important, changes of mentalities and deep-rooted ways of thinking, like now the large group of former Communist countries. Because while institutions can be replaced quickly, culture in the sense of norms, values and “habits of the heart” is much more tenacious and continues to be influenced by political cultural traditions and legacies from the past (cf. Eckstein, 1988, Ekiert & Hanson, 2003). Political conditionality has been and still is strongly emphasised during the process of Eastern enlargement, implicating that the EU rests clearly on the foundations of Western liberal democracy. At the same time, the fifth enlargement has been described as a “cultural transformation from a logic of closure and antagonism to a dynamic of openness and accommodation that unlocks new directions of social and system integration beyond the western modernist project launched by Jean Monnet” (Bojkov, 2004, 510). That elected politicians and civil servants from applicant countries and even presumptive members are drawn into different kinds of co-operative formal structures like the Joint Parliamentary Committées (JPC) in the European Parliament, professional twinning programmes or informal networks already at an early stage in the accession process could thus be interpreted as an EU strategy for increasing political learning and in the longer run strengthening European identity-building. "Elite understanding is quite vital in directing a country´s accession. This is not simply a question of grasping the complexities of integration in both its institutional and its policy dimensions, essential to negotiations, but also of understanding the diverse mentalities in the EU institutions and its member states. There is a connection here with an understanding of democratic values and procedures in general" (Pridham, 2005, 79). Against this background, it is crucial to ask to what extent the political elites of the post-communist countries who are now quickly becoming also part of the European elite have come to embrace a liberal discourse on democracy? In other words, how efficient is elite socialisation at the EU-level in a field that will come to matter even more for the future legitimacy of the EU, namely democracy? These are the questions which will be addressed in the proposed project.

The Aim of the Project

The process of enlarging the EU eastwards and integrating a divided Europe came to a first stop in May 2004 when the first eight post-communist countries became full members. By many described as a historic moment, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania entered a cultural community based on liberal democracy and Christian values and are now part of the process of sustaining an "European civilisation" that aside from more immediate concerns could be regarded as the EU:s foremost spiritual *raison d'etre.* The first Eastern enlargement involved the eight post-communist countries who were believed to have developed the most democratically and economically. These were furthermore all states with extensive Western commercial contacts, to a large degree favoured by their embeddedness in the geopolitical sphere of the West. None of them carried the burdening legacy of a patrimonial Communist rule, but ranged from the most liberal nationalist-accomodative Communist regimes (Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Lithuania) to the more repressive bureaucratic-authoritarian (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia) (cf. Kitschelt *et al*, 1999). When the next step is taken in 2007, two countries with less advantageous Communist regime pasts will however be entering, Romania and Bulgaria. In an even longer run, there most probably will take place a closer rapprochement between the EU and Ukraine, a country which presently is struggling for Western orientation and identity. EU membership is quite high on the agenda in Romania and Bulgaria and "is rightfully deemed by the political elites in both countries as a possible solution to the political and economic problems plaguing their societies" (Bojkov, 2004, 513). In Ukraine, the pro-democratic forces are likewise turning to the EU for cultural and moral support, as well as institutional.

However, these three post-communist states are much less developed democratically than the first group since not least their Communist regimes were characterised by patrimonialism involving a pre-communist authoritarian rule, low levels of formal professional bureaucratization and high repression combined with high levels of co-optation (Kitschelt *et al,* 1999, 36-37, cf. Bojkov, 2004). In addition, the democratic period since the beginning of the 1990s has in these states been far from unproblematic and at least Ukraine under Kuchma was by many observers considered as a semi-democracy (cf. Way, 2004).

In short, because of their predominating authoritarian traditions of a patrimonial kind the inclusion of and opening up towards Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine constitutes a much larger challenge for the EU than any of the previous enlargements (including those of Spain, Portugal and Greece). At the same time, the great compliance of national political elites to demands of almost any kind from the EU has been striking among all applicant countries not least in the political sphere. "Such attitudes reflected a certain logic of appropriateness that the right way to conduct political affairs was to conform with official European standards. This could easily be matched with the failure of CEE elites to conceptualise their own form of democracy or think aloud about alternative forms of democratic procedures or democratic behaviour" (Pridham, 2005, 90). That the officially smooth accession processes thus often are born out of necessary but at times overly predominant instrumentality from the political elites in the applicant countries however raise questions regarding the extent to which such unity actually hides profound cognitive diversity. It has for example been claimed that the necessary meeting of minds, of cultural rapprochement has "so far failed to occur with Bulgaria and Romania" (Bojkov, 2004, 510). While it thus is obvious that the EU has considerable influence over institutional and economic development in the post-communist countries, the effects on fundamentally crucial cultural outlooks, on values and beliefs, are much less explored not least on the elite level.

In a recent study on post-communist political discourses on democratization, Dryzek and Holmes identified no less than fourteen different discourses that all were shaping outlooks among citizens in the thirteen studied countries. The discourses ranged from liberal, social democratic, moralistic, elitist, nationalist, nostalgic to presidential populist and authoritarian (2002, 264). Their study was, however, made already in 1997, and there are strong reasons to believe that since then the impact of soft Europeanization has created new preconditions for democratic perceptions. The aim of the proposed project is to investigate to what extent the Europeanization of the Romanian and Bulgarian elites has generated more cohesive cognitive outlooks on democracy approaching the liberal-democratic kind which forms the core of the EU:s democratic identity? Or if the "competing" influences of national legacies and transnational socialisation have produced national elite discourses which reflect both national legacies rooted in authoritarian lines of thought besides liberal elements. To provide "poles" against which the Romanian and Bulgarian elites can be compared two more countries are included.

Ukraine is an example of a state still in an earlier stage of Europeanization but with a similar Communist patrimonial background. Including Ukraine will also provide a very good basis for opportunities of following the process of elite adaptation in a state that most likely is going to play a more crucial role in the region and in relation to the EU than before. The Czech Republic will constitute a fourth reference "case" as the most Europeanized but selected among the new post-communist member states, since it is among those with the most troublesome Communist past (but with interwar democratic legacies). If elite socialisation has effects the Romanian and Bulgarian elites should be closer to the Czech than to the Ukrainian.

However, the political elites in these countries are not unified groups. It has been pointed out that there are already a second or even third generation of democratic elites dominating after the generation of the "breakthrough" (Frenzel-Zagorska & Wasilweski, 2000). While some members of the political elites are presently in a process of becoming parts of what can be called the European elite, others remain solely active at the national level thus creating a situation of elite dualism and potential cognitive tension in these states while still in the process of consolidation (cf. Wesolowski, 2000, 32).

In the study a comparison will be conducted of the "Europeanised" members of the national political elites and the "national" elites with the aim of drawing conclusions regarding institutional socialisation within the EU and whether such socialisation tends to create cognitive split on the elite level in the post-communist states. The study will theorise the question of cultural continuity and change by focusing on how the competing influences of EU socialisation and political cultural traditions give rise to new patterns of democratic thinking.

In sum, two questions will be asked focusing on the political elites in these four post-communist states: what are the consequences of EU socialisation on democratic discourses and what are the consequences of the EU on national elite cohesion? While socialisation effects can prove beneficial in uniting the "European" parts of the political elites there is a clear danger that an alienation of the national elites takes place if there are insufficient channels of communication between these. The major hypothesis, relating closely to the theme formulated by Sieps on the effects of the EU, is that institutional socialisation within the EU is indeed strong, tying together European top level decision makers into an elite but simultaneously distancing them from national elites and national political cultures (Cf. Laffan, 2004). From a democratic perspective such a development raises profound issues of legitimacy, representation and national supremacy which will be discussed.

The Role of Elites

Elite theories differ in their definitional strictness (cf. Etzioni-Halevy, 1997, Higley & Paluski, 2000). The elite paradigm for example emphasises that elites are social groups tied together by various features. In this project, political elites will however be defined positional, i.e. by the political posts they occupy in the system and not by sociological features. The aim is not to find out if elites exist but if there exists any cognitive cohesion at the political top level. Why should we be interested if there is developing a "unitary mind-set" of democracy on the elite level? Aside from the general truth that even though democratic government has spread world-wide, political elites continue to play crucial roles, there are a couple of particular preconditions which justify the focus on elites when EU (and the post-communist states) is concerned. The European Union is a "polity" still in the making even though it looks back at an over fifty year long existence. Its geographical borders are not settled, its constitutional foundations are unclear and the demarcation lines between Union authority and nation-state authority regarding policy areas are constantly floating as a result of changed practices. That clearly indicates that the European Union is a dynamic entity, but it also emphasises characteristic elements of change and transformation. The importance of elites becomes greater than usual in times of institutional and cultural change as a bulk of literature on for example democratic transitions and revolutions show. Furthermore, ever since the beginning of the 1990s there have been accusations of a "democratic deficit" within the EU. Through its institutional construction the EU thus gives too much power to political elites and too little to citizens to exercise control. This has often been formulated as an admittedly understandable critique in times of democratic euphoria that the European Union in particular on the political level is an "elite project". Whether we think that is desirable or not from a normative perspective it is hard to by-pass the fact that the political, judicial and professional elites populating the European institutions possess great powers in influencing choices and decisions vital for the future of the Union as well as for increasing or decreasing the popular support for Union existence and policies. The point of departure in the proposed research project is thus that it is precisely because of the elite character of the EU that there is a demand for increasing knowledge about the cognitive aspects of the political elites and the forces contributing to forming these characteristics.

Previous research

Today's literature on the European Union, its integration and the Eastern enlargement is extensive. The perspective has been overwhelmingly institutional while there is a lack of culturally and sociologically oriented studies that approach the EU as the social system it also is, held together not only by instrumental considerations and institutional structures but also by norms and beliefs (cf. Pridham, 2005). One growing strand in the literature preoccupied with cognitive perspectives is, however, the formation of European and alternative identities where institutional socialisation processes and identity-building on the elite level are focused and where ideas similar to the ones presented here have been developed (Sabic & Btglez, 2002, Hermann, Risse & Brewer (eds), 2004, Laffan, 2004, cf. Robyn (ed) 2005). Systematic research and comparisons are still very much lacking. The on-going Eastern enlargement and its effects on the post-communist countries has so far also mainly been approached by studying institutional and policy transfer in particular fields (Papagianni, 2003, Vermeersch, 2005, Verdun & Croci (eds), 2005), by more general and broad studies of democratic consolidation (Pridham, 2002, 2005) or party system change (or non-change) (Lewis, 2004, Dauderstädt, 2005, Hough & Handl, 2004). The literature on post-communist elites has mostly been biographically and sociologically oriented (Steen, 1997, Aareleid-Tart, 2000, Frenzel-Zágorska & Wasilwski (eds), 2000, Humphrey, Miller & Zdravomyslova, 2003). If concerned with subjective opinions of the elites, most often surveys have been used. The proposed project will bring together the three strands of research, on integration, enlargement and elites, but also relate the effects of the EU to the broader literature of socialisation and political culture.

Research Methodology

How do we as reliably and valid as possible identify the cognitive dimensions that structure national elite discourses about democracy? There are of course several possible ways to proceed, including surveys, long qualitative interviews and even focus group research. Although survey research has become all the more common in political science there are some reasons for ruling it out in this project. While its advantages lie in the representation and generalisation, the drawbacks are likewise obvious. Categories of values are pre-decided and atomised, answers are close-ended and do not give room for complexity and nuances and the attitudes captured may change rather radically as a consequence of the situation and what

happened to the respondent just before answering the survey. I will not go into a detailed critique of survey research here, but suffice it to say that not least reliability can be problematic. Furthermore, previous experiences, both my own and those of others, show that when investigating elite groups personal interviews work much better than a standardised survey (Putnam, 1973, Barrling Hermansson, 2004). Instead, in order to lay bare the elite actors' mindsets regarding such a complex theoretical and empirical phenomenon as democracy, I have decided to use the so called Q methodology which was originally developed in psychological research (Stephenson, 1935, 1953, Brown, 1980) but has since been successfully employed in various other disciplines including political science (Dryzek & Holmes, 2002, Robyn *et al,* 2005). This is an approach "that seeks the orderly examination of human subjectivity" (Robyn, 2005, 19). The basic idea is that each individual in the study rank-order a set of statements (usually between thirty to sixty statements) regarding a specific topic with reference to the extent that the individual agrees or disagrees to the statement as an accurate description of the topic (in the case here democracy). The statements are not constructed from pre-decided categories but are generated from the particular discourse in that context since the point of departure is that there is a "shared communicability" in societies on many topics which constitutes the framework within which the individual forms his own 'discourse'. Factor analysis of the results from all the participants are conducted and "the goal of the Q study is to reveal common groupings of opinion within a given population on a particular topic" (Robyn, 2005, 20). The major reason for conducting a discourse analysis employing the Q-methodology is that this methodology appears better than either surveys or various forms of qualitative interviews in revealing systematically and reliably thought structures, "discourses" among individuals since it combines qualitative and quantitative techniques. The Q-methodology enables the researcher to capture coherent "themes" or discourses which can and often do vary between individuals even in the same cultural group. By using Q methodology, Dryzek & Holmes (2002) for example made a seminal contribution to the literature on post-communist democratisation by analysing the various democratisation discourses that prevailed in their thirteen-country study. Recently, discourses on European identity have been studied and compared in a large number of EU member states (including Sweden) by the use of Q methodology (Robyn *et al*, 2005). There is no room to go into a more detailed description here, but the basis for the analysis will be individuals defined as positionally belonging to the political elite and selected according to certain criteria elaborated in the methodological literature on the Q-technique.

Practical Considerations

The empirical research work will be conducted by docent Li Bennich-Björkman with the help of local student assistants. I am quite experienced in interviewing top level decision-makers. I published a study in 1997 based entirely on depth interviews with academics and have since headed and conducted several Swedish studies where interviews have been frequently used. During the last four years my research field has been political development and democratisation in the three Baltic States. That has involved interviewing more than one hundred present and previous members of parliaments, government representatives, ministers and others, sometimes with the help of translators and sometimes in English. Recently, similar work was started in Ukraine (I made a field visit to Kiev in May 2005). My research networks are as a consequence of previous research oriented towards Central and Eastern Europe and I have several useful academic contacts in the Czech Republic, Romania and Ukraine who can facilitate planning and implementing research. The research will be reported in two articles for international publication one empirical and one theoretically oriented. Aside from that, I also plan a more popular publication in Swedish for politicians and practitioners.

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"We Used to Be so International": Everyday Cross-Border Relations at the Estonian-Latvian-Russian Borderlands

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The disintegration of the Soviet Union created numerous borders between states in places where there had only been borders between Soviet republics. The borders between the different Soviet Republics were administrative, and there were no border controls or posts. One of the priority tasks facing each new state after the dissolution of the Soviet Union was to institute functioning border regimes with its neighbours. For Russia, the borders with its Baltic neighbours manifested and confirmed a new political reality which Russia (and many Russians) has had some difficulty dealing with. Nevertheless, Russia's relations with its new Baltic neighbours have stabilised and improved and the borders in question have become the least of Russia's borderland and ethnic worries (see Valuev 2003). For Estonia and Latvia, small countries that in 1991 regained their independence after almost fifty years of Soviet occupation, the state borders with Russia are of special political and symbolic significance. Both of these countries have also had serious disagreements with Russia about the proper location of the borderline. In both cases the border as a physical and politico-juridical reality is a factor that strongly divides the people who happen to live on its opposite sides.

After the initial porousness of the Estonian-Russian and Latvian-Russian borders in the 1990s, new stricter and more uniform border regimes have been enforced since 2000. From 2004 Estonia and Latvia are members of both the European Union and NATO, and the borders in question have become the EU's new borders towards Russia and Russia's new land border facing a NATO country. These changes have forced local inhabitants in the region to ask themselves a crucial question: to which state to belong? Flexible borderland identities, statuses and practices are not encouraged by the respective states or by powerful agents like the European Union and NATO, which want their new borders facing Russia to be efficiently controlled. Today, when everyday personal contacts across these borders are much more difficult and costly than before, local residents have to make decisions about and plans for their residence and citizenship that had little relevance in the Soviet period or in the early years of new independent statehood.

Our anthropological research project[1] explores how the states' efforts at nation building with and at their borders concretely affect the everyday lives of women and men, young and old who live in a peripheral area of the former Soviet Union where Estonia, Latvia and Russia meet. We examine local residents' efforts to adapt to, support or oppose the workings of the respective states in a situation where the recently enacted state borders are an important part of everyday life. The issues of border, border crossings, citizenship and ethnic/national identity are vividly present in local people's acts and conversations, and therefore we have used them in our analysis as clues to studying the local actors' relationship with the state. The findings are based on observations of everyday interaction, on thematic interviews and conversations with local residents and on written materials collected for the purposes of this research.[2]

An anthropological perspective on borders and border crossings that investigates both the overlap and the limits of state action and authority draws attention to the agency of the subjects under study. Borderland dwellers in their everyday actions often defy, counteract or subvert rules and regulations defined by state actors, as in illegal crossings or informal cross-border trade. But even when they behave legally, local residents attach meanings to the border that differ significantly from those of actors at other levels. For example, for local actors borders are more porous than state actors would usually expect. Even extremely guarded borders can be crossed in some ways, and through many different activities. Furthermore, cultural borders are more fluid and flexible than political borders and rarely do these two coincide (Wilson and Donnan 1998; Verdery 1998; Donnan and Wilson 2003). Borders can also mean very different things to men and women, and to people of different ages.

The case of the borderlands between the three former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia and Russia provides a very topical case to study the relationships between symbolic-cultural boundaries and juridical-political ones. The eastern border of Estonia and Latvia has sometimes been seen as part of the easternmost border of Western civilization, as in political scientist Samuel Huntington's much-disputed thesis about an unavoidable clash of civilizations (Huntington 1996). It is true that the border between majority Russian Orthodox and Protestant (Lutheran) Christianity runs precisely here, although the religious and ideological border has always been permeable. Even in atheist Soviet times there was a clear mental line between the Russian SSR on the one hand and the Baltic socialist republics on the other. Also, the Estonian and Latvian fear of 'the big bear' of Russia is understandable in the light of the long Soviet occupation (and earlier relationships with imperial Russia), and this distrust is bound to affect all kinds of cross-border relations, including economic ones, for many years to come. Seen from the Russian perspective, the efforts of her small western neighbours to assert their distinctiveness might easily seem exaggerated. However, nationalistic sentiments are used, popularised and enhanced for political purposes by all sides (Ruutsoo 1995; Smith et al. 1998; Verdery 1998; Oldberg 2002; Valuev 2003).

The cases that I present in this paper are drawn from the Russian-Latvian border area where we have studied villages in the Aluksne district (*Aluksnes rajons*) in Latvia and the Pechory district (*Pechorskii raion*) in Russia. The Aluksne district as a whole is 82 per cent Latvian and 17 per cent Russian-speaking, but in the villages facing the Russian border the percentages are reversed. In Pededze village, three kilometres from the Russian border, 74 per cent of the population is ethnically Russian and 78 per cent Russian-speaking (Alusknes rajons 2002). There are both Latvian citizens and non-citizens among the Russian-speakers of Pededze. Those who have Russian citizenship travel most often to Russia, since they experience less practical difficulties than Latvian citizens. Most Russian-speakers have at least some knowledge of Latvian, due to a minority situation of Russian language in this region as a whole. The population of Pechory district, on the other hand, is overwhelmingly Russian or Russian-speaking, with very small but distinctive minorities of Estonians and Setos. In Lavry (Lauri) village, seven kilometres from the Latvian border, there is a Latvian minority, people who consider themselves to be Latvian, although do not always speak the language. As a whole, the Latvian roots and Latvian history of the village are acknowledged and appreciated, also by local Russians. Moreover, local Russians tend to distinguish themselves from ‘newcomers’ (Russian-speakers of different nationalities of the former Soviet Union).

The research areas at the Estonia-Russian border are coastal villages of Lake Peipus and the Setomaa/Petserimaa area. We have also done some comparative interviews in villages on the Latvian-Estonian border area, in Aluksne district in Latvia and the Võru district (*Võru maakond*) in Estonia. (See Assmuth 2003.)

Until the year 2000, Estonian and Latvian citizens living in border municipalities facing Russia had been allowed to cross the border without a visa on certain important religious holidays, like Easter or local patron saints’ days, if they could provide proof of living or dead close relatives in Russia, and if they applied for inclusion in the official list of such visitors. This practice of simplified border crossings was successful in easing the situation of practising Russian Orthodox Setos, most often elderly women, who have been by far the most regular visitors from Estonia to the Russian side. In Latvia, there have been similar bilateral arrangements for so-called simplified border crossing that have particularly eased the everyday lives of ethnic Russian non-citizens who live in villages close to the Russian border (see Valuev 2003).

Full mutual visa regimes have been in force between Estonia and Russia and Latvia and Russia since 2000. In the last five years, Estonian and Latvian border officials have regularly exchanged lists with their Russian counterparts of border-area residents who have received free or reduced-price entry visas to the neighbouring country. The visa exemptions for borderland residents have continued even after Estonia and Latvia joined the European Union in May 2004, but such practices are due to end at the latest in 2007 in accordance with Estonia and Latvia joining the Schengen agreements.

When doing fieldwork in this border area of the former Soviet Union, we have heard numerous fascinating and gripping descriptions about how the new border regime very concretely affects local people’s lives. Besides the many negatively felt effects of the nearby border there are also some positive effects. For example in Lavry village the new border has brought with it some new job opportunities. We interviewed a woman in her 50s who has got a relatively well-paid job at the new village gas station. She is not completely happy with her job, however, because of its low social status; this woman has a university degree and naturally feels that a saleswoman’s job is beneath her capacities and educational level. It is still better than nothing, and the gas station came about as a consequence of increased flow of customers due to the border regime. We talked to a man in his early 40s who was made redundant with many others when the local collective farm collapsed. He got a job in the border services. This man has a middle-class background and is highly educated but has to content himself with working as a driver at the border crossing point. Were it not for this blue-collar job there would be nothing available for him in Lavry. This local man feels with resentment that his family has lost its high social status of the rural intelligentsia in post-Soviet Russia.

The school-pupils' essays from Misso, a county in south-eastern Estonia that borders both Russia and Latvia, are full of personal and family stories about the everyday difficulties of visiting relatives and family graves, shopping and trading on the Russian side. Interestingly, these 17- and 18-year-olds make comparisons with both the times of the non-existent border (Soviet times) and the early years of independence (1991-1994), when the border was still porous enough to be crossed freely in practice. Many of the memories that the pupils relate are actually those of their parents and grandparents, which shows how urgent and much discussed the theme of the border actually is in these borderland families. An 18-year-old girl writes:

> *When there wasn't a border regime my parents very often went to Latvia and Russia. A couple of times a week. Everything was much cheaper there. They bought clothes, carpets, food. It was much cheaper to go by bus to Latvia and Russia than to Võru or Tartu. It was a shorter distance and much more comfortable for people who live in the borderland. They could not even imagine a different kind of life.*

And from the essay of a 17-year-old boy:

> *In the Soviet times my parents grew potatoes and went to sell them to the market in Pskov. That gave them a job and some extra money for living. Now you can't cross the border and we've been left without that money. Therefore life was better when we could still go to the Russian market.*

There is also the intriguing story of a school boy who goes to school in Misso although his home is on the Russian side, 20 kilometres from the present border. He has experienced directly all the changes in the border-crossing regime:

> *"The state borders between Russia, Latvia and Estonia came about when I went to my first classes at school. In the beginning, when I started first grade, there wasn't a border yet. Back then it was really easy to go to school compared with how it is now, because now the buses don't run anymore. Then the buses ran many times a day and I could always go back home after school. When the border came all the pupils who came to Estonian schools from Russia had to live in boarding houses, which wasn't nice at all. ... But lately the border crossing has become even more difficult. When I now come to school I can't ever go back home except for some weekends."*

Despite the deeply felt concerns of the local people, it is not likely that the border regime on the two Baltic borders facing Russia will become more relaxed or more tailored towards the needs of borderland residents. On the contrary, the easternmost border of the European Union is going to be strictly controlled. The present situation makes spontaneous, informal and personal interaction and trade across the Estonian-Russian and Latvian-Russian borders quite difficult (cf. Kuldin 1999; Berg and Oras 2003), but despite all the difficulties and for various motives, borderland residents do engage in such interaction (for other Russian borders see Valuev 2003).

Seen from the Latvian side, there are economic, familial and educational motives for quite many people to keep up relations with the Russian side. Most Russian-speakers who are permanent residents in Latvia sometimes travel to Russia for cheaper shopping and for family visits. Some Latvian Russians have even sent their children to continue their education in the Russian city of Pskov, where living costs are much lower than anywhere in Latvia. Such everyday cross-border interaction is much more difficult, however, for ethnic Russian Latvian citizens wanting to visit Russia; for them, a rather expensive visa is needed. In such circumstances it is clear that personal relationships across the border are eventually becoming less common.

Seen from the Russian side, a Lavry man born in 1936 told us about his frequent visits to the neighbouring countries:

> *Interviewer: Do you go to Estonia and Latvia often?*
>
> *Respondent: Yes, I do. Yesterday I was in Latvia. I was in Ape for private matters... I go there by bicycle.*
>
> *I.: Do many people go there by bike?*
>
> *R.: Most go by foot.*
>
> *I.: Why did you go to Latvia?*
>
> *R.: I have family members there ... And I was in Estonia a couple of days before.*

Identities at the borderland

The population of the Lavry area, which includes the main village and small hamlets and isolated farmsteads around it, is about 2000 people and only about 20 Latvian families are living there at present. Only a few of the Latvians speak Latvian in their families. As one old Latvian woman told us: "We speak Russian at home, my husband and I. We live among Russians – that's why we speak Russian". (Kormina 2001.)

Our respondents told us that Lavry was the centre of a Latvian settlement that was established in this region in the 1860s. Between 1920 and 1940 this territory was a part of the Republic of Estonia. In 1949 many Latvians of Lavry were among those deported to Siberia. Those who were able to return did not settle in Lavry as a rule. A considerable part of them went to live in the Estonian SSR. Some of the local Latvians have returned back to Lavry only during the last ten years. Thus, the population of Lavry has changed considerably. However, while conducting fieldwork there we found a strong local patriotism among modern Lavry's inhabitants. What is important is that this local patriotism is based on the "Latvian" and "Estonian" history and heritage of Lavry. (Kormina 2001.)

Local Russians and Latvians have a shared understanding about the past of their village in the period when Pechory district was under Estonian rule. Both groups had equal rights and neither of them was the titular nation. However, when telling about this period some Russians noted that they had somehow felt themselves as being part of an ethnic minority in those times. After Soviet power was established local Russians became and started to feel as the majority population. In the present situation they are in fact an absolute majority, and yet they need the Latvians with their unique heritage to make this place something special. (Kormina 2001.)

The ideas of the ethnic Russian informants living in the Pechory district about what it means for them to be Russian vary a great deal. In Lavry opinions and ideas range from extreme, chauvinistic Russophilia to the idealisation of the Latvian heritage and culture of the village. In the first case, Russianness is constructed in opposition to other identities and peoples, and is seen to be superior to either Estonianness or Latvianness. In the second case, Russianness is constructed on the basis of a multicultural local identity, which means that it is flexible and changeable. At the moment, aggressive nationalistic Russophilia is to some degree being promoted by some influential regional as well as national leaders. For example, the ancient roots of Russian culture in this part of Russia, especially in the form of the Russian Orthodox Church, have recently been stressed and symbolically asserted by the president of Russia himself. For many local people on the Russian side, then, the Pechory district is unquestionably ‘a holy Russian land’.

By contrast, in Pededze village in the Latvian borderland, our informants commonly referred to themselves as ‘Latvian Russians’, even when they are not Latvian citizens. Many people made it absolutely clear to us that they feel different from Russians in Russia proper – and that they get treated differently, ‘Westernised’ or ‘Latvianised’, by Russians on the other side of the border or while visiting in Moscow or St. Petersburg. In some situations and contexts they wish to stress their ethnic Russian or Russian-village identity, in other contexts they emphasise more the differences between their own Latvian Russian culture and that of the ‘true Russians’. Hilary Pilkington (1998), in her study of ethnic Russian migrants from the former Soviet republics to Russia, also notes that Russians who have lived among other nationalities often develop a heightened sense of their Russian-ness, feel different from or superior to Russians in Russia, and definitely get treated differently by them. This is clear in this typical quote from one of Pilkington’s returnee informants: ‘Although we are Russians (*russkie*), we are not the same kind of Russians that live here’ (Pilkington 1998:191).

Jelena, 30 years old, who lives in Aluksne town, had a nice way of expressing her identity. She is an ethnic Russian who was born in Pededze and has lived all her life in Latvian territory. (Interview by Sanita Vanaga 2000, LV18.)

> *Question: Do you feel yourself here as a Russian in Latvia or a Latvian Russian, or how would you characterize yourself?*
>
> *Jelena: My personal feelings I could characterize so that I feel that I’m more a Latvian with a Russian touch. There isn’t a right word to characterize my feelings.*

Marina, 32 years, is an ethnic Russian woman who lives in Pededze village. She told the interviewer about how the practical and emotional get blurred in matters of citizenship and identity:

> *Question: But what do you think – are you more an inhabitant of Pededze, of the Alūksne district, of Vidzeme, of Latvia, of Russia? What would you say, where do you belong?*
>
> *Marina: Actually, I am a citizen of Russia, but it's not because of my conviction, so to say, but it's because when I drew up my documents for a visa and contemporary residence permit, then they told me short and sweet that in Latvia there are already enough aliens [residents without any citizenship]. You have to decide, you must have some citizenship. Well, which citizenship? I could only get the citizenship of Russia. So, for this reason I got the Russian citizenship. But during these years, however, with a small interruption, I feel myself as an inhabitant of Latvia. Latvia, Alūksne is my second motherland now. So, I don't want to go anywhere from here. (Interview by Sanita Vanaga 2000, LV8.)*

People everywhere are re-creating and re-enforcing local and ethnic identities, and the same processes are under way in the former Soviet Union. The paradox of the 21st century is that the increasing homogenisation of economies and societies is paralleled by cultures becoming more and more heterogeneous. People living in different European peripheries have indeed become thoroughly modern and still want to and decide to retain their cultural distinctiveness. Many of our informants are now making new choices with regard to their ethnic identities as Seto, Russian, Latvian or Estonian. But a modern ethnic identity is not exclusive: the people who live in the border villages in three different states will continue to want to choose their distinct ethnic identities, but they might also at the same time feel that they are borderlanders, village people, citizens of their nation states or Europeans, depending on the context. In the modern world, people can and will hold multiple identities, and increasingly, they are doing so quite consciously.

Conclusion

The borderlands between Estonia, Latvia and Russia have become peripheries of all three new states, and people on all sides feel cut off from earlier ties and ways of living and moving about. In the Russian borderlands such feelings of loss and nostalgia are especially strong in the village of Lavry, which really has declined considerably in the post-Soviet period. In the town of Pechory people are more optimistic, but their hopes and plans for the future are very much directed towards their richer neighbour, Estonia. In the borderlands of both Estonia and Latvia young people have by now almost turned their backs on poor Russia. They direct their future hopes and aspirations towards the capital cities of their nation-states, towards urban living and life-styles, and also towards ‘Europe’. An ethnic Estonian man in his thirties living in Vecleicene, a village three kilometres from the border with Estonia, answered my question about what it means to him to live in a borderland:

> *We [the villagers] never used to think of ourselves as living in some kind of far-away place. On the contrary, we were so close to everything here: Riga, Leningrad, Pskov, even Novgorod was close to us! We used to be so international [laughs]! But now... Riga is far, even Tartu is far, and Tallinn is very far. And all the rest are equally cut off. So yes, this has become the bottom end of*

Latvia, the end of the road, a dead end if you like. But who knows, things have changed so many times in so many directions around here, they might change once again.

Indeed, in some circles there are high hopes for this area becoming an international crossroads instead of a ‘back pocket’ of three strictly separate states. Entrepreneurs, regional and EU bureaucrats and some intellectuals have visions of and plans for regional co-operation in tourism, infrastructure and trade. For example, in the booklet of the South-Eastern Estonian Logistics Development Foundation (1999) the area is optimistically represented as ‘the gateway between the new European Union and Russia’. The newest idea of regional co-operation is in terms of the EU’s Euregio (EU-region) cross-border areas, where the proposed Euregio Tartu-Pskov would be the second such area to include Russia as partner (the first being Euregio Karelia between Finland and Russia)[3] (Krashevsky et al. 2003). Whether and how the local people would benefit from such developments is still an open question, but a future in national peripheries isolated from each other is certainly not beneficial to them either. Unfortunately, among our informants in the three countries we have so far encountered only very few signs of a developing *regional* identity.

Research on Russian-speakers who live in Pechory district facing Estonia shows that some local people are starting to consider the new border not as an obstacle to economic development but rather as a possible advantage. Kuldin (1999) found that the perceived economic and other opportunities of a border situation have encouraged young people to stay on in the area. A Seto activist informant told us that in recent years an increasing number of new private farmers have been moving into the Pechory district, which they apparently find an economically dynamic and relatively safe area. As elsewhere, people make use of all kinds of illegal or informal economic opportunities connected with the border, such as smuggling and picking berries and mushrooms in the quiet forests of the border zone. Small-scale private enterprise has also slowly developed between the national economic areas: in the town of Pechory people can now arrange a taxi to come and take them from the Estonian border to the town; and more and more stalls are appearing in the town market where Ukrainians, Belorussians and Moldavians sell their produce to visitors from Estonia and even foreign tourists and pilgrims.

Thus, living *close* to these particular state borders can be beneficial to some people in the three countries involved, and I have described here how people adapt to, adjust and manipulate the complexities and changes of borderland living. However, different people have very unequal capabilities to do this. In the present circumstances it is very difficult to imagine true co-operation *across* the borders on an equal basis for all participants. The gap in living conditions and standards is much too big between Russia on the one hand, and Estonia and Latvia, on the other, and if anything the gap seems to be getting bigger.

Seen from the vantage point of this case study my somewhat grim conclusion is that Russia has remained firmly in post-Soviet space and mentality whereas next-door neighbours Estonia and Latvia have made an enormous leap forward in only a few years. The two Baltic states have been eager to and successful at shredding almost all traces of their Soviet past. In this sense there is now a real barrier between Russia and its Baltic neighbours. But this is not the only dividing line. As Valuev (2003) notes for Russia as a whole, there are also tensions between the national centre Moscow and the regional administrations of the border regions. Moscow has shown little interest and commitment to developing the border regions and the regions’ efforts to invent new kinds of cross-border co-operation are viewed with suspicion. On a smaller scale, this is true also of Estonia and Latvia, where rural people in almost every region feel forgotten, betrayed and excluded from the benefits of record economic growth and Europeanization. Both Latvia and Estonia only started to pay serious attention to regional disparities when EU structural funds for regional development became available during the EU accession negotiations.

The feeling of having been left on their own by the respective states is something that people on all sides of the border seem to share, to varying degrees of course. In this sense the state is conspicuously absent in the borderlands, like in ‘ordinary’ peripheries. But paradoxically, the state is also very much present precisely because of the border location, and people are continuously reminded of the power of the state when they go about their daily lives. The presence of the border thus becomes an additional extra burden on these regions and their people.

In this paper I have focused on everyday life experiences at a special kind of international border, that between the post-Soviet states of Estonia, Latvia and Russia. This kind of closer-up perspective on lives at borders, made possible by ethnographic fieldwork is, I believe, the crucial contribution of anthropology to border studies. In this spirit I end with the story of an 18-year-old Seto boy from Misso high school in Estonia about the effects of the border on his family life. I think this is an apt reminder of the absurdities of borderland living from the point of view of local residents. The boy writes:

> *We have lots of relatives who live in Russia. The one who lives the closest is my aunt. When we count the distance between our home and where she lives it is about 700 metres. You can see the border with Russia from our doorstep. If it wasn’t for a small forest we could even see my aunt’s house. She herself lives about 50 metres from the border. She lives on her own, all alone. Sometimes, when the weather is good, one of us goes to the border to meet with the aunt, especially in summer when the weather is warm. Sometimes we do it all together. What makes us sad is the fact that she can’t hear so well. We have to stand at about 15 metres distance from each other. It’s a terrible sight, really. But if we want to really meet her, talk to her and comfort her we have to travel 35 kilometres through the border crossing point. It is so sad.*
>
> *Sad indeed. But then, these are in many ways sad borders, these new European Union borders facing Russia.*

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Footnotes

[1] Research projects 'Ethnic identity and everyday life in the borderlands between Estonia, Latvia and Russia' (1999-2001) and 'Russia and the new EU-neighbours on a local level: a comparative ethnography of the border area between Estonia, Latvia and Russia' (2004-present). Besides the author, the researchers in the projects are: Dr. Jeanna Kormina and Marina Hakkarainen from the European University at St. Petersburg; Sanita Vanaga and Aija Lulle from the University of Latvia; and Dr. Aili Kelam, Institute of International and Social Studies, Tallinn Pedagogical University. The projects have been funded by the Academy of Finland and by the University of Helsinki Network for European Studies.

[2] The discussion in this paper is based on fieldwork in 2000 and 2004. See Assmuth 2003, 2004 for detailed descriptions of all research areas. The main research material are transcripts of long theme interviews conducted with men and women of different ages, nationalities, citizenships and social positions. For this paper mainly the Russian and Latvian interview materials have been used. Besides the transcribed interviews, the other large body of research material is essays (N=110) written in 2000 by school pupils (17-18-year-olds) from the study areas on the themes of ethnic and local identity and the border. These were collected by way of a writing competition organised in local schools by interested teachers. Here twenty-four essays written in schools in Estonia, Latvia and Russia are utilised (thirteen written by girls, eleven by boys).

[3] In fact, the EU Phare Program funded Euregio Pskov-Livonia was established in 2003 under the governance of the Council for Co-operation of Border Regions between the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia and the Russian Federation. See Development of Cross-border co-operation in the region Pskov-Livonia: vision 2010. http://www.aluksne.lv/cbc/EN/PROJEKTI.htm, also www.stete.org/annuskans/

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Political Elite's Value-Attitudes and Legitimacy of Power in Russia in the Middle of 1990s

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Background

Democratic transition in Russia is greatly influenced by changes in national elites' configurations and by their behaviour. I believe, these changes are a major determinant of post-communist transformation. Stable democracy requires the political elite with consensual attitudes towards society. Stable democracy and integrated nation-state cannot be established if there exists weak or non-differentiated elite without legitimacy and political tolerance.

The key questions arise: are divided, fragmented, or consensual national elites emerging in these countries? What are the attitudes and perceptions of national elites? These questions are addressed to the transformations of elites in the Russian Federation. In this respect, the paper is focused on the analysis of political elite's value-attitudes and legitimacy of power in Russia. From the empirical point of view, the paper is oriented towards understanding of contradictions and preferences in values, as well as the state developments and policy priorities. Our main hypothesis is: the level of political consolidation of Russian political elites is low and depends on dispersion of political power, and elites' value dimensions and policy preferences.

Data and Methodology

The survey of the Russian political elite and its attitudes towards the Baltic States is based on the survey "Political Elite in the Russian Federation", which was done by the author in the period of November 1996 – February 1997, in the Russian State Duma (Parliament). The data on political elite's opinion were gathered from formalized face-to-face questionnaire-interviews that had been conducted with sixty-nine deputies of the Russian Parliament. Identifying political elite by formal position was supplemented by "reputation analysis" and "decision-making" approaches (Dahl 1961). The borderlines and structure of the Russian political elite and its attitudes were explained using a model aimed at discovering the Russian deputies' perception of the political elite. All deputies were formally interviewed in the Russian Duma, by Russian interviewers. The sample of the Russian political elite is also representative and reflects the composition, blocks, and factions in the Russian Duma.

Legitimacy of Power in Russia

To study the extent of democratic consolidation of the political elites in Russia, the leaders' attitudes towards legitimacy and political power were analyzed.

Legitimacy plays an important role in functioning of any type of society, its models of political changes and stability. Legitimacy indicates acceptance of the ruler's authority by the subordinates. According to various scholars (Lipset and Bendix 1959; Lipset 1981; Lipset, Linz and Diamond 1988; Miller and Listhaug 1991, and others), legitimacy is the belief that the existing social institutions are appropriate for the society or simply better than others. There is a lot of confusion and disputable questions relating to how much legitimacy a particular state has, or what should be considered as an "ideal legitimate" regime (Linz 1988). According to M. Dogan, legitimacy comes gradually (Dogan and Kazancigil 1994, p. 302). In order to compare a variety of regimes, many scholars rank them from complete support (which may be a sign of totalitarian regime) to complete rejection, which indicates the existence of an illegitimate state. There is no confusion if opinion holders support legitimacy of the regime and, at the same time, neglect or have lost confidence in governmental institutions and political leadership. The declared distinction between regime, power and office-holders, which is typical of pluralist democracies, is becoming a matter of practice in transitional societies.

Legitimacy is particularly important during the regime transformation into a democratic form of government, because democracy can work only when supported by the people (Higley, Pakulski and Wesolowski 1998; Miller and Listhaug 1991). But the theories of legitimacy are concerned with the dual social problem of extinguishing the old political legal cynicism and distrust in government, a legacy of the totalitarian regime, and constructing of new legitimacy in the process of democratization. Moreover, changes in democratic institutions and structural imitations may be duplicated by a high level of political alienation and distrust in government, as in case of the Baltic States (Rodins 1993, 1999, 2000; Steen 1996).

Legitimacy can be tested empirically by surveying opinion-polls on confidence in institutions, trust in leaders and support for the regime (Miller, Reisinger and Hesli 1993; Dogan and Kazancigil 1994; Miller 1974).

Attitudes towards institutions of power, leadership and regime may me regarded as a precondition of legitimacy and integrative politics.

Confidence in Institutions

Confidence in institutions is considered a vital and important prerequisite for political stability in democratic society. Public opinion on issues of confidence in institutions and trust in political leaders is a primary indicator of the state of a particular society. Most reports on public attitudes towards confidence in institutions in Western democracies demonstrate low level of society's confidence in various social and political institutions (Listhaug and Wiberg 1993; Miller and Listhaug 1991). Miller's opinion survey in Russia gives exact indications of strong crisis of respondents' confidence and absence of political trust in traditional institutions. According to Miller and his colleagues, a rather low level of confidence in new alternative institutions and structures has emerged as a part of transition from totalitarian regime (Miller, Reisinger and Hesli 1993, p. 60). The same evidence of little positive attitudes and trust in institutions has been collected in Rose's survey conducted in Russia (Rose 1993, 1995). In this case, the question of interrelation between the low level of confidence and political stability and performance is still conceptually and empirically uncertain (Lane 1995).

In Table 1 the institutions are presented and ranged according to their policy-making functions (president, parliament, government, local governments, political parties/movements, trade unions), implementing functions (courts, security forces), more symbolic functions (armed forces, church, press, mass media, system of education) and private-interest functions (private business). It is evident that the attitudes towards various groups of institutions are different. The expected low level of confidence and its distinctive character coincide, and this may be explained both by various reports on apathy and cynicism Russia (Rose 1993), and by selective perception of output of existing institutions, which has affected the individual's life in particular ways. Various reports on transformational process and its participants in Russia are presented in the conference reports "Where Russia Comes" (Zaslavskaja 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000).

A dependent variable in our analysis is the individual/mass level of confidence as perceived by representatives of the elite. This variable is based on the answers given to the following two questions: 1) "Please, consider these alternatives and state how much confidence you have in each of the institutions listed."; 2) "In your opinion, to what extent ordinary people trust leaders of the following institutions".

The empirical results of confidence in institutions in Russia are presented in Table 1. Institutions with symbolic functions, such as church and the system of education enjoyed more confidence among elites and masses. The President in Latvia had twice more confidence among elites and masses than Boris Yeltsin had in Russia. The policy-making institutions like government and local governments in Russia enjoyed very little confidence. The same low level of confidence was reported towards national armed and security forces, mass media and private business. Surprisingly, the lowest level of support was declared towards political parties and movements (10.1% in Russia and 31.6% in Latvia) and trade unions in Russia (7.4%), which were playing a rather decorative role in the political process. The low level of confidence in political parties may be explained by the lack of tradition of multi-party system and their poor performance, especially concerning fulfilment of people's economical expectations.

According to the elites' point of view, multi-party system does not play a significant role. According to respondents' party identification, the elites' perceptions of the institutions are rather different. In Russia, the representatives of Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia; Party of Russian Regions; Agrarian Party and "Power – to the People" are more negative in their evaluations of institutions of power than the members of centrist and democratic parties. In Russia, another issue in which elite's views are different is its attitudes towards President, Federal Government (lowest confidence) and Russian Parliament (the level of trust is rather high), which can be explained by constant conflicts between President, his Administration and Parliament.

Having compared masses' and elites' attitudes, we can make a conclusion that both the elites and the masses have little confidence in institutions.

Table 1

Confidence in Institutions in Russia, as Perceived by Elites and Masses, (in brackets)* in %**

Variables	Russia	
	(1997)	2000***
Institutions		
1. President	33.3 (37.7)	75 -
2. Federation Council	42.0 (30.4)	64 -
3. Parliament	53.6 (31.9)	56 -
4. Government	26.1 (18.8)	65 -
5. Armed forces	31.9 (43.5)	75 -
6. Local governments	33.8 (39.1)	62 -
7. Political parties/ movements	10.1 (17.4)	25 -
8. The church	31.9 (66.7)	66 -
9. Courts	47.8 (42.0)	33 -
10. Press	17.4 (31.9)	25 -
11. TV and radio	15.9 (33.3)	25 -
12. Trade unions	7.4 (27.5)	34 -
13. System of education	53.6 (59.4)	84 -
14. Private business	23.2 (11.6)	39
15. Federal Security Service	20.3 (33.3)	- -

*Confidence in institutions, as perceived by masses from the elite's point of view.

**Responses to these questions were coded so that indexes "a great deal, quite a lot"; "total trust, some trust", which were combined and presented, correspond to support. The respondents' answers "no answer or don't know" are calculated as missing data and are not presented in the table.

*** Data are computed from Steen (2003).

At the same time, the public attitudes demonstrate less confidence in institutions than those expressed by the representatives of the elite. Compared with Russia, the Latvian public attitudes are more positive towards the President, Government and Parliament than the elite's perceptions. The more positive confidence in institutions among the elites than among the masses may be considered a sign of consolidation among the elites and tendency towards political stabilization of the country.

To sum up, the extremely low level of confidence in social and political institutions expressed both by elites and masses in Russia do not comply with the concept of stable democracy. The obvious deficit of trust in institutions of power and social structure has a negative impact on the whole process of transition to democracy.

Trust in Leaders

According to the theory of transition, during the transformation of the regime into democracy, political elites play a key role in the whole process of social changes. There is no single common definition of the concept of elite; the structure, function, initial mechanism of recruitment of political leadership is vague and uncertain. As stated by Edinger, leaders are people who exercise control over behaviour of others so that to move them in a desired direction (Edinger 1967). Leadership's property in many ways depends on its political attitudes and modes of decision-making; and, therefore, this concept is very individualistic. It is clear that every political leader is an individual and unique actor; the outcomes of their actions are very ambitious and very different. The extent, to which political leaders are able to influence and to get involved in decision-making process, can be explained by interaction between leaders and political environment in which they work.

Elite configurations, their attitudes and actions are crucial factors in determining how government and political power are organized and exercised. An important dimension for the evaluation of post-communist democratic transition in Russia is the level of trust in political leadership, as a vital precondition of legitimacy of the regime. At the same time, trust in leaders may be regarded as a necessary source for legitimate functioning of the national parliaments.

Our hypothesis is that elected leaders receive little political support but it is higher than trust in institution in which they work. It is supposed, that the negative mass attitude towards political elites contributes to political instability and creates the "attitudinal gap" between elite and masses.

The responses given to the questions concerning the most important characteristic features of society tend to be directed towards rational view of personality. According to the data collected, an individual's main characteristics are mainly connected with education, profession, character traits, and income and less connected with ethnicity, religion and gender.

A more complicated picture appears if we consider the elite's attitudes towards the role of political leadership and evaluation of its influence over the society. As to the variable of leadership in society, the respondents in Russia agree that it will always be necessary to have strong people who can run everything. At the same time, the elites put little value on the leaders' awareness of what really is of priority in their interests, and their actual behaviour. Political elites share a very pessimistic belief that in this complicated world we can rely on trustworthy leaders or experts only. One may conclude that there is a disagreement between the recognition of necessity of leadership in society on the one hand, and distrust in leaders and scepticism about their abilities to decide and work on the other hand. Comparing with the data collected in Russia, trust in political leaders, from the viewpoint of political elites, is higher, especially concerning President (82.9%), the armed forces (52.6%) and mass communication (more than 65%).

As it has been expected, trust in leaders in Russia is higher than in the institutions. An essential conclusion is that in Russia there exists a person-oriented political process, which testifies to strong elitist composition of transitional societies.

Support to Regime

D. Easton states (1979) that the attitudes towards regime incorporate both institutions and general principles of government and politics, including the support to a multi-party system or a parliamentary form of government. In order to emphasize the empirical distinction between various levels of support to legitimacy, we incorporate D. Easton and M. Dogan's (1998) approaches towards understanding of regime variable by introducing operative indexes of support to government and political system as a whole.

A very interesting issue in the theory of trust in government is the existenceof strong links between political trust and feelings of political efficacy andperceived

Table 2

Support to Government in Russia by Political Elites (in %)*

Variables	Russia
A. Confidence	
1. How much confidence do you have in the government?	26.1
2. Most politicians cannot be trusted to do what they think is the best for the country.	47.8
3. People holding important public positions usually think more of their own good than of the people.	53.6
B. Effectiveness and responsibility of the government	
4. The government is generally responsible for public opinion.	33.3
5. The public has little control over what politicians do in office.	58.0
6. The average person can get nowhere by talking to public officials.	52.2
C. Subjective competence	
7. The politicians generally make right decisions for our country.	49.3
8. Certain people are better qualified to run country because of their experience and skills.	78.3
9. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to betrayal of our own interests.	18.8

* In the table the codes: "agree strongly", "agree" and "a great deal", "quite a lot" are combined and presented.

government responsibility. All these variables are of great significance. People who believe that the government is responsible (external political efficacy) are more likely to be politically trusting. The efficacy dimension of political alienation refers to people's perception of their ability to influence towards the society (Abramson 1983; Abramson and Inglehart 1992, 1994, 1995). The trust dimension refers to beliefs about outputs of a political system.

A crucial and still unsolved question is: how far are the feelings of trust in Soviet regime of the former communist nomenclature, which is, in fact, in a position of political leadership, recruited predominately by the previous communist power elite group as the main architect of democratic revolutions in Eastern European countries.

Thus the purpose is to examine the extent to which all these alternative models ofattitudes towards regime changes comply with empirical evidence. The specific feature of the transition in Russia is not only the uncertainty of the process of change itself and the cherished good of this marathon (a definite model of democracy), but also the domination of political experience of the former communist regime. The tenacity and stress of the stagnation period are changed by the emphasis on surviving under reforming institutional arrangements.

To reach the goal of the analysis of support to Russian government, nine items were selected to form a variable trust-scale; they included confidence in government and authorities, effectiveness and responsibilities of the government and subjective competence of governmental authorities (see Table 2). As Table 2 indicates, the Russian, more than half of respondents suppose that most politicians cannot be trusted to do what they think is the best for the country, or that they usually think more of their own good than of the people's benefit. The low level of trust in government and authorities coincides with the elites' evaluation of the efficiency and responsibility of the government. Only 33.3% in the Russian Parliament think that the government is generally responsible for public opinion. About 60% of respondents in Russia think that the public has little control over what politicians do in office, and that the average person can get nowhere by talking to public officials. The last statement may lead to the conclusion that there exists a barrier between political leaders and the public. At the same time, more than 73% of the Russian political elite have indicated a preference to the equal chance to influence government policy by ordinary citizens. The indicator of subjective competence of governmental authorities is based on three items presented in Table 2. All these items clearly indicate that about a half of the respondents positively evaluate personal competence and professionalism during the political decision-making process. And more than two thirds of the whole Russian Duma is convinced in the necessity of compromises with political opponents. In general, the distribution of responses in Table 2 reveals that the degree of political alienation from government is very high and correlates with the "gap" in elite-mass interrelations. At the same time, the personal competence and self-evaluation in governmental bodies are rather high and contradict with common distrust in leadership.

The next independent variable, following the analysis of political elites' attitudes towards legitimacy, is power. The central function of the state is the maintenance of its order. Historically, this has been achieved due to institutional monopoly over the use of force. Institutions affect individual action and collective outcomes by conditioning both the distribution of power and the definition of interests. Political elites fight over the content of the constitution, which influences the distribution of power; and there is a range of options available to the decision-makers. Attitudes and orientations concerning the distribution of power are in the centre of our attention.

In the case of Russia, it is much more plausible to suppose that the weaknesses of political power, incapability of the government to control the society, and lack of consensus or unclear vision of direction of developments of the Russian Federation are connected with the political instability and political rule evasion. The questions dealing with the study of the power of Russian political elite considered in our study are: 1) What are the attitudes towards perspectives of power sharing and governmental control over Russia from the elite's point of view? 2) What are the perspectives of developments of the Russian Federation; is it likely that disintegration or enlargement is the future scenarios for Russia from the elite's viewpoint? 3) To what extent do the ideological positions of elites towards power sharing and Russian space developments promote consensus or conflict? Answering these questions, we will better understand the actual manifestation of power: the role of the state and the power of the elite.

Political power is always concentrated in the hands of those who occupy the top positions in powerful and influential organizations or institutions. The data collected in our poll provide mixed results on power sharing. According to the data, political power in Russia mainly belongs to the President (60.9%). The weaknesses of presidential power declared in press and literature (which is, in many ways, an objective view) do not coincide with the political elite's perception of the president's power. One might argue that there is no strong opposition to presidency, which could, to some extent, influence or compensate the failure of the reform policies.

The elite considers that besides the presidency, the real power in Russia belongs to the oil-extracting complex (49.3%), the former party apparatus (47.8%), democrats (21.7%), the reformers among communists (17.4%), the military-industrial complex (17.4%), the Federal security Service (14.5%), the agrarian-industrial complex (7.4%) and to the national-patriotic forces (4.3%). Concentration of power in particular institutional bodies (predominantly outside the accepted constitutional structures) reveals not only the real picture of powerful centres, but also highlights the main conflict cleavages of the power in Russia.

An important identifier of understanding of political power is its ability to control the situation in the country. Only 33.3% of Russian political elite think that Russian government is controlling the country. The centrists are more convinced in the power's ability to control Russian society than the leftists and the rightists. At the same time, the right-wing political leaders are more convinced than the left-wing leaders, that Russian government dominates the situation in the country.

The elites' representatives' attitudes, orientations and decisions towards the post-soviet space are crucial determinants of the fundamental changes in the Russian society. But uncertainties about the Russian Federation are serious. V. L. Kaganskii notes that the space of Russia is unclear, unstable and deprived of unity (Kaganskii 1995). The Russian space is extremely extensive and polarized, and the centre (Moscow city area) plays the dominant role; vertical and horizontal ties are fragmented, all the internal differences are stronger than external, but at the same time, the external attitudes are stronger than internal ones. K. Stoner-Weiss writes that the question of what kind of federation Russia is to be (and indeed, whether it is to be a federal system at all) has been of a pressing concern (Stoner-Weiss 1997). Actually, the centre-periphery problem is in the centre of Russian policy. The “catastrophic” or “chaotic” visions of Russia’s development are descriptive clichés that are very often used in literature.

An important issue is that the general image of Russia, the pattern of its development and vision of on-going and future construction of federalism are viewed utmost contradictorily both by society and political leaders. According to Mikul’skij’s parliamentary elite survey in Russia Mikul’skij, Babaeva and Tarshis 1995, 1996, 1997), as the Russian elite does not have sophisticated view of the present, it has only vague ideas and images of the future, which often boils down to the saying “more of the same”. An important finding of the survey carried out by Mikul’skij’s team, in which they used the method of open-question interview, is that the Russian political elite’s vision of future is likewise colourless and unappealing, and often even catastrophic (Mikul’skij, Babaeva and Tarshis 1996).

Other scholars report a more optimistic picture of the federative developments in Russia. Arutiunian claims that Russia will not disintegrate in its worst case, Russia may only “crumble” from its borders.

It is evident that these political elite’s visions, especially those of the problem of strong authority and regional attitudes, play a fundamental role in Russian geopolitical policy. Political elite’s consensus on the federal arrangement and its development is the substantial and necessary condition for a stable federalism and strong links between centre and periphery.

In what way do the attitudes of political elite apply to the development of federalism in Russia? Table 3 demonstrates the political elites’ attitudes towards the.6% of the elite groups in Russia and 24% of population (from elite’s point of view) consider that some development of development of Russia. According to the data, 69.6% of the elite members in Russia consider that Russia would stay within the present borderlines (this opinion is shared by 39% of people). 24 regions will become independent. 7.2% of Russia elite think that Russia will completely disintegrate. It is evident that the elite have more optimistic views than the attitudes dominating in the society.

With the help of the analysis of elites’ vision of Russia’s development, two items were selected to make up a more detailed picture. These items included questions about the involvement of particular countries or regions in the enlargement of the Russian Federation, and the factors affecting the process of enlargement of Russia. The responses to these two questions are presented in Table 3. The data indicate that Russian elite is strongly supporting the idea of enlargement of the Russian Federation by, first of all, Byelorussia (60.9%), the Ukraine (37.7%), Kazakhstan (34.8%), and Kirghizia (17.4%).

Table 3

Developments of the Russian Federation According to the Views of Russian and Latvian Elites (%)

Variables*	Russian elite
A. 1. Russia will stay within the present borderlines	69.6
2. Some regions will become independent	24.6
3. Russia will disintegrate completely	7.2
4. Enlargement of the Russian Federation is possible	66.7
B. Countries or regions will be involved in the enlargement of the Russian Federation:	
a. Latvia	2.9
b. Estonia	2.9
c. Lithuania	2.9
d. Ukraine	37.7
e. Byelorussia	60.9
f. Armenia	13.0
g. Georgia	8.7
h. Kirghizia	17.4
i. Kazakhstan	34.8
C. Factors affecting the process of enlargement of the Russian Federation:	
a. The economical interests of Russia	58.0
b. NATO expansion to the East	29.0
c. Common will and desire of the former USSR republics	59.4
d. The defence of ethnic minorities of the "near abroad"	37.7
e. Russia's military interests	30.4

*Questions: "Do you consider that Russia will stay within the present borderlines or some regions will get independence or Russia will disintegrate completely?"; "Do you consider that enlargement of the Russian Federation is possible?" "If you consider that enlargement of the Russian Federation is possible, which of the following countries or regions it will involve?"; "What factors will, in your opinion, affect the process of enlargement of the Russian Federation?" (one answer in each line). In the table answers "agree strongly" and "agree" are combined and presented. Armenia (13%) and Georgia (8.7%) are considered the countries for the enlargement of Russia to a lesser extent.

The question, which is of special interest, is the understanding of the reasons of the possible enlargement of the Russian Federation. The items were predominately tied up with the social problem of large anxiety in society. According to elite's perceptions, the factors affecting the process of enlargement of the Russian Federation are the following: common will and desire of the former USSR republics (59.4%), the economical interests of Russia (58.0%), the defence of ethnic minorities of the "near abroad" (37.7%), the military interests of Russia (30.4%) and NATO expansion to the East (29.0%). The attitudes towards the understanding of the reasons of possible enlargement of Russia are controversial.

The centrists are more pragmatic and motivated for enlargement of the Russian Federation than the right- and the left-wing leaders. The responses indicate that the ideological reason for the possible inclusion of particular countries during the enlargement of the Russian Federation has strong positions and prevails over the economical factor. The ideological factor (common will and desire of the former USSR states), which is very strong and correlates with the elite's political party's slogans, plays a strategic role for decision-makers. Obviously, inclusion of Byelorussia and Kazakhstan into the Russian Federation seems to provide a more plausible result in the enlargement policy of the Russian Federation.

Summarizing all the above said, we can state that Russian elite's responses suggest that political power has a quite dispersed character in which the elite's ideological identification plays a substantial role. The real power belongs to the institutions located in the non-constitutional arrangements. A more important thing is that all political elite's representatives agree that the Russian government's ability to control the situation in the country is weak. Weaknesses of the government, absence of independent court, powerful administration of the President, or so-called "pocket service of Kremlin", unclear vision of the Russian federalism intensify the growth of anti-constitutional structures and deviant behaviour.

Political Elites' Value-attitudes and Policy Priorities

The elites' value-attitudes towards political system are an important part of the whole integration process in society. Elite's consensus on the basic democratic norms and values may be regarded as a vital issue for the functioning of the democratic rule (Dahl 1967). Elite integration by attitudes towards fundamental democratic political norms and values, by ideological identifications and policy preferences could be regarded as a precondition for the democratic stabilization and consolidation. This means that at personal level none of the political elites' representatives doubts the concept of democracy as "the only game in town." All members of elite groups must follow the democratic procedures and accept the equality in the competitive political struggle. At the structural level of elites there must be a political and value consensus, which means that none of the parliament's political parties, blocks and political movements goes against the regime and government, there is no anti-system party of the government (Sartory 1987).

One can say that elite's consentient unity exists at the stage of initial settlement in Russia. The latter may be explained not by typical difficulties of the whole process of transition, but rather by weaknesses of the governmental power and serious conflicts among the power groups. Despite the extremely low level of elites' satisfaction with the development of democracy in Russia (not more than 17%), according to the Russian elites' viewpoints, about 50% of the Russian political leaders generally make up the right decisions for the country. The value preferences and ideological identifications of the Russian political elite are very different, and this makes an impediment to successful consensus framework. A lot of deputies of the Russian Duma express unclear visions of economical and political reforms, fragmented images of the regime characteristics and models of developments of Russia. This can be partially explained by the lack of workable alternatives and social strategies, as well as by the existence of strong feelings towards support of state regulations and authoritarian modes of attitudes and behaviour.

The fragmented value-attitudes and ideological polarization among and between the political elites are the barriers, which hinder the development of sharing strategy in achieving democratic goals and open-market principles, and destabilize the society.

Within the frames of theories of democracy and democratic transition, there is a lot of discussion concerning the question whether the democratic leadership needs a kind of desired values and orientations, which are claimed to be more or less conditional for the prospects of democracy and elites' consensus (Dahl 1971; Pennock 1979). A democratic theory is defined by key values favourable for the survival of a democratic country. The regime values, which have been held by an overwhelming majority of the people, who live in democratic countries, include such coherent fundamental constructions as freedom, property and equality. The belief in political equality in a sense that every citizen should have an equal chance to participate and influence the government's policy is often proclaimed a basic democratic orientation (Dahl 1971). For a leadership to be labelled as a democratic one there must be positive attitudes towards acceptance of norms and procedures of political equality. The selected value items measuring the elites' attitudes towards political equality are: "Every citizen should have an equal chance to influence government's policy;" "People ought to be allowed to vote even if they cannot do it efficiently enough."

Table 4

Political Equality, Individual versus Collective Values* (%)

Variables	Russia
A. Political equality	
1. An equal chance to influence government policy.	73.5
2. Right to vote even if people cannot do it efficiently enough.	84.1
B. Individual versus collective values	
3. Income must be unequal	50.7
4. Private ownership in business and industry should be increased.	29.0
5. Individuals should take more responsibility for their own welfare.	26.1
6. Competition is good.	53.6

* In the table the codes: "agree strongly", "agree" and "a great deal", "quite a lot" are combined and presented.)

The second classical cleavage within democratic theory concerns individual versus collective values. Competitive models of control and distribution of income and wealth of individuals for the benefit of the society (Macpherson 1977; Dahl 1982, 1985) often contradict with the values of economical freedom and property rights (Pennock 1979). To measure individual versus collective values, the survey strategy was formed of the following variables dealing with the roles of individuals or the state:

- taking responsibility for distribution of income, ownership in business and industry, care for an individual's welfare, competition. All these variables, which were measured by 10 point scale, contain the following items:

1) Income must be equal/ Individual initiative must be financially stimulated;
2) Private ownership in business and industry should be increased / State ownership in business and industry should be increased;
3) Individuals should take more responsibility for their own welfare/ the state should take more responsibility for the welfare of people; 4) Competition is good. It stimulates people to work actively and makes them search for new ideas and possibilities / Competition is harmful. It makes people do harm to each other.

To what extent do political elites share the values of political equality? The acceptance of personal equality in a sense that "every citizen should have an equal chance to influence government's policy", is shared by the political elites: 73.5% of the interviewed leaders in Russia reported that they are consigned to this value of democratic leadership. 84.4% of Russian respondents agree that "people ought to be allowed to vote even if they cannot do it efficiently enough." The centric and pro-government parties in Parliament are more committed to political equality than the left- and right-wing parties.

Regarding the elites' values, which are important for functioning of liberal democracy, the shift towards acceptance of democratic preferences is evident. In particular, these beliefs include more favourable attitudes towards different opinions, conflict prevention and conflict settlement through maintaining contacts between interest groups. The second block of items, presented in Table 4, is connected with testing of opinions on how elite is coping with individual or collective values on behalf of the state's regulative role in economic attitudes, property rights and welfare. Opinions can be divided almost equally in two value-clusters: more than a half of the deputies in Russia in 1997 state that competition is necessary, as well as inequalities in income distribution. At the same time, the second cluster shows that only about 30% of the deputies in Russia support the idea that private ownership in business and industry should be increased, and individuals should take more responsibility for their own welfare. It is obvious that the attitudes towards individual alternatives (unequal distribution of income and competition) are asymmetrically combined with the strong emphasis on the state regulative role in economy. Respondents' answers to the question: what should be the role of the state and market in the settlement of socio-economic problems, clearly demonstrate that in Russia the state should dominate in dealing with economic growth (76%), energy (67%), transport (43%) and health care (56%). At the same time, the state's role decreases if we consider the responses given to the questions relating to environment protection (20%) and food (7%). It is surprising, that 75% of the respondents maintain the position that the market must solve the pension problems. The maintenance of the state provision for basic material security of an individual supports collective value of "equality in poverty". Differences in the respondents' answers demonstrate the polarity in the views shared by the respondents. Russian political elite seems to be more tightly bound to political values of democracy than to the values of market economy. It could be characterised as a rather egalitarian and hostile towards the liberalization of economy and individual values. Elite groups tend to perceive social and economic relations as conflicting and asymmetrical, and emphasise the state ownership and responsibility for the people's welfare, and, on the other hand, maintain the value of unequal distribution of income.

The analysis provides some important conclusions about the Russian political elite's political values and policy preferences. Such democratic social values as inequality of income distribution and necessity of competition are widely shared among the representatives of Russian political elite. All Russian deputies share beliefs in the fundamental political values of political equality. To some extent, the consentient nature of Russian elite might be argued. At the same time, the elite's representatives declare the state's priority in regulation and responsibility for economy and individual welfare. Actually, there is a wide difference in a sense of ideological identification of political beliefs and orientations. It is not surprising, that the left-oriented elites are less connected with the values of market attitudes and individual competition. The fragmentation of the value attitudes of Russian political elite may be partially explained by weak and insufficient structural arrangements. Weak institutions of power and undeveloped democratic procedures are transferred into the inconsistency of the political elite's attitudes. Political elite's groups view a variety of social relationships in an asymmetrical way. The political leaders' attachment to the market values and, especially to the process of privatization by the political leaders indicates that there is great anxiety about the corruption. The same can be seen in the leaders' preferences, where the social problems of criminality, drug consumption and corruption are the most acute and important. To sum up, there is no consensus of the political and social issues, political preferences often compete with each other, and this may promote appearance of an open value-conflict.

Policy Priorities

Policy decision is the process of placing a particular set of problems on the political agenda, constructing short-term and long-term priorities, selecting the mechanisms for implementation and realization of these priorities. In the period of weak power and ineffective institutional arrangements, elites' political attitudes towards the priorities in the sphere of social issues are of special interest. The research question at this stage is: to what extent are the elite representatives worried about particular social problems? Then we will present the elite's point of view on the mode of implementation of social issues. The preferences for the market or state instruments will be summarized in the variety of factors. It is important to note, that policy preferences and solution variants are a strong indication of the direction, in which society is moving.

Political elites are facing various social problems, which are connected with essential interests of society. The results obtained clearly show that the most alarming problems, from political elites' viewpoint, are associated with crime, unemployment and inflation, young generation, education and ethnic conflict. Less importance is attached to the problems connected with human rights and freedom of individual. Other types of problems with lower priorities are related to social stratification and sexual equality, which indirectly affect people's life.

Table 5 summarizes the data on the elites' preferences to the factors, which pose a real threat to state development in Russia. One may notice that once again there is a clear tendency to put policy issues related to corruption, drug consumption, criminality, ethnic conflicts and terrorism in Russia at the top of the agenda. It is evident that the general problem of corruption and criminality is a concern of the whole society.

Table 5

Factors that Pose a Real Threat to State's Development in Russia (%) *

Factors	**Russia**
1. Western European countries	0.0
2. USA	24.6
3. The external policy in Russia	-
4. The internal policy in Russia	-
5. Ethnic conflicts in Russia	75.4
6. Immigrants, refugees from other countries	13.0
7. Terrorism	71.0
8. Drug consumption, criminality	78.3
9.Corruption	81.2

* In the table the code: "present strong threat" is combined and presented.

Question: Do you think any of the following factors pose a real threat to state's development in Russia?

Our purpose is to analyse, which countries or regions political elites regard as the desired models for the development of Russia. The choice of the country model or structure makes the elites seek for the perspectives of their social policy development.

Supporting democratic values, one may expect that political elites will prefer democratic countries to be the appropriate models of development. Political elites were asked which countries are regarded as significant partners of Russia. The political significance arises from the political leaders' preference of model of society and importance of cooperation with a particular state. There is substantial desire for Russia to cooperate with Germany, the USA, China and France. Russian elite is also willing to cooperate with Great Britain and Sweden, but to a lesser extent. But the Baltic States are not evaluated as high as other regions by the Russian elite.

At the same time, there is a substantial cleavage in political elites' attitudes towards political and economic partnership with various states, the reason of which might be explained by the elites' ideological views. Unlike ideological leaders of the right and the left, the centrist leaders (more than 50%) have considerably more pragmatic and rational attitude towards partnership with different countries.

One may conclude that positive orientation to partnership with countries of different regime is very high among Russian political elites. Elites wish to cooperate both with their traditional partners (China, Germany, France), and with rich and powerful countries as the USA, which may help to transfer the resources and gain stability. By defining these priorities political leaders demonstrate their vision of national interests.

Conclusions

The article presents theoretical and empirical research into the attitudes of Russian political elites towards cooperation, which is based on formalized interview – survey carried out in national Parliaments and Russia. More specifically, the research is focused on political stability in Russia as a precondition for integration and favourable cooperation.

Empirically, one of the main objectives of the research was to confirm that Russian political leaders place the Baltic States on a scale of economical partnership as an important priority. The data obtained demonstrate that the elites recognize democratic values and rule of law.

The analytical model worked out in the framework of the research is focused on major determinants of political stability in Russia: state monopoly of political power, legitimacy and trust in government. Empirically, the detailed survey results prove that political power in Russia is of fragmented and dispersed nature. A more important thing is that all Russian political elite's representatives agree that the government's ability to control the situation in the country is weak. Weaknesses and distrust in government, lack of independent court, powerful administration of President, unclear vision of Russian federalism and absence of value consensus among elites are the sources of instability and hamper the development of cooperation.

In general, Russian political elites give evidence of being faithful to democratic process and integration strategy, and, in this respect, the importance of transition to democracy has been validated. The elites' commitment to democracy and value models may constitute an essential basis for the development of Russia.

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Russia's Self-Imposed Calamities: The Case of Chechnya Today and Latvia in 1917

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Introduction

An astute Swedish observer of East Europe Richard Schwarz noted in 1989 that the mentality is the deciding factor for the about-to-be liberated eastern half of Europe to achieve democracy. Otherwise these countries will block their own way back to Europe. The problem was not only the communist dictatorship's heritage – the problem dated back to the independence era between the world wars and had its roots in the czarist era.

East Europe, now known as Northern and Central Europe, overcame the mentality problem in a decade that led to EU and NATO enlargement (it took several hundred years in Western Europe to put in place the conditions for democracy). For the Baltic states America's support for their integration in these organizations, as highlighted in President Clinton's speech at the Latvian Freedom Monument in Riga in 1994 was decisive and was instrumental in bringing about a "Europe united, whole and free." The question today is whether "the trick" can be done for the real Eastern Europe, the countries lying on the other side of Huntington's cultural divide.

Recent events in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova indicate positive movement toward the goal of achieving a democracy that is – to paraphrase a famous Lenin saying on the nationalities question in Czarist Russia – not only in form but also in content. That is the challenge, but the problem is Russia. Russia is moving East, not West. By not coming to terms with its past, it is going back into its history. There are slim prospects for a "flower" or "color" revolution there, because it itself was an empire and still wants to remain a "partial empire" to the detriment of its closest neighbors.

Except among former soviet dissidents augmented by a small band of the liberal intelligentsia there has not been a paradigm shift in the inherited mentality from the czarist era. Teenagers go wild when listening to a pop star singing "I am made in the USSR", but the most painful return to the past is the war against Chechen separatism. The methods used differ little from czarist or Stalin methods and dramatically effect how Russian society is now being molded. It may even become the cause of the demise of Russia as we know it today just as Russia's insensitivity to the Latvian national, social and economic situation after the fall of the Romanov dynasty in 1917 led to the triumph of communism in Russia. Similarly, radical Islam may play the role of communism in Russia's future.

I will compare the Latvian situation 88 years ago with the Chechen situation after the fall of communism in Russia in 1991 and show that Russia has failed to learn from its past and is repeating mistakes, which could have reverberations beyond Russian society itself. Two questions will emerge with regard to the role of the West with regard to Chechnya, mainly if, after September 11, the West has not walked into a carefully laid Putin trap that has implications in the struggle against global terrorism and, two, whether a common agreement on Chechnya can contribute to a revitalized transatlantic agenda.

The 1917 Latvian situation

In the stand-off between the Russian and Latvian governments over the wording of the common declaration between both countries that was to precede the long overdue signing and ratification of the Latvian-Russian border earlier this year, President Putin a day after meeting President Bush in Bratislava on February 24, brought up the Red Latvian Rifles and said that those who honored their assistance in maintaining the power of the Communists (Bolsheviks) should be respected. He crafted this into a paragraph by saying that those in the Baltics who think their countries lost independence after the end of World War Two should also be respected. He implied that Russia could not be blamed for the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states if the Latvians were responsible for establishing communism in Russia in the first place.

The legend of the Red Latvian Rifles and their support for Lenin is firmly rooted in Russia and Latvia even today and, in as much as the Rifles did give a decisive contribution to Lenin in both preparing the ground for the October *coup de etat*, beating down the sudden Socialist Revolutionary uprising in July 1918, and subsequently crushing the White Russian armies, then the legend corresponds to reality.

Yet Putin is selective in using this argument – the majority of the Rifles returned to Latvia after the Russian-Latvian peace treaty of 1920 holding high the Latvian national flag despite the opposition of the Latvian Communist Party located in Russia. Further, he sidesteps the question of <u>why</u> the Rifles supported Lenin: Lenin pronounced that Czarist Russia was a prison house of nationalities and, unlike Alexander Kerensky, the leader of short-lived democratic Russia, not to mention the generals and royalty leading the White Russia armed forces in the Civil War, who wanted nothing but a return to imperial Russia, he offered a new deal to the oppressed nationalities. Lenin supported various forms of statehood for them.

There are several observations to note in a complicated set of circumstances stemming from the Russian revolution of February 1917 that have relevance today. Imperial Russia failed to consolidate democratic reform after the first revolution in 1905. The suppression of the revolution in Latvia 100 years ago was particularly brutal – a scorched earth policy, torture, and summary executions even though the Latvian revolutionaries demanded nothing more than autonomy. But to "flatten" the Latvian provinces became the obsession of czar Nicholas II. If a European Court of Human Rights had existed then in Strasbourg, then Russia would have been found guilty on a thousand counts. Needless to say the suppression came back as a boomerang in 1917. The soldiers in the Latvian Rifles regiments were the sons of those who made the revolution. The seeds were planted – and when Russia mismanaged to implant democracy after the second revolution in 1917 the seeds burst above the ground.

Four observations must be made with which certain parallels can be drawn with the Chechen situation:

1. Russian deputies in the parliament or Duma that was convened after the 1905 revolution made highly inflammatory statements about the Latvian people in response to the petition for political autonomy on the part of the Latvian deputies in the Duma. These remarks were made after the February revolution and after the eight Latvian regiments in the Russian Imperial Army had brought the German advance to a halt in Latvia for three years. The deputies were calling for the same status to Latvia already enjoyed by Finland. Democratic Russia said that if autonomy must be given to the Latvians then Russia would have to do the same for the various “Indian tribes” in Siberia. The regiments were established after the same Latvian deputies had succeeded in gaining permission for Latvians to form their own military units. Finns were not obliged to serve in the Russian army.
2. The Latvian military units were betrayed both by imperial Russia and democratic Russia. They fought with passion, suffered high losses, but their successes were not followed up by the Russian High Command; it never expected and hence did not prepare for the eventuality that the Rifles would breach German lines. They learned to loath the Russian military for its corruption, incompetence and lack of discipline.
3. At the end of 1917 Col. Jukums Vacietis, who commanded one of the Latvian regiments on the Riga front and had earned the admiration of the Latvian Rifles, became the first commander of the Red Army and was ready to strike a deal with his erstwhile enemies the Germans after they had taken Latvia. He would bring the Latvian Rifle Regiments, who at this time formed the backbone of the Red Army, back to Latvia in exchange for political autonomy. The German High Command was not interested in autonomy for Latvia. Until he was shot by Stalin in 1938 Vacietis never became a member of the Communist Party. His wife and family lived in independent Latvia.
4. Neither Europe nor America supported independence for the new states emerging from the ruins of imperial Russia. Latvian independence was supported by Great Britain and France only because communism was a greater evil - the USA finally came around to recognizing Baltic independence in 1921, one year after international recognition and two years after the peace treaties with Lenin’s Russia, when Baltic independence was recognized by Russia “in eternity”. Finland had already been “granted” independence by Lenin at the end of 1917. Hence, the Latvian Rifles, fighting on all the fronts in the Russian civil war, indirectly helped to bring about Baltic independence and the defeat of the Russian lobby in Western capitals.

The Chechen situation

People familiar with the situation in Chechnya may have been struck by some similarities, i.e. an uncompromising stand on the part of an "indivisible Russia" regarding the national and political rights of non-Russian peoples, war and deprivation, and embracing the most radical ideology available: in 1917 it was international communism, today it is global radical Islam. We need to look closer at why many Chechen fighters and their commanders adopted radical Islam, an ideology wholly alien to the Chechen people as a whole, as, indeed, communism was for the Latvian people.

Julie Wilhemsen at the Norwegian Institute of International Relations has provided us with a comprehensive analysis on the Islamisation of the Chechen national separatist movement, which will be presented here as a summary. [1] Her carefully researched analysis shows that Islam itself is not the key conflict-generating factor in Chechnya. The aim of the National Congress of the Chechen people in 1990 was to resolve problems the Chechen *nation* was facing, including the elimination of discrimination against Chechens in their own country and the gathering of all Chechens on their own territory. Dzhokhar Dudaev, who became president in October 1991, only began referring to Islam two years later in response to growing internal opposition and in the face of the Russian invasion in November 1994. He fell back to the slogan of *ghazawat* used by the 19th century hero Imam Shamil, but this slogan appealed to the young Chechen men more in the interpretation of a fight against the Russians than against infidels. The first foreign *jihadi* fighters arrived in 1995, and Zelimkhan Yandarbiev attempted to establish an Islamic state in the short period he acted as president after Dudaev was killed in April 1996. But he was pushed aside by Aslan Maskhadov, a moderate, who was elected to the post in 1997.

Clearly Maskhadov was the choice of the Chechen people. Nevertheless, he lost control of the Islamised warlords and was forced to introduce Islamic law in 1999. This was the year the second Chechen war was launched by Putin after Shamil Basaev led an incursion into Dagestan, and after the explosions in Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk. Putin blamed the Chechens for these explosions and the war was branded an anti-terrorist operation by him.[2]

It is important to note that Wilhelmsen in her portrayal of the prominent warlords who underwent radicalization observes that they do not seem to hold the same version of radical Islam. These are (or were) Shamil Basaev, Salman Raduev, the brothers Arbi and Movsar Baraev, Movladi Udugov, and Zelimkhan Yandarbiev. They embraced radical Islam during the first Chechen war. But while Yandarbiev and Udagov eventually interpreted their fight as part of the *Global Islamic* fight against the "distant enemy" Basaev interpreted his fight in the context of liberating the Caucasus. For Raduev and the brothers Baraev radical Islam never became more than useful slogans. Furthermore, radical Islam to a large extent had been adjusted to the local context – it was not directly imported. Basaev, for example, refers to himself as a Sufi, despite the fact that Sufism is a heresy to the Wahhabis and other radical Islamists.

It was the total collapse of functioning state structures during the war which allowed the introduction of Islamic policies: Yandarbaev used Islam to try to revive the state. Wilhelmsen quotes an important statement made by Udugov, which may have implications for the future of Russia when seen today in the context of Russia's nationalities and religious policies under Putin: "communism collapsed, orthodoxy in the present situation is doomed to fail and democracy, obviously, does not work in Russia … we have to fill the vacuum with Islam."

Then there is the question of who co-opted whom? The foreigners fighting in Chechnya have been small in numbers and Wilhelmsen suggests that it is reasonable to say that the foreigners involved over a longer period were as much co-opted to the cause of ambitious Chechen warlords as the war lords were co-opted for the *Global Jihad.* Funding from radical Islam organizations did reach the warlords, but the point Wilhelmsen makes is that the moderates under Maskhadov increasingly found themselves with diminishing funds. In other words, western organizations did not send Maskhadov money, but he was expected to reign in the radicals. The pressure of the second war and Russia's uncompromising stance against Chechnya, in the end, forced Maskhadov into an alliance with the radical Islamists. Wilhelmsen describes graphically that at one point Basaev and Khatab, the Afghan-Arab responsible for much of Wahhabi funding to Chechnya, pointed their guns at Maskhadov at a meeting – be killed or fight with us.

Looking now at Russia's policy toward Chechnya, Wilhelmsen underscores the paradox that Putin carried his war not only against the radical Islamic warlords but also against the moderates headed by the duly elected Aslan Maskhadov, who wanted a dialogue with Russia, wanted a secular state, and close cooperation with Moscow in order to rebuild Chechnya after the war. For the radicals Maskhadov was a puppet of secular Russia, but to Putin he was another Osama bin Laden! Although Maskhadov lacked the power to stop Basaev and Khatab from marching into Dagestan he did hold a rally in Grozny gathering 5000 people against the attack.

Wilhelmsen's bottom line is that Moscow did not choose to align with Maskhadov against the radical forces, but rather opted for a full-scale war against Chechnya and thereby forced Maskhadov into an alliance with the radicals. Initially Maskhadov desisted from joining his army troops to those commanders resisting the advancing Russian troops. He offered to hand over Basaev and Khatab as Moscow demanded, but on the very same day he made the offer Putin declared that he was not the legitimate president of Chechnya. Maskhadov countered by calling on the religious leaders of Chechnya to declare a holy war "to defend the country's sovereignty". In the end, as Wilhelmsen concludes, the strategy of non-negotiation and the alienation of Maskhadov by Moscow and isolation on the part of the West was probably an important factor in tipping the balance of power in favor of the radicals within the Chechen separatist movement.

After the assassination of Maskhadov on March 8, we can conclude that Russia, and by implication also the West, has succeeded in bringing about not only enormous destruction to the Chechen people for the third time in their history, but also left two power poles on the battlefield in Chechnya – the radical Islamists and the criminalized puppet regime of Kadirov the Younger with very little in between. Further, in killing both Dudaev and Maskhadov Russia destroyed the only two "Europeans" in the Chechen separatist movement: both were high-ranking officers in the Soviet armed forces stationed in the Baltic states. Dudaev even had an Estonian wife. There is no doubt that both men were influenced by the local environment – which, even though the Baltic states were then under the Soviet Union and heavily russified – nevertheless still maintained a strong European identity and cultural outlook. These men could not be but moderate nationalists, who were ready to defend the national interests of their country but also ready to live with Russia.

The EU, after one of the Putin-Schroeder meetings, has said it is willing to rebuild Chechnya. But what is its political strategy? Is it based on the legitimacy of the puppet Kadirov and the physical annihilation of both nationalists and Islam radicals? And who will get the money? Before we analyze the present situation in Chechnya and look for possible solutions to be derived from the Latvian situation a critical view from Russia should be briefly looked at.

The Russian dissident viewpoint

Two years ago just before the outbreak of the Iraq war one of the foremost former Soviet dissidents Vladimir Bukovsky, together with Elena Bonner, the wife of Andrei Sacharov, wrote an open letter to President Bush.[3] They asked: why must we condone near extermination of some nations in order to liberate others? Is it not an unacceptable price to pay for a dubious advantage such alliances may bring? They quote Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister: "Russia has such a vast experience in fighting terrorism," and wonder if he has forgotten that Russia invented modern political terrorism elevated to level of state policy. What was the point of putting Milosevich on trial if he fought Muslim terrorism in Bosnia and Kosova? In the war of ideas nothing was more dangerous than the *Realpolitik* approach, which has brought so many disasters in the past. They end by asking why the US government is not as smart as its weapons are?

This is particularly painful for me to read. In 1985 on the very eve of the birth of the Baltic popular front movements I shared a cabin with Bukovsky, and two other former dissidents from Lithuania and Latvia expelled, like Bukovsky, from the Soviet Union. We were on board a ship chartered by the Baltic Peace and Freedom Cruise organization of Baltic exile groups that was traveling along the Baltic coast to Helsinki to mark the tenth anniversary of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE) taking place in Helsinki. Today I have returned to a free Latvia but Bukovsky is denied a visa to his own country!

The Chechen spokesman in the West Akhmed Zakaev in an open letter to president Bush just before the Bush-Putin meeting in Slovenia on February 24 echoed the Bukovsky/Bonner letter, except that it also carried a warning in the message.[4] He claimed that Bush gave the green light to Putin for pacification of Chechnya but the only outcome was the emboldening of radicals at the expense of the moderate leadership, and the spread of militant ideology throughout the Caucasus. Bush should realize that his hands-off policy in Chechnya does not increase security but, instead, breeds terrorism. The warning is that Maskhadov's unilateral ceasefire was a "unique opportunity, perhaps the last, to break the viscous circle of hatred, death and destruction." If it is lost, the responsibility for the escalation of the conflict will fall on those who persist in the failed policy of appeasing Putin. As we know, the unique opportunity was lost – Russia responded by killing Maskhadov. Was it a unique opportunity? Has the window of opportunity been lost?

I have chosen as an answer the reflections put forward by Emil Pain, director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Center for the Study of Xenophobia and the Problems of Extremism, who in an interview earlier in January says that while Putin may get away with his methods in Chechnya in the short term, Russia will ultimately be the loser.[5] The real "horror" of the Chechen conflict is not just the violence and suffering of the people in the north Caucasus or the terrorism connected with the conflict there, but the extension of the use of force rather than negotiations, and staged elections rather than genuine votes to the Russian Federation as a whole. Pain does not mention the million Russian Chechnya war veterans, but their political impact on future developments in Russia cannot be ignored as pointed out by other Russian thinkers. The West's interest in having Moscow as an ally in the war against terrorism not only provides Putin with a kind of legitimacy in the eyes of his own people but also gives him a plausible justification for using force in Chechnya. Together with the continuing flood of petro-dollars into Russia there is no one likely to challenge Putin.

But this situation cannot last forever, and when it ends, the consequences both for those now in power and for the country as a whole will be "truly frightening" according to Paine. He compares the situation with that of Nicholas I in the 19th century and Brezhnev's rule. Putin, like these rulers, is driving out the thinking people of an expanding state apparatus in the name of building "an autocratic vertical of power" and seeking to generate support by exploiting the resentments of the country's ethnic majority against certain minorities. Bad feelings will grow. Pain concludes that the outcome is almost inevitable as if this is determined by Russian history.

Udugov, as quoted above, has a point. Islam is a growing factor in Russia, and there is a growing body of evidence that indicates that Russia's reaction to radical Islam could be fanning its appeal. That Russia deep inside is afraid of this was made clear to me ten days after the theater siege in Moscow in October 2002. Speaking to a group of young Russians I compared the Red Latvian Rifles situation to that of the Chechen separatist movement – the room immediately fell silent and remained so throughout my talk. There were no arguments or questions after my presentation. I myself was struck that here was the only country in the world where young people did not have to be told who the Latvian Rifles were. Now we must return to the Latvian situation to see if lessons can be drawn for the purposes of our paper.

A Common Western approach?

Though there are huge differences with the Latvian situation in 1917 there are certain instructive parallels with today's Chechnya that can be readily seen. Although the situation may seem hopeless in Chechnya, the situation was also hopeless in Latvia but, nevertheless, out of the chaos, turmoil and devastation caused by war a small country was born that later helped to bring down the Soviet Union together with the two other Baltic states and today serves as a positive example for the post-Soviet states. The peaceful "color" revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia are but a continuation of the "singing revolutions" in the Baltic states more than a decade ago.

How was the question of independence resolved in Latvia if the Latvian national army had been "robbed" of almost all men because they had embraced communism? The answer lay in the support given to the nationalists by Great Britain and France at a decisive point in the struggle for independence. This, coupled with a reign of terror instigated by the communist regime, and the realization that the nationalists were not German puppets, dissolved the Latvian Red Rifles fighting the nationalist army in Latvia - they simply deserted to the Latvian National Army. Other regiments were kept inside Russia by Lenin and Trotsky to defeat the mortal enemy – Old Russia.

If we compare the Latvian and Chechen situations and interchange Latvian communist soldiers with radical Islam fighters and national army soldiers with moderate or nationalist Chechen fighters we can not only see the similarities but also the solution, i.e. Chechen independence – or political autonomy, if it is not too late for that. Russia's attempts to destabilize Georgia, especially in its successful bid to put an end to the OSCE border mission on the Chechen border, is a calculation based on Stalinist thinking – a people could get fully fledged "Soviet Socialist Republic" status only if the "republic" bordered a foreign country: if Georgia truly became independent and managed to regain its territorial integrity, then Chechnya could accordingly become an independent national republic together with Ingushia. In that case the Chechens will have been gathered together in one land and no longer persecuted by Russia. Can the EU and the USA reach agreement for rebuilding Chechnya on this basis?

The problem is that there is no power in the West to support the moderate forces in Chechnya to whom the radicals could desert to. The other problem is that Putin's Russia is not the greatest evil to the West, as was communism in Russia in the Latvian situation. Therefore nobody will support the national Chechens. Yet if Putin is leading Russia down the road to another revolution, the West would be well advised to think about the implications of such a Russian policy and change its policy toward Chechnya.

This is also the problem with the solution put forward by Fiona Hill and Anatol Lieven calling upon the Russian government to show that it is committed to a legitimate political process in Chechnya.[6] It is not, as we have seen, and cannot even theoretically be committed because it itself has evolved into a hybrid model of Czarist and Soviet Russia, and hence committed to the policies of these former empires. If there is no genuine democratic process in Russia how can Russia promote a genuine democratic political process in Chechnya? If it does so in its "Chechenization" policy and actually allows free and fair parliamentary elections, then this can go back as a boomerang to Russia: if democracy is possible in Chechnya – why not in Belarus, Russia's closest ally. Indeed, why not in Russia itself?

But Hill and Lieven are right about the need to create a mass political-nationalist party or an effective political-military movement by the Chechens. This is what the Irish and Tamil nationalists succeeded in doing. This is what the Latvians succeeded in doing in 1917-1918 by bringing together the different political forces together under one roof to defend Latvian independence.

But then Putin would have to bite the bullet and open a dialogue with the "terrorists" as the British did when they started talks with Sinn Fein, the political arm of the IRA, and as the "transformed" Sharon is now doing with the PLO by pulling back Jewish settlements from the occupied territories. The British, after making a very difficult decision, certainly succeeded. The IRA was split, it gradually lost its support among the people, and is now degenerating into a criminal organization while Sinn Fein itself is coming under pressure to come clean all the way. [7] Apparently the British thought this approach would be instructive to the Russians, as the Institute of International and Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, before September 11, organized field trips to Northern Ireland for Russian interested parties, but nothing seems to have resulted from this.

It is an open question why Tony Blair did not insist on the successful British experience in fighting terrorism based on respect for human rights for Putin to follow, but no doubt the shock of September 11 is to be blamed for the resultant short-sighted *Realpolitik*. This also holds true for the USA. There was probably an understanding on this matter reached between Bush and Blair, which may well be regretted now by both of them as seen by their statements recently on Russia. Perhaps Russian pressure tactics on the British government to deliver Akhmed Zakaev, who has found refuge in London, have helped in this.

According to a Washington insider, however, the Bush administration's policy toward Chechnya may have been more sophisticated than appeared in public. Washington has pursued a subtle, behind-the scenes effort to nudge Putin toward seeking a political solution in Chechnya, which only Maskhadov might have been able to deliver.[8] After all, the unilateral peace declaration on the part of Maskhadov actually was enforced. But that is why Putin wanted him to be killed. According to reports from independent sources in Russia, Maskhadov fell into a trap because he thought there would be peace talks facilitated by Germany and Switzerland. But killing Maskhadov, however, only twelve days after Bush talked to Putin in Bratislava at the February meeting, previously mentioned, on the need for peace talks with Maskhadov, must have political implications in US-Russian relations.[9] No implications seem to be apparent after the Zapatero, Schroeder, Chiraq, Putin meeting in Paris ten days later on March 18. But no news have filtered out from this meeting that Putin was taken to task for killing Maskhadov.

Conclusion

Can the USA and EU agree on a common approach to the simmering Chechnya conflict that is corroding the credibility of European and Transatlantic values, even though this may not be apparent today? Can the EU countries agree between themselves on this issue? The EU was not able to do so for tabling a resolution on Chechnya in March for the meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights. One cannot but note the marked difference between the call for an independent inquiry into the recent killings involving hundreds of demonstrators in Uzbekistan by the UN, strongly backed by the EU and NATO, and the killing of tens of thousands of civilians in Chechnya that has gone on for several years.

In thinking about post-Maskhadov Chechnya we might find another clue from the revolutionary history of Latvia under the Czars. After the crushing of the 1905 revolution, the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party, which had consolidated the majority of the Latvian population under its leadership, suspended its guerrilla activities in the forests and cities of Latvia in 1907. The armed resistance was showing signs of degeneration that was beginning to harm the image of the party and the interests of the Latvian people. The guerrillas were disarmed and smuggled out of Latvia to countries as far away as the USA and Australia, where they and their offspring became good, law-abiding citizens. The nationalist branch of the Chechen resistance might also do this, leaving the field open to the Islam radicals. But, as we saw in the case of the Latvian Rifles, the nationalists certainly will return in one guise or another. Putin's Chechenization policy guarantees this.

What is lacking today on the part of the West is the political will in confronting Russia over the Chechnya issue. Yet the war has spread beyond Chechnya as witnessed by Basaev's attack on government security forces in Nalcik, the capital of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic this October. Furthermore, the intensity of the fighting now is higher in Dagestan, where Basaev made his first ill-fated incursion six years ago, than in Chechnya itself. This has led analysts to conclude that perhaps the Chechens have succeeded where they have failed for 200 years – mainly to unite the many disparate ethnic groups and nationalities of the North Caucasus against Russia under the banner of radical Islam! If so, can this be ignored on the part of Europe and the USA? But what can be done?

If we recall that the late George Kennan said in his Long Telegram of February 1946, when the USA was perplexed by Stalin's behavior: "Soviet power was "impervious to the logic of reason," but it was "highly sensitive to the logic of force." The policy of containment was the result, and where the Soviet Union stepped over the line, as in Afghanistan in 1979, then arms were given to the Afghans to push back the Soviet army in 1989. This had the unintended consequence of contributing enormously to the collapse of the Soviet Union itself.

Today, of course, the situation is completely different with Russia, but, as we have noted, the Russian leadership mental map has not basically changed much. The logic of force has to be replaced by the logic of persuasion for the good of Russia itself and by standing firm where Russia tries to repeat its expansionist policies as, for example, in Ukraine and Georgia.

The logic of reason was very strong and compelling in President Bush's speech in Riga on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the end of World War Two, when he renounced the Yalta agreement because it followed in the unjust tradition of Munich and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Russia could be persuaded that, as a signatory of both the latter two agreements, to follow the American example, even though America was responsible for only one agreement, and Russia for two. Were Russia to do that, it would help very much in changing the mental map in Russia's approach to the bloody conflict in the North Caucasus and hence raise the prospects of ending it. Russia would be the first country to benefit from this.

Footnotes

[1] Julie Wilhelmsen, „ Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.57, No.1, January 2005, 35–59.

[2] There still is no evidence that the Chechens were responsible for these explosions. At that time, the Russian press was rife with speculation that the Russian secret service

was behind them. For a thorough analysis of the 2002 theater hostage taking drama in Moscow by Movsar Baraev and attempts by Russia to discredit Maskhadov see John Dunlop*, Organized Crime and Terrorism Watch,* http://www.rferl.org/reports/corruptionwatch/2003/12/42-181203.asp

[3] Valdimir Bukovsky and Elena Bonner, "Open Letter to President Bush," March 10, 2003, *FrontPageMagazine.com.*

[4] Akhmed Zakaev, "Stop Appeasing Putin in Chechnya," *International Herald Tribune*, Febr.16, 2005.

[5] *Druzhba narodov*, January 2005 issue, as reviewed by Paul Goble, „Window on Euroasia: The Real 'Horror'of Chechnya."

[6] Fiona Hill and Anatol Lieven, "Now let the Chechens select their leaders," *International Herald Tribune,* March 12-13, 2005.

[7] See, for example, John Murray Brown, "A leader under fire," *Financial Times*, March12/13, 2005.

[8] Jim Hoagland, "Reassessing Putin," *Washington Post*, March 13, 2005.

[9] See note 7.

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Eastern and Western Latvian Foreign Policy After 1999: A Comparative Quantitative Approach

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The development and formation of Latvian foreign policy has been little researched over the last fifteen years. Rather, research has tended to focus on the process of accession to the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, foreign policy is a multi-layered and complicated policy area that synthesizes and transforms domestic policy into the international arena into a single policy. Thus the authors decided to focus on the foreign policy impact of state and official visits, through a comparative quantitative analysis of Latvia's foreign policy in both eastern and western directions.[1]

The years following 1999 were chosen because Latvia was invited to begin negotiations on accession to the EU in Helsinki that year, and was also named as a NATO candidate country. The intensity of the negotiations meant that administrative resources were focused on day-to-day issues connected with the twin accessions. However, it also makes sense to trace international relations and the development of partnerships which will serve as the basis for identifying Latvia's place in the international system. Latvian foreign policy is an attempt to strike a balance between east and west, because an unbalanced foreign policy would signify an inability to utilize all the resources that the international system offers. In this perspective, accession to the EU and NATO should not be a hurdle in developing closer relations with neighbouring states who are not members of these organizations. Moreover, Latvia's integration into the EU and NATO has presented enhanced opportunities for developing partnerships in the east.

1999 was a watershed year for Latvian foreign policy. A big step had been taken in the 'return to Europe', and the next stage of foreign policy was under discussion. We consider whether Latvia has widened its international interests since 1999.[2]

One method of measuring the intensity and effectiveness of foreign policy is by looking at state and official visits.[3] State visits mirror national geopolitical, political, economic, and other interests. Thus this paper looks at state visits from 1999 to October 2004 and considers the extent to which Latvia's interest in its neighbours' development is rhetoric or rationally based politics. It also analyzes how these visits have supported Latvia's interests. The empirical data will make clear if there is a link between the aims of a visit, its content and the intensity of future inter-state relations. This is of particular interest to Latvian policy-makers as they seek to repair the relationship, and forge closer links, with Russia.

I. Measuring the effectiveness of foreign policy

State and official visits are an important part of foreign policy. But how to measure their effectiveness? It is difficult to avoid normative conclusions because the choice of criteria is the choice between conflicting aims and values. It has been argued that foreign policy is succesful if it is balanced and flexible enough to change if there are developments in the international system.[4] On the other hand, it has been argued that foreign policy is successful if a state can control changes in the international system and ensure its own survival.[5] In this case foreign policy is to be seen as adaptive behaviour, and its efficiency is measured through the capacity of the state to adapt to challenges posed by the external environment. This is a foreign policy that finds its roots in domestic policy, and in this case the state is ready to react to changes in the international system. Thus it is a change leader, rather than a victim of change. Wolfram Hanrieder holds a somewhat similar view. He argues that in explaining foreign policy behaviour instead of analyzing the impact of historical legacy, political culture and social background of decision-makers, more emphasis should be put on systemic level conditions.[6]

William Smith and Phil Williams argued for adoption of the following criteria for evaluating the viability of foreign policy: clarity of objectives, consistency of purpose, continuity of design and execution, compatibility of objectives and policies and, finally, adaptability and flexibility of purposes.[7] However, most authors focus on the macro-level of foreign policy,[8] and do not pay attention to measuring the aims and effectiveness of foreign policy. While the criteria mentioned above are certainly also relevant to Latvia, the authors consider that foreign policy can have a wider interest than just self-preservation e.g. economic development or image-building.

Thus the aim of this article is not to research Latvian foreign policy as a whole, but to focus on the impact of state and official visits. The effectiveness of these visits will be measured by a number of quantitative criteria including: delegation structure, number of treaties and agreements signed during the visit, growth of tourism, bi-lateral economic-relation growth before and after the visits, return visits and opened embassies. While it may be possible to draw some conclusions regarding the Smith and Williams criteria, the focus of the article is on measuring how state and official visits reflect changes in the international system that have come about through accession to the EU and NATO.

II. Methodology

The analysis is divided into the following blocks:

1. Aim of the visit - visits were classified according to their aim: representative, political, business or geostrategic. Representative visits made up the greatest number, because all visits have an element of representativeness. However, it provides a point of reference for measuring the relevance of the other possible aims. Representation is especially important for a new country or one which has a negative image. Political visits in this period focused on building support for eventual EU and NATO accession in 2004.[9] Business visits were those which featured a large representation of Latvian business interests in the travelling party.[10] Geostrategic visits were those to states that could be counted as potential future partners. As accession to NATO and the EU had already entailed the expansion of regular and intensive partnerships with the North American and European states, then the geostrategic visits were those to Kazakhstan and China.[11]
2. Delegation structure – the size and structure of each delegation allowed us to evaluate the significance of a visit from an economic or political standpoint. For example, the number and rank of public officials on a visit, or the number of treaties signed, was an indicator, of its political significance, while the size of the business delegation provided the same information from a business perspective.[12]
3. Economic relations – analyzing economic relations before and after a visit allows us to make conclusions about the economic effectiveness of the visit. After all, if the visit has a large delegation of business leaders then logic dictates that bi-lateral trade or foreign investments indicators, should increase.
4. Tourism – visits can increase overall interest in a country through media coverage, and perhaps lead to increased tourist flows from the country visited.
5. Return visits[13] – a return visit is an indicator of increasing bi-lateral cooperation as well as a sign of mutual interest in increasing the scope and intensity of cooperation.[14]
6. New embassies opened – visits that intensify political and economic cooperation may also lead to the opening of diplomatic representations which send a signal of close cooperation.

Most state and official visits had more than one goal. However, visits with a single clear purpose may be of great strategic importance.

III. The purpose of state visits

Between the start of 1999 and October 2004 the Latvian President and Prime Minister undertook a total of 33 state and official visits. As discussed above, the purpose of these visits can be divided into four different categories: representative, political, business or geostrategic. (see anex 1). All 33 visits were representational, while 18 were political, 19 had a large accompanying business delegation, while only 3 were geostrategic.[15]

The data indicates that the number of political visits dramatically fell after accession to the EU and NATO. While most visits before 2004 had the purpose of securing Latvia's accession to these organizations, only the visit to Spain had a political aspect (EU neighbourhood policy) after accession. Moreover, this was accompanied by a large business delegation. Indeed, in the post-accession period all visits were accompanied by large business delegations, which had not been the case earlier.

Table 1 details the growing role of business delegations since 1999. In the first three years there were only five business delegations in the sixteen visits. However, in the latter three years twelve of the seventeen visits had a business delegation. A rise from 1/3 to ¾.

Table 1

Business delegations accompanying state and official visits: 1999–2004

Year	Number of visits	Number of visits with a business delegation
1999	6	2
2000	4	2
2001	6	3
2002	6	5
2003	5	3
2004	6	5

Sources: **Latvian Presidential Arhives (2004).** *The Purpose of State Visits by the Latvian President.* **Unpublished.**

Latvian Investment and Development Agency (2004), *Business Delegations in State Visits.* **Unpublished.**

Dripe, J. (2004) *Letter from Latvian Foreign Ministry regarding the Prime Ministers visit delegations.* **Unpublished. 30.11.2004.**

Table 2

State and Business Delegations 1999–2004

Year	Size of State and Business Delegations					Total
1999	Greece 13	Czech Rep. 19				32
2000	Estonia 5	Norway 5				10
2001	Lithuania 24	Kazakhstan 43	Hungary 14			81
2002	Greece 8	Slovenia 5	Ireland 35	Iceland 29	Switzerland 29	106
2003	Poland 23	Germany 38	Bulgaria 17			78
2004	Malta 21	China 34	Portugal 19	Kazakhstan 53	Spain 11	154

Sources: Latvian Presidential Arhives (2004). *The Purpose of State Visits by the Latvian President***.**

Latvian Investment and Development Agency (2004), *State Visit Business Delegations.*

Unpublished.

Dripe, J. (2004) *Letter from Latvian Foreign Ministry regarding the Prime Minister's visit delegations.* **Unpublished. 30.11.2004.**

Moreover, the increasing overall size of the delegation indicates the growing relevance of business. However, the growth has been rather sketchy (see Table 2). In 1999 the business delegations were rather small, but in 2000 there were no accompanying businessmen at all. However, there was a big jump in 2001, primarily because of the large business delegation (81 people) to Kazakhstan. It rose to over 100 people in 2002, before again falling in 2003 when there were only three business delegations. Nevertheless, there was a large jump again in 2004.

The data in Table 2 indicate two major tendencies. First, business delegations are larger in geostrategic visits – three of the five largest business delegations were on geostrategic visits. One of the visit aims is to develop Latvian business interests and find new markets, and it is clear that businesses are interested in accompanying state visits and this should be continued. This is also in the interests of the continued economic development of the state. Second, businesses are also increasingly interested in smaller countries as evidenced by the 2004 trips to Malta and Portugal.[16]

IV. Delegation Structure

We will now take a closer look at the structure of visiting delegations accompanying the President. The accompanying delegation typically includes translators, media, photographers, advisers, staffers and low-level public officials, however there is a lack of detailed data on these parts of the delegation. Thus we will only compare the size of the official delegation and that of the business delegation (in those visits that had a business delegation).

Table 3

Size of official and business delegations 1999–2004[17]

Year	Delegation size	Size of Business Delegation
1999	33	32
2000	30	10
2001	45[18]	81
2002	64	106
2003	43	78
2004	74	154

Sources: **Latvian Presidential Archives (2004).** *The Purpose of State Visits by the Latvian President..* Unpublished.

Latvian Investment and Development Agency (2004), *State Visit Business Delegations.* Unpublished.

Dripe, J. (2004) *Letter from Latvian Foreign Ministry regarding the Prime Ministers visit delegations.* Unpublished. 30.11.2004.

The data in Table 3 reveal a tendency for the size of the business delegation to grow, while the size of the official delegation remains about the same. Indeed, the official delegation's size with regard to the business delegation fell from almost two-thirds (0.63[19]) in 1999-2001, to half (0.50) in 2003-2004. This means that while the official delegations have remained about the same size, the size of business delegations has grown considerably during the period 1999-2004.

Which business sectors have been most represented? This is impotant for two reasons. First, it is an indicator of the most internationally competitive and trade-oriented sectors of the Latvian economy. Second, it indicates the countries in which Latvian businesses have an economic interest and which should be taken into account when planning the geostrategic space. Activity is not only a quantitative indicator, as it certainly has its qualitative aspects. The authors of this article do not argue that qualitative aspects (such as established contacts, signed contracts etc) of Latvian business delegation activity are less important than quantitative aspects (such as the size of delegation). However, the focus of this article is on quantitative aspects of Latvian state and official visits, therefore qualitative aspects of Latvian business delegation activities are left outside the scope of this paper and is an issue for further research.

The most active part of the business delegations have been the information technology, telecommunications and electronics sectors which have had 63 representatives in 18 visits. Second was the port, logistics and infrastructure (including roads and railroads) sector with 58 representatives. Third and fouth place belonged to the banking and finance, and food processing and tobacco sectors, each with 39 representatives. Heavy industry and machining was fifth with 34 representatives. Further details are available in appendix 2.

V. Treaties and agreements

The number of treaties and agreements signed during a visit is an indicator of the effectiveness of the visit. Of course, not all visits result in treaties or agreements, particularly those visits to countries with whom Latvia has already forged a close relationship. Nevertheless, they do point to the development of bilateral relations in certain spheres, the utility of which can be quantified in later years. Moreover, it is an important element of geostrategic visits.

A total of 32 treaties and agreements were signed in 11 of the 33 visits. A mean average of 3 per visit. If we compare the geostrategic visits with the others (eastern versus western visits) we find that these are just 3 of the 33 visits. However, the number of treaties and agreements is 13 in the east against 19 in the west. Thus every visit to the east has resulted in a mean of 4.3 treaties and agreements against 0.6 to the west. It means that treaties are signed more often during geostrategic visits.

Because the western visits include countries with which Latvia has forged a close relationship following EU and NATO accession, it follows that there are fewer treaties and agreements signed with them. In contrast, the high number of treaties and agreements with eastern countries points towards a dynamic development of the bi-lateral relationship. Appendix 3 contains more details on the signed treaties and agreements.

VI. Economic Relations

This section will look at the dynamics of the economic relationship between Latvia and the countries visited by the Prime Minister and President. Particular attention will be paid to those countries that had a significant accompanying business delegation. The economic indicators we have used are bi-lateral trade and direct investment. These are indicators of intensifying economic relations and also allow us to speculate on the future development of economic relations.

The causal relationship between visits (the independent variable) and economic relations (the dependent variable) seems to be straightforward. However, it is difficult to establish this relationship and to separate it from other intervening variables (such as economic crises). One also has to take into account the possibility that economic relationships have their own dynamics and are not influenced by political relations at the heads of state and government level.

Naturally, visits could be organized as a result of increasing economic ties. In this case depending on the pre-visit dynamics, economic relationship can intensify or stabilize on a pre-visit level. It is also not clear how quickly economic relations would increase following a visit. Moreover, data on trade and investments for 2004 were unavailable at the time of writing, and thus no analysis of the visits undertaken in 2003 were available.

Being aware of the difficulties related to establishing causal relationships between both variables, the authors believe that the link between a visit and the intensification of economic relations could be visible if there was a clear and lasting increase in trade and direct investment one year after the visit was made.[20] All visits were analyzed, as a visit with no business delegation may also have provided a stimulus for economic cooperation.

Analysis of the data revealed that there were no significant, long-term linkages between a visit and bi-lateral economic relations. Latvian exports rose after visits to Iceland, the Czech Republic, Sweden (partly), Estonia, France, Norway, Lithuania, Denmark, Kazakhstan, Ireland, Switzerland and Germany.[21] Imports rose after visits to the Czech Republic, Sweden (partly), Estonia, Norway, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Ireland, Switzerland and the USA.[22] See appendix 4 and 5 for more details.

We would note that even in these cases it is a coincidence rather than a causal relationship as regards visits and the growth of imports and exports, because in most cases the intensification of economic relations occurred gradually. Moreover, in many cases where the import and export volumes have been quite small, they may have grown because of factors not connected with the visits. Moreover, as Latvia has gradually integrated with western Europe over the last decade, its economic relations with these countries has also grown. Thus international trade is more influenced by macro rather than micro (such as visits) factors, e.g. geography, tariffs, the labour force etc. Indeed, most visits did not have a business delegation.

A somewhat similar picture also emerges in the case of foreign direct investment where in individual cases, a visit has coincided with an upturn of investment into Latvia (e.g. the visits to Lithuania and Kazakhstan), but in the case of Ireland, investment in Latvia fell heavily over the following six months.[23] Despite these individual cases, it generally seems that state and official visits have had little impact on economic relations.

VII. Tourism

Both state and official visits are widely covered by the media. Thus it is logical to expect that they may increase public interest in Latvia among the population of the country visited. This could, in turn, lead to increased tourism from that country to Latvia. Of course, visits are just one possible source of tourism. Accession to the EU led to large flows of tourists to the new member states. Also, Latvia as a tourist destination has been heavily advertised in the international media, and other factors such as the international climate and its geography also influence tourist flows. Thus it is hard to identify the specific impact of visits on tourism in Latvia. Nevertheless, if there was sharp increase of tourists from a visited country in the year after the visit, this would be evidence of the visit having a positive impact on tourism. This is particularly true of countries geographically distant from Latvia and which are probably less informed about it than, say, Lithuania or Sweden.

An analysis of the impact of visits on tourism is hampered by a lack of precise incoming tourist data for a number of visited countries: Austria, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Kazakhstan, China, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Switzerland. Some of these countries appear in the EU section. However, the data on China and Kazakhstan, two geostrategic space widening trips, have no data because they were undertaken in 2004 and the data is simply not yet available.

Nevertheless, an analysis of the data that we do have reveals that in certain cases (e.g. Estonia, Norway, and Hungary), after a visit the flow of tourists did increase. However, in other cases (e.g. Sweden and the Czech Republic) it radically declined.[24] More detailed data on tourism can be found in appendix 7. The overall lack of data means that we cannot make conclusive statements about the link between tourism and visits. At the moment we can state that visits may have a positive impact on tourism when a geographically distant country is visited. But because data on the USA, China and Kazakhstan is currently unavailable, there is no evidence to support this claim. In other cases the relationship between state and official visits and tourism can be regarded as coincidence without any straightforward and verifiable evidence that a particular visit has caused an increase in the number of tourists. Finally, state visits can certainly develop a positive country image, but they are not the only mechanism to achieve this.

VIII. Return Visits

Return visits (from a country first visited by Latvia) indicate that there is a reciprocated interest in national cooperation. Of course, Latvian political leaders frequently meet with their EU and NATO counterparts in multilateral forums specific to these organizations. Thus relations with these countries cannot be measured by return visits alone. However, this is not true of visits dedicated to enlarging Latvia's geostrategic space, thus special attention was paid to these visits.

Between 1999 and 2004, there were six return visits by foreign countries: Greece (2000), the Czech Republic (1999) , France (2001), Netherlands (2001), Lithuania (2002) and Germany (2004).[25] The small overall number of return visits can be explained by the purpose of the majority of visits in this period – to garner and maintain support for Latvia's accession to the EU and NATO – and these type of visits do not lend themselves easily to return visits. In the case of geostrategic visits, two of the three visits were in 2004, and thus it is logical that return visits have not taken place in the period we are studying (although Kazakhstan is likely to announce a return visit shortly).

China is an interesting case, because it is a large country with a fast-growing economy and increasing influence in the world. Thus it is to be expected that Latvia would be most interested in developing a relationship with China. However, China has actually shown a great interest in developing its relationship with Latvia. Thus Pesident Jiang Zemin visited Latvia in June 2002, and China's Foreign Minister Li Zhao Xing visited in August 2005.[26] Chinese interest in Latvia is probably promoted by Latvia's status as an EU member state, thus indicating that Latvia's accession to the EU has strengthened its foreign policy hand in developing relations with other countries.

Important examples of Latvia attempting to enlarge its geostrategic space can also be found after October 2004. In terms of strengthening Latvia's foreign policy in the east, we can see a state visit to Turkey in April 2005, Georgia in May 2005, as well as to Armenia and Azerbeijan in October 2005. Moreover, the Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili visited Latvia in October 2004, the Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin in September 2005, and the Armenian President Robert Kocharian in 2002. All these visits indicate that Latvia is working towards expanding its geostrategic space in the east.

IX. Embassies opened

The opening of new embassies is an indicator of intensifying bi-lateral relations.[27] This section presumes that a state visit has been effective if, in the case of there being no diplomatic representations prior to the visit, a representation is opened following the visit. As the research only looks at the period up to 2004, it cannot evaluate visits that took place in 2004. However, all the visits up to the end of 2003 have been included.

Many of Latvia's western partners and other countries had already opened representations before 1999 (e.g. Sweden, Estonia, France, Norway, Netherlands, Lithuania, Denmark, USA, Germany, Austria and China). Other states have located their diplomatic representations in neighbouring states (e.g. Portugal). Prior to 1999 Latvia had opened representations in the following countries included in this research: Greece, Sweden, Estonia, France, Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, Lithuania, USA, Poland, Germany, China and Spain. Thus these countries were not analyzed.

We will now turn to look at countries that have opened an embassy in Latvia following a visit. First, the Czech Republic opened an embassy in Riga in 2003, following visits in 1999 and 2001. While it is possible that this could have been as a result of the 2001 visit, it is also possible that it could have been because of closer relations based on their mutual status as EU candidate countries, and Latvia's preparation to join NATO. It may also be because of increased economic relations.[28]

In the case of Slovakia, it is difficult to find a link between the visit and the opening of the embassy, as these both took place in 2001. Bearing in mind that it takes a great deal of time to find the funding and organize the technical details of an Embassy, it is clear that these two events are not connected. The same also applies to Spain, which was visited in 2003, and opened an embassy in the same year. However, in the case of Switzerland, which was visited in 2002 and then opened an embassy in 2004, there is the possibility of a link. In the case of Poland, the visit took place in 2003, but an embassy had already opened in 2001.[29] And neither Hungary nor Slovenia, Ireland, Bulgaria, Malta or Kazakhstan have yet opened representations in Latvia.

What about Latvia opening representations in the country that has been visited by the President? Certainly, there are some cases of this taking place. Latvian embassies were opened in the Czech Republic in 2001 (after visits in 1999 and 2001), and in Ireland in 2003 (visited in 2002). However, in the case of Austria, an embassy was opened in 2000, three years before a visit, while the embassy in Portugal was opened in 1999, five years before the visit.

Thus while in some cases a state visit resulted in the opening of an embassy, in others it did not. It is particularly interesting to look at the impact of the geostrategic visits, made to countries geographically distant from Latvia, on the opening of embassies, where the opening of new embassies could be regarded as a diplomatic success. However, it is not possible to make conclusions about the two most recent visits to China and Kazakhstan. Moreover, China had already opened an embassy in Latvia before 1999. However, in the case of Kazakhstan, while an embassy was not opened after the first visit in 2001, a Latvian embassy to Kazakhstan was opened in 2005, a year after the last visit. Moreover, Kazakhstan opened a Consulate in Latvia, which may well lead to an embassy in the future.

Conclusions

The aim of this article was to analyse state and official visits between 1999 and 2004 and consider the extent to which Latvia's foreign policy reorientation towards the CIS, Asia and the Balkans was real rather than rhetorical. The article also considered the impact of visits on economic relations and tourism.

First, it is clear that while the number of purely representative visits has declined, the representative function remains important for a small and largely unknown country like Latvia. Leading up to Latvia's accession to the EU and NATO, most visits were directed towards states that could influence this process. But after accession Latvia has been reorienting its visits towards enlarging its geostrategic space e.g the 2004 visits to China and Kazakhstan. However, Latvian foreign policy had also claimed to be working towards closer relations with Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Turkey and certain Balkan states, but this was not realised, at least in the form of state and official visits.

The most important evidence of the longevity of Latvian foreign policy interests can be found after 2004 in the state visits made by the President to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia, as well as their return visits to Latvia. Has Latvia's foreign policy become more pragmatic? It may well seem like that, however, an increase in the number of visits does not prove this. Rather, this can be seen in the diversity of countries that Latvia has visited, indicating that it is attempting to maintain a wider circle of political and economic partners both east and south-east from Latvia.

Second, it proved rather difficult to examine the impact of visits on economic relations and tourism, because in most cases it was impossible to create a clear linkage between the different variables. The only conclusion that can be made is that in most cases, there is no straightforward relationship between state and official visits and intensification of economic relationship. However, there is a growing tendency for business representation on these visits. This will probably bring a significant economic impact in the future. This is less significant in the case of Latvia's EU and NATO partners, but more so in terms of Latvia's economic relations with Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as other post-Soviet states with whom Latvia has not yet formed a close economic relationship. Indeed, as political relations develop, economic relations will also grow.

Appendix 1

State and official visits classification based on the aim of the visit

Year	Date	Country	Status	Represent-ative	Political	Business	Widening the geostrategic space
1999	26-27 January	Sweden	Official (PM[30])	+			
1999	16-20 March	Greece	State	+	+[31]	+	
1999	19-21 April	Iceland	State	+	+[32]		
1999	10-12 May	Czech Rep.	State	+	+[33]	+	
1999	9-11 June	Hungary	Official (PM)	+			
1999	30-1 December	Sweden	Official	+			
2000	1-3 May	Estonia	State	+		+	
2000	22-26 May	France	Official	+	+[34]	+	
2000	20-21 September	Norway	State	+	+[35]	+	
2000	22-24 October	Netherlands	Official (PM)	+			
2001	14-16 March	Lithuania	State	+	+[36]	+	
2001	28-30 March	Denmark	Official	+	+[37]		
2001	13-14 May	Slovakia	Official (PM)	+			
2001	11-13 June	Czech Rep.	Official (PM)	+			
2001	5-7 September	Kazakhstan	Official (PM)	+			+
2001	16-18 October	Hungary	State	+	+[38]	+	
2002	26-29 March	Greece	State	+	+[39]	+	
2002	16-18 April	Slovenia	State	+	+	+	
2002	3-5 June	Ireland	State	+	+[40]		
2002	6-9 June	Iceland	Official (PM)	+			
2002	11-13 August	Iceland	State	+	+[41]	+	
2002	30-31 October	Switzerland	State	+		+	
2003	16-19 February	USA	Official	+	+[42]		
2003	26 February	Poland	State	+	+[43]		
2003	17-20 March	Germany	State	+	+		
2003	9-12 July	Austria	Official	+	+		

2003	3-5 December	Bulgaria	State	+	+	+	
2004	16-18 February	Malta	State	+		+	
2004	13-17 April	China	State	+		+	+
2004	6-7 September	Netherlands	Official	+		+	
2004	13-16 September	Portugal	State	+		+	
2004	7-9 October	Kazakhstan	State	+		+	+
2004	18-20 October	Spain	State	+	+[44]	+	

Sources: **Latvian Presidential Arhives.** *The Aim of State Presidential Visits.* Unpublished. 2004

Appendix 2

Business division representation by number of visits

Country	Auditing, finance, tax advice	Car servicing	Refuse collection, recycling	Air transport	Banking and financial institutions	Building	Various	Security, safeguarding investments	Energy	IT, telecommunications, electronics	Education	Lawyers, business	Wood processing, lumber	Chemistry and pharmaceuticals	Agriculture	Real estate	Ports, logistics infrastructure (also roads, railroads)	Paper, stationary and printing	Food production, tobacco	Regional development and local authorities	Heavy industry, machine building	Sales and marketing	Tourism	Light industry	Total countries
Greece					1	1				2				2		2			1		1		3		13
Czech Rep.						1				2				2					7		1	1	1	4	19
Lithuania	1	1		1	1	1			1	2			1	4					9				1	1	24
Kazakhstan	1			2	5	2	2			3				3		1	15			2	5			2	43
Hungary										4		1		2	2				2		1		1	1	14
Greece					1	1			1	3		1									1				8
Slovakia						1			1	2			1												5
Ireland	1		1	1		2			1	9			3	2	6	1	3	1	1	1				2	35
Iceland						1				1			4	2	3	1	4	2	3		6		1	1	29
Switzerland				1	10					6			1	1		1			1		2	1	5		29
Poland	1	1			5					5		1		1			3		2		2	1		1	23
Germany		2		1	7		1			4		1	2				6	1	3		5		1	4	38
Bulgaria										4		1		2	1				5		1		1	2	17
Malta	2		2		2				2								5			1	1		5	1	21
China	1					4	2		1	8	1	1	3	1			5		2	1	2	4	2	1	39
Portugal	1					1				3	1	1	1		1				1	1	1		6	1	19
Kazakhstan	2		1		7	4		2		4	3	1	1	2			16		2		5	1	1	1	53
Spain						2	1			1		1	1	1			1			2				1	11
Total	10	4	4	6	39	21	6	2	7	63	5	9	18	25	13	6	58	4	39	8	34	8	28	25	

Source: **Latvian Investment and Development Agency (2004),** *State Visit Business Delegations.*Unpublished.

Appendix 3

Treaties and agreements signed during visits. 1999–2004

Year	Date	Status	Country	Number of signed treaties
1999	26–27 January	Official (PM)	Sweden	
1999	16–20 March	State	Greece	4
1999	19–21 April	State	Iceland	
1999	10–12 May	State	Czech Rep.	2
1999	9–11 June	Official (PM)	Hungary	2
1999	30–1 December	Official	Sweden	
2000	1–3 May	State	Estonia	
2000	22–26 May	Official	France	
2000	20–21 September	State	Norway	
2000	22–24 October	Official (PM)	Netherlands	
2001	14–16 March	State	Lithuania	
2001	28–30 March	Official	Denmark	
2001	13–14 May	Official (PM)	Slovakia	
2001	11–13 June	Official (PM)	Czech Rep.	
2001	5–7 September	Official (PM)	Kazakhstan	3
2001	16–18 October	State	Hungary	2
2002	26–29 March	State	Greece	4
2002	16–18 April	State	Slovenia	1
2002	3–5 June	State	Ireland	
2002	6–9 June	Official (PM)	Iceland	
2002	11–13 August	State	Iceland	
2002	30–31 October	State	Switzerland	
2003	16–19 February	Official	USA	
2003	26 February	State	Poland	1
2003	17–20 March	State	Germany	
2003	9–12 July	Official	Austria	
2003	3–5 December	State	Bulgaria	3
2004	16–18 February	State	Malta	
2004	13–17 April	State	China	7
2004	6–7 September	Official	Netherlands	
2004	13–16 September	State	Portugal	
2004	7–9 October	State	Kazakhstan	3
2004	18–20 October	State	Spain	

Source: **Latvian Foreign Ministry.** *Bilateral treaties and agreements: http://www.* am.gov.lv/lv/Arpolitika/bilateral/ (accessed 16.12.2004)

Appendix 4

Latvian exports to countries visited 1998–2003

Latvian Exports 1998–2003 (thousands, Lats)						
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
USA	30 714	52 954	37 729	32 621	59 641	47 680
Austria	6 503	6 270	7 253	7 630	8 484	8 169
Bulgaria	483	231	138	122	384	526
Czech Republic	3 346	3 511	5 972	9 411	8 224	7 892
Denmark	54 454	61 667	65 882	72 625	80 423	99 029
France	18 202	18 545	20 361	24 290	28 666	36 551
Greece	226	738	454	505	2 146	2 361
Estonia	48 526	47 196	60 076	72 085	84 484	108 452
Ireland	6 275	7 399	18 400	14 407	13 284	19 697
Iceland	2 324	1 830	3 067	4 484	5 755	9 473
Kazakhstan	7 242	2 163	2 697	4 702	5 777	6 021
China	4	65	127	1 036	1 807	9 498
Lithuania	79 325	75 905	85 749	101 973	117 719	135 144
Malta	507	638	237	275	288	228
Netherlands	37 093	35 376	45 118	46 300	53 774	53 686
Norway	8 237	8 192	9 421	17 681	23 257	32 095
Poland	18 836	17 887	18 204	24 102	22 034	24 565
Portugal	397	694	680	601	3 615	6 340
Slovakia	1 956	3 630	6 200	5 986	5 258	5 389
Slovenia	2 111	1 270	3 499	1 126	1 190	1 495
Spain	6 374	5 966	5 603	8 630	9 582	13 773
Switzerland	4 868	4 625	4 327	4 208	5 521	7 247
Hungary	1 124	1 099	192	2 125	2 409	3 537
Germany	166 822	169 984	194 288	209 501	218 269	245 313
Sweden	110 017	107 621	122 523	120 106	148 578	174 204

Source: **Latvian Statistical Office (1999-2004)** *Latvian Foreign Trade* **Rīga: Latvian Statistical Office**

Appendix 5

Latvian imports to countries visited 1998–2003

Latvian imports 1998–2003 (thousands, Lats)						
	1998	**1999**	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**
USA	38 348	35 054	38 430	40 613	39 274	51 952
Austria	23 606	22 881	20 688	25 321	34 806	46 585
Bulgaria	5 808	6 764	5 522	5 289	5 383	5 125
Czech Republic	25 570	21 016	24 259	31 246	34 433	41 831
Denmark	70 985	67 019	69 753	81 911	84 826	101 934
France	49 371	55 326	58 726	53 301	65 386	84 114
Greece	2 963	4 100	4 077	4 185	3 780	3 402
Estonia	124 827	110 235	120 529	139 114	153 876	191 780
Ireland	10 225	13 286	14 037	12 428	11 803	13 150
Iceland	508	485	1 120	2 264	2 128	1 681
Kazakhstan	4 930	2 287	3 803	1 802	1 810	1 556
China	8 285	8 748	14 301	16 995	26 334	38 449
Lithuania	118 518	126 335	146 446	186 383	245 796	289 668
Malta	27	21	61	58	78	40
Netherlands	66 980	67 660	66 588	71 489	84 389	92 624
Norway	29 049	29 599	21 634	27 695	31 387	38 858
Poland	66 212	75 587	91 900	110 210	125 763	152 702
Portugal	1 837	1 235	2 168	3 031	4 808	4 847
Slovakia	7 339	5 691	12 558	16 075	17 167	19 203
Slovenia	1 966	3 831	3 826	5 047	6 355	7 881
Spain	15 271	13 015	20 190	26 083	30 736	36 850
Switzerland	28 871	36 685	34 025	38 304	47 525	56 490
Hungary	13 683	16 041	16 677	22 472	22 526	23 441
Germany	315 547	261 297	302 601	374 863	429 459	479 788
Sweden	135 096	124 847	130 447	143 052	159 450	187 088

Source: **Latvian Statistical Office (1999-2004)** *Latvian Foreign Trade* **Rīga: Latvian Statistical Office**

Appendix 6

Direct Foreign Investment into Latvia (1998–2003) from states visited

Foreign Investment in Latvia 1998–2003 (thousands, Lats)							
	1998	**1999**	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**
USA	70 597	76 720	77 439	89 054	81 116	95 381	83 561
Austria	8 052	6 807	4 766	6 059	6 601	7 965	6 818
Bulgaria	718	687	687	691	4	4	-
Czech Rep.	347	639	547	649	647	976	159
Denmark	100 189	106 580	116 501	124 369	130 383	121 490	122 733
France	615	294	296	550	550	550	662
Greece	-	-	315	317	317	317	-
Estonia	25 685	38 633	50 482	62 339	73 812	79 600	72 519
Ireland	34 785	30 496	17 302	24 057	24 646	10 161	1 226
Iceland	66	1 556	237	870	1 575	1 964	5 142
Kazakhstan	0	1	1	611	1 831	1 831	3 470
China	-	32	3	28	28	28	-
Lithuania	1 608	2 667	3 165	3 880	4 938	7 949	6 019
Malta	90	259	257	1 311	1 083	2 653	35
Netherlands	16 567	22 530	24 916	33 578	39 923	63 046	61 457
Norway	26 551	28 583	34 395	57 763	91 773	95 398	88 245
Poland	186	260	276	531	466	553	766
Portugal	130	28	130	130	130	130	-
Slovakia	30	108	0	6	6	6	-
Slovenia	1	1	0	-	-	-	-
Spain	2 313	586	522	719	974	1 205	752
Switzerland	15 521	8 534	16 182	23 972	25 812	35 234	21 445
Hungary	25	34	11	9	9	99	90
Germany	56 663	65 475	105 859	135 195	129 310	126 725	108 223
Sweden	44 465	63 948	84 840	141 941	150 331	160 799	156 561

Source: **Latvian Statistical Office (1999-2004)** *Investment in Latvia* **Rīga: Latvian Statistical Office**

Appendix 7

Foreign Tourists to Latvia (thousands). 1998–2003

Foreign Tourists to Latvia (thousands). 1998–2003						
	1998	**1999**	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**
USA	23,7	10,4	14,2	18,4	19,6	19,1
Czech Republic	25,4	17,6	13,2	14,3	20,8	19,7
Denmark	16,2	13,8	13,6	19,6	18,3	24
Estonia	454,9	498,7	602,3	572,8	600,2	645,2
Lithuania	621,5	513,3	653,3	675	711,4	753,7
Norway	14,4	13,4	10,8	19,4	14	16,1
Poland	56,1	63,6	56	87,1	91,5	94,4
Slovakia	13,2	14,2	11,7	9,5	11,5	-
Hungary	19,5	9,3	14,3	6	12,4	12,8
Germany	71,4	83,8	65,6	89,6	118,7	191,9
Sweden	86,2	57,3	53,8	51,2	53,7	77,7
EU	355,2	338,7	310	368,5	457,9	582,6
CIS	190,7	197,2	203,5	220,4	283,6	278

Source: **Latvian Statistical Office (1999–2004)** *Tourism in Latvia* **Rīga: Latvian Statistical Office**

Footnotes

[1] Western states are understood as those in the EU and NATO, while eastern states are members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Asia.

[2] This article is based on a large data-set gathered by the authors and their assistants.

[3] A 'state visit' is the official visit of the President while an 'official visit' is one undertaken by the Prime Minister.

[4] Michael Smith. (1981) 'Comparing Foreign Policies: Circumstances, Processes and Performance'. *Foreign Policy Analysis*. Michael Clarke and Brian White (ed's). G.W.&A.Hesketh, Omskirk.

[5] James Rosenau. (1970), 'Foreign Policy as Adaptive Behavior: Some Preliminary Notes for a Theoretical Model'. *Comparative politics*, 2 (3)

[6] Wolfram Hanrieder. (1967) 'Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy.' *The American Political Science Review*, 61 (4)

[7] Michael Smith. (1981) 'Comparing Foreign Policies: Circumstances, Processes and Performance'. *Foreign Policy Analysis*. Michael Clarke and Brian White (ed's). G.W.&A.Hesketh, Omskirk.

[8] Most authors, e.g. Kenneth Waltz (1967), James Rosenau (1970) and Wolfram Hanrieder (1971) analyse the process of foreign policy formation, rather than the effectiveness of foreign policy.

[9] The research does not consider the extent to which political visits were motivated by coalition building for the post-accession period. After all, by 2000 it was clear that Latvia, barring a member-state veto (which the visits certainly aimed to ensure against), would join both the EU and NATO.

[10] The authors of this article are aware that the benefits of analyzing the interests of the business elite from the quantitative perspective are quite limited, and that qualitative aspects may have more explanatory power. However, the authors consider that comparative quantitative indicators are also powerful indicators of the utility of state visits.

[11] It is certainly in Latvia's interests to develop closer ties with Asian countries. Asia has recently experienced unprecedented economic growth, particularly in comparison with western Europe. China and India are fast rising economic powers. Thus geostrategic visits are an effort to establish closer cooperation with Asian countries, particularly business contacts. In contrast, West European countries already are important export markets for Latvian businesses.

[12] Of course, the number of treaties alone does not reflect the political and economic impotance of each treaty. Moreover, it is possible that some visits that are of great political significance do not actually sign any treaties. However, the number of signed treaties is at least an indicator of the bi-lateral relationship between Latvia and other states, particularly those to the east.

[13] In terms of state or official visits from the host country.

[14] This is not to deny that a visit can have many purposes, not least of which is to discuss bi-lateral problems that may have arisen. A return visit can also be purely representative, with no further intensification of the relationship. However, return visits are generally an indicator that relations are constructive and both sides wish to solve any complications that may have occurred. Moreover, following 1999 Latvia may have been seen as a stable EU and NATO candidate country with which to form closer relations.

[15] Latvian Presidential Arhives (2004). *The Purpose of State Visits by the Latvian President.* Unpublished.

[16] Interest in these particular countries may have been heightened because of their developed port and transport sectors, which are also significant in Latvia.

[17] Data from 2000 is not included because there were no business delegations in that year.

[18] The 5-7 September 2001 Prime Ministerial visit to Kazakhstan includes the Latvia-Kazakhstan intergovernmental working group.

[19] Ratio between the size official delegation and business delegation.

[20] It is debatable whether a visit should cause a long-term or short-term increase in economic relations.

[21] Latvian Statistical Office (1999-2004) *Latvian Foreign Trade* Rīga: Latvian Statistical Office

[22] Visits aim to increase exports and inward investments rather than imports, however, the authors also chose to include data on imports as an indicator of increased interest in Latvia after a visit.

[23] Latvian Statistical Office (1999-2004) *Investment in Latvia* Rīga: Latvian Statistical Office

[24] Latvian Statistical Office (1999-2004) *Tourism in Latvia* Rīga: Latvian Statistical Office

[25] Latvian Foreign Ministry. *Foreign Officials Return Visits* http://www.am.gov.lv/lv/Arpolitika/divpusejas-attiecibas/ (accessed 16.12.2004)

[26] The former Latvian Ambassador to China, Einārs Semanis published a detailed account of Latvian-Chinese relations up to 2002 in the Latvian newspaper *Diena*. Semanis, E. *Sagaidot Ķīnas prezidenta vizīti Latvijā*. Diena, 10.06.2002. p.2

[27] Generalconsulates, Consulates, Honarary General Consulates and Honorary Consulates were not considered.

[28] Latvian Foreign Ministry. *Foreign Diplomatic Representations in Latvia.* http://www.am.gov.lv/lv/Arpolitika/divpusejas-attiecibas/ (accessed 16.12.2004)

[29] Ibid.

[30] *PM* – Prime Minister

[31] Greek political support for Latvia's foreign policy.

[32] Iceland's political support for Latvia's foreign policy.
[33] Czech Republic support for NATO accession and issues of EU accession, security policy.
[34] French political support for Latvias accession to the EU and NATO, minority issues in Latvia.
[35] Norwegian political support for Latvian accession to NATO, Norwegian technical support for the Latvian armed forces, minority issues in Latvia.
[36] NATO enlargement, signing the sea border treaty.
[37] Danish political support for Latvian accession to the EU and NATO, Baltic sea state cooperation.
[38] Hungarian political support for Latvian accession to NATO, cooperation in education and defense, European and international security issues.
[39] Greece's, as the EU President country, political support for Latvian accession to NATO, dialogue between member and candidate countries on CAP, European defense, cooperation in NATO programmes.
[40] Ireland's political support for Latvian accession to the EU
[41] Iceland's political support for Latvian accession to NATO, the future of CAP, regional cooperation.
[42] Iraq, NATO, American and Russian relations, energey in the Baltic sea region.
[43] Polish political support for Latvian accession to NATO, EU integration policy, Baltic sea region development, Iraq.
[44] EU neighbourhood policy

362.-373. lpp.

Latvijas – Krievijas attiecību tiesiskie aspekti

Legal Aspects of Latvia–Russia Relations

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Šodienas Latvijas–Krievijas attiecību problemātikas pamatā ir 1940. gada notikumu atšķirīga interpretācija. Fakts, ka abas valstis ir ieņēmušas savstarpēji nesavienojamu nostāju, ir vispārzināms un liekus komentārus neprasa. Jāatzīst, ka juridiskie aspekti, kas aplūkoti šajā nodaļā, ir izraisījuši karstas debates abu valstu gan politiķu, gan juristu, gan arī plašākos iedzīvotāju slāņos. Lai arī par jautājumiem, kas saistās ar 1940. gada notikumiem, runāts daudz, ir acīmredzams, ka diskusijai bieži pietrūkst juridiskas precizitātes un tā vairāk apspēlē politiskus vai emocionālus faktorus. Šī pētījuma ietvaros, protams, nav iespējams veikt visaptverošu juridisko analīzi, tāpēc šajā daļā tiks apskatīti biežāk sastopamie argumenti, kā arī izceltas būtiskākās juridiskās premisas saistībā ar 1940. gada notikumiem un no tiem izrietošajām sekām.

Pastāv trīs aspekti, kas ir izraisījuši visasākās diskusijas, un tie patiesībā ir tik cieši saistīti, ka izriet viens no otra loģiskā secībā. Pirmkārt, tas ir jautājums par okupāciju, kas savukārt sakņojas vēsturisko faktu atšķirīgā interpretācijā. Otrkārt, ar okupācijas jautājumu nesaraujami saistīta ir premisa par valsts turpināšanos (*continuity*) starptautiskajās tiesībās. Treškārt, tas, ka jautājums par okupāciju ir palicis neatrisināts Latvijas–Krievijas attiecībās, rada tālākus juridiskus sarežģījumus abu valstu starpā, jo īpaši robežlīguma jautājumā. Problēmas nopietnību akcentē fakts, ka šeit vairs nav runa tikai par divu valstu robežu, kas principā var palikt apstrīdēta paaudzēs, kā to nereti atspoguļo vēsture. Tas, ka Eiropas Savienībai nav noteiktas un atzītas robežas ar valsti, kura nav tās sastāvā, ir anomālija, kas būs jānovērš, neraugoties nedz uz vēstures faktu atšķirīgu interpretāciju, nedz atšķirīgiem juridiski pamatotiem argumentiem.

1. LATVIJAS OKUPĀCIJA

1.1. Spēka draudu aizliegums starptautiskajās tiesībās

Lai varētu izvērtēt Latvijas–Krievijas attiecību tiesiskos aspektus 1940. gadā, ir nepieciešams aplūkot tās starptautisko tiesību normas, kas pastāvēja tajā laikā, un šī normatīvā regulējuma gaismā attiecīgi izvērtēt vēsturiskos notikumus.

Analizējot starptautiskās tiesības šobrīd, ir redzams, ka ar diviem (ļoti šauriem, strikti regulētiem un atrunātiem) izņēmumiem[1] starptautiskajās tiesībās pastāv pilnīgs un absolūts spēka un spēka draudu lietošanas aizliegums.[2]1940. gadā starptautisko tiesību normas attiecībā uz vairākām starptautisko tiesību jomām nebija tik attīstītas un skaidri definētas, kā tas ir šodien. Tomēr jau ap 1930. gadu starptautiskajās tiesībās pastāvēja uzskats, ka spēka draudi ir prettiesiski apstākļos, kad nav pamatojuma spēka lietošanai.[3] Turklāt 1934. gadā Starptautisko tiesību asociācija, pamatoties uz 1928. gada Briāna–Keloga paktu, atzina, ka spēka draudi ir starptautisko tiesību pārkāpums.[4] Šeit jāpiezīmē, ka Briāna–Keloga paktam, kas aizliedza izmantot "karu" kā nacionālās politikas instrumentu, pievienojās gan Latvija, gan PSRS. Protams, šis dokuments neaizliedza lietot varas draudus, pie kuriem ir pieskaitāms arī ultimāts tādā formā, kādā tas tika iesniegts Latvijai.

Nepārprotamā formulējumā spēka draudus izmantot aizliedza 1933. gada konvencija par agresijas definīciju. Šai konvencijai, ko, starp citu, iniciēja Krievija[5] (tā dēvētā "Ļitvinova konvencija") un kas absolūti aizliedza tieši vai netieši izmantot spēku (varu) valstu savstarpējās attiecībās, pievienojās gan Latvija, gan Krievija. Minētā konvencija savā preambulā atsaucas uz Briāna–Keloga paktu, kas savukārt aizliedz jebkādu agresiju (*aggression*). Konvencija definē agresoru kā valsti, kas, ņemot vērā visus divpusējos līgumus, ieņem otras valsts teritoriju ar vai bez kara pieteikšanas.[6] Konvencija arī aizliedz jebkādu atsaukšanos uz politiskiem, ekonomiskiem, sociāliem vai administratīviem motīviem, kurus varētu izmantot, lai attaisnotu agresora darbības.[7]

Krievijas puse, runājot par Latvijas iekļaušanu PSRS sastāvā, bieži vien ignorē iepriekš minētos dokumentus vai norāda, ka šādu dokumentu esamība neapstiprina spēka draudu aizlieguma esamību starptautiskajās tiesībās līdz 1940. gadam.[8] Ir saprotama Krievijas juristu skepse šajā jautājumā, jo īpaši ņemot vērā starptautisko tiesību attīstības vēsturi un to, ka ne vienmēr normas starptautiskajās tiesībās ir skaidri formulētas jeb definētas, kā tas nereti mēdz būt paražu tiesībās (*customary international law*). Tomēr starptautiskās tiesības nav vienīgais avots, kas norāda uz PSRS rīcības pretlikumību. Papildus starptautisko tiesību avotiem pastāv virkne divpusēju līgumu, kas tika pārkāpti brīdī, kad Latvijas puse saņēma ultimātu, un abi šie avoti – gan starptautisko tiesību normas, gan Latvijas–PSRS divpusējie līgumi – ir jāskata mijiedarbībā, tos piemērojot Latvijas okupācijas vēsturiskajiem faktiem. Zīmīgs ir fakts, ka Krievijas juristi, kuri mēģina atspēkot Latvijas juristu izvirzītos argumentus attiecībā uz starptautisko tiesību normām un šo normu piemērošanu 1940. gada notikumiem, ir salīdzinoši kūtri divpusējo līgumu apspriešanā.

1.2. Divpusējie Latvijas–Krievijas līgumi

1920. gadā noslēgtais Miera līgums (turpmāk – Miera līgums) starp Latviju un Krieviju paredz, ka Krievija uz mūžīgiem laikiem atsakās no pretenzijām pret Latviju un apņemas ievērot tās suverenitāti un neatkarību.[9] Šeit ir svarīgi atzīmēt, ka šis līgums neparedz tā darbības izbeigšanu vai denonsēšanu. Ja starpvalstu līgums neparedz šādu iespēju, tad tā darbība var tikt izbeigta tikai saskaņā ar 1969. gada Vīnes konvenciju par līgumu tiesībām (turpmāk – Vīnes konvencija).[10] Šis aspekts detalizētāk tiks apskatīts saistībā ar robežlīguma jautājumu un šeit tiek pieminēts tikai kā apstāklis, kas atspēko Krievijas puses izvirzītu argumentu, ka Miera līgums automātiski zaudēja spēku brīdī, kad Latvija tika pievienota PSRS. Vīnes konvencija uzskaita situācijas, kurās līguma darbība tiek pārtraukta, un vienas valsts iekļaušana otras sastāvā nav minēta šajā uzskaitījumā.[11] Tāpat arī neviena no pusēm nekad nav paziņojusi otrai pusei par līguma darbības izbeigšanu vai tā denonsēšanu, kas ir viens no Vīnes konvencijā paredzētajiem gadījumiem līguma darbības izbeigšanai.

Fakts, ka Miera līgums darbojās un bija nozīmīgs faktors Latvijas–Krievijas attiecībās, var tikt ilustrēts ar virkni citu līgumu, kas tika noslēgti starp Latviju un Krieviju, atsaucoties uz Miera līgumu. Kā piemēru šeit var minēt divus tirdzniecības līgumus, kas tika noslēgti 1927. un 1933. gadā, kā arī 1923. gada Neuzbrukšanas līgumu, kas savā preambulā atsaucās uz Miera līguma noteikumiem. Tāpat arī Latvijai, kā izrādījās, ļoti nozīmīgais 1939. gada Savstarpējās palīdzības pakts, ar kuru Latvija piešķīra PSRS tiesības ierīkot militārās bāzes Latvijas teritorijā un kurā bija pasludināts attīstīt Miera līgumā nodibinātās draudzīgās attiecības.

Nākamais divpusējais līgums, ko Krievijas juristi savās diskusijās labprāt ignorē, ir jau pieminētais 1923. gada Neuzbrukšanas līgums. Noslēdzot šo līgumu, abas līgumslēdzējas valstis apņēmās atturēties no jebkāda “uzbrukuma” un no jebkādiem “varas darbiem”, kas vērsti pret otras puses neatkarību. Šī līguma terminu interpretācija jāmeklē ne tikai paša līguma kontekstā, bet arī 1932. gada konvencijā par samierināšanās procedūru. Minētā konvencija, kas, tāpat kā Neuzbrukšanas līgums, tiek nepelnīti piemirsta Krievijas puses argumentos, paredz, ka līgumslēdzējas puses visus strīdus (arī tos, kas saistās ar līgumu izpildi) kārtos samierināšanās ceļā, ar izlīgšanas komisijas palīdzību.[12] Tāpat arī šī konvencija ir Neuzbrukšanas līguma “neatņemama sastāvdaļa”, un puses apņemas “atturēties no jebkādiem līdzekļiem, kas varētu nelabvēlīgi iespaidot kāda jautājuma apspriešanu samierināšanās komisijā”.[13] Šo abu starpvalstu līgumu esamība atspēko Krievijas puses izvirzīto argumentu, ka Latvija PSRS darbībām piekrita labprātīgi, tas ir, formāli piekrita ultimātam, kura mērķis esot bijis nodrošināt 1939. gada Savstarpējās palīdzības pakta izpildi, un atļāva ievest PSRS Bruņotos spēkus Latvijas teritorijā.[14] Krievijas juristi arī nenorāda, kādā veidā Latvija bija pārkāpusi paktu, nedz arī izskaidro, kāpēc netika ņemti vērā Neuzbrukšanas līgums un konvencija par samierināšanās procedūru.

Būtisks šajā kontekstā ir arī tas, ka PSRS valdība, anektējot Latviju un to inkorporējot PSRS, mēģināja darboties saskaņā ar nacionālo likumdošanu. PSRS valdībai bija svarīgi, ka visus lēmumus it kā pieņem vietējā vara, pamatojoties uz pilsoņu gribu.[15] Viens no biežāk dzirdamajiem argumentiem no Krievijas puses tagad ir balstīts uz faktu, ka inkorporācija PSRS esot bijusi veikta saskaņā ar nacionālo likumdošanu.[16] Neatbildēts paliek jautājums – ja Latvijas aneksija un inkorporācija nebija pretlikumīga un bija saskaņā ar starptautisko tiesību tā laika prasībām, kāpēc PSRS valdībai bija tik svarīgi nodrošināt savu darbību it kā atbilstību nacionālajai likumdošanai.[17]

Nākamais aspekts, kas apskatāms saistībā ar 1940. gada notikumiem, ir jautājums par Latvijas valsts turpināšanos, kas savukārt ietver divus elementus – Latvijas valsts prasību par Latvijas nepārtrauktību starptautiskajās tiesībās un šīs prasības atzīšanu no citu valstu un starptautisko organizāciju puses.

2. LATVIJAS VALSTS TURPINĀŠANĀS [18]

2.1. Latvijas prasība par turpināšanos starptautiskajās tiesībās

1990. gada 4. maija deklarācijā Latvija pasludināja, ka 1940. gada akts par pievienošanos PSRS ir spēkā neesošs *ex tunc* (no pieņemšanas brīža) un pieprasīja *restitutio in integrum* (iepriekšējā statusa atjaunošanu). Tā pamatoja savu prasību ar faktu, ka 1940. gada iekļaušana PSRS bija nelikumīga.

Viens no šīs prasības stūrakmeņiem ir fakts, ka 1939. gada Molotova–Ribentropa pakts un tā slepenie papildprotokoli, kas sadalīja "interešu sfēras" starp Vāciju un PSRS un kas atklāj abu minēto valstu agresīvos nodomus, ir pasludināti par spēkā neesošiem *ab initio* (no paša sākuma).[19] Kaut gan Krievijas juristi apgalvo, ka "interešu sfēras" atrunāšana pati par sevi nebija pretlikumīga, tomēr ir grūti apstrīdēt, ka PSRS 1940. gada darbības tika veiktas tiešā cēloņsakarībā ar Molotova–Ribentropa paktu un tā slepenajiem papildprotokoliem.[20]

Nebūtu juridiski korekti arī pieņemt, ka jautājums par Latvijas valsts turpināšanos ir tikai teorētisks, nevis reāls. Starptautisko tiesību viena no pamatfunkcijām ir valsts neatkarības sargāšana. Kā raksta D. A. Lēbers, "..starptautiskās tiesības nelabprāt atzīst valsts izdzišanas faktu.." un tāpēc "..nelikumīgas aneksijas gadījumā starptautiskās tiesības prasa, lai valstu izdzišana būtu 'skaidra un galīga' (*definite and final*)".[21] Ar "galīgumu" ir jāsaprot situācija, kad vairs nav cerību un kad ir acīmredzams, ka neatkarības atgūšana ir absolūti nereāla. Tas, ka Baltijas valstu gadījumā cerības noteikti nebija zaudētas, ir plaši dokumentēts.[22]

Tāpat arī nekorekts ir pieņēmums, ka Latvija 1991. gadā īstenoja savas tiesības uz pašnoteikšanos. Kā norāda D. A. Lēbers, pašnoteikšanās ir tiesības, kas var tikt īstenotas vienu reizi, valstij iegūstot (nevis atjaunojot!) neatkarību, un Latvijas tauta savas tiesības uz pašnoteikšanos jau īstenoja 1918. gadā.[23] Šis aspekts ir skaidri definēts Miera līgumā.[24]

Vēl viens arguments, ko bieži nācies dzirdēt no okupācijas atzīšanas pretinieku puses un kas šeit jāpiemin, ir saistīts ar faktu, ka Latvija piedalījās padomju impērijas valdīšanā un tādēļ tā ir līdzatbildīga par to, kas notika PSRS.[25] Attiecībā uz šo argumentu ir svarīgi apzināties, ka starptautiskajās tiesībās nepastāv tēze, ka sadarbība iznīcina valstisko turpināšanos. Šādā situācijā "sadarbība" nav juridisks termins un tāpēc šis arguments jāatstāj politiskajai zinātnei, nevis starptautisko tiesību zinātnei.[26]

Prasības par valsts turpināšanos atzīšana no citu valstu un starptautisko organizāciju puses nav obligāts starptautisko tiesību priekšnoteikums, bet tas noteikti ir prasību atbalstošs faktors un vairumā gadījumu arī indikators, kas norāda, vai un cik lielā mērā šī prasība ir juridiski un aktuāli pamatota.

2.2. Citu valstu un starptautisko organizāciju attieksme pret Latvijas prasību

Latvijas valsts turpināšanos atzīst gandrīz visas Eiropas Savienības valstis. Izņēmumi ir Nīderlande un Zviedrija.[27] Austrija savukārt sākotnēji balstīja savu atzīšanu uz pašnoteikšanās tiesībām, bet vēlāk savu nostāju mainīja. Ārpus Eiropas Savienības Latvijas turpināšanos ir atzinušas vairums valstu (protams, šeit ir runa par tām valstīm, ar kurām Latvijai bija nodibinātas diplomātiskās attiecības līdz 1940. gadam). Latvijas turpināšanos neatzīst Krievijas Federācija un dažas agrākā sociālistiskā bloka valstis (Albānija, Bulgārija). Šis īsais salīdzinājums Eiropas kontekstā skaidri rāda, ka nevietā ir Krievijas juristu tēze par to, ka Latvijas turpināšanos ir atzinušas "dažas" valstis.

Nozīmīgākās starptautiskās organizācijas atzina Latvijas turpināšanos. Notiekot Latvijas uzņemšanai ANO, Drošības padomes prezidents atsaucās uz Baltijas valstu neatkarības atgūšanas faktu.[28] Šeit jāpiezīmē, ka ANO speciālo organizāciju attieksme ir bijusi dažāda – no turpināšanās atzīšanas līdz tās ignorēšanai.[29]

Arī Eiropas Padome, lemjot par Latvijas iestāšanos, atsaucās uz faktu, ka Latvija ir atjaunojusi (*re-established*) parlamentāro demokrātiju.[30] Šeit ir arī jāpiemin fakts, ka laika posmā no 1940. līdz 1991. gadam regulāri tika pieņemtas rezolūcijas gan starptautiskajās organizācijās[31], gan ārvalstīs[32], kas vairumā gadījumu tieši pauda nosodījumu PSRS īstenotajai politikai Baltijas valstīs un uzsvēra, ka 1940. gadā bija notikusi nelikumīga okupācija.

Par abiem iepriekš minētajiem aspektiem ir rakstīts daudz un izsmeļoši, tāpēc šajā pētījumā tiem vairāk uzmanības netiks veltīts, kaut gan tie ir būtiski faktori Latvijas prasībai par valsts turpināšanos.

Ja runā par robežlīgumu, konfliktsituācijas pamatā ir Krievijas Federācijas apstrīdētais jautājums par Latvijas okupāciju un līdz ar to Latvijas valsts turpināšanos. Ir bijuši vairāki mēģinājumi noslēgt robežlīgumu starp Latviju un Krievijas Federāciju, taču tie visi ir cietuši neveiksmi. Nākamā šī pētījuma sadaļa īsumā ieskicēs galvenās juridiskās problēmas saistībā ar robežlīgumu, kā arī piedāvās iespējamos risinājumus. Jāņem vērā, ka šīs daļas mērķis nav piedāvāt gatavu politisku vai diplomātisku kompromisu, kas neizbēgami būs jāpanāk abu valstu starpā.

3. ROBEŽLĪGUMA JAUTĀJUMS

1920. gada Miera līguma 3. pants nosaka robežu starp Latviju un tagadējo Krievijas Federāciju. Principā strīds par robežlīgumu balstās uz savstarpēji nesavienojamām premisām: Latvijas nostāja ir tāda, ka Miera līgums ir spēkā, turpretī Krievija apgalvo, ka Miera līgums zaudēja savu spēku 1940. gadā, kad Latvija pievienojās PSRS.

Kā jau tika pieminēts, Miera līgums pēc tā noslēgšanas bija būtisks faktors abu valstu attiecībās – vairāki svarīgi divpusēji līgumi tieši atsaucās uz Miera līgumu. Tātad fakts, ka Miera līgums darbojās laika posmā līdz 1940. gadam, ir dokumentēts. Jautājums, kas tiks apskatīts detalizētāk, ir: vai Miera līgums joprojām ir vai nav spēkā?

Krievijas Ārlietu ministrija ir paziņojusi, ka Latvijas inkorporācija PSRS sastāvā nozīmēja visu divpusējo līgumu darbības izbeigšanos.[33] Papildus tam Krievija uzskata, ka Latvija ir zaudējusi savu starptautisko tiesību subjekta statusu "neatkarīgi no zaudējuma apstākļiem un cēloņiem".[34] Vai šim pieņēmumam ir pamatojums starptautiskajās tiesībās?

Kā jau tika pieminēts, 1969. gada Vīnes konvencija[35], kurai ir pievienojušās abas valstis, kodificēja lielu daļu no paražu tiesībām, kas pastēvēja līdz tam. Jebkura starpvalstu līguma darbības izbeigšanai ir jānotiek minētās konvencijas ietvaros un kārtībā. Tomēr Vīnes konvencija netiek piemērota valstu pārmantošanas gadījumos.[36] Valstu prakse rāda, ka šajos gadījumos valstis parasti vienojas par katra divpusējā līguma likteni.[37] Tāpat arī tad, kad Latvija atdalījās no Krievijas 1918. gadā, pēc miera noslēgšanas Miera līgumā tika noteikts, ka līgumi, kurus noslēgusi Krievija un kuri attiecās uz Latviju, "zaudē savu spēku uz nākošiem laikiem".[38]

1940. gadā Latvijai nebija nekādas vienošanās ar PSRS attiecībā uz divpusējiem līgumiem. Tāpat arī, kā jau tika minēts, Miera līgums pats nesatur nevienu nosacījumu par iespēju izbeigt tā darbību vai to denonsēt, jo ir noslēgts "uz mūžīgiem laikiem".[39] Turklāt starptautiskajās tiesībās 1940. gadā nepastāvēja saistošas normas (*jus cogens*), kas noteiktu, ka valstu pārmantošanas gadījumos divpusējie līgumi paliek spēkā vai pārstāj darboties.[40] Vēl vairāk – 1940. gadā nebija vispārēji atzītu un piemērotu principu attiecībā uz divpusēju līgumu likteni valstu pārmantošanas gadījumos. No iepriekš minētajām premisām var secināt, ka Krievijas arguments par Miera līguma automātiskas darbības izbeigšanos nav juridiski pamatots – pat pieņemot *argumentum*, ka Latvija tika iekļauta PSRS sastāvā, nepārkāpjot starptautiskās tiesības.

D. A. Lēbers ir izvirzījis alternatīvu iepriekš minētajam aspektam. Pamatojoties uz 1978. gada Vīnes konvencijā par valstu pārmantošanu attiecībā uz līgumiem[41] ieteikto normu, viņš izsaka iespēju, ka Miera līgums varētu būt palicis spēkā, ja "tā piemērošana 'attiecībā' uz PSRS ir 'savienojama' ar faktu, ka Latvija pievienojās PSRS".[42] Viņš arī nonāk pie slēdziena, ka šādu līgumu nesavienojamība ir bijusi iepriekš pieņemta, neraugoties uz PSRS Konstitūcijā postulēto katras suverēnas republikas neatkarīgās valsts varas īstenošanu.[43] Turklāt, kā atzīst pašas Krievijas juristi, līgumi, kas nosaka valstu robežas, paliek spēkā, pat ja viena no līgumslēdzējām valstīm zaudē starptautisko tiesību subjekta statusu. Vienīgais izņēmums, ko Krievijas juristi pieļauj, attiecas uz gadījumiem, kad valstis apvienojas "uz pašnoteikšanās tiesību pamata".[44] Šis izņēmums Latvijas gadījumā nav piemērojams. Kā jau tika minēts, Latvija pašnoteikšanās tiesības izmantoja 1918. gadā.

Tāpat arī Krievijas juristi ir norādījuši, ka līgumus par robežām starptautiskajās tiesībās denonsēt nevar. Šeit ir svarīgi atcerēties, ka, lai arī PSRS "prasīja" Latvijas piekrišanu 1944. gadā, tomēr tas nebija starptautisko tiesību akts, bet gan iekšējo tiesību prasība, un starptautisku robežu ar vienpusējas akcijas palīdzību par iekšējo robežu pārgrozīt nevar.[45]

Saistībā ar Miera līgumu jāpiemin Krievijas puses izmantotais arguments par Abrenes etnisko iedzīvotāju sastāvu. Starptautiskās tiesības neatzīst apstrīdētas teritorijas iedzīvotāju etnisko sastāvu par pamatu vienpusējai starpvalstu līguma darbības izbeigšanai. Tas, protams, var būt kā pamudinājums ieinteresētajai pusei uzsākt sarunas par jautājuma atrisināšanu.[46]

Latvija uzskata, ka tā 1940. gadā tika okupēta, pārkāpjot starptautiskās tiesības un virkni divpusējo līgumu, un ka Miera līgums ir spēkā. Šajā gadījumā ir piemērojama Vīnes konvencija. Pamatojoties uz 42. pantu, "Starptautiskā līguma izbeigšana, tā denonsēšana vai puses izstāšanās no tā var notikt tikai līguma vai šīs konvencijas noteikumu piemērošanas rezultātā. Šī pati norma piemērojama līguma darbības apturēšanas gadījumā."

Nedz Latvija, nedz Krievija nav izstājušās no Miera līguma. Tās nav paziņojušas viena otrai par Miera līguma darbības izbeigšanos. Tās nav apturējušas Miera līguma darbību tādā veidā, kā to paredz Vīnes konvencija.[47] Arī atsauce uz "apstākļu fundamentālu pārmaiņu" ir nevietā, jo tā netiek piemērota, "ja līgums nosaka robežu".[48] Miera līgums pats neparedz tā denonsēšanu vai tā darbības izbeigšanu. Secinājums, kas izriet no iepriekš minētā, ir acīmredzams: ja Latvija tika okupēta prettiesiski, Miera līgums ir spēkā.

Okupācijas jautājums ir pārāk plašs, lai to detalizēti izanalizētu šī pētījuma ietvaros. Ņemot vērā iepriekš minētos argumentus saistībā ar 1940. gada notikumiem, kas, lai arī saīsinātā veidā un tālu no pretenzijām uz visaptverošu analīzi, liecina par to, ka Latvijas nostāja okupācijas jautājumā nenoliedzami ir pamatota juridiski korekti, kā to arī apstiprina starptautiskās sabiedrības reakcija. Krievijas puses nostāja, savukārt, satur vājus juridiskos argumentus un tāpēc vedina uz domām, ka tās nostājas pamats ir meklējams nevis starptautiskajās tiesībās, bet citur. No pušu juridiskajiem argumentiem var secināt, ka Latvija 1940. gadā tika okupēta prettiesiski. Tātad 1920. gada Miera līgums ir spēkā.

Kādi tad ir iespējamie risinājumi robežlīguma jautājumā? D. A. Lēbers piedāvā kompromisu: Latvija atzīst pašreizējo strīdīgo robežu apmaiņā pret Krievijas atzīšanos par to, ka teritoriālās izmaiņas bija Latvijas 1940. gada nelikumīgās okupācijas sekas.[49]

Saeimas Ārlietu komisija piedāvā vairākus variantus.[50] Viens no tiem ir ierosinājums, ka robežlīgums satur atrunu, ar kuru Latvija patur sev tiesības atgriezties pie šī jautājuma pēc 20–50 gadiem. Nākamais priekšlikums ierosina, ka Krievija samaksā Latvijai kompensāciju par šīs teritorijas iegūšanu, kā tas bija paredzēts 1992. gada līguma projektā. Trešais variants paredz, ka Latvija deklarē, ka Abrenes pilsēta un seši Abrenes pagasti Krievijas īpašumā nonākuši nelikumīgi, PSRS okupācijas dēļ. Pēdējais risinājums, ko piedāvā Ārlietu komisija, paredz Latvijas atteikšanos no turpmākām diskusijām gadījumā, ja robežlīgums nepiemin 1920. gada Miera līgumu.

Varētu šķist, ka, no starptautisko tiesību viedokļa raugoties, Latvija var izvēlēties jebkuru risinājumu. Kā pilntiesīgam starptautisko tiesību subjektam tai ir tiesības šajā jautājumā rīkoties, pamatojoties uz pašas definētām prioritātēm. Tomēr, pieņemot lēmumu, ir jāapzinās sekas.

Piemēram, var apskatīt Ārlietu komisijas ieteikto pēdējo risinājumu. Ja, robežlīgumu slēdzot, Latvija politiska kompromisa dēļ izvēlas nepieminēt Miera līgumu, ir jārēķinās ar to, ka šī situācija būs būtisks trieciens Latvijas līdzšinējai, konsekventai nostājai attiecībā uz 1940. gada notikumiem. Tas Krievijai dos lielisku pretargumentu un ievērojami sarežģīs un varbūt pat pilnībā iznīcinās Latvijas prasības par okupācijas seku likvidēšanu uzturēšanu. Visi Latvijā pieņemtie dokumenti, kas deklarējuši okupācijas nelikumību, tāpat kā visi dokumenti, kas pieņemti ārvalstīs un starptautiskajās organizācijās, iegūs vairs tikai vēsturiskas atsauces statusu.

Papildus minētajiem sarežģījumiem šis konkrētais risinājums būtu starptautisko tiesību lomas un normu noniecinājums. Ir svarīgi, ka Latvija konsekventi seko nostājai, kādu tā ir ieņēmusi līdz šim. Atsakoties no starptautisko tiesību normu piemērošanas pat tik svarīgā jautājumā, kāds ir līgums par robežu, Latvija sevi nostādītu principiāli līdzīgā situācijā, kādā sevi nostādīja Krievija 1940. gadā un kādā tā turpina sevi nostādīt. Lai arī starptautisko tiesību konsekvences ignorēšana šajā gadījumā būtu zaudējums tikai pašai Latvijai, būtībā tā parādītu, ka ir gatava atteikties no korektas starptautisko tiesību piemērošanas politisku kompromisu dēļ. Pirms tas tiek darīts, ir jāuzdod jautājums, vai šis ir signāls, kuru Latvija vēlas raidīt starptautiskajai sabiedrībai.

KOPSAVILKUMS

Šīs sadaļas mērķis bija ieskicēt galvenos juridiskos aspektus Latvijas–Krievijas attiecībās laika posmā no 1918. līdz 2005. gadam. 1940. gada notikumi un to izraisītās sekas turpina vajāt Latviju līdz pat šodienai un, ņemot vērā Krievijas nostāju robežlīguma jautājumā, turpinās vajāt vēl ilgu laiku.

Ir grūti saprast Krievijas puses argumentus tādēļ, ka to juridiskais pamatojums ir vājš. Vēstures faktu atšķirīga interpretācija ir aizbildināšanās, nevis juridiskā diskusijā izmantojams arguments. Vēsturi, jo īpaši tik koncentrētu un sarežģītu, vajadzētu interpretēt tikai vienā veidā, pamatojoties uz dokumentētiem pierādījumiem.

Pirmā šīs daļas sadaļa aplūkoja jautājumu par Latvijas okupāciju koncentrētā veidā, analizējot starptautisko tiesību normas, kādas tās bija attīstījušās līdz 1940. gadam, kā arī divpusējos Latvijas–Krievijas līgumus. Tieši šajos līgumos meklējama Latvijas nostājas juridiski spēcīgākā argumentācija. Jautājums par spēka draudu lietošanas aizlieguma esamību starptautiskajās tiesībās 1940. gadā ir diskutējams. Miera līgums, Neuzbrukšanas līgums un konvencija par samierināšanās procedūru apvienojumā ar vispārējiem starptautisko tiesību principiem, kas attiecas uz līgumu tiesībām, diskusijai plašu telpu neatstāj. Tas arī ir redzams Krievijas juristu argumentācijā, jo viņu pamatojumi principā nesatur paskaidrojumus par šo līgumu noteikumu neievērošanu 1940. gadā.

Otrā sadaļa īsumā atainoja Latvijas turpināšanās aspektu, apskatot Latvijas prasības par tās turpināšanos juridisko pamatojumu un šīs prasības atzīšanu no ārvalstu un starptautisko organizāciju puses. Šeit jāpiezīmē, ka Latvijas nostāja vienmēr ir bijusi konsekventa – 1940. gada okupācija bija nelikumīga, un tādēļ 1991. gadā Latvijas neatkarība tika atjaunota, nevis iegūta no jauna. Cits jautājums, protams, vai šī nostāja ir tikusi pausta pietiekami bieži un pietiekami skaļi – bet šī jau ir diskusija, kas sakņojas Latvijas iekšējos politiskajos procesos, nevis juridiskos argumentos.

Trešā sadaļa ieskicēja Latvijas aktuālāko problēmu saistībā ar Krievijas Federāciju. Jautājums par robežlīgumu ir nesaraujami saistīts ar jautājumu par okupāciju un valsts turpināšanos starptautiskajās tiesībās. Šeit jāpiebilst, ka, raugoties strikti no starptautisko tiesību viedokļa un, iespējams, ignorējot politisko realitāti, Latvijas lēmums par deklarācijas pievienošanu līguma par robežu projektam ir vienīgais pareizais risinājums. Saeimas Ārlietu komisijas pieņemtais lēmums, kas noraidīja iespēju atteikties no minētās deklarācijas, ir apsveicams kā fakts, kas atbalsta starptautisko tiesību ievērošanu un to nozīmi, tas ir, pieņemot, ka Latvija nevēlas atteikties no prasības par okupācijas nelikumības uzturēšanu. Protams, Latvija var atteikties uzturēt šo prasību un piekāpties Krievijas Federācijai, parakstot robežlīgumu bez šīs deklarācijas. Izņemot ideālistiska rakstura vilšanos, ko tas radītu, arī šāds lēmums no starptautisko tiesību viedokļa ir saprotams un pieņemams.

Nobeidzot šo nelielo pārskatu, ir vietā piezīme par to, kā ir prognozējama notikumu attīstība, pieņemot situāciju, kurā Latvija neatkāpjas no savas prasības par nelikumīgo okupāciju ar visām no tās izrietošajām sekām. Ņemot vērā Krievijas reakciju uz robežlīgumam pievienoto skaidrojošo deklarāciju, ar nožēlu jāsecina, ka šis jautājums tuvākajā laikā netiks atrisināts. Kompromiss pieprasa divas puses, kas ir gatavas sarunām, un Krievija acīmredzot sarunām gatava nav. Ir iespēja, ka D. A. Lēbera izteiktā versija, kas minēta šī pārskata trešajā sadaļā, tomēr īstenosies, lai arī ne tik drīz. Minētā kompromisa īstenošana būtu reāls un vislabvēlīgākais iznākums Latvijas pusei.

Summary

This part of the research sets out to evaluate three main aspects of the relations between Latvia and Russia from a legal point of view.

The first matter discussed concentrates on the issue of occupation of Latvia by the USSR in 1940. This discussion is preceded by determination of whether or not Russia was in breach of any international law when it posed the ultimatum to Latvia in 1940 as well as in her actions that resulted in annexation of Latvia. The author looks briefly at the general norms of international law as well as bilateral treaties in force at that time. The author arrives at the conclusion that Russia's actions were in breach of international law in 1940. This conclusion is reached not so much by an application of general international law which did not necessarily contain unambiguous prohibition of the threat of use of force at that time but rather by application of bilateral treaties that were in force in 1940.

The second matter discussed is the question of Latvia's continuity in international law. In order to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion in this regard, one has to look at two main underlying issues, namely whether and how did Latvia maintain her claim to state continuity in international law and secondly, what was the reaction to this claim and whether the claim was recognised by the international society. The author arrives at the conclusion that it is well documented that Latvia has continuously upheld her claim and that this claim has indeed been recognised by the international society.

The last matter discussed in this part is concerned with the question of the border agreement between Latvia and Russia. The author looks at the main bilateral treaty relevant to this question, namely the Peace Treaty of 1920 and, by application of relevant international law the author concludes that the Peace Treaty is still in force and applies irrespective of whether or not both parties to this treaty agree to such.

The legal analysis part of this research is concluded by sketching a few scenarios of how the border question could be resolved, none of them fully satisfactory from the international law point of view or plausible from the current affairs point of view.

Atsauces

[1] Apvienoto Nāciju Organizācijas Statūti, 51. pants un 7. nodaļa.

[2] Id., 2 (4) pants.

[3] *Ian Brownlie, I nternational Law and The Use of Force by States*, Oxford, 1991, p. 364., 431.

[4] Budapeštas deklarācija, 1934. gads (*Budapest Articles*).

[5] Konvencijas 1. pants atsaucas uz agresijas definīciju Drošības jautājumu komisijas 1933. gada 24. maija ziņojumā, kas tika sagatavots Konferences par bruņošanās ierobežošanu vajadzībām un ko ieteica Padomju delegācija.

[6] Konvencijas 2. pants.

[7] Id., 3. pants.
[8] Piemēram, Krievijas jurists S. Černičenko pilnībā noliedz, ka 1940. gadā pastāvēja aneksijas aizliegums (šī aneksija nav notikusi kara rezultātā). Viņš arī norāda, ka ultimāti tajā laikā nepārkāpa starptautiskās tiesības. Sk.: Черниченко С. События в Прибалтике 1940 года как предлог для дискриминации русскоязычного населения. *Международная жизнь*, Москва, 3, 1998, 64 с.; Черниченко С. Об „Оккупации" Прибалтики и нарушении прав русскоязычного населения. *Международная жизнь*, Москва, 7–8, 2004, 213 с.
[9] 2. pants.
[10] Svarīgs apstāklis Latvijas situācijai ir fakts, ka, lai arī Vīnes konvencija tika pieņemta tikai 1969. gadā, tomēr ir vispāratzīts, ka šī konvencija vienkārši kodificēja līdz tam esošās paražu tiesību normas. Tātad šeit būtu nevietā pieņēmums, ka Vīnes konvencija neattiecās uz Miera līgumu 1940. gada kontekstā.
[11] 42., 54. un 56. pants. Šeit jāpiemin, ka Krievijas puse uzskata, ka, Latvijai pievienojoties PSRS, notika valstu pārmantošanās. Vīnes konvencija nav piemērojama valstu pārmantošanas gadījumos (*succession of states*). Šis jautājums tiks apskatīts detalizētāk attiecībā uz robežlīgumu.
[12] 1. pants.
[13] 7. pants.
[14] Черниченко С. *События в Прибалтике 1940 года как предлог для дискриминации русскоязычного населения. 64 с.*
[15] I. Ziemele. *State Continuity, Succession and Responsibility: Reparation to the Baltic States and their Peoples?*: *Baltic Yearbook of International Law*, Vol. 3. Kluwer Law International, 2003.
[16] Piemēram, sk. Krievijas delegācijas Latvijā vadītāja S. Zotova izteikumus 1994. gada 27. maija laikrakstā "Labrīt". Līdzīgu viedokli ir paudis Černičenko, sk.: Черниченко С. *События в Прибалтике 1940 года как предлог для дискриминации русскоязычного населения. 64 с*.
[17] Detalizētu analīzi par PSRS valdības darbībām un to atbilstību Latvijas nacionālajiem likumiem sk.: D. A. Lēbers. Latvijas valsts bojāeja 1940. gadā. Starptautiski tiesiskie aspekti, 22., 28. lpp.
[18] Izsmeļošu un vispusīgu analīzi par Latvijas valsts turpināšanos sk.: I. Ziemele. *State Continuity, Human Rights, and Nationality in the Baltic States. The Baltic States at Historical Crossroads*, 2nd ed. T. Jundzis (ed.). Latvijas Zinātņu akadēmija, Rīga, 2001, 231; D. A. Lēbers. Latvijas valsts bojāeja 1940. gadā. Starptautiski tiesiskie aspekti. *Latvijas valsts atjaunošana 1986–1993*. Blūzma, V., Celle, O., Jundzis, T., Lēbers, D. A., Levits, E., Zīle, Ļ. (red.). LU žurnāla „Latvijas Vēsture" fonds, Rīga, 1998; arī D. A. Lēbers. Molotova–Ribentropa pakts un tā juridiskās sekas Baltijas valstīs, *Baltic Yearbook of International Law*, Vol. 1.
[19] 1989. gada 24. decembra PSRS Tautas deputātu 2. kongresa rezolūcija. Īsi pirms tam, 1989. gada 1. septembrī, līdzīgu deklarāciju pieņēma Vācijas Federālā valdība.
[20] Šo cēloņsakarību dokumentāli apstiprina Vācijas arhīvu materiāli, kas pieejami kopš 1945. gada. Atsauce citēta: D. A. Lēbers. Molotova–Ribentropa pakts un tā juridiskās sekas Baltijas valstīs, *Baltic Yearbook of International Law*, Vol. 1.
[21] D. A. Lēbers. Molotova–Ribentropa pakts un tā juridiskās sekas Baltijas valstīs.
[22] Šeit ir runa par prasības par nelikumīgu okupāciju uzturēšanu, ko nodrošināja, pirmkārt, trimdas latvieši, otrkārt, Latvijas diplomātiskā pārstāvniecība ārvalstīs laika posmā no 1940. līdz 1991. gadam un, treškārt, starptautiskās sabiedrības reakcija. Pēdējais aspekts tiks skatīts detalizētāk tālāk šajā daļā. Kopumā jautājums par prasības uzturēšanu ārvalstīs okupācijas 50 gados ir apskatīts tik daudzos avotos, ka tos visus nav neiespējams šeit uzskaitīt. Piemēram: T. Jundzis (ed.).

The Baltic States at Historical Crossroads, Rīga, Latvijas Zinātņu akadēmija; I. Ziemele (ed.) Baltijas starptautisko tiesību gadagrāmata (*Baltic Yearbook of International Law*), Vol. 1.

[23] D. A. Lēbers. Molotova–Ribentropa pakts un tā juridiskās sekas Baltijas valstīs.

[24] Miera līguma 2. pants "Izejot no Krievijas Sociālistiskās Federatīvās padomju Republikas pasludinātām visu tautu tiesībām uz brīvu pašnoteikšanos, neizņemot pat pilnīgu atdalīšanos no valsts, kuras sastāvā viņas ietilpst, un ievērojot Latvijas tautas noteikti izsacīto gribu uz patstāvīgu valsts dzīvi.."

[25] U. Fastenrāts, citēts D. A. Lēbers. Molotova–Ribentropa pakts un tā juridiskās sekas Baltijas valstīs.

[26] Id. Turpat arī sk. izsmeļošu Latvijas turpināšanās pretinieku argumentu uzskaitījumu un atspēkojumu.

[27] Šīs valstis 1940. un 1941. gadā (attiecīgi) bija atzinušas Baltijas valstu aneksiju, un tāpēc diplomātiskās attiecības tika nodibinātas no jauna, nevis turpinātas.

[28] "*The independence of Latvia…was regained peacefully…* " ANO Drošības padome, *Offical Records, 46th year*, 1991.

[29] D. A. Lēbers. Molotova–Ribentropa pakts un tā juridiskās sekas Baltijas valstīs.

[30] *Parliamentary Assembly Opinion No. 183 (1995) on the Application by Latvia for Membership of the Council of Europe.* Pieejams http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/TA95/Eopi183.htm. Citēts: Ž. Ozoliņa (ed.). Pagātne nākotnē: 1940. gada notikumu izvērtējums, 2005, Latvijas Universitāte.

[31] Piemēram, sk. G. Andrejevs. Okupācija starptautiski atzīta jau sen, 27.04.2002., „Diena", kurā tiek precīzi apskatīti Latvijas okupācijas fakta atzīšanas dokumenti no starptautisko organizāciju puses.

[32] Dokumenti par Latvijas valsts starptautisko atzīšanu, neatkarības atjaunošanu un diplomātiskajiem sakariem*, 1918–1998*. Nordik, Rīga, 1999. „Viena no uzstājīgākajām valstīm, kas neatzina Latvijas okupāciju, bija ASV. Kā vienu no piemēriem ASV nostājai var minēt tās reakciju uz Helsinku nobeiguma aktu (sk. galvenajā tekstā), kad attiecīgi ASV Kongresa Pārstāvju palāta (1975. gada 13. novembrī) un Senāts (1976. gada 26. jūlijā) pieņēma divas rezolūcijas, kuras noteica, ka ASV turpina atzīt suverēnas un neatkarīgas Baltijas valstis un ka EDSA Helsinkos parakstītais Nobeiguma akts nekādā veidā nemaina ASV ilgstoši realizēto politiku par PSRS īstenotās triju Baltijas valstu nelikumīgas sagrābšanas un aneksijas neatzīšanu." Šī atsauce citēta no: Ž. Ozoliņa (ed.). Pagātne nākotnē: 1940. gada notikumu izvērtējums, 2005, Latvijas Universitāte.

[33] *Дипломатический вестник*, No. 13–14, 1992, c. 76; No. 5–6, 1993, c. 69.

[34] Id.

[35] Vīnes konvencija par līgumu tiesībām.

[36] 73. pants.

[37] Piemēram, Vācijas apvienošanās gadījumā jautājums par divpusējiem līgumiem tika atrunāts 1990. gada Apvienošanās līgumā, 11. un 12. pants un 1. un 2. pielikums.

[38] 2. pants.

[39] Id.

[40] D. A. Lēbers. Krievijas un Latvijas teritoriālais strīds Abrenes jautājumā *(The Russian-Latvian Territorial Dispute Over Abrene), The Parker School Journal of East European Law, 1995, Vol. 2, p. 537–559.*

[41] 31. pants.

[42] Id.

[43] PSRS Konstitūcija, 15. pants.

[44] *Мирза М. Аваков. Правоприемство освободившихся государств. Москва, 1983, c. 46–47; Клименко. Международное право. Москва, 1995, c. 81.*

[45] D. A. Lēbers. Krievijas un Latvijas teritoriālais strīds Abrenes jautājumā.
[46] Id.
[47] 65. pants.
[48] 62. pants.
[49] D. A. Lēbers. Krievijas un Latvijas teritoriālais strīds Abrenes jautājumā.
[50] Ārlietu komisijas 2005. gada 19. janvāra sēde.

3. Information Environment and its Impact on Communities and Indentities

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An Impact of Local Newspapers on Shaping of National Identity Russia, March – August 1917 Kharkov Province as a Case Study

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1. Introduction

The Russian Revolution in February 1917, having itself been the outcome of profound changes in society, brought about further transformation of this society and an outburst of the political activity in Russia. Political parties and activists of various national movements launched propaganda campaigns in order to assert their position in society. The publishing of the non-official press was allowed, therefore, various political forces started to issue newspapers for the political, agitation and other purposes.

Such non-official press emerged not only at the all-Russian level. There was a great number of regional newspapers that served as a sphere for public debates of a local character. In the Ukraine, a range of publications emerged both in Russian and Ukrainian. The period from March to September 1917 became key months when the Ukrainian activists created a Ukrainian national discourse through mass circulated periodicals. In Kiev, The Ukrainian Central Council (*Ukrains'ka Tsentral'na Rada*) began its work, where the main subject of its agenda became the question of Ukrainian autonomy within the framework of democratic Russia.

In the newspapers, the matter of Ukrainian autonomy may have appeared as the following questions: What is the Ukraine? Are Ukrainians a nation? Is it necessary for Ukrainians to achieve autonomy within federal Russia? What status of the Ukrainian language will be in autonomous Ukraine? What are the territorial borders of the future Ukrainian autonomy?

Kharkov province seems to have represented a remarkable example of controversial regions in Russia. The population and the local officials as well as the central government had quite ambiguous perceptions of the affiliation of the province to one or another region. It was indeed a complex matter since the province was situated between the Ukraine and the core area of Russia and both Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking[1] population lived in Kharkov province at that time. Unlike the Ukrainian–speaking countryside, the city of Kharkov was heavily populated by Russian-speaking citizens. In addition, the province was a part of the historical region *Slobozhanshchyna* (*the Sloboda Ukraine*). So here we can single out at least three levels of possible identities – all-Russian, regional and local.

This paper examines the role of the mass circulated press in shaping of Ukrainian national identity. The research is based on the case study of Kharkov province (*Khar'kovskaia guberniia*). In particular, I explore how political ideas and concepts were reflected in the local newspapers in the province, in March – August 1917, that is, just after the February Revolution. Thus, the subject of this work is also a possible impact of the local press on the readership. To be more specific, I intend to compare diverse points of view, which existed in society, on the so-called Ukrainian question and issues that resulted from it.

I will focus upon several prints in both Russian and Ukrainian. I will show that we can find the largest difference in opinions on the Ukrainian question comparing the newspapers in these two languages. It is remarkable that there was no print that might had been published in two languages simultaneously. Besides, I will deal with those newspapers whose political and social orientation differed: governmental, left-centrist and socialist ones.

2. Russian Newspapers in Kharkov Province

The analysis of the principal Russian periodicals will show that in general they held similar attitudes toward the Ukrainian question and the activity of The Ukrainian Central Council, but they support their arguments with different reasons – legal, economic or political – while dealing with the matter under inquiry.

I will present three Russian newspapers.

2.1 The official view: the local perspective

The first part considers "the Ukrainian question" as it was covered in the local daily *The Kharkov Provincial News* (*Izvestiia Khar'kovskogo Gubernskogo Obshchestvennogo Komiteta*). This was the official publication of the Provisional Government in Russia, which published materials coming from Petrograd and of all-Russian importance, as well as presented regional and provincial events and opinions on them.

The overall attitude of the gazette with regard to the Ukrainian cause seems to have been consistent and self-restrained. Time and again there appeared articles and even commentaries on the Ukrainian subject. It paid attention to the activity of The Ukrainian Central Council in Kiev and even put out whole pieces of the documents issued by The Council. The editors of the newspaper seemed to strive to inform their readers impartially and comprehensively.

As soon as the question of the **integrity of Russia** was touched upon the official newspaper allocated an article devoted to it on the first page. The main concern of the article was the following: "it is rumoured that the latter (the Ukrainian Congress) will be pronounced The Ukrainian **Constituent** Assembly with the purpose of declaring of federation and even independence (of the Ukraine)."[2] We can see that it did not follow from the article that it saw Kharkov bearing any relations to this matter. Perhaps, the bulletin did not see the relevance of the activity of The Central Council in Kiev to the province of Kharkov.

The Kharkov Provincial News published the memorandum by which The Central Council attempted to establish rapport with the Provisional Government call upon appealed to the Government.[3] The two-column publication was a direct reprint of the document without (and this is very interesting) any comments on it, except several sentences in the introduction. Regarding the content of the appeal, The Ukrainian Central Council insisted that the Ukrainian people (nation) **did** exist. It was depicted as if it were a live organism which had awakened and whose existence required a national school, an army, Ukrainization of all aspects of life. The Ukrainian national awakening was seen by The Central Council as imminent, and The Council's purpose was regarded as just smoothing inevitable frictions: "We may not keep silence and should *warn* all Russian democratic movements about the extreme danger of a hostile attitude toward the Ukrainian movement."[4]

Having allocated major part of the non-governmental document to the pages of the governmental gazette, the editors did not express any comments on it. Perhaps, they simply did not know how to treat all these statements about Ukrainian national awakening. One may conclude that there was no elaborated official point of view on the subject. It comes as no surprise because this was the first time since the issue of Ukrainian autonomy in Russia had been raised. On the other hand, a non-emotional tone was in general agreement with a formal attitude.

Indeed, only the next number of *The Kharkov Provincial News* contained, along with a formal report, indirect commentaries on Ukrainian autonomy problem. It was reported that the investigation of the matter had been entrusted to the legal meeting which was supposed to answer some fundamental questions: **Was the Central Council (and, hence, its activity) legitimate?** Was it legitimate to issue any governmental act to approve/disapprove of the establishment of Ukrainian autonomy? Here we can see that the shift from the political context to the juridical one not only overthrew the question, but also deprived The Council of any status at all.[5]

Undoubtedly, at the level of negotiations, the Government won the battle. However, in the long run, at least within 1917, it turned out insufficient to consider only the legal aspect of the question. Having successfully denied the legitimacy of The Central Council, The Provisional Government was unable to suspend The Council's activity. The other consequence was that irrespectively of **how** the special committee defined the status of The Ukrainian Council, the existence of the polemic that was mirrored in the press influenced the evolving tradition of dealing with ambiguous political situations and created precedents for the future public policy of the authorities.

There are some other examples that can illustrate how the Government strived to shift the Ukrainian question into the legal perspective and at the same time it had to recognize that the legal perspective did not allow the government to resolve the question completely.

The then chairman of the Provisional Government, prince Lvov, brought up the Ukrainian issue in the special appeal to the Ukrainian people in the pages of socialist newspaper. Specifically, the prime-minister called upon the population of the whole of Russia to wait for the all-Russian Constituent Assembly. He underlined that the Ukrainian question would be resolved in accordance with the free will of the Ukrainian people.[6] The speech of the head of the Government shows that the political reality required the Government to discuss the officially illegitimate case in the press: public opinion would be taken into consideration and at the same time it was being shaped.

2.2 The socialist and centrist perspective: the Ukrainian question seen from Petrograd

The second Russian newspaper I will examine is the newspaper *Labour and Liberty.* It was a daily of socialist orientation which promised to pay attention to all kinds of socialist movements in Russia.[7] The periodical was conceived as *a people's/popular newspaper.* Some articles were directed on strengthening understanding of some key political terms and conceptions by readers. This was being done in live and vivid language. The overall attitude of this periodical was to react to events actively – whether austerely or sometimes emotionally, with official wordings and personal comments of readers.

The conspicuous example is the article *(The Appeal) to Ukrainians*[8] which was allegedly written by a certain Ukrainian. Perhaps, the editor wrote this text sincerely pretending to be a Ukrainian who was at the same time a patriot of Russia.[9]

The author operated with several notions which were topical at that time: *freedom*, *revolution*, *unity of population* in Russia (people of Russia[10]), *war*, *victory*, *the spirit of the army*, *the unity of the Russian army.*[11] He **contrasted** the proclaimed Ukrainian autonomy to democracy and the Russian revolution. Here is his description of the political context in which the Universal of The Central Council came into existence:

At the threatening moment, when the blood of the prominent sons of Russia is prepared to be shed, and the Germans, shooting them, will not recognize whom they kill: whether Poles, Great Russians or Little Russians, in the rear, a new event (the declaration of the Universal, the declaration of Ukrainian autonomy) has taken place.[12]

It appealed rather to feelings than logic. The Universal which proclaimed the autonomy of Ukraine was depicted as "a stab in the back of the revolution" and mildly "a mistake that should be corrected." Furthermore, grammar used by the author urged people to act – there were many imperative sentences there – "correct the mistake, … write to the front, struggle with the enemy as you did it before, do not think only about the Ukraine, be sure that you need to live and die for the whole of Russia."[13]

In this article the discourse flew from *the revolution* and *freedom* toward *the war*. The war threatened freedom and democracy. The common cause for "Poles, Great Russians or Little Russians" was to defend free/revolutionary Russia: "freedom that come to Russia is freedom for the Ukraine, … the victory of Russia is the victory of the Ukraine, and its collapse (of Russia) is your collapse."[14]

While trying to analyze and interpret the meaning of the Universal, the newspaper *Labour and Liberty* generated some misinterpretation of the Universal.

Whereas the document did not claim independence of the Ukraine from Russia, it was often understood as exactly a declaration of independence.[15] The political terminology in Russia was not particularly developed and it was easy even for political activists to confuse the terms *autonomy* and *independence*. The newspaper *Labour and Liberty*, making attempts to elucidate democratic ideas for politically inexperienced society, sometimes arrived at conclusion that **as** autonomy meant *self-governing,* the declaration of *autonomy* was tantamount to the declaration of *independence*.

Another periodical, *The People's Freedom (Narodnaia Svoboda)* was a printing organ of the Kadet party, or the party of constitutional democrats. There were a great number of extensive political commentaries, which traced the insight of developments. Names of politicians, details of numerous governmental acts and articles showed clearly that the understanding of political realities of that time in Russia expected efforts and required possessing some educational level from the individual.

The Kadets saw Ukrianian autonomy as a matter of concern because of its precedent nature. The article *Unity of Russia* reflected how Kadets construed Russia's destiny. Here the problem of unity of the Russian state was raised not from the short run legal prospective as it was done by the Provisional Government, but from the long run political and economic expediency. The illustrations of economic unity were the following: "the Black Sea and adjacent lands, connected to the north of Russia by tens of thousands economic and cultural threads" – and the negative picture of the divided state was: "the break of vital interests not only of Russia, but the Ukraine itself."[16]

From the geopolitical perspective, Kadets believed that the Ukraine was destined for dependence on one of great powers – Russia, Poland or Austria[17] – since the Ukraine was located in the region where interests of these powers clashed. The affiliation of the Ukraine to Russia was regarded as natural and the most beneficial for the Ukraine since Russia and the Ukraine were close in cultural terms.

However, there was a huge discrepancy in this Kadets' concern. Although The Ukrainian Central Council did not claim independence of the Ukraine from Russia[18] in the First and Second Universals, the so-called claim of independence was ascribed to The Central Council many times by the periodical *The People's Freedom.*

Therefore, in general, all Russian newspapers under consideration dealt with the Ukrainian question. The only periodical that allocated the opinion of The Central Council itself was the local newspaper published by the Provisional Government. I may assert that the reaction of the Russian press toward Ukrainian autonomy varied *from* neutrally/legally **negative** *to* mildly **disapproving**, *from* arguing **irrelevance** of the rise of the issue at that time *to* persuading **inexpedience** of the question **at all**. This allows me to conclude that to a different degree, all these newspapers were involved in constructing the project of the greater Russian nation, which envisioned the rapprochement[19] of Russians and their neighbours – Malorussians and Byelorussians.

3. The Ukrainian Press in the Province of Kharkov

The emergence of the Ukrainian press in Kharkov province was revealing because the province was peopled by mostly **illiterate Ukrainian**-speaking peasantry, and the city of Kharkov was **Russian**-speaking. Yet the Ukrainian newspapers were circulated in the province and, apparently, had their readers.

In their overall mood, like the Russian press, the Ukrainian newspapers were overwhelmed with hopes for social changes and improvement in the economic situation in the country. They covered important events as well as commented on them. They also strived to enlighten the public. However, the Ukrainian newspapers differed dramatically from their Russian counterparts in that sense that the autonomy of the Ukraine appeared to be one of the prime topics for the Ukrainian mass circulated local press.

Here I will present a local weekly *The Native Word* (*Ridne Slovo).* The analysis of this key Ukrainian newspaper shows enlightening and agitation character of the Ukrainian press: it appealed to the audience with the concept of the Ukrainian nation project and the idea of the autonomy. Therefore, its editors advocated the policy pursued by The Central Ukrainian Council.

In Kharkov province, there appeared to be few circles and societies which promoted the project of the Ukrainian nation **before** the February Revolution, as was, in Kiev. The launch of *The Native Word* testified that the province turned out to be placed into the sphere of influence of Ukrainian nation project champions. Indeed, the newspaper was a print organ of the Kharkiv Ukrainian Organizing Committee (Kharkivskii Ukrainskii Organizatsiinyi Komitet). In its turn, the Committee was established to

> *organize (emphasis is mine) the population of Kharkov region, enter into relations with some existing Ukrainian organizations…, organize trains with lectures at railway stations, distribute books, newspapers and leaflets in order to encourage the foundation of new Ukrainian public organizations and start to publish the newspaper The Native Word.*[20]

On the whole, arguing over the matter of Ukrainian autonomy, the newspaper paid attention to two aspects. The first was a staunch concern and even some view of the future political *structure of Russia*, that is, as "a Democratic Federal Republic."[21] Such preoccupation with the political structure of Russia can be ascribed to the necessity to determine the background against which "Free Ukraine as an autonomous member of (Russia)"[22] would come into existence. So, the political status of the Ukraine was almost always discussed together with reservations that Russia was supposed to be free, democratic and federal.[23]

The second aspect of debates was the autonomy of the Ukraine itself and the strategy of its implementation. The proposed strategy was quite illustrative: not to ask, demand or wait for the autonomy from the all-Russian authorities, but to build it from inside, from the bottom to the top[24] and come to the self-governing *de facto*: "we have to elect The Central Council (*Tsentral'na Rada)* out of representatives of all the Ukrainian people **immediately**… and this Council *(Rada*) will run all the affairs of people and **negotiate** with the all-Russian government."[25]

Yet there was an obvious contradiction *between* the ideas of immediate implementation of the autonomy in the Ukraine, that is, *before* the all-Russian

Constituent Assembly[26] *and* the legal function of the all-Russian Constituent Assembly which was supposed to establish a new political order for all Russia. So, the Government could not recognize the autonomy of the Ukraine since it did not have authority to do this,[27] but The Council strove to achieve the government's recognition.

Here arises a question: Why it was so important for The Central Council to receive the autonomous status for the Ukraine before the all-Russian Constituent Assembly. It seems useful to discern two types of grounds the Ukrainian press rested upon. The first was of a positive character, that is, which advantages the autonomy would bring for both – the Ukraine and for Russia. The second was based on presenting the danger of losing the historical chance for Ukrainians to change their destiny. Both of them referred to the national feelings of the Ukrainian people.

In several editorials, the periodical argued that national consciousness possessed a great potential.[28] "Where people have woken up for national life, where people feel themselves Ukrainians, where Ukrainian organizations exist – there has never been and will not be either agrarian devastation, nor massacres, nor land seizures, nor any disorder at all."[29] Taking into account such power of national feelings, the newspaper proposed to see the main *immediate advantage* of the national Ukrainian autonomy. "The awakened people would have fed its army, … [and] would have paid taxes in a *different* [better] way."[30] Therefore, national consciousness was viewed as a powerful driving force, which could contribute to either the social order or/and the Russian victory in the world war.

As we have seen, the war was one of the central points discussed in the Russian press. Yet, contrary to the Ukrainian periodicals, the Russian one suggested that the Ukrainian national movement undermined the joint efforts of all-Russian peoples to win the war. In other words, this illustrates how two national discourses – Russian and Ukrainian – competed in Kharkov province. However, there appeared to be no references in the Russian press to any articles in the Ukrainian press and visa versa. Apparently, there existed several public spheres where the Russian and Ukrainian press operated.

In the periodicals of *The Native Word*, there were some references to Ukrainian people as a nation:

> *The Jews, Poles, Czechs, Estonians are greeting the Ukrainian Congress; the Russians – the socialist revolutionaries, the kadets [constitutional democrats] – are greeting it. Unfortunately, we have not heard the words of greetings only from the Russian socialist democrats.*[31]

In the article, the national principle stood behind the author's position: Ukrainian autonomy could be recognized as national if it was recognized by other nations. It can be hardly assumed that there was no stratification among Jews, Poles or Czechs at that time. Nevertheless, such greetings were offered as those from all Poles, all Czechs and all Jews. At the same time, the Russians were the only one who was perceived as a complexity of various political forces rather than as a nation.

It is likely that the advocates of Ukrainian autonomy did discern different strata of the Russians **as** the term *Russian* could be construed as a synonym to *imperial* and *all-Russian* rather than in terms of the Russian nation. Besides, it cannot be denied that Ukrainian autonomists were concerned with the official position of Petrograd and made attempts to determine their allies in the Russian camp. Hence, there appeared their particular scrutiny to any greetings coming from Russia.

The Native Word attached importance to enlightening and educational measures which could contribute to growing national consciousness among ignorant and uneducated people. For this purpose, enlightening *Prosvita* societies/circles were encouraged to operate:

> *Our village has been covered by a thick mist. With the light of Prosvita societies, let's put this mist away! ... These societies will help Ukrainian peasantry find their own way. Let's open Prosvitas!*[32]

As long as the Russian language was associated with the socially hostile class – "Moscow language of landowners"[33] – the main goal was to form "awaken, educated/enlightened, free Ukrainian people with its own native language."[34] In other words, *Prosvita* societies were proposed not only to educate but to enlighten, help peasantry to find/gain their Ukrainian identity. The activity of these societies was nothing else as the implementation of the Ukrainian autonomy in practice. The same can be said about the circulation of the newspaper itself – the periodical was channelling the ideas and contributed to the shaping of Ukrainian identity among the population of Kharkov province.

In summary, I have analyzed Ukrainian press circulated in Kharkov province after the February revolution in Russia. On the whole, the presence of the Ukrainian newspapers in the province testified that there **was** Ukrainian-reading audience which could serve as the initial basis for the Ukrainian national project in the province. Along with this, those who did not identify themselves with any particular nation/community/group could perfectly get interested in the concept of Ukrainian national autonomy and accept Ukrainian national identity for themselves.

Conclusions

In this paper, I have examined the role of newspapers in the process of nation building in the Ukraine in 1917. Kharkov province has served as a case study. The research is based on the type of primary sources that have been poorly used until now. Furthermore, there appeared to be no evidence on usage of the periodicals, presented here, before. The mass circulated press, newspapers in particular, appear to be a great source for the examination of social trends as well as of the possible impact of specific concepts and ideas that can influence individuals.

The presented analysis of the local Russian press has shown that the Ukrainian question as a problem regularly appeared in the pages of newspapers. Interpretations and commentaries supporting the disapproving position toward the project of Ukrainian autonomy were extensive. Therefore, the local Russian periodicals defended the project of a greater Russia nation.

The consideration of the Ukrainian press has revealed its participation in the promotion of the Ukrainian national project. We can see two dimensions in the Ukrainian national movement. It associated itself with the new life after the February Revolution, in other words, its activists asserted the democratic nature of the Ukrainian movement. Then, it was of a national character. The arguments of the Ukrainian newspapers were sometimes emotional and based on the depiction of unanimity and unity of the Ukrainian people. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian papers were successful enough to exist up until the Bolshevik coup in October 1917 and even later.

On the whole, we could see that despite the fact that Kharkov was Russian-speaking and that the Ukrainian-speaking population of the province was mostly illiterate, the Ukrainian press managed to compete with the Russian press. In a sense, each newspaper was a kind of a tribune for a specific political force to promote and distribute a set of principles and practices. So, I may conclude that the Russian and Ukrainian newspapers, circulated in Kharkov province, represented public domains where national consciousness of future Ukrainians and Russians of the province was being shaped.

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Footnotes

[1] I use the term *the Ukrainian-speaking population* in order to avoid using the term *the Ukrainian people/ Ukrainian nation* concerning 1917. Yet the term *the Ukrainian language* was itself far from being widely recognized. Even in Ukrainian newspapers of the explored period, we can meet some references and explanations that Ukrainian language was people's language (narodnaia mova), what meant the language ordinary people spoke.

[2] "Возникли слухи, что последний (Украинский Конгресс) будет объявлен украинским учредительным собранием с целью провозглашения федерации и даже самостоятельности." *KHar'kovskii Gubernskii Vestnik (The Kharkov Provincial News)*, 21 (8 April, 1917).

[3] *Ot Tsentral'noi Ukrainskoi Rady (From The Central Ukrainian Council), Ibid.*, 67 (4 April, 1917).

[4] "Мы не можем молчать и должны предупредить всю русскую демократию о крайней опасности враждебного отношения к украинству." *Ibid.*

[5] The Government had to deal with the Central Council in various ways. Its legal strategy did not resolve the problem. Nevertheless, the official newspaper limited to the coverage of only the legal aspect.

[6] See (*Proclamation) to the Ukrainian people (The Provisional Government's Proclamation) (K Ukrainskomu Narodu (Vozzvanie Vremennogo Pravitel'stva)), Trud i Volia (Labor and Liberty)*, 35 (18 June, 1917).

[7] *Kharkovskii Gubernskii Vestnik (The Kharkov Provincial News)*, 74 (13 June, 1917).

[8] *K Ukraintsam*, *Trud i Volia (Labor and Liberty),* 32 (15(28) June, 1917).

[9] The article was signed by certain Maxim Potyka. My supposition about the authorship is based on the fact that the newspaper reacted to the events almost immediately whereas the stance of the mail network could hardly provide receiving of the letter from "a Ukrainian" in less than several days if not more. In addition, the editor might not allow oneself to rely on the occasion that some indignant person would write an article. Again, it was hardly probable that this supposed ordinary Ukrainian knew about the Universal earlier than newspapers had reported.

[10] The author discerns in the text *the people of Russia (narod Rossii)*, that implied the population of Russia, and *the Russian people (russkii narod)*.

[11] As in the previous commentary – see footnote 12, *Russian* implies *Russia's – the Russian army* meant more likely *the army of Russia*.

[12] "В грозный час, когда на фронте готова пролиться кровь лучших сынов России, и немцы не будут различать, кого убивают: поляков ли, великороссов, или малороссов, в тылу совершилось новое событие." *(The Appeal) to Ukrainians, Ibid.*

[13]*Ibid.*

[14] "Свобода пришедшая в Россию есть свобода и для Украины, … победа России есть победа Украины, и гибель ея – гибель ваша." *Ibid.*

[15] The article *The Question about Independence (Samostoiatel'nost') of the Ukraine* was about *autonomy. Trud i Volia (Labor and Liberty),* 33 (16(29) June, 1917). On the contrary, in *(The Appeal) to Ukrainians* prince Lvov called Ukrainians not to break away from common motherland. *Trud i Volia (Labor and Liberty),* 32 (15(28) June, 1917).

[16] "Черное море и прилегающие к нему земли, десятками тысяч экономических и культурных нитей связанных с севером России", "нарушение жизненных интересов не только России, но и самой Украйны". *Narodnaia Svoboda (The People's Freedom), 11 (13–15 July, 1917).*

[17] Although Poland was not great power at the time while Germany was, the article revealed the existing perception about great powers.

[18] The Third Universal (November, 1917) declared independence of the Ukraine from Bolshevik Russia whereas recognized legitimacy of federal democratic Russia. The Fourth Universal declared independence of the Ukraine without any reservations.

[19] Sblizhenie/sliianie.

[20] *Ridne Slovo (The Native Word),* 4 (22 April, 1917).

[21] *Kyivs'kyi Vseukraiins'kyi Z'izd (The Kyiv All-Ukrainian Assembly), Ridne Slovo (The Native Word),* 3 (15 April, 1917).

[22] "Вільна Україна як автономний член тої республіки", *Ibid.*

[23] See also the article *Kyivs'kyi Vseukraiins'kyi Z'izd. Kyivs'ki Rezolutsii) (The Kyiv All-Ukrainian Assembly. Kyiv resolutions)*: "… The assembly recognizes federal democratic Russian republic as the only appropriate form of the state system" ("… Єдиною відповідною формою державного устрою з'їзд визнає федеративну демократичну республіку російську"), *Ibid.*

[24] *Kyivs'kyi Vseukraiins'kyi Z'izd (The Kyiv All-Ukrainian Assembly), Ibid.*

[25] "Треба вже тепер переводити Автономію України у життя, а не ждати поки її дадуть. Треба тепер же обібрати собі Центральну Раду з представників від усього народу Українського і з усіх країв, а Рада ся вже й буде кермувати усіма справами народу і зноситиметь ся з всеросійським правительством." *Ibid.*

[26] "The future Constituent Assembly will only have to approve the new order [in the Ukraine]." "Майбутнім Установчим зборам треба буде тільки санкціонувати новий лад." *Kyivs'kyi Vseukrains'kyi Z'izd (The Kyiv All-Ukrainian Assembly), Ibid.*

[27] Similar to that of the Government was the viewpoint of the all-Russian Kadet party, even more so that this party participated in the work of the Government, and so, their positions overlapped. See analysis of the newspaper *Narodnaia svoboda (The People's Freedom)* in the Chapter 2 of this thesis.

[28] In the same way, *Viys'kovyi Vistnyk (The Millitary Bulletin),* 3–4 (June, 1917) referred to Ukrainian national consciousness as "organized and elemental power of awaken Ukrainian movement."

[29] "Там, де народ пробудився до національного життя; там де люди почувають себе українцями; там де існують українські організації – там не було, нема і не буде ні аграрних розрухів, ні погромів, ні захватів землі, ні взагалі яких будь безпорядків." *Ridne Slovo (The Native Word),* 7 (13 May, 1917).

[30] "Свідомий народ *інакше* годував би свою армію, … [та] платив податки." *Ibid.*

[31] "На тому з'їзді виявилось хто наші друзі, хто наші спільники. Вітали Український Конгрес жиди, поляки, чехи, ести, вітали росіяни – соц. рев., кадети. На превеликий жаль не почули ми слів привіту тільки от російської соціал-демократії." *Kyivs'kyi Vseukraiins'kyi Z'izd (The Kyiv All-Ukrainian Assembly), Ridne Slovo (The Native Word),* 3 (15 April, 1917).

[32] "Село наше ще загортає тяжкий туман; світлом "Просвіт" гонім його геть! Треба щоб у кожнім селі заклалось товариство "Просвіта", ці товариства допоможуть українському селянству стати на певну дорогу. Відчиняймо ж "Просвіти"! *Ridne Slovo (The Native Word),* 4 (22 April, 1917).

[33] "панська московська мова." *Shcho Nam Robyt'? (What should we do?), Ridne Slovo (The Native Word),* 13 (24 June, 1917).

[34] "свідомий, освічений, вільний український народ із своєю рідною мовою." *Ibid.*

Par mobilajām virtuālajām kopienām

On Mobile Virtual Communities

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Informācijas procesu un sociālo kontaktu nozīme sabiedrības, kādas tās grupas vai atsevišķa indivīda dzīvē šodien nav, protams, nevienam speciāli jāpierāda. Jautājums ir tikai par šo procesu realizācijas paņēmieniem un līdzekļiem, kvalitāti un kvantitatīvajiem rādītājiem – informācijas ticamību, precizitāti, operativitāti, pieejamību, informācijas aprites ātrumu, izmaksām, kontaktēšanās iespēju plašumu un intensitāti. Sabiedrības straujas pārkārtošanās periodos sociālo procesu sekmīgai norisei sevišķi svarīgi ir nodrošināt pietiekami intensīvu informācijas apmaiņu un plašas kontaktēšanās iespējas. Pusgadsimts PSRS sastāvā Latvijai ir atstājis arī vēl tagad jūtamas informācijas telpas deformācijas. Laiks, kā zināms, dziedē visas brūces, taču ir zināms arī tas, ka informatīvie un cilvēciskie kontakti „pašplūsmā" veidojas ārkārtīgi gausi. Lai šo procesu paātrinātu, ar labiem nodomiem un deklarācijām vien nepietiek, nepieciešams mērķtiecīgs un neatlaidīgs darbs daudzu gadu garumā, kā arī piemērotas tehnoloģijas. Jaunās informācijas un komunikāciju tehnoloģijas – tīmeklis, tā portāli, forumi, virtuālās kopienas u. c. –, salīdzinot ar tradicionālajiem paņēmieniem, nodrošina ģeogrāfiski daudz plašāku un dziļāku aptveri un lielāku informācijas aprites ātrumu, tādējādi dodot iespēju sasniegt nospraustos mērķus daudz efektīvāk un īsākā laikā.

Pēdējos gados arī Latvijā vērā ņemamu popularitāti ir guvušas virtuālās kopienas, it sevišķi skolu jaunatnes un studentu vidē. Piemēram, Latvijā populārākajā virtuālajā kopienā *draugiem.lv* līdz 2005. gada 25. novembrim bija reģistrējušies 484725 lietotāji [7], turklāt jebkurā laika brīdī apmēram 3% no viņiem – ap 15000! – ir aktīvi, tas ir, pieslēgušies portālam. Cits piemērs – zviedru virtuālā kopiena *Lunarstorm* ir piesaistījusi sev zviedru jaunatnes lielākās daļas – vairāk nekā 60% – uzmanību [19]. Virtuālās kopienas ir populāras arī Somijā, piemēram, *nuorilahti.net* [17], un citās Skandināvijas valstīs.

Kur meklējama šādu fenomenālu panākumu atslēga? Pētījumi, piemēram, [24], rāda, ka šeit darbojas vairāki faktori. Viens no tiem un varbūt pats galvenais ir cilvēka neapzinātā vēlme kontaktēties, rast jaunus draugus un paziņas pēc iespējas plašākā lokā, kādu ikdienas dzīve fiziski nespēj nodrošināt. Kā zināms, šī vēlme, saistīta ar emocionālu pārdzīvojumu, piedzīvojumu alkām, ir sevišķi izteikta pusaudža gados, lai gan sociālo kontaktu nozīme cilvēka dzīvē pusaudža vecumā vēl nav īsti apzināta. Cits svarīgs faktors ir vēlme nepastarpināti (t. i., bez profesionāļu – žurnālistu, rakstnieku, skolotāju – starpniecības) iegūt informāciju un uzklausīt savu vienaudžu viedokļus. Nozīmīgas ir arī jauno informācijas un komunikāciju tehnoloģiju piedāvātās pašizpausmes iespējas – var izteikt savu viedokli par jebkuru interesējošu jautājumu, apliecināt sevi dažādos literatūras, vizuālās mākslas un mūzikas žanros. Turklāt fiziskā distance un pēc vēlēšanās arī anonimitāte, ko nodrošina virtuālie komunikācijas līdzekļi, rada zināmu drošības un atbrīvotības sajūtu, lai gan vairāki pētījumi rāda, ka, neraugoties uz to, joprojām samērā liela virtuālo kopienu lietotāju daļa ir klusētāji jeb t. s. glūņas (angl. *lurker*).

Nevar neatzīmēt arī darbošanās rotaļīgo vieglumu un bezgalīgo iespēju subjektīvo izjūtu, ko saviem lietotājiem piedāvā daudzas virtuālās kopienas, tajā skaitā arī *draugiem.lv*.

Virtuālo kopienu izveidošanas mērķi un tematiskā ievirze ir ārkārtīgi dažādi [18, 24]. Kā visbiežāk sastopamos var atzīmēt brīvā laika pavadīšanu, tērzēšanu (*čatu*), spēles, hobijus, iepazīšanos, politiskās diskusijas, tālmācību, sadarbību (piemēram, kopēja projekta īstenošanai), savstarpējo izpalīdzību un līdzjūtību (slimības, tuvinieku zaudējuma gadījumos), reliģiju u. c. Protams, ir arī komerciālas ievirzes kopienas, kuru izveidošanas mērķis ir veicināt kāda produkta pārdošanu.

Ne visas virtuālās kopienas ir vienlīdz veiksmīgas un masveidīgas. Virtuālajām kopienām zaudējot novitātes statusu, sabiedrības interese par tām pakāpeniski atslābst un, piemēram, ASV daudzas no agrīnajām virtuālajām kopienām jau ir beigušas pastāvēt.

Laika gaitā izgaismojas arī virtuālo sabiedrību problēmas, ko rada to atrautība no fiziskās vides – gandrīz nav reālu cilvēcisku kontaktu, apgrūtinātas vai neiespējamas neverbālās komunikācijas, grūti attēlot emocijas, ģeogrāfiski ļoti plašā auditorijā parādās arī valodas un kultūras barjeras. Tas viss izraisa gan sniegtās informācijas, gan kopienas locekļu personību deformētu uztveri. Izskan bažas [21] par virtuālo kopienu nākotni.

Lai novērtētu virtuālo kopienu tālākās attīstības un lietojuma potenciālu, acīmredzot lietderīgi nedaudz atskatīties pagātnē.

Virtuālās kopienas nav pēdējo gadu izgudrojums, to pirmsākumi meklējami vēl pirms tīmekļa un pat pirms interneta rašanās. Pirmās sistēmas, kuras deva iespēju ne tikai ievietot paziņojumus un sludinājumus, bet arī uzturēt samērā operatīvu dialogu starp domubiedriem, apmainīties ar idejām un informāciju, organizēt diskusijas, piemēram, BBS (*Bulletin Board System*), tika izveidotas, savienojot vairākus personālos datorus vienotā tīklā ar parasto telefona līniju un modemu palīdzību.

Internets pavēra iespēju apvienot atsevišķas BBS vienotā sistēmā, tādējādi veidojot intereškopas, no kurām daudzas, tostarp *FidoNet*, *USENET* (*USEr NETwork*), savulaik bija ārkārtīgi populāras. Intereškopas piedāvā lietotājiem iespēju izteikt savu viedokli, iesūtot jaunus ziņojumus un atbildot uz jau esošajiem. Dialoga (diskusijas) struktūra, ko veido sākotnējie ziņojumi un tiem pakārtotās atbildes (replikas), ir labi pārskatāma. Tematiski intereškopas ir organizētas grupās, tematiskā struktūra ļoti atvieglo nepieciešamās informācijas meklēšanu. Ziņojumu iesūtīšanai intereškopās izmanto tradicionālā e-pasta sistēmas, līdz ar to ziņojuma autors principā nevar palikt pilnīgi anonīms, vajadzības gadījumā viņu iespējams identificēt. Tas, protams, veicina autoru nopietnāku attieksmi pret savu ziņojumu saturu, taču tik un tā intereškopās parādās ļoti daudz surogātvēstuļu un ziņojumu, kas neatbilst grupas tematikai.

Lai pasargātu savus lietotājus, daudzas intereškopas ir slēgušas durvis svešiniekiem, pieprasot nosaukt lietotājvārdu un paroli, kā arī pārbaudot lietotāja IP adresi. Tādējādi ap intereškopām ir sākusi veidoties noslēgta sabiedrība.

Attīstoties tīmeklim, intereškopu funkcijas lielā mērā ir pārņēmuši tīmekļa portālu forumi, līdz ar to interese par vecajām intereškopām ir ļoti kritusies un liela to daļa ir beigusi pastāvēt. Latvijā faktiski palikusi tikai viena aktīva *USENET* intereškopa – lv, kas atrodama uz *Latnet NNTP* servera [12].

Tīmekļa publisko portālu forumi vairumā gadījumu diemžēl ir zaudējuši intereškopu stingri tematisko uzbūvi. Portālos ziņojumi ir vai nu piesaistīti kādai konkrētai portāla publikācijai, vai arī portālā ir izveidots forums ar ļoti izplūdušu tematisko struktūru. Turklāt publisko tīmekļa portālu forumi parasti pieļauj pilnīgu anonimitāti, līdz ar to autoru attieksme pret savu ziņojumu saturu veidojas ļoti nenopietna. Pietiek aplūkot jebkura Latvijas publiskā portāla, kaut vai, piemēram, [5], forumu, un it sevišķi atsauksmes par publikācijām, lai par to pārliecinātos. Surogātvēstuļu (*spama*), diletantisma un profanācijas plūdos ir ļoti grūti atrast patiešām vērtīgu informāciju – portālu atsauču kopas un forumi ir pārvērtušies par sava veida „tvaika nolaišanas ventiļiem”. Raksta visi, kas vien grib, bet nelasa gandrīz neviens. Tendences nav gājušas secen arī visumā nopietnajam Latvijas Universitātes portāla [13] forumam, arī šeit var sastapt, lai gan, par laimi, ne pārāk bieži, akadēmiskai videi pilnīgi neatbilstošas publikācijas.

Praktiski visas mūsdienu virtuālās kopienas realizētas kā slēgta tipa portālu forumi. Pieeja tiem iespējama, tikai norādot lietotāja vārdu un paroli. Lietotāju reģistrēšanai galvenokārt izmanto 3 veidu procedūras:

- atklāto reģistrēšanu,
- slēgto reģistrēšanu,
- reģistrēšanu ar ielūgumu.

Pirmais paņēmiens ir labi pazīstams – to plaši lieto publiskie tīmekļa pasta serveri, piereģistrēties var ikviens, līdz ar to nekādas aizsardzības praktiski nav. Neraugoties uz to, daudzas pasaulē plaši pazīstamas kopienas, piemēram, *The Well* [25], to izmanto. Lielāku drošību mēģina panākt, ievācot samērā izsmeļošus personas datus, kā arī kredītkartes informāciju.

Slēgtā reģistrēšanas procedūra paredz, ka jaunu lietotāju reģistrēšanu, līdzīgi kā Latvijas Universitātes informācijas sistēmā LUIS, var veikt tikai portāla administrācija. Šis paņēmiens ir salīdzinoši visdrošākais, taču piemērots tikai nelielām kopienām. Šāds mehānisms tiek izmantots, piemēram, *The Bricks Community* [4].

Reģistrēšana ar ielūgumu Latvijā arī ir labi pazīstama – tā tiek lietota portālā *draugiem.lv*, jaunu biedru kopienā var uzaicināt kāds no esošajiem biedriem. Paņēmiens principā dod iespēju izslēgt biedru, kas pārkāpis noteikumus, lai neļautu viņam turpināt darbību portālā, kā arī atklāt un sodīt uzaicinātāju, taču kopumā aizsardzība ir samērā vāja. Jāatzīmē viena ļoti svarīga šī paņēmiena priekšrocība – tas veicina kopienas strauju teritoriālu paplašināšanos, kā arī iespiešanos visdažādākajos sociālajos slāņos, ar to lielā mērā arī ir izskaidrojami *draugiem.lv* panākumi.

Ir zināmas vairākas virtuālo kopienu definīcijas [19, 20, 22, 23, 24]. Piemēram, Hovards Reingolds – *The Well* kopienas radītājs – virtuālo kopienu definē kā tādu cilvēku grupu, kurus vieno kopējas intereses, idejas un iespaidi un kuri dalās ar tiem, izmantojot internetu vai cita veida sadarbības tīklu. Barijs Velmans uzskata, ka virtuālā kopiena ir starppersonālo attiecību tīkls, kas nodrošina saviem biedriem socializāciju, atbalstu, informāciju, piederības izjūtu, sociālo identitāti un kontaktēšanās iespēju, lai kur arī viņi atrastos. Konstance Portere [18] virtuālo kopienu raksturo kā tādu indivīdu vai biznesa partneru kopumu, kuri sadarbojas kopēju interešu vadīti, turklāt sadarbība vismaz daļēji notiek, izmantojot tehnoloģijas, un tiek reglamentēta ar noteiktu protokolu un normu palīdzību. Konstance Portere [18] piedāvā arī virtuālo kopienu klasifikācijas shēmu atkarībā no kopienas dibināšanas veida un attiecību rakstura kopienas biedru starpā – sk. 1. zīm.



1. zīm. Virtuālo kopienu klasifikācijas shēma [18]

Virtuālo kopienu veidošanā tiek aktīvi izmantoti jaunākie interneta tehnoloģiju sasniegumi. Lai kaut nedaudz kompensētu reālo cilvēcisko kontaktu trūkumu, tiek piedāvātas interneta audio un video tehnoloģijas un pat 3D telpā modelētas realitātes ainas [3], taču pamatā tomēr saglabājas no intereškopām mantotā tekstuālā komunikācijas forma. Taču arī šajā jomā vērojama attīstība. It sevišķi jaunatnes vidē ļoti populāras ir interneta tiešsaites komunikācijas – tērzēšana (*čats*) un ziņneši, tādi kā, piemēram, *AOL*, *Yahoo,* un jo īpaši *Skype*, kas nodrošina ne tikai tekstuālās informācijas pārraidi, bet arī audiosakarus – interneta telefoniju. Tērzēšanas sistēmām un ziņnešiem raksturīgas ļoti operatīvas, praktiski momentānas komunikācijas un plaša auditorija. Tajā pašā laikā tematiskā struktūra ir vāji izteikta, lietotāji ir praktiski anonīmi, līdz ar to sarunas un diskusijas svešinieku starpā ir samērā nenopietnas.

Cits aktuāls virziens ir mobilās komunikācijas [6]. Lai gan tekstuālās komunikācijas mobilās telefonijas vidē ir apgrūtinātas mobilā telefona mazā ekrāna un neērtās klaviatūras dēļ, tomēr nevar noliegt acīmredzamās priekšrocības –

mobilais telefons ir visiem un visur pieejams, lēts, mazs, viegls, vienmēr ieslēgts, līdz ar to sarunu biedrs ir sasniedzams jebkurā laikā un vietā. Dažādo mobilo komunikāciju veidu popularitāte nav visā pasaulē vienāda, piemēram, īsziņas, mobilais e-pasts un mobilais internets tiek plaši lietoti Skandināvijas valstīs un Japānā, kur veidojas pat īpašs īsziņu un mobilā telefona kults [9], tajā pašā laikā, piemēram, ASV, mobilo telefonu izmanto gandrīz vienīgi sarunām.

Pēdējos gados mobilās komunikācijas sāk lietot arī virtuālajās kopienās, piemēram, *Winksite* [26], *Mopilot* [16], *Joca* [10], kā arī *draugiem.lv* [7] izmanto kombinētas audio un teksta tiešsaites komunikācijas. Tā kā mobilā telefona mazais ekrāns un neērtā klaviatūra nav īsti piemēroti liela apjoma tekstuālām komunikācijām, mobilās virtuālās kopienas paredz iespēju izmantot arī parasto personālo datoru. Mobilās virtuālās kopienas ir novitāte un modes lieta, taču ir diezgan maz lietojumu, kur mobilitāte būtu tik vitāli svarīga, lai mobilā interneta izmantošana būtu pamatota. Viens no tādiem lietojumiem ir masu pasākumu – demonstrāciju, mītiņu – rīkošana.

Virtuālās kopienas veidošanā izmantojamie tehniskie risinājumi un tehnoloģiju izvēle, protams, ir ļoti atkarīgi no kopienā risināmajiem uzdevumiem un mērķiem, kurus grib sasniegt kopienas biedri. Skaidrs arī, ka jaunveidojamajai kopienai jābūt kaut kādā ziņā labākai, pārākai par jau esošajām. Ja vēlamies radīt virtuālo kopienu plašai sabiedrībai, tai jāatbilst ļoti dažādu sociālo un profesionālo grupu vēlmēm, vajadzībām un iespējām. Izmantojot pieredzi, kas gūta esošo kopienu izpētes rezultātā, var mēģināt definēt dažas Latvijas kultūrvidei un pašreizējai sociāli ekonomiskajai situācijai raksturīgākās „vispārcilvēciskās" vajadzības un vēlmes:

- pieeja plašai, pietiekami kompetentai informācijai un idejām visdažādākajās sadzīves, profesionālās un sabiedriskās darbības, kultūras, izglītības u. c. jomās,
- iespēja rast savām idejām un informācijai pietiekami plašu un kompetentu auditoriju,
- iespēja rast vidi, kur izvietot un pastāvīgi glabāt visdažādākā satura informāciju (zinātniskos rakstus, tehnisko un mācību literatūru, daiļliteratūru, publicistiku, visdažādākos tradicionālās un elektroniskās mākslas, mūzikas veidus, ieskaitot video un TV),
- iespēja veidot un uzturēt gan virtuālus, gan reālus cilvēciskus kontaktus, kopējas interešu grupas un darba grupas kāda kopēja mērķa sasniegšanai, veidot un uzturēt partnerattiecības un sadarbību visdažādākajās jomās,
- iespēja uzturēt efektīvu, operatīvu dialogu interešu vai darba grupas biedru starpā,
- iespēja piedalīties diskusijās par visdažādākajiem jautājumiem.

Lai arī cik atšķirīgas no pirmā acu uzmetiena liktos dažādas virtuālas kopienas, to pamatā ir shēma, kas pārmantota no intereškopām un sastāv no 3 savstarpēji saistītiem raksturīgiem pamatelementiem – lietotājiem, ziņojumiem un ziņojumu veidošanas, iesūtīšanas, glabāšanas, meklēšanas un atlases procesiem. Sakarības starp šiem 3 pamatelementiem shematiski attēlotas 2. zīmējumā. Lielākajā daļā interneta komunikācijas līdzekļu lietotāju raksturošanai bez lietotājvārda, kas kalpo lietotāja identificēšanai, un paroles parasti ievāc vēl virkni personas datu: vārdu, uzvārdu, e-pasta adresi, vecumu, dzimumu, intereses. Taču, lai realizētu



2. zīm. Mobilās virtuālās kopienas elementi

iepriekš minētās vēlmes, ar to ir par maz. Piemēram, partnerattiecību veidošanai ir svarīgi zināt ne tikai dotās personas intereses, bet arī kompetences jomas un pakāpi.

Ja kopienā norisinās intensīva informācijas apmaiņa, tās biedri slīkst nemitīgā informācijas straumē. Šādos apstākļos svarīgi, lai katrs lietotājs varētu uzstādīt sev pieejamības filtru, tieši norādot, kas, kādos jautājumos, pa kādiem sakaru kanāliem (e-pastu, ziņnesi, mobilo telefonu utt.), kādos diennakts laikos var pie viņa vērsties. No otras puses, lai sakārtotu informācijas plūsmas, nepieciešami līdzekļi auditorijas pārvaldīšanai. No intereškopām pārmantotā kārtība pieļauj tikai divus variantus: 1) ziņojuma nosūtīšanu visai intereškopai un (vai) apakškopai, 2) ziņojuma nosūtīšanu konkrētam adresātam. Lai varētu labāk pārvaldīt informācijas izplatīšanas procesu, lietotājiem (biedriem) lietderīgi apvienoties grupās, turklāt katrs lietotājs var ietilpt vienā vai vairākās grupās. Pie šādas kārtības ziņojumu pēc vajadzības var sūtīt lietotāju grupai un to saņems visi grupas locekļi, tādējādi kļūst lieki garie izsūtīšanas saraksti.

Lielās kopienās (tajā skaitā arī *draugiem.lv*) bieži jāsastopas ar parādību, ka kopienas biedrs patiesībā nav tā persona, par kuru uzdodas. Nopietnai darbībai un attiecībām būtu nepieciešams, lai kopienā esošajai informācijai varētu uzticēties. Ir zināmi un tiek izmantoti vairāki uzticības modeļi [1, 2], viens no tiem – centralizētais modelis – paredz t. s. reģistrācijas autoritāti, kuras pienākumos ietilpst personas datu pārbaude un personību apliecinošā elektroniskā paraksta izsniegšana. Šis modelis paredzēts arī Latvijas elektronisko dokumentu likumā. Ņemot vērā elektroniskā paraksta ieviešanas procesa grūtības Latvijā un arī citās valstīs, šis modelis diez vai tuvāko gadu laikā gūs plašu lietojumu virtuālajās kopienās. Cits tā saucamais tīkla uzticības modelis vai PGP[1] modelis paredz iespēju lietotājiem (biedriem) pašiem apliecināt vienam otra personību, tādējādi veidojot savstarpējās uzticēšanās tīklu. Šis modelis liekas daudz perspektīvāks, jo metodoloģiski labi sader ar virtuālo kopienu pamatnostādnēm.

Veidojot partnerattiecības, svarīga ir ne tikai datu ticamība, bet arī kopienas biedra reputācija. Reputācijas veidošanās mehānismi pēdējos gados ir plaši pētīti saistībā ar interneta izsolēm. Arī kopienā jāparedz veids, kā varētu vērtēt katra biedra reputāciju atkarībā no viņa iepriekšējās darbības kopienā.

Daudzas virtuālās kopienas un citi interneta komunikāciju rīki piedāvā iespēju īstenot praktiski jebkuru ieceri, kas saistīta ar kontaktēšanos, taču nepiedāvā nekādus instrumentus, kas atvieglotu tās īstenošanu. Vienkāršākais rīks te varētu būt parastais kontaktu menedžeris [8], kaut vai, piemēram, *Microsoft Outlook*. Taču patiesībā kontaktu veidošanas problēma nav tik vienkārša [15]. Lai izveidotu un, galvenais, uzturētu sociālo kontaktu tīklu, jāiegulda liels darbs un daudz laika, lai šī darbošanās būtu efektīva, nepieciešams arī speciāls sociālo kontaktu menedžeris, kas dotu iespēju pārvaldīt informāciju, kura radusies kontaktu veidošanas procesā.

Informācija kopienā, atšķirībā no tradicionālajām intereškopām, glabājas pastāvīgi, turklāt tiek izmantoti ne tikai parastie teksta, bet arī hiperteksta ziņojumi, audio, foto un video materiāli. Lai atvieglotu nepieciešamās informācijas sameklēšanu un atlasi, acīmredzot lietderīgi paredzēt hierarhisku tematisku struktūru – ziņojumu grupas un apakšgrupas. Kopienas darba grupās efektīvai darbībai bieži nepieciešama ļoti operatīva informācijas apmaiņa, tādēļ jāparedz steidzamie ziņojumi, kurus nosūta ar ziņnesi uz adresāta (vai vairāku adresātu) personālo datoru vai mobilo telefonu.

Kā jau iepriekš minēts, mobilais telefons šodien vēl nav pati piemērotākā ierīce tekstuālām komunikācijām. Taču situācija šajā jomā strauji mainās. Jauno mobilo telefonu modeļu ekrāni kļūst arvien lielāki un, galvenais, ietilpīgāki, tādējādi dodot iespēju diezgan ērti aplūkot samērā liela apjoma tekstus, kā arī foto un video materiālus. Liela apjoma tekstu ievadīšana no mobilā telefona klaviatūras, protams, ir neērta un gandrīz neiespējama. Taču informāciju var ievadīt attēla formā, izmantojot mobilā telefona videokameru, un pēc tam pārveidot teksta formātā, lietojot OCR[2] datorprogrammas. Perspektīvs paņēmiens ir arī informācijas ievadīšana ar balsi, pēc tam to pārveidojot teksta formātā ar balss atpazīšanas datorprogrammu palīdzību. Taču daudz svarīgāks mobilā telefona lietojums ir paziņojumi, ka kopienā parādījusies jauna informācija, kas interesē lietotāju. Tikpat svarīgi ir atgādinājumi par kādas darbības beigu termiņa tuvošanos, kā arī konkrētajai personai adresētie steidzamie ziņojumi.

Summary

During periods of rapid changes in society maintaining intense social contacts and fast information exchange is an essential premise for their succesful outcome. Development of information flows and interpersonal contacts in a natural way appears to be a very slow process. Advanced Internet communication technologies such as the web portals, forums, virtual communities etc. would help there assuring geographically much wider audience and faster information turnaround time thereby providing the chance to achieve goals and objectives more efficiently. In the paper there are examined development history, reasons for recent popularity and main challenges of virtual communities which has grown widespread in the whole world and more recently also in Latvia. A number of well established virtual communities were surveyed and theorethical grounds of their development investigated. As a result needs and desires of the nowadays potential members of the virtual community were defined particulary in regard with Latvian cultural environment and recent social and political situation. Further there principles of development and various issues of functionality and structure of the virtual community were also considered with emphasis on options provided by advanced Internet and mobile communication technologies. Special attention was paid to the new issues of virtual community development such as security, trust, expertise, reputation, availability, audience and content management.

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Atsauces

[1] PGP ir saīsinājums no *Pretty Good Privacy* – tas ir pazīstamas firmas nosaukums. Šī firma nodarbojas ar kriptogrāfijas un elektroniskā paraksta programmatūras izstrādi. Sīkāka informācija atrodama firmas mājas lapā: http://www.pgp.com

[2] OCR – *Optical Character Recognition* – datorprogrammas, kas atpazīst teksta simbolu attēlus un tādējādi dod iespēju izveidot teksta formāta failu.

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Religious Electoral Slogans in Contemporary Ukraine

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There are claims that with the development of social and economic structures there will be no place for religion. It will remain as one's private identification but will never play an active role in any other sphere except one's emotional world.[1] Nevertheless, in the 21st century we have a situation which Casanova calls "the deprivatization of religion"[2]. He explains it through the dual nature of the functioning of faith. On the one hand, religion is based on a special connection between an individual and "High Force". On the other hand, there is a specific community involved in the same religion. That is why religion combines privacy and publicity. In contrast to Casanova's statements, Berger[3] discussing the contemporary resurgence of religion in the global context makes the point that now religion plays the same role in society as it did during the previous epochs because (1) there is no one global tendency of religious revival but many different cases, including the European situation where the secularization process is obvious, and (2) because many contemporary religious movements have non-religious basis for their support. Ukrainian scholars talking about the religious situation in Ukraine of the independence times prefer to emphasize "religious revival"[4] after the Soviet atheistic policy.

To my mind, these controversial approaches have to be proved by historical evidence. In order to provide this evidence I want to explore the role of religion in the Ukrainian parliamentary electoral campaigns of 1998 and 2002 in a comparative perspective. The electoral campaigns are essential events when members of a society make their choice that could illustrate clearly the current tendencies. In independent Ukraine politicians continue to use religious slogans, symbols etc. in their electoral appeals and other activities in order to improve their electoral results. I will call this use of religion during electoral campaigns the "religious rhetoric".

The parliamentary elections of 1998 and 2002 are the only elections in Ukraine that were organized using the mixed electoral system. It means that half of 450 National Deputies of Ukraine are elected at 225 constituencies (the majority plurality system) and another half – at one national constituency (the proportional system) according to the lists of candidates proposed by political parties and their blocs.

This mixed electoral system was introduced in 1997 by the Law of Ukraine "On National Deputies of Ukraine Elections".

In my research I concentrate on the party policy concerning the use of religion, which is why my emphasis is made mostly on the proportional part of the Ukrainian parliamentary elections mentioned. As a result, I focus on an institutionalized strategy of contemporary Ukrainian political parties towards religion if it is a case.

In order to investigate this issue, we have to know what the official position of a party towards religion is during elections and how it correlates with its practical realization. Thus, in this paper I will illustrate the religious rhetoric in electoral programs of parties and their blocs in order to look through the practical agitation in future.

Obviously, slogans about religious issues in party programs in independent Ukraine are not new in party politics. For example, the first registered party, the Ukrainian Republican Party (1990), had in its program such slogans as "spiritual revival", "freedom of conscience and religion", "strict separation of church from state".[5] All the problems mentioned by the party were relevant because the Law of Ukraine "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" was adopted in 1991 only.[6]

Nevertheless, the year of 1998 was prominent for Ukrainian political parties: they became strategic actors in electoral campaigns. To my mind, this fact has mobilized them, especially in their policy-building and image-making. This mobilization had its impact on the religious rhetoric too.

To begin with, on March 29, 1998 in the electoral bulletins there were 30 parties and their blocs marked. On March 31, 2002 – 33 parties and their blocs took part in the parliamentary elections.

Not all the electoral actors paid their attention to religious issues. In 1998 in the programs of 10 parties and blocs there were no religious slogans. They were:

Parties

- the Party of National-Economic Development of Ukraine (PNERU),
- the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU),
- the All-Ukrainian Party of Women Initiatives (VPZI),
- the Party "Reforms and Order" (PRP),
- the All-Ukrainian Party of Working People (VPT),
- the Party of Defenders of Motherland (PZV).

Electoral blocs

- "The Labor Party and the Liberal Party – Together" (EB "PP ta LP – Razom!"),
- "Less Words" (EB "Menshe Sliv" in which there were the Social National Party of Ukraine, the Party "State Independence of Ukraine"),
- "The European Choice of Ukraine" (EB EVU in which there were the Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party, the Liberal Democratic Party of Ukraine),
- "SLOn – the Social Liberal Union" (the party "Interregional Bloc of Reforms", the Constitutional Democratic Party of Ukraine).[7]

They constituted nearly 33% of all the parties and blocs that took part in the elections.

It is remarkable that in 2002 only 5 parties and their blocs did not have any religious slogans in their programs. They were:

Parties

- the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU),
- the Political Party “Iabluko”.

Electoral Blocs

- “Our Ukraine” of Viktor Ushchenko (“Nasha Ukraina”, in which there were the National Movement of Ukraine, the Ukrainian National Movement, the Party “Reforms and Order”, “Christian national Union”, “Solidarity”, “Ahead, Ukraine!”, the Youth Party of Ukraine, the Republican Party of Ukraine, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Liberal Party of Ukraine),
- “The Command of Winter Generation” (“KOP”, in which there were the Liberal Democratic Party of Ukraine, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Peasant Democratic Party of Ukraine, the Party of Private Property),
- “New World” (“Novyi Svit”, in which there were the Ukrainian Party, the All-Ukrainian Party of Interethnic Understanding).[8]

The parties mentioned constituted nearly 15% of all the parties and blocs that took part in the 2002 elections. The comparison with the 1998 situation illustrates that the religious rhetoric of electoral programs became more popular within party politics in Ukraine.

Thus, the majority of electoral actors used the religious slogans in their programs. In order to present a clear picture of the variety of these slogans in comparative perspective I have created Table 1.

It shows that there were 17 different religious slogans within the two electoral campaigns discussed. During both elections the same number of slogans -13- was in use. Certainly, their content was different.

I have grouped all the slogans into 4 thematic categories in order to differentiate the levels of party involvement into religious issues. That is why the first category presents the general slogans of the near-religious problems: spiritual revival, spiritual development etc. The second category concerns freedom of conscience and religion that is not as general as the first category because it has more practical outcome. The third category describes more specifically the party attitudes to religion and religious organizations. Finally, the fourth category shows what parties have the religious background that is supposed to be the deepest involvement into religious problems.

Table 1

Religious Slogans in the Party Electoral Programs of 1998 and 2002– 1

Religious Slogans	Parties and Blocs of Parties 1998	Number of Parties and Blocs of Parties 1998	Parties and Blocs of Parties 2002	Number of Parties and Blocs of Parties 2002
1. General slogans about "spirituality":				
a) spirituality as a part of national revival;	PRVU, "Gromada", PZV	3		0
b) spiritual revival;	PZU, RKhP, PMU, "Soiuz", EB UKhDP and KhNS, EB "Trudova Ukraina", KhDPU, EB SPU and SelPU, SDPU(o)	9	SDPU(o), LPU(o), ZhZM	3
c) spiritual development;		0	EB Vitrenko, KPU, EB "Ednist", EB DemPU-Demsoiuz, UNA, NGU, EB "Ruskyi Blok", EB "Za EdU!", "Nova Syla", EB "Proty Vsikh", KhR, PZU, PRTU, EB ZUBR	14
d) struggle with destructive contemporary elements;	NDP, APU, "Soiuz", EB UKhDP and KhNS, PSPU	5	NPVSZ, EB DemPU-Demsoiuz, KPU, LPU(o), ZhZM, KPU(o), VPT, EB "Spravedlyvist"	8
e) universal human and Christian values;	KPU, EB KhDPU and KhNS, PSPU	3		0
f) spiritual values		0	NPVSZ, UMP, ZhZM, KPU(o), EB Tymoshenko	5
2. Freedom of conscience and religion:	PMU, EB "Trudova Ukraina", KhDPU, PSPU, PZU, SDPU(o)	6	NPVSZ, KPU, LPU(o), SelPU, EB "Za EdU!", VPT, SDPU	7
3. Attitude to denominations:				
a) support of particular church (churches);	NRU, EB "Nasionalnyi Front", "BDS NEP", UNA	4	SelPU, EB "Ryskyi Blok", EB NRU	3
b) wish to cooperate with churches (believers);	PZU	1	NPVSZ, KPRS, VPT, EB Tymoshenko	4

c) latitude in religion;	PMU, EB “Trudova Ukraina”, KhDPU, SDPU(o), PDSEP	5	NPVSZ, “Nova Syla”, EB “Proty Vsikh”, ZhZM, EB “Spravedlyvist”	5
d) “for peace and cooperation” between churches;	NRU, “Gromada”, SDPU(o)	3	SDPU(o), “Nova Syla”, EB NRU	3
e) cooperation with church and school;	PZV, PRVU	2	EB Tymoshenko, KhR	2
f) strict separation of church from state;	“Gromada”, EB SPU and SelPU, NDP, SDPU(o)	4	EB “Ruskyi Blok”	1
g) united Ukrainian church;		0	EB NRU	1
h) economic aspects of church activities:				
- return of unjustly confiscated property;	PRVU, NDP, UNA	3		0
- no taxation of church.	KhDPU	1		0
i) legal position of eparchial trials for Christian believers.		0	KhR	1
4. Religious basis of party.	RKhP, PMU, EB UKhDP and KhNS, KhDPU	4	VOKh, KhR, KPRS, EB ZUBR, PRTU, EB Tymoshenko	2 (6)

Now I will discuss the possible explanation of causes and change of the religious slogans.

In the **first category** I have 6 slogans (from *a* to *f* in Table 1) that are connected to religion because they are dedicated to spirituality, that I consider to be in the sphere of religion. Maybe these slogans are not consciously perceived by political parties as religious. But, to my mind, the statement about a possibility to be spiritual without religious background is quite disputable especially taking into consideration the long historical tradition of religious beliefs that has formed the values of modern society and the term “spirituality” itself.

The slogans of the first category illustrate a special type of continuity and change. For example, the greatest popularity of the slogan for *spiritual revival* (*b* in Table 1) in 1998 went to the slogan for *spiritual development* (*c* in Table 1) in 2002. It looks like the Ukrainian national revival connected with spiritual revival as well came true and now we need to develop our success only. To my mind, we also have to take into consideration that from the end of the 80s the “revival” slogans have been everywhere, which has made them usual and non-outstanding. As a result, these slogans became unpopular within the image-makers of the political parties.

Another remarkable change in the first category is a shift from the slogan for *universal human and Christian values* (*e* in Table 1) in 1998 to the more general slogan for *spiritual values* (*f* in Table 1) in 2002 in a sense that the latter does not employ the "Christianity". I think this is an example of how politicians construct their programs according to the sociological data. Nowadays the Ukrainian population is characterized by untraditional approach to religion but with traditional self-identification as believers. Thus, the change of the slogans mentioned fits this feature of Ukrainians well.

The only slogan in the first category which had nearly the same popularity among the parties and blocs was for *the struggle with destructive elements of contemporary society* (*d* in Table 1). This theme is very relevant to the current Ukrainian situation mostly as a result of the liberal Ukrainian legislature that has caused the growth of different sects.

The second category slogans for *freedom of conscience and religion* remain very popular though the Law of Ukraine "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" was adopted in 1991. This situation shows that the practical implementation of this Law has not been solved. In addition, it seems to me, the slogan is controversial: the problem is still on the agenda because politicians do not give the same rights to all Ukrainian confessions, as I will discuss later.

The third category explains the attitudes of electoral actors to the Ukrainian confessions and outlines their vision of the role of religious organizations in society. It contains 11 religious slogans (from *a* to *i* in Table 1) and this is the largest group. The category defines precisely what religious issues still remained on the agenda and what - became unpopular or popular.

The same level of popularity was presented by the slogans for *support of a particular church* (*a* in Table 1), *latitude in religion* (*c* in Table 1), *"peace" relations between the Ukrainian churches* (*d* in Table 1), *cooperation of church with school* (*e* in Table 1). This stability may be explained by the current circumstances in Ukrainian society as follows.

First, for a political party *to support a particular church* is useful because in the situation of church tensions in Ukraine every denomination will agree to have one more supporter. Nevertheless, this strategy is dangerous too because that party will never obtain the all-national support as a result of the absence of the only national church in Ukraine.

Second, the slogan for the *latitude in religion* might be connected to that for freedom of conscience, which was discussed before.

Third, the relations between and within the Ukrainian churches are not improved mostly between different Orthodox currents. Thus, the slogan for "*peace"* between them is relevant and it is opposite to the slogan for the support of one particular denomination.

Finally, the introduction of optional course "Christian Ethics" into the secondary school program has found many discussions on its way but still this idea has many supporters. Thus, the popularity of the slogan *for cooperation of church and school* is not high but stable.

Besides, the third category proposes two slogans with opposite histories: sudden growth and sudden fall of popularity.

The former is for *cooperation with churches and believers* (*b* in Table 1). This change is remarkable because it illustrates the broader shift that occurred during the 2002 elections. Then the electoral actors understood that in reality propaganda is much more effective if it is connected with the local context of each constituency. To my mind, this understanding came from the same sociological data that shows that Ukrainian believers are more interested in the life of their parishes than that of high church hierarchy.

The most striking example of this shift is the religious rhetoric used by the electoral bloc “Nasha Ukraina”. As I have already mentioned, this bloc did not have any religious slogans in its electoral program in 2002. Nonetheless, there were the clergymen officially supported by this bloc in the majoritarian constituencies such as O. V. Bespalov – the pastor of the Christian Church “The Word of Life” (“Slovo Zhyttia”) – in the constituency #61 in Krasnogorivka, Donetsk region.[9]

The latter slogan is for *strict separation of church from state*. I do not think that this fall of the popularity of this slogan happened because the current situation proves that there is no need for the separation. It seems for me, that it is actually a case that politicians understand that they need ecclesiastic support. That is why they do not want the separation mentioned. In addition, this fall of the slogan complements the growth of the slogan for cooperation with churches and believers.

All the remaining slogans in the third category (*g, h, i* in Table 1) form the group of slogans that appeared in the 1998 elections or the 2002 elections, but never during both. Here I will discuss why it happened.

The disappearance of the slogans about *the economic life of Ukrainian denominations* (*h* in Table 1) may be explained by the preparation and adoption of the President of Ukraine Decree “On Emergency Measures Concerning Final Negotiation of Negative Outcomes of Totalitarian Policy of the Former USSR towards Religion and Concerning an Instauration of Broken Rights of Churches and Religious Organizations”[10]. Nevertheless, all the problems of property returning to churches still do not have proper solutions. Especially, deep tensions occur when some former religious buildings are now occupied by different scientific and cultural organizations. For example, the Lvov Museum of Religion has former Catholic Church as its office and feels a pressure to move from it now.[11]

Two new slogans appeared in the third category in 2002: *for united Ukrainian church* (*g* in Table 1) and *eparchial trials for Christian Believers* (*i* in Table 1).

The former idea is popular throughout the Orthodox churches in Ukraine. But for parties it is dangerous to use it because there is no agreement within the church hierarchy which church will become the leader of such unification. In addition, it is a long process for Constantinople’s approval of this change. Nevertheless, in the Verkhovna Rada 1994–1998 and 1998-2002 there were the deputies’ unions “For the United Ukrainian Church” on the basis of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – the Kyivan Patriarchate as a “state” church and against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – the Moscow Patriarchate as a “foreign” state which continuity we find in the really unpopular religious slogan in 2002.

The latter idea is presented by one party too. The Christian Movement (KhR) as a newly formed party (2000) wanted to differentiate itself from the other parties in the Ukrainian Christian Democratic ideoscape. But the political use of such religious peculiarities can not help the party to obtain national scope without which it is impossible to be a real party. Because of this, all Ukrainian Christian Democratic Parties, e.g. the Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine (KhDPU), the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party (UKhDP), suffer from political weakness too [12] In addition, the slogan mentioned might be connected with the early time of Ukrainian independence when it was possible, for example, for the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party to claim that it struggled for the holidays on Christmas, Easter and other great religious celebrations.[13]

The last – **fourth – category** is dedicated to the religious background of parties and their blocs. This background is obvious for the Christian Democratic Parties and Muslim one. But during the 2002 elections we observe a situation when some other parties obtained "religious" features. I will discuss this phenomenon here.

I have put the electoral bloc of Iulia Tymoshenko (in which there were the All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna" – "Fatherland", the Ukrainian National Party "Sobor", the Ukrainian Republican Party, the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party) in this fourth category because in its program the chapter "Spiritual Life" stood in the very beginning and there were the words: "Our purpose is to make the development of spirituality a top-priority. It is the first step of our progress"[14]

The same "religious" proclamations were in the electoral program of the Party of Rehabilitation of Seriously Ill People of Ukraine (PRTU). Its main program slogan was a citation from the Bible: "He that hath pity upon the poor lendeth unto the Lord and that which he hath given will he pay him again (Proverbs 19:17)[15].

The Communist Party of Workers and Peasants (KPRS) stated that Christianity is an early communist doctrine.[16]

The electoral bloc "For Ukraine, Belarus and Russia" (ZUBR, in which there were the political parties "Light from the East" and "The Union of Labor") aimed to unite three states mentioned in its title. The main justification proposed was a statement that that unity was gifted by God.[17]

In addition, it is also worth investigating the change of variety of slogans for each electoral actor. Unfortunately, the political spectrum is very instable in Ukraine that makes my aim difficult to achieve. Moreover, it is possible to illustrate such a comparison for some parties that took part in both electoral campaigns. I demonstrate it in Table 2.

Table 2 shows that only two parties used the same number of religious slogans in their programs during the 1998 and 2002 elections. The majority of parties – ten – decreased the number of religious slogans whereas only five parties increased this number.

Summing up, the electoral programs of the Ukrainian political parties and their blocs of the 1998 and 2002 elections contained a great variety of religious slogans. Those slogans resembled not only the current Ukrainian situation but also were constructed according to the historical religious evidence and the current Ukrainian mindset. Thus, the most popular religious slogans are very general and populist.

Table 2

Religious Slogans in the Party Electoral Programs of 1998 and 2002–2

Parties and Blocs of Parties 1998	Number of Religious Slogans 1998	Parties and Blocs of Parties 2002	Number of Religious Slogans 2002
PZU[18]	4	PZU	1
NDP	4	NDP in EB "Za EdU!"	2
PSPU	4	PSPU in EB Vitrenko	1
SDPU(o)	4	SDPU(o)	4
UPS in EB "Trudova Ukraina"	4	UPS in EB "Ednist"	1
EB KhDPU and KhNS	3	KhPU and KhNS in EB "Nasha Ukraina"	0
UNA	2	UNA	1
NRU	2	NRU and UNR in EB "Nasha Ukraina"	0
		EB NRU	3
EB SPU and SelPU	2	SPU	0
		SelPU	2
"Soiuz"	2	"Soiuz" in EB "Ruskyi Blok"	3
RKhP	2	PKhP in EB "Nasha Ukraina"	0
KPU	1	KPU	3
KUN in EB "Natsionalnyi Front"	1	KUN in EB "Nasha Ukraina"	0
URP in EB "Natsionalnyi Front"	1	URP in EB Tymoshenko	4
DemPU in "BDS NEP"	1	DemPU in EB DemPU-Demsoiuz	2
PRP	0	PRP in EB "Nasha Ukraina"	0
LPU in EB "PP ta LP – Razom!"	0	LPU in EB "Nasha Ukraina"	0
KDPU in EB "SLOn"	0	KDPU in EB "KOP"	0
VPT	0	VPT	3
SDPU	0	SDPU	1
LDPU in EB "Evropeiskyi Vybir Ukrainy"	0	LDPU in EB "KOP"	0

Describing the electoral programs of 2002 Tomenko claims that there is a difference between the 1998 and 2002 programs when the latter "are the clear social-economic documents where the key goals are economic development, new jobs, higher wages and pensions."[19] Though many parties really decreased the number of religious slogans in their electoral programs, (1) a larger percent of the electoral actors used religious rhetoric in their programs and tried to correlate them more with the current religious problems; (2) the number of religious slogans remained the same.

Besides, I do not think that the programs of 2002 were more close-tongued if we take into consideration their religious content as Elenskyi states.[20] For me, they simply became more constructed according to the current circumstances.

The religious rhetoric in the electoral campaigns of 1998 and 2002 as a part of the more general issue of the role of religion in Ukrainian society presents the evidence that does not support the ideas of "deprivatization of religion" and "religious revival" because the majority of the Ukrainian population has religious self-identification with one of the historical churches in Ukraine but they are not involved in church activities. This feature of the Ukrainian mindset has an impact on the construction of the religious rhetoric that becomes more and more general and does not touch real religious problems. Even the church hierarchy trying to achieve secular power through elections does not pay much attention to the particular religious issues in its propaganda. To my mind, the process described has to be named "the symbolization of religion" as a method of power functioning in modern society if we use the Foucaulian definitions.

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Footnotes

[1] See, for example, Thomas Luckmann's view: **Greeley, A** Religion Isn't What It Used Be: Bryan Wilson and Thomas Luckmann// Greeley, A. (ed.), *Sociology and Religion: a Collection of Readings*. Harper Collins: College Publishers, 1995, pp. 200–201.

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[9] *Golos Ukrainy (Voice of Ukraine) 29*, 2002.

[10] *Golos Pravoslavia (Voice of Orthodoxy) 9*, 2002, p. 2.

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[14] *Golos Ukrainy (Voice of Ukraine),* 2002, September 19.

[15] Ibid., March 1.

[16] Ibid., February 23.

[17] Ibid., February 16.

[18] Names in bold denote that the party or bloc of parties has overcome the electoral threshold to become a parliamentary party.

[19] **Tomenko, M.** Parlamentski Vybory 2002: Dyskusiia Pro Maibutne Ukrainy" (Parliamentary Elections of 2002: Discussion about the Future of Ukraine)// M. Tomenko (Ed.). Pravo Vyboru: Politychni Partii ta Vyborchi Bloky. Kyiv: Geoprynt, 2002, p. 4–5.

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Globālas nozīmes lēmumi par informācijas pieejamības nodrošināšanu pieņemti 1999. gada 14. un 15. oktobrī Eiropas valstu politiķu un bibliotēkas politikas veidotāju Kopenhāgenas Deklarācijā[2] un 2004. gadā PULMAN (*Public Libraries Mobility Advanced Networks*) Oeiras (Portugāle) konferences Manifestā.[3] Šie lēmumi ir publisko bibliotēku politikas vadlīnijas pasaules, nacionālajā un Eiropas mērogā. Dokumentos noteikti šādi bibliotēku pamatuzdevumi:

– Demokrātija un pilsoniskā sabiedrība.
  Piedāvājot brīvu un vienlīdzīgu iespēju piekļūt augstas kvalitātes informācijai, publiskās bibliotēkas uzlabo iedzīvotāju dzīves kvalitāti un sniedz demokrātiskās iespējas informācijas sabiedrībā.
– Ekonomiskā un sociālā attīstība.
  Nodrošinot vietējās sabiedrības vajadzībām atbilstošus informācijas pakalpojumus, publiskās bibliotēkas sniedz atbalstu vietējās sabiedrības attīstībā un palīdz samazināt nevienlīdzību informācijas pieejamībā Eiropas iedzīvotāju vidū.
– Kultūras un valodu daudzveidība.
  Publiskās bibliotēkas ir kultūras institūcijas, kurām saskaņā ar Eiropas Savienības līgumu ir liela atbildība kultūras mantojuma, literatūras un lasīšanas iemaņu apguves jomā.

Visiem vienlīdzīgas informācijas pieejamības nodrošināšanas pamatprincips un bibliotēku būtiskā nozīme informācijas sabiedrībā deklarēta 2005. gada

11. novembrī pasaules Nacionālo bibliotēku direktoru konferencē Aleksandrijā[4] un oficiāli apstiprināta konferences komunikē 'Mūsu digitālās atmiņas saglabāšana' (Maintaining Our Digital Memory)[5] Informācijas sabiedrībai veltītajā Pasaules sammitā Tunisā 2005. gada 18. novembrī IFLA's prezidents Alekss Bairns (Alex Byrne), uzrunājot Informācijas sabiedrības Pasaules sammita plenārsēdes dalībniekus, pauda pasaules bibliotekārās sabiedrības aicinājumu valdībām un starptautiskajām organizācijām ieguldīt līdzekļus bibliotēku un informācijas centru attīstībā, jo tie ir informācijas sabiedrības stratēģijas un politikas pamatelementi, kā arī nodrošināt informācijas brīvu pieejamību un informācijpratības apguvi visiem pasaules iedzīvotājiem[6]. Analoģiski secinājumi un norādījumi ietverti arī Starptautiskās bibliotēku asociāciju un institūciju federācijas (IFLA) 2005. gada jūnija ziņojumā par interneta pārvaldības jautājumiem.[7]

Šajos dokumentos uzsvērts, ka Nacionālās bibliotēkas un visas pasaules bibliotēkas kopumā ir cilvēces digitālā atmiņa, kultūras mantojuma sargi informācijas sabiedrības telpā un ka to pienākums ir vākt, saglabāt un padarīt šo mantojumu pieejamu šodienas cilvēkiem un nākamajām paaudzēm, visai lietotājvidei bez ierobežojumiem un aizliegumiem. Bibliotēkas un informācijas dienesti nodrošina informācijas brīvību un brīvu pieejamību. IFLA aicina nacionālās, reģionālās un vietējās valdības kā arī starptautiskās organizācijas veikt šādus pasākumus:

- ieguldīt līdzekļus bibliotēkās un informācijas dienestos kā nozīmīgos informācijas sabiedrības eksistences nodrošinātājos;
- modernizēt un paplašināt bibliotēku tīklus, lai garantētu kvalitatīvus pakalpojumus saviem iedzīvotājiem;
- atbalstīt informācijas pieejamību un izteikšanās brīvību;
- nodrošināt atklātu pieeju informācijai;
- novērtēt informācijpratības nozīmi un lasītprasmes būtisko vietu informācijas un informācijas sabiedrības globālā attīstībā.

Ņemot vērā iepriekš teikto, jāsecina, ka publisko bibliotēku galvenais uzdevums ir informācijas pieejamības nodrošināšana ikvienam sabiedrības loceklim neatkarīgi no vecuma, rases, dzimuma, reliģijas, tautības, valodas vai sociālā stāvokļa. Dzīvesvietai vai fiziskiem traucējumiem nevajadzētu būt par šķērsli bibliotēkas pakalpojumu izmantošanā. Lietotājiem, kuri kādu iemeslu dēļ nevar izmantot parastos bibliotēkas pakalpojumus un materiālus, nepieciešams piedāvāt īpašus pakalpojumu un dokumentu veidus.

Tomēr šodien šāds lietotājvides statuss bibliotēkās netiek pašsaprotami nodrošināts. Lai bibliotēkas nezaudētu savu īpašo misiju un nekļūtu tikai par atpūtas telpām, tām jānodrošina bibliotekārās informacionālās telpas un lietotājvides nepārtraukta saskarsme un tās modernizācija uz mūsdienīgotu resursu bāzes. Jāapzinās, ka tradicionālās funkcijas informācijas, izglītības un kultūras un izklaides jomā paplašinās un iegūst jaunu saturu. Latvijas bibliotēkām ir izvirzīti jauni darbības mērķi un uzdevumi. Tie nosaka, ka bibliotēkām jākļūst par daudzfunkcionāliem centriem ar integrētiem bibliotekārajiem procesiem, kas spēj nodrošināt pieeju sakārtotām zināšanām. Lai konkurētu par līdera pozīcijām *informācijas maģistrālē*, ir jābūt atbilstošiem līdzekļiem. Patīkama vide, bibliotekāra dvēseles bagātība un skaista grāmata savu nozīmi nezaudē, bet vieni vairs nespēj atrisināt visus uzdevumus. Pastāv divi galvenie iemesli, kas kavē bibliotēkas pilnā mērā piedalīties informācijas sabiedrības un informacionālās telpas veidošanas procesā:

- sabiedrības un reizēm arī pašu bibliotekāru neizpratne par bibliotēkas jauno nozīmi;
- līdzekļu, piemērotas infrastruktūras un personāla trūkums.[8]

Abi iemesli ir savstarpēji saistīti un vienlīdz svarīgi, jo labs resursu nodrošinājums bez pareizas bibliotēkas misijas izpratnes nesasniegs izvirzītos mērķus. Savukārt, apzinoties bibliotēkas misiju, bez nepieciešamo resursu nodrošinājuma bibliotekārs ir bezspēcīgs un daļa vietējās sabiedrības kļūst informacionāli nabadzīga. Turpretī cita sabiedrības daļa kļūst informacionāli tukla un sabiedrībā veidojas informācijas plaisa, kas kavē tās attīstību. Tikai harmoniski attīstoties un sadarbojoties bibliotēkas darbības un ietekmes sfērām, tiks panākta jauna kvalitatīva pakāpe bibliotēku attīstībā.

BIBLIOTĒKAS RESURSU ATTĪSTĪŠANAS NEPIECIEŠAMĪBA

Bibliotēkas misijas būtība izpaužas nepieciešamībā radīt garīgu, intelektuālu, ekonomisku un sociālu labumu. Publiskās bibliotēkas ir visiem iedzīvotājiem visplašāk pieejamās un visdemokrātiskākās pret katru interesentu. Svarīgs bibliotēkas uzdevums ir ne tikai vākt informāciju, bet arī to sakārtot, lai varētu ievadīt komunikācijās un personībai tā būtu pieejama un izmantojama.

Informācijas sabiedrības veidošanās procesā tradicionālā bibliotēka strauji pārveidojas un to ietekmē šādas sociālās un informacionālās vides attīstības tendences:

- blakus tradicionālajiem informācijas nesējiem svarīgu vietu ieņem elektroniskie resursi – arvien plašāk tiek izmantotas jaunas informācijas tehnoloģijas un datortehnika. Lietojot interneta pieslēgumu, kļūst pieejami lokālie, reģionālie, nacionālie un globālie elektroniskās informācijas resursi;
- orientācija no iespiedmateriāliem uz digitalizētu informāciju;
- tīklveida darbības modelis kā valstu, uzņēmumu un cilvēku sadarbības princips;
- publisko un zinātnisko bibliotēku integrācija informācijas apmaiņā;
- noteicošā ir konkurētspēja finanšu sfērā;
- mainoties informacionālajai videi, rodas jaunas darba formas – lietotājiem tiek piedāvāti pakalpojumi, kas bāzējas uz modernām informācijas tehnoloģijām, – attālinātie lietotāji;
- vide kļūst sociāli pieejama ikvienam;
- orientācija uz lietotāju, segmentējot lietotāju grupas un ievērojot to informacionālās vajadzības;
- nepieciešamība pēc dažādām sadarbības formām, konsorciju veidošana, sabiedrības iesaistīšanās u. c.;
- zinību menedžmenta attīstība pār tehnoloģiju menedžmentu;
- personāla vispārējo kvalitāšu pieaugums atbilstoši informācijas sistēmas prasībām.

Publisko bibliotēku pārkārtošanas pamatā ir pāreja no lasītāju iespējamām interesēm uz reālām un konkrētām visu apkalpes rajona iedzīvotāju kontingenta vajadzībām.

Šobrīd pašvaldību publisko bibliotēku nozīme strauji paplašinās – tās kļūst par svarīgiem vietējās sabiedrības informācijas un komunikācijas centriem. Bibliotēkas palīdz risināt arī sašķeltās sabiedrības konsolidācijas problēmas, jo to darbības mērķis ir nodrošināt informācijas pieejamību visiem valsts iedzīvotājiem neatkarīgi no viņu sociālā stāvokļa, dzīvesvietas, nodarbošanās, vecuma un citām atšķirībām.

Bibliotēkas nepietiekamā resursu attīstība kavē pārorientēties no eksistenciālo problēmu risināšanas uz cilvēku – bibliotēkas lietotāju – un attīstīt jaunus informācijas pakalpojumu veidus. Harmoniska resursu attīstība jāuzskata par bibliotēkas informacionālās vides attīstības bāzi. Resursu kopumu veido:

- aprīkojuma infrastruktūra;
- tehnika;
- tehnoloģijas;
- ēku un telpu infrastruktūra;
- personāls.

Bibliotēkās, kurās attīstās visas resursu grupas, it īpaši jaunie pakalpojumi, kas bāžeti uz jaunajām tehnoloģijām, tehniku un aprīkojuma infrastruktūru, pieaug lietotāju skaits un apmierināto lietotāju skaits. Kā nākamā jārisina ēku un telpu infrastruktūras problēma, citādi tiek ierobežota informācijas pieejamība un līdz ar to bremzēta bibliotēku attīstība. Resursu attīstību var kavēt arī personāla vājā ieinteresētība vai nepietiekams izglītības līmenis. Bez *VISU* resursu grupu sakārtošanas un harmoniskas attīstības netiks atrisināta informācijas pieejamība un nebūs pozitīvas saskarsmes ar lietotājvidi. Publiskās bibliotēkas tikai daļēji darbosies kā sabiedrības informācijas bāze un neveicinās tautsaimniecības attīstību, lietotājvides piesātinātību un pievienotās vērtības radīšanu.

Harmoniski attīstoties un sadarbojoties bibliotēku ietekmes sfērām, iespējams panākt jaunu kvalitatīvu pakāpi bibliotēku attīstībā.

BIBLIOTĒKAS INFORMĀCIJAS VIDES NOTEICOŠIE FAKTORI UN LIETOTĀJU PRIORITĀTES

Bibliotēku informācijas vidi un resursus, kas to veido, ietekmē divi faktori:

- no vienas puses – bibliotēka ar relevantiem un profesionāliem pakalpojumiem iespaido sabiedrību un lietotājvidi;
- no otras puses – sabiedrība atbalsta resursu kvalitāti un izsaka savu viedokli par to un par uzlabojumiem, kas nepieciešami bibliotēkā.

Būtiskākās problēmas bibliotēkas un lietotāju saskarsmē:

- nepietiekams sabiedrības aptvērums;
- nepietiekams skaits datorvietu, ko publiski izmanto lietotāji;
- bibliotēkas nav atvērtas laikā, kad tas lietotājiem būtu visizdevīgāk – darbdienās pēc pulksten 18.00 un svētdienās;
- netiek veidotas mērķtiecīgas sabiedriskās attiecības, kas nostiprinātu bibliotēkas tēlu un radītu bibliotēkas politiku bibliotēkas informacionālās telpas un lietotājvides saskarsmē.

Ceļā uz informācijas sabiedrību publiskajām bibliotēkām pats svarīgākais ir apzināties sabiedrības mērķgrupas – tās, kuras aktīvi spēj atbalstīt un aizstāvēt bibliotēku; tās, kuras ir neitrālas; un tās, kurām bibliotēka ir vienaldzīga. Katrai mērķgrupai nepieciešama atšķirīga bibliotēkas pieeja un cits pasākumu komplekss. Bibliotēkas pēta lietotājvidi, jo strādā pēc tās pieprasījuma un saskaņā ar pieprasījumu plāno pakalpojumu un resursu attīstību. Bibliotēkas arī popularizē savus, jo sabiedrība ne vienmēr izprot, ko bibliotēka tai var dot. Sabiedrība neizprot līdzekļu ieguldījumu bibliotēkas resursos, kā arī to, ka nodokļu maksātāju nauda atgriežas atpakaļ pie cilvēka kā bibliotēkas pakalpojums.

Pirmais mēģinājums apzināt situāciju iedzīvotāju apkalpošanā un informācijas pieejamības nodrošināšanā Latvijas publiskajās bibliotēkās ir pētījums par publisko bibliotēku attīstības jautājumiem Latvijā – Latvijas Universitātes atbalstītais un Bibliotēkzinātnes un informācijas zinātnes nodaļas veiktais pētījums "Publiskā bibliotēka informācijas sabiedrībā" (2003–2004), kura mērķis bija:

1) noskaidrot lasītāju un bibliotekāru domas par publiskās bibliotēkas nozīmi un sniegtajiem informācijas pakalpojumiem;
2) apzināt situāciju dažādu lasītāju grupu bibliotekārajā apkalpošanā Latvijā.

Turpmāk uzrādītajās tabulās fiksētie skaitļi iegūti, pētījuma ietvaros aptaujājot 1600 lietotājus un 445 bibliotekārus Latvijas rajonu publiskajās bibliotēkās.

Viens no pētījuma aptaujas jautājumiem *Kādām lasītāju grupām tiek piedāvāti pakalpojumi bibliotēkā?* atspoguļots 1. tabulā.

1. tabula

Lietotāju grupas bibliotēkā

LIETOTĀJU GRUPAS	BIBLIOTĒKU PIEDĀVĀTIE PAKALPOJUMI, %
Mācību iestāžu audzēkņi (skolēni, studenti)	98,3
Vecāka gadagājuma ļaudis, pensionāri	88,4
Bezdarbnieki	87,1
Pašvaldību deputāti un administratīvais personāls	71,8
Saimniecisko iestāžu (firmu, uzņēmumu u.c.) darbinieki	70,1
Dažādu mazākumtautību iedzīvotāji	71,1
Pirmsskolas vecuma bērni	67,0
Sociālās aprūpes grupas	59,9
Citi	3,7

Kā liecina atbilžu rezultāti, pakalpojumi tiek piedāvāti plašam lietotājvides interesentu lokam. Lielākās grupas ir: mācību iestāžu audzēkņi (98,3%), vecāka gadagājuma ļaudis (88,4%), bezdarbnieki (87,1%). Vairāk nekā puse (59,9%) bibliotēku atbild, ka apkalpo arī sociālās aprūpes grupu iedzīvotājus.

Lietotāju un bibliotekāru viedokļi par bibliotēkas vietu sabiedrībā un mērķiem, kādiem tiek lietoti bibliotēku resursi, apkopoti 2. tabulā.

2. tabula

Bibliotēkas un lasīšanas izmantošanas mērķi

LIETOTĀJI		BIBLIOTEKĀRI
80%	Redzesloka paplašināšana	86%
63%	Atpūta	67%
49%	Mācības	87%
41%	Darbs	57%
29%	Draugu un domubiedru satikšanās vieta	33%
27%	Pētnieciskā darbība	43%

Bibliotekāru un lietotāju viedokļi sakrīt, atšķiras tikai priekšstats par izmantošanu mācību nolūkos un pētnieciskajā darbā – bibliotekāri ir lielāki optimisti šajā jautājumā.

Lietotāju un bibliotekāru viedokļi par to, kas ir bibliotēka, apkopoti 3. tabulā.

3. tabula

Lietotāju un bibliotekāru viedokļi par bibliotēkas misiju

LIETOTĀJI		BIBLIOTEKĀRI
86%	Informācijas ieguves vieta	96%
85%	Satikšanās un domu apmaiņas vieta	51%
77%	Grāmatu apmaiņas vieta	92%
77%	Atpūtas un izklaides vieta	34%
75%	Zināšanu papildināšanas vieta	85%

Būtiski atšķiras lietotāju un bibliotekāru viedokļi par to, vai bibliotēka ir atpūtas un izklaides vieta vai arī satikšanās un domu apmaiņas vieta. Informācijas telpas un lietotājvides saskarsmes attīstīšanai jāveicina šo uzskatu saskaņošana. Turklāt pētījumā noskaidrots arī lietotāju viedoklis par literatūras izvēles motivāciju un bibliotekārās vides pievilcību: 50% lietotāju literatūru izvēlas pēc bibliotekāra ieteikuma, 92% aptaujāto lietotāju bibliotēkā jūtas ļoti labi.

Kopumā Latvijā bibliotēku pakalpojumus izmanto 30% iedzīvotāju.[9] Citās ES valstīs šie rādītāji ir augstāki – vidēji 40–50% iedzīvotāju.

Arī Latvijā pieaug iedzīvotāju motivācija un vajadzības bibliotēku pakalpojumu izmantošanā. Ir pierādīts, ka, krasi uzlabojot bibliotēkas informatīvo, materiāltehnisko un tehnoloģisko bāzi, vismaz divas reizes pieaug bibliotēkas lietotāju skaits. Tas nozīmē, ka, uzlabojot bibliotēku darbību, sabiedrība arvien aktīvāk iesaistīsies bibliotēku pakalpojumu izmantošanā.

Aptaujā pozitīvi vērtē to, ka bibliotēkā ir:

- brīvi pieejami fondi;
- īpaša vieta uzziņu saņemšanai;
- sabiedriskā interneta pieejas telpa;



1. diagramma. **Institūcijas, ko izmanto sevis pilnveidošanā**

- telpas mācībām, studijām, pētniecībai;
- kafejnīca;
- kursu, semināru, konferenču telpa.

Mazāk nozīmīgas respondentiem likās video, izstāžu zāle un novadpētniecības lasītava. Tas ļauj secināt, ka lietotāji no bibliotēkas vēlas saņemt operatīvas, izglītojošas zināšanas. Lietotāji par nozīmīgāko institūciju sevis pilnveidošanā atzinuši bibliotēku (sk. 1. diagrammu).

Ja bibliotēka vēlas izvērst, nostiprināt un saglabāt savu nozīmi sabiedrībā, tai jāmaina savs redzējums. Kā secināts ZA Ekonomikas institūta pētījumā, lasītāji sagaida no bibliotēkas atbalstu operatīvas informācijas saņemšanā, pašmācības un mūžizglītības procesā, turpretī bibliotēkas bieži vēl joprojām par savu galveno uzdevumu uzskata populārās literatūras krājuma nodrošināšanu un uzziņu sniegšanu. Svarīga ir bibliotēkas misijas izpratne, jo plānošanas un pārmaiņu procesā tā palīdz saglabāt mērķtiecību.[10]

BIBLIOTĒKU FUNKCIJU JAUNĀ KVALITĀTE SASKARSMES PROCESĀ

Svarīgs mērķis ceļā uz bibliotēkas eksistences nodrošināšanu ir panākt maksimālu bibliotēkas un tās resursu atpazīstamību, izmantojamību un lietotāju apmierinātību. Šo mērķi var sasniegt, tikai pārzinot lietotājvides vajadzības. Piedāvājumam ir jāatbilst klientu prasībām. Bibliotekāriem uz visiem laikiem jāatsakās no iedomas, ka viņi instinktīvi nojauš apmeklētāju vajadzības. Lietotāju vēlmes un intereses var noskaidrot tikai ar objektīvu datu palīdzību un labu tirgzinību. Lietotāju apmierinātība un bibliotēku rīcībā esošo resursu izmantošanas optimizācija nodrošina, lai bibliotēkas pakalpojumi kļūtu neaizstājami iespējami lielai vietējai sabiedrībai.[11]

Piemēram, Vācijas Bibliotēku savienību federālās apvienības uzdevumu aprakstā lielpilsētu bibliotēku sistēmas centrālajām bibliotēkām norādīts, ka bibliotēka ir gan informācijas un komunikācijas centrs, gan mācību, spēļu un satikšanās vieta, gan tirgus laukums visplašākajā nozīmē. Tā izdibina ikreizējās informācijas vajadzības un ar atbilstošiem pakalpojumiem vēršas pie mērķu grupām.[12]

Publiskajai bibliotēkai integrācijai informācijas sabiedrībā tiek izvirzītas šādas galvenās funkcijas:

- bibliotēka – kultūras centrs;
- bibliotēka – izglītības un tālākizglītības (mūžizglītības) centrs;
- bibliotēka – galvenais vietējās sabiedrības informācijas centrs;
- bibliotēka – sociālais centrs.

Kopējie procesi publisko bibliotēku attīstībā virzās uz daudzfunkcionālu centru veidošanu bibliotēkās. Pārmaiņas paredz plašu bibliotēku funkciju attīstību un daudzveidošanos.[13]

Kultūras funkcijas attīstība paredz:

- bibliotēkas lietotāju pieeju nacionālajam un pasaules kultūras mantojumam (digitalizētiem un nacionāliem krājumiem);
- iespiesto un multimediālo izdevumu saņemšanu;
- elektronisko dokumentu piegādi;
- atbalstu vietējās sabiedrības radošās darbības izpausmēm – elektroniskās publikācijas, vietējās elektroniskās konferences vai diskusijas par kultūras jautājumiem utt.;
- elektronisko informāciju par vietējiem kultūras notikumiem un pasākumiem;
- speciālus pasākumus bērniem, pensionāriem, valodas un kultūras minoritāšu grupām;
- speciālus interešu pasākumus kultūras interešu grupām: iespējas izmantot bibliotēkas multimediālos tehniskos līdzekļus savu radošo ieceru īstenošanā un izplatīšanā;
- lekcijas, diskusiju grupas, tālākizglītības pasākumus kultūras jautājumos, izmantojot pieeju elektroniskās informācijas avotiem;
- izstādes (tradicionālās un interaktīvās) un ar tām saistītās darbības.

Izglītības un tālākizglītības funkcijas attīstība paredz:

- informacionālu atbalstu formālai (vispārējā, profesionālā, augstākā) un neformālajai (tālākizglītība, mūžizglītība) izglītībai – vispārēju informācijas nodrošināšanu un specializētas, klientorientētas informācijas nodrošināšanu; interaktīvās izglītības un tālmācības iespēju attīstību;
- visu vecumgrupu bibliotēkas lietotāju izglītošanu informācijas patstāvīgā meklēšanā, izmantojot tradicionālos un elektroniskos informācijas resursus (lietotāju apmācības programmas);
- informācijas tehnoloģiju izmantošanas pamatzināšanu apguves iespējas visiem iedzīvotājiem, lai mazinātu atšķirības starp "informacionāli bagātajiem un informacionāli nabadzīgajiem" (datortehnikas, datorprogrammu, informācijas tīkla un interneta izmantošanas pamatiemaņu apguve) un pārvarētu analfabētismu IT jomā.

Informācijas centra pamatpakalpojumu un specializēto pakalpojumu attīstība paredz:

- informācijas pakalpojumi vietējā biznesa (īpaši – mazā un vidējā biznesa) atbalstam un veicināšanai (bibliotēka kā biznesa projektu un ekonomiskās attīstības projektu izstrādes informacionālais nodrošinātājs);
- vienota informācijas tīkla izveidi ar citām novada "vēsturiskās atmiņas", kultūrvides un tūrisma industrijas institūcijām – muzejiem, arhīviem, tūrisma aģentūrām; nacionāli un reģionāli nozīmīgu kultūras mantojuma krājumu digitalizāciju;
- bibliotēku (kā pašvaldības informācijas centra) vietējo elektroniskās informācijas avotu satīklošanu un saišu veidošanu ar citām pašvaldības iestādēm, uzņēmumiem un organizācijām, lai iedzīvotājiem sniegtu publiski pieejamās informācijas pakalpojumus un atbalstītu vietējās pašvaldības darbību;
- pieejas nodrošināšanu valsts pārvaldes institūciju publiski pieejamai elektroniskai informācijai;
- līdzdalību sociālo problēmu risināšanā, lai nodrošinātu ar informāciju maznodrošinātos, pensionārus, bezdarbniekus.

Bibliotēku informacionālās telpas attīstības virziens ir integrēto sistēmu veidošana ar citām kultūras un informācijas institūcijām daudzveidīgai lietotājvides apkalpošanai.

Apkalpošana – mūsdienu bibliotēkas prioritāra funkcija

Lasītāju bibliotekārā apkalpošana mūsdienās tiek traktēta kā dialogs, kurā galvenā nozīme ir lasītājiem, viņu interesēm un pieprasījumiem. Mūsdienu apstākļos, kad mainās bibliotēkas vieta sabiedrībā, apkalpošanas funkcija kļūst par vadošo un nosaka visu pārējo bibliotēkas funkciju būtību. Pārmaiņas saistītas ar bibliotēkas kā sociāla institūta būtības maiņu – mainās bibliotēkas un sabiedrības savstarpējās attiecības, tās sociālā misija. Pirmām kārtām tas ietekmē lasītāju apkalpošanu.

Bibliotēkas kā sociāla institūta darbību vienmēr nosaka sabiedriskā iekārta. Padomju totalitārajā režīmā bibliotekārās apkalpošanas galvenais uzdevums bija lasīšanas vadība. Tika radītas tipiskas bibliotēkas tipiskiem lasītājiem. Šādos apstākļos prioritāras bija tās bibliotēkas funkcijas, kas saistītas ar to resursu veidošanu atbilstoši valdošās ideoloģijas nostādnēm.

Demokrātiskā sabiedrībā bibliotēkas ideoloģiskā funkcija ir zudusi. Pašos pamatos mainās attiecības starp resursu veidošanas un apkalpošanas funkciju. Jaunajos apstākļos resursi pakļaujas lietotāju interesēm un vajadzībām. Prioritāra kļūst apkalpošanas funkcija. Tāda attiecība starp bibliotēkas funkcijām veido mārketinga kā bibliotekārās apkalpošanas filozofiskā pamata būtību.

Nepieciešamība pēc bibliotekārās apkalpošanas ir atkarīga no vairākiem faktoriem: no sabiedrības intelektuālās attīstības līmeņa, t. i., no nepieciešamības pēc informācijas un tās ieguves iespējām; no masu informācijas līdzekļu, pirmām kārtām, video un televīzijas, iedarbības rakstura. Šodien šie faktori neliecina par labu bibliotēkai. Tajā pašā laikā ir daudz faktoru, kas piesaista cilvēkus bibliotēkai:

1) dārgā parakstīšanās uz periodiku;
2) jauno grāmatu dārdzība;
3) nepieciešamība pēc informācijas tādās jaunās sfērās kā bizness u. c.

Galvenie iemesli, kāpēc bibliotēkas ir sabiedriski pieprasītas:

1) līdz ar jauno vēsturisko situāciju nepieciešama jauna informācija, zināšanas par valsts attīstību pagātnē un tagad;
2) nopietnas izmaiņas mācību procesā skolās un augstskolās;
3) krīze grāmatu izdošanas un izplatīšanas jomā;
4) nepieciešama profesionālās kvalifikācijas paaugstināšana pieaugošā bezdarba apstākļos;
5) iespieddarbu cenas aug ātrāk nekā iedzīvotāju vidējie ienākumi. Tāpēc bibliotēkas vairāk sāk apmeklēt maznodrošinātie, īpaši skolēni un studenti;
6) bibliotēkas ir palikušas gandrīz vienīgās bezmaksas iestādes, kur iespējams iegūt kultūras vērtības, papildu izglītību;
7) psiholoģiskais komforts – bibliotēkā vienmēr ir tīrs, silti, mājīgi.

Efektīvas bibliotekārās apkalpošanas galvenais nosacījums mainīgajā pasaulē – sekošana līdzi pārmaiņām un operatīva reaģēšana uz tām. Tādējādi saistība starp bibliotēku un lietotājiem iegūst jaunu kvalitāti – elastīgumu. Attiecības starp bibliotēku un lietotājiem nosaka divi subjektīvi nosacījumi:

1) bibliotēkas iespējas lietotāju vajadzību apmierināšanā;
2) paša lietotāja iespējas izmantot bibliotēkas pakalpojumus.

Mūsdienās kā apkalpošanas kritēriju izmanto bibliotēkas lietotājdraudzīgumu visos cilvēka un bibliotēkas mijiedarbības aspektos, sākot ar bibliotēkas atrašanās vietas un transporta nodrošinājumu un beidzot ar sniegto pakalpojumu atbilstību pieprasījuma mērķim. Līdz ar to tika ieviests jēdziens "bibliotekārā pakalpojuma sociālā vērtība". Tā ieviešanai ir trīs cēloņi:

1) bibliotēkas vērsās pie lietotāja kā galvenā un svarīgākā bibliotēku pakalpojumu vērtētāja;
2) bibliotēku uzmanības lokā iekļūst potenciālais lietotājs, kas vērtē bibliotēkas darbības atbilstību apkalpojamo iedzīvotāju vajadzībām. Iedzīvotāju domas tiek noskaidrotas aptauju rezultātā;
3) novērojumi par bibliotekārā pakalpojuma sociālo vērtību lika pārvērtēt bibliotēkas lietotāju sastāva analīzes principus. Ja agrāk tā balstījās uz formālām pazīmēm – vecumu, izglītību, profesiju utt., kas neatspoguļo personības individuālās īpatnības, tad tagad citu valstu bibliotēkās arvien biežāk tiek ņemti vērā tādi kritēriji kā bibliotēkas darba grafiks, apmeklējuma ilgums, darbs ar dokumentiem (vai tos ātri pārskata vai dziļi pēta), apmeklējuma mērķis (lai mācītos, strādātu, atpūstos) utt. Tas ļauj precīzāk uzskaitīt tos faktorus, kas nodrošina lietotāju ērtības – bibliotēkas personāla darba grafika izmaiņas, telpu pārkārtošana, laika izvēle dažādu pasākumu organizēšanai.

Kopumā sociālās vērtības kritēriju var uzskatīt par kvalitatīvi jaunu pieeju bibliotekārajai apkalpošanai.

Bibliotēkai ieņemot vienu no vadošajām vietām sabiedrības nodrošināšanā ar zināšanām, par galveno kļūst apkalpošanas funkcija. Tā nosaka un maina pārējo bibliotēkas struktūrvienību darbu, veido bibliotēkas tēlu sabiedrībā un, galu galā, pārskata bibliotēkas vietu sabiedrībā un bibliotēkas sociālās iedarbības sfēru.

Informacionālā apkalpošana šobrīd tiek uzskatīta kā visu bibliotēkas piedāvāto pakalpojumu kopums – sākot dokumentu izsniegšanu un beidzot ar bibliotēkas personāla attieksmi pret klientiem.

Svarīgākais šeit ir cenšanās, lai pakalpojumi būtu precīzi, notiktu laikus un būtu kvalificēti. Prasmīga kvalitātes vadība uzlabo apkalpošanas kvalitāti, un lasītājs ir apmierināts ar piedāvāto informāciju un lietpratīgi izmanto bibliotēkas resursus.[14]

Jebkuru bibliotēku var aplūkot divējādi:

1) no materiālās puses,
2) no nemateriālās puses.

Materiālā puse ir bibliotēkas resursi: ēka, mēbeles, apkure, apgaismojums utt., kas atkarīgi no bibliotēkas finansiālā stāvokļa, administrācijas ieinteresētības nodrošināt lasītājiem labvēlīgus apstākļus darbam ar grāmatu un pienācīgas ērtības.

Nemateriālā puse ir bibliotēkas atmosfēra jeb bibliotēkas psiholoģiskais klimats, kas lasītājam var būt gan draudzīgs, gan nedraudzīgs un ko veido bibliotēkas personāla darba kvalitāte un attiecības bibliotekārs–lasītājs.[15]

Grūti noteikt, kura no šīm pusēm ir nozīmīgāka, bet katra no tām veido sabiedrībā priekšstatu par bibliotēku, ietekmē bibliotēkas lasītāju skaitu un apmeklējumu biežumu.

Tieši bibliotekārās apkalpošanas sfērā (pirmkārt jau bibliotekāra un lasītāja saskarsmē) ir potenciālas iespējas, lai mainītu sabiedrībā valdošo, bieži vien negatīvo attieksmi par bibliotēku un paaugstinātu tās sociālo statusu.

Mūsdienu bibliotēkai jābūt lasītājorientētai, jo ikvienas bibliotēkas būtība bija, ir un būs lietotāju pieprasījumu apmierināšana (tradicionālā vai virtuālā bibliotēkā, ar tradicionāliem paņēmieniem vai izmantojot jaunās informācijas tehnoloģijas).

Katra bibliotēka pilda četras funkcijas: vāc, apstrādā, glabā un piedāvā dokumentus un informāciju. Jaunajā tūkstošgadē tieši apkalpošana, iedzīvotāju nodrošināšana ar informāciju kļūst par galveno bibliotēkas funkciju.

Apkalpošana veido priekšstatu par bibliotēku, tās vietu un nozīmi sabiedrībā. Augsta apkalpošanas kvalitāte rada pozitīvu bibliotēkas tēlu un piesaista jaunus lasītājus. Citiem vārdiem sakot, laba, pieprasīta mūsdienīga bibliotēka – tā ir bibliotēka lasītājam, bibliotēka, kas prot un vēlas kvalitatīvi un profesionāli apkalpot.

Tādējādi lasītāju apkalpošanas darbs aplūkojams ciešā saistībā ar sabiedriskajām attiecībām bibliotēkā. Sabiedriskās attiecības ir viens no veidiem, kā sabiedrība pielāgojas pārmaiņām, saskaņo atšķirīgus un konfliktējošus viedokļus, vērtības, idejas, institūcijas un indivīdus. Sabiedriskās attiecības ne tikai rada priekšstatu par institūciju, bet arī palīdz tai iegūt ārējo veidolu. Bibliotēku sabiedriskās attiecības ir prasme gūt nepieciešamo, bibliotēkai svarīgo cilvēku – apmeklētāju, darbinieku, finansējošo institūciju darbinieku – atbalstu.

Līdz ar jauno informācijas tehnoloģiju ienākšanu bibliotēku dzīvē mainās bibliotēkas darbības tradicionālais modelis. Šodien par modernu tiek uzskatīta tāda bibliotēka, kurā ne tikai izmanto informācijas un komunikāciju tehnoloģijas, bet arī pārdomā un reformē savu stratēģiju, struktūru, prioritātes, mērķus un to īstenošanas veidus.

Bibliotēkām ir nepieciešamas sabiedriskās attiecības, lai varētu:

1) komunicēt ar visiem bibliotēkai svarīgiem adresātiem un to grupām;

2) radīt un izplatīt pozitīvu un atbilstošu priekšstatu par bibliotēku;
3) informēt par bibliotēkas resursiem, programmām, pakalpojumiem;
4) nodrošināt nepieciešamo finansējumu un gūt papildu finansējumu;
5) veidot bibliotēkas un profesijas profilu, identitāti un prestižu.[16]

Jauno informācijas tehnoloģiju ieviestās izmaiņas bibliotekārajā apkalpošanā

Līdz ar mūsdienīgu informācijas tehnoloģiju ieviešanu mainās priekšstats par bibliotēku, bibliotekāru, lasītāju, fondu (krājumu) un bibliotekārajiem procesiem.

Kopš seniem laikiem bibliotēka pilda cilvēces sociālās atmiņas funkciju: vāc, glabā un izsniedz nepieciešamo informāciju. Kā sakārtot informāciju, lai tā būtu viegli atrodama; kā atbilstoši lietotāja vajadzībām atlasīt informāciju maksimāli īsā laikā; kā nodot to lietotājam. Jaunās informācijas tehnoloģijas ļauj daudz veiksmīgāk risināt informācijas glabāšanas un apkalpošanas problēmas un veicina bibliotēku darbības diapazona paplašināšanos, telpas un laika barjeru pārvarēšanu. Tādējādi bibliotēku krājumos ietvertā informācija kļūst pieejamāka.

Līdz ar to radās iespēja veidot vienotu informācijas telpu, vienotu pasaules bibliotēku bibliotēku bez robežām. Var runāt par bibliotēku kā par Visumu, kas paplašinās – ikvienai bibliotēkai ir nodrošināta pieeja daudzlīmeņu kārtotam fondam; informācijas apjoms palielinās, jo informāciju iegūst no arhīviem, muzejiem, informācijas centriem, pateicoties to savstarpējiem sakariem; lietotāju pieprasījumu plūsma pieaug no dažādām pasaules malām. Kādas ir šīs paplašināšanās robežas – jautājums, uz kuru šodien diezin vai var atbildēt viennozīmīgi.

Pastāvīgi pieaugošā informācijas masīva glabāšanas un piedāvāšanas problēmas risinājumi:
1) ierakstu sablīvēšana uz jauniem informācijas nesējiem;
2) bibliotēku un citu informācijas iestāžu tālākā diferenciācija un specializācija pēc dažādām pazīmēm: pēc informācijas aktualitātes, dokumentu un informācijas veidiem;
3) informācijas sistematizācijas pilnveidotu paņēmienu izstrāde;
4) padziļināta dokumentu analīze.

Neierobežotā pieeja attālināto bibliotēku resursiem maina priekšstatu arī par bibliotēkas lietotājiem. Bez lasītājiem, kas fiziski atrodas bibliotēkas apkalpošanas sfērā, ir arī lasītāji, kuri bibliotēkā nokļūst caur lokālajiem tīkliem vai internetu. Tie ir cilvēki, kurus bibliotekārs varbūt nekad personīgi neiepazīs. Rodas jautājums – vai ietvert virtuālos lietotājus un viņa intereses bibliotēkas darba plānā un uzskatīt viņus par pilntiesīgiem lasītājiem.

Mūsdienīgu tehnoloģiju lietošanas apstākļos šī bloka procesi īstenojas bez bibliotekāra līdzdalības, izmantojot programmnodrošinājumu un paša lietotāja darbības dēļ. Tikai literatūras popularizēšanas pasākumu organizēšanas tehnoloģija paliek tradicionālā. Bibliotekāra uzmanība ir pievērsa pirmajam un trešajam blokam. Līdz ar to bibliotekāra uzdevums ir:
1) noskaidrot lietotāju informacionālās vajadzības un to apmierināšanas iespējas;
2) ņemot vērā lietotāju vajadzības, piedāvāt un ieviest jaunus pakalpojumu veidus;

3) gan attālinātajiem lietotājiem, gan arī tiem, kas ierodas bibliotēkā, veidot komfortablu bibliotekāro vidi, radīt pieeju pasaules informācijas resursiem un nodrošināt ērtu to izmantošanu.

Mainās arī bibliotēkas abonementa jēga (abonements paredz grāmatu izsniegšanu uz mājām). Līdz ar jauno informācijas tehnoloģiju izmantošanu lietotājam nav obligāti jādodas uz bibliotēku, lai atrastu sev nepieciešamo. Konsultatīvā un bibliogrāfiskā apkalpošana, informācija par aktuālo tēmu vai problēmu – tas viss kļūst pieejams bez tieša bibliotēkas apmeklējuma. Lietotājam ir pieejami pasaules informācijas resursi, nevis vienas bibliotēkas vai bibliotēku tīkla resursi. Tādējādi līdz ar jaunās tehnoloģijas un informācijas nesēju ieviešanu apkalpošana kā bibliotekārās darbības joma neizzudīs, bet kļūs virtuāla, un informācijas tehnoloģiju izmantošana ir līdzeklis, kā uzlabot apkalpošanas darba kvalitāti. Ņemot vērā iepriekš teikto, jāsecina, ka pastāv būtiskas atšķirības starp apkalpošanu, kas balstās uz informācijas tehnoloģiju izmantošanu, un tradicionālo apkalpošanu. Lietotājam kļuvuši pieejami pasaules informācijas resursi un to saturs, ne vairs vienas bibliotēkas vai atsevušķa bibliotēku tīkla resursi. Tradicionālā apkalpošana lietotāju virza vispirms uz dokumentu konstatēšanu, bet jaunā – uz plašu informācijas un tekstu satura un būtības izmantošanu, uz globalizāciju.

LIETOTĀJVIDE – PARTNERIS BIBLIOTĒKAS INFORMACIONĀLĀS TELPAS UN RESURSU ATTĪSTĪBĀ

Dažādu tipu bibliotēku un citu institūciju sadarbība un kooperācija neapšaubāmi būs nākotnes publiskās bibliotēkas modelis. Lai arī bibliotēka piedāvā sabiedrībaisavus pakalpojumus, tomēr pati sabiedrība bibliotēkas darbībā, problēmu risināšanā un attīstības veicināšanā tiek iesaistīta maz.[17] Kā redzams 2. diagrammā, iestrādes vietējo iniciatīvas grupu veidošanā ir tikai 36% rajonu galveno bibliotēku.



2. diagramma. **Sabiedrības iniciatīvas grupu darbība rajonu galvenajās bibliotēkās**

Jāatzīmē, ka no šiem 36% vairumā bibliotēku darbojas tādas iniciatīvas grupas kā Diskusiju klubs (Balvi), Lasītāju klubs (Aizkraukle, Ogre, Kuldīga u. c.), Jauno autoru apvienība (Jēkabpils). Sabiedriskā bibliotēku padome, kas ietekmē bibliotēkas darbību, pagaidām ir izveidota Limbažos, bet tuvākajā nākotnē to iecerēts izveidot Rīgas CB, Ventspils CZB un Dobelē.

Ventspils CZB attīstības koncepcijā[18] Sabiedriskās padomes sastāvā paredzēts apvienot pārstāvjus no Ventspils pašvaldības, augstskolas, skolu tīkla, uzņēmēju aprindām, nacionālo minoritāšu grupām. Sabiedriskās padomes uzdevumi:

- palīdzēt bibliotēkai pareizi izvērtēt savus pakalpojumus, to atbilstību visu iedzīvotāju grupu vajadzībām;
- vairot pilsētas sabiedrības acīs bibliotēkas darba nozīmīgumu un sabiedrības uzticēšanos bibliotēkas darbībai un izdevumu pamatotībai;
- pārliecināt pašvaldību, tās dienestus par bibliotēkai objektīvi nepieciešamo finanšu un citu resursu piešķiršanu.

Sabiedrības iniciatīvas grupas ir partneris nacionālo programmu un projektu īstenošanā. Ar savu darbību tās veicina sabiedrības aktivitāti, informētību, izglītotību, mudina aktīvi darboties, kad jāpieņem lēmumi par tālāku bibliotēkas attīstību.

Sabiedriskās padomes var būt formālas un neformālas. Par formālām uzskata tādas, kuru veidošana un darbība pamatojas uz vietējās varas lēmumiem. Tādai padomei ir oficiāls statuss. Neformālās sabiedriskās padomes ir atvērtākas, tajās var iesaistīties katrs, kam ir interese un vēlēšanās.

Sabiedrības iesaistīšanas prakses pieredzi var apgūt Dānijas publiskajās bibliotēkās, kurām šāda pieredze ir jau no 1983. gada. Dānijā lietotāju sadarbība un ietekme uz bibliotēkām nav ar likumu noteikta, tā ir brīvprātīga un parasti netiek organizēta " no augšas".[19]

1993. gadā Dānijas Bibliotekāru biedrība veica aptauju, lai noskaidrotu, vai notiek sadarbība ar lietotājiem un cik plaša tā ir. No 212 aptaujātajām publiskajām bibliotēkām sabiedriskās padomes bija 35 (27 municipalitātēs). Dažās bibliotēkās tās radušās kā publiska kustība, kuras cēloņi meklējami apstākļos, kad bibliotēkas pastāvēšana kaut kādā veidā tikusi apdraudēta, samazinot budžetu, slēdzot bibliotēkas nodaļas u. c. Vēlāk šī kustība spontāni izauga kā atbalsts bibliotēkai, dibinot "bibliotēkas draugu grupu". Citur bibliotēka pati bijusi procesa uzsācēja vai pat vietējā pašvaldība bijusi tā dzinējspēks.

Vairumam bibliotēku padomju ir statūti, kuri apstiprināti vietējās pašvaldībās. Tajos noteikts padomes statuss, gadījumi, kuros padomei ir tiesības paust oficiālu viedokli, kā arī tās atbildību un pienākumus. Pārsvarā bibliotēku padomes ir padomdevējas un dažādu novitāšu ierosinātājas.

No daudzu bibliotēku padomju statūtiem ir redzams, ka to mērķis ir palīdzēt bibliotēkai īstenot vietējās sabiedrības vēlmes un vajadzības bibliotēku jomā. Šai ziņā padomes strādā kā saite starp bibliotēku un sabiedrību, bibliotēku un pašvaldību. Pāris gadījumos redzams, ka padome nepiekrīt budžeta samazinājumam bibliotēkām. Tikai dažreiz bibliotēku padomēm ir reāli pienākumi, kā, piemēram, tiesības iesniegt pašvaldībai ieteikumus par bibliotēkas budžetu vai nepieciešamo darbinieku skaitu. Dažos gadījumos bibliotēkas direktoram ir jāsniedz padomei atskaite par darbu.

Padomes ietekme uz bibliotēkas budžetu katrā vietā ir citāda. Var būt, ka bibliotēkas direktors kopā ar padomi administrē to summu, kura tiek iedalīta no pašvaldības, un padome ir tā, kas nosaka, pēc kādiem pamatprincipiem summa jātērē. Citviet padomēm ir tikai tiesības rekomendēt, kā būtu jāsadala budžeta līdzekļi. Turklāt tās nodarbojas ar naudas meklēšanu pie dažādiem sponsoriem, fondiem utt. Tās izlemj arī par maksas pakalpojumu lietderību. Daudzas bibliotēku padomes nosaka, kāda žanra grāmatas un kuru autoru darbi bibliotēkai jāiegādājas. Tās spriež par bibliotēkas darba laiku, par maksas pakalpojumu izcenojumiem.

Dažās bibliotēku padomēs ir ļoti stingri noteikts, pēc kādiem principiem tiek ievēlēts tās sastāvs. Tas nozīmē, ka tajā noteikti jābūt pārstāvim no pensionāru vidus, no izglītības sfēras, sporta organizācijas utt.

Cilvēki, kas aizstāv šo sistēmu, uzsver, ka šajā gadījumā ikvienam individuālam bibliotēkas padomes loceklim ir sava "aizmugure" – ļaužu grupa, kuru viņi pārstāv, un tas dod viņam stimulu strādāt. Šāds cilvēks pārstāv noteiktu elektorātu. Šīs striktās sistēmas oponenti brīdina par briesmām – bibliotēkas padomē tiks ievēlēti cilvēki, kam būs savas slēptas intereses, kuras dziļākajā būtībā nemaz nesaistīsies ar bibliotēkas vai tās darbinieku labklājību.

Citās vietās cilvēki vienkārši tiek lūgti iesaistīties bibliotēkas padomē, un tie, kuri piekrīt, arī darbojas.

Ir vēl daži faktori, kas atšķir strikti formālu pieeju un atvērtu pieeju bibliotēkas padomēm:

- noteikumi attiecībā uz cilvēku skaitu un sastāvu padomēs. Dažās ir noteikts, ka jaunākajam dalībniekam noteikti jābūt 14–16 gadus vecam;
- vienā no bibliotēkām ir neformāla padome – tajā sanāk tie, kuri vienkārši to vēlas. Taču, ja kāds nav apmeklējis trīs bibliotēkas padomes sēdes pēc kārtas, viņš automātiski tiek no padomes izslēgts.

Vairumā gadījumu padomes darbības laiks ir četri gadi. Tas sasaucas ar municipalitātes ievēlēto cilvēku darbības laiku, bet citviet padomes strādā divus gadus, tad tās tiek pārvēlētas. Sanāksmes padomēs notiek četras reizes gadā, nepieciešamības gadījumā arī biežāk.

Bibliotēku padomes ierosina un organizē dažādus pasākumus. Piemēram, pēc to ierosmes Kopenhāgenā notika Klusā okeāna nedēļa ar teātra izrādēm, koncertiem un lekcijām, un šai pasākumā uzaicināja viesus no Klusā okeāna saliņām. Citur bibliotēku padomes regulāri aicina ciemos rakstniekus un dzejniekus; rīko grāmatu izpārdošanas, iegūstot finanses citiem mērķiem, kas saistīti ar bibliotēku; palīdz remontēt telpas; piedalās talkās utt.

Bibliotēkās padomes netiek dibinātas dažādu iemeslu dēļ:

- par to nav padomāts, nav laika un enerģijas;
- bibliotēka ir maza, ar apmeklētājiem ir cieši un ilgstoši kontakti, viņu vēlmes un vajadzības zināmas un izanalizētas;
- bibliotēku vadītāji uzskata, ka padomes darbība var aizēnot politiķu ieguldījumu un interesi bibliotēkas attīstībā;
- bibliotēku apmeklē ļaudis, kuri nedzīvo konkrētās pašvaldības teritorijā.

Sabiedrības iesaistīšanai ir arī alternatīvi ceļi:

- regulāri tikšanās vakari, kuru pirmajā daļā tiek lasītas dažādas lekcijas, pēc tam ir iespējas uzdot jautājumus un diskutēt;
- domes Kultūras komitejas vadītājam ir oficiālas pieņemšanas stundas bibliotēkā, kur lietotāji var izteikt ierosinājumus. Par šādu iespēju tiek izziņots vietējā presē un televīzijā;
- regulāra lasītāju anketēšana – gan par specifiskām problēmām, gan vispārējiem jautājumiem.

Dānijas Bibliotekāru biedrība ir reģistrējusi lielu skaitu iesniegumu no bibliotēku padomēm. To pārstāvji arī apmeklē ikgadējās Bibliotekāru biedrības konferences un piedalās reģionālo nodaļu darbā. Tiek organizētas speciālas konferences, kas pulcē daudzas bibliotēku padomes.

Pieredze dažādu formu izmantošanā, iesaistot sabiedrību bibliotēkas atbalsta pasākumos, ir uzkrāta arī Latvijā, Limbažu Galvenajā bibliotēkā.[20] Limbažu pilsētas Bibliotēku sabiedriskā atbalsta padome izveidojās 2002. gada janvārī krīzes situācijā, kad budžeta saspringtās situācijas dēļ pilsētas dome bibliotēkām gatavojās iedalīt finansējumu tikai darbinieku algām un telefona sakariem. Limbažu Galvenā un Bērnu bibliotēka aicināja uz kopīgu tikšanos ilggadējus bibliotēkas lietotājus, deputātus, pašvaldību darbiniekus, vietējā sabiedrībā atzītus kultūras cilvēkus, vietējo presi un televīziju. Būtisku atbalstu sniedza Latvijas Nacionālā bibliotēka, publiski uzsverot bibliotēkas svarīgo nozīmi sabiedrības pārmaiņas procesos un Limbažu bibliotēku vietu bibliotēku profesionālā attīstībā Latvijā.

Katram tikšanās dalībniekam bija sagatavota uzskatāma tabula par nepieciešamajiem bibliotēkas resursiem, to finansējuma apjomu. Ikviens varēja pārliecināties, ka, trūkstot kādai finansējuma daļai, bibliotēkas nespēs nodrošināt konkrēto pakalpojumu.

Līdz ar to tika izveidota Bibliotēku sabiedriskā atbalsta padome, kurā savu vēlmi darboties izteica paši iedzīvotāji. Padome strādā astoņu cilvēku sastāvā, un to vada priekšsēdētājs.

Nākamo pasākumu – Limbažu novada uzņēmēju atbalstu bibliotēkai un tikšanos organizēja padomes locekļi. Limbažos tika izsludināta akcija "Dāvini bibliotēkai grāmatu". Akcijā iesaistījās grāmatnīca, kas izveidoja atsevišķu jauno grāmatu kopu, kura nepieciešama bibliotēkām, un dāvinātājs tās varēja nopirkt ar 10% atlaidi. Pasākumu veiksmīgu norisi garantēja arī preses un televīzijas līdzdalība. Diemžēl tā ne vienmēr ir korekta. Piemēram, Valmieras televīzija Novadu ziņām Latvijas televīzijas 1. programmā bija sagatavojusi tendenciozu sižetu, kas neatbilda patiesībai.

Aktivitāšu dēļ konkrētais mērķis – panākt bibliotēkas minimālu pakalpojumu finansiālo nodrošinājumu – tika sasniegts un bibliotēka bija vienīgā Limbažu pašvaldības iestāde, ko neskāra darbinieku algu samazinājums.

Latvijas bibliotēkām jāizvirza uzdevums veidot mērķtiecīgas un organizētas saites ar vietējo sabiedrību, iesaistot bibliotēkas informacionālās vides izmantošanā un pilnveidošanā gan esošo, gan potenciālo lietotājvidi.

Summary

The precondition of creating knowledge-based society and providing knowledge circulation in contemporary society is the positive communication between library and users environments. The result of information use – development of all spheres of life, transformation of the acquired knowledge in additional value, therefore the library should serve as the knowledge base of society.

The possibility to integrate in modern information society mainly is pre-conditioned by library resources development and implementation of users-orientated strategy. In situation when library has no resources, it is impossible for it to provide services corresponding to society demands. It in turn jeopardizes library existence in market economy conditions - without society demand local communities are not interested to maintain, to support library

premises and to pay salaries to personnel – it is not financially viable. For development of resources we must realize that development of resources are secured not only in financially, but in the intensive recycling mode too.

Library stable existence and steady development needs not only computers, softwares and high quality collection, they must be dislocated in comfortable premises, easy for access. Still it will be too few, if there will be non-professional librarians in library and users environment will be negative and without information about possibilities, given by libraries in scope of knowledge acquirement.

Authors main conclusions are, that all above mentioned are influenced the whole line of processes, which in turn are influenced by state political, professional, educational and financial possibilities: the existence, development and communication of library informational environment with society and users environment. The essential factor of influence, by author s point of view, is the users environment, therefore in paper are analysed separate features of this environment and discussed communication between this environment, library and its informational space.

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Latvian Media Identity and Diversity

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1. State and Media Paradigm

The peculiarity of the Latvian media market is that it has been divided into two target audiences: Latvian-speaking and Russian-speaking audiences. This historical situation, which is mostly seen as a result of the Soviet occupation, assigns the State of Latvia to a unique place in the context of the old and the new member countries of the European Union.

In Latvia the proportion between the basic nation and minorities is 60% to 40 %[1]. Being aware of the perilous trends in the demographic development (the average decrease being minus 10 000 annually)[2] makes us realise that the number of the perspective Latvian and non-Latvian media consumers, including children and vision-impaired and hearing-impaired people, **roughly speaking** , is one million Latvian and one million Russian consumers.

This unique situation has been the basis for several laws in Latvia that are especially protective in reference to the use of Latvian in the public sphere. There is a very simple, but exceedingly harsh formula in Latvia: the language identity is the national identity, and the national identity is the State identity. In other words, a State of Latvia where most people speak Russian is a totally surreal vision. However, very many foreign as well as local public figures see it as a quite acceptable development.

And a very huge role in the preservation or destruction of the above formula ”language – nation - state” is played by the media and the problem of media ownership concentration.

Another very important aspect is that Latvia, upon entering the EU, occupies the last place among the 10 new member states with the lowest GDP per capita – 40%.[3] It means that the purchasing power of Latvia’s media consumers is extremely low. It also means that the media consumers are in a very peculiar situation when they must choose the cheapest medium or the media that are for free, which, from the point of view of media contents, means wide possibilities to manipulate the audience and to aim to satisfy the lowest tastes. From the point of view of media concentration, it opens almost unlimited opportunities for the subsidized and various artificially sustained information channels.

Advertising plays a very significant role to maintain the independent status of media, to practise democracy and freedom of expression. During the last three to five years after Russia's last crisis, which had a very serious influence on Latvia's economic situation on the whole as well as the media financial situation in particular, a very rapid development in the advertising market has taken place, reaching 100 million euros last year, with the relative growth of 20% in comparison with each preceding year.[4] This, in fact, is the first pleasant news that I can communicate concerning the media situation in Latvia.

The growth of the advertising market is a direct reflection of the economic growth in Latvia, which is a surprisingly good phenomenon both in the European as well as the world context. The GDP growth in the country in these last years has reached 7-10%[5] in comparison with each preceding year. This is why, in spite of a number of unfavourable factors that I mentioned earlier, there are a number of media that have successfully found their target audience and have attracted advertisers, to work with an increasing profit and to become increasingly high-quality and independent in their voice.

On the other hand, all of these media are connected with or fully owned by foreign capital. This is easy to understand because to be competitive in, for example, the TV market or in a weekly media market it is necessary to possess new technologies, exercise modern principles of work organisation and possess new knowledge. The above mentioned can be more easily obtained by profitably selling a successfully started national medium to foreign investors.

In a similar way, foreign capital regulates the market of PR services and the advertising market where the dominant element is about 20 huge agencies of integrated communications that are involved in the global network.[6]

The major part of advertisers comprises international brands and in Latvia they are mainly adapted. These usually constitute long-term campaigns, which, of course, have an impact of depressing uniformity, but they give long-term guarantees to the medium, actually being something similar to subscription, ensuring the perspective of the medium.

2. Rationale of Regulatory Functions

The legislation that regulates media activities in Latvia has developed favourably, in accordance with the recommendations of the EU and the EU directives, and the experience of international associations for printed and electronic media, broadcasting and press associations. All topical legislation in Latvia corresponds to the accepted international norms. Latvian Law on the Press and, for example, with such specific regulations as on the dissemination of erotic material, Latvia has been a pioneer and an example for the teams working on similar legislation in other countries.

On the other hand, with the collapse of the Soviet system of trade unions, the missing element has not been replaced by anything new. In fact, it means that in Latvia journalists are not united in their demands on employers, and that as a very important entity of leaders they cannot put forward any strict demands to their employers. This is why the media concentration, which I welcomed earlier, means that along with the inflow of foreign capital also such laws , contracts and traditions penetrate Latvia that essentially heighten the status of the journalist as an employeed. And, the bigger the number of employees in the media concerns, the higher is the journalist's status and ability to function. It undeniably reduces the danger that I spoke of earlier to manipulate and influence the journalist as well as the public.

Latvia's legislators and Latvia's National Radio and Television Council take into consideration a further development of media technologies and they have prepared proposals for the parliament, thinking, for example, of the possibilities of digital television entering Latvia's media market.

Latvia's experience in the restriction of monopoly and the field of competition monitoring must be highly evaluated, whereby the corresponding institutions react very promptly and precisely, preventing any possible breach of the law. This is why, looking at the perspectives, Latvia does not think that other, additional legislation and monitoring of the monopolisation process and media competition on the European level is necessary.

In this context, one must not forget to mention the development of Internet communications. Practically all influential media in Latvia operate Internet versions. The Internet advertising market shows essential growth. Unfortunately, the existing legislation in Latvia, like everywhere else in the world, has not yet weighed up the positive and negative trends of the Internet development and has not produced any legislative documents to that effect. My personal point of view is that in the nearest future, this may cause negative repercussions on the advertising business as such, because at present advertising in the Internet runs a brutal game without rules.

3. Media Concentration: Considerations of the Future

As media concentration is inescapable, I believe that in Latvia's context it has a principally positive effect. The practice so far has shown that, unfortunately, it is not possible to speak of media concentration in the context of European regionalisation, for example, forming the Baltic states media groups or the Nordic countries media groups, which would be logical from the economic and geographical point of view.

If this were possible, Latvia's and Baltic influence in the EU and in the global development context would be bigger and would synchronize with the principal national interests of the Baltic countries. The common interests can be expressed by two terms:

1) rapid growth of welfare,
2) lasting security.

It is the last aspect that is of greatest concern for me, in terms of the media concentration. If Scandinavian or American capital influx in Latvia's media market brings along traditions and tasks of democratic media, then the capital that is backed by Russia's interests and presence in the Latvian media market, especially this year, works in an adverse way.

The media whose owners strive to achieve political goals in Latvia and to influence the huge Russian-speaking audience in Latvia, among them about 0.45 million non-citizens – these media aim at disrupting the agenda of the existing lawful power of Latvia by putting forward their own agenda of absurd and scandalous questions, in this way hampering a normal dialogue of the state power and society, and various social groups. They have been pursuing through Latvia, for example, a controversial aim to have the Russian language as one of the EU working languages, by striving to give it the legal status of a second state language in Latvia. [7]

These tendencies are aimed at making pro-Russian elements more functional in the parliament as well as in local governments, and on the level of international organisations.

An impressive example: several years ago a journalist of the Russian newspaper *Panorama Latvii* published an appeal to pensioners to turn out for a non-sanctioned meeting at the Riga City Council in protest of heating tariffs. Several participants of the picket consciously barred the traffic of a very busy street so that the policemen had to interfere to move the picket participants off the street. A skirmish arose. It was recorded by the world's most influential media representatives and interpreted as the maltreatment of the Russian minority by the state of Latvia. [8]

Similar reports have appeared recently, with just the Russian-capital maintained media coming out with exaggerated interpretations of the staged protests by school students against teaching the Latvian language in Russian schools. Most of the international media correspondents in the Baltic states reside in Moscow and know the Russian language. This is why they provide the world with a one-sided view of the situation in the Baltics which is mainly based on Russia's media or Latvia's media under the influence of Russian capital. As a result, it all essentially interferes with Latvia's political dialogue with the world public. This creates the so-called Baltic card that Russia plays against the EU, NATO and other organisations, in the name of her political interests.

Money has no nationality, but the capital that is invested in the media acquires national identity. And, in terms of the media concentration, this is the really dangerous aspect that Latvia needs to consider. The existing multi-party system in Latvia and the transition period do not permit talking about media concentration as a threat to the political system or the idea of pluralism, as it is for example in the case of Italy (where Prime Minister S. Berlusconi owns an influential media empire) or in other similar cases. [9]

These tendencies have moved very much to the fore in recent times when Latvia was on the road to its EU membership. On the one hand, this was a great opportunity for the flourishing of democracy; on the other hand, it opened possibilities for non-democratic forces to use the situation to achieve their aims.

Examples are close at hand: it is the case of the Russian-capital influenced Lithuanian president Rolandas Paksas;[10] it is a delegation of Latvia's Russian-speaking students being granted a visit to the officials of Russia in the Kremlin where the support was clearly voiced and transmitted on TV; it also is the staged growing unrest among the Russian-speaking population of Latvia in protest of teaching Latvian in Russian schools. Tatiana Zhdanoka, member of the European Parliament, invited a group of students from Latvia to Strasbourg to stage a picket at the European Parliament in opposition to the educational reform. [11]

It is well-known that one cannot choose one's parents or neighbours. One of Latvia's historical neighbours and partners is Russia, a good and perspective neighbour. Latvia here has certain advantages in comparison with other European states, having had long-term experience and ties with Russia. This is why Latvia, as no other country, has always wished to realize the ideas of the most beneficial cooperation with Russia.

Final Points: The Double Nature of Media Ownership and Concentration

Media concentration and media ownership by foreign capital is a process that cannot and need not be stopped. However, while with the Western or American capital Latvia's media are supported by the impulses of well-established democratic traditions, the capital from the parts of this world that do not possess such traditions and are driven by their national political interests exercises an unwelcome, at times dangerous influence on the media market and media contents.

This is the situation we face in the media development in Latvia: on the one hand, the flow of foreign capital into Latvia's media should be welcome and should in no way be restricted by any specific EU regulations. On the other hand, an unrestricted buying and selling in the media market in the case of Latvia ultimately may pose a threat of eventual change of the political bias.

Sources:

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2. http://www.csb.lv/Satr/rad/A2.cfm?kurs3=A2
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4. http://www.tns.lv/?lang=lv&category=showproduct&id=adex
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6. http://www.lasap.lv/news/5/
7. http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=109531&lang=lv
8. http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/stranga.pdf
9. http://www.financenet.lv/news/law/index.php?id=68581 - 77k
10. http://www.ltv-panorama.lv/panorama/2003-10-31 - 23k
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Footnotes

[1] http://www.np.gov.lv/index.php?lv=fakti_lv&saite=iedzivotaji.htm
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EU Public Communication's new strategy

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Introduction

Communications are a contemporary phenomenon and necessity. The driving forces which have, in a comparatively short period of time, rapidly increased the space of development in the world have divided the people of the world into countless different groups. Leslie tells us that all of these people pursue different goals, and yet they are brought together by general yearnings, by the need to work together in pursuit of common benefits and progress.[1]

How can co-operation be achieved? How can we reach our common goals? Today this is an issue which public relations and communications help to resolve. Are these things one and the same? Yes, in recent times we have quite frequently equated public relations and communications. Full unanimity has not been achieved, but the issue is whether that is possible in the first place. Do we need complete unanimity? The important thing is to achieve understanding when specific situations and processes are analysed. That's because at that point we do need to reach agreement on specific terminology and on specific understanding of the terms that are used.

Communication or Public Relations

Communication seems so simple until we begin to examine it. Then all terms and concepts creep into the conversation, even definitions add the confusion.[2] Grunig, J. and Hunt, T. had defined public relations as management of communications or as the ability to manage contacts between organisations and their surrounding environment.[3] These authors equate public relations and management of communications. Public relations of this kind include general communications between an organisation and its internal or external society, or with the public group which influences the ability of the organisation to achieve its goals and plans, as well as the execution and evaluation of those goals and plans.

Public communications – that is a concept that is used by the authors Gijbels, van der Houwen and Mihordea in their handbook for specialists in the area of governmental communications.[4] The authors analyse the totality of communicational functions for an organisation:

- Informing the public
- Providing public services

- Public behaviour
- Public relations
- Popularisation of the organisation and communications processes related to same.

The process of communications can take place within an organisation or in its contacts with the external environment. The emphasis is on ensuring contacts between the employees of the organisation and the various environments of the organisation.

Given the existing situation and the way in which communications are being organized in the EU, I increasingly think that when it comes to the EU's activities, we can equate communications and public relations. Still, we need to look at the issue of how the EU approaches its own activities. Here we can take a look at historical models of how public relations are established.

Models of Public Relations. Which models are used in practice?

The history of public relations has differentiated four different models:

1) The *press agency* appeared in the late 19th century.[5] Organizations made use of communications programmes which sought only to propagandise the organisation. This usually involved advertising in the mass media. This model mostly involves unidirectional communications which are aimed at specific target audiences.
2) The model of *public information* emerged in the United States in the early 20th century.[6] Typically, this involved a process in which the mass media and the controlled media (brochures, informational materials and direct correspondents) were used by an organisation to try to "enlighten" society – i.e., to disseminate information to as many audiences and target groups as possible. This information was carefully considered by the organisation, and as far as it was concerned, the information was true and easily understood by the public. PR specialists use this model to engage in the functions of a personal press secretary. The model of public information is particularly typical of government institutions and organisations, as well as commercial structures. Public relations specialists thus seek to work in a way which benefits both – the organisation or the institution on the one hand and the public at large on the other hand.

The two aforementioned models, however, are just a unilateral approach. They focus on the egotistical desire of an organisation to present itself in a positive light. Unilateral models make use of public relations programmes which are extremely simple and not very effective. *They are not based on any research or on strategic planning they involve no response or reciprocal link in relations with the public*. The models of publicity and public information are both asymmetrical models – their goal is to ensure that the organisation creates a positive image of itself, either by making use of propaganda or by disseminating only positive examples about itself.

3) The model of *convincing others* is also known as *the two-way asymmetrical model.*[7] It emerged in the 1920s. This, unlike the two aforementioned models, makes use of a slightly more complicated and considered approach to public relations. This involves public opinion

surveys and the collection of public views. It allows public relations specialists and their team to prepare and develop more easily the information which protects the organisation's interests and views, to enhance public support for the organisation, and to convince the strategic target audience of the organisation to do the things which the organisation wishes it to do. In this case, the organisation needs a reciprocal link with the public only insofar as it is necessary to learn the views of the public vis-à-vis the organisation. In that case, the organisation can make use of this in its next communications programme on behalf of its own interests.

The first two of these models are put to practice most often, and the third model of convincing others is quite popular in the operations of certain organisations. Despite this, several authors such as James and Larissa Grunig, S. M. Katlip and others have emphasised in their work that unilateral and asymmetrical models, as well as the two-way asymmetrical model, do not indicate that the operations of the organisation are of a high level of quality. They do not indicate that despite efforts to establish the process of communications or, even, a slight attempt to engage in research; the fact is that all of these models are too simple and ineffective to ensure that the organisation can engage in successful, long-term and high-quality public relations. This requires a fourth approach – one that is seen in the fourth model. This is a model of dialogue.

4) The *model of dialogue or the two-way symmetrical model.*[8] This model emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, and it speaks of public relations which are based on a more in-depth process of research. This is public relations which makes use of communications so as to overcome conflict situations, to improve the organisation's ability to reach mutual understanding with the relevant society, and, particularly, to ensure that the segment of society which has the most direct influence on the organisation understands the issue. The dialogue model is used by specialists so as to establish relations which are acceptable and of advantage to both sides. The results of research that is focused on this model and the information that is extracted from society – these are used to enhance mutual relations.

EU Public Communication's New Strategy

The EU enlargement process creates also a lot of new questions for public communication agenda. The plan for new communication strategy was set up. To a great extent it was connected with analysis which was done by communication specialists. After that the decision was made that there was a necessity to improve the way the Commission presented its activities to the outside world. The needs to refine upon one's methods also connected with declining confidence in political systems, the Commission believes that it is important to ensure that the representative democracy continues to maintain the trust and involvement of Europe's citizens. The latest Eurobarometer survey[9] shows that public approval of the European Union has steadily decreased over recent months. Whether in terms of trust, image or assessment of EU membership, all the indicators have fallen. A similar decline is seen in the public approval and trust in the national political process. While membership of the European Union is still supported by 54% of EU citizens, the image of the European Union has steadily decreased in citizens' eyes with only 47% of respondents giving a positive response. Trust in the European Union has dropped from 50% of citizens trusting the EU in autumn 2004 to 44% in spring 2005. People need to feel that Europe provides an added value and they have the ability to affect the way decisions are taken. Currently 53% of European citizens do not believe that their voice counts in the European Union.

When EC started to define the new strategy more exactly, M. Wallstrom pointed out to a very important purpose "Information for citizens should be factual and non-propagandist" about the EU. The European institutions are too often the scapegoat for unpopular decisions and are often seen as remote and bureaucratic. One of the main objectives of the period of reflection should be to stimulate a more accurate communication of the activities of the European Union. Ending the blame-game, both by Member States and the European institutions, is an important change that must take place.[10]

In 2001–2004 before Plan D EC adopted three communications dealing with information and communication. But these communications had several weaknesses:

- **Continuous fragmentation of communication activities** by insufficient coordination and planning, therefore loosing efficiency
- **Messages reflecting political priorities, but not necessarily linked to citizens' interests, needs and preoccupations**: current campaigns focus on political elite and media and fail to portray the benefits and consequences for day – to – day life in a direct and understandable manner
- **Inadequate implementation**: the strategies adopted in the past by the Commission were too focused on financing campaigns rather than on dialogue and proactive communication

After the enlargement in 2004 when EU became very broad union new members brought to the union new traditions, new experience etc. After – low voter turnout in the 2004 European elections and the 'No' votes in France and the Netherlands in May–June 2005 confirmed the declining trust of EU citizens in the European institutions. On 20 July 2005, after internal and external consultation, the first part of an Action Plan[11] was presented. The year 2005 is a very crucial year in terms of re-defining public communication strategy: this is a year of transition when EU became broader (instead of 15 EU now having 25 member states)

Margot Wallström, the commissioner for institutional relations and communication strategy, advocates a radical shake-up of the Commission's representation offices and admits the Prodi commission's failure to communicate the services directive. There are some reasons why communication was not efficient and failed, but they must be analyzed very carefully.

On 21 September 2005 Mrs Wallström launched the idea of a "plan D" for democracy, dialogue and debate.[12]

The Commission is now preparing the second part of its strategy in the form of a White Paper on communication, which will focus on the role of other EU institutions and other external communication players (governments, press, think tanks, civil society). The White Paper is expected to be ready before the end of December.

What is New Strategy?

For understanding new strategy I'll look through Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate. This plan is *about debate, dialogue and listening. Plan D aims to inject more democracy into the Union, to stimulate a wide public debate and build a new consensus on the future direction of the European Union. Now Member States must bring this process alive.*[13]

The main principles of the plan for "Democracy, Dialogue and Debate" are:

- **Listening:** communication is a dialogue, not one – way street. It is not just about EU institutions informing EU citizens but also about citizens expressing their opinions so that the Commission can understand their perceptions and concerns. Europe's citizens want to make their voices in Europe heard and their democratic participation should have a direct bearing on EU policy formulation and output.
- **Communicating**: EU policies and activities, as well as their impact on everyday lives, have to be communicated and advocated in a manner that people can understand and relate to if citizens are to follow political developments at European level.
- **Connecting with citizens by "going local":** good communication requires excellent understanding of local audiences. The Commission's communication activities must be resourced and organized in such a way as to address matching demographic and national and local concerns and convey information through the channels citizens prefer in the language they can understand.

The idea is to win back citizens' confidence in the European project through local and national exercises of listening ["putting ears on Europe" as Wallström says] and debate. The vice-president had a first discussion with her colleagues on this plan during the 20 September seminar on the future of the EU[14]

Plan D's main idea – is to help member states:

- to organize and stimulate national debates on the future of the Union., Mrs Wallström hopes that country-wide discussions with national parliaments, civil society and the media will lead;
- to create a "European public sphere". "Europe has been a project for small political elites," Wallström said, "today, people are more educated and better informed", implying citizens need to be more involved.

Plan D proposed thirteen specific initiatives to organize and stimulate these national debates. Commissioners will visit the member states and engage in discussions with national parliaments; European "goodwill ambassadors" will raise the profiles of the debate; citizens will be more involved in consultations on major new policies. These are just a few of the instruments the Commission intends to use to make Plan D work. In addition to this Plan D EC offers Action plan to improve communicating Europe by the Commission [15]

If looking on Plan D we can see that it includes very important aspect – a feedback process which has been put in place. In April 2006, there will be a first evaluation of the national debates and on the 9th of May, the Commission will organize a Conference on the future of Europe. By the end of the Austrian Presidency (June 2006), a synthesis report on the debates will be on the table.

Challenges

There will be some challenges when EU institutions will start to implement Plan D and also an Action plan.

Just as with the Lisbon agenda to become the world's most competitive knowledge society by 2010, the Commission has set itself high ambitions with the Plan D. But as with Lisbon, it has very little leverage over the delivery capacity and will of the member states. Ultimately, the success of Plan D lies with the national political elites in the member states. The lack of a real citizens' debate during the Convention on the future of Europe, where a similar listening and debating ambition was foreseen, does not bode well for Plan D. And there is the danger that if this ambition fails, in the end, the Commission will get the blame, as it mostly does when national leaders fail to deliver.

The difficulty to convince member states to organize these debates on the future of Europe was underlined one day before Mrs Wallström's presentation when the Dutch parliament decided not to hold a broad debate on Europe after its 'No' vote on the Constitution.

There is a number of prerequisites which was pointed out by EU institutions, specialists and experts in political life for Europe's integration on national level: firstly, national parliaments should be involved in EU debates, and that does not require a new Constitution. There should be national training programs on Europe for policy makers or forums on EU matters, like the one in Ireland that contributed to the positive referendum vote after the first failed attempt. I believe that political parties at EU level have a role to play. However, there are different views on this and progress has been very slow so far.

So, is it really political and social life that should change?

Secondly, EU-funded programs and projects should include communication plans with national elements. Sending press releases to correspondents, opening a website in English, printing brochures: all this is has become a standard practice now but not sufficient. What is required is linking the project / EU policies / benefits for national citizens in a customized way: adapted content-wise and linguistically. On this, the action plan is 'spot on'. The challenge is implementation, given that there is a lack of public relations experience for many officials and project managers.

There are other problems on EU Communication: credibility of the Commission reflects a political reality, inability to listen, capacity of National parliaments. We are still stuck in the 'yes' and 'no' debate. One of the things that is always said is that listening is very important and to look at every relevant viewpoint and on the differences between member states.

Some Preliminary Conclusions

After short analysis of the previous EU public communication it is almost certain that latest development on building new strategy is just in time. Substantial contribution was made on investigating the failure and weaknesses of previous programs as well as on setting of new objectives and aims. Therefore it may be said that new Plan D is more or less a reaction on the situation.

Another observation is that till 2005 in public communication the "top down" or information model was used, but the new Plan D puts emphases on listening and further involvement.

Practitioners enacting the public communications programs must involve scientific research methods to help develop targeted strategies and to create long term action programs.

The new program contains very important and complicated tasks therefore in the centre of attention must be education and training the specialists for communication. Special programs, courses and other activities should be composed by executive officers.

Finally, Plan-D must seek to clarify, deepen and legitimize a new consensus on Europe, address criticism and find solutions where expectations have not been met.[16]

Footnotes

[1] Lesly, P.Lesly's Handbook of Public Relations and Communications. 5th ed., 1997, p. 5.

[2] Theaker, A. The Public Relations, p. 19.

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[4] See: Gijbels, F., van der Houwen, D., Mihordea, M. Public Information and Communications as a Strategic Political Instrument.

[5] Grunig, J., Grunig, L. Models of Public Relations and Communication. p. 287.

[6] Grunig, J., Grunig, L. Models of Public Relations and Communication. p. 288.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Grunig, J., Grunig, L. Models of Public Relations and Communication. p. 289.

[9] Eurobarometer 63 http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/index_en.htm.

[10] htt://www.eu.int/comm./commission_barrosso//wallstrom/pdf/communication_ plan D.

[11] See EurActiv 22 July 2005.

[12] See EurActiv 22 Sept. 2005.

[13] htt://www.eu.int/comm./commission_barrosso//wallstrom/pdf/communication_plan D.

[14] See EurActiv 21 September 2005.

[15] Action plan to improve communicating Europe by the Commission SEC(2005) 985-20/07/2005.

[16] Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate.

Daži informācijas intelektuālās pieejamības aspekti globālās informācijas telpas kontekstā

Some Aspects of Intellectual Accessibility of Information in the Context of Global Information Space

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Ievads

Īss terminu precizējums

20. gadsimta 90. gados, kad iesākās globālā tīmekļa attīstība, visstraujāk ir paplašinājušās informācijas telpas robežas. Līdz ar to ir kļuvuši fiziski pieejamāki dažāda satura, formāta un valodu dokumenti. Taču dokumentu fiziskā pieejamība vēl nenozīmē to intelektuālo pieejamību. Terminu "informācijas intelektuālā pieejamība" var raksturot gan no informācijas speciālistu viedokļa, gan no informācijas lietotāju viedokļa. Informācijas lietotājiem šis termins nozīmē atrastā informācijas avota saprotamību un atbilstību informācijas lietotāja zināšanām, tāpēc to var uzskatīt par vēlamo rezultātu ikvienai informācijas meklēšanas situācijai. Informācijas speciālistiem informācijas intelektuālā pieejamība nozīmē rīkus, kas tiek piedāvāti informācijas lietotājam tematiskās informācijas meklēšanas gadījumos. Informācijas zinātnē tos sauc par informācijas meklējumvalodām (IMV), un, tā kā valoda fiksē zināšanas, tad bieži vien šos rīkus sauc arī par zināšanu organizācijas sistēmām (ZOS). Kā valodas tie pilda saskarsmes funkcijas ar informācijas izguves sistēmu, kā ZOS tie strukturē informācijas telpu, kas pieejama ar informācijas izguves sistēmu, piedāvājot noteiktu izpratni par pasaules "lietu kārtību". Tā kā šie rīki tiek izmantoti arī dokumentu tematiskajā apstrādē, tad atbilstoši kā valodas tie apraksta dokumenta priekšmetu (vai citiem vārdiem – piedāvā pieejas punktus informācijai un zināšanām, kas fiksētas tekstā), kā ZOS tie "klasificē" dokumentus vai nu fiziskās, vai virtuālās klasēs.

Temata aktualitāte

Informācijas telpas paplašināšanās dēļ meklējumvalodu izveides aktualitāti nosaka šādi faktori:

1) liela apjoma informācijas krātuvēs, piemēram, globālā tīmekļa resursos, portālos, digitālajās bibliotēkās, bibliotēku elektroniskajos kopkatalogos

(e-kopkatalogos), precīzai un pilnīgai meklēšanai un izguvei (atrašanai) ir īpaši būtiski izstrādāt meklējumvalodas, kas spētu nodrošināt atbilstošu (relevantu) informācijas avotu atlasi un samazinātu "informācijas troksni", t. i., liekas informācijas atlasi;
2) šobrīd dominējošā valoda globālajā informācijas telpā, tai skaitā arī kā meklējumvaloda daudzās datubāzēs, ir angļu valoda. Šāda situācija apgrūtina informācijas pieejamību tiem, kas šo valodu nepārzina. Informācijas meklēšanai, līdzīgi kā izziņai vai zināšanu apguvei, būtiski ir nodrošināt meklējumvalodas nacionālajās valodās. Tāpēc viens no mūsdienu pētījumu virzieniem ir nacionālo meklējumvalodu saskaņošana vai daudzvalodu meklējumvalodu izstrāde, kas nodrošinātu iespēju informācijas lietotājam izvēlēties labāk zināmo valodu informācijas meklēšanai.

1. attēlā redzama viena no darbības shēmām, kas nodrošinātu tematisko meklēšanu globālajā vai daudzvalodu informācijas telpā (shēma nedaudz izmainīta no [3])[1].



1. att. **Tematiskā informācijas meklēšana globālā vai daudzvalodu informācijas telpā**

Shēmas būtība ir šāda: saskaņojot IMV dažādās nacionālajās valodās (t. i., fiksējot atbilstošos ekvivalentos terminus latviešu, franču, krievu, angļu u.c. IMV), indeksētājs var apstrādāt dokumentus, piešķirot tiem tematiskos pieejas punktus savā valodā (piem., latviešu valodā), savukārt informācijas meklētājs var izvēlēties valodu, kura rada vismazāk grūtību saskarsmei ar informācijas izguves sistēmu un tematiska pieprasījuma formulēšanai, un ar tās palīdzību meklēt dokumentus, kas var būt publicēti gan dažādās valodās, gan arī atrodami dažādās datubāzēs (piem., latviešu, krievu, franču, angļu u. c.).

Par šī jautājuma aktualitāti liecina arī pēdējo gadu starptautisko konferenču temati, kā arī uzsāktie projekti. Piemēram, pēdējās IFLA[2] konferencēs Klasifikācijas un indeksēšanas sekcijai ir bijuši šādi temati: Priekšmetu (priekšmetiskās) pieejas rīku lomas maiņa (Berlīne, 2003); Priekšmetiskās pieejas globālo rīku ieviešana un piemērošana lokālajām vajadzībām (Buenosairesa, 2004); Kataloģizācijas un priekšmetu rīki globālajai pieejai: starptautiskā partnerība (Oslo, 2005)[3].

Lai nodrošinātu meklēšanu vairākās valodās Eiropas nacionālo bibliotēku e-katalogos, ir uzsākti divi nozīmīgi projekti: **MACS** (*Multilingual Access to Subjects*)[4] [3] un **MSAC** (*Multilingual Subject Access to Catalogues of national libraries*)[5] [1]. MACS mērķis ir nodrošināt daudzvalodu tematisko meklēšanu Lielbritānijas, Šveices, Vācijas, Francijas nacionālo bibliotēku katalogos, piedāvājot iespēju lietotājam izvēlēties meklējumvalodu vācu, angļu vai franču valodā. Otra projekta – MSAC – mērķis ir nodrošināt daudzvalodu meklēšanu Čehijas, Lietuvas, Latvijas, Horvātijas, Maķedonijas, Slovākijas, Slovēnijas nacionālo bibliotēku katalogos. Mērķa sasniegšanai katrā projektā ir izvēlētas atšķirīgas metodes: MACS – saišu izveide starp priekšmetu valodu (LCSH, RAMEAU, SWD[6]) ekvivalentiem vācu, franču un angļu valodā; MSAC – par vienojošo valodu citu valodu sasaistei ir izvēlēta Universālā decimālā klasifikācijas sistēma.

Dažādu meklējumvalodu saskaņošanas temats ir aktuāls arī Latvijā. Pirmkārt, tāpēc, ka nozīmīgākās un labāk izstrādātās priekšmetu valodas, kuras tiek lietotas Latvijas bibliotēkās (LCSH, AGROVOC un MeSH[7]), ir izstrādātas angļu u. c. svešvalodās un tiek tulkotas, tās adaptējot Latvijas situācijai, t. i., meklējot atbilstošākos ekvivalentus latviešu valodā. Otrkārt, Latvijas valodvide nosacījums paredz, ka e-katalogu, portālu meklējumvalodām būtu jābūt ne tikai latviešu valodā, bet arī krievu valodā (pašlaik risināmais uzdevums gan ir izstrādāt kvalitatīvu priekšmetu meklējumvalodu latviešu valodā). Treškārt, lai neatpaliktu no informacionālo procesu norisēm, neizbēgama ir arī Latvijas bibliotēku iesaistīšanās globālajā informācijas telpā, kurā ir uzsākta daudzvalodu meklēšanas nodrošinājuma izstrāde.

Gan tulkošanas prakse, gan teorijas tādās nozarēs kā antropoloģija, valodas filozofija, sociālā semiotika, izziņas psiholoģija, literatūras analīze rāda, ka daudzvalodu meklējumvalodu izstrāde nav vienkāršs un ātri izpildāms uzdevums, jo tas nenozīmē tikai dažādu valodu ekvivalento terminu sasaistīšanu un to savstarpējo attiecību mākslīgu pārnesi, kas, kā atzīmē M. Hudona[8] [6] attiecībā uz vienvalodu tēzaura tulkošanu citā valodā, novestu pie noteiktas "kultūras imperiālisma" citā sabiedrībā (piem., ASV Kongresa bibliotēkas priekšmetu saraksta (LCSH) tieša pārtulkošana latviešu valodā būtu "amerikāņu kultūras pārnešana" Latvijā). Valodas un kultūras mijiedarbības izpratne ir gan daudzvalodu, gan vienvalodas meklējumvalodas izveides pamatnosacījums.

Valodas un kultūras mijiedarbības izpratne

Daudzvalodu meklējumvalodas un galvenās problēmas to izveidē

Daudzvalodu meklējumvalodas var eksistēt dažādās formās: kā klasifikācijas sistēmas, kā priekšmetu valodas, kā tēzauri u. c. Būtiskākā to iezīme ir tā, ka termini un to attiecības ir atveidotas vairākās valodās. Daudzvalodu informācijas meklējumvalodu izstrāde bibliotēkzinātnē un informācijas zinātnē pamatā ir aizsākusies saistībā ar informācijas meklēšanas tēzauru izstrādi. Daudzvalodu tēzauru izveides standarts ISO 5964 [9][8] piedāvā vairākas metodes daudzvalodu tēzauru izveidei:

1) jauna daudzvalodu tēzaura izveide, to uzsākot pilnīgi no sākuma un pievienojot pie vienas pamatvalodas citu valodu ekvivalentos terminus;

2) esošo tēzauru kombinēšana, vai nu no vairākiem izveidojot vienu jaunu daudzvalodu tēzauru, vai arī vairāku tēzauru deskriptorus atbilstoši sasaistot;
3) viena (dominējošā) tēzaura pārtulkošana vienā vai vairākās citās valodās.

2005. gadā ir izstrādātas vadlīnijas, kuras papildina daudzvalodu tēzauru izveides standartu. Tajā arī minētas divas galvenās problēmgrupas, kas saistītas ar šādu tēzauru izveidi[10] [4]:

1. Semantikas problēmas (references semantika). Tās ietver jautājumus par ekvivalences un daudznozīmības attiecībām gan vienas valodas ietvaros (vienas valodas ekvivalence, piem., *rokasbumba* un *handbols*), gan vairāku valodu ietvaros (starpvalodu ekvivalence). Attiecībā uz daudzvalodu meklējumvalodām ekvivalences noteikšana ir viena no sarežģītākajām problēmām, jo ir secināts, ka iespējami trīs ekvivalences pamatveidi: tieša ekvivalence (1:1) (piem., *skolas* : *schools*), daļēja vai netieša ekvivalence (3:1) (piem., angļu valodas terminiem *additives, adjuvant, supplements* atbilst tikai viens termins latviešu valodā – *piedevas*) un neekvivalence (1:0) (piem., terminam *formālie katalogi* nav atbilstoša ekvivalenta termina angļu valodā).

2. Struktūras problēmas (relāciju attiecības). Tās ietver hierarhiskās un asociatīvās attiecības starp terminiem. Nozīmīgākais jautājums – vai šīs attiecības ir un var būt dažādu valodu meklējumvalodās vienādas un tātad "pārnesamas" no vienas valodas uz citu?

Šo minēto problēmu risināšanai būtiski ir izprast valodas un kultūras mijiedarbības jautājumus. Pēdējā laikā arvien vairāk pētījumu informācijas zinātnē pamato atziņu, ka konceptuālā izpratne par valodu būtiski ietekmē gan dokumentu tematisko apstrādi, gan meklējumvalodu izstrādi.

Valodas konceptuālā izpratne

Mūsdienās, pamatojoties uz sociālās semiotikas, antropoloģijas, psiholoģijas u. c. zinātņu, teorijām, var izdalīt divas galvenās atziņas par valodu:
1) valoda nav tiešs realitātes spogulis;
2) valodas nozīme (teksta nozīme) ir kontekstuāla.

Valoda nav tiešs realitātes spogulis

Samērā ilgu laiku valdīja uzskats, ka valodai ir pakārtotas attiecības ar domāšanu un realitāti un triādē valoda–domāšana–realitāte valoda pilda tikai spoguļa funkciju, t. i., tā pasīvi attēlo domāšanas rezultātā izveidojušos jēdzienus par izzināto realitāti. Tāpēc valoda tika pētīta kā patstāvīga sistēma, kurai ir noteikta elementu struktūra, un tika uzskatīts, ka šie elementi veido valodas (teksta) nozīmi. 2. attēlā parādīti elementi (valodas skaņas, morfēmas, vārdu formas, vārdu savienojumi, teikumi, teksts) un līmeņi (fonētiskais, morfoloģiskais, leksiskais, sintaktiskais, semantiskais), kas raksturo valodu kā abstraktu zīmju sistēmu.

Šāda izpratne par valodu ilgu laiku un arī vēl šobrīd ir vadošā daudzu bibliotekāru vidū, jo tiek uzskatīts, ka grāmatas priekšmets ir atrodams tieši tekstā. Tas ir galvenais temats, kam autors pievērsis lielāko uzmanību, tie ir vārdi, kas biežāk tekstā ir sastopami u. tml. Šāda izpratne noved arī pie domas, ka visu bibliotēku katalogiem var derēt viena meklējumvaloda un vienai grāmatai visās



2. att. **Valoda kā abstrakta zīmju sistēma**

bibliotēkās ir jābūt piešķirtiem vienādiem priekšmetiem. Atbilstoši mūsdienu epistemoloģijas teorijām šāda pieeja atbilst racionālismam un empīrismam, kas pauž novecojušu izpratni par zināšanām, to dabu un valodu.

Pamatojoties uz pētījumiem par zīmēm un to uztveri dažādās zinātnēs, var secināt, ka valoda nav pasīva attiecībā pret domāšanu un realitāti. Šobrīd tiek uzsvērts, ka valoda nosaka mūsu pasaules robežas un mēs dzīvojam valodā. No tā izriet, ka ir nepareizi analizēt jēdzienus kā no valodas atsevišķu sistēmu un valodu kā no realitātes neatkarīgu zīmju sistēmu. Kā norāda L. Introna[11] [7], "jēdzieni neeksistē citādi kā konkrētā nacionālajā valodā. Valoda nevis atspoguļo, bet atveido (reprezentē) pasauli. Tā atveido cilvēku konstruēto pasauli, un tā ir cieši saistīta ar to vidi, kurā tā tiek lietota. Valoda nav rīks, ar kuru norādīt uz pasauli, bet gan pati pasaule".

Līdzīgas atziņas par valodas un domāšanas mijiedarbību, kā arī par valodas ietekmi uz pasaules uztveri ir atrodamas feminisma filosofijas darbos. "Valoda ir sistēma, kas nav caurspīdīga, nav neitrāla un producē nozīmes. Šāda izpratne ir pretstatā klasiskajai humānajai domāšanai par indivīdu kā savas runas un darbības nozīmju avotu un definētāju. Valoda – dažādās vēsturiski un kontekstuāli īpašās formās un lietošanas situācijās – "vienmēr jau" ir apveltīta ar nozīmi. Tādējādi tiek noteiktas robežas tam, ko un kā drīkst teikt, izpaust, saprast un saukt vārdā. Kad lieta, parādība, pieredze tiek apzīmēta ar vārdu, tā ar valodas starpniecību tiek ieausta plašākās nozīmju sistēmās, kas savukārt nozīmē šīs lietas, parādības, pieredzes klasificēšanu attiecībā pret sabiedrības vērtību, normu un varas sistēmām."[12] [10].

Šīs domas sasaucas arī ar filosofa Ortegas i Gasetas atziņām rakstā "Tulkošanas nabadzība un spožums", kurā viņš ilustrē tulkošanas problēmas. Viņš norāda, ka "ikviena tauta sašķeļ pasaules daudzveidību pēc sava ieskata, piegriež to pēc sava prāta, tāpēc arī pastāv tāda valodu dažādība ar atšķirīgu gramatiku un dažādu leksiku un semantiku".[13] [14]. Dokumenta tematiskā apstrāde arī bieži vien tiek uztverta kā tulkošana – indeksēšanas procesā autora teksts tiek pārtulkots meklējumvalodā un aprakstīts ar tās leksiskajām vienībām. Kā ikviens tulkotājs, arī indeksētājs ir "savas kultūras cietumnieks", kuram jācenšas izveidot "tulkojumu" – piešķirt pieejas punktus tekstam, maksimāli saglabājot oriģinālā teksta semantiku (nozīmi).

Valodas un kultūras ciešo saistību raksturo arī pētījumi antropoloģijā un psiholoģijā. Pēdējā laikā arvien vairāk šo zinātņu atziņas tiek izmantotas informācijas zinātnes pētījumos saistībā ar meklējumvalodu izveidi. Piemēram, B. Kvasnika (*B. Kwasnik*) un V. Rubina (*V. Rubin*)[14] [11], raksturojot grūtības bibliotekāro un bibliogrāfisko klasifikāciju sistēmu tulkošanā no vienas valodas un kultūras uz citu, to pamato ar pētījumiem, kas parāda dažādu valodu vārdu un to savstarpējo attiecību atšķirības, kā piemēru izmantojot radniecību apzīmējošos vārdus un to savstarpējās attiecības 14 valodās no 4 valodu grupām. Viņas secina, ka, lai klasifikācijas sistēmas varētu paplašināt un "pārtulkot" izmantošanai "globālās sistēmās", nepietiek tikai ar leksikas, sintakses un semantikas jautājumu risinājumu, papildus tam ir jāņem vērā atšķirības zināšanu struktūrās un jāizprot, kā veidojas šīs attiecības noteiktās diskursu kopienās un noteiktā kontekstā. To, ka dažādas kultūras un tajā valdošā "lietu kārtība" ietekmē termina izpratni, pierāda arī S. Keranenas (*S. Keranen*) pētījums[15] [9]. Viņa ir veikusi viena termina – homemakers[16] nozīmju salīdzinājumu, noskaidrojot, kā šis termins tiek lietots dažādos sociālo zinātņu tēzauros, datubāzēs, vārdnīcās, kā arī speciālistu izpratnē. Pamatojoties uz iegūtajiem datiem, viņa secināja, ka vairumā gadījumu šis dzimuma neitrālais termins tiek uztverts sieviešu dzimtē, tā parādot konkrētā sabiedrībā valdošo uzskatu par lomu un darbu sadalījumu ģimenē.

Tātad atziņa – valoda nav tiešs realitātes spogulis – maina izpratni par valodu un procesiem, kuros valodas izmantošana ietekmē to rezultātu (piem., informācijas apstrādi un informācijas izguvi). Ir svarīgi ņemt vērā, ka valoda ne tikai nosaka domāšanu, bet pat virza to, ka mūsu pasaules robežas ir mūsu valodas robežas, ka sabiedrības vērtības, normas, "lietu kārtība" nosaka sabiedrības kultūru, un tas parādās valodas struktūrā. Tas savukārt ļauj secināt, ka dokumenta teksta analīzei un tā priekšmeta noteikšanai ir svarīgs ne tikai pats teksts, bet arī konteksts un teksta lietotājs.

Valodas (teksta, vārda) nozīme ir kontekstuāla

Pamatojoties uz iepriekšējo atziņu, var secināt, ka valoda, tās nozīme ir cieši saistīta ar vidi un kultūru, kurā tā tiek lietota. Kultūru raksturo cilvēku grupas – kopienas – tradīcijas, pārliecība, dzīves forma un izpratne par "lietu kārtību". Atziņa par nozīmes kontekstualitāti ļauj secināt, ka nozīme nav objektīva un absolūta, bet tā ir mainīga un sociāli konstruēta. Tā ir noteiktas kopienas valodas lietojums. Iedzīvinot šo atziņu attiecībā uz dokumentu tekstu apstrādi, nepieciešams mainīt izpratni gan par kritērijiem, kuri ir jāņem vērā dokumenta priekšmeta noteikšanā, gan par kritērijiem, kuri ir jāņem vērā vienvalodu un daudzvalodu meklējumvalodu izveidē.

Piemēram, dokumenta priekšmeta noteikšana ietver teksta saprašanu, kas savukārt ir teksta interpretācija, kurai atbilstoši hermeneitiķu atziņām ir nepieciešama iepriekšsapratne. Vārda *interpretācija* izcelsme ietver tādas darbības kā izskaidrošana, iztulkošana. No tā ir iespējams secināt, ka jebkuru tekstu mēs saprotam, pateicoties savām iepriekšējām zināšanām, kuras mums palīdz tekstu izskaidrot vai iztulkot. Kur veidojas šīs iepriekšējās zināšanas, un kā mēs apgūstam valodu un tās lietojumu? Tā skaidrojumam tiek lietots termins *diskurss*, kuram ir samērā daudzveidīgs definējums. Vienkāršākajā variantā ar diskursu[17] saprot saistītu izteikumu virkni, tekstu, konkrētu valodas lietojumu, runu [15]. Tātad diskurss ir kādas sociālas grupas valodas lietojums (konkrētā nozarē, nozares apakšgrupā u. c. sabiedriskā institūcijā). Tas ietver gan normas, gan darbības, rīkus, objektus, procesus, valodas lietotāju pārliecību, vērtības u. tml. Diskurss ir saistīts ar valodas (teksta) pragmatisko nozīmi – noderīgumu, izmantojamību noteiktu mērķu sasniegšanai, piemēram, teksta atbilstība nepieciešamo zināšanu ieguvei, lai nokārtotu eksāmenu mācību priekšmetā. 3. attēlā parādīts valodas nozīmes izpratnes modelis, akcentējot atziņu, ka teksta nozīme atrodas nevis tekstā, bet informācijas uztvērēja (lasītāja) un teksta mijiedarbībā.



3. att. **Valoda kā kontekstuāla zīmju sistēma**

Diskurss norāda, ka valodas nozīme ir saistīta ar to kultūru, kurā valodu lieto un kuru valoda arī maina. Atšķirībā no izpratnes par valodu kā abstraktu sistēmu, 3. attēla shēmā pievienotie nozīmes analīzes līmeņi (diskursa, pragmatiskais) netieši ietver valodas lietotāju (lasītāju) kā teksta nozīmes konstruētāju. Tie parāda valodas lietotāja nozīmi teksta saprašanā un tādējādi arī atbilst Č. Pīrsa zīmes modelim, kas ir sociālās semiotikas pamatā.

Diskursa analīze ļauj arī secināt, ka vārdiem var būt situatīvas nozīmes, kuras tiek izskaidrotas ar "kultūras modeļiem" vai "izskaidrošanas teorijām", kas ir pieejamas indivīdam kā noteiktas sociālas grupas pārstāvim (piemēram, vienu un to pašu vārdu skaidro bērns un profesors). Diskursa analīze ļauj atklāt, ka daudzas teorijas ir "sociālas konstrukcijas" un to izstrādi ir ietekmējušas noteiktas intereses.

Pamatojoties uz atziņu, ka valodas (teksta) nozīme ir kontekstuāla, var secināt, ka vienai grāmatai (u. c. dokumentam) var būt dažādi, atšķirīgi priekšmeti, kas raksturo tās nozīmi attiecībā pret noteiktu informācijas lietotāju grupu. Tātad, jo daudzveidīgāk un dziļāk dokuments tiek analizēts, jo daudzveidīgāki tematiskie pieejas punkti tiek piešķirti vienam dokumentam un tiek nodrošinātas meklēšanas iespējas dažādām lietotāju grupām (piem., gan nozares speciālistiem, gan nespeciālistiem).

Valodas kontekstualitāte ļauj secināt, ka nav iespējama arī viena meklējumvaloda. Tās leksikas krājums un terminu attiecības (relāciju semantika) var būt atšķirīgas gan vienas valodas ietvaros, gan daudzvalodu meklējumvalodās. Vienas valodas ietvaros dažādām lietotāju grupām var būt nepieciešama atšķirīga meklējumvalodas leksika vai pieejas punkti dokumenta tekstam, piemēram, mediķiem – *apendicīts*, nespeciālistiem – *aklās zarnas iekaisums*. Atšķirīgu terminu struktūru var redzēt vienam terminam dažādu nozaru tēzauros. Piemēram, SAGE pilntekstu datubāzē ir trīs tēzauri (socioloģijas, komunikācijas zinātnes un politoloģijas), kuros ir atšķirīga terminu struktūra (deskriptorbloks ar šaurākiem un asociatīviem terminiem) terminam (deskriptoram) *information* (informācija) (sk. 4. attēlu): politikas zinātnes tēzaurā terminam *informācija* ir šaurāki termini: dati un inteliģence; socioloģijas tēzaurā – tikai dati; savukārt komunikācijas zinātnes tēzaurā – veselības informācija, politiskā informācija, zinātniskā informācija, publiskā informācija. Atšķirības izskaidrojamas ar dažādībām šo nozaru diskursos, kas parādās tekstos.

"Valodu ekvivalences" problēma norāda, ka ir neiespējami izstrādāt "tieši simetriskas" daudzvalodu meklējumvalodas – gan leksikas (terminu) līmenī un, jo īpaši, – terminu attiecību līmenī, kur, piemēram, asociatīvās attiecības, kā arī hierarhiskās attiecības atveido noteiktus "kultūras modeļus" vai "teorijas" par "lietu kārtību".

Valodas nozīmes kontekstuālo dabu ir svarīgi apzināties, izstrādājot informācijas izguves sistēmas, jo informācijas izguve ir efektīva tad, ja cilvēkiem, kas ir iesaistīti meklēšanas procesa nodrošinājumā un norisē, ir līdzīgas zināšanu struktūras. Globālās informācijas telpas kontekstā, kultūru (gan plašā, gan šaurā nozīmē) un valodas struktūru saskaņotībai ir īpaši būtiska nozīme. Pretējā gadījumā piedāvātā meklējumvaloda var būt tāda, ka to ir grūti atpazīt kā savu valodu dotās valodas lietotājam. Kā šāda rezultāta galvenos iemeslus M. Hudona ir minējusi valodu izstrādi, kura veikta, tieši pārtulkojot terminus no avotvalodas uz mērķvalodu, kā arī tiešu vienas kultūras konceptuālo struktūru pārnesi uz citu kultūru, nenovērtējot to atbilstību[18] [5].

Jāatzīmē, ka globalizācijas kontekstā vērojama kultūru integrēšanās un saskaņošanās. Līdz ar to mainās gan valodu leksikas krājums (svešvārdi), gan leksikas nozīmes. Jau šobrīd ir izmainījušās proporcijas starp universālo un lokālo



4. att. **Termina *informācija* atšķirīgie deskriptorbloki SAGE tēzauros:**
Worldwide Political Science Thesaurus, Sociological Thesaurus, Communication Thesaurus

bieži vien par labu universālajām nozīmēm. M. Hudona, izpētot tādu kultūras un politikas ietekmētu nozari kā izglītība un tai atbilstošās meklējumvalodas dažādos interneta resursos, ir secinājusi, ka meklējumvalodas internetā kļūst arvien vispārīgākas (tas apgrūtina meklēšanas precizitāti), kā arī universālākas, tādējādi mēģinot apmierināt dažādu lietotāju meklēšanas iespējas un samazinot lokālās ietekmes[19] [6].

Tātad atziņa, ka valodas nozīme ir kontekstuāla, par galveno kritēriju tekstu analīzē, pieejas punktu piešķiršanā un (vai) izdalē un meklējumvalodu izveidē izvirza informācijas lietotāju kā noteiktas kultūras un diskursa pārstāvi.

Secinājumi

Analizējot valodas un kultūras mijiedarbības mūsdienu izpratni, galvenie secinājumi ir šādi:

1. Ja netiek ņemta vērā valodas nozīmes kontekstuālā daba, tad, veidojot daudzvalodu meklējumvalodas, ir iespējams, ka viena valoda tiek "iespīlēta" citas valodas konceptuālajās struktūrās tā, ka valodas lietotājam ir grūtības savu valodu atpazīt un izmantot informācijas meklēšanā.

2. Valodas nozīmes sociālā daba (kultūras un valodas mijiedarbība) ietekmē gan vienvalodu meklējumvalodu izveidi, gan daudzvalodu izveidi, jo referenciālā (attiecinājuma) un relāciju (terminu attiecību) semantika ir atšķirīga gan vienas valodas ietvaros (valodas lietojums dažādās darbības jomās), gan tās atveidojot citās valodās. Starpvalodu un introvalodas atšķirības ir jāņem vērā, izstrādājot indeksēšanas politiku, un tas ietver gan dokumenta teksta tematiskās analīzes jautājumus un dokumenta priekšmeta noteikšanas kritēriju izpratni, gan arī nosacījumus, kas jāievēro meklējumvalodu izveidē.

3. Valodas nozīmes kontekstuālā daba akcentē faktu, ka informācijas lietotājs kā noteiktas sociālās grupas pārstāvis ir noteicošais kritērijs dokumentu tematiskajā apstrādē un meklējumvalodu izveidē. Tam nepieciešama padziļināta diskursa analīze, kas ļautu labāk izprast vērtības, normas, nozīmes vai vispārinot – "lietu kārtību" kādā darbības laukā (nozarē), kurā valoda tiek lietota un veido šo "lietu kārtību".

4. Bieži vien zināšanu trūkums un plašāks skatījums neļauj izprast informācijas organizēšanas jautājumus. Informācijas racionāla organizācija vienmēr ir jā-skata saistībā ar valodu, kas tiek lietota tās pārraidei. To neievērojot, informācijas intelektuālā pieejamība gan lokālā, gan globālā kontekstā būs ierobežota.

Summary

Due to the development of global information space, the necessity to provide adequate tools and methods for information intellectual accessibility are increasing. One of the trends of research is to match national information retrieval languages or to construct multilingual retrieval languages. The aim of the paper is to give contribution into the theoretical understanding of the issue to help to define criteria for analyze of the text and for defining access points to the text, as well as both for the construction of the monolingual and multilingual retrieval languages. The main attention of the paper is the conceptual understanding of interaction between language and culture in the context of information retrieval languages.

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[6] LCSH – (Library of Congress Subject Headings) – ASV Kongresa bibliotēkas priekšmetu saraksts (angļu valodā).

RAMEAU – (repertoire d'autorite-matiere encyclopedique et alphabetique unifie) – priekšmetu saraksts (franču valodā).

SWD – (schlagwortnormdatei) – atslēgvārdu normatīvā (autoritatīvā) datubāze (vācu valodā).

[7] AGROVOC – lauksaimniecības tēzaurs.

MeSH – (Medical Subject Headings) – medicīnas tēzaurs.

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[16] Homemaker = persona – sieviete vai vīrietis, kura uzdevums ir rūpēties par māju un ģimeni, nevis pelnīt naudu. Sieviete vai vīrietis, kuram galvenais pienākums ir mājsaimniecības vai ģimenes pārvaldība [tulkojums definīcijai no UK Data Archive, User Guide to ELSST Thesaurus].

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Democratization or Americanization?

A Discourse Analysis of Press Reports on Bush's May 2005 Speech in Riga

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But it is principally upon their own languages
that democratic nations attempt to make innovations.
Alexis de Tocqueville

Introduction

News reporting can be seen as part of the way in which specific cultures understand, express and communicate concepts which are important to self-identity. Though a global information system permeates our era, we know what we are allowed to know through the filter of mass media, which may influence our view of reality and our sense of belonging to a global community.

This paper intends to investigate the role the press may play in the debate of border spanning and democratization in post-Communist countries.

The case study is the contrasting reactions, diffusely reported in the international press, provoked by the speech President Bush delivered in Riga in May 2005. This fact has raised a crucial question: to what extent is the EU enlargement eastwards and beyond perceived as a process of Americanization rather than Democratization?

1. Methodology

The present small-scale case study is based on an empirical, qualitative analysis of a selected corpus of press reports on President Bush's speech. The analysis has been carried out making use of the Appraisal Framework[1], a still ongoing approach aimed at exploring, describing and explaining the way language is used to evaluate, to adopt stances, to construct textual personas and to manage interpersonal positioning and relationships.

According to the Appraisal, the way events are observed, interpreted and reported will always be conditioned by the social background and ideological perspective of journalists, editors and management. Even the most ostensibly 'factual' report will be the product of numerous value judgements. For many journalists, the ‘hard news’, ‘factual’ report is a benchmark, a textual base level which may be transformed into ‘commentary’ or ‘opinion’ by the addition of subjective elements. The Appraisal divides these elements into three main functions, namely *Attitude*, *Dialogue* and *Intertextuality*. *Attitude* expresses how writers/speakers indicate either a positive (praising) or negative (blaming) assessment of people, places, things, happenings and states of affairs; *Dialogue* involves engagement, that is to say the means by which speakers/writers adjust and negotiate the arguability of their propositions and proposals; under *Intertextuality* speakers/ writers adopt evaluative positions towards what they represent as the views and statements of other speakers or writers.

2. President Bush’s Speech

The starting point of this study is obviously Bush’s speech, whose typescript is available on the White House official site with the title ‘President Discusses Freedom and Democracy in Latvia’[2].

A qualitative linguistic analysis is often supported by a quantitative analysis reliant on language software applications[3] used to generate a frequency list of the word occurrences. As shown in Table 1, the most frequent occurrences in Bush’s speech, which amounts to 3143 words, can give an idea of the main contents of the speech.

Table 1

Most Frequent Occurrences in President Bush’s Speech

WORD	OCCURRENCES	%
We	42	1.33
Freedom	36	1.14
Will	25	0.79
Democracy	22	0.69
You	19	0.60
Europe	14	0.44
Latvia	10	0.31
Free	10	0.31
Middle East	8	0.25
Democratic	7	0.22
America	7	0.22
Iraq	6	0.19
Russia	5	0.15
Afghanistan	5	0.15
Must	5	0.15

The high occurrence of the words *freedom* and *democracy*, as well as of related words such as adjectives and adverbs, is not surprising.

What it seems worth pointing out is that the inclusive personal pronoun *we* occurs 42 times and conjures up a unity, whereas the pronoun *you* is clearly dialogic and evokes involvement.

As to modals, future auxiliary will is the most used in the speech. It has a dynamic function, performing the intention to do something, when associated with human agents, and a predictive value pregnant with expectation when it is associated with inanimate subjects[4] as shown in the following examples:

> *"[..] we will stand for freedom across the broader Middle East."*
>
> *"[..] it is the strength of Russian democracy that will determine the greatness of Russia."*

On the other hand, the modal *must* is often used to underline a moral obligation to act, as in the following statement:

> *"[..] the freedom of Europe, won by courage, must be secured by effort and goodwill."*

Then we have the protagonists: Europe, America, Latvia, Russia, but also Iraq, Afghanistan, and Middle East, which is thought provoking.

3. Press Reports Analysis

Turning to press reports, public speeches of this kind usually generate commentaries, articles that, according to the Appraisal Framework, are models of argumentative genres identified by a catching headline, an incisive topic sentence in the first paragraph introducing the arguments, and a usually though-provoking closure. The texture of commentaries encodes the senders' ideological positioning since all language choices (vocabulary, deixis, modality, syntax) convey an ideological meaning[5]. Considering the three elements above, we can have an idea of the attitude of journalists towards what they are reporting, in particular, we can realize to whom and what the journalist has given prominence and how his/her choice may influence the reader's opinion about the news. This is particularly true for the on-line reader, who usually scans the articles rather than reading them line by line, and gives great importance to the above-mentioned elements.

The reason why the Internet has been chosen as the source of the analysis is twofold. Firstly, both the script of the speech and the commentaries are constantly and real-time available. Secondly, a global community is infrastructurally dependent upon the spread of global communication networks, including the systematic use of the World Wide Web.

The present paper considers the main parts which constitute some of the articles analyzed and the impact they may have on the general reader.

3.1. General Observations

The International Herald Tribune[6] published an article with a quite descriptive headline:

> *"Bush Opens Eastern European Trip Amid Tensions."*

The first paragraph topic sentence underlines the friendly atmosphere and the warm welcome Latvian people showed to President Bush:

> *"President Bush highlighted democracy in this ex-Soviet republic on Saturday where his motorcade rolled through streets adorned with American flags."*

The closure of the article seems to be factual, but not for those who are familiar with recent history:

"He closes his trip on Tuesday with a visit to Tbilisi, Georgia."

The headline of the article appeared on the *CBS News* heading[7] is a quotation from President Bush:

"Greatest Wrongs Of History."

In the topic sentence, the use of the quoting verb 'say' shows non-endorsement, neutrality, but the expression 'second-guessing' conveys subjectivity rather than objectivity:

"Second-guessing Franklin D. Roosevelt, President Bush said Saturday the United States played a role in Europe's painful division after World War II – a decision that helped cause "one of the greatest wrongs of history" when the Soviet Union imposed its harsh rule across Central and Eastern Europe."

In the closure, the reporter gives prominence to the fact that Bush's visit to Latvia and Georgia has irritated Russia. Noteworthy is the use of the non-core verb 'bracketing':

"Mr. Bush has irritated Russia by bracketing his visit to Moscow Sunday with stops in two former Soviet republics, Latvia and Georgia."

According to Carter[8], core vocabulary includes terms which have a general application, while making use of non-core terms is a way of slipping subjectivity into a text even without the presence of explicit judgement items; non-core terms are more limited in application and may be associated with a sense of greater formality or informality and with some emotive or emotional connotation.

The article written by James Coomarasamy for *BBC News*[9] shows a completely different perspective:

"Europe Trip Buoys Bush:

– So far, it has been a pretty impressive balancing act."

There is a patent reference to other problems President Bush has to cope with, in all probability the growing internal discontent due to the ever-increasing number of American victims in Iraq. There is also a subtitle, which underlines Bush's ability to balance Russia's and Baltic countries' relationships with America.

The topic sentence is apparently descriptive, but the reader may perceive an ironic attitude. The use of irony is one of the ways a writer can slip subjectivity into a text:

"President George W. Bush has looked relaxed and smiling during his visit to Europe – whether he has been joking about the president of Lithuania's age, or driving in President Putin's vintage car."

The closure recaptures the headline, underlining undoubtedly the journalist's point of view:

"Nothing, it seems, will deflect Mr. Bush from his goal of making the spread of freedom and democracy his foreign policy legacy.

The success of this trip will only reinforce his resolve."

The article written by Siddharth Varadarajan[10] appeared on three different headings, *The Hindu*, *The Sunday Observer* (Sri Lanka's English newspaper with the largest circulation) and *The Mirror of the World Foundation* (an Iraqi heading). Its headline refers to something in the past, specifically the relationships between America and Latvia before World War II; the subtitle shows immediately that the writer is highly critical of Bush's conduct:

> *"Mr. Bush and the Riga Axioms:*
>
> *– His attack on Yalta shows the U.S. is not interested in cooperative security. "*

Noteworthy is the choice of the category label *Mr.* rather than *President* when referring to Bush. Also the topic sentence alludes to the historical facts the headline alludes to:

> *"Historians of the Cold War will not have missed the significance of President George W. Bush choosing Riga as the venue for his speech on Saturday repudiating the 1945 Yalta Agreement."*

Not surprisingly, the closure is highly critical:

> *"Mr. Bush has little time for universal organisations. Instead, he believes in unilateral action. At Riga, he has served notice to the world that he is ready to take the good fight against "tyranny" beyond Iraq. Stability be damned."*

It's worth pointing out that inverted commas highlight the "tyranny" concept as a dubious one. The issue of expanding borders is represented as a "risk" of Americanization, with an unambiguous reference to the question of "exporting" democracy with war.

The headline of the article written by Howard Fineman for *Newsweek*[11] is a question, hence it is clearly dialogic:

> *"What's Yalta Got to Do With It?:*
>
> *– Bush rehashes history and revisits the lessons of the Soviet scourge."*

Also in the topic sentence the focus is on Yalta. The tone is clearly colloquial, as shown by the use of the informal American expression *boy*, whereas the journalist's point of view may be perceived in the adjective *incendiary* referring to Bush's speech:

> *"Boy, it's been a long time since Yalta made news – a half century or so. And yet if George W. Bush's trip to Europe is to be remembered for anything, it will be for the incendiary speech about Yalta he gave in Riga, Latvia, accusing FDR and Churchill of having agreed at the Crimean summit in 1945 to abandon Eastern Europe to Soviet communism."*

As to the closure, the journalist's ironic attitude is clearly shown. President Bush is referred to as "the Liberator of Iraq", with a capital 'L':

> *"And where is the urgent, tough, confrontational western leader who can end that [North Korea's] threat? If he isn't the Liberator of Iraq, then who is he?"*

Also the headline of the article written by Patrick J. Buchanan for *World Net*

Daily[12] is an interrogative:

"Was World War II Worth It?"

In the topic sentence the author gives prominence to Putin's position and to the ongoing debate on WWII between Putin and Bush:

> *"In the Bush vs. Putin debate on World War II, Putin had far the more difficult assignment. Defending Russia's record in the "Great Patriotic War," the Russian president declared, "Our people not only defended their homeland, they liberated 11 European countries"."*

In the closure, the use of the adverb "bravely" shows that the journalist sides with Bush, whereas the final metaphor is provocative:

> *"The truths bravely declared by Bush at Riga, Latvia, raise questions that too long remained hidden, buried or ignored. Yes, Bush has opened up quite a can of worms."*

As demonstrated by Lakoff and Johnson[13], metaphors are an important feature of political communication as they carry emotive connotations which may reinforce a world view and arouse feelings of identification and rejection.

Not surprisingly, the headline of the article written by Klaus Susiluoto for *Nordicum*[14], a Scandinavian business magazine, summarizes the main contents of Bush's speech responding to the efficiency criteria its readership demands:

"Bush Doctrine – Countries Helping Each Other Become Free."

The opinion of the writer is clearly shown at the very start of the article in the way Bush's popularity in Western Europe is presented:

> *"In Western Europe and elsewhere it is quite popular to criticize George Bush because of his foreign policy. When it comes to his policy towards small nations in Europe, however, Bush seems to do much better than most other prominent world leaders."*

The obtrusiveness of the author is patent: there is no evidence that President Bush is regularly criticized in Western Europe, the land of Blaire and Berlusconi, notoriously his best European allies.

In the closure there is a clear expression of judgement in the use of the term *naïve*:

> *"It would be naïve to believe that the United States is the greatest friend of small nations in Europe, but at least President Bush did much good by having a parallel interpretation of history as the Baltic countries."*

BelaPAN, Belarusian Information Company, reported a quotation from Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka commenting on Bush's Riga trip:

> *"I believe the Baltic States have enough problems of their own that could be discussed with their [American] boss. It's good that they talk about us. We're glad if someone among them has studied a map and showed their overseas boss where Belarus is located. We welcome such discussions, but I fear any other sort of talk will*

end badly for the leaders of the Baltic States. "

This quotation was chosen by the heading *Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova Report*[15] as an implicit comment on Bush's speech. In the words of the Belarusian leader the President of the United States of America is a "boss", a term which is severely in contrast with the idea of freedom and democracy. According to this opinion, the Baltic States are on the way of Americanization rather than democratization and border spanning is represented as a menace to national identity.

4. Conclusions

News discourse, despite its claim to objectivity, is a value-charged representation of the world shaped by journalists (and editors) on a double plane: a) in the selection, in that the characteristics of newsworthiness are "not neutral but reflect ideologies and priorities held in society"[16]; b) in the transformation, as the given event is processed and presented through cognitive categories and linguistic filters.[17] This mixture of fact and interpretation gives rise to the expression *faction*[18], a blend term coined by analogy with fiction, hence deeply evocative of the blur of ontological boundaries between reality and representation/perception.

Readers, as individuals and members of communities 'embedded' in a plethora of power networks, should always be aware of this, especially when they have to confront the crucial questions of our time. In this complex and fragmented world, where is the place of 'democracy'? How to speak of democracy in a plurilateral world, and how to institutionalize new forms of democracy commensurate with the complexity and fragmented structure of this world? Is there a unique model of democracy and can it be exported?

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Footnotes

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