

NEGOTIATING FUTURES –
STATES, SOCIETIES AND
THE WORLD

UZRUNĀJOT NĀKOTNI –
VALSTIS, SABIEDRĪBAS UN
PASAULI

Proceedings of the International Conference
Riga, November 11–14, 2004

Starptautiskās konferences ziņojumi
Rīga, 2004. gada 11.–14. novembris

UDK 30(063)

Ne 168

“Negotiating Futures – States, Societies and the World”

Proceedings of the International Conference. Riga, November 11–14, 2004.

Rīga, Latvijas Universitāte, 2004. – 378 lpp.

Rīga, University of Latvia, 2004, 378 p.

International Conference organized by:

University of Latvia

Faculty of Social Sciences

Advanced Institute of Social and Political Research (ASPRI)

and

Strategic Analysis Commission

under the Auspices of the President of the Republic of Latvia

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ISBN 9984-770-81-8

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Address by H. E. Dr. Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, President of Latvia

Ekselences,
dāmas un kungi!

Es priecājos būt klāt šajā oficiālajā mūsu Stratēģiskās analīzes komisijas rīkotajā konferencē un vēlos pateikties šīs komisijas locekļiem par viņu ieguldījumu, Latvijas Universitātei un tās rektoram par gatavību mums izpalīdzēt ar savām telpām, ar savām iespējām, ar saviem intelektuālajiem resursiem. Paldies!

Excellencies,
ladies and gentlemen!

I am pleased to see the good attendance at a conference that I would like to see as being a historic one, as marking the first of a very long series of intellectual debates taking place here in Riga, the capital of Latvia, and devoted to an in-depth analysis of both where we come from and where we need to go in the future.

Latvia, like its neighbours and others, stands at the beginning of a new historical period. The year 2004 is a historical watershed. From being a captive nation a mere 13 years ago, we have become a member of the European Union. From being unable to determine our own fate, from having lost our sovereignty to an armed invasion and annexation, we have become members of the NATO Alliance and have thereby ensured guarantees for the survival of our sovereignty and our freedom in the foreseeable future.

We now stand at the threshold of a new period, to face challenges that are no different from those that more fortunate nations in the rest of Europe have been facing for rather a longer time. But together with our neighbours, we are now faced with the task of uniting Europe, not just in terms of administrative structures and economic agreements, not just under the political common will of all those willing to stand under that star-spangled banner of Europe, but also of forming a common vision of what Europe is about.

Where does Europe come from, where is it going? What does anyone of us – be it here in Latvia or anywhere else, be it among the member States of the European Union or among our neighbours near and far – what does anyone of us foresee and envisage as the future of this continent, as the future for each and everyone of our nations? Most of all, what sort of future does anyone of us, as individuals, as citizens, have in store?

Latvia had been literally wiped off the map of Europe for far too long ever since the Second World War, and obviously such a state of affairs has left a mark on our people. Europe had been divided into spheres of influence since the infamous 1939 agreement between two totalitarian dictators, Hitler and Stalin, as to how to split up the continent among themselves. Europe remained divided by the Iron Curtain, thanks to the compliance of the Allies when faced with the Stalinist Soviet Union and its demands. It remained so for many decades, and it is not until 1991, at the end of the August coup, that the former captive nations were able to start on their path of, first of all – ensuring their sovereignty, their freedom, regaining democracy, regaining all the rights that that entails, but most of all – of entering into discourse and interaction with the rest of Europe.

The Iron Curtain had not been just the Berlin Wall and the barbed wires and the dogs and the sentries all along the borders of the Soviet Union and of its satellite countries. The Iron Curtain was lowered so as to stop the flow of ideas and the flow of information. I think that is the wall that we would like to break down now, by integrating our thinkers and our general population into the flow of ideas, into a mix from which, we hope, sparks will ignite and insights will be generated, and whereby all of us will be enriched by the debate, even if, as the rector alluded, we do not always have the same outset position and start from the same premises, nor do we necessarily reach the same conclusions by the same arguments.

My dream as President is to see Riga regain its place as an intellectual centre of Europe. I see this conference, in this hall, as a symbolic declaration of that intent. Riga, after all, is the place where Kant published his Critique of Pure Reason, even though he had written it in Königsberg. Riga is the place where Herder developed his ideas about the “folk,” about “folk-songs” and the meaning of nationhood. Herder’s ideas, in interaction with those of other important thinkers of the movement of German Romanticism, among them Harder, Hamann, the brothers Grimm, Lessing and others, their thoughts about the meaning of culture and the source of ideas were to revolutionise Europe.

At the time when German Romantics came forth with their ideas that all national languages, as well as the cultural heritage of the common folk, had an important contribution to make. Europe was governed by an aristocratic view of the world of ideas. Apart from the obvious role of the Christian faith, secular ideas were mostly inherited from Classical Antiquity. They were transmitted and embellished by an intellectual elite and supported by royalty or the more enlightened members of the nobility. The Royal Society of England was founded by Charles II immediately after his restoration. Twenty-five years earlier, the French Academy had already been founded by Richelieu for the King of France. Academies were founded in Berlin and other capitals under royal patronage in the more powerful and prosperous nations of Europe.

Ideas were propounded by great thinkers and by scientists, but they were supported by an aristocratic, authoritarian system of governance. The German Romantics came up with the notion that ideas are not generated only from the top down. They can also work their way from the bottom up. This is a very democratic idea in that it views culture as a multi-layered and multi-

faceted phenomenon that includes the contributions of the common folk as an integral part of it. The common folk in their cottages transmit traditional knowledge in tales and folk songs and oral literature that frequently contains as much insight and wisdom as the most erudite and the most turgid of academic discourses.

This was a novel and a revolutionary conception. It helped to fuel the numerous National Awakening movements across Europe. It played a role in the creation of new nation-states in Europe after the First World War, simply on the basis of the fact that they possessed a different language and a different culture. It also led eventually, as good ideas often do, to distortions and caricatures and to the reversal of what was originally a very noble idea. We saw some aspects of it picked up in German National Socialism and in Italian Fascism.

The last century has been rough on Europe and it certainly has left a bloody mark on the Latvian population and on Latvian soil. We would like the next century to be better, to be radically different. That is why the time has come for us, now that we have recovered our freedom, now that we have achieved the immediate policy aims that our nation had set for itself, to think about our priorities in the future, to think more deeply about what it means to be a European and what the values are that unite us on this continent. What really are the values that we so often invoke: those of democracy, of individual rights and freedoms, of the free market economy, of the possession of private property, of rights of authorship and so on?

Politicians, and especially in Latvia, may have a short career at the helm of their state. Intellectuals can hope for a longer career, but they do not have the power of decision-making in their hands, they cannot directly change the direction of the ship of State. In a democracy, ideally, we would like the people to be the ones to determine the course of the nation. But in order to do so, the people must be well-informed and they must be able to form their choices as rational and *informed* choices, not as emotional whims based on the popularity of this politician or of that slogan.

This is a formidable challenge. We saw it in the last elections of the European Parliament, how few people in Europe feel directly interested in electing their members of parliament to this legislative body, how little faith they have in its ability to represent them and to bring about any substantial change of direct concern to them. We are experiencing a similar scepticism here in Latvia. We have waited so long for our freedom, we have fought so hard and worked so hard to become members of the European Union. Now that we are in it, what are we going to do? What are our priorities going to be, and how are we to set out about determining them?

A few years ago I invited the population of Latvia to sit down on New Year's Day and to draw up a list of 99 of their most ardent wishes, to make among these a set of concrete priorities that they would like to see come into effect within the next year. Many people told me afterwards that they found this a singularly difficult challenge and many had difficulties in finding even ten goals that they felt were important, that they would like to see fulfilled during the coming year. I must admit that when I tried to follow my own advice, I got as far as 33 wishes and ran out of speed for myself, personally.

Setting goals and priorities is not an easy task. It is far easier to see what is wrong in the world. It is far easier to try and diagnose the ills that beset us. That, of course, needs to be done as well, and that is part of the task that some of you will be engaging in at this conference. Proper diagnosis of our ills is a necessary starting point, but we must get beyond that. We must get beyond griping, whining and complaining and condemning. We must get to dreaming about what we would like to be, about what we would like to become. It is not easy, it takes work and effort. It is just as hard as learning to fly. But one must fly in imagination, and one must have a vision for the future.

I invite you therefore to put your heads together and to help us in this strategic form of thinking. We have created, under the auspices of the President of the Republic, a Strategic Analysis Commission. The aim of this Commission is to gather our brightest minds in a variety of sectors, to get them to engage specialists in various areas as well as the general public in debating, in exchanging ideas, and in presenting goals about our future.

It is important for us as Latvians to find the goals and priorities that we wish to accomplish here and now for our country. When I took office as President, I declared publicly that I was ready to listen to anyone who would be ready to offer advice to me as President about what needs to be done in the country. I got many letters, I got quite a substantial response. Many of them were very long: 17, 18, 20 pages long, with a lengthy list of complaints about what was wrong with the country. Very few of them came with concrete suggestions as to what should be done to improve the state of our nation. I did receive one letter, though, from an elderly gentleman who outlined 20 points that, in his view, needed to be changed. Soon after I got an angry letter from him, saying:

“Two weeks ago I went to the trouble of setting down 20 things that need to be set right in the country, and I am very disappointed that you have not yet realised them.”

Debating about what we need to accomplish and forming a clear mental image of our goals and our aspirations is not enough. It is also important to set up a practical road-map of how we might get from here to there, what are the steps needed to get us from A to B. The roads chosen, of course, will vary in their details. This is where in a democracy, the role of political parties and interested groups comes into play, each one of them making and outlining a road-map with different sign-posts about the tasks that lie ahead.

In a democracy, we also have to find a way of harmonising all these different ideas in setting our national goals. We have to formulate those goals that are best for the nation as a whole, that are in the interests of the nation in the long term and not just the short term. This is a very difficult task in the governance of a country. It is definitely a challenge. We need ideas, and good ideas, for going about it in the best possible way.

These challenges are similar in other countries. I would like to welcome in particular today the substantial delegation from Lithuania. Thank you for being here. I am sure that your ideas and your insights will enrich the debate in this conference. I welcome all those visitors from far-away lands. Thank you for being here. We value your contribution and your ideas.

The challenges that we face are not unique. We like to think that we Latvians, just as much as anybody else, have a contribution to make. A contribution that is as unique as individuals are in a crowd or in a nation. In a democracy the whole point is to allow every individual a chance to reach the height of his or her potential. In a democratic union of nations such as the European Union, much the same applies to the contribution of individual nations. Some have longer histories and greater accomplishments, but every one of them brings the human resources of its people, their accumulated experiences and their unique skills for survival and growth.

Each nation, because of its own unique history, has its own unique national heritage and collective wisdom. I quite agree with the German Romantics in that regard. Our desire, then, is to make our voice heard in the chorus of European voices. Our desire is for every nation to be so heard. Every nation can make a contribution, be it large or small. Each has something to offer and we all have something to gain from our interaction.

I wish you well in this conference. I wish you well in all your personal endeavours. I hope that this is the beginning of a long journey in which we will continue to meet annually during the cold autumn month of November in Latvia. November marks our liberation, the creation of our state, which we commemorate on the 18th, our national holiday. We would like to see the misty month of November become a month of intellectual debate here in Riga for many years to come: of debates through which nebulous notions will be turned into lucid formulations, and clear recommendations arise out of the fog of conflicting claims and interests. Thank you for coming. My best wishes to you all!

1. Culture and Identities

Importance of Interplay between Science and Politics when Building New Stages

Lassi Heininen

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If we agree that science is needed, whether for trying to solve problems or for developing new inventions, then it becomes important to interpret and transform new research findings into a form that is useful for decision-making and vision-creation in modern societies. Here the social relevance of science is taken seriously, i.e. as a natural and relevant part of science, which the research community should be interested in.

An interplay between science and politics, or theory and practice means that the research community has a connection, i.e. common discussions, with decision-makers. Thus, academic and political elites communicate with each other when building a strategy for the future, which means some sort of negotiating processes between states and societies as the slogan of the Riga International Conference on Social Sciences indicates. This does not, however, mean a consensus between the two elites, or within them, since on one hand a dialogue should continue, and there is no dialogue without different opinions, and on the other hand an important part of an academic discourse is a critical point of view. More the question is that a process where science, mostly social sciences, gives its contribution and influences politics.

One approach is exactly to take this as an exciting process between theory and practice / science and politics including the main question: How research outcomes are and will be utilized in a decision-making process? It is good to be open-minded in order to be innovative, which correspondingly requests that you respect a process, which has its own dynamics. In my research I have used the method of active research, which means that a researcher is not only an observer but also an actor, and studied political processes, also those which I have been involved in¹.

1. STARTING POINT

Why an interplay is needed? And, why new stages are needed in general and also in (North) Europe? According to my understanding behind is a new

¹ E. g. Lassi Heininen. Pohjoinen politiikan ja kansainvälisten suhteiden tutkimuksessa. In: *Maailman tutkimisesta ja muuttamisesta – juhla kirja Jyrki Käkösen täyttäessä 60 vuotta 23.1.2003 / Studying the World and Changing It – Festschrift for Jyrki Käkönen*. Edited by Unto Vesa. Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 2003, 319–340.

kind of approach of Northern geopolitics after the end of the Cold War period including the following main features². Firstly, there have been socio-economic changes and changes in the economies of the North. This was followed by more fundamental changes of the international system, which were found a bit earlier in the North than in other regions of the globe like for example, the impacts of the climate change. Secondly, instead of confrontation and hegemony fights there is international cooperation in order to decrease tension and increase security in the former ‘military theatre’ of the Cold War.

Thirdly, due to an expanded list of international actors in international politics, and thus also in International Relations, a new kind of regional dynamics was created in which the state-centric and military issues, that had dominated Northern and Arctic geopolitics, ceded ground to more human-orientated concerns³. Fourthly, there is a new approach that instead of a traditional *Power* there is a more post-modern phenomenon, *Influence*. This has been tested both in global, regional and local contexts, and has been much the case in northern affairs within the last ten years.⁴

There is also a lack of the legitimacy of politics in the eyes of the public for example, due to the feeling that politics is without politics, i.e. content. Also there is a lack of, and thus need for, a real leadership in the current world politics. This together with globalization means that there is a lack of a wider dialogue and a need for openness and new kinds of bigger stages for wider dialogue between decision-makers and citizens⁵. This is much due to many and more active actors in international relations and a bigger scale such as trans-national corporations (TNCs) and non-governmental and civil organizations (NGOs).

Another reason is that decision-making processes are often weak, and decisions are not necessarily made by elected decision-makers but the so-called market-forces, or even things only happen before decisions are made. A part of the picture is that scientific results are not always used or utilized systematically in decision-making. Behind is the situation that there is no easy model or mechanism how to develop research findings into practise in general, and especially when going through a democratic process – like for example, public hearings and open discussions in general – where different interest groups are equal and able to have their voice heard.

Therefore, there is a need to concentrate on change, however not only climate change and changes in the globalized world economy, but also, and even more human responses to global changes “how to implement and promote adaptive capacity and accelerate human change in the North”⁶.

² Lassi Heininen. Circumpolar International Relations and Geopolitics. In: *AHDR (Arctic Human Development Report)*. Akureyri: Stefansson Arctic Institute, 2004, 12: 207–225.

³ Sanjay Chaturvedi. Arctic Geopolitics Then and Now. In: *The Arctic: Environment, People, Policy*. Eds. by M. Nuttall and T. V. Callaghan. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000, 441–458.

⁴ Lassi Heininen. *Euroopan pohjoinen 1990-luvulla. Moniulotteisten ja ristiriitaisten intressien alue*. Acta Universitatis Lapponiensis 21. Rovaniemi, 1999, 27–50.

⁵ E. g. *Newsweek*, July 30, 2001. “The World needs a bigger forum”.

⁶ See Call for Participation of the 3rd NRF Open Meeting: The Resilient North – Human Responses to Global Change. Yellowknife, NWT. Canada, September 15–18, 2004. Website: www.nrf.is.

Therefore, a more comprehensive and holistic point of view, which is based on both scientific studies and academic discourses, and other kind of knowledge such as traditional knowledge, is needed on one hand. On the other hand, there is a need for open discussions and dialogues, namely before a decision-making process, where the research community as a whole and researchers as individuals are actors. One way to implement these is to build new stages based on an interplay between science and politics.

2. BACKGROUND

Region-building with nations as main actors is one of the main themes, or tendencies, of international relations and geopolitics in the circumpolar North after the end of the Cold war period⁷. It has mostly meant a top-down process, where governments are initiators and states are the main, although not the only, actors.

Behind is the above-mentioned changed policy of the unified states that instead of confrontation it would be better to have cooperation, and this is possible to implement by building new cooperative regions. The main aim, at least in political rhetoric, of this new strategy is to have more security, prosperity and sustainable development, and thus first of all stability. This is mostly done through functional cooperation in more practical fields of low politics, which cooperation requires to have a new kind of stage and for a. And, here a cooperative region is a forum or stage for cooperation.

This is according to the theory of functionalism and a peace model by David Mitrany to emphasize the importance of cooperation in the fields of the so-called low politics when trying to build confidence between the former enemies⁸. Region-building can also be interpreted as a new way to apply new realism, and therefore, it is possible to compare to the nation-building of the 19th century in Europe like for example, that of Finland.

Region-building is, however, a more sophisticated way, or method, to control a region and an activity by non-governmental actors than for example, colonialism or the power politics of the Cold war period. Followed from this, region-building does not only mean a top-down control, but it has also bottom-up features and an alternative point of view to new realism, i.e. to interpret a region as an actor. It also includes the relationship between the North and the South, i.e. the rest of the world, which is another main theme of circumpolar international relations and geopolitics. This means impacts of global changes and globalization in the North on one hand, and on the other, and even a bit more, a possibility for a new kind, and most probably stronger, position of the north with non-colonial approaches in the relationship. "Defining the new relationships between the Arctic and the outside world and finding new approaches are politically important as well as scientifically interesting"⁹.

In the background of region-building there are aims and interests coming from the main international actors, and hopes, needs and expectations coming from other actors such as indigenous peoples and sub-national governments.

⁷ Heininen. 2004, 212–218.

⁸ E.g. David Mitrany. *A Working Peace System*. Chicago, 1966.

⁹ Heininen. 2004, 222.

Therefore, there are also different processes and procedures, and one of the most interesting processes is an interplay between science and politics.

Politically region-building can be interpreted to give an alternative approach to the current and traditional model of the unified state system. Behind is another geopolitical approach, regionalism or regionalization, which emphasizes a space structured for local and regional needs. This does neither deal with geography nor a power structure, since it also takes into consideration social spaces, identities and actors. Scientifically region-building is an interesting phenomenon in International Relations, which in this conference can be taken as one way to build, or to negotiate, strategies for the future.

Instead of taking the circumpolar North, or the Arctic, as a laboratory, or of claiming it as a distinctive region, it would be interesting to take the circumpolar wide organizations and fora as platforms for a wider discussion and common activities of, and by, both the residents and the actors from outside the region. One way to implement this is to organize local and regional public hearings based on the two substantial scientific reports launched in November 2004, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) and the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR).

This may be more relevant, since there are opinions saying that there is both a social need and readiness to move from quantity into quality in the current northern international cooperation, which is also a necessity in order to go deeper¹⁰. One of the main needs why to go deeper is that there are many gaps in knowledge like for example, there is a need for “a better understanding of the effects of cumulative changes on cultural and social well-being in the Arctic” and “to improve our understanding of the roles that modern industrial activities play in the pursuit of sustainable development at the regional level”¹¹.

And further, there is a need for more research adopting a comprehensive circumpolar approach that would complement the still dominant national perspectives¹², i.e. there is a need for wider information and literature covering the whole North, and even more fundamental, a comparative study on globalization and the North. These all deal with an interplay between science and politics.

3. EXAMPLES OF REGION-BUILDING AND STAGE-BUILDING IN THE NORTH

In order to illustrate the situation and make the text more concrete I have here five examples or case studies of region-building and stage-building in the North as an empirism of my study. They all include a relevant interplay between science and politics, and some of them can be taken as success stories.

¹⁰ E. g. Lassi Heininen. New External Political Structures in Northern Cooperation and Northern Governance: From Quantity to Quality. In: *Arctic Governance*. Eds. by Timo Koivurova, Tanja Joona and Reija Shnor. *Juridica Lapponica* 29. Rovaniemi, 2004, 27–42.

¹¹ Oran R. Young and Niels Einarsson. A Human Development Agenda for the Arctic: Major Findings and Emerging Issues. In: *AHDR (Arctic Human Development Report)*. Akureyri: Stefansson Arctic Institute, 2004, 229–242.

¹² Heininen. 2004, 222.

In the background there are on one hand, multi-disciplinary Northern / Arctic studies programs in northern universities, which have run in North America since the 1970s and a bit later in North Europe, one of them is the Arctic Studies Program at the University of Lapland, Finland. They are special kinds of programs of area studies concentrating on Arctic regions and Northern issues. On the other hand, since the 1980s there has been academic discourses and international research projects in North America, and partly in Europe with an idea and attempts to define the Arctic / North as a distinct international region. Among them was the international research project "Sustainable Development and Security in the Arctic" by the Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) in Finland, and a public forum for it, the Kuhmo Summer Academy.

Based on these study programs and research projects the new Arctic approach and a growing research interest toward the North were raised up, and soon they became into political discourse and onto political agendas.

3.1. Environmental Protection in the Arctic, and the AEPS and the Arctic Council

Parallel to the academic discourse some kind of circumpolar political body had been suggested earlier. Behind was thinking that a common platform or organization, that specifically deal with northern issues, would be useful for open discussion between different partners promote environmental protection and sustainable development in the Arctic. A concrete proposal and model for a common platform, an Arctic Council was made in a study by Canadian research institutions and civil organizations in 1991¹³.

One of the hypotheses of the TAPRI research project was that it would be potentially interesting, even important, to have international cooperation in environmental protection, i.e. a field of the so-called low politics, in order to decrease tension, have détente and build trust between the East and the West based on Mitrany's theory on functionalism. This was especially crucial in northern seas, which were among the 'military theatres' of the 1980s. As a part of the research was a new approach and research question of environmental protection, i.e. the relationship between the military and the environment such as nuclear safety¹⁴ by environmental organizations such as Greenpeace and political scientists interested in the relationship between the environment and development.

In October 1987, President Mikhail Gorbachev had a speech in Murmansk including six concrete proposals for international cooperation in the North, one of them was international cooperation in environmental protection in the Arctic¹⁵. At the same time the environment in general, and

¹³ Actic Council Panel, *To Establish an International Arctic Council. A Framework Report*. Prepared by F. Griffiths, R. Kuptana. Canadian Polar Resources Committee, 14 May 1991.

¹⁴ E. g. Johan Galtung. *Environment, Development and Military Activity. Towards Alternative Security Doctrines*. Oslo-Bergen-Trondheim, 1982; Lassi Heininen. *The Conflict of Interests Between the Environment and Military Strategy in Northern Waters and the Arctic*. In: *Perspectives on Environmental Conflict and International Politics*. Ed. by Jyrki Käkönen. London, Pinter Publishers, 1992, 55–71.

¹⁵ Mikhail Gorbachev. *The Speech of President Mikhail Gorbachev on October 2, 1987 in Murmansk*. In: *Pravda*, October 2, 1987.

especially environmental protection, was included a foreign policy agenda of many countries, for example that of Finland. And, as a follow-up of the Murmansk Speech Finland made an official initiative for an inter-governmental conference and process on an international cooperation in Arctic environmental protection in 1989¹⁶

And, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) was signed in 1991 and several working groups were established. Actually, also nuclear safety was taken into the political agenda of the AEPS, although in the beginning the nuclear waste from the military sources was excluded. Encouraged by and copied the above-mentioned Canadian proposal the Canadian government made an official initiative to create an Arctic Council in 1991.

The Arctic Council (AC) including the Arctic eight states as the members and northern indigenous peoples' organisations as the permanent participants was found a bit later, in 1996. The AEPS with the working groups was moved under the Arctic Council, and environmental protection became another pillar of the AC, when the other is sustainable development. Nowadays the Council is a high-level forum for international cooperation between governments and northern indigenous peoples. It is not, however, an international organization for decision-making with legally-binding decisions but a soft-law agreement, which seeks consensus-based solutions to shared problems. Although sub-national and regional governments are not among the permanent participants of the AC, their representation is there through the Northern Forum, which is an observer like are also some scientific and other non-governmental organizations.

Followed from this the role and importance of the Arctic Council has gradually increased, and is increasing, as a forum. This is on one hand, because it has become a forum for open discussion between (almost) all main actors of the northern cooperation. On the other hand, this is due to the work of the AC working groups, where researchers and other experts cooperate making new monitoring and assessment studies and analysis on a state of the circumpolar North like for example, the two reports by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP)¹⁷, and the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) and the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR).

As a conclusion, the role of the scientific community, when building both the AEPS and the AC has relevant, and especially the interplay between the Arctic research community and the decision-makers of the Arctic Eight states has been crucial. This may continue due to the encouraging experiences like for example, the two above-mentioned valuable reports done under the auspices of the working groups of the Arctic Council indicate.

3.2. The European North as a Cooperative Region and the BEAR

In the early 1990s there was an academic discourse by the Finnish and Norwegian social scientists on a potential cooperative region in the European North. A model, that especially the Norwegians were looking, was the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) established in 1992. Behind was, however, the

¹⁶ Background Information. International Conference on Environmental Protection in the Arctic. Ministry of the Environment. Finland, 12 July 1989.

¹⁷ E. g. *Arctic Pollution 2002*. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, AMAP. Oslo, 1997.

strong tradition of inter-regional cooperation between northern regions of Europe, especially within the North Calotte.

There was not only an academic discourse, but also a feasibility study on a region-building in the post-Cold War period by Norwegian research institutions emphasizing international cooperation instead of confrontation¹⁸. This was followed by the official initiative of the Norwegian Government to establish an international Barents cooperative region which was launched by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 1992¹⁹. Finally, the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) with its two councils was established in January 1993.

The official BEAR cooperation includes many fields of functional cooperation and excludes traditional security-policy. Indeed, the main aim of the Norwegian Government was to decrease tension and increase stability in the Barents Sea region, the former 'military theatre' of the Cold War²⁰. If this is the case, then the BEAR has been so far a success story, although cooperation is neither deep nor mostly multi-lateral but much functional and bi-lateral. All in all, the BEAR and its initiative owe the academic discourse and the Norwegian interplay between science and politics since it is based on the feasibility study and used the traditional cooperation as a metaphor of region-building.

3.3. An Idea of Northern Politics and Northern Dimensions

As a part of the approach of "the Arctic as a distinctive region" and international research projects on the North a concept of Northern politics was raised up into an academic discourse in the late 1980s. Here the point is that a northern policy would be a part of both external and internal policies of the Arctic Eight states. Behind was the emphasize of the research project to take northern regions both as parts of the rich industrial and welfare states and as fresh and innovative peripheries of the world on one hand. On the other, a northern policy was taken as a new kind of approach to traditional foreign policy including for example, environmental protection emphasizing an importance of international cooperation.

Concrete analyses and even proposals for example, about the relevance of northern policy as a part of the foreign policy of Finland were made in the Kuhmo Summer Academy²¹. The Finnish Association on Northern politics was found in 1994 first of all to promote an interplay between science and politics, i.e. on one hand to organize and promote both academic discourse and political discussion on, and create new scientific frameworks around, northern issues, and on the other hand to promote Northern studies and research. A bit later there was geographically the northern dimension of the European integration, for example, when Finland and Sweden joined the Union in 1995, although Norway decided to stay outside. As a part of the integration process of Finland

¹⁸ Olav Scram Stokke, Rune Castberg, Willy Östreng, Arild Moe og Henning Simonsen. Regionalt samarbeid i Nord: muligheter, betingelser, tiltak. *Fridtjof Nansens institutt. RSN Rapport № 1*, 1992.

¹⁹ Thorvald Stoltenberg. Barentsin alue: Uusi dynaaminen kehys Pohjoisten alueiden yhteistyölle. Pohjoiskalotista Suurkalotiksi – seminaari. Rovaniemi, Finland, 21.10.1992.

²⁰ E. g. Sverre Jervell. An interview in August 15, 1995 in Oslo (personal notes).

²¹ E. g. Lassi Heininen. Suomen reaktiot Arktiksen haasteisiin. In: *Kuhmon henki 1988. Turvallisuuspoliittisen kesäakatemian aineisto*. Helsinki, 1989, 58–65.

the term of Northern dimension, although first in the form of Nordic dimension, has mentioned in the foreign policy of Finland already in the early 1994.

What happened was that, in addition of the Finnish initiative of the AEPS, the Finnish government made the initiative on a Northern Dimension of the European Union in 1997 in the conference, which was organized by the Provincial Government of Lapland and the University of Lapland²². And, the 1st Action Plan was approved in 2000, and the 2nd in 2003, and the concept found its way onto political agendas.

There is, however, not only the EU's ND but also that of Canada's foreign policy, which was accepted in 2000. A discourse on Northern dimensions and new kind of North-South relationship has just started between the scientific community and decision-makers with ideas like for example, "Defining the new relationship between the North and the outside world and finding new approaches are politically important and scientifically interesting"²³. Thus, a Northern Dimension is both a policy toward the North and a metaphor for North-South relations in the context of the Arctic Council member states. Further, it can be taken as a model for a platform, or stage, for dialogue between the EU and Canada, and the EU and Russia on one hand, and on the other between the research community, NGOs and decision-makers as the Brussels Symposium indicates.

3.4. Indigenous Peoples and the Arctic Epistemic Community, and the Stockholm Convention

Since the establishment of the AEPS the northern indigenous peoples have actively pushed international work on environmental protection, in close collaboration with working groups under the auspices of the Arctic Council. For example, they acknowledged the work of the AMAP in identifying the impacts of transboundary pollution in the Arctic, especially Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) as new kind of thread, i.e. significant, but underestimated, pollution in the circumpolar North²⁴. They used the AMAP and pushed governments to sign an agreement, the global Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants to stop these pollutants.

The Convention, which came into force in May 2004, is one of the first examples of a global treaty, where the Inuit and other northern indigenous peoples influenced strongly through research, public education and lobbying. This can be seen as a success story of fruitful cooperation between northern indigenous peoples and the Arctic scientific community. And, more important internationally is that this can be repeated in other global environmental negotiations like already the process of the Arctic Climate

²² Paavo Lipponen. The European Union needs a policy for the Northern Dimension. In: *Europe's Northern Dimension: the BEAR meets the south*. Eds. by L. Heinen & R. Langlais. Publications of the Administrative Office of the University of Lapland. 1997: 39, 29–35.

²³ Report on "Northern Dimensions – Expanding Circumpolar Cooperation Symposium" by the NRF, the Canadian Embassy in Finland and the Canadian Mission to the European Union in June 3-4, 2004 in Brussels.

²⁴ J. C. D. Paci. Connecting Circumpolar Environments: Arctic Athabaskan Council and Arctic Council Programmes. In: *Circumpolar Connections. Supplementary Proceedings of the 8th Circumpolar Cooperation Conference*. CUA and Yokon College, 2003, 18–26.

Impact Assessment shows.²⁵ Here international negotiations represent a new kind of stage between indigenous peoples, an epistemic community and decision-makers.

3.5. Open Discussion between Different Stakeholders and the NRF

The above-mentioned Kuhmo Summer Academy and its sister forum, the Calotte Academy (started in 1991) are two international fora and travelling seminars with an annual meetings for both an academic discourse and a political dialogue on relevant northern issues. Based on the design and experiences of these two it came out that there is a social need for an open discussion between scholars and decision-makers, and representatives of NGOs, and also for a dialogue across sectoral borders in one society and in global scale in several societies.

The momentum came, when first, President Olafur Ragnar Grimsson made a proposal to establish an international research platform called a Northern Research Forum in 1998, and second, the feasibility study by University of Lapland applied the proposal and added an open discussion across sectoral borders as the main mission²⁶. This was well taken and the Northern Research Forum (NRF) was established in autumn 1999. Since that the process has been intensive, and there has been progress since the 3rd NRF Open Meeting was in September 2004 in Yellowknife and Rae Edzo, Canada and the 4th Open Meeting will be in October 2006 in Oulu and Tornio, Finland and Haparanda and Luleå, Sweden.²⁷

Due to the fact that my presentation on the Northern Research Forum is published in the Proceedings of the Congress of Centres Riga in May 2002²⁸ there is no need to repeat what is written there. Therefore briefly, the NRF is an international, inter-disciplinary platform with a mission to organize, implement and promote a cross-sectoral and open discussion and to implement a comprehensive, holistic point of view, which is badly needed in decision-making processes. The NRF means first of all an Open Meeting every second year including discussions and dialogues in plenaries, projects sessions and square hours by the leadership of a research community. Presentations and reports of young researchers are playing more and more significant role in these gatherings.

²⁵ Stephanie Meakin and Terry Fenge. Indigenous peoples and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. In: *AHDR (Arctic Human Development Report)*. Akureyri: Stefansson Arctic Institute, 2004, 210.

²⁶ Olafur Ragnar Grimsson, President of Iceland, "The Northern European States: New perspectives Call for Creative Research". Celebratory Speech, Opening Ceremony of the 20th Academic Year of the University of Lapland, September 7, 1998; The Northern Research Forum. The Feasibility Report. Prepared by an ad hoc group composed of Lassi Heininen (chair), Kari Hakapää, Vilho Harle, Frank Horn, Richard Langlais, Soili Nysten-Haarala and Outi Snellman. Publications in the University of the Arctic Process No. 8. University of the Arctic Circumpolar Coordination Office. University of Lapland. Arctic Centre. Rovaniemi 1999.

²⁷ For more detail see *Northern Veche. Proceedings of the Second NRF Open Meeting*. Eds. by Jon Haukur Ingimundarson and Andrei Golovnev. Northern Research Forum. Akureyri, 2004 and the NRF Website: www.nrf.is.

²⁸ Lassi Heininen. The Northern Research Forum. In: *The Changing Focus in European Studies: EU > Europe > World*. Eds. by Jorgen Drud Hansen, Gustav Kristensen, Alf Vanags. University of Latvia, EuroFaculty (Tartu-Riga-Vilnius), 2003, 112-119.

These discussions deal with relevant and acute issues and are both issue- and policy-orientated with a concentration on opportunities, and thus the main themes are relevant like for example the slogan of the 3rd NRF Open Meeting was “The Resilient North – human responses to global changes”. . Themes of each Open Meeting are decided about 1,5 years beforehand with an idea that they will be relevant and acute in the next two years line and even further.

The NRF is also a process, not an organization, with a light and flexible structure to organize expert workshop on relevant issues, to organize and promote local and regional events with international participation (like for example, the Riga International Conference on Social Sciences and the Calotte Academy) and public hearings, and to have an expert network on northern issues. Thus, both the background and the current implementation of the NRF deal with an interplay between science and politics.

4. CONCLUSIONS

All in all, there exist several new and new kinds, partly post-modern, stages and forums for discussion and dialogue. Based on them and experiences from them I have the following conclusions: First, both ideas and frameworks for these new stages have been built both through and by an interplay between science and politics. Second, social sciences have played, and could play also in the future, an important role here. Third, there is a growing need to cross different borders and to be international, multi-lingual, multi / interdisciplinary and open-minded. Fourth, although both science and politics have been involved in these processes the scientific community has created ideas or visions for content in most of the cases, and made a feasibility study or proposal for a framework in some cases. Fifth, decision-makers have made the decisions and found frameworks, and thus are mostly in charge of the implementation, although there are some examples, where also the scientific community has been involved in the implementation.

Finally, there is still a question: how research findings are used and utilized in decision-making? Therefore, more dialogue between the research community and decision-makers are needed on one hand, and on the other hand, new stages – local, regional and global ones – are needed for discussion and dialogue between citizens and decision-makers in order to let more and new voices to be heard.

Cultural Identities, Hybrid Identity and Transversal Politics: The Case of Rural Identity¹

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INTRODUCTION

I guess that participants in this conference are expected to talk and exchange on national and ethnic identities, more than on rural identities. We think that this contribution on multiple identities and hybrid identity, resulting from our approach of the changes at work in the rural world 'here and there', can enrich the collective reflection on national and ethnic identities and its political perspective, in Latvia or in France².

This paper aims at understanding why and how the claim for the recognition of **cultural specificity** (*différence* in French) is becoming more and more central. The weakening of nation state and the multiplication of socio-economic conflicts contribute to the questioning of national or religious culture as a fundamental principle of unity: it is more and more thought as a principle of division and conflictuality within the social body. In a fragmented society, **cultural identity** and identities are becoming a major political stake: in terms of recognition and politics: how to make them co-exist, how to make them back on each other to carry out society transformations?

A definition of Identity found in a very commonly used dictionary³ in France: Identity is what allows to *reconnaître* a person among all others. In French, the verb *reconnaître* has a double meaning: *to recognize* and *to identify*.

Identity is a sense, a meaning attached, attributed to an individual or a group that serves to distinguish them from the others. As such, identity has a twofold role: it is both constitutive and framing for its holders themselves, 'explaining' them who they are, entangled with meanings and behaviours. It announces and represents an individual or a group to the other members of the society.

¹ Tereza Stockelova, sociologist from the Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University in Prague (CZ), has inspired key ideas of this paper, but not its many weaknesses of course. Thanks to her...

² This contribution reflects questions and hypotheses formulated in a European action research project called IRIDE project: *Imaging Rural Identities in the Enlarged Europe: When rural people take the camera and tell their stories*. Partners : Babel, NGO, Paris – Grenoble (France), CLM, Centre for Agriculture and Environment, Utrecht (Netherlands), MAS, NGO, Riga (Latvia), School of Agriculture, Pisa (Italy), UCD, University College, Dublin (Ireland).

³ Dictionnaire Le Robert, 1991.

Identity is not something prescribed once and forever. Sooner than a fixed attribute it is a permanent process of construction of senses: it is re/constructed over time period, within ongoing social interactions and under contextual circumstances. Identity is a subject of transformations. By accepting and appropriating them, it is unavoidable that individuals and groups also modify them. Moreover, we can talk about identity strategies – procedures developed in relation with the specific situation of interactions and implemented by actors to reach their goals – that comprise the idea that individuals and groups possess a certain capacity of action with respect to the choice of their reference group⁴. Thus they are also actors themselves who are able to introduce changes in their identity path.

The case of rural identities shows that the reconstruction of rural identities in the world is a reaction to deep social, economic and political changes happening in the countryside: in name of market efficiency, modernity and public expenses cuts, the agricultural roots of rurality are being questioned, wherever in Brazil, France or Latvia... A diversity of processes is at work: economic and social contradictions within the farmers' population, new population arriving to the countryside with their urban life styles...those movements generate tensions. Finally there is a multiplicity of rural identities, reflecting conflicts, splits in between different movements. An interesting question is in which ways this multiplicity of rural identities in our countries or in the world, can be articulated to make emerge new processes and forms of rural collective identity.

This presentation will propose some ideas and hypotheses to understand deep changes at work in the rural world.

- Economic and financial globalisation induces processes of questioning and destructuring of cultural and social identities: the rural world is under pressure.
- These processes are sources of tension and richness: diverse answers are identifiable here and there. They reflect the ways in which multiple and multi-facet identities are mobilised in transversal dynamics, transversal politics 'to cross borders' and to elaborate projects and initiatives able to re/configure? Different visions of the world, to generate a hybrid, new rural identity.

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT PUTS UNDER PRESSURE THE 'UNITED RURAL WORLD'

Two aspects in the identity construction process are important: actor's active role and connections and interchanges with a broader social environment taking place in a specific context. Those contextual circumstances may include geographical specificities, history, economic system, etc. as well as social structure and relations.

Several very deep structural changes are at work in our societies since the 70s – 80s. Economic globalisation and the destructuring of state

⁴ 4 Lipiansky, E. M., Taboda-Leonetti, I., Vasquez, A. Introduction à la problématique de l'identité. In: Camilleri, C., Kastarsztein, J., Lipiansky, E. M., Malewska-Peyre, H., Taboda-Leonetti, I., Vasquez, A. *Stratégies identitaires*. Presses Universitaires de France, 1999.

interventions have been inducing a process of questioning of collective and individual identities, everywhere. The crucial relation opposing workers' movements and economic dominant class has lost its centrality for other multiple oppositional relations induced by a set of distinct problems related to job insecurity, unemployment and exclusion. The crisis of the welfare state, already underlined in France at the end of the 70's, is also perceivable in the US and UK at the same period.

It creates exclusion and *fracture sociale*: this notion of *fracture sociale* refers to the existence of entire groups of the population who, without being totally excluded, are fragilised in their existence: job, income and more and more difficult access to consumption, health and education for their kids⁵. This marginalisation process is social and economic, but also cultural and political. In France and other countries, those populations exist as problem to solve more than actors in the public political debate: the key work word being *exclusion*, more than excluded groups.

If we combine a less protective state with the destructuring of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and exposure to the world commodity markets, the result is a fragilisation of the whole traditional rural tissue based on agriculture and farming, with an especially vulnerable category: the small farmers.

The process which has been at work with the industrial working class decline since the 60's in Western Europe and Northern America, characterises the current post-industrial era:

- excluding farmers from the countryside,
- stimulating concentration and industrial agriculture,
- breaking the cultural relation between rural population, agricultural production and territory or land.

And at the same time, neorural population is arriving to countryside, contributing also to redefine rurality, new economic activities are progressively developing in relation or not with farming.

Residential qualities of rural areas, migration flows (e.g. 'rurbanization'), new consumption phenomenon of countryside (e.g. tourism) and consumer demand (e.g. quality food, nature) are at the centre of controversial rural identity processes. Multiple actors and multiple perspectives interact and 'struggle' in shaping new rural identities / identity.

What is on the agenda in Europe is rural development or sustainable rural development, and much less the future and the recognition of rural groups, like small farmers. There is a kind of political justification: the priority is on how to have living and attractive countryside and not really to keep small farmers working in agriculture. There has been a gradual disconnection between rural and agricultural realities.

This shift from a favourable to a destabilised economic and social status has generated a loss of social references. In a certain way, this loss is compensated by a nostalgic and a more or less imaginary relation to national or religious identity: this is quite obvious when observing electoral attitudes in the countryside in France or Poland, quite sensitive to nationalistic or xenophobic discourses.

⁵ Wiewiorka M. *Une société fragmentée? Le multiculturalisme in débat* [A fragmented society? Debating multiculturalism]. La Découverte, Paris, 1997.

THOSE EVOLUTIONS ARE SOURCE OF TENSION AND INITIATIVES

There is a changing nature of territorial bases of collective – cultural, ethnic, political and other – identities at the local, regional and national level. The rebuilding of territorial identities appears as a major issue of rural development in current Europe⁶.

In the countryside, the tensions can be economic, cultural or political. In my mountain rural village, farmers do not like at all horse breeders who are ready to rent land at higher price. Mountain farmers as landless farmers...Of course, the situations can be very diverse and contrasted.

Again in my village located at 30 km of a dynamic town, Grenoble, the agricultural rural population is not anymore the driving force of the local life, politically and culturally. This process can be observed daily by the kind of cultural activities and associations set up in the village in which the ‘old rural’ population does not really feel concerned. Different cultural practices coexist: young rural people with agricultural origin play music in the village brass band, spend evenings in the bars or take care of traditional celebrations, while neo rural young people still spend a lot of their leisure time at the big town. They do not really succeed to converge on joint projects.

Landscape and local products play significant roles in identity (re)-building – symbols to identify with rural. They can reflect rather innovative farmers’ development strategies, engaged in new farm product production and marketing positioning, but also in a new explicit way to relate with nature and landscape. Very often, such orientations are successful when they can be elaborated collectively: collective-ness as group value, as project management and as economic efficiency⁷. Collective-ness as an answer to marginalisation. Different kinds of farmers can involve in those initiatives: small and not small. Most of the time, those initiatives can only be successful if they are in condition to be connected with other kinds of actors, non agricultural or non rural ones: they reflect their capacity to enrol, to absorb, to deal with differences. A lot of collectives projects are related to the development of organic production and direct selling.

Within such perspective, communication on self to external world is crucial: to articulate voices, to visualise diversity, to counteract against globalization negative effects by asserting the self and the importance of its relation with local-ness.

In Western Europe, we have studied⁸ the blossoming of the many initiatives which aim at recreating social link, regiving the sense of collectiveness, claiming for and valorising values, traditions, heritage and culture, to make them an element of modernity and territorial identity.

⁶ Ray C. Endogenous development in the era of reflexive modernity. *Journal of Rural Studies*. 1999. 15 (3), 257–267.

⁷ Assouline G., Oerlemans N. Organisational changes for consolidating sustainable agriculture and rural development in Europe: the role of farmers ‘networking strategies’. In: *Agricoltura Mediterranea*. 2002. Vol. 132, 179–197.

⁸ In the frame of a European research project entitled TRUC: Transforming Rural Communication, involving teams from France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, The Netherlands (2002-2004).

There are attempts *to cross the borders* of those multiple identities and seek adhesion to common values and grounds. A cooperation project aiming at developing relations between landless farmers' settlements of Brazil and my mountain village can mobilise very different people from the village. It is based on solidarity and the mutual recognition of what Brazilians can offer to the French village people and vice-versa. There are many other initiatives in the villages which allow gathering very different groups of people like citizen cafes where you can debate of any kind of macro or micro questions.

Interestingly, those projects recognise that from each cultural or identity positioning the world is seen differently, and thus that any knowledge based on just one positioning is 'unfinished' – which is not the same thing as saying it is 'invalid'⁹. Then, the only way to be approaching the 'truth' is by a dialogue between people of different positioning and identities. This means that people who identify themselves as belonging to the same collectivity or category (let us say group of farmers in a village) can be positioned very differently in relation to a whole range of social divisions (gender, ability, religion, political opinion, sexuality...). For example, different persons involved in the kind of solidarity transversal project may not really back up their *pair* group: other farmers are not interested at all by this initiative and even criticise the members of the group for politicising cultural activities. At the same time, people with similar positioning and/or identity can have very different social and political values¹⁰.

MULTIPLE IDENTITIES AND TRANSVERSAL POLITICS

Social construction of identity always happens in the context of power relations.¹¹ Therefore it can both reflect the existing power relations and contribute to their reproduction or, possibly, redefinition¹². Even if identity can not be learned, assigned or adopted, "learning" about the self, social system and their relations followed by raise of self-awareness contributes to

⁹ Haraway, D. Situated knowledge: the science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective. In: *Feminist studies*. 1988. 14 (3). Quoted by Yuval-Davis N. What is 'transversal politics'? In: *Soundings*, issue № 12, summer 1999. London.

¹⁰ Yuval-davis, N. What is 'transversal politics'? In: *Soundings*, issue № 12, summer 1999, 94–98. London.

¹¹ Castells, M. *Le pouvoir de l'identité*. L'ère de l'information [The power of identity. The information era]. Fayard, 1999.

¹² Castells identifies three types of identities on the base of their relation to the power system: legitimising identity that is accepted by the governing institutions; resistant identity that stands in opposition to the dominant structures and secludes from them; identity-project – construction of a new identity that redefines the individuals' position in the society and therefore introduces transformation in the whole social structure. As such it is dynamic and transformative in comparison to first two ones that accept the existing power relations by profiting or dissociating from them. Over time period the same identity can pass from one standing to another. So, no identity per se is legitimate. Their construction depends on the historical context. He considers that in contemporary network society identities-projects as well tend to follow more the logic of dissociation and resistance than the model of legitimate identities. Similarly also the local communities are more often defending reactions to the aggression and rapid and uncontrollable changes in the external world. They are culturally constructed, e. g., organised around specific values, which comprise meanings for self-identification.

develop identity strategies that can lead to progressive transformation of stakeholders situation in the social system.

The feminist movement has developed quite radically this perspective by proposing the concept of *transversal politics*.

*...Transversal politics it seems to me is about people being able to come together across differences, understanding where each other is coming from, understanding the different power relationships that exist, but at the same time being able to overcome those differences, however painful and difficult they are, in order, first, to sustain an alliance. But not only that. It's also so that the alliance can work to bring about some kind of wider transformation. And envisaging that wider transformation means subscribing to some kind of common agenda for change, from wherever you're positioned...*¹³

It focuses on the creation of a political identity (hybrid or transversal?) without oppressing differences, by recognising them, by rejecting totalising unity by domination or unity by incorporation¹⁴.

*...Because transversal politics does not privilege a priori any positioning or identity, the same value system might simultaneously prioritise different political projects from different standpoints. For example, where campaigns about women's control of their own body might prioritise struggles for the legalisation of abortion in some location, they might prioritise against forced sterilisation in another...*¹⁵

THE TRADITIONAL WAY

One major type of answer corresponds to the participation of social movements to history, intervention in the public sphere, emerging as a priority on the political agenda. In this case, we can see that the resources are far from being only cultural. The resources can be political, electoral, by forcing politicians to be attentive. This dimension is rather known and traditional. Its objective is to modify relations of strength in order to be able to weight on and influence policies.

In Brazil, the Landless Farmers Movement (MST) has been a powerful ally of the governing party, the Workers Party (PT), left – social democrat, but is in conflict on the delayed and too modest agrarian reform and on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) official policy. This promotes a cultural, social and political identity and develops a radical programme and rhetoric.

In France, Confédération Paysanne, the second farmers' union, is close to Green and Socialist Parties; but during the socialist government (till 2002), this union was in frontal opposition with the government and still is with the new government on agricultural policy and on GMOs.

Another movement in France like Coordination Rurale is rather close to extreme right.

¹³ Mulholland, M., Pate, P. Inclusive movements/movements for inclusion. In: *Soundings*, issue № 12, summer 1999, 127–143. London.

¹⁴ Haraway, D. *Simians, Cyborgs and Women*. London: Free Associations Books, 1991. www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Haraway/CyborgManifesto.htm

¹⁵ Yuval-Davis, op. cit., p. 98.

Those examples show that in the rural world, farmers are the main social group, organised in unions or movements and can intervene to defend their interests and a specific vision of the relation between agriculture and rurality. If we look at them in a historical perspective, we can only observe that those movements are able, to some extent, to defend social and economic interests on short term but are not really in condition to propose and carry out regenerating transformation of the rural world.

THE TRANSVERSAL WAY

In the last 5 to 10 years, the important mobilisation on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in many countries involving farmers' organisations, urban environmental movements, consumers associations, economic interests (retailers), political parties could be considered as a transversal dynamic, making converge different kinds of actors with their own vision of the world able to raise some universal questions such as: which kind of food do we want? Which agriculture? Which kind of risk are we exposed to?

In this mobilisation leading to the crossing of economic, cultural, social and political borders¹⁶, knowledge is produced and transferred among stakeholders, new discourses are forged on food, agriculture, nature, consumer choice, risk, expertise. This social movement, made of very different identities, has its own identity, partly nourished by this capacity to articulate local direct actions (experiment GM field destruction) with global contestation present in developed and developing countries. In this process, the power issue is tackled through the denunciation of the risk of a monopolistic control on world food resources, the criticism of the collusion between political power and expertise and the undemocratic way in which public decision makers impose GMOs on a very reticent population.

At international level, European regions, in UK or France, engaged in GM free strategies in which territorial identities are emphasised, are building cooperation relations with Brazilian regions producing soybean to get access to non-GM soybean.

The anti-GMO international mobilisation is an interesting case of transversal politics. It assembles very different actors, converging in a struggle and on the other hand evidently keeping their specificities, identities... This characteristic is not a weakness of this social movement. On the contrary, it is a strengthening process which allows the enrolment of people on different topics. And these topics are urban and rural, or we can say they question the border between urban and rural topics.....and thus identities.

CONCLUSION

This paper shows that rural identity can be re-built and promoted through transversal alliances, reconfigurations, and not through insistence on purity, as essence of rurality.

¹⁶ Cockburn, C. Crossing borders. Comparing ways of handling conflictual differences. In: *Soundings*. Issue № 12, summer 1999, 99-114. London.

By making cultural differences a strength and by proposing to build a political proposition based on transversality, feminists have enriched this approach of identity building and recognition. They propose ‘to cross borders’ and to elaborate projects and initiatives able to aggregate different visions of the world, to generate a hybrid, new identity. Ideas, concerns, projects or products circulate through networks, change or enrich everyone identity. Their combination may create the conditions for carrying out societal transformations.

Simultaneously, they have the potential to accentuate pressures from *pairs* or communities, rejection of policy amendments or alternatives by policy makers. Induced conflicts and processes of polarisation are difficult to regulate anywhere. Those tensions put identities at stake: to make accept their recognition, the virtues of conflicts need to be accepted: conflict as a process of integration of actors within society¹⁷, of multiple identities cross fertilisation and hybrid cultural identity building.

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¹⁷ Rui, S. *La démocratie en débat: les citoyens face à l’action publique* [democracy into debate: citizens and public action]. Armand Colin, Paris, 2004.

Political Views of the Orthodox Mindset in Contemporary Ukraine (Religious Resource: Reasons and Causes)

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The aim of this paper is to shed light on the question of whether the Orthodox mindset in contemporary Ukraine will culminate in its own political identity. In order to achieve this goal, I want to present some main points concerning:

- (1) The Orthodox population map of Ukraine,
- (2) Soviet heritage as a cause of political activity among the religious people,
- (3) The political activity of the Orthodox population,
- (4) The religious activity of the Ukrainian politicians during electoral campaigns,
- (5) My own views concerning the sum of the presented facts.

Byzantine Christianity was adopted in Ukraine in 988. Nevertheless, even today we find that the views within the Orthodox Church are combined with the ethnic ancient pagan religions. The latter gave modern society the variety of holidays and ceremonies that are the basis of religious practice for most Ukrainians. Today we find that 34.1% of people polled say that Ukraine is an Orthodox country and, additionally, 23.7% are of the opinion that Ukraine is a Christian country [1].

The total amount of the population that subscribe to the Orthodox point of view is 15468 (01/01/2004) – 51.9% of the total religious population in Ukraine. The Orthodox religious map can be seen in the following make up; the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (10628 – 35.7%), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kiev Patriarchate (3508 – 12%), the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (1190 – 4%), the Russian Orthodox Free Church (Foreign) (29 – 0.1%), the Russian Orthodox Church of Old Ritters (Bila Krynyca consent) (62 – 0.2%), the Russian Orthodox Church of Old Ritters (unpriest consent) (10 – 0.03%), the Russian True Orthodox Church (26 – 0.09%) & others (15 – 0.05%) [2, 68].

But it is not possible to objectively view this without correlating the number of the religious communities with the sociological surveys that show confession-

membership of the Ukrainian citizens. The last survey which provided this information was with the UOC (MP) – 37.8%, the UOC KP – 28.7% [3]. As we can see, the previous tendencies are the same as in the poll in mentioned earlier with the greatest difference being observed in the UOC KP survey.

In my opinion, the reason for these results is due to the fact that the orthodox mentality makes up a large part of the political mindset and state structures. Therefore, the makeup of these structures is seen as part of national interest. For example, the orthodox leader Patriarch Philaret said: “Our primary aim is to defend and build the Ukrainian state. Any party that has the same basis is receiving our support. We do not limit the freedom of our members ... but we ask them to recognize this principle which will protect the interests of the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kiev Patriarchate” [5, 6]. As you can clearly see the orthodox leaders are contributing to the formation of the political mindset with in Ukraine. Ideally, “the national church in Ukraine must be the church that functions based on deep ritual-cultural traditions of the people, helps the development of ethnoculture, self-consciousness and the state mentality of the nation” [6, 25]. A person who goes to church after the collapse of the USSR, especially an intelligent one, feels that its his/her obligation to the past and to the present nation to be Orthodox and attend church regularly. Let’s try to understand this part of “perestroika.”

People lost their ground – the communist faith. Concerning this point, I agree with S. Bulgakov when he said that Bolshevism had its spiritual roots in Orthodox religion [7]. Also, I might add that the practice of becoming a communist member looked like the ceremonies of the church – most likely, the reason for this was due to the difficulties people had innovating new ideas in the Russian empire – new leaders didn’t know any other way to rule the state. As a result, I do not agree with the term “the politics of atheism” as the correct term for that time. I have some reasons to insist on my position. Firstly, the Orthodox Church existed and was helped when the state needed its help (lets remember famous words of Stalin – “Brothers & sisters” after the German invasion). Secondly, the new power used many “religious” practices and ideas. For instance, the idea of life in paradise after death has been transformed to the image of an excellent future, which after time became a fantasy only living in the minds of the people. Thus, Communism became another version of the Orthodox faith. But after the collapse this faith was destroyed.

In other words, the new reality needed a new basis and it came from the past. Now, I will illustrate the situation through the words of the investigators and victims of this process:

C. Hill: “... anticommunist reaction means the growth of the Orthodox authority” [8, 560];

Z. Krahmalnikova: “I connect today’s tragedy of our Motherland with the church’s tragedy. There is no moral, spiritual authority in the society today” [9, 251];

V. Elensky: “the time of “Perestroika” is considered to be the age when the church went from the status of supporters of dictatorship to the anticommunist mindset that formed the basis of such process when “post soviet state representatives of nearly all political orientations began to appeal to religion” [10, 21];

“Religion goes in turn with politics causes and the “western” model is changed by “assigning” one as the global process of changes and transformations” [11, 14];

L. Byzov, S. Filatov: “The growth of the religious thought... is explained by the collapse of previous system of values and filling the vacuum with what appeared to replace the communist ideology” [12, 14];

G. Vasilev: “Religious difference has to be the key reason for the acceleration in growth of the Ukrainian nation” [13, 3];

O. Kudoyar: “The cleansing of social life is a returning of the state to the Christian values” [14, 96];

O. Buchma: “The transformational processes of politics and religion make them “profession” and “business”” [15, 50];

V. Klymov: “Today in Ukraine the Church has the function of fashioning the social and national image” [16, 53];

A. Voronov: “One dictatorial system (soviet-atheistic) was changed by another... – religious-nationalistic” [17] and so on.

All of these post-communist visions concerning religion and politics lead to the same explanation for growth of religious thought among the intellectuals, primarily the new politicians.

For example, I would like to present Ukraine as a case of UAOC’s development. Its revival began in 1990 after being made illegal in 1930 by the USSR. Territorially, it predominates at the village level in the West and in the cities in the East. But primarily the representatives are mainly “radicals for national revival and political independence from the artistic and scientific intellectual communities” [18, 84]. They think of the church as a political organization not religious. The 35th article of the Constitution of Ukraine (1996) says: “The church is separated from the state”.

Special attention must be given to the religious characteristic of the Ukrainian people when reflecting on their attitude toward politics [19, 231].

Confession	I’m representative of the political party, %	I take part in meetings, %	I’m interested in politics, %	I’m not interested in politics, %
The UOC KP	6.37	1.45	53.98	36.18
The UOC	5.95	0.79	61.9	28.17
The UAOC	9.3	2.33	67.44	23.26
The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church	5.08	1.69	65.54	29.38
The Ukrainian Catholic Church	0	0	70	25
Another	3.8	1.27	48.1	44.3
The Orthodox (without precise definition)	2.84	0.78	56.59	39.02
Without confession	5.21	4.17	60.42	29.77

This sociological investigation presents a view of the Ukrainian electorate but also explains how the religious mindset works during electoral campaigns. The Ukrainians like politics via television & do not take active part in the political parties' day to day functions. This is why the minor parties are full of the unrealistic slogans and work.

The politicians know that historically our country is mainly Orthodox and will try to use its values during the electoral process. For example, in 2002, the parliamentary elections, we had up to 16 points which were directly connected with religious beliefs, struggle for spiritual development, spiritual revival, censure of destructive elements in contemporary society, spiritual values, wish to support the church, church communication, cooperation of church and school, the idea of the only one Ukrainian church, religious basis of the party and so on. Such deep interest in church/state matters can be interpreted by understanding that support for the Orthodox Church mindset in Ukraine is more than 50 %. Such a level of trust is impossible to attain for any political party. But by using the religious community as a resource they believe they can achieve it.

Also, I must confess that in practice politicians use Orthodox values because these values are quite active in policies the electorate want to see implemented. Let's illustrate this thesis through a religious resource. It has a lot of forms, including electoral slogans with in the programs and during the meetings (the latter ones have more Orthodox features like words from the Bible in Old Slavonic language and classical compositions of the Orthodox writers), clergymen as the representatives of the party (mainly the Orthodox), deputies' Orthodox cooperation in the Ukrainian parliament – the Verhovna Rada, new projects of the religious law of Ukraine with privileges for grand confessions (status of juridical face, using of land, taxes & so on) that are Orthodox in Ukraine.

But the elections results are full of interesting facts. The correlation between the level of religious activity and the final result of the party or candidate are some what disparate. It meant – the only chance to win was by combining slogans about the universal needs with the religious. It they ignored the religious mindset altogether in meant ultimate defeat at the polls.

The reason the religious parties are so weak in Ukraine can be understood through reviewing the survey where it shows atheistic persons as more active and quite numerous.

Also, I must present the whole view of the Ukrainian religious people. The main characteristic of them is illustrated in the phrase of N. Dudar when she said: “Generally religious people believe in God, a Great Mind, Logos, life after death & reincarnation” [20, 13].

What is in the final result?

The Ukrainian religious mindset is both a historical and modern. It is the part of the political identity of the Orthodox population. The politicians try to use this mindset in their electoral campaigns. But the churches are not far from the process. The Orthodox are very active because of their understanding of “the symphony with state”. Even now they are against civil society [21, 52] which means they want to rule with the power from God not from people. Politics and religion in Ukraine have the same wishes. We want to remember the word of R. Newhouse: “The first political aim of the Church is to be and

remain the Church” [22, 578]. In conclusion, the only remark remaining to state – civil life is having a building by people that use their view of correctness according to the personal belief or non-belief in God. This is the only way to develop the state without the church predominance and religious mindset dominating the political parties.

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Towards Unity of Different Cultures: N. Roerich's "Culture of Pan-Humanity"

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At the end of the 19th century one of the most philosophically important and culturally influential occult movements was Theosophy. Like many contemporaries, Nicholas Roerich (1874–1947) responded to Theosophy's religious and philosophical dimensions. Moreover, he and his wife Helena Roerich compiled their own doctrinal variant of Theosophy¹. The influence of N. Roerich's thought is international and enduring. Still in existence today, Roerich societies remain dedicated to the recording and dissemination of the teaching of Living Ethics that claims to encompass and synthesize the philosophies and religious teachings of all ages.

The artist of extraordinary Himalayan landscapes who has created more than 7000 paintings dedicated his activity to the idea of synthesis of cultures. Offering to build a culture of pan-humanity, he claimed to resolve the crisis of culture experienced by European thought². N. Roerich's effort to form a universal culture went beyond empirical description. In 1922, in New York, he founded the *Corona Mundi*, International Art Center. This society sponsored schools, arts studies, libraries, exhibitions, concerts and scientific expeditions. In this way Roerich societies continue the social mission that is an important dimension of up-to-date theosophical activities.

1. "THE GREAT TRUTH" IN DIFFERENT CULTURES

Observing that instead of a gradual realization of the greatness of culture and unity of the whole world, humanity strives to divide itself, N. Roerich is looking for a great universal notion. According to him, it is necessary "... to unite in the glory and benefits of Culture"³. In other words, he proposes as a

¹ The Roerichs published 15 volumes of the teaching of Living Ethics or Agni Yoga, presenting the actual words, spoken by the Master — the great physical being existing in the subtle body.

² Having noted the dissonance of material and immaterial culture, W. G. Ogburn introduced the term *culture lag*. (*Social Change*. New York: Huebsh, 1922.)

³ Roerich, N. *Fiery Stronghold*. Boston: The Stratford Company, 1933, 174.

means of unification the “universally evocative symbol – culture”⁴. In order to help humanity “... to learn to feel one’s heart not as one’s own, but as the universal one”⁵, N. Roerich proposes to establish “the culture of entire humanity”⁶, i. e., universal culture.

2. COMMON ORIGINS OF DIFFERENT CULTURES

For N. Roerich, there can be only one truth. Consequently, while each society possesses its own culture, in their foundation cultures are united. Therefore, the starting point to prove the common nature of different cultures consists in finding the common origins of different cultures.

N. Roerich ascertains that during the Stone Age in different, separated continents there existed the same technical skills and the same methods of ornamentation. In America, the tribal customs of the native peoples of the Southwest strike N. Roerich as remarkably similar to those of the ancient Slavs and other early cultures. These similarities convince N. Roerich that the natives of the New and Old Worlds shared common origins.

Going further, N. Roerich acknowledges that once America and Asia was one continent, i. e., American Indians and Mongols shared a common culture. Now, divided by a cosmic catastrophe, they remember their former unity. In this connection, he recalls a beautiful tale, told by the Mongols, of how, at one time, there lived two brothers, how the earth on which they lived was split, and how, since that time, these relatives have always been expecting news of one another; and they have always been confident that some time they will receive news from them⁷.

As a matter of fact, the question is that of the unity of the East and the West. N. Roerich makes an important point when he observes: “... the seeming diversities became only various degrees of human consciousness!”⁸ One of the main assumptions of his Teaching is that the idea of the East and the West — the idea of the twins who shall never meet — is already an antiquated idea. He acknowledges that in reality division between the West and the East, or the North and the South does not exist⁹. In this framework, the diversity of cultures is regarded by N. Roerich as apparent; i. e., in their foundation cultures are united. In order to abolish divisions created by human consciousness and to unite all nations of the world, N. Roerich proposes “a mutual feeling, based on the construction of the coming culture which is at hand”¹⁰.

3. “THE GREAT TRUTH” REVEALED IN SYMBOLS

With an intuition of an artist, N. Roerich perceives that the common ground of different cultures is the inherited system of meanings embodied in symbols. Therefore, the starting point to prove the common nature of

⁴ Roerich, N. *Himavat. Diary Leaves*. Allahabad: Kitabistan, 1946, 248.

⁵ *Heart*. New York: Agni Yoga Society, 1975, 12.

⁶ Roerich, N. *Fiery Stronghold*. Boston: The Stratford Company, 1933, 253.

⁷ Roerich, N. *Heart of Asia*. New York: Nicholas Roerich Museum, 1990, 52.

⁸ Roerich N. *Shambhala*. New York: Nicholas Roerich Museum, 1985, 211, 283.

⁹ Roerich N. *Realm of Light*. New York: Roerich Museum Press, 1931, 157.

¹⁰ *Ibid*. 154.

different cultures consists in finding the very meaning of symbols included in myths, legends, and tales of different peoples. Being aware of the deep symbolic meaning of folklore, he pays particular attention to it.

In his opinion, folklore is the refined fantasy of the ancients, combined with reality. Therefore, legends, tales and myths, "if correctly interpreted in the new light of research"¹¹, can give very important information. N. Roerich's approach to the reality which is veiled in the language of symbols consists, firstly, of comparing the beautiful "pearls of folk consciousness"¹²; secondly, of eliminating from tales and legends the stylization of language and images. According to N. Roerich, only in this way it is possible to encounter an ancient teaching based on true knowledge.

Let us note in passing an example of N. Roerich's interpretation. He tells an ancient legend: "And great hunger descended upon earth and people perished and could no longer endure. Then the Blessed Bodhisattvas sent a shower of rice. There was such excess of food that not only were all the people fully sustained but they also brought mountains of rice and erected temples and chortens of it. The temples were of such dimensions that it took several years to walk around them, and one chief chorten could only be encircled in several days. This place exists upon an island where formerly flourished the true teaching of the Blessed One¹³."

Next, the commentary of N. Roerich: "One must understand it thus: Great spiritual hunger descended upon earth. And people could no longer exist in such dreadful conditions. Then the Great Teacher sent a true shower of spiritual food. Humanity which was exalted by this benediction erected great monuments of spiritual achievements. The measurements of these achievements are unencompassable. The teaching of Shambhala exists in a fortified place. And its power will soon become manifest¹⁴."

N. Roerich comes to the conclusion that in legends "people sought to express in their own way the link between the human spirit and cosmic manifestations"¹⁵. Thus, "the great Truth", which is revealed in beautiful symbols of legends and tales of different cultures, is the knowledge of the unity of the cosmos, evolution, subtle worlds, psychic energies etc. The issue is an important one, and it is not to be evaded — the new light in which N. Roerich proposes to expound folklore is Theosophy.

4. DIFFERENT CULTURES AS VARIOUS EXPRESSIONS OF "THE GREAT TRUTH"

According to N. Roerich, everything that exists consists of one and the same essence or reality. In this sense, diverse cultures have to be seen as realizations of what N. Roerich calls *the great Truth*¹⁶." In this context, truth has the role of the axis connecting different cultures. An analysis of

¹¹ Roerich N. *Fiery Stronghold*. Boston: The Stratford Company, 1933, 377.

¹² Roerich, N. *Invincible*. New York: Nicholas Roerich Museum, 1974, 60.


¹³ Roerich, N. *Altai-Himalaya: A Travel Diary*. New York: Arun Press, 1983, 372.

¹⁴ *Ibid*.

¹⁵ Roerich, N. *Invincible*. New York: Nicholas Roerich Museum, 1974, 70–71.

¹⁶ Roerich, N. *Shambhala*. New York: Nicholas Roerich Museum, 1985, 211.

N. Roerich's comprehension of culture can be made by considering culture diagrammed as three concentric circles.



The center of “the great Truth” lies in the first circle, at the very heart of the diagram. According to N. Roerich, this element exists within all cultures. Moreover, in the heart of “the great Truth” lies knowledge of the unity of the whole world. Thus, Theosophy becomes an essential part of culture.

Around this center of “the great Truth” is the circle of the creativeness of humanity. This circle represents different cultures. Through them “the great Truth” is realized.

Around this circle is the circumference of synthesis of national cultures, leading to a universal culture. Synthesis is the main concept used by N. Roerich to describe the process of unification of different cultures. In his opinion, synthesis comes into being in the process of combination.¹⁷ The key to synthesis, according to N. Roerich, is a mixture. At this point, the entire character of synthesis is expressed as follows: “All the mixture of form of the old Hindu, Dravidian and Moslem, can give new solutions to the unprejudiced architect”¹⁸.

We can sum up that the term *synthesis* is used extensively by N. Roerich to signify that, in the process of unification of different cultures, they are all mixed or combined in such a way that a definite separation of one national culture from another is impossible: “There is no old or new age, there is no antiquity nor modernism for the ever life-giving Panacea”¹⁹.

According to N. Roerich, the new culture should unify all human beings. So one wonders: why, proclaiming the approach of the age of building a new

¹⁷ Roerich N. *Fiery Stronghold*. Boston: The Stratford Company, 1933, 112.

¹⁸ Roerich N. *Altai-Himalaya: A Travel Diary*. New York: Arun Press, 1983, 7–8.

¹⁹ Roerich N. *Himavat. Diary Leaves*. Allahabad: Kitabistan, 1946, 82.

culture – *the culture of pan-humanity*, N. Roerich makes a sharp distinction between *the friends of culture*²⁰ and *the enemies of culture*²¹. Obviously, he excludes whole groups of persons from the appellation *the builders of culture*²². An important question arises here regarding the criterion of the division. For N. Roerich, every human being becomes a cultured person not in virtue of his interpersonal relationship with other human beings, but in virtue of his acceptance of the one Truth. Consequently, culture consists in having insight in Theosophy which transforms the person, making him able to penetrate the mysteries of the universe. Anything less than this is not culture. Since he tends to measure the contemporary state of "culturality" by that standard, this leads to a kind of disintegration which manifests itself in a negative attitude towards whole groups of persons. It is not so much the people as a whole who are regarded as builders of a new culture, but a certain number of elites within the masses. In other words, in the eyes of N. Roerich, a new culture can be built only by the elite, i. e., by those who have entered the road of Theosophy.

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²⁰ Roerich N. *Invincible*. New York: Nicholas Roerich Museum, 1974, 278.

²¹ Roerich N. *Realm of Light*. New York: Roerich Museum Press, 1931, 71.

²² Roerich N. *Fiery Stronghold*. Boston: The Stratford Company, 1933, 158.

Learning in Doing: Participation of Rural Communities for a Common Future

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INTRODUCTION

An understanding of what is rural and rural community for policy makers and researchers has changed over the last decades since the very situation of rural areas has changed in both Latvia and other European countries. Scholars, economists, and policy makers have argued on what is the main criterion to define the “rural”: whether it is population density in a particular area, importance and role of agriculture in a local economy, rural lifestyle, and identification with a place and a culture (particular behaviour style) and social network of local community, or something else¹. The forms of community are changing either, becoming more virtual and thus broader in some cases. Many of the community characteristics and functions remain the same; however, rural communities face new features and development possibilities. For example, communities and other local actors involve in elaboration and implementation of development strategies, programmes and activities. Participatory approach is acknowledged as an important factor in promotion of local development, reduction of poverty and promotion of social integration². That requires from participants mutual learning, understanding and increased social capital. Development of partnerships – a form of cooperation of various development agents where community initiatives are of great importance – is one of the ways to introduce the participatory approach. In the European context the partnership approach is already widely

¹ Hoggart, K. (1990) Let's Do Away with Rural. *Journal of Rural Studies*, Volume 6 (3), pp. 245–257.

Halfacree, H. K. (1993) Locality and social representation: Space, discourse and alternative definitions of the rural. *Journal of Rural Studies*, Volume 9 (1), pp. 23–37.

Moseley, J. M. (2003) *Rural Development: Principles and Practice*. London & Thousand Oaks & New Delhi: SAGE Publications.

² Tisenkopfs, T. un Šūmane, S. (2003) Lauku partnerības programma: Gala pārskats. 2003. gada 5. novembris.

established; however, in Latvia partnership discourse of rural development is just evolving and some good partnership examples already exist in Latgale³.

The article will seek to find an answer to the questions of how rural communities in Latvia shape the process of rural development and what helps people to live and cooperate today in rural areas. The concept of communities of practice⁴ as well as an idea on how communities of practice can be applied to characterise rural communities' initiatives will be presented in the article.

UNDERSTANDING RURAL COMMUNITY

Traditionally and historically with the community was understood something quite small and local like a unit of local people that share common place, interests, values, needs or problems, and common social network. In a rural context, living in the community and acting accordingly to its formal and informal rules was crucial for every individual socially, economically, and culturally. Behaving differently could lead to social as well as economic isolation of an individual from the community in many cases. Today globalization of economic and socio-cultural life and development of information technologies have reached rural communities to a very great extent and that is the main reason why they change.

As Moseley states, community cannot be referred to any group or collection of people who live close to each other, they must share something in common⁵. Flora et al⁶ point out, that sociologists use the term of community in different ways focusing it on groups of people: community is a place where group members interact with one another; community is a social system itself through which group members meet their needs; community is also a sense of identity that is held by people who do not necessarily share the same geographical space. In a rural context, especially in the past, each community composed all these meanings and ensured local people with various institutional settings (for example, schools, churches, or businesses) thus tying a place, social system and identity closely⁷. Nowadays all these traditional broad functions of the community are more and more separated by processes that are caused by transition, globalization and new information technologies. Nevertheless, they have a specific institutional setting even now; it just differs to more traditional settings. In Latvia the typical case is the situation where an individual lives in a village or rural area, works in a close (and not always necessarily the closest) town or city, and spends his or her leisure time in some other places. The question immediately arises as to which community the person belongs to? What are the person's networks? An important feature of the community of today is that it becomes more virtual and dispersed.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Lave, J. and Wenger, E. (1991) *Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁵ Moseley, J. M. (2003) *Rural Development: Principles and Practice*. London & Thousand Oaks & New Delhi: SAGE Publications, p. 74.

⁶ Rural Communities: Legacy and Change (2003) Edited by Cornelia Butler Flora, Jan L. Flora, with Susan Fey, 2nd edition. Boulder (USA) and Oxford (UK): Westview Press, pp. 7–8.

⁷ Ibid.

People living close might not even know each other, so they are not in a common network. Following, a common place solely is not ensuring an existence and operation of community. Increased mobility and possibilities to use various information technologies allow rural people to be members of various communities simultaneously where each of them serves to meet different ends. Hence, it allows the argument that rural communities become ones more interest rather than territory based.

PARTICIPATION FOR COMMON DEVELOPMENT

Whether community is territory or interest based, it has its own resources. When invested to create new ones, resources become capital: cultural, human, social, financial, natural, and political⁸. The role of social capital – trust, social networks, both norms and rules as an institutional form of social capital⁹ – in the community life and rural development should be emphasized here. More and more local actors are encouraged to take responsibility for the design and implementation of development strategies¹⁰ thus emphasizing participatory approaches to rural development in order to ensure that existing resources are used in the best way. However, this approach has a number of disadvantages and weaknesses. For example, participation may be dominated by some local authorities or undermined by local apathy. That is the lesson also from European partnership experience¹¹ and should be taken into consideration when promoting and analysing community initiatives in Latvia. It is claimed often by the officials and researchers¹² that weakness of informal, horizontal social structures, lack of co-operation, reciprocity, trust among rural actors as well as insufficient policy co-ordination and interference of top-down and bottom-up governing mechanisms are serious obstacles for the further development of partnerships in Latvia. A low level of social capital and lack of trust as well as passivity and indifference partially can be explained by analyzing the historical experience. Polish sociologist Sztompka in his book on trust describes Poland's experience during real-socialism culture, but this to a very great extent may be transferred to characteristics of Latvia's society. This is because both countries for many decades belonged to one socialist culture – what Sztompka calls “block culture”¹³. He examines how this “widespread erosion of trust”¹⁴ has been developed. Sztompka states that

⁸ Rural Communities: Legacy and Change (2003) Edited by Cornelia Butler Flora, Jan L. Flora, with Susan Fey, 2nd edition. Boulder (USA) and Oxford (UK): Westview Press, p. 9.

⁹ Ostrom, E. and Ahn, K. T. (2003) Introduction. In: *Foundations of Social Capital* (2003) edited by Elionor Ostrom and T.K. Ahn, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: An Elgar Reference Collection

¹⁰ Murdoch, J. (2000) Networks – a new paradigm of rural development? *Journal of Rural Studies*, Volume 16, Issue 4, pp. 407–419.

¹¹ *Local Partnerships for Rural Development: The European Experience* (2003) edited by Malcolm J. Moseley, Wallingford: CABI Publishing

¹² For example, Tisenkopfs, T. un Šūmane, S. (2003) Lauku partnerības programma: Gala pārskats. 2003. gada 5. novembris.

¹³ Sztompka, P. (1999) *Trust: A Sociological Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 153.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

people's thoughts and actions during the communist period were guided by the two opposed spheres of life: private (personal) and public (official). From the ordinary citizen's or community member's point of view, the private was seen as "good" and public as "bad" and vice versa from the point of view of the state or official ideology. In the area of beliefs, the double standard of truth prevailed: official and private. It was obvious from everyday life, statistics and mass media that in most cases officials lied and that consequently caused the decay of trust. In the area of action, people had to behave in accordance to rules and decisions derived from the official ideology and provided by the both central and local authorities. As Sztompka¹⁵ states, "trust in the whole social order, its continuity and predictability, was undermined". This produced widespread apathy and passivism, uncertainty and suspiciousness.

These consequences still have their impact on development of cooperation amongst local actors in many rural areas in Latvia. Nevertheless, horizontal networking among the local actors, which basically means creating and strengthening social capital, refers to coordination of activities in the local area to enhance the capacity of local actors to cooperate and gain access to markets and other economic opportunities¹⁶. Scholars¹⁷ point out that networks enhance learning and innovation and facilitate mutual knowledge, collaboration and the exchange of information and foster trust.

Another lesson from the partnership experience is that communities have their local knowledge and vision on local development processes that also is crucial for the future of the particular area¹⁸. Moseley et al¹⁹, referring to cross country partnership research, point out some key achievements of the partnerships and one of them is building up the capacity of voluntary and community organizations so they become more active in both planning and delivery of local programmes. The authors acknowledge also the importance of learning process through which agencies and individuals become more aware of, and more skilled in local development. To a very great extent success of community initiatives depends on informal processes like networking, mutual learning, and building social capital. Learning and social capital are both inputs enabling, for example, partnership work and outputs that enhance the sustainability of particular cooperation form. These outputs are social, valuable and less tangible than economic ones, for example, jobs created or business start-ups²⁰.

¹⁵ Sztompka, P. (1999) *Trust: A Sociological Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 154.

¹⁶ Murdoch, J. (2000) Networks – a new paradigm of rural development? *Journal of Rural Studies*, Volume 16, Issue 4, pp. 407–419.

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¹⁸ Scott, M. (2004) Building Institutional Capacity in Rural Northern Ireland: the Role of Partnership Governance in the LEADER II Programme. *Journal of Rural Studies*, Volume 20 (1) pp. 49–59.

¹⁹ Moseley, J. M., Cherrett, T., Cawley, M. (2001) Local partnerships for rural development: Ireland's experience in context. *Irish Geography*, Volume 34(2), 2001, pp. 176–193, 179.

²⁰ OECD (2001) *Local Partnerships for Better Governance*. Paris: OECD, p. 18.

LEARNING IN DOING

Community initiatives are developing in order to solve particular problems or realize interests of particular group within a wider community. In the partnership work as well as for community initiatives the process of “learning in doing” is of great importance. Hence, it is worth to discuss the concept of “communities of practice”²¹ here.

Lave and Wenger²² first introduced the concept of communities of practice based on a social theory of learning. This perspective deals with how learning occurs in social settings²³. The primary focus of the theory is on learning as social participation that includes four components: meaning, practice, community and identity²⁴. Wenger states that “this collective learning results in practices that reflect both the pursuit of [people’s] enterprises and the attendant social relations”²⁵. He views these practices as the property of all kinds of community that he calls “communities of practice” that are created over time by the sustained pursuit of a shared enterprise. These communities are organized around particular practice that in the rural development context might be, for example, elaboration of local development strategy or organizing cultural life in a parish. Working together involves agents in a process of mutual learning that is called “learning in doing” because of its informality and basis on practice. Informality in this sense means organic ways of evolving practice (mutual engagement) and thus escaping formal descriptions and control²⁶ (Wenger, 2003). From these situated perspectives on learning many things are learned more effectively through informal processes²⁷. Hence, things are learned through informal learning resulting through daily activities related to work or leisure.

O’Hara et al²⁸ describe a community of practice as a “relatively loose, distributed group of people connected by a shared interest in a task, problem, job or practice”. The authors agree that “community of practice is an informal self-organizing group” where “membership goes to people who wish to improve or maintain their skills [...] , and who are prepared to enter into

²¹ Lave, J. and Wenger, E. (1991) *Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

²² Ibid.

²³ Elkjaer, B. (1999) In Search of a Social Learning Theory. In: *Organizational Learning and the Learning Organizations: Developments in Theory and Practice* (1999) Edited by Mark Easterby-Smith, John Burgoyne and Luis Araujo. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: SAGE Publications, p. 75.

²⁴ Wenger, E. (2003) *Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity*. Cambridge, USA: Cambridge University Press, pp. 4–5.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 45.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Colley, H., Hodkinson, P. and Malcom, J. (2002) *Non-formal Learning: Mapping the Conceptual Terrain: A Consultation Report*. Leeds: University of Leeds Lifelong Learning Institute. Retrieved March 7, 2004 from http://www.infed.org/archives/e-texts/colley_informal_learning.html.

²⁸ O’Hara, K., Alani, H., Shadbolt, N. (2002) Identifying Communities of Practice: Analysing Ontologies as Networks to Support Community Recognition. *Information Systems: The e-Business Challenge 2002*: pp. 89–102.

discourse about the practice with like-minded people”²⁹. This is very similar to any community initiative. According to Wenger³⁰, communities of practice are everywhere and all people belong to several communities of practice at the same time. He says that the community of practice “is an integral part of our daily lives”³¹ and is informal and pervasive. Even if the term of the communities of practice might be new and many communities of practice do not have a name, the experience is not new. Community of practice is defined as informal; nevertheless, it can be applied successfully to any formal setting.

North³² points out that many kinds of skills cannot be learned from a book because they are embedded in tacit knowledge. These skills as tacit knowledge are acquired in part by practice and can be only partially communicated because they are very difficult to articulate and to transfer between individuals³³. In the partnership or community initiative context this means that local people cannot learn cooperation or negotiation skills in other way but by doing the practice, observing, and exchanging their experience and local knowledge. Communities of practice have their common “repertoire”³⁴, which includes, for example, symbols, routines, and ways of doing things or concepts that the community has produced or adopted while it exists. The repertoire becomes a part of the practice and is important in the process of learning. As Maskell et al acknowledges³⁵, symbols and language are involved in codifying tacit knowledge and thus also in creating new knowledge. Hence, codified knowledge can be communicated and transferred to others³⁶. Different individuals have different innate abilities for acquiring tacit knowledge³⁷. Therefore communication of tacit knowledge normally requires mutual trust and understanding³⁸, or in other words, developed social capital.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Wenger, E. (2003) *Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity*. Cambridge, USA: Cambridge University Press, pp. 6–7.

³¹ Ibid.

³² North, C. D. (1990) *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge, USA: Cambridge University Press, p. 74.

³³ Polanyi, M. (1967) *The Tacit Dimension*. Routledge & Kegan Paul

North, C. D. (1990) *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge, USA: Cambridge University Press, p. 74.

Sveiby, K. E. (1996) Transfer of Knowledge and the Information Processing Professions. *European Management Journal*, Volume 14 (4) pp. 379–438.

³⁴ Wenger, E. (2003) *Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity*. Cambridge, USA: Cambridge University Press, pp. 83.

³⁵ Maskell, P., Eskelinen, H., Hannibalsson, I., Malmberg, A., Vatne, E. (1999) *Competitiveness, Localised Learning and Regional Development: Specialisation and Prosperity in Small Open Economies*. London and New York: Routledge, p. 35.

³⁶ Maskell, P., Eskelinen, H., Hannibalsson, I., Malmberg, A., Vatne, E. (1999) *Competitiveness, Localised Learning and Regional Development: Specialisation and Prosperity in Small Open Economies*. London and New York: Routledge, p. 93.

North, C. D. (1990) *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge, USA: Cambridge University Press, p. 74.

³⁷ North, C. D. (1990) *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge, USA: Cambridge University Press.

³⁸ Maskell, P., Eskelinen, H., Hannibalsson, I., Malmberg, A., Vatne, E. (1999) *Competitiveness, Localised Learning and Regional Development: Specialisation and Prosperity in Small Open Economies*. London and New York: Routledge, p. 93.

Different authors³⁹ view learning as a process that cannot be designed (systematic, planned) and managed; still, they acknowledge that social infrastructures such as social networks foster learning. This is important at the community level, where learning is involved in a building of social capital. Networks as a part of social capital can be built as sustainable “by strengthening relationships and communication on a community-wide basis and encouraging community initiative, responsibility, and adaptability”⁴⁰. These processes take time to unfold. Time is crucial also for social capital to develop.

Partnership observations in Northern Ireland⁴¹ show: the partnership approach encourages participants to be involved in a process of dialogue, which in some cases resulted in improved local knowledge and multi-dimensional definition of the local area. Learning through dialogue by increasing trust can increase recognition among partnership members of shared mutual interests in an area and improve commitment to working together. Scott⁴² cites an example where “barriers” between farmers and the rest of the community created a “producers versus consumers” attitude. By working in partnership and increased communication both sides highlighted common concerns that led to better understanding and cooperation. The more people interact, the more they strengthen their links with each other thus creating and developing bonding social capital with like-minded people. Horizontal links between actors within a partnership or community enhance the development of social network structures that is another form of social capital.

Working in partnership requires agents’ cooperation that in turn can be developed by interactive learning between actors. Community initiatives might involve different actors and each of them has different experience, local knowledge and skills. Jarvis⁴³ defines learning as the “process of transforming experience, of one kind or another, into knowledge, skills, attitude, values, senses [and] emotions”. Scott⁴⁴ states that increased opportunities for mutual learning between the community and local government members can decrease a degree of mistrust that might emerge especially at the beginning of the partnership arrangements. Concerns of evolving distrust are reasonable because local authorities from the governance level might feel more competent

³⁹ Wenger, E. (2003) *Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity*. Cambridge, USA: Cambridge University Press, pp. 225–228.

Elkjaer, B. (1999) In Search of a Social Learning Theory. In: *Organizational Learning and the Learning Organizations: Developments in Theory and Practice* (1999) Edited by Mark Easterby-Smith, John Burgoyne and Luis Araujo. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: SAGE Publications.

⁴⁰ *Rural Communities: Legacy and Change* (2003) Edited by Cornelia Butler Flora, Jan L. Flora, with Susan Fey, 2nd edition. Boulder (USA) and Oxford (UK): Westview Press., p. 52.

⁴¹ Scott, M. (2004) Building Institutional Capacity in Rural Northern Ireland: the Role of Partnership Governance in the LEADER II Programme. *Journal of Rural Studies*, Volume 20 (1) pp. 49–59.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Jarvis, P. (1987) *Adult Learning in a Social Context*, Croom Helm, London, p. 90.

⁴⁴ Scott, M. (2004) Building Institutional Capacity in Rural Northern Ireland: the Role of Partnership Governance in the LEADER II Programme. *Journal of Rural Studies*, Volume 20 (1) pp. 49–59.

or more legitimate, for example, in a decision-making or in an elaboration of development strategy. Again, communication and mutual learning can help here to develop trust relationships and exchange experience and knowledge. As result of mutual learning between stakeholders in the partnership process behavioural changes are observed, for example, “new ways of working” or “changed styles of discussion”⁴⁵. Similarly with communities of practice, this implies the idea of a common repertoire that partnership develops in doing its practice and also on peripherality that engages stakeholders in learning by doing. For the new practitioners it is important that the old members of the practice (like the local government members in the case mentioned above) acknowledge the presence and competence of the newcomers (the community members). The newcomers may be rejected⁴⁶. However, Scott⁴⁷ points out that communication helps to increase social capital and trust relationships in particular. Hence, there is evidence that increased communication increases the level of social capital and mutual understanding amongst community or partnership members, promotes their activity and common efforts for the common future.

CONCLUSIONS

Because of global changes in socio-economic and political life in Europe, rural communities have changed over the last decades and now face some new features and development opportunities. In both Europe and Latvia community initiatives and participatory approach to rural development are welcomed and promoted. Owing to globalization and information technologies, rural people are able to involve in various interest communities simultaneously, can acquire foreign experience, and learn from it. However, the process is not easy and requires from local agents ability and willingness to learn both formally and informally. From the discussion above it becomes clear that the very process of informal learning, or in other words, “learning in doing” in particular, is of great importance in successful participation in local development, partnership work and community initiatives especially at the local level. Learning in doing allows local community initiatives view as communities of practice that operates informally and promotes processes of mutual learning, acquiring knowledge, development of trust relationships and networking greatly in rural areas. As a result a common vision and understanding on local development is developed thus putting together common efforts for the common future.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Wenger, E. (2003) *Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity*. Cambridge, USA: Cambridge University Press.

⁴⁷ Scott, M. (2004) Building Institutional Capacity in Rural Northern Ireland: the Role of Partnership Governance in the LEADER II Programme. *Journal of Rural Studies*, Volume 20 (1) pp. 49–59.

Fifteen Years Later – Shifts in the Paradigms of Polish National Identity

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Fifteen years is a period long enough to start evaluating the changes which have occurred within that time. And let me stress, that the last fifteen years have been extremely important for Central- and Eastern European countries and for their people who one by one became new democracies and then joined the EU family. The year 1989 marks the beginning of the Polish way towards freedom, democracy and civic society which based on human rights, obligations and freedoms; market-economy and multi-party political system pulls down the Western-Eastern divide which existed for longer than fifty years.

One of the questions which we tend to answer while both looking back and trying to anticipate the future is where are we now as a society; how has our system of values evolved and what has our national identity become like – have we gone global or have we become more local as a result of our conscious choice to stick to the values which have always been ours. Growing atomisation of societies together with their visible interdependence constitute complementary but also mutually excluding frames of reference against which to discuss the process of identity formation in post-modern societies. Furthermore, more and more various factors from seemingly unrelated fields impinge on identity and make its borders blurred. Consequently, identity issues have become more complex and challenging than ever before and the question concerning what our post-modern national identity is like is very difficult to answer in an unambiguous manner.

The discussion about Polish modern identity reflects a general concern about identity-related issues which have become extremely important in the 21st century, much weightier than in the previous epoch. The speed of changes as well as their spectrum and depth make many of us often feel at loss and senseless (cf. Baussinger 1983: 337–346), unable to define who we are. Our life has been dominated by movement and change which have become our new roots. As James Clifford (cf. Clifford in: Nowicka, E., J. Szacki, 1999: 45) says we are all travellers, true or imaginary, who cross real and virtual borders of distant cultures. On the one hand identity has become much more the question of individual choices than of socially imposed trends but, on the other, identity models, homogeneous and commercialised as they are all over the world, are more easily available within the global village and its information society. Thus two mutually exclusive but also complementary tendencies – globalisation vs.

globalisation¹ mark the post-modern culture and account for some significant shifts in identity paradigms, which are especially conspicuous among Central- and Eastern-Europeans. The metaphor of the Berlin Wall has not lost its full strength although its meaning is different. Although some mental and emotional barriers still exist and complexes, stereotypes and prejudices continue to be felt in every day life, some others are successfully overcome. We witness the process of conscious rediscovery of national identities, especially in new democracies and of creation of the pan-European one.

The first years after 1989 were a relatively short period of time when Western-European values tended to be uncritically adopted in Poland. It was also when the “American dream” exercised its unquestionable power over nearly the whole nation due to intellectual, emotional and also economic deprivation of previous years. However, for the last ten years, each year has been a step towards recognising the importance of Polish national culture and its values, especially on its local levels where past inspires future and gives it more meaning. Consequently, the present model of Polish identity combines both the Polish national values traditionally reflected by Polish culture with global and the world-wide tendencies shaping the pace and direction of changes in the united European family within the European Union. Let us look at the Polish people, their dilemmas, difficulties and also successes in self-creation against a much more challenging and complex reality of the 21st century.

For centuries the Polish system of values was defined with such concepts as religion, personal freedom and national independence, honour, patriotism, idealism and romanticism as well as some curious combination of individualism and collectivism in the sense given to these terms by Hofstede and enriched with such typically Polish values as those ones embodied in *liberum veto* and the golden liberty of Polish nobility (cf. Hofstede 1994: 49–78). The tragic history of Poland, especially its partitions in the 19th century, when the trauma of two wars, particularly of World War II followed by mental and civic enslavement within the Soviet bloc made the Poles cherish their national values as the only way to preserve their sense of moral strength. A nation which was deprived of a state for over one century had to create something other than political dimensions of its existence to survive. That compensatory role was assigned to culture and culture-related values. Also, history as a source of either unquestionable glory or of a very bitter and sour experience became one of the most important factors shaping Polish identity and international relationships of Polish people.

Throughout the history of Poland, Polish people have always been fighters, not only defending their own country but also the freedom of others (e. g. Poland as an *ante murale*, Napoleonic wars, Kościuszko and Pułaski – the heroes of two continents, Warsaw uprising, Polish pilots fighting in Great Britain, etc.). On the one hand, the Poles have assigned to themselves the role of a hero fighting for freedom all over the world, but on the other hand, that of a victim of international politics and treaties (e. g. Yalta). The double complex became especially conspicuous in the 19th century in the works of Polish national poets such as Mickiewicz (cf. the concept of Messianism”, “Poland, a

¹ Globalisation is the term created by Bauman, a Polish sociologist to describe tendencies which counterbalance global trends, cf. Z. Bauman, *Tożsamość. Wtedy, teraz, po co?* [w:] E. Nowicka, J. Szacki [red.] *Idee zarządzania świata społecznego*. PWN, Warszawa, 1999.

Christ of the nations) and Słowacki but it has been also embodied in the ideology of the “Solidarity” movement. A strong conviction that Poland and its people have a mission to fulfil made the Poles romantic dreamers in the world which is mainly pragmatic in its existential philosophy. The conflict between the romanticism of Poles and the pragmatism of the present world are dominated by the values typical of global and mass culture whose roots are in America, and have resulted in a shift in the Polish value system. The cultural heritage of Poland, which has shaped the Polish concept of militant patriotism, is no longer applicable to the Polish reality after 1989. Thus the basic question asked in a nation-wide discussion, often heated and critical, (cf. Prokop 2004, Jasińska-Kania & Marody 2002, Kolarska-Bobińska 2003, Marody 2002a, Kizwalter 1999) is how to remain true to the essence of Polishness and at the same time to keep up with the pace of global changes to prevent marginalisation and ghettoisation as it was the Polish past experience.

While discussing the shift in values in the Polish identity paradigm it should be stressed that the process creates some areas of conflict or, at least, misunderstanding between generations deepening the already existing generation gap. For older people as well as for those who are less educated and less economically privileged any attempt to change tradition is regarded as a kind of betrayal and severely criticised². Many youngsters, in turn, are not able to take advantage of new opportunities as the reality has surpassed their expectations and abilities to cope with it. Most of the changes reflect international transformation processes but there is some very important difference between Central- and Eastern European countries and other members of the European Union: it is the time pressure and the necessity for the ex-Soviet bloc countries to adjust to often culturally alien patterns of values and subsequent behaviours. Changes in Polish religiosity and in the role of the Polish Catholic Church, a new attitude to work and an emerging work ethos as well as a new form of tolerance which is an answer to a modified and enlarged concept of multiculturalism contribute to shaping a civic society in Poland. Let me discuss briefly these three aspects of changes whose role in creating the post-modern Polish identity cannot be ignored.

The impact of the changes affecting the Polish Catholicism is deeply felt in other areas of social and private life for at least two reasons. Firstly, due to the history of Polish religion which has influenced the life of Polish people in a total way. Secondly, religion was treated rather within the category of politics than faith for nearly 200 years. Both Polish national identity and Polish political identity was a religious identity. It must be also remembered that all kinds of activities within the Polish Church, be it political, social or cultural were a unifying force for the whole nation throughout the long history of Poland. The religious aspect of Polish national identity became especially conspicuous under partitions when the Catholic religion distinguished Poles from their oppressors – Protestant Prussians and Orthodox Russians. It is also in the 19th century when

² The European Value Research project conducted most European countries and also in Poland in 2000 clearly shows the correlation between demographic factors and value shift. cf. A. Kania-Jasińska & M. Marody (eds.). *Polacy wśród Europejczyków. Wartości społeczeństwa polskiego na tle innych krajów europejskich (The Poles among the Europeans. The values proper to the Polish society against other European countries)*. Warszawa: Scholar, 2002.

an equality sign was put between a Pole and a Catholic. “God, honour and motherland” on the banners of the Polish fighters for the independence of their country is a tangible proof that religion and patriotism are inseparable concepts. Furthermore the mission of the “Solidarity” movement could have been differently fulfilled if it wasn’t for the strong support and moral, intellectual and also economic encouragement of the Polish Catholic Church. However, after 1989 there is no longer need for the Catholic Church to continue its role as a political power, as it has been already stressed, the role of the only political institution recognised by the state which consistently opposed the state policy of oppression and enslavement, and acted as an accelerator for the democratisation of life. Consequently, the religiosity of a great number of Polish Catholics has become depoliticised and the choice of being a Catholic has become for the majority of Polish people a private decision rather than a public declaration of their political affiliations. Consequently, the process of privatisation of religion is observed.

Polish Catholicism is also under a strong impact of world-wide trends such as secularisation and moral relativism, which results in a situation- and person-bound interpretation of the ten commandments (e. g. in Poland Sunday has become the most popular day to do shopping in shopping malls). Although still about 96% of Poles declare that they are Catholics, many of them are only Catholics by name celebrating main religious holidays – Christmas and Easter, baptising their children, getting married in Church and celebrating the first communion, confirmation and Catholic funerals. It is also very significant that in contrast to previous years, most Polish people do not assign to the teaching of the Church the value of a guiding force. They do not believe, either that the Church, as an institution, can solve all or most of their problems independently of their nature, be it family or work-related issues (cf. Marody, 2002b : 146–167 and Mandes, 2002 : 168–186).

On the other hand, considering the economic polarisation of the Polish society the Church belongs to the most active charity institutions helping the most economically underprivileged families, elderly and homeless people, taking care of children and organising socio-cultural and also educational activities for them in the poverty-stricken zones. It acts as a non-governmental organisation whose work aiming at minimising the negative impact of the transformation process must be positively evaluated.

Work, the second of the top values declared by 80% of Poles (cf. the results of the European Values Studies [in:] Kania-Jasińska, & Marody, 2002 : 9–19) comes as some surprise considering the work ethos under the communism. Thus, how to explain that work has been so highly ranked among other values? First of all, it is indicative of economic changes – the switch from centrally-planned to market economy (cf. bankruptcy of many collective farms in the north-east part of Poland, privatisation or closing down of many state-owned companies, etc), and of their impact on the unemployment rate which last year was as high as 20%. Thus it is the economic difficulties and the threat of job loss that makes most respondents assign to work so much importance. On the other hand, they tend to treat it instrumentally as the only means to earn living and mark one’s social position. Although the purely instrumental approach prevails among the Polish people, we can also observe an emergence of some new attitudes based on demographic data: the more educated the person, the younger and the higher his/her socio-economic position, the higher expectations put on work.

For such groups work is not only a source of income but it also provides other, not economy related values such as: work satisfaction, self-development, self-fulfilment etc. For young, educated professionals career and professional success together with proper economic gratification have become dominating values. To achieve it they act assertively, they know their value as a company asset, they have confidence in themselves and they want to be a success. They get married in their thirties, their families are nuclear ones with one child, they have sectorial friends and many of them are workaholics. Thus their “life Decalogue” is in an open conflict with Polish traditional values, where family, especially an extended and multigenerational family and family life as well as the quality of life itself, real friendship, conviviality, people orientation and modesty were valued more highly than work. Moreover, because of their behaviours they are often perceived as selfish, aggressive, career- and money-oriented, bragging, arrogant and over-self-confident.

Let me stress it once more that a business and market success needs mastering certain skills many of which have never been prominent in Polish culture. Assertiveness, self-assurance, risk taking, entrepreneurial spirit, responsibility, ability to make quick decisions, time management, competitiveness, etc. are to be learned and internalised. However, many older people either are unable to meet the new criteria of success and the challenges of the new reality or they refuse from taking part in this kind of a rat race. In the context of the above it is rather significant that about 40% of Poles put the blame for their economic difficulties on the economic system in Poland minimising or ignoring their own responsibility for their failure (cf. Sikorska 2002:41). Hence, the bitter end is the feeling of injustice, of both economic and social marginalisation and victimisation by external conditions outside of their reach. Considering all the above opportunities, challenges and misgivings the question is: does a new approach to work contribute to a true work ethos? It is too early to be positive and the answer is even more difficult because the Polish experience under partitions and during communism is rather negative and cannot be used in the process. Thus, once more Polish history leaves its impression on the present.

Multiculturalism is the third important area marked by changes. The term has become a key concept of the 20th century but it is often overused and consequently misused. It should be made clear that the proper understanding of multiculturalism consists in seeing diversity as a manifestation of some genuine richness and a value in itself. The above understanding of multiculturalism has become a real challenge because apart from traditional cultural minorities – ethnic, racial and national, today its concept embraces such new or silent minority groups as persons of other gender orientation, women and disabled people. There are also increasingly more numerous groups of political and economic migrants who create new Diasporas in host countries, mainly in Western Europe and also in the Central and Eastern-European democracies. The name “silent minorities” or “invisible minorities” given to those groups reflects their marginalised role within the societies of which they are a part of. Often ghettoized and denied an access to the mainstream society the silent minorities have started fighting for their civic rights. They want to speak for themselves and to be heard within the society which has ignored their presence for such a long time. But stigmatised by

their “otherness” they experience more intolerance and misunderstanding than tolerance and assistance.

In Poland, the ideologically imposed cultural unity or uniformity of the fifty years of communism, when Polish culture became national in its form but ideological in its contents, limited significantly the experience of “the other” often reducing it to a kind of “invented tradition”³. Cultural homogeneity made tolerance a value rather declared than practised in everyday life. Thus today, to rediscover the true value of the new multiculturalism, the Polish people have to undertake the difficult task to recreate the old tradition of tolerance and of a synergy of mutually inspiring and enriching co-existence of various cultures, languages and denominations of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 14th – 17th centuries. In this case the experience of the past may have very positive effect however only if it is put in to practice.

Everyday life brings many pieces of evidence from that time; intercultural education and hard work are needed to bring positive changes. Although on the other hand, there are many signals that there are also successes in building an intercultural dialogue. One of the biggest challenges is how to change victim mentality often typical of minorities, who keep evaluating the minority-majority relationships in the one-dimensional category of a victim and its oppressor. Assigning the role of the victim to the majority (cf. some very negative results of the ideology of political correctness) will only enhances the spiral of hatred, animosity and mutually unjust claims. In many cases, unfortunately, such an attitude still works as a self-fulfilling prophesy which shapes the reciprocal relationships between both the old and the new minorities. There is a lot of tension or uneasiness in the relations between e. g. some groups of Gypsies, especially in Bergitka Roma from the south of Poland and their Polish neighbours or the women and men in the work environment. Mutual respect for differences, tact, sensitivity, cross-cultural knowledge and self-esteem are basic in the process. In the fight for the recognition of minority rights the elementary values of neither the majority nor the minority can be endangered. However, sometimes the decision to meet the claims of both groups will bring about a totally opposite meaning and result in mutual hostility and unnecessary conflicts. This happened last June in Krakow when initially, the Corpus Dei procession and the parade of gays and lesbians were organised simultaneously along the same streets.

While discussing the situation of the so-called silent minorities the questions should be asked why is it so. One of the reasons is that for many centuries they were either totally invisible in the public sphere (they were kept in families or in asylums not to remind society of its obligations) or allowed only a very limited access to social life. Consequently, the majority is not used to listening to them and to their real needs. Moreover it was the majority which became the spokesperson for the minority interpreting their world through the majority system of values. Thus, in the process of constructing a truly tolerant society, a new language is needed where both minorities and majorities can express themselves in a dialogue respecting differences and allowing for a true understanding of the unknown and of the

³ The term „reinvented tradition” was created by Eric Hobsbawm (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) to describe the Balinese culture invented for tourists and thus only very loosely related to the real Balinese tradition.

different. The minority-majority dialogue is not possible without the rhetoric of peace, which constitute a true challenge for post-modern identities.

Summing up this very short discussion merely outlining some identity dilemmas of the Poles it should be stressed that the pace of changes together with a very hard pressure to adjust to them makes identity issues much more complex and difficult in Poland than in the Western countries which initiate them. Moreover, as in many cases traditional Polish values do not belong to the main stream of the post-modern culture, much effort should be given to save those which constitute the backbone of the Polish national value system. A membership in the EU means that although we are all different we are all equal and, as it has been stressed on many occasions, diversity is our common challenge and our common richness. Identity implies continuity in time where the past enriches and inspires the future and the future respects the past and uses it to its best for the current generation.

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2. Democracy and State Building: Sharing Experiences and Approaching the Future

Changing Patterns of Local Government and Civil Society: Towards a Common Model of Welfare Society in Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden?

Design for a Joint Nordic-Baltic Research Project

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PURPOSE OF RESEARCH

This research design is the outcome of a joint project involving researchers from academic institutions in Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, and the United States. The broad aim of this research is to examine comparatively the modernization and democratization of local government and how these institutional changes impact on the delivery of vital welfare services in four selected countries.¹

During the last 15–20 years the public sector in many western countries has been influenced and modernized through new ways of organising the public sector. Particularly influential have been ideas identified with New Public Management (Baldersheim, Hagtvet, and Heidar 2001; Baldersheim, Illner, and Wollman 2003; Christensen and Læg Reid 2001; Pollitt and Bouchart 2000). In short, the goal of these changes is to make the public sector more responsive by the introduction of market-like models of organisation and leadership in public sector agencies. Common NPM measures consist of the privatisation and outsourcing of service delivery, and efforts to establish customer-driven service delivery (Jensen 1995). These changes have also had impact on the organisation of local government, with great variations from one country to another (Christensen and Læg Reid 1999;

¹ The authors thank the other project participants, Mark Chandler, Arvydas Guogis, Torbjörn Nilsson, and Raymond Rosenfeld together with colleagues at Oslo University College for their contributions and comments to this paper.

2001). This development has coincided with changes in political participation at the local level, such as membership in local political parties, voter turnout, citizens' perceptions of their role in the democracy (Baldersheim, Hagtvet, and Heidar 2001), citizen participation in non-government organizations, and the overall role of NGOs in policy making and service delivery.

According to Illner the Baltic States have to a lesser extent than other countries within the former Soviet sphere been involved in research on local government and decentralization reforms (Baldersheim, Illner, and Wollman 2003). Sten Berglund (2003) adds that from the point of view of political science 'East European local politics is in many ways a *terra incognita*.' These are in themselves good reasons for launching this particular research project.

The main focus of this project concerns how new forms of organisation and leadership, such as NPM, affect the responsiveness of local democracy in providing welfare services in two former communist countries, Latvia and Lithuania, compared with Norway and Sweden, representing two countries with about 150 years of local democratic tradition. In particular the project will look at how local government in these four countries are involving citizens in various stages of decision-making, as well as the implementation of policies.

PROPOSED EFFECTS

The realization of this project will contribute to the creation of knowledge regarding the relationship between administrative modernization, civil society, the private sector, and government with reference to social policy. The comparative nature of the project will hopefully aid in the analysis and interpretation of the complexities of the welfare state. By including two Baltic as well as two Nordic countries, this project will additionally provide insight into alternative futures of the Nordic welfare model. The researchers will seek to disseminate the findings not only through academic channels, but also by face-to-face contact with community representatives and decision-makers who can act on possible conclusions and recommendations of the research.

PARTICIPANTS

Participating researchers represent the University of Latvia, the Law University of Lithuania, and the Stockholm School of Economics in Riga, the Oslo University College, the University of Växjö, and the Østfold University College.² An associated member of the group represents the Eastern Michigan University. The nationalities of the participating researchers are as follows: Norwegian, Swedish, Latvian, Lithuanian, British, and American. Others might be involved, such as graduate and doctoral students, depending on the resources being allocated to the study.

The main focus of this project concerns how new forms of organisation and leadership, like NPM, affect the responsiveness of local democracy in providing welfare services in two former communist countries, Latvia and Lithuania,

² National designations: Latvijas Universitāte, Mykolo Romerio Universitetas, Rīgas ekonomikas augstskola, Høgskolen i Oslo, Høgskolen i Østfold, Växjö universitet.

compared with Norway and Sweden, representing two countries with about 150 years of local democratic tradition. In particular the project will look at how local government in these four countries are involving citizens in various stages of decision-making, as well as the implementation of policies.

A secondary aim of the project is to foster cooperation between these institutions and regional and international partners focusing on patterns of relationships between local governments and civil society through joint publications and seminars.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The literature about organisational changes covers a wide variety of disciplines (Skorstad 2002). Much of this literature refers to theories of how to create effective organisations – both in public and private enterprises. Studies focusing on the implications for democratic bodies express mixed opinions about the effects of organisational change for democratic values and civic virtues. A majority of these studies seem to conclude that some of these democratic values and civic virtues may be threatened (Christensen and Læg Reid 2001).

Additionally centralization of welfare policy on the national level may represent a threat to local democracy (Fimreite 2003). Norwegian studies have shown that local elected officials appear particularly unwilling to introduce user-oriented market reforms under conditions of financial stress (Sørensen and Ludvigsen 2003). Other scholars argue, however, that decentralization, delegation, and privatization are moves toward local control (Handler 1996). In Norway this claim has found some support in some studies of health services on the local level (Tufte 2003). The potential tension between organisational change and democratic values in the provision of welfare services will be a central concern in this research.

The point of departure will be to study relations between local government, civil society, and social policy. For instance, are we witnessing the creation of new meeting grounds between local governments and citizens? This project will look at what implications these changes might have with regard to democratic values and civic virtues, the role of local political parties, local voting turnout, citizen roles and the role of local civic organisations (NGOs).

While scholars in the West have expressed concern that traditional associational ties have been seriously weakened, especially among young people (Putnam 2000; Øia 2004), scholars studying Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have called for the strengthening of this aspect of civil society (Berglund and Duvold 2003; Howard 2003). Ralf Dahrendorf, according to Illner (Baldersheim, Illner, and Wollman 2003), argued in 1990 that civil society cannot be decreed, and he estimated that many decades will be needed before it becomes firmly established in the transforming countries in a manner that would seal and safeguard results of the transformation. How does Dahrendorf's argument fit into today's situation on the local government level in Latvia and Lithuania, 14 years later? Further, what similarities and differences exist between the civil society and local governments in Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden? (The participants are aware of the possible fallacy of making Norway and Sweden a

prototype of democratic excellence in such a study. However, we will try to handle this challenge with the required caution).

In this investigation special focus will be on new and alternative ways of connecting representatives of civil society to decision-making and implementation of local policies and politics. In particular this research project will seek to assess how local governments actually live up to their claims to provide arenas and channels for communicating individual and organized citizen input on welfare issues (Koht 2003; Reitan 2003). Since local governments in the participating countries vary considerably in regard to areas of responsibility for welfare services, the particular issues to be investigated must be left for further consideration. While, as previously cited, important work has been done analyzing the link between local government reform and welfare services in Norway, similar studies from the Baltic countries tend to focus on social policies on the national level (Downs 2003; Aasland 2002). However, in this research project, the likely areas for analysis involve services at the local level directed at children, youth, the elderly, and the socially excluded, such as housing, health care, nursing, and child care.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework of the study will build upon definitions of three concepts: the public ethos, civic culture, and civil society. We use these three concepts to compare the relations between local government and society at large in the four countries, which are included in this design.

Public Ethos

The concept public ethos is taken from Lundquist (1998) who argues that the public ethos should be divided into two main parts: democratic values and economic values. Democratic values are in turn subdivided into three parts: political democracy, the rule of law, and ethics (meaning values, rights and wrongs, principles, ideals). Economic values are divided into another group of three parts; functional rationality, economic efficiency and productivity (p. 63). Lundquist points out that these values overlap with each other. Economic values are potentially relevant to many sectors of society, while democratic values (as defined by Lundquist) are valid solely for the public sector. This project will first and foremost relate to the democratic values. It will be essential to develop Lundquist's arguments further in order to apply them as fruitful inputs to this study.

Civic Culture

The concept civic culture is often used in the international political culture literature for studies of modernization (Kjær 2004). Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* (1963) is a seminal work, which is much referred to. Revisiting this literature, Reese and Rosenfeld (2002) recently examined the political culture arguments of Almond and Verba and others. Reese and Rosenfeld find that the new political culture emphasizes national level values, social-psychological dynamics, and individual attitudes and values (p. 9). They argue that municipalities have collective memories and identities that are not the simple sum of individual preferences and values, and that there is a history and a sense of community as a political, economic and social place. Local civic

cultures represent systems of individual and group interactions in a public-policy-making context that inherently necessitate the allocation of value with processes reflecting both individual and community values and goals.

While Reese and Rosenfeld focus on one policy area, local economic development policy, this Nordic-Baltic research project will focus on social issues. The major reasons for examining policies of social policy and welfare can be divided in two parts. First, the field relates to issues of civil society in the four countries involved in this study, and second, it represents policy areas that in recent years have been subject to serious reorganisation efforts in the same countries, allowing in principle for greater user-choice, but also for considerable redefinition and retrenchment of some services.

Civil Society

While civic culture emphasizes characteristics of the individual members of a particular culture, civil society normally refers to the immediate associational domain between the state and the private sphere of individuals and families. A functioning civil society allows citizens to act collectively to express their interests in a public arena and to make demands on the state (Kjær 2004). While the Nordic countries have traditionally been identified as having high citizen involvement in civil-society institutions, this is not the case for the Baltic countries. The legacies of the communist experience of mandatory participation in state-controlled organisations and disappointments with developments since regaining independence have left many people with an aversion to public activity (Howard 2003). Brigita Zepa (1998) has interpreted the lack of political involvement in political and social activities in Latvia as the result of lack of positive experience and lowered self-evaluation (p. 55). Anheiser and colleagues have developed empirical indicators for the comparative study of civil society (Anheiser and Stares 2003). The World Bank has conducted surveys in which civil society has been included as an aspect of governance and operationally defined as the rules that shape the way citizens raise and become aware of public issues (Kjær 2004).

The Comparative Aspect

The involvement of two post-communist countries in the study provides an opportunity to explore how these countries have restructured local governments to fit into a democratic political system. A challenging part of the study will be comparison of local government reforms in former Soviet republics with those implemented in Norway and Sweden; to see if they follow any recognizable common pattern, and to ascertain the nature and possible causes of these variations. We have in mind patterns like the introduction of market-like reforms, managerialism, in short the efforts to create less bureaucracy, increase efficiency, and provide better welfare services for their citizens. These reforms seem to have had a hegemonic impact on the transformation of the public sector in a wide variety of Western countries (Christensen and Læg Reid 2001; Lane 1997; Pollitt and Bouchart 2000).

The fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe meant that the transformation included the creation of new institutions and the recruitment of a new generation of public officials. As Anders Åslund (2002) has remarked,

contrary to the general perception, the communist administration was not all that large, and most countries saw their bureaucracies swell with the transition.

Restitution of national independence has been followed by local government reforms, modelled after the standard Western pattern. However, the weight carried by local government in the Baltic countries varies considerably according to a study carried out by Berglund (2003). Conditions may also have changed considerably from the seminal study made by the team of Baldersheim and Illner (2003) using data collected in 1991–1992 from Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. However, since this research project will be carried out more than ten years later, and involves other East European countries, we will seek to replicate some of aspects of previous research.

In addition, this research effort will consider whether historical aspects from the past may serve as constraints on the potential for Latvia and Lithuania to develop local governments and NGOs according to Western ideals? Such historical influence might, according to Illner, be connected to values, beliefs and habits from the past, while past choices can serve as constraints on political actors' behaviour, or possible other sources of influence on today's reforms (Baldersheim, Illner, and Wollman 2003). The impact of hegemonic ideas, incentives, and pressures from the European Union, and historical circumstances mean that this study will also be focusing on explanatory frameworks that are well-suited to interpret the research data.

In this research project we will assume that the hegemonic strength of ideas connected to modernisation of the public sector (NPM), alongside incentives and pressures from EU regulations and standards will influence local government reforms in Latvia and Lithuania in much the same way as they do in Norway and Sweden.

METHOD AND SAMPLE

The research project will focus its analysis on to two local councils within each of the four countries. The selection of communities will be decided upon with respect to size, preferably medium-sized, and attitudes towards external and internal relations³. Data will be gathered through personal interviews and survey questionnaires. Elite interviews will be conducted with about twenty selected members of the local government elite in each town. Next, in each of the communities the leaders of two or three NGOs will have to be selected and interviewed. Finally, there will be structural interviews with a random sample of 400 inhabitants in each town. This combination of elite interviews with a general population survey sample will be a particular strength of this research project compared to previous efforts, especially in the Baltics, where there has been a tendency to do either elite studies or population surveys. The data will be analyzed using both qualitative and quantitative methods.

Each country study will be headed by a team-member living in or with long-term experience with the particular country, and in cooperation with local and/or regional stakeholders. The studies will share a common research design as far as conditions with regard to contextual relevance and access to data make

³ Since a secondary aim of the project is to develop cross-national cooperation between educational and governmental partners, see [Participants](#) above.

it possible. This implies that there will be room for country-specific variations. For instance, one of the Norwegian members of the team has already had opportunity to put questions of interest to this research into a recent questionnaire of a nationwide survey of members of Norges Velforbund (Norwegian Association of Neighbourhood Clubs). It is expected that the initial round will be followed up by a national survey of all Norwegian communes.

TIMETABLE

Phase 1: (Fall 2005) – Preliminary work

The preliminary period will include refinement of the theoretical approach, literature review, specification of research design, and operationalization of variables. The communities to be studied will be selected and necessary agreements will be made with each. Necessary permits and waivers to collect data through personal interviews will be applied for. Questionnaires and survey instruments will be tested, and the recruitment of master and doctoral students as contributing participants will be initiated.

Phase 2: (2006) – Systematic data gathering

Data gathering through elite interviews and surveys will be carried out in each of the eight selected communities. Meetings with community representatives will be arranged to present and discuss the significance and possible useful ramifications of the research.

Phase 3: (2007-Spring 2008) – Analysis and reporting

Work with and analysis of the data material from elite interviews, surveys, and meetings. Follow-up meetings with community representatives will be arranged for the presentation of findings. Findings, conclusions, and possible recommendations will be disseminated through articles in scholarly and semi-scholarly publications and conferences. A book manuscript will be prepared.

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On Crystallization of Democratic Consolidation

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This paper deals with the preconditions and prospects of democratic consolidation. To understand this process from the bottom-up, methodological individualism and actor centered institutionalism are set as the analytical frame. In this frame an institutional gap and its filling as a crucial precondition for the sustainability of democratic consolidation are highlighted. In addition, new insight from experimental economics democratic consolidation is introduced as a public good and the importance of conditional cooperation between individuals for the evolution of social norms is reconsidered. In this context, trust is shown as being crucial for the sustainable provision of this public good. Finally, in connection with this some conclusions are drawn for effective trust building public policy.

1. INTRODUCTION

In many respects the end of communism in central and Eastern Europe impressively showed the limits of holistic plans and their theoretical justifications. And it triggered sustainability questions for the western role model as well, which was considered widely as a model for the introduction of a free market economy and political systems. The overwhelming economic success of this model was undoubtedly a strong incentive for the economic reform in CEE,¹ and the promise of individual freedom and self determination was considered even more crucial after the communist experience of forced collectivism. The decision about alternative options was made to some extent under time pressure, because the capacity limits and the goal definition changes of existing institutions (EU, NATO) were likely to appear. Given the limits of time and realistic alternatives, the integration was based, to a considerable extent, on the assumption that the available institutions have similar effects in CEE.

In the meantime, the process of formal institutional integration has reached a high level and the question is raised, “Integrated into what?”² The

¹ Sharman, J. C.; Kanet, R. E. (2000): International Influences on Democratization in Postcommunist Europe, in: Hollifield, J. F.; Jillson, C. (Eds.): Pathways to democracy: the political economy of democratic transitions. New York; London, p. 230.

² This is directly linked to the question: Transition to what? See Macedo, S. (2000): Transitions to what? The Social Foundations of the Democratic Citizenship, in: Hollifield, J. F.; Jillson, C. (Eds.): Pathways to Democracy: the political economy of democratic transitions, London; New York, pp. 53.


underlying transition theories³ give reason to reflect. What extent are they scientific or political?⁴ The broader context is the process of reflection about what will emerge in countries representing the reality of the models with which they should be compared. For that reason, a deeper understanding has to deal with forces which drive human behaviour rather than with those ones which connect this behaviour to a specific transformational set of circumstances. So the analytical frame used in this paper is neither specific transformational nor specific for political science.

Initially, this paper outlines the basic assumptions of democratic consolidation, and a brief characterization of the transformational context. In this context a missing but necessary precondition for democratic consolidation is described as an institutional gap. A short description of the analytical frame (methodological individualism and actor centered institutionalism) follows. To close the institutional gap – starting from the understanding of democratic consolidation as a public good – empirical evidence about the evolution of the conditionally cooperative provision of public goods is presented. Finally, some policy recommendations are developed in the light of new insights around economics of trust.

2. TRANSFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

As a general model of transformation, to describe the different interactions and aggregated social structures we will use the following⁵:

Different Levels of Transformation



In this framework transformation we can see a social process of fundamental political, economic, technological, and cultural change in structures and values, including all levels of the society, in their various relations. Transformation is

³ For the deep rooted connection between methodological and normative design of this process see detailed Thumfart, A. (2002): Die politische Integration Ostdeutschlands, Frankfurt am Main, p. 15.

⁴ Pickel, A. (2002): Transformation theory: scientific or political? in: Communist and Post-Communist Studies 35 (2002), p. 115.

⁵ Lang, R. (2003): Thematic Opening 6th Chemnitz East Forum "The End of Transformation?" (http://www.tu-chemnitz.de/wirtschaft/bwl5/ostforum/keynotes2003/of2003kn_rl.pdf), p. 9.

both, managed (intentional) or self organized. It underlines the importance of values, culture⁶, power and actors. Organizational change can be described as an economically based strategic decision, but also as a process of cultural change, (re-) institutionalization, individual and organizational learning, a process of power and control as well as of co-evolution.

To measure democracy, several definitions of the term and a broad range of indicators are used both quantitative and qualitative. But the basic fact still remains that any analysis presupposes a value judgment. Therefore, all the synthesis in this paper are value driven and influenced by “sensitivity under starting conditions”. This holds especially true for measuring democracy⁷ in the transformational context⁸ and making certain definitions operational. So there is a broad range of definitions of democracy⁹ in the literature.¹⁰ For analytical purposes, political democracy is centered around the core dimensions of competition, participation, as well as civil and political liberties.¹¹

Similarly to the definition of democracy, there is only an imprecise definition of the level¹² of democracy, from where it can be called consolidated (after transformation from communist rule).¹³ Differentiation is modelled for

⁶ See for the context of democratic consolidation in CEE and the importance of political culture: Pickel, G.; Pickel, S. (2000): Politische Partizipation und politische Einstellungen der osteuropäischen Transformationsstaaten im Vergleich, Discussion Papers 1/99, Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies, Frankfurt an der Oder (<http://fit.euv-frankfurt-o.de/Veroeffentlichungen/Discussion%20Papers/PDF-Format/00-04Pickel-Pickel.PDF>).

⁷ For a general introduction with emphasis on the “value-free” problem see: Birch, A.H. (1993): *The Concepts and Theories of modern Democracy*, London, New York, p. 45.

⁸ See Thumfart, A. (2002), loc. Cit, pp. 18.

⁹ P. G. Roeder defines “the extent of democracy by the probability that half the population plus one member can remove incumbent officials (or defeat an attempt to do so).” For R. D. Anderson, Jr. “the criterion is whether elites compete with one another and some of the citizens respond by taking sides.” M. S. Fish defines democracy “by the extent of rights to vote, communicate, and associate.” For S. E. Hanson democracy is “a state that formally defends institutional guarantees of electoral contestation and citizen participation.” They all follow the definition of J. Schumpeter, who considers democracy “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” Anderson, Jr., R. D.; Fish, M. S.; Hanson, S. E.; Roeder, P. G. (2001): *Conclusion: Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy*, in: Anderson, Jr., R. D.; Fish, M. S.; Hanson, S. E.; Roeder, P. G. (Eds.): *Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy*, Princeton, Woodstock, p. 159.

¹⁰ Although Sørensen gives a detailed description of democracy, he concludes after review of the evolution of the term “democracy”, that beside the meaning a rule by the people “a more precise definition is difficult to formulate because democracy is a dynamic entity that has acquired many different meanings over the course of time.” Sørensen, G. (1998): *Democracy and Democratization*. Oxford; Boulder, p. 23.

¹¹ For evaluation of democracy see also the Freedom House Index with a description of a detailed methodology (<http://www.freedomhouse.org>).

¹² Beichelt argues that with a more explicit definition many analytical frames lose considerably explanatory power. So he considers necessary a higher level of abstraction. See Beichelt, T. (2002): *Demokratie und Konsolidierung im postsozialistischen Europa*, in: Bendel, P.; Croissant, A.; Rüb, F. W. (Eds.): *Zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur. Zur Konzeption und Empirie demokratischer Grauzonen*, Opladen, p. 183.

¹³ Gunther, R.; Puhle, H.-J.; Diamandouros, P. N. (1995): Introduction, in: Gunther, R.; Puhle, H.-J.; Diamandouros, P. N. (Eds.): *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore, p. 1. For a detailed description about the fuzziness of the term see: Schedler, A. (1997): *Concepts of Democratic Consolidation* (<http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/LASA97/schedler.pdf>).

several levels and areas of consolidation.¹⁴ For consolidation recently, several new parameters were added to go beyond typological comparisons, including historical, social and cultural traditions. In general, a ***democracy is positively consolidated, when the pro-democratic social relations can crystallize and become social structures, change proof against external change.***¹⁵ It refers to both attitudes of masses and elites with their respective subjective beliefs and values and leaves consolidation very much unfinished.¹⁶ Simultaneously, it creates an explanatory gap between quicker institutional democratization and its individual base and leaves the basic category of society and state unrecognized. In this paper, I will use institutional gap to describe the difference between formal-institutional and informal social norm. It is also the fundamental justification to include methodological individualism into an analytical frame. And it shows it is necessary to connect the already existing observable social structures with a deeper understanding of the subjective dimension of the transformation and consolidation process.¹⁷ Most of the concepts focus on the crystallization of democratic institutions and stress the necessity for the evolution of supportive social norms on an intermediary level, that have to be based on democracy-compatible behaviour of political actors and the population in general.

An important step toward understanding the interaction between institutional structure and individual or collective action is to throw light on the ***social function of culture*** as an option filter for behaviour in a reflexive relationship. Depending on the interest of recognition, there is a wide range of definitions¹⁸ concerning the meaning of culture. Finally, it describes several dimensions culture possesses in the creation of social behaviour and crystallizing social structures (institutions). The approach used here is to

¹⁴ Merkel, W. (1996): Theorien der Transformation. Die demokratische Konsolidierung postautoritärer Gesellschaften, in: von Beyme, K. (Ed.): Politische Theorien in der Ära der Transformation, Opladen, pp. 30. See also Merkel, W. (1999): Systemtransformation, Opladen.

¹⁵ Extending A. Przeworski's definition of consolidation (democracy is consolidated, when it is the only game in town), Linz and Stepan stress the actors dimension: "Behaviorally, democracy becomes the only game in town when no significant political group seriously attempts to overthrow the democratic regime or secede from the state... Attitudinally, democracy becomes the only game in town when, even in the face of severe political and economic crisis, the overwhelming majority of the people believe that further political changes must emerge from within the parameters of democratic formulas. Constitutionally, democracy becomes the only game in town when all of the actors habituated to the fact that political conflict will be resolved according to established norms and that violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and costly." Linz, J.; Stepan, A. (1996): Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore, p. 5.

¹⁶ Sharman, J. C.; Kanet, R. E. (2000), loc. Cit., p. 229.

¹⁷ Most of the concepts focus on the crystallization of democratic institutions and stress the necessity for the evolution of supportive social norms on the intermediary level, that have to be based on democracy-compatible behaviour of political actors and the population in general. But they don't provide a conclusive explanation for the evolution of social norms which consolidate democracy compared to their definitions. See e.g. the model of Beichelt, T. (2002): loc. Cit.

¹⁸ For a detailed overview see Alevsson, M. (2002): Understanding Organizational Culture. London, Thousand Oaks, New Dehli. For culture on a more aggregated level see: Hedetoft, U. (2003): Cultures of States and Informal Governance in the EU: An exploratory study of elites, power and identity, Occasional Papers No.35/2003, European Research Unit, Aalborg University (http://www.ihis.aau.dk/eru/publications/35_Hedetoft-2003.pdf).

understand ***culture as shared values and convictions of individuals and therefore “congealed history”¹⁹ of their respective interaction.***

Culture fundamentally represents societies (communities of commonly shared public spirit) by shaping and expressing their collective identity.²⁰ It consists of attitudes and respective patterns of behaviour, which are passed on with symbols and the creation of traditions.²¹

In the light of the this understanding of culture and its function it becomes more visible where potential conflicts could take place when “policy learning” (institution import) occurs. As individuals can have multiple identities, understanding sustainable consolidation on a personal level refers to comprehensive understanding of physical as well as emotional well-being and therefore a functional coherence concerning the institutions, in which people are set or set themselves. This paves the way for the assumption that there is a critical individual resonance necessary to make individuals live up to functional roles in institutions. This contains the interactive process of mutual self-referential reassurance of intra-organizational social norms and the feature to be credible in a “social role” and leads the organizational level to pass on the respective organizational “beliefs and traditions”. In the transformational context the pro-social behaviour facilitating democratic consolidation with regards to political actors can be described as “responsiveness”²², understood as a mutually dependent feedback sensitiveness and an actor quality as well as the precondition of meaningful participation in all political arenas of state and society. If society and state lack this responsiveness, structures can be considered “facade-like institutions”²³, because the basic condition is missing is the acceleration of social capital – social trust. In an interdisciplinary approach the term “resonance” can be applied to describe a process of conditional interaction.²⁴ As a condition for democratic consolidation can be considered therefore ***to bring in sustainable***

¹⁹ See Fisch, S. (2000): Verwaltungskulturen – Geronnene Geschichte?, in: Die Verwaltung 91 (2000), p. 303.

²⁰ van Waarden, F. (1993): Wie lassen sich unterschiedliche Verwaltungsstile und Verwaltungskulturen erklären?, in: Wehling (Ed.): Länderprofile. Politische Kulturen im In- und Ausland, Stuttgart, p. 193.

²¹ See a basic study to this topic: Almond, G. A.; Verba, S. (1963): The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Princeton. See with special regard to administrative culture: Keraudren, P. (1996): In Search of Culture: Lessons from the Past to Find a Role for the Study of Administrative Culture, in: Governance. An International Journal on Policy and Administration 9 (1996), p. 71.

²² See Thumfart, A. (2002), loc. Cit., pp. 877. For an overview see also Thomas, M. (2000): Vertrauen in wirtschaftlichen Transformationsprozessen – Fallstudien und Konzeptualisierungen aus regionalen Kontexten, Discussion Papers 1/99, Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies, Frankfurt an der Oder (<http://fit.euv-frankfurt-o.de/Veroeffentlichungen/Discussion%20Papers/PDF-Format/00-06Thomas.pdf>).

²³ Rottenburg, R. (1996): When Organization Travels: On Intercultural Translation, in: Czarniawska, B.; Sevón, G. (Eds.): Translating Organizational Change, Berlin; New York, pp. 191. See also in this context: Rosenbaum, E. F. (1999): Culture, Cognitive Models and the Performance of Institutions in Transformation Countries, Discussion Papers 1/99, Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies, Frankfurt an der Oder, (http://fit.euv-frankfurt-o.de/Veroeffentlichungen/Discussion%20Papers/PDF-Format/99-01_Rosenbaum.pdf).

²⁴ For a detailed description see: Kramer, F. (1998): Symphonie des Lebendigen. Versuch einer allgemeinen Resonanztheorie, Frankfurt am Main, 2nd Edition. For a comprehensive approach see also: Kramer, F. (1999): Gibt es eine wissenschaftliche Welterklärung?, in: Universitas 1/1999, p. 18.

critical resonance to the implicit value structure of formal institutions with the value structure of the respective set of cultures (e. g. political, administrative, regional, state, business).

3. ANALYTICAL FRAME: METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM AND ACTOR CENTRED INSTITUTIONALISM

3.1. Methodological individualism

The basic reason to choose methodological individualism as paradigm in this paper is the conviction that in no other way the explanatory power of the analytical frame can be increased substantially and arrive at a deeper understanding of human behaviour. Because of the heterogeneity of man, one has to come down to every single individual to understand the specific behaviour. This also means to adapt knowledge about individuals which are not comparable in their specific configuration like genes and their expression in proteins, cells and individual experiences of social interaction (individual social memory) and others.²⁵ And if (organizational, political or state) culture is bounded to real individuals, the respective personal limits of social behaviour play an ever greater role the more theories get individual. Even on macro levels of social theories the “subjective factor” of important veto actors is limited by the real individual despite all given institutional incentives and influences at least in the short run the institutional capacity. And as Kenneth Arrow points out:

“The starting point for the individualist paradigm is the simple fact that all social interactions are after all interactions among individuals. The individual in economy or in the society is like the atom in chemistry; whatever happens can ultimately be described exhaustively in terms of the individual involved.”²⁶

So methodological individualism asserts, “A sound explanation has to be based on facts about individuals.”²⁷ Therefore, social outcomes are the evolution and the continuation (social reproduction) of institutions and policy outcomes and in particular should be explained in terms of the choices of individuals. ***Consequently, individuals constitute the base of value judgement.***

3.2. Actor centered institutionalism²⁸

Traditionally, political scientists focused on the effects of institutions and paid less attention to the origins and change of institutions.²⁹ In empirical

²⁵ See Franssen, M. (1998): The Not-so-trivial Truth of Methodological Individualism, Paper provided for the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Boston (<http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Scie/ScieFran.htm>).

²⁶ Arrow, K. (1994): Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge’, *American Economic Review* 84 (2), p. 1 (p. 3).

²⁷ Lukes, S. (1968): Methodological Individualism Reconsidered, *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 19, No. 2, p. 119.

²⁸ This theory was initially developed by Fritz W. Scharpf and Renate Mayntz. For a descriptive introduction see: Scharpf, F. W. (2000): *Interaktionsformen. Akteurzentrierter Institutionalismus in der Politikforschung*, Opladen. See also: Immergut, Ellen M. (1998): The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism, in: *Politics & Society* 26, 1, p. 5. As well as Peters, B. G. (1999): *Institutional Theory: The “New Institutionalism” in Political Science*, London.

interaction-oriented policy research, a unit of analysis is a set of interactions among policy actors, mostly groups, parties and other institutions. These composite a representation of individuals that do not contradict the assumptions of methodological individualism. The reason is that individuals also act in a representative capacity and they have the ability to act from a perspective of larger units.³⁰ Simultaneously, analysis should be focused on the level of individuals and take into consideration the outcomes of their interaction and the influence of these outcomes for future interaction (social structuration)³¹.

Actor centered institutionalism starts from a double perspective: firstly, it recognizes that institutions matter, in particular in the transformational context,³² but also states that actors (individuals and organizations) have a leeway for discrete non-institutional self-determination. Therefore, they possess an analytical value.³³ It assumes fundamentally that actors shape the change in social systems and institutions.³⁴ In this way actor centered institutionalism is characterized by a multi-level-perspective.³⁵

With in this perspective, actor centered institutionalism is highly suitable to describe transformational change, because a typical feature of transformation is the disintegration of institutions and the decay of social norms. Therefore, actors have even more room for individual manoeuvre or rather discrete leeway.

Since institutional focus in this situation gives an unsatisfying explanation, an investigation into the reasons behind individual behaviour and the evolutionary principles of new social and economic norms and institutions appears to contain the potential of additional explanatory power. For this reason, the following democratic consolidation is considered a public good and it will be connected to the evolution of pro-social democratic norms.

²⁹ Pierson, P. (2000) *The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration*, Vol. 13, No. 4, p. 475.

³⁰ Scharpf, F. W. (1997): *Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research*, Boulder, p. 61.

³¹ Structuration theory introduces the notion of the interdependency between human actions and organizational structures. See Giddens, A. (1988): *Die Konstitution der Gesellschaft. Grundzüge einer Theorie der Strukturierung*, Frankfurt am Main. Giddens describes the frame as follows: "In seeking to come to grips with problems of action and structure, structuration theory offers a conceptual scheme that allows one to understand how actors are at the same time the creators of social systems, yet created by them ... It is an attempt to provide the conceptual means of analysing the often delicate and subtle interlacing of reflexively organized action and institutional constraint." Giddens, A. (1991): *Modernity and Self Identity*, Cambridge, p. 204.

³² Thomas, M. (1999): *Neoinstitutionalismus, economic sociology und der Transformationsfall*, Discussion Papers 8/99, Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies, Frankfurt an der Oder (<http://fit.euv-frankfurt-o.de/veroeffentlichungen/discussion%20papers/PDF-Format/99-08Thomas.PDF>).

³³ Mayntz, R.; Scharpf, F. W. (1995): *Der Ansatz des akteurszentrierten Institutionalismus*, in: Mayntz, R.; Scharpf, F. W.: *Gesellschaftliche Selbstregelung und politische Steuerung*, Frankfurt am Main, New York, p. 39.

³⁴ Schwanitz, S. (1997): *Transformationsforschung: Area Studies versus Politikwissenschaft? Plädoyer für einen akteurstheoretischen Ansatz*, Working Paper No. 03/1997, Osteuropa-Institut of FU Berlin (http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~segbers/working_papers/AP03.pdf).

³⁵ Nemitz, C. (2000): *Erfolgsfaktoren für eine Reform politischer Systeme*, Speyerer Forschungsberichte No.208, DHV, Speyer.

4. TRUST AND THE DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AS A PUBLIC GOOD

Having the institutional gap in an institutionally unstable social environment in mind, it is appropriate to reflect on the sources of individual behaviour, which measures consolidated democracies using the definitions of Linz and Stepan.³⁶ In the following, we consider democratic consolidation a “public good”³⁷. Following methodological individualism, the basic feature of required social interaction in all dimensions (behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional) is pro-social democratic behaviour, which constitutes society and state as well.³⁸

The connection between trust and (political) culture for the outcome of social interaction is obvious. Because social norms evolve endogenously, given institutions, per se, are not a sufficient characteristic for existing trust. But a deeper understanding of the evolution of such norms facilitates the creation of a public space and respective policies. Interesting enough, the level of interpersonal trust is one of the most powerful stimulants for economic growth by reducing transaction costs (control costs e. g.),³⁹ which is in turn one of the crucial factors of democratic consolidation. Beside that it simply testifies the sufficient ability and effectiveness of the existent institutions to trigger growth.

Distrust is not worthwhile for anybody: There are “hidden costs of control”⁴⁰ and the fact remains that if time is crucial for economic efficiency and growth, trust has to be existent independent from the specific business partner.⁴¹ Otherwise there is the risk to undermine the base of free market economy.⁴²

³⁶ See Footnote 15.

³⁷ Is a “consolidated democracy” a public good? A public good, in economic terms, is firstly something that is best provisioned for everyone (an economic characteristic called non-exclusion). For constitutional reasons exclusion is very unlikely. Secondly, a public good anyone can use without depleting the resource (a characteristic called non-rival use – individual users are not rivals for the resource) means that additional consumers can be added without increasing the cost of production. The marginal cost of adding a consumer to any given quantity (population) is close to zero. So the overall conclusion is that a consolidated democracy is something that has major characteristics of a public good. Additionally, the fall of dictators, a healthy environment, collective action of workers, political mass movements and the maintenance of forest land possess similar public good features.

³⁸ It is noteworthy, that the divide into state and society is fictional, because in fact they have the same elements. To abstract from a public servant or politician his or her biological or social dimension is as unrealistic as to assume that social structures and institutions could determine life cycles and biological rhythm - rather institutions have to be compatible with biological and psychological requirements.

³⁹ Zack, P. J.; Knack, S. (2001): Trust and Growth, in: *The Economic Journal*, 111, p. 295.

⁴⁰ Falk, A.; Kosfeld, M. (2004): Distrust – The Hidden Cost of Control, Working Paper No. 193, Institute of Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Zurich.

⁴¹ Hirschman, A. O. (1993): *Entwicklung, Markt und Moral. Abweichende Betrachtungen*, Frankfurt am Main, p. 96.

⁴² „Da wahr ist, daß der Markt von einem normativen Unterbau abhängig ist (der die jedem Vertrag vorausgehenden Grundlagen wie Vertrauen, Kooperation und Ehrlichkeit liefert), den jegliche vertragliche Beziehung erfordert, entsteht ein Paradoxon: *Je mehr die Menschen das neoklassische Paradigma zum Leitsatz für ihr Verhalten machen, desto mehr wird die Fähigkeit unterminiert, eine Marktwirtschaft aufrechtzuerhalten.*“ Etzioni, A. (1994): *Jenseits des Egoismus-Prinzips. Ein neues Bild von Wirtschaft, Politik und Gesellschaft*, Stuttgart, p. 446.

What holds true for economic transactions is corresponding to the cooperation for the provision of public goods and therefore democratic consolidation. Generally speaking, the demand for a social norm arises when individual action causes positive or negative side-effects for others.⁴³

But to get out of the “poverty trap” with a defect resulting from mutually reinforcing distrust raises the question. “Is there a reason to assume that in a low-trust environment people (and additionally under incomplete social contracts) contribute to that public good?” Anyhow, one could suppose that the negative side effects of selfish behaviour trigger a huge demand for a social norm in the transformational context.

5. CONDITIONAL COOPERATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS

The need for responsiveness to fill the institutional gap with pro-democratic social norms is accompanied by the need to reflect on the basics of the justifications of human social behaviour, because tit-for-tat strategies lead in the Nash-equilibrium to non-cooperative behaviour. Strong evidence from experimental economics suggests that pure self interest is not the most prominent trait for the majority of humans.⁴⁴ This is even more amazing, because large-scale cooperation emerges between genetically unrelated individuals.⁴⁵

Selfish humans are only interested in the maximization of the own personal utility. If strong reciprocity⁴⁶ occurs, behaviour considered unfair triggers in a wide range of situations a hostile reaction, whereas fair behaviour triggers a benevolent reaction. Therefore, positive reciprocity induces selfish humans to act fair, whereas negative reciprocity prevents selfish humans to act unfair. The interaction between self interest and reciprocity implies that institutions (social norms and their structurization) play a central role for the design of cooperation.

⁴³ Fehr, E.; Fischbacher, U. (2004a): Social norms and human cooperation, in: Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol. 8 No. 4, April 2004, p. 185.


⁴⁴ See fundamentally: Fehr, E.; Fischbacher (2004b): Third Party Punishment and Social Norms, Working Paper No. 106, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Zurich. See also: Sigmund, K.; Fehr, E.; Nowak, M. A. (2002): Teilen und Helfen – Ursprünge sozialen Verhaltens, in: Spektrum der Wissenschaft, März 2002, pp. 52 and: Fehr, E.; Fischbacher, U.; Gächter, S. (2002): Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms, in: Human Nature 13, p. 1.

⁴⁵ Cooperation among related non-human species is governed by the “Hamilton Rule”, which states that any potentially costly behaviour, including cooperative behaviour, is more likely to emerge when individuals share more genes. Zack, P. J.; Knack, S. (2001): loc. Cit.

⁴⁶ “Strong reciprocity is a combination of altruistic rewarding, which is a predisposition to reward others for cooperative, norm-abiding behaviours, and altruistic punishment, which is a propensity to impose sanctions on others for norm violations. Strong reciprocators bear the cost of rewarding or punishing even if they gain no individual economic benefit whatsoever from their acts. In contrast, reciprocal altruists, as they have been defined in the biological literature, rewards and punish only if this is in their long-term self-interest. Strong reciprocity thus constitutes a powerful incentive for cooperation even in non-repeated interactions and when reputation gains are absent, because strong reciprocators will reward those who cooperate and punish those who defect.” Fehr, E.; Fischbacher, U. (2003): The nature of human altruism, in: Nature Vol. 425, 23 October 2003, p. 785.

The systematic willingness of a large share of individuals to punish altruistically is rooted more in non-strategic factors as social norms rather than in strategic (e. g. reputation or future payoff calculations).⁴⁷ At the same time, it makes visible the fundamental importance of the state of law.

Now in the context of a public good where no one can be excluded from the consumption, all group members are better off if the good is provided and respective costs are shared. But every individual also has an economic incentive to free ride (contribute nothing towards providing the good). If group members follow their incentives, they do not cooperate and the public good will not be provided. Consequently, a social norm such as, “You should not take advantage of your group members by shirking” contributes to the provision of the public good.⁴⁸ Accordingly, we can generalize the evidence and call it, “**social norm of conditional cooperation.**” *The norm prescribes cooperation if the other group members also cooperate, whereas the defection of others is a legitimate excuse for individual defection.*⁴⁹ Evidence for this social norm of conditional cooperation comes from a broad range of experimental sets. A typical pattern of distribution of single clusters of cooperation for public goods is shown in the graphics⁵⁰ below:



It appears that a majority show conditionally cooperative behaviour, although they are not perfect conditional cooperators. They increase their contribution to the public good if the average contribution of the group members also increases, although less than others. But there is a considerable minority who never contribute anything (free riders). That suggests that

⁴⁷ Falk, A.; Fehr, E.; Fischbacher, U. (2001): Driving Forces of Informal Sanctions. Working Paper No. 59, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Zurich.

⁴⁸ Fehr, E.; Fischbacher, U. (2004a): loc. Cit., p. 185.

⁴⁹ Fehr, E.; Fischbacher, U. (2004a): loc. Cit., p. 186.

⁵⁰ Fehr, E.; Fischbacher, U.; Gächter, S. (2000): Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment, Working Paper No. 16, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich (http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp_iewwp016.pdf), p. 13.

punishment of selfish group members is necessary to enforce broad cooperation because these free riders are unwilling to contribute to the public good without sanctions. 14% of the members show a hump-shaped and 6% irregular contribution patterns.

Without option of punishment for non-cooperative group (and also non-punishing) members in combination with complete free riders it is likely that over time contribution will decrease. High levels of sustainable cooperation can not be kept if a majority of group members wants to contribute below the average of contribution.⁵¹

With the option of punishment, the contribution increases considerably to almost 100%. But it is of high importance whether the motivation for punishment is considered selfish or altruistic. So the moral legitimacy of the sanction appears to be a crucial factor for maintenance of cooperation.⁵² In terms of the state of law it requires a reflection on the social perception of law. If it is considered not fair, it demotivates altruistic punishers to punish altruistically. To put it constructively. "The task of the custodian of the law should be to provide law enforcement not only by written law, but also by providing incentive structures for altruistic punishers to punish or to become a punisher after having been hump-shaped or irregular contributor." There is also evidence that a successful dynamic system of punishment with regard to norm enforcement should not be too severe and avoid a standard law-and-order-approach.⁵³

6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

To summarize: a majority of individuals show reciprocal social behaviour, i. e. they reward fair and punish unfair behaviour, even if this involves individual costs. For humans to judge social action or its results as "fair", intentions are of high importance. If reciprocal (pro-social) or selfish behaviour gains acceptance in social dilemma situations as public good provision depends largely in the institutional sphere, which is in turn reflexively shaped by the crystallization of the social interaction that appears in this context. If punishment options are not available, selfish behaviour is likely to dominate. If sanctions are perceived unfair or selfish, they almost completely destroy altruism.

But if there is a balance between formal punishment options like effective state of law and/or informal sanctions, egoists (free riders) can be disciplined, cooperation and therefore the provision of the public good is likely to happen. To obtain a balanced social norm effective, altruistic punishment plays an important role for the emergence of highly social norms. Therefore, the encouragement of altruistic punishers to act should be a core task of any public policy to break the circle of distrust and non-cooperative social behaviour. Besides that, empirically distrust is a fundamental cause of poverty

⁵¹ Fehr, E.; Fischbacher, U. (2004a): loc. Cit., p. 186.

⁵² Fehr, E.; Rockenbach, B. (2003): Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism, in: *Nature Vol. 422*, 13 March 2003, p. 137.

⁵³ Huck, S.; Kosfeld, M. (2004): *The Dynamics of Neighbourhood Watch and Norm Enforcement*. Working Paper No. 199, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Zurich.

and makes more visible the objective meaning of social action, which is accompanied with a process of resonance building in terms of a critical set of shared values that create a public spirit.

In this context trust can be seen as faith in other member's future contribution to a public good i. e. democratic consolidation. This faith needs transparency to evaluate the real intentions and shares of contributions of other (society) members.

Public spirit can carry out this function if it is similar in terms of shared values. Public debate is in this way a necessary precondition to communicate about the shape of this essential public spirit. Social segmentation is a major obstacle for this process and therefore should be a major task for public policy to bridge existing communicational gaps.

The self-dynamics of social interaction are also relevant for public administration that is in many respects critical for an effective state of law. Public servants themselves are relevant in this process, because as Grover Cleveland⁵⁴ put it, "a public office is a public trust". Corruption is a major concern. The more widespread corruption is, the more it erodes the individual psychological barriers against corrupt behaviour. Concerning leadership, a major task for leaders is to manage transformational change, which includes the task of managing expectations convincingly. So a responsive (administrative, political or state) culture starts with the ability of leaders to convince other group members of their pro-social democratic intentions. This is a major concern in the transformational context, because corruption is definitely a sign for non-democratic intentions and therefore a major obstacle to restore faith in institutions that grant those political actors the political power to set formal social norms and influence the rules of the institution.

Democratic consolidation is also more likely to be achieved, if leaders promote a permanent discourse about the uniting of public spirit and the personal chances and risks every single individual has in this social community of sense. As the level of attributed trust differs among different cultures, they possess supposedly different levels of collective action. This may create distrust, because individuals with a higher initial trust are likely to be disappointed about the real contribution to the common public good. This question refers finally to the problem of the democratic consolidation of a multicultural society. Consequently, further research seems necessary, because there is little evidence about the evolution of culturally bounded social preferences, in particular in the transformational context.

New insight in to the nature of social norms inspires us to investigate in the incentive structures of human behaviour, e. g. the neurological base of human altruism. Recent research shows the important role of evolutionary biology in this context. It may well be especially fruitful for theorizing on social interaction and institutions, because it leads to a reflection on the basic assumptions of political, sociological and economic theories, which may have prevented mankind up to now from understanding its objective limits of steering power and a wise social self organization in the light of these limits.

⁵⁴ 22nd and 24th president of the United States.

Corruption as a Threat to Functioning of Transparent Political System in Lithuania

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INTRODUCTION

Aristotle in his work “Politics” has noted that persons, having the position of charondas are corrupt and often sacrifice state affairs to their personal use. The term “corruption” Aristotle used describing this phenomenon as bad form of monarchy – tyranny.

Corruption is the main phenomenon destroying any transparent political system. For protection, strong and transparent laws must be created while at the same time performing anti-corruption policies with in the politics in the state. It is worth emphasizing that the laws of the Republic of Lithuania do not define the legal contents of political corruption but legislate regulations for the sphere of prevention of corruption among politicians. They are reflected by these main elements:

1. Fixed in law a depoliticising principle;
2. Regulations of law and an order providing officers' independence from politics and political powers;
3. Mechanisms and procedures for determining financing control of political parties and political campaigns (Vaitiekus, 2002).

Therefore, there is a need to analyse the conception and manifestation of the forms of corruption as a threat to the functioning of a transparent political system.

THE PROBLEM OF PERCEIVING CORRUPTION

The term corruption itself originates from Latin “*corruptio*” meaning spoilage, corruption. Dictionary of international words explains: “corruption [Lat. *corruptio* – spoilage, bribing], usage of official rights in order to make profits; bribing of officer or politician”. (1985) Another dictionary of international words expands the definition of this word and states that corruption is taking a bribe by a state institution officer or politician for performing duties or breaking the law in order to have use for oneself or both

sides, bribing, graft". (1999) Therefore, corruption can be related to a behavior of officers who abuse their position for personal selfish gain.

In countries where corruption has taken root it stops the powers prompting reforms. The poor stand to deal with the worst part of corruption. Due to corruption, the state can work as efficiently, state resources go into the wrong hands and development is stopped. The fight against corruption must be complex, acknowledging various factors determining the spread of corruption. Corruption can be divided into state occupation and administrative corruption. State occupation is the actions of persons, groups or companies acting in the public or private sectors in order to bend the formation of laws, rules, decrees or state politics to their favour by using state officers in illegal and untransparent ways. Separate state government branches may be distinguished as: legislation, executive, courts, control and supervision offices. State corruption ensures use by certain people or a group within the sphere of law regulation, while administrative corruption is deliberate perversion of existing laws, rules and regulations by performing them for the good of state or non-state persons and giving private use of state officers in an illegal and in transparent way (Dapšys, 1997). Usually, when fighting against corruption it is advisable to focus upon administrative corruption and to reform public administration and management of state finances. But perceiving that the root of corruption is deeper than shortages of state ruling topics of wider type are included into anti-corruptional stock: internal organization of a political system, relations of key state institutions, link between the state and civil society (Christian, 2002).

Corruption is the use of an official position in order to obtain something or bribing of an officer or politician. The most important issue is that the usage of an official post or political power in order to get gain is possible only when this position exists and allows (or even obliges) to set the rules for others, decide, judge, divide. The right to decide, order, direct, divide has any government: state leader and officer. Usage of official position by state government officers is called corruption that can only occur where there is government: its extent will depend on the wideness of governmental functions, on given (or poached) commissions. Corruption is the product of government and its activity. It is worth emphasizing that the most effective means of overcoming corruption actually is not educating people, not punishments, not looking for fair officers or principled activity of law protection institutions (Trumpa, 2002). The most effective means is limiting and cancelling of the root of corruption: possibility to decide and divide. Here it must be focused on limiting the regulation of power of legal state officers or politicians. The Fight against corruption and bureaucracy decrease leads to decrease and limiting of governmental functions and powers, especially in economics, privatization of these functions and giving them into private hands.

Bribing of various levels government representatives, legal or illegal, tolerated or punished, existed, exists and we may think it will exist for a long time, though the problem of corruption is often ideologized and politicized. Ensuring normal state functions mostly depends on the activity of state officers, on how that they perform in implementing the Constitution, laws and other law acts, honest performing of their commissions, official duties and

rights. It must be admitted that state office issues are not properly, thoroughly and consistently regulated. Most laws that regulating state office are inconsistent, illogical and contradictory.

The Constitution of Republic of Lithuania Art. 5 provides that “state governing in Lithuania is performed by Seimas, Administration and court. Governmental powers are limited by the Constitution. Governmental institutions serve the people. State officers must properly perform their official duties and keep the set work and state discipline. For offences connected to state office and order of its performing the workers are drawn to amenability”. All four legal amenability kinds are applied, that is disciplinary, administrative, material and penal. In “National fight against corruption strategy outline project” signed by manager of Special Investigation Service signed in October 1999 it is also noted that “Conception of corruption should not be forgotten while performing legal reform in Lithuania and should be reflected in the corresponding laws”. Regrettably, the content and conception of this phenomenon is not provided in the newest state penal code, though we realize that dangers to society and things opposite to law are talked about. It is worth noting that the legal problem of corruption concept is being tried to solve in projects of Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania law and Fight against corruption and ratchet of the Republic of Lithuania law that has been presented to Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania. In the first case the following conception of corruptions is presented: “Corruption is the use of state politicians and officers official position or possibilities connected to it in order to illegally get use for oneself or other persons, as well as natural and legal person's providing use or privileges to state politicians and officers for their illegal beneficial activity or non-activity connected to official position, as well as other deliberate activities, by which activities outlined in this part are organized, incited, helped and intermediated.” A long explanatory letter is necessary with this definition. It is a rather wide definition currently having just theoretical meaning. Therefore attention is drawn to corresponding international acts. The most important act of international law on this topic is a Convention about corruption No. 173 that on 27th January 1999 in Strasbourg was also signed by plenipotentiaries of the Republic of Lithuania. The first part of Article 6 of this Convention provides the forms of corruption manifestation:

1. Direct or indirect state officer's or person's performing state functions demand or acceptance of any monetary value having a thing or other use gained in the form of a present, favour promise or privilege for oneself or other person or legally instituted subject for performing or not performing activity according to his position;
2. Direct or indirect offer or presentation for state officer or person performing state functions of any monetary value having thing or other use gained in the form of a present, favour, promise or privilege for oneself or other person or legally instituted subject for performing or not performing activity according to officer's position;
3. State officer's or person's performing state functions official actions or omission of them in order to gain use for oneself or the third party;
4. Secret use or hiding of property gained by illegal activity outlined in this article;

5. Participating as the main character, partner, instigator, performer or helper when the fact of corruption is determined or any other participating, intention to participate, collaboration or hiding in performing activities provided in this article.

Analogous forbidden activities are found in the Penal Code of the Republic of Lithuania that has been in force until 1st May 2003 (art. 282 – art. 284 etc.) and the new Penal Code of the Republic of Lithuania that has come into force (art. 225 – art. 228). Thus corresponding forms of corruption manifestation, i. e. grafting and bribing of an intermediary, are defined both in the international extent and national law.

THREAT OF CORRUPTION TO STATE OFFICE AND STATE GOVERNING POLICY

It is worth emphasizing that crime of state office especially endangers the state and society. The extent of this danger is key stoned by the following arguments:

- Corrupted officers leave the activity assigned to them unattended and do not prevent further spread of corruption;
- Bribed state officer performs duties assigned to him improperly;
- Essential human rights may be violated due to bribing an officer;
- Corruption can enlarge the investment price up to thirty percent of any country;
- Due to corruption country attracts less foreign investment as corruption often acts as a payment for direct foreign investments.

The harm of grafting and bribing state officers is also reflected by impossibility of democracy strengthening, state governing, creation of law state, organization of state economy for general welfare of the nation and dealing with other state and society matters without a certain system of institutions – state apparatus that must work legally and effectively. As it was mentioned, according to Constitution art. 5 p. 3 it is determined that state institutions serve the people it is assumed that the importance of state apparatus – guarantee of protection and realization of human rights and liberties – is emphasized by this.

There exist various descriptions of state office. According to J. N. Starilov, the state office in the wide theoretical sense is the realization of state bodies staff governing function and practical activity of all persons getting wages from state budget. Other Russian authors like A. P. Aliochin and J. M. Kozlov understand the state office in the wide sense as performing state officer's duties in state organizations (state government bodies, companies, institutions). In the narrow sense, according to authors, state office comprise performing the duties of state officers only in the institutions of state governing. Here also can be assigned the persons performing the functions ascribed by local municipality institutions. V. M. Manochin joins two different phenomena – state office and activity of its organization and legal regulation. B. M. Lazarev describes state office as “serving the state, that is activity performed in state institutions, by which state tasks and functions are realized, by the order of the state and for a payment”. Generalizing the review of various opinions, state offices may be

treated as one of the main spheres of state activity, during which the state-governing apparatus is formed and legally regulated the work aspects of officers in certain positions and realizing the functions assigned to them by state institutions. However, it is assumed that the main aspect in defining the conception of state office is revealing of it in law acts of the Republic of Lithuania. From the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, which is a solid act outlining the foundations of state governing, the main principles of state office characteristic to democratic states arise. The Constitution provides essential basics of state office organization and functioning, establishes the following main attitudes: a) state institutions serve the people; b) citizens have equal rights to enter the state office of the Republic of Lithuania; c) the citizen has a right to receive information about him had by state institutions by the order provided by the law; d) all persons are equal to all state institutions and officers; e) state offices and officers are forbidden to persecute persons for the criticism of state government; f) occupation of state institutions by violence is considered to be anti-constitutional, illegal and inofficiously. Thus, the main attitude is that the state office must serve public interests. In today's state office relations the public interest in most general sense is described in the established attitude in the Constitution art. 5 of the Republic of Lithuania. This means that state officers perform specific functions, depending on the purpose of state governing office. In order to perform these functions properly a citizen joining the state office must meet the conditions provided by the laws.

The State office decree of the Republic of Lithuania (further STL) currently in force defines *the state office* as entirety of legal relations, originating after acquisition of state officer status, changing or loss of it, also originating due to state officer's public administration activity in state or municipality body or institution when performing the governing policy of a certain sphere or ensuring the coordination of its implementation by coordinating the activity of certain sphere of state governing institutions, governing and dividing financial resources and controlling their usage, carrying out the audit, accepting and implementing law acts and state or municipality institutions decisions in the sphere of public administration, preparing and coordinating law acts, contracts or programmed projects and providing conclusions about them, managing the staff or having commissions of public administration in respect of insubordinate persons.

It should be emphasized that in the life of state, society and a person it is very important to create an effective, stable state apparatus acting according to Constitution, law and other legal acts. It greatly depends on the honesty, dutifulness and responsibility of people working in state office. In the State office law art. 3 p. 1 is determined that the state office of the Republic of Lithuania is based on principles of law superiority, equality, political neutrality, transparency and career. Following these principles in state office actually guarantees the protection of human rights and free interests, social legality in state life, economical welfare and etc. On the other hand, very important is protection of state office itself by legal and penal means from encroachment to normal activity of state office. Especially big damage to normal activity of state office is done when it is encroached from the "inside" of state office, i. e. crimes committed by state office workers. State officers are responsible for performing certain state bodies and institutions functions or

have rights and duties to provide respective public services to people, but by non-compliance or improper and dishonest performance of their duties or using the official position for their interests disorganize and destruct the work of state office in various spheres and on various levels, stop or even destroy implementation of important projects, laws, etc. Thus, directly and indirectly human rights and liberties are violated, material welfare of all society members is impoverished, etc. It is worth emphasizing that the extent of consequences of criminal encroachment directly depends on the importance of culprit's position: culprits having higher positions in state office cause more severe consequences by their criminal actions, especially in the political sense. Therefore, by crimes to the state office constitutional attitudes about the obligation of the state to serve people are perverted or denied, which undermines peoples trust not only in the state office, but generally in the state, therefore it is undoubtedly talked about in transparent political system.

Therefore, political corruption is dangerous activity of persons who having respective positions in the state office and using them cause essential damage to the state interests or other persons. These crimes are always connected to subject's official position; the culprit in the state office has a certain position and therefore can be a subject of such crimes. Therefore, differently from other similar crimes, e. g. some state crimes, crimes to order of governing, crimes to the state office committed by the workers of institutions to which normal activity it is encroached, i. e. from "inside". Namely the official position enables a subject to perform activity that is a sign of the crime to state office on the objective side. Certain position and commissions in the state office are used (i. e. enables) to commit criminal activity, i. e. act oppositely to office interests. Such activity violates the principles of the state office, normal activity of the state office institutions, contradicts the state office obligations and functions. In some cases crimes of this type are committed by directly using official commissions or competency, in other cases crimes are committed not in the sphere of subject's official commissions but by having influence on other subjects' illegal activity in the office (Trumpa, 2002). Position in the state office, its character and importance have direct impact on the character and degree of an official offence and its consequences. It is worth noting that by crimes to the state office not only general requirements to the state office supported by law are violated, but also special requirements supported by other law acts, e.g., official statutes, official instructions, are not performed or performed improperly.

WHERE TO START THE REDUCTION OF CORRUPTION ROOTS?

The most effective means to overcome corruption actually is not educating people, not punishments, not looking for fair officers or principled activity of law protection institutions. The most effective means is limiting and cancelling of the root of corruption: possibility to decide and divide. Fight against corruption and bureaucracy decrease leads to decrease and limiting of governmental functions and powers, especially in economics, privatization of these functions and giving them into private hands.

There are created and implemented programmes of export prompting, company reanimation, prompting of investments, minor and medium business, preferred credits to farmers and cooperatives, constituted business

expansion council, instituted partially state import and export insurance company. General feature of their activity is that the officer has the right to decide who is worth state support. In addition, any state support provides a possibility for a “successful business” to appear and survive” in non-market conditions. The ones who wish to reduce corruption must reject support to business for all times.

Current tax system creates especially beneficial conditions for corruption. Here are some examples. The government can manipulate the tax system by passing tendentious tax laws. The government can manipulate the tax system by obliging various state institutions to set real tax rates. The government can manipulate the tax system by providing tax privileges. The government can manipulate the tax system as if deliberately mixing tax rules when tax administrator becomes the main but not responsible figure in tax accounting. Therefore, in order not to leave conditions to corruption the number of taxes must be reduced, tax rules corrected, tax accounting simplified and no one should get exceptions.

The state not only sets activity conditions to market participants but actively participates itself by creating products and providing services. The state as an enterpriser acts in banking, municipal sector, energetic, hospitals, etc. State company as if follows the profitability criterion, as if not. State bank may give credit not to the best businessman but the one indicated by the officer. State company can buy not the cheapest or best materials but the ones sold by a close officer's friend. For a state company it is not a problem to work ineffectively and to stay in the market as the government creates exceptional conditions to it, sometimes – state orders. It is done not for the benefit of society but for the benefit of particular persons connected to government. Therefore, all system of state offices is auspicious for expansion of corruption. It must be disorganized – the state must withdraw from business, state companies must be privatized. All this is necessary to eliminate the root of corruption.

CONCLUSIONS

The list of corruption threats and means to curb it presented in this report is not comprehensive. The aim of this report is not to name every point of corruption. It can be any additional commissions granted to the state. If it is actually desired to eliminate corruption a simple and useful formula must meet the main condition: to reduce state commissions and privatize state functions. It must be done not by special acts, commissions or actions but constantly, every day, by every made decision. Only then instead of one eliminated bureaucratic institution or function three new ones would not appear.

There is still an opinion pressed upon society that the fight against corruption is possible only in ways such as the obligations of political leaders and openness of the government. If adding stiffening of punishments, raising officers' wages, and the education of businessmen will have a pack of “classical” means of fighting against corruption. These means are applied in many countries but none of them can boast of overcoming corruption. So, are “classical” means more effective than reducing government commissions, is

for everyone personally to decide, but in our opinion, drifting and ignoring effective means but unpopular among government representatives is very expensive. Leaving the right to interfere, decide and divide to the government we take on a heavy load of corruption.

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Information Flow in the Soviet Union: A Synergetic Approach

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A commonly held view among students of mass communications is that democracy requires informed citizens. To a certain extent, post-Soviet states are afraid of the free flow of information. Persisting distrust in society's subsystems suggests that maintenance of existing order must come from above. In this paper, I analyse the treatment of the notion of information in the Soviet variant of systems theory. This particular local and philosophical interpretation of imported cybernetics and systems theory – both of which have created the foundations of synergetics – still exerts its influence on the contemporary perception of the role of information flow, and it excuses the reserved attitude of state authorities when it comes to public communications. At the end of this paper I will evaluate certain trends in Latvia's public communications from the synergetic perspective.

The classical sciences have traditionally been interested in stability, order, homogeneity and equilibrium. These are characteristics of closed systems and linear relations. In such systems, input results in proportional and predictable output. Synergetics makes the opposite argument – that the world consists of open systems which are constantly exchanging energy-matter and information with the environment. Diversity, a lack of equilibrium and non-linear relations – these are characteristics of open systems where information exchange performs a paramount role.

Russia has a long tradition of systemic studies of non-social systems. Aleksandr Bogdanov's book, *The General Science of Organisation*, outlined a systemic approach to social studies in 1925. Nikolai Kondratyev (1928), in his analysis of market conditions, underlined the non-linear nature of socio-economic dynamics as a sequence of cycles and oscillation. In the 1930s, the physicist Leonid Mandelshtam argued that non-linear processes are of a general character and are applicable to social systems.

The systemic approach was reviewed at the end of 1950s, when Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev announced urgent economic and social reforms. In order to "catch up and surpass America", the system was opened up for information input from the West. In 1955, the Communist party leadership and the government urged, in a special act, the study and

implementation of Western scientific and technological progress. Another act in 1959 demanded that the translation and publishing of appropriate foreign literature be improved. Wiener's and Ashby's works on information theory and cybernetics were published in Russian in 1958 and 1959 respectively. *Kibernetika* became a fashionable word in the 1970s, and it was followed by another one – *sistemnost'* ('the systemic state'). In the order and regularity of the Soviet planned economy, '*sistemnost'* stood in opposition to the chaos of the unregulated capitalist market.

Application of the new theoretical paradigm was possible only after its adjustment to the limitations of dialectic materialism. Local interpretations expelled notions which contradicted the dominant paradigm, as a result of which the adapted Western theory served to prove the reliability of centralisation and top-down regulation in the Soviet state.

Theoretical divergence appears in translations and in the connotation of the key notions of cybernetics. In Russian, the word 'steering' is translated as *upravleniye*, which has connotations of ruling, top-down regulation, rather than management and mutual co-adaptation of equal subsystems. *Ozhegov's Dictionary of Russian Language* explains *upravleniye* as the driving of something or somebody, as well as the functioning of institutions of state power. This connotation enabled the use of cybernetics as the cornerstone of the Soviet '*nauka upravleniya*' – the science of hierarchical regulation in different kinds of systems, including social ones. In the early 1960s cybernetics was treated mostly as a theoretical foundation of industrial automatization and guidance of socialist enterprise (Biryukov, Spirkin 1964: 118–119). It was conceived as a miraculous aid to the ambitious economic designs of Khrushchev's government.

Soviet interpreters explained the Greek concept of *συστημα* (a union of parts) in a way turned it into a hierarchically organised monolith. The Soviet theorist Afanasyev listed the system's properties: a common goal, interrelated elements, environments and resources, and administration by the centre (1980: 35). Priority of a common goal and centralised administration hinders the free development of subsystems, it is not possible in such conditions to conceptualise interaction among all elements as a freely developing process. It is also true that the Soviet social sciences accorded utmost priority to class-based relations, disregarding other ones.

The Soviet definition allows for some of the components to be excluded, ignored or destroyed, while systems theory itself stresses the importance of the very interaction within the system and with its environment. 'System' is defined as a set of elements standing in interaction (Bertalanffy 1956: 3); a set of interacting units with relations among them (Miller 1978: 16); a network of interaction between elements of conceptions, objects, people (Ackoff 1974); a set of objects which possesses expressed systematic properties, i. e., such properties that neither belong to any part of system, nor can be derived from properties of its parts (Bushev 1994: 18). Therefore, systems theory perceives reality as consisting fundamentally of relationships among relationships (Ball 1978). Systems theory focuses on relationships and processes at various levels within a social system rather than on its separate components. All aspects of socio-cultural life are seen in process terms, as networks of information and communication. The individual and society are treated equally, as mutually

constitutive fields, related through feedback, and the sociologist's task is to develop the logic of their relationships, conceptualising social reality in relational terms.

The word *synergy* is derived from the Greek συν εργον or joint action. Synergetics develops the idea of interaction at the sub- and supra-systemic levels, it studies "spontaneous formation of spatial, temporal or functional structures by self-organisation. It focuses attention on situations where the macroscopic properties of a complex system change qualitatively" (Haken 1991: 20). All forces operating in a system contribute to its development. In situations of bifurcation, even minor fluctuation can trigger off disproportional changes. Contrary to the classical sciences, synergetics denies the possibility of any prognosis in such conditions. Let me turn now to the main synergetic postulates and to their Soviet interpretation in detail.

Information Exchange vs. Energy-matter Exchange. In socio-cultural systems, information exchange is more significant than exchange of energy-matter. In Russia, exchange of the latter was dominant. Access to information and its flow was reduced and subjected to control and censorship. Relationships between elements of the system were regulated through distribution of energy-matter. A shortage of material goods and a lack of exhaustive information about other subsystems – a prerequisite for structures of mutual trust – favoured barter exchange relationships. Distribution of the energy-matter flow fulfilled the role of control, influence and sanction. Concomitantly, the system's development was related to the availability of energy-matter. The principle of "bigger is better" was a leitmotif for industrial development. The system tended to avoid novelty and any input of new information, because that could have led to the restructuring of the whole complicated mechanism.

Open vs. Closed System. Systems theory stresses that heterogeneity and contradictions are important for a system's development. Dialectic materialism recognises only inner contradictions as sources for the development of natural and social phenomena, while external influences lead merely to quantitative changes (Konstantinov 1981, vol. 1: 16). The USSR defined itself as a stable, goal-oriented system. External influences which result in qualitative changes would mean changes in the system's philosophy. In order to eschew contradictory ideological effects, the object was given the properties of a closed system. Progressive development of a closed system is impossible, however, due to the dissipation of energy. The dilemma of systemic openness vs. closure is among the most acute topics in the Russian public sphere, usually taking shape as a dispute between Slavophiles and Westernisers.

Feedback vs. One-way Communication. Soviet theory treated information exchange as unimportant. Afanasyev, in his manual on systems theory, mentioned feedback in passing, stressing the importance of regulation: "Preparation and adoption of decisions, organisation of execution of decisions, control over execution and calculation of results" (1980: 234). The *Dictionary of Philosophy* (1991) explained regulation without the notion of feedback, adaptation and self-organisation. Krushanov even argued that feedback was not the most important characteristic of regulation (1986: 247). He mentioned traffic lights as a mechanism which operates without feedback. Nevertheless,

it can operate only in stable conditions. Incorrect pre-programming or changes in traffic could lead to its ineffective performance, even to chaotic traffic. In order to avoid rush hour jams, a human traffic-controller provides effective feedback.

Decentralisation vs. Centralisation. For the Soviet philosophers, it is subordination of subsystems rather than their equal interrelations that determines dynamics of complex systems (Lektorskii, Sadovskii 1960). This thesis substantiated theoretically the Communist party's leading role, and the centralised regulation. "A systemic approach is important for the arrangement of scientific and practical problems *first and foremost in regulation*" (Afanasyev 1980: 12, my italics). The imperative of centralised regulation required a bulky system of administration, which demanded information at a variety of parameters. Excessive loading of the feedback loop causes feedback to destabilise the system, and this may lead to uncontrolled fluctuations (Wiener 1994).

Russians have a popular anecdote: "Russia has two evils: idiots and bad roads". Centripetal communications channels failed to satisfy the increasing demands of information processing. Long transmission times and instances of overload resulted in delay, distortion or loss of important information. Numerous consecutive senders and receivers (controlling institutions) were sources of noise. The task of these institutions was 'adjustment' of information to ideological expectations, because, according to Afanasyev, the most important properties of information that was used in social administration were "the party and class approach, trustworthiness, convincingness, completeness, preciseness, usefulness and novelty" (1980: 245). The first four characteristics are not properties of information *per se* – this is a subjective interpretation through the prism of ideological values, according to conformity to the chosen goal. Nevertheless synergetics contends that values operating in a system manifest only a certain level of adaptation. They are not at an absolute level of organisation correlating with value. Value is always relative to the context of system-environmental interaction (Laszlo 1983: 56). The optimum value for cognitive systems is a state of sufficient information input (Laszlo 1972: 267).

State centralisation meant that all questions were to be resolved by institutions in the capital city. The centre distrusted peripheral subsystems, and their decision-taking rights were reduced. At the same time, the central regulating mechanism possessed restricted capacities to process the input information. The principles of cybernetics posit that the simplification of systems for more effective usage of a growing quantity of information is a condition for progress in a system (Ashby 1959). Small and mobile units fulfil the role of feedback in the market economy. Afanasyev explained that in the Socialist society, the "producer, consumer, assortment, quantity and quality of manufactured goods are known beforehand, but only when information about it, its quality and the quantity of demand and supply is collected, analysed and used in the redistribution of social labour" (1980: 231). In the USSR, such information was collected by special administrative bodies, not by the actors involved in the actual process of production/consumption. Information transmission and processing was slow, users lacked direct and immediate

access to information, and the planned economy lacked flexibility and a capacity to react rapidly.

Deviations in the system were not permitted on ideological grounds; therefore, it was able to exist in only one dynamic condition. Dynamics demand continuous readjustment to a changing environment. Only a diversity of components and their complex structure makes the system able to survive in more than one dynamic condition, and, therefore, make it the subject of evolution (Laszlo 1995: 70).

Chaos vs. Determination. Soviet commentators attacked notions of probability and contingency. They argued that “objective social laws of historical materialism” made social projection and precognition possible (Editorial 1961). Later Afanasyev admitted the role of spontaneity, although in Socialism, “even these processes are not completely uncontrollable” (1980: 230).

Synergetics interprets chaos as a dynamic, highly complex order, one which is able to manifest itself in a plethora of ordered situations (Prigogine 1984). The strong determination lessens possibilities for bifurcation or mutation. A stable and highly ordered system will be destroyed in changing conditions, a high level of determination leads to rapid growth of entropy and chaos. The optimum ratio of real entropy and structural information in the system is one to four (Sedov 1985, 1993). Sedov borrowed this figure from Brillouin (1956), who measured the ratio of spontaneous and predicted appearance of letters in European languages. Sedov’s first article was published in 1985 as an abstract discussion of the problem of looseness vs. strong determination. Sedov did not apply this rule to social systems, however. He noted that “it is common for all systems” (1985: 184). In 1993, the same article appeared in a second version, this one devoted exclusively to social systems.

In a totalitarian state all subsystems are incorporated into the system-state, which means that individual actions are fully determined, because individuals possess only the system’s structural information. To possess some entropy meant to be free of the system-state, to acquire abilities for self-determination. The sum of entropy of the system of society and of the individual was reaching the zero point, as both were highly structured. When it exceeds the level of structural information by more than 80 percent, the system comes under threat of changes in the stability of its environment. A large amount of structural information impairs adaptability; even small changes can trigger a descent into chaos. A normal system which has reached the ratio one to four passes to a new level and starts the creation of new information relations between elements of the former level.

Misinterpretation of the notion of order led the Soviet system to disorder. “Chaos has a higher degree of homogeneity and isotropy; symmetry of chaos is higher than that of any spatial or temporal structure” (Bushev, 1994: 94). Striving for more homogeneity as a characteristic of order, the Soviet system arrived at chaos instead.

Different Russian political regimes succeeded in the construction of homogeneous and ordered systems. The strong determination made impossible the existence, development and accumulation of reasonable entropy in terms of dissident thought and debate of potential goals. The death

of an authoritarian ruler usually led to chaotic fluctuations, because the system was unable to adjust itself to the new conditions.

The mistake of Soviet reformers such as Khrushchev and Kosygin in the early 1960s was that they incorrectly understood the level that had been achieved by the whole Communist system. Laszlo stresses that the level of organisation achieved by viable systems and, by extension, by the structural information that is acquired, is a *product* of their evolutionary adaptation and not their *goal* (1983: 56). The basic goal of natural-cognitive systems is their continued existence, and that is assured through adaptation in the appropriate state of organisation, not necessarily the highest one (Laszlo 1972: 269). The system must be free of the total bounds of structural information in order to be flexible in the face of changing conditions in environment. Chaos, as a property of subsystems, functions as a mechanism of self-organisation and self-completion of structures, it removes the superfluous and the useless, it finds relatively simple structures-attractors of evolution (Knyazeva 1993: 40). According to Prigogine, instability helps to choose the best.

Non-linearity vs. Linearity. One of the key notions of synergetics is the non-linearity of evolutionary processes. When an external force is applied to a system, this does not result in a conceived outcome, because the former may be influenced by smaller accompanying oscillations. Unlike linear systems, non-linear ones possess a variety of equilibrium states; their stability is not uniquely determined (Bushev 1994: 140). When it deviates from the point of stability, a linear system loses balance, while a non-linear system possesses multivariant possibilities for the future. The passage to a new equilibrium state occurs at the bifurcation stage, when variations of certain parameters surpass the critical value. The theory of bifurcation stresses the impossibility of predicting further developments at this stage. “Such a question has no answer *in principle*, because here stochasticity (fluctuations) comes into play. The system becomes extremely sensitive to perturbations. ... Evolution at the bifurcation stage becomes irreversible and unpredictable” (Bushev 1994: 14).

Engagement of non-linear, positive feedback can lead a system to regimes of intensification. The system has to co-ordinate external influences with internal characteristics. The ideal steering process is a search for zones of resonance, where the external input synchronises with the internal trends. Here the system may experience resonance as the force that is applied to the system increases non-linearly.

Inner Tendencies vs. Regulation Efforts. Complex, highly organised systems have a plurality of ways of development – attractors – which correspond to the system’s nature. Imposition of a certain attractor from above is not possible. From the previous paragraph it follows that it is important to understand the system’s inner tendencies and to lead it in that direction. However, a common goal was compulsory for the whole Soviet system (Afanasyev 1980: 30). Russian reformers understood their task to be an arbitrary combination and a redistribution of elements of inert social material, according to a pre-invented design. Synergetics allows subjects only to initiate environmental action which is followed by self-construction and the self-completion of the structure towards one of attractors – basic macrosocial conditions (Knyazeva 1993: 44). Chaos, as a property of the subsystem,

functions as a mechanism of self-organisation and self-completion of structures, it removes the superfluous, and it finds relatively simple structures-attractors of evolution. Self-organisation of the Soviet system had been invalidated.

Self-organisation: Morphogenesis vs. Morphostasis. Self-organisation is maintenance of a definite level of an organisation or self-improvement of a system which is capable of accumulating past experience and of making use of it (Bushev 1994: 7). Self-organisation consists of two information exchange processes. Determined self-regulation – morphostasis – is maintained by the 1st cybernetics, which allows system to react to environmental changes in order to keep homeostasis. The 2nd cybernetics allows the system to implement a probabilistic self-development – morphogenesis. The positive feedback loop allows the system to select and process information for future use. The second circuit amplifies deviations, permitting an increase in the system's level of organisation (Maruyama 1963: 164). Information received by the first circuit is compared with other information about the situation and memory. Thus, an actor is able to select a response. The new system at the higher level is functioning more simply than the sum of uncoordinated functions of subsystems (Laszlo 1995: 80).

The Soviet system was designed to maintain homeostasis through operation of the first circuit. “Self-organisation is the capability of system to stabilise parameters through ordering its structural and functional relationships in order to resist entropy of the medium” (Konstantinov 1981 vol. 3: 160). The system lacked the second circuit which is needed to develop new structures. Effects of dissent were being attenuated in order to keep the political structure at the desired equilibrium. However, the dynamism of a system is secured by tensions, variety, selection and interpersonal relationships, which is the basis for the development of larger structures (Buckley 1967). The functioning of the Soviet system was restricted by a compulsory and centralised plan and by the “purposeful activity of state and non-governmental institutions led by the Communist Party” (Afanasyev 1980: 228). Variety was not permitted; recognition of the exclusive attractor excluded selection; construction of the system from above disregarded microlevel relations. Society, however, is never an absolutely plastic environment, one that is pliant for controlling influence. It is necessary to take into account the ratio between the governing efforts of power and the internal tendencies of a self-organising society (Knyazeva 1993: 39).

Soviet and Latvian Systems in Comparison

Dialectic materialism failed to define clearly the notion of information. Soviet philosophy discussed the phenomenon of information for decade after decade, but it was reluctant to award information the status of a philosophical category (Abdeyev 1994: 20, for discussion, see also Yankov 1985). Information was deprived of its important status in the Soviet variant of systems theory. Analysed through the prism of synergetics, the main drawbacks of the Soviet system were the following:

1. A disregard for information exchange;
2. The system's closure, which inhibited negentropic input from the outside;

3. The conception of relations among the subsystem's elements as ruling, rather than steering;
4. Excessive centralisation of ruling, limitation of self-regulation;
5. Minimisation of feedback;
6. Encumbering of the adequate treatment of input due to the overloading of periphery-centre communication channels and the complexity of information processing structures;
7. A disregard for information arbitrarily judged valueless by the regulating body;
8. An impediment against new information input due to the high level of the system's structural information.

The following conclusions can be drawn about public communications in contemporary Latvia:

- Information Exchange vs. Energy-matter Exchange
As Latvia is a country that is poor in energy-matter, its government has recognised the importance of information exchange. At the same time, however, actual data which could prove the importance of information exchange remain fairly insignificant. Insufficient financing for science and education are examples of the lack of a strong programme of information exchange.
- Open vs. Closed System
The openness of the system is recognised, Latvia maintains active exchange with surrounding socio-political entities. However, the state is attempting to close down the system toward the East.
- Feedback vs. One-way Communication
The importance of feedback is disregarded. Examples include a top-down model of political communications; impaired public broadcasting, which does not facilitate access of civic pressure groups to the public sphere; disqualification of social movements; and arbitrary selection of 'useful' information, i. e., that which satisfies the dominant political opinion.
- Inner Tendencies vs. Regulation Efforts
Ignorance of feedback minimises the role of the inner tendencies of subsystems in public social planning. There is a discrepancy between ad hoc self-organisation and adaptation to the immediate environment on the one hand, and legal regulation efforts on the other. The absence of analysis of sub-systemic inner tendencies (e. g., a lack of debate about draft laws, or disqualification of any information which contradicts the dominant worldview) inhibits the enforcement of legal provisions.
- Chaos vs. Determination
Concomitantly, the provisions are being enforced by an increase in the system's structural information. In Latvia, this tendency is formulated as the myth of 'orderliness' (*sakārtotība*). Sociologists have observed that Latvia is obsessed with legal provisions: "Everything is to be determined in a legal and bureaucratic way. The most detailed instructions are required. Problems are being resolved by writing new laws" (Kilis 2000).

- Morphogenesis vs. Morphostasis
If a subsystem is obliged to follow imposed structural information, this blocks the subsystem's initiative; it cannot assume responsibility for decision-making. Subsystems are looking for negative feedback, allowing them to return to the state of equilibrium, rather than accumulating and processing divergent information so as to generate a new level of structural organisation.
- Decentralisation vs. Centralisation
Subsystems cannot process all of the structural information and take their own decisions in cases not addressed in existing regulations. As a result, the centre is increasingly charged with regulatory duties, which overloads communications channels and delays decision-making.
- Non-linearity vs. Linearity
Accumulated contradictions may lead to an unexpected progression of events.

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Democratic and Authoritarian Management Styles in Organization

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INTRODUCTION. THE SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM OF RESEARCH

There was a survey taken of 289 Lithuanian schools' managers. They were given a series of open ended questions in which they were asked to opinion in identifying the most important problems of school management, the expression of proportion of democracy and authoritarianism in schools' management, the problems of autonomy institutions of organization, and their perspectives on the development of the schools' management. This article, in particular, presents an analysis of two of the surveys questions given to the schools' managers. The questions were as follows: *Are there any rudiments of democracy in your school? If "yes" (or "sometimes"), in what way do these rudiments assert themselves in your school?* and *Are there any rudiments of autocracy and authoritarianism in your school?? If "yes" (or "sometimes"), in what way do autocracy and authoritarianism assert themselves in your school?*

634 statements were given to the "democracy" question and 309 were given concerning the "authoritarianism" question. The analysis used the means of qualitative (hermeneutic) content analysis, the empirical statements were generalized respectively by 42 and 35 semantically homogeneous categories. The procedures of categories' validation and intersubjectivity's control are presented in the article by G. Šaparnis and G. Merkys (2000a). Afterwards, the quantitative data analysis was taken into account. The rating of categories' mentioning frequency was set using the means of descriptive statistics. The categories' taxonomic consistencies were questioned by a cluster analysis (Šaparnis, 2000b).

From the methodological point of view, the research is based on the training of empiric social research about qualitative and quantitative ones and their matching principles – triangulation (Denzin, 1970; Cohen ir Manion, 1994; Bitinas, 1998; Charles, 1999; Mayring, 1988; Kardelis, 1997; Lamnek, 1993; Merkys, 1999).

The conceptual basis of the research is formed by matching the (congruency's) test results of different theoretical traditions (nowadays already called classical). Here we have in mind – humanistic psychology, training of social psychology about authoritarian personality, authoritarian

social relationships and theory of symbolic interactionism (Rogers, 1969; Maslow, 1971; Adorno, 1969; Oesterreich, 1974; Blumer, 1969).

In addition, management (including education management) and an organizations structured research form an important feature in theoretical context research (Jucevičienė, 1996; Jucevičius, 1996; Želvys, 1999; Kalvaitis, 1997; Večkienė, 1996; Targamadžė, 1996; and others). However, we must admit that from the point of view of diagnostic educational management research we were not able to detect the phenomenon of systemic professional research in Lithuania. The research deficiency of an appropriate division is a significant aspect of researching the scientific problem.

A certain branch of psychology – psycho semantics – performed a rather important role in motivating research theoretically and interpreting data (Sinchenko, Mescheriakov, 1996). One of its main concerns is to investigate what subjective implications individuals and social groups tend to apply to the verbal (lexical) stimuli. The usage of analysis of psycho semantic structures provided an opportunity to achieve concrete goals in the research spheres of differential psychology, psycho diagnostic and social regulations (Osgood, 1959). Specifically, the role of word-stimulus in our research was performed by stimulating material created on the basis of “*democracy*” and “*authoritarianism*” lexical combinations which was presented to the respondents in different problematic organization management’s contexts.

The **aim** of the research is to disclose the psycho semantics condition of the organization members’ opinion (about the expression of democracy and authoritarianism’s proportion in school’s management).

In regard to the method, the aim was achieved using a non-standard open questionnaire and matching methods of qualitative and quantitative context analysis.

The **object** of the research – the management process in a comprehensive school.

Principally, the problem of any scientific research can be defined by a question, as question tends to be a logical form of a scientific problem (Merkys, 1995). The scientific problem of our research is defined by a series of concrete questions to which management and state educational sciences do not provide relevant answers for nowadays. These questions are as follows:

1. What is the rating’s law of subjective psycho semantic categories revealing the expression of democracy and authoritarianism of a schools’ management team?
2. What is the character of psycho semantic taxonomies’ of the mentioned “topics” empirically resulting from the rating’s data?
3. What is the inner structure of empirically discovered psycho semantic derivatives that reveal democratic and authoritarianism’s expression?

RESEARCH RESULTS AND THEIR CONSIDERATION

The cluster analysis of categories formed on the basis of both questions presented in the introduction was performed with reference to the chosen and confirmed scheme of statistical processing of data. This provided an opportunity to create categories’ taxonomy. The research results prove that in both cases it is advisable to refer to the model of three clusters (see Tables 1

and 2). The categories rating's data statistically grounded in both cases can be divided (according to the achieved rating of mentioning) into three homogeneous groups (see Tables 2, 3). It is symptomatic that in both cases one of the clusters if formed only by two categories. These are the categories which according to how frequently they are mentioned obviously overtake the rest of the categories.

The unanimous qualitative interpretation formed for the three groups is revealed in Table 1.

Table 1

The Qualitative Interpretation of Taxonomy's Results According to the 3 Clusters' Model

Group number in the dendrogram	Interpretation of model of 3 groups (clusters)
Group 1	<i>high rating</i>
Group 2	<i>medium rating</i>
Group 3	<i>low rating</i>

Table 2

The Rating of Categories of Pedagogues' Opinion about Democracy's Expression in the Organization

Categories' titles	N	Mentioning frequency	Percentage	Group number according to 3 clusters' model
It is allowed to express one's own opinion, suggestions	289	79	27%	1
The majority of decisions is acknowledged collectively (together)	289	73	25%	1
Pupils autonomy's activities	289	44	15%	2
Opportunity to work in a free and creative way	289	43	15%	2
Free and active work of the School Board	289	40	14%	2
Pupils can express their opinion	289	36	12%	2
Parents are involved in school's life	289	30	10%	2
Good, warm relationships in community	289	25	9%	2
Activities of teachers' trade-union	289	22	8%	2
Striving to develop pupils as independent personalities	289	18	6%	2
Good teachers and pupils' relationships	289	17	6%	2
Establishment of election institute at school	289	17	6%	2
Imitation of democracy	289	13	4%	3
Prosecution of researches and surveys	289	11	4%	3
Tolerant school leaders	289	11	4%	3
Respected majority's opinion	289	10	3%	3
Rational control	289	9	3%	3
School's syllabus is discussed together with pedagogues	289	9	3%	3
No barriers to enhance qualification	289	8	3%	3

Categories' titles	N	Mentioning frequency	Percentage	Group number according to 3 clusters' model
Discussing and trying to accept pupils' rights	289	7	2%	3
School – like open society	289	7	2%	3
Opinion of teachers' majority can change leaders' decisions	289	7	2%	3
Internecline reliance	289	6	2%	3
Teacher's personal troubles are taken into account	289	6	2%	3
Delegation of decisions and responsibilities	289	6	2%	3
Pupils offer shows and realize them	289	6	2%	3
Normally accepted criticism with regards to the leaders	289	5	2%	3
Pupils are free to choose extracurricular circle	289	4	1%	3
Spread of information	289	4	1%	3
Pupils are educated according to the democratic grounds	289	4	1%	3
Teacher – a servant to a pupil	289	3	1%	3
Too much democracy	289	3	1%	3
It is allowed to reject an “intolerable” teacher	289	3	1%	3
Activities of informal groups are tolerated	289	3	1%	3
Democracy is discussed during meetings	289	2	1%	3
Work is organized according to our own affirmed rules	289	2	1%	3
Number of lessons is discussed and divided by ourselves	289	2	1%	3

Table 3

**The Rating of Categories of Pedagogues' Opinion about
*Autocracy's Expression in the Organization***

Categories' titles	N	Mentioning frequency	Percentage	Group number according to 3 clusters' model
Opinion of community's majority is ignored	289	52	18%	1
Commands, autocracy	289	34	12%	1
It is risky to express one's own opinion in public	289	17	6%	2
Inappropriate distribution of lessons	289	14	5%	2
Psychological pressure (intimidations, offences)	289	13	4%	2
Protection or discrimination of separate employees	289	13	4%	2
Inappropriate sanctions	289	10	3%	2
Leaders do not consider teachers' opinion	289	10	3%	2
Distrustful atmosphere	289	9	3%	2

Categories' titles	N	Mentioning frequency	Percentage	Group number according to 3 clusters' model
Imposed administration's opinion	289	9	3%	2
Premature decisions	289	8	3%	2
Lack of publicity	289	8	3%	2
Lack of information	289	7	2%	2
Subservience atmosphere	289	7	2%	2
"Fictitious" activities of the School Board	289	6	2%	2
Blind fulfilment of commands from the top	289	6	2%	2
To my mind, there is no autocracy	289	6	2%	2
Leaders overestimate themselves humiliating others	289	6	2%	2
Administration's position: if one not with us, then – against us	289	4	1%	3
Evil is frequently emphasized, achievements are left aside	289	4	1%	3
Personnel selection problems	289	4	1%	3
Lack of attention to employee's personality	289	4	1%	3
Excessive control	289	4	1%	3
Leader's scream – means of impact	289	4	1%	3
Excessive severity	289	3	1%	3
An old fashioned leader	289	3	1%	3
Suppression of initiative	289	2	1%	3
Intolerable to the formation of teachers' trade-unions	289	2	1%	3
Violated subordination	289	2	1%	3
Restricted teacher's pedagogical creativity	289	2	1%	3

In respect to the interpretation, the greatest attention has been paid to the categories characterized by those that were mentioned more often. As a result, according to both: "democracy" and "authoritarianism" dimensions, the top most categories had the same content but different values (see Table 4).

The central part of the structure of teachers' thoughts (about democracy and authoritarianism's manifestation at school) held by the dimension of *opinions' expression* (if there is a possibility or not to express one's opinion) and the *autocracy-collegiality* dimension.

On the whole, among the investigated psychosemantic structures the keyword "opinion" occupies an exceptional position and frequently arises out of the categories' formulations. In addition to the categories noted in Table 4, it is worth to mention the following categories referring to the commented keyword: "It is risky to express one's own opinion in public"; "Managers do not consider teachers' opinion"; "Imposed administration's opinion"; "Pupils can express their opinion." If we formed a compound (composite) mentioning frequency's rating of categories that refer to the keyword "opinion", it would be obvious that in comparison with other categories it would break all records. Needless to say, that psycho semantic structures are not purely speculative and subjective

matter, more or less they reveal real (objective) social relationships as well. At this point we dare to offer a hypothetical assumption about empirically discovered, confirmed and consistent criteria. In other words, we may reasonably state that opinions express the character of members of school community and the essential criteria that differentiates the prevailing management style in the organization. The discovered consistency in the criteria is essential in both senses – diagnostic (for example, while creating standardized inventories of management of closed-type school) and inspection of school management (for instance, granting leaders management categories, etc.). Theoretical validity and reliability of the opinion’s criteria are grounded by the training of social psychology about authoritarian personality (Adorno, 1969; Oesterreich, 1974) and training in political sciences about democracy and autocracy’s content. There the lack of dialogue, or a person’s inability to listen to and tolerate other’s opinion in social relationships, is the essential indicator of authoritarian personality type and the basis of authoritarian personality’s psycho correction. In turn, freedom of speech (opinion), according to political science, is an attributive feature of democratic society.

Table 4

The Examples of Categories’ Statements that Reveal Democracy and Authoritarianism’s Dimensions

Democracy dimension		Authoritarianism dimension	
Categories	Statements	Statements	Categories
It is allowed to express one’s own opinion, suggestions	“Expression of one’s own opinion.”	“School society’s opinion is not followed.”	Opinion of majority of society’s members is neglected.
	“Pedagogues can express their opinion about various questions.”	“Ignorance of opinions.”	
	“Very often it is possible to express one’s own opinion and suggest various things.”	“Teachers’ suggestions are not accepted.”	
	“It is possible to express own opinion and provide suggestions.”	“School society’s opinion is neglected.”	
Majority of decisions are acknowledged collectively	“Most of the decisions are accepted collectively, following teachers’ advice.”	“Everything is determined by one person’s opinion.”	Commands, autocracy
	“Some matters often depend upon teachers’ suggestions.”	“Leader decides for us our holiday time.”	
	“Parents, teachers, and children participate in accepting various decisions.”	“Director likes commanding.”	
	“Present problems are solved together.”	“Leader decides everything for his subordinates, after expressing their opinion they are offered to leave the job.”	

Therefore, two circumstances namely: 1) exceptional positions of the keyword “opinion” in a psycho semantic structure of questioned teachers and 2) theoretical validity of phenomenon of opinions’ expression in social psychology, management and political sciences, treat this point as an essential criterion of dominating management style in the organization. That is to say, the peculiarities of opinion’s expression in the organization are the most reliable criteria and diagnostic indicators differentiating school’s democratic management style from authoritarian one.

Hence, we dare to affirm hypothetically that the stated fact is culturally specific and relevant to countries and cultures of the so called “new democracy”. It is possible to make an assumption that in the societies which have deeper democratic traditions free expression of opinions is an unquestionable (not trivial) matter, as from the point of its differential power this criterion is not as relevant and significant as it can be in the countries of “new democracy” that Lithuania refers to. It is not a secret that professional biography of most of the contemporary leaders and teachers was formed in a system where the expression of non-juncture opinion was undesirable, let alone sometimes rather risky. During decades the mechanism of social learning shaped an inadequate attitude towards public expression of “*disliked*” or “*different*” opinion. Otherwise, this stated fact reveals the potential of development of school’s management that is based on an adequate and modern attitude towards free expression of opinions in school’s community.

From the perspective of development of school’s management we would like to juxtapose the stated fact with other facts acknowledged during the survey. It should be noted that designing strategic visions of school management school leaders gave preference to “*Implementation of sociality and partnership*” and “*Intention of perfection*”, whereas teachers preferred “*The improvement of school’s microclimate.*” It is obvious that if free expression of opinions in school’s community is unwarranted, the certainty of both – leaders’ and teachers’ – visions and expectations of strategic management are very problematic. It is possible to make an assumption that security (or restriction) of the expression of an opinion is a systemic determinant of management and social relationships. In other words the restriction of the dimension of making comments directly influences many other essential management dimensions. Consequently, the mentioned congruency of facts in the survey’s research forcibly emphasizes the exceptional role of the expression of *opinions* in the manner of the organization’s culture and modern effective management.

In this context it is worthwhile to discuss other significant tendencies of democracy and authoritarianism’s expressions in school’s management as the survey’s results provide an opportunity to do this.

A significant criterion that allows differentiating democratic and authoritarian management style and type of social relationships at school is the functionality of school’s active institutions. This is revealed by formulations of adequate categories and authentic respondents’ statements representing these categories (see Table 5).

Table 5

Examples of Categories' Statements that Reveal Functionality of School's Active Institutions

Category's Title	Statements' Examples
"Fictitious" activities of the School Board (A)	"The formulations of documents adopted by the School Board are such as the school director needs."
	"The School Board is introduced with already adopted decisions and it is demanded to approve them."
	"Favourable adopted decisions of the School Board are not implemented as they are unhandy to the school leader and everyone is afraid to say this."
	"Though there is the School Board at school, but it does not actually function as such."
Intolerable to the formation of teachers' trade-unions (A)	"Creation of trade-unions is despised."
	"Prevents creation of a trade-union at school."
Pupils autonomy's activities (D)	"Pupils' autonomy functions at school."
	"Pupils' autonomy."
	"The Board of pupils' monitors."
	"Pupils' Seim."
Free and active work of the School Board (D)	"Free School Board's activities."
	"The School Board's activities."
	"The School Board functions."
	"The School Board functions actively."
Activities of teachers' trade-union (D)	"Teachers' trade-union has been formed."
	"There is teachers' trade-union."
	"There is the trade-union."
	"Teachers' trade-union functions actively."
Establishment of election institute at school (D)	"Election of the School Committee."
	"President's Election (Pupils' Board)."
	"Democratic elections of school director (by secret vote)."
	"Election of the School Board."

Comment. A – category of authoritarianism's dimension; **D** – category of democracy's dimension.

The manner of psychosocial relationships and social microclimate in the organization are considered to be an important criterion. This is proved by categories: *"Psychological pressure (intimidations, offences)"; "Distrustful atmosphere"; "Subservience atmosphere"; "Leaders overestimate themselves humiliating others"; "Good, warm relationships in community"; "Good teachers and pupils' relationships."* From this point of view, obvious crisis of management and social relationship at school is indicated by the category: *"Leader's scream – means of impact."* Typical examples of this category: 1) *"It is terrible when the leader is shouting and demanding to do the work that is meaningless and useless"* 2) *"The leader shouts, screams in a womanlike manner and demands to do the work that we are actually doing"*; 3) *"Leader's increased voice tone makes us do things that really are not our duties"*. In addition to the discussed opinion expression's phenomenon in this context the dimensions revealing *"freedom and initiative's"* psycho semantics become an essential criterion. The examples of relative categories: *"Suppression of*

initiative"; “*Opportunity to work in a free and creative way*”; “*No barriers to enhance qualification*” and other.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

The central part in the structure of teachers’ images about the manifestation of democracy and authoritarianism at school occupies the dimension of their expressed opinions. (If there is or not a possibility for the community members to express their opinion) and autocracy-collegiality dimension.

It is purposeful to state hypothetically that the manner in which you can express your opinion at school as in an organization is the essential criterion differentiating the prevailing management style at school, and from the diagnostic point of view it is the main indicator allowing us to recognize a concrete management type and thus to see the actual reality of a school’s management style. In other words, this indicator permits us to recognize and distinguish two management styles at school – democratic management style and authoritarian one.

It is possible to make an assumption that the restriction of expressed opinions in ones school’s community is a systemic determinant of management and social relationships in the organization. In other words, the restriction of commented dimensions directly influence how many other essential management’s dimensions are influenced.

The Hypothetical assumption states that criteria mentioned in expressing one’s opinion is culturally specific i.e. it is more important to the countries of the so called “new democracy.”

Alongside the phenomenon of expressing ones opinion are how opinion is provided through outside organizations like the School Board, trade-unions, pupils’ autonomy, etc. It is a significant criterion to allow differentiating democratic and authoritarian management styles and types with in the context of social relationships in the organization in a more reliable way.

The content of the various categories reveal the expectations of creativity, freedom, initiatives, and favourable psychological and social climate holds on an essential position in the management’s psycho semantic structure (about the democracy and authoritarianism’s expression in the organization). In the course of this research the stated facts witnessed an obvious crisis between management and social relationships. “*Leader’s scream – means of impact.*”

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Main Tendencies of the Economic and Social Development of Šiauliai County

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The aim of the work – to investigate the main development tendencies of Šiauliai county in the general context of Lithuanian development.

The object of the research – economic and social situation in Šiauliai county.

The problem and topicality of the research – Lithuania develops into Vilnius and Kaunas metropolis, and also into the periphery of the remaining part of Lithuania. Such a tendency may negatively influence the general development of the economy of the country and reduce the competitive ability of the country. This topic is still a little investigated in Lithuania.

Research methods – literary and documental analysis.

REGIONAL SITUATION IN LITHUANIA

The concept of region is not strictly defined (Čepaitienė, 2004), contradictory definitions occur. In general, a region is defined as a separate territorial administrative unit. A region is frequently identified with a county in Lithuania.

There is no universal theory of regional development (Tijūnaitienė, 2004); consequently, we have to apply a theory appropriate in certain circumstances.

Harvey Armstrong and Jim Taylor wrote, that the analysis of regional policy instruments have come a long way during the last 30 years or so (Armstrong, 2000).

EU regional policy is implemented through various instruments (Jones, 2001), principally:

- Objective programs (accounting for about 94% of the expenditure of the structural funds);
- Community initiatives;
- Innovative actions (for example pilot projects on regional problems).

Regional topic was analysed in a greater detail in Lithuania only a decade ago. Two new phenomena determined the following:

- The unevenness of the formation of new economic situation in the country after gaining the independence, the concentration of industry, business, and investments in the biggest towns of the country, and economic and social backwardness of peripheral territories of the country;
- The process of the preparation to join the EU and a great attention to regional policy.

Theoretical backgrounds of the development of the regions resulted from the classical theory of economy. However, special theories of the development of the regions have also been elaborated (Guild, 1998). **Metropolis – periphery theory**, which analyses regional imbalance when economic activity centres in the metropolis, is emphasized in the work.

Metropolis is defined as a rapid industrialisation centre, which supplies the periphery with industrial production, whereas peripheral regions supply the metropolis with stock and food (Mačerinskis, 2003). Metropolis has a high level of urbanization, attraction for investments, and rapid implementation of innovations.

The migration of personnel is considered to be the main factor, which determines the formation of metropolis – periphery. Specialists of high quality and modern companies are on the move to metropolis, but peripheral regions are increasingly being neglected in economic and social aspects. Such process accelerates because a centre, which develops rapidly, offers more and more promising workplaces, and the unemployment and economic stagnation in the periphery stimulates the migration of human resources, especially the well – educated people, to the metropolis.

Seeking to reduce the disproportion of the region and metropolis, peripheral regions offer two options:

- Intensive economic shake – up, improvement of business conditions, and major investments in the attraction of human resources and huge companies and their retention in the region. A region, which chooses an open and effective economy, can develop more rapidly than a huge and complex metropolis;
- Isolated regional economy, with an objective to move away from metropolis and to be independent.

Some scholars (McCarthy, 2000) state that the formation of metropolis and peripheries in a country blocks the general development of country's economy, that is why it is worth seeking equal economic development of the whole region. Domestic regions of a country should compete not among themselves, but with the regions of other countries. The collaboration of the regions in a country concentrates human and economic resources (Mathis and others, 2002), compensates the differences of the economic development of regions, and increases the income of a country and international competitive ability. So, metropolis – periphery is considered to be a negative phenomenon, which blocks the development of a country.

At present many authors (Bagdzevičienė, 2002; Damašienė, 2004; Tamošiūnas, 2003) emphasize the uneven development of Lithuanian counties and economic and social leap of Vilnius and Klaipėda towns in respect of peripheral regions. On the 10th of February 2004, a two – town contract (inhabitants – 1,5 million, i.e. 45 per cent of the population of Lithuania), was signed between Vilnius and Kaunas. A rapid development of this two – town region may increasingly polarize the economy of the country and confirm the saying “Vilnius and the rest of Lithuania”.

The experience of the Western countries (Bagdzevičienė, 2002) proves that the development of the region was implemented as follows: rapid support for problematic regions, the balance of the development in the regions, the shake –

up of the regions, the exploitation of domestic potential, the encouragement of small and medium businesses, and the formation of clusters.

The implementation of “oasis” ideas (B. Melnikas, 2004), when particularly favourable conditions for social economic development, investments, and academic and technologic progress are established, is an effective contribution to Šiauliai region. The main favourable conditions for “oasis”: easy tax and credit terms established by the state, additional sponsorship for funds and favourable political and organizational conditions for the implementation of projects.

The long-term strategy (by 2015) of the development of Lithuanian Economy has set the goal – “To overcome the inequality of the development of the regions in the aspects of work market, occupation, and social development”.

TENDENCIES OF ŠIAULIAI COUNTY

Šiauliai county is situated in the North of Lithuania and covers the parts of Western Higher Lithuania and Samogitian ethnographic regions. The county is the second largest in the country (13 per cent of the total area of Lithuania) and covers 8540 km².

The county includes areas of Šiauliai town and district, Akmenė, Joniškis, Kelmė, Pakruojis, and Radviliškis districts. According to the data of Census, the population of Šiauliai county in 2002 was 370 096 (including 134 000 inhabitants of Šiauliai town), constituting approximately the tenth of the total population of Lithuania. The county stands the fourth by population (Šiauliai Regional Development Plan for 2004 – 2006, p. 7).




Fig. 1. The Handling of Men in Lithuanian and in the EU Countries in 2001

Source modified: <http://www.std.lt> / 2003.12.22.

The number of inhabitants has a tendency to decline. In 1996–2001 in Šiauliai town and Akmenė district the number of inhabitants declined notably. In 2001 in all Lithuanian counties natural increase of population was negative and Šiauliai county conforms to the average level of the republic. In most countries of the European Union this rate is positive. According to the data of Census of the Republic of Lithuania dated at the beginning of 2002, 61 per cent of inhabitants lived in towns. According to this rate, we stand in the fourth place, being behind the counties of the biggest towns.

However, the handling of men in 2001 shows that Šiauliai county is agrarian: 30% of the manpower is employed in agriculture in Šiauliai county, and 20% in Lithuania (see Fig. 1). Whereas agricultural sector in Great Britain employs only one per cent of the employees, in Sweden – two, in Germany and Belgium – three, and in France, Denmark, Holland, and Austria – 4%.

The first tendency follows from here: the percentage of agriculturalists will decline, so their retraining into other preserves is necessary.

GDP for one inhabitant increased by approximately 20% in the county in 1996–2001. However, in 2002 the GDP of the county constituted only 7.8% of Lithuanian product and totalled only 73.45% from the average of the country per one inhabitant (see Fig. 2).




Fig. 2. Relative Decline of GDP in Šiauliai County

Source modified: <http://www.std.lt> / 2004.10.15.

Comparing with the average in the country, GDP per one inhabitant in the county declined from 90% in 1996 to 73.4% in 2001, that is the reduction constitutes approximately 20%. Accordingly, an average monthly salary in 2002 does not make one happy: 817 lt per one inhabitant in the county – the ninth rate among counties (the average in Lithuania – 1014 lt).

V. Damašienė and M. Butkus assessed (Damašienė, 2004b) that leading counties – Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipėda – created 66.1% of Lithuanian GDP in 2001, while Šiauliai, Marijampolė, and Tauragė counties, which take up the lowest positions, produced only 13.5% of Lithuanian GDP in 2001.

The second tendency: economy and not very marketable agricultural production determines low GDP in Šiauliai county. It is

necessary to introduce the transition from agriculture to industry, business, and public services.

Quite a few means of the development of industry and business are scheduled in Šiauliai county. Šiauliai Industrial park and projects of Auštrakiai waste clearing system being among them. The activity of the agencies of Šiauliai regional development, Šiauliai Business incubator, Science and Technologic Park, Business information centres in Šiauliai county and some other financial projects, which are oriented to the EU structural funds assistance, are also promising. In Šiauliai Development Plan for 2004–2006 even 1496 measures are projected, the implementation of which demand projects oriented to the EU structural funds assistance. The members of industry and business introduced the most measures – 575, and 232 million LTL were budgeted for them. The total plan of Šiauliai county financial funds for 2004–2006 constitutes 759 million LTL, 490 million LTL of which are EU funds.

We have to state that in Lithuania a little attention is paid to the researches in industrial and business spheres. In 2003 investments into science and researches constituted only 0.68% of GDP. Finland and Sweden, which allocate 3–4% of GDP for this purpose, are notable for industrial and business competitive ability. In Šiauliai county the programme of business development and industrial and business monitoring is not developed.




Fig. 3. Direct Foreign Investments in Šiauliai County

Source modified: <http://www.std.lt> / 2003 12 23

Direct foreign investments in the county increased by 3.6 times from 1995 to 2003 (see Fig. 3). In 2000 investments into the county constituted only two per cent, and in 2002 – 1.4% of all direct foreign investments into Lithuania (see Table 1). Here Vilnius dominates steadily: two thirds of foreign investments into Lithuania which is 47.4 times more than in Šiauliai county.

The third tendency of the county development: the increase of the attraction of the county for foreign investors, and the establishment of more favourable economic, infrastructural, and social conditions for them.

Though the disproportion between tangible investments per capita and foreign investments is lower in the counties of Lithuania, Šiauliai county lagged behind Vilnius county more than seven times (see table 1) in 2002. In 2002, only 5.6% of total national tangible investments were provided for Šiauliai county.

B. Martinkus, V. Damašienė and M. Butkus analysed the investment strategies of industrial enterprises for 1995–2003 in Šiauliai (Martinkus, 2004). Their studies revealed that financial decisions were conditioned by the limited industrial capacity of companies and the lack of financial funds. The main factors promoting investments – endeavour to develop the range of production and the need to modernize production technologies.

In 1996–2000 in Lithuanian counties material investments per one inhabitant are not characteristic of such a huge disproportion as foreign investments, however, even here, Šiauliai county is behind Vilnius county more than three times (see Table 1). In 2001 only 2.9% of the material investments of the country went to Šiauliai county.

Table 1

Material investments per one inhabitant in the counties in 1997 – 2000 and direct foreign investments in 2001 and 2002

County	Material investments in 2002	Direct foreign investments in 2001		Direct foreign investments in 2002	
	Million Lt	Million Lt	%	Million Lt	%
Total:	8124	10661.9	100	13183.8	100
Alytus	277	147	1.4	141.2	1.1
Kaunas	1470	1310.5	12.3	1573.4	11.9
Klaipėda	1005	1294.6	12.1	1361.9	10.3
Marijampolė	243	61.3	0.6	73.6	0.6
Panevėžys	508	453.1	4.2	459.8	3.5
Šiauliai	456	165.8	1.6	179.1	1.4
Tauragė	122	19.5	0.2	14.6	0.1
Telšiai	357	17.1	0.2	555.7	4.2
Utena	255	205	1.9	335.3	2.5
Vilnius	3248	6988	65.5	8489.2	64.4

Source modified: <http://www.std.lt> / 2004 10 15

According to the investments in house building, Šiauliai county outnumbered the average of the country in 2002 (Striaukienė, 2003). A new form of investment – concession is quite promising (Gurėjevas, 2003).

According to the general plan of the area of Republic of Lithuania dated 29/10/2002, **Šiauliai is identified as a 1st level metropolitan centre of regional category**. Vilnius and Kaunas are metropolitan centres of international category, Klaipėda is of state category, and Panevėžys, Alytus, and Marijampolė are of 2nd level of category A. But, the general plan states that currently Šiauliai does not meet the criteria of metropolitan level centre and is the weakest link in this level. Four possibilities are scheduled to develop

Šiauliai into the centre of metropolitan level: good demographic situation of Western Lithuania, university, possibility to interact intensively with the potentials of neighbouring regions, and the increase of the importance of Via Hanseatika highway. Having used the potentials of this highway, main line, and airport, which does not have weight restrictions, Šiauliai region may become an international centre of logistics.

The fourth tendency of the county development: the development of the system of material investments into Šiauliai county and of domestic industry, business, and public services.

In Lithuania, high-tech industry constitutes 4.1 per cent, middle high – 10 per cent, while Šiauliai county has no high-tech and middle high industries at all. The industry of low technology constitutes 61 per cent of total industry in the county (Šiauliai Regional Development Plan for 2004–2006, p. 58).

M. Starkevičiūtė emphasises (Starkevičiūtė, 2003), a region with few natural resources can develop in three ways:

- by processing its own products (e.g. agriculture);
- by processing foreign raw material or by exporting goods to foreign countries (textile, industry of oil processing, transport);
- by using human intellect for the implementation of high production technologies. Such services have the biggest surplus value and provide competitive superiority.

One of the main strategic objectives in the Long-term Strategy of Lithuanian Economy Development by 2015 is: “To achieve that exclusive weight would be laid on the development of sciences and technologies while developing national economy and the society receiving more benefit from research work and innovative activity”.

Knowledge economy and information society following a continuous learning are permanent accents of the formation of the future and they are relevant to Šiauliai region as well.

The fifth tendency of regional development: assimilation of high and middle high production technologies, the intensive growth of the intellectual potential of regional specialists and the integration of studies, research work in production and service sector.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The rates of the economic development in Lithuania in 1997–2002 enable to claim that there are signs of the formation of metropolis – periphery. This can reduce the general international economic competitive ability of the country.
2. All five development tendencies of Šiauliai region are closely interdependent and influence each other. Their implementation is closely related with the intensification of human resources potential and benevolent will of all employees in the county.
3. It is necessary to form a strategy of intensive economic development, use domestic potential optimally, encourage investments and innovations, form sympathetic environment to the development of small and medium business and industry, and master progressive technologies.

4. Modern strategic management of Šiauliai region would enable not to become a region “in pursuit”, but to regularize the competitive opportunities of economic subjects, resources, and long-term objectives in the region. It is essential to create an effective chain of the system of strategic management: region – science – researches – competitive clusters.

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Local Democracies in the Baltic Sea Region¹

Considering a Model to be Applied to a Comparative Study of Local Democracy

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According to Illner (Baldersheim, Illner, Wollman (eds.), 2003: 11), the Baltic States have to a lesser degree than other countries within the former Soviet sphere been involved in research on local government and decentralization reforms.

This paper discusses briefly a model, which I consider to be fruitful in comparative studies of local governments in the Baltic Sea Region. The region encompasses here Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on the Eastern side of the Baltic Sea, and Denmark, Norway² and Sweden on the Western side.

My principal purpose is to communicate a model of a comparative research design, of which my colleagues (confer footnote 1) and I are considering to put into use in a study of how *local democracies* work.

A MODERNISATION FRAMEWORK

The first framework refers to the modernisation processes of the public, which have been going on during the last 15–20 years in many Western countries. These processes have changed the public sector by new ways of organising public services, such as the ideas connected to New Public Management (Baldersheim: 1996, Christensen and Laegreid, 2001, Pollitt and Bouckaert: 2000, a.o). In short, the goal of these changes is making the public sector more competitive through the introduction of market-like models of organisation and leadership in public sector agencies, and/or through the privatisation of such agencies. These changes have also had impact on the organisation of local government organisations, with great variations from one country to another (Christensen and Lagreid a.o.).

¹ This paper is a result of discussions with Mark Chandler, Harald Koht, Thorbjorn Nilsson, Raymond Rosenfeld and Lars Zanderin. Only I am responsible for this paper, though.

² Though Norway has no border to the Baltic Sea, it is in the last decade seen as belonging to the Baltic sea region, for example through its membership in the Council of the Baltic Sea States, which was established in 1992.

This development has coincided with changes in political participation at the local level, such as membership in local political parties, voter turnout and in the citizens' perceptions of their role in the democracy (Baldersheim, Hagtvedt, Heidar (eds.: 2001).

One problem is that research within this framework runs the risk of becoming too occupied with organisation design like neo-Fordism and other NPM-like designs, which build on ideals from private enterprises (Ramsdal et al 2000: 44). New ways of linking local governments to the civil society can emerge without setting its marks on the formal organisation design. Hence, some additional focuses should supply this framework.

A HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL FRAMEWORK

A supplementary framework that we advocate refers to the impact of historical and cultural components. The Baltic States share some vital experiences from the past in being communist countries. Illner (2003), referring to what he calls the generalizing approach, proclaims that a good part of research on all of the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe, and the non-European members of the USSR as well, the 90s has been based on the implicit assumptions that

- 1) there are a certain geopolitically determined historical and cultural commonality among the ex-communist countries because of their being East-European,
- 2) there are structural and cultural similarities among them given by their common communist past,
- 3) all the countries aim at the same target, i.e. political democracy of the Western type and a market economy,
- 4) on their way towards that target they will follow more or less the same path (p. 25).

After that, Illner continues with expressing that such assumptions may have been legitimate before 1989, when the otherwise widely different societies of Eastern and Central Europe and the non-European parts of the USSR were amalgamated by the external pressure of the Soviet dominance and forced into the Procrustean bed of the uniform institutional structure (p. 25).

Never the less, and still following Illner, we think it is useful to study the Baltic States in the light of these four assumptions, because Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania belong to a cluster of its own, separated from other groups of countries that belonged to the USSR or its sphere of influence (p. 25). Apart from merely drawing on Illner's categories, who at this point does not explain why he puts the Baltic States in the same group, we would find it likely that these countries have some relics from the tsarist period as well.

Such circumstances (i.e.: being ex-communist states and land of tsars), properly operationalised, could contribute to the formulation of hypotheses on what might explain contrasts between the Baltic States on the one side, and the Nordic states on the other, with respect to local government.

AN EU-FRAMEWORK

The third framework is about the impact of EU-decisions and other aspects of the EU-system, not at least ideas of what the different layers in a democratic political system ought to do. It might be difficult to differentiate between impacts from the EU and impacts from modernizing ideas like NPM (which we mentioned above, as our first explanatory framework), which have had substantial influence also on the functioning of the EU-system itself.

A DESCRIPTIVE FRAMEWORK

A fourth framework refers to the concept civic culture. In contrast to the three before mentioned frameworks, we recommend that this framework should be used to describe vital aspects of local government.

The concept civic culture is often used in the international political culture literature. Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* (1963) is an early work, which is much referred to. Revisiting this literature, Reese and Rosenfeld (not dated) examine the political culture arguments of Almond and Verba and others. Reese and Rosenfeld find that the new political culture emphasizes national level values, social-psychological dynamics, and individual attitudes and values (p. 9). They argue that municipalities have collective memories and identities that are not the simple sum of individual preferences and values, and that there is a history and a sense of community as a political, economic and social place. Local civic cultures represent systems of individual and group interactions in a public-policy-making context that inherently necessitate the "allocation of value" with processes reflecting both individual and community values and goals (ibid). We shall try to develop the civic culture concept in order to adapt it to comparative studies of local government in the Baltic Sea Region.

A MODEL FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

As already mentioned, our focus is on local democracy in the Baltic Sea Region. Three States representing countries with meagre traditions of local democracy and three States representing countries with about 150 years of local democratic (Western-styled) traditions.

We propose that these frameworks should constitute a first approximation to a model for comparative analysis. The model can be depicted as follows:




Fig. A Model of Local Government Trends

The purpose of the model is to provide one framework for subsequent discussion by depicting the broad forces, which are and have been at work in the development of local government in the Baltic Sea Region. A model such as this is both a conceptual map and a diagram of forces. From it and within it we will develop more detailed sets of typologies, which are aiming at classifying and explaining specific pattern and trends. Simultaneously one must remind oneself of the chances that a too strict model increases the risk of missing the sight of vital aspects of what one wants to map out.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of such a study will build upon definitions of the two concepts: the public ethos and civic culture. We recommend these two concepts to compare the relations between local governments and civil society in the five countries, which are included in our design. To my mind both concepts are easy to connect to standard definitions of democracy.

The concept *public ethos* is used according to Lundquist (Lundquist, 1998). Lundquist argues that the public ethos should be divided into two main parts: democratic values and economic values. Democratic values are subdivided into three parts: political democracy, rule of law and public ethics, whereas economic values are divided into another group of three parts: functional rationality, cost efficiency and productivity. Lundquist argues that one has to focus on both main parts. On the other hand he proclaims that the balance might be on different values in certain cases (p. 63). So, what we recommend as political scientists, are to give the main attention on the part,

which in Lindquist's terminology contains political democracy: political democracy, the rule of law and public ethics.

We are following Reed and Rosenfeld when they operationalise civic culture in three components: the community power system, the community value system and the community decision-making system (ibid: p. 10). However, while Reed and Rosenberg's research design is constructed to fit a very elaborate quantitative study, we will add that such studies might be less elaborate in its quantitative approach. In addition we would recommend a qualitative aspect, like intensive interviews with elite persons in our sample.

While Reese and Rosenfeld focus on one policy area, which is economic policy, it'll be easy to focus on a lot of other policy areas, like for example planning (land use etc.), sports/recreation and care for elderly. Our reasons for mentioning these three policy areas, are partly because they are supposed to be well connected to the civil society in the four countries involved in our study, and partly because they represent policy areas that in recent years have been subjects for a lot of reorganisation efforts in the same countries (as is the case in many other countries in the Western world). We have in mind such reorganisation efforts that are mainly initiated under the influence of what is generally known as New Public Management.

I think it might be fruitful to tailor-make any operationalisation of the concept civic culture to fit such a research based upon the general idea of Reese and Rosenfeld's discussion. The main parts of their discussion consist of developing the civic culture concept from the labels *the community power system*, *the community value system* and *the community decision-making system*. Due mostly to the limits set for the papers on this conference, I have to call my readers attention to the literature list, where Reed and Rosenfeld's discussions are developed further.

Research Questions

The literature about organisational changes covers a wide variety of disciplines. Widespread questions of these studies refer to theories of how to create effective organisations – both in public and private enterprises. In the last decades studies of trends in modernisation processes of the public sector in the western world, there seem to be mixed opinions about what implications such changes have had on democratic values and civic virtues (Christensen and Laegreid: 2001). A majority of these studies seem to conclude that some democratic values and civic virtues are threatened. In a study I did myself (Tufte, op. cit.), I found some data which put some doubt about the general validity of this conclusion. I reckon this issue to be of interest to follow up in the study we are planning.

To study relations between local governments and civil society is one aspect of such an issue. One question might be: are we witnessing the creation of new meeting grounds between local governments and citizens? Special focus might be on new ways of connecting representatives of civil society to decision-making and implementation of local policies and politics. Furthermore one can look at what implications these changes might have with regard to

- democratic values and civic virtues,
- the role of local political parties,
- local voting turnout,

- citizens roles and
- the role of local civic organisations (NGOs) like neighbourhood organisations, sporting clubs, local history associations, religious groups, choirs etc.

For example, R. Dahrendorf, according to Illner (op. cit.: 14), argued in 1990 that civil society cannot be decreed, and he estimated that many decades will be needed before it becomes firmly established in the transforming countries in a manner that would seal and safeguard results of the transformation (*from an authoritarian and centralised communist system into a liberal democratic system*. Comment added by us). How does his argument fit into today's situation on the local level in the Baltic States, 14 years later?

Another research question might be what similarities and differences exist between the civil society and local governments in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden?

Furthermore, in spite of the different historical and cultural components among the countries, it would be of interest to see if it is possible to see whether the development is towards a clear common model of local government in this region or not.

The involvement of three post-communist countries in such a study gives one the opportunity to explore how these countries have restructured local governments to fit into a democratic political system. A challenging part of the study will be comparison of local government reforms in three former communist countries with those implemented in Norway and Sweden; to see if they follow any recognizable common pattern, and to ascertain the nature and possible causes of these variations. We have in mind patterns like the introduction of market-like reforms, managerialism, in short the efforts to create less bureaucracy, increase efficiency, and provide better service for their citizens. These reforms seem to have had a hegemonic impact on the transformation of the public sector in a wide variety of Western countries (Pollit and Bouchaert, op. cit., Christensen and Laegreid and others).

According to Baldersheim and Illner (1996: 1), the fall of communism in Eastern Europe in 1990 led to the introduction of local government reforms, modelled after the standard Western form. Baldersheim and Illner's book builds on data from Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, which were collected in 1991–1992. We hypothesize that the same Western forms have had great impact on the local government reforms in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania too. However, since such a study will be done some ten years later, and involves other East-European countries, we are also curious to replicate some of the aspects of Baldersheim and Illner's research.

Furthermore, one can ask whether it is possible that we witness historical aspects from the past that constrain the possibilities Latvia and Lithuania have to develop local governments according to Western ideas? Such historical influence might, according to Illner, be connected to values, beliefs and habits from the past, and/or past choices can serve as constraints on political actors' behaviour (Baldersheim, Illner, Wollman (eds.) 2003:12), or eventually other sources of influence on today's reforms.

The impact of hegemonic ideas, incentives and pressures from the EU, and historical circumstances, imply that our study will also be focusing on explanatory frameworks, suited to interpret the results.

Finally one can postulate that such a study will indicate that the hegemonic strength of ideas connected to modernisation of the public sector (NPM), alongside incentives and pressure from EU-rules and standards, dominates local government reforms in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, in much the same way as they do in Norway and Sweden.

A serious methodological problem is the propensity of making Norway and Sweden a prototype of democratic excellence in such a study. One must also be aware of the possibility of making the countries at the Eastern Baltic seaboard into such a prototype. Hence it is indispensable that a study like this must involve experienced scholars from the countries that are included.

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Evaluation of Democracy – Current Situation and Challenges for Further Analysis

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Two basic trends regarding democracy can be identified over the past decades: on the one hand democracy has spread to a majority of the world's states. On the other hand – decline in voter turnouts and the broad decline of public confidence in governmental and political institutions, the growing citizen alienation from political parties in particular, and the widespread perceptions that democratic governments and politicians are increasingly corrupt, self-interested and unresponsive – are common to many democracies.

Consequently analytic attention has turned increasingly from explaining regime transitions to evaluating and explaining the character of democratic regimes.

This paper is intended to give a brief outline of some attempts to assess democracy as well as to point out the main challenges for further democracy assessment.

Prior to speaking further on the evaluation of democracy, a few more steps should be taken.

The first step is to define clearly the scope of analysis. Therefore it should be agreed what is meant by the term democracy.

Currently it seems that it is almost a consensus among theorists on the basic requirements that should be met by a democratic system.

At a minimum, democracy requires:

- 1) Universal, adult suffrage;
- 2) Recurring, free, competitive and fair elections;
- 3) More than one serious political party;
- 4) Alternative sources of information;
- 5) If elections are to be truly meaningful, free and fair, there must be some degree of civil and political freedom beyond the electoral arena, permitting citizens to articulate and organize around their political beliefs and interests;
- 6) In addition, formal democratic institutions should be sovereign. In fact, they should not be constrained by elites or external powers that are not directly or indirectly accountable to the people.¹

¹ See Dahl, Robert. *Polyarchy: participation and opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.

Next step is to list aspects of democracy that are crucial to the process of democracy evaluation, but due to limited space will not be covered by this paper.

First to mention here is a concept of equality. Despite the fact that this aspect is vitally important in studies of democracy (basic principles of democracy can be characterized by phrases “equal rights under the law” and “one person one vote”) special attention to equality will not be paid because of breadth and complexity of this issue.

Another aspect, which is not covered by this paper, is attitude of society towards democracy. On one hand this seems to be an easy task by asking the general public: Is *having a democratic system a good or bad way of governing the country?*² At the same time results obtained by such an approach are rather controversial, because surveys taken during 1995–1997 and 1999–2001, an overwhelming majority of the population in virtually every society said, “having a democratic political system” as either “good” or “very good.”³ However opinion polls show that widespread tendency is declining. Trust in government and public institutions as well as increasing intention to vote for “strong leaders” is also declining. It is clear that people’s attitudes towards the political system should be measured, but to come to comprehensive results a more complex approach is needed.

After the basic frame of reference is defined, it is possible to move forward with the evaluation of democracy.

As this issue is on the top of the agenda of many political analysts and think tanks, a number of evaluation systems using different approaches and states of departure are developed.

WORLD AUDIT AND FREEDOM HOUSE DEMOCRACY SCORE

The first example is evaluation of democracy carried out by World Audit⁴. It provides a comparative study of democracy around the world in the form of a democracy audit. Several components from different sources of information are used to develop a unique democracy table, which contains the rankings from all countries researched in the respect of: Political rights; Civil liberties; Press freedom; Rule of Law; Corruption; Human rights; Economic freedom⁵. For example to evaluate political rights and civil liberties Freedom House (FH) data is used.

² World Values survey contains question measuring attitudes towards democracy: “I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? ... *Having a democratic System?*” for more information on this survey see <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/> For Ingleharts’ analysis of data related to democracy and values Inglehart Roland *How solid is mass support for democracy – and how can we measure it?* <http://home.sandiego.edu/~mb5/inglehart.pdf>

³ Inglehart, Roland. *How solid is mass support for democracy – and how can we measure it?* <http://home.sandiego.edu/~mb5/inglehart.pdf>.

⁴ World Audit is an international not-for-profit company that brings together statistics and reports from highly respected agencies, each with their own developed specialities. Freedom House, Transparency International, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, The International Commission of Jurists. Comprehensive information is available at their home page <http://www.worldaudit.org/aboutus.htm>.

⁵ Civil liberties and Political rights scores developed by Freedom House <http://www.freedomhouse.org/> serve as a tool to group countries in 4 divisions. Within each division positions are calculated using an average of press freedom and corruption scores. More on methodology see <http://www.worldaudit.org/methodology.htm>.

Freedom House Annual Survey employs the Political Rights and Civil liberties checklists. This checklist of political rights examines: 1) Freedom of elections and the legal framework of elections; 2) The freedom to assemble and the presence of opposition; 3) Popular sovereignty; 4) Rights of minority groups. It also may include a checklist of civil liberties rights examining: 1) Presence of alternative source of information; 2) Human rights, personas and social freedoms, for example religious freedom, freedom of expression, freedom to assemble, private property and gender equality; 3) Rule of law. Each country is then rated on a seven-category scale.

What kind of conclusions about the state of democracy can be drawn from those scores?

As it is clear from the checklists, these conclusions do not go far beyond the definition of democracy mentioned earlier in this paper. However, free elections and universal suffrage as considered by FH as criteria for analysis in issues related participation, have remained mostly uncovered. Basically, the Freedom House Annual Survey of political rights and civil liberties speak about rights, liberties, opportunities and abilities of citizen within the current system.

They use comparison as a method and come to comparable numeric scale at the end but at the same time the degree of subjectivity in this assessment is rather high.

The most notable drawbacks are that some of the attributes used to measure democracy such as “socioeconomic rights”, “property rights” and “freedom from war” – are not exclusive to democracy and at the same time there is almost nothing said about participation that is crucial for democracies.

POLITY PROJECT⁶

The last development is the Polity IV project that continues Polity research tradition of coding the regime and authority characteristics of states in the world system for purposes of comparative, quantitative analysis. Within this approach Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements.

- 1) Presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders.
- 2) Existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive.
- 3) Guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation.

Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are treated as means to, or specific manifestations of, these general principles. The data set does not include coded data on civil liberties.

The basic assumption is that a mature and internally coherent democracy, for example, might be operationally defined as one in which (a) political participation is fully competitive, (b) executive recruitment is elective, and (c) constraints on the chief executive are substantial.

⁶ The original Polity conceptual scheme was formulated and the initial Polity I data collected under the direction of Ted Robert Gurr and informed by foundational, collaborative work with Harry Eckstein, *Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975.

User manual and data sets are available free of charge at the home page of the project <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/showFiles.asp>.

The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0–10).

The comparative advantage of the data set developed within the polity project is that it covers all independent countries with populations greater than 500,000 in the time period from 1801 to 2002.

At the same time if we assume that participation is what makes democracy meaningful, the validity of scores can be doubted because for example Switzerland has scored a perfect 10 out of 10 on democracy dataset since 1848, even though women – roughly half the population – were not granted the right to vote until 1971, 123 years later. Furthermore, electoral turnout has been around 30% recently, despite virtually universal suffrage.⁷

It should also be noted that the degree of subjectivity in this assessment is rather high.

PARTICIPATION ENHANCED POLITY SCORE

The attempt to include participation as a variable in evaluation of democracy has resulted in Participation Enhanced Polity Score (PEPS)⁸.

The PEPS combine institutional factors with citizen participation, by introducing a variable called voter turnout scalar (VTS), the following is what is calculated according to the formula:

$$VTS_{i,t} = \text{Votes}_{i,t} / \text{Adult Population}_{i,t}$$
⁹

(where i represents country, but t represents year).

Participation Enhanced Polity Score is based on the Polity scores mentioned before and adjusted with the newly introduced VTS variable. So PEPS1 is calculated according to the formula:

$$PEPS1_{i,t}^{10} = (VTS_{i,t} * \text{Polity Democracy Score}_{i,t}) - \text{Polity Autocracy Score}_{i,t}$$

The numeric score calculated in this way reflects both institutional developments and patterns of participation in elections therefore a deeper description of democracy. The degree of subjectivity in this assessment is lower than in previous ones, however it should be noted that the assessment of institutional aspects is based on Polity Score therefore credibility of PEPS is closely related to credibility of Polity Score.

At the same time the methods of how to include voter's turnout in the evaluation of democracy and arrive to comparable numeric scale can differ greatly.

⁷ For more remarks, see Bruce E. Moon, Jennifer Harvey Birdsall, Sylvia Ceisluk, Lauren M. Garlett, Joshua J. Hermias, Elizabeth Mendenhall, Patrick D. Schmid, Wai Hong Wong: *Voting Counts: Participation in the Measurement of Democracy*; Department of International Relations Lehigh University; 2004.

⁸ Article by Bruce E. Moon, Jennifer Harvey Birdsall, Sylvia Ceisluk, Lauren M. Garlett, Joshua J. Hermias, Elizabeth Mendenhall, Patrick D. Schmid, Wai Hong Wong *Voting Counts: Participation in the Measurement of Democracy*; can be found http://www.lehigh.edu/~bm05/democracy/Voting_Counts.text.cps.pdf.

⁹ The threshold for adult population in this formula is marked 18.

¹⁰ More information on PEPS1 as well as PEPS 2 index is available at http://www.lehigh.edu/~bm05/democracy/Voting_Counts.text.cps.pdf.

VANHANEN'S INDEX OF DEMOCRATIZATION

Tatu Vanhanen, a professor of political science at the University of Helsinki makes a point of departure from the two basic dimensions considered by Dahl, competitiveness and political participation.

This approach is based on the assumption that the existence of legal competition means that individuals and groups are free to organize themselves and to oppose the government. It also implies the existence of some degree of equality in the sense that different groups are equally free to compete for power. Vanhanen considers the degree of participation in crucial decision-making processes through elections indicative of the relative number of people taking part in politics in general. Vanhanen suggests that the higher the number of participants represent a higher degree of competition and participation, as well as the higher the level of democratization in a particular political system. He uses these indicators in a relatively simple and straightforward manner by taking available electoral data as its base¹¹.

Calculations based on two variables are quite simple. The degree of participation (P) is assessed by the voter turnout in consecutive elections in terms of the share of persons voting of the total population of a country.¹² The competitiveness of elections (C) is measured by the share of the largest party in national parliamentary elections subtracted from 100. Both measures are then multiplied by each other and divided by 100 to result in a scale ranging from 0 to 100 ($P \cdot C / 100$)¹³. A value of 5 on this scale is the minimum threshold for a system to be considered as “democratic” in his sense.

What kind of conclusions about the state of democracy can be drawn from those scores?

Vanhanen's approach is rather controversial in terms of results because in fact, all countries listed score above his minimum threshold and even Lukashenko's Belarus passes his test of democraticness.

It also must be noted that high values on this index do not represent a *better* democracy in any functional or normative sense because the measure of competitiveness, which is an indication of the degree of fragmentation of the party system, cannot be taken as a “qualitative” standard, but only as a minimum requirement in each case.

¹¹ For brief description of principles and methodology see <http://www.janda.org/c10/data%20sets/Polity%20files/democratization.htm>, for detailed information Vanhanen, Tatu. *The Process of Democratization: A Comparative Study of 147 states, 1980–1988*. New York: Crane Russak. 1990.

¹² It should be noted that this percentage is calculated from the total population, not from the adult population or from the enfranchised population. That leads to the situation where countries with higher percentage of those who are not eligible to vote – non-citizens, convicted criminals and young population under the certain age (most common age barrier is 18) get worse scores than countries with smaller numbers of those who are not eligible for voting (including young population). So to get more precise data during certain time it ought to be adjusted with birth rates.

¹³ The variables could be combined in many ways, depending on how we weight the importance of competition and participation. It seems to me impossible to determine which of them is more important or how much more important. Vanhanen weights them equally in the construction of an index of democratization.

On the other hand this approach goes a bit further if compared with the Freedom House (FH) Annual Survey of political rights and civil liberties and Polity Project. If FH speaks about rights, liberties, opportunities and abilities of citizens, Vanhanen, by including the number of voters in his formula attempts to assess how people act within this system.

Another big difference between two approaches mentioned above is that the one used by Vanhanen is by far the most objective. Using the formula does not reflect or involve any subjective judgment made by an analyst¹⁴. At the same time, unlike those approaches mentioned before this approach does not include any information about citizens rights and liberties.

THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY BY INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE

The last approach I would like to mention is developed by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).

This evaluation method can be used in several ways. The most significant difference from the previous methods is that the questionnaire¹⁵ is designed to give a profile of the condition of democracy and can be given to ordinary citizens. This questionnaire on the one hand can be treated as an educational tool for citizens, because it is designed to help people understand different dimensions of democracy. On the other hand, it can be treated and used as a tool to evaluate the different dimensions and functions of democracy, and make an assessment of democracy. This approach is based on the assumption that the right people to assess a country's democracy are its own citizens, rather than outsiders sitting in judgment upon it.

Another difference is that the results of the questionnaire will not place countries in a ranking order.¹⁶

The questions in the questionnaire are organized around three main components of democracy:

- 1) The first has sections on: nationhood and citizenship; the rule of law; civil and political rights; economic and social rights.
- 2) The second has sections on: free and fair elections; the democratic role of political parties; government effectiveness and accountability; civilian control of the military and police; minimizing corruption.
- 3) The third part is civil society and popular participation and it has sections on: the media in a democratic society; political participation; government responsiveness; decentralization.
- 4) The fourth section devoted to the international dimensions of democracy, which includes issues of governmental autonomy from external control, as well as the supportiveness of government policy towards democracy abroad.

¹⁴ Despite that a certain deal of subjectivity is reflected by formula itself.

¹⁵ Which is a simplified version of the assessment tool from International IDEA's programme on the 'State of Democracy'.

¹⁶ More information is available at <http://www.idea.int>. Complete Methodology of this evaluation method is included in the handbook. David Beetham, Sarah Bracking, Iain Kearton and Stuart Weir, *International IDEA Handbook on Democracy Assessment*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001.

Each component contains a number of sections and the classifications that are: very high; high; middle or ambiguous; low; very low.

What kind of conclusions about the state of democracy can be drawn from the results of this assessment?

More than a half of the questions speak about rights, liberties, opportunities and abilities of citizen within the current system. This approach is rather similar to one the used by FH and Polity Project. The third part goes beyond the institutional framework. Questions relating to other forms of participation are asked, for example: Is there full citizen participation in a public life? How extensive is the range of voluntary associations, citizen groups, social movements etc. and how independent are they from government? How extensive is citizen participation in voluntary associations and self-management organizations, and in other voluntary public activity?

This means that the evaluation frame developed by IDEA is an attempt to include analysis of civil society in the evaluation frame for democracy. This is the most significant difference between this and other approaches as well as the comparative advantage of this approach.

After describing several approaches in the evaluation of democracy, it is important to note that there is one feature common to almost all of the attempts to evaluate democracy. It also has a rather high degree of subjectivity. Main reasons for this are:

- 1) Differences in understanding of the concept of democracy, therefore different variables are measured; or, if the same variables are measured they can be weighted differently;
- 2) Most of the time the variables used are not easily quantifiable. Especially in the case when checklists and/or questionnaires are used. The rating or score therefore depends heavily on the subjective approach and experience of the analyst. Sometimes it is hard to distinguish whether the analyst is looking back to assess the progress already made, or forward to what still has to be done. Whether the analyst compares the system he/she analyzes with the worst cases, best practices or the ideal.
- 3) Even in the case when formulas are used, rather broad interpretation can be added both to the input and output data.

One more remark concerning the evaluation approach. Most of the approaches intend to express a result of analysis in numeric scores. This is reasonable, to a certain extent, because it makes them easy to understand. But others, at the same time, are trying to avoid numeric scoring. Some authors suggest that it is impossible to compare the results if the indicators are all different. Like comparing apples to oranges.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY

Larry Diamond a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution once wrote *Illiberal democracies have regular, more or less "free and fair" elections, but they lack some of the underpinnings of liberal democracy: civilian supremacy over the military, an independent judiciary, a free parliament, a constitution that protects liberties, and a vigorous civil society.*¹⁷

¹⁷ http://www.pponline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?cp=1&knlgAreaID=115&subsecid=900026&contentid=1328.

Or putting it in other words wrote by Ivan Doherty director of political party programs of National Democratic Institute *A dynamic civil society fosters many elements essential for democracy: participation, accountability, and sustainable political reform, to name but a few. An organized civil society gives a voice to the underprivileged (as well as the privileged) and amplifies their influence in the political process. Nongovernmental organizations play a critical role in developed and developing countries. They contribute to the shaping of policy by making technical expertise available to policy formulators and by exerting pressure on governments and political institutions. They encourage citizen participation and promote civic education. (..)*¹⁸

If the evaluation of democracy is viewed from this perspective then indicators like FH, Polity Project, even Participation Enhanced Polity Score and Vanhanens index of democratization do not cover all the aspects necessary for comprehensive evaluation of liberal democracy, because those evaluations does not pay any or pay minimal attention to the civil society.

Taking into consideration the above mentioned it is clear that to get complete idea of the level of democracy (or democratisation (Vanhanen) or state of democracy (IDEA)) civil society should be evaluated.

EVALUATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Social capital

One approach is to measure social capital. According to Francis Fukuyama *an abundant stock of social capital is presumably what produces a dense civil society, which in turn has been almost universally seen as a necessary condition for modern liberal democracy.*¹⁹

The most widely known way to measure social capital is by combining social trust²⁰ and associational membership. (Norris)²¹

A less known approach was developed by John A. Booth and it includes the measure of political knowledge or information and a measure of interpersonal trust.²²

Both of the approaches end up with numeric scales and possess a high degree of objectivity. The most important characteristic of both approaches however is that they do not measure the rights, liberties and opportunities of people, but the real behavior of people. In other words they describe the way the institutional framework of democracy is filled with human action.

¹⁸ <http://www.google.lv/search?q=cache:GTdNGo41jJAJ:www.policyreview.org/APR01/doherty.html+role+of+civil+society+in+democracy&hl=lv> .

¹⁹ Fukuyama, Francis. *Social Capital and Civil Society*. 1999, <http://www.google.lv/search?q=cache:JJVg2kBoqaMJ:www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/fukuyama.htm+measure+of+social+capital+civil+society&hl=lv>.

²⁰ For more on social capital and social trust see Robert Putnam, *Making democracies work*, Princeton: 1993; Putnam, Robert. *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community*. NY, 2000.

²¹ Norris, Pippa. *Making democracies work: Social capital and Civic engagement in 47 societies*. 2000.

²² John A. Booth and Patricia Bayer Richard *Civil Society, Political Capital, And Democratisation Central America* ; <http://136.142.158.105/LASA97/boothbayerrichard.pdf>.

Looking closer at the ways of measuring social capital's two variables, which we have yet to explore, appear as – the first is values (such as interpersonal trust) another is knowledge.

Evaluation of decisions

Professor James Fishkin, Director of Center for Deliberative Democracy, Stanford University argues: *Citizens are often uninformed about key public issues. Conventional polls represent the public's surface impressions of sound bites and headlines. The public, subject to what social scientists have called "rational ignorance," has little reason to confront trade-offs or invest time and effort in acquiring information or coming to a considered judgment.*²³ And it is hard to disagree with this.

Is there any way to measure the difference between informed and uninformed decision? Fishkin's answer is Deliberative Polling²⁴ (DP). The brief description of the method is following: *a random, representative sample is selected and first polled on the targeted issues. After this baseline poll, members of the sample are invited to gather at a single place for a weekend in order to discuss the issues. Carefully balanced briefing materials are sent to the participants and are also made publicly available. The participants engage in a dialogue with competing experts and political leaders based on questions they develop in a small group discussions with trained moderators. Parts of the weekend events are broadcast on television, either live or in taped and edited form. After the deliberations, the sample is again asked the original questions. The resulting changes in opinion represent the conclusions the public would reach, if people had an opportunity to become more informed and more engaged by the issues.*

The DP is currently used in order to measure the difference between informed and uninformed decision of the general public as well as to introduce the broad public with balanced information on the issue. It is no doubt that informed decisions contribute better to the outcome than uninformed ones. Therefore, increasing the number of informed decisions could make a significant step towards the ideal of democracy. If DP could be used as a part of an evaluation of democracy then the indicator should be how significant is the difference between informed and uninformed decisions and the normative "ideal" would be that there is almost no difference between those two scores.

Regarding this method from the perspective of objectivity, it is quite objective. The weakest link here is balanced information material. It is heavily dependant on the people who prepare it due to the fact that they select the information included and therefore it can suffer from the analysts' own interpretation.

Measuring values

Ronald Inglehart, Senior Research Scientist, Center for Political Studies points out that interpersonal trust plays a crucial role in democracy.

²³ Information on the method called deliberative polling as well as information about the authors of the method and experiments conducted so far can be found at the home page of the centre for deliberative democracy <http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/index.html>.

²⁴ Dahl introduced to this method has said: *Deliberative Polling is the most promising innovation in democratic practice of which I am aware. I hope that in the coming century, it will be widely adopted in the United States and other democratic countries.*

Furthermore, James Gibson²⁵, Professor of political science, Washington University in St. Louis, has argued convincingly that tolerance of out-groups is essential to democracy: civil liberties and legitimate opposition require tolerance toward groups with whom one disagrees and dislikes. Inglehart has carried out a comprehensive study²⁶ by measuring how strongly the individual-level responses to survey items like tolerance, trust, political activism, and postmaterialist values are linked with high (or low) levels of democracy²⁷. This approach is based on the assumption that the extent to which a society emphasizes a syndrome of tolerance, trust, political activism, and postmaterialist values is strong predictor of stable democracy (Inglehart).

The main conclusion from this research is that index of social capital as well as presence of values like tolerance and trust shows a strong positive correlation with the level of democracy.

CONCLUSIONS

Main conclusion that can be drawn from the attempts to evaluate democracy as mentioned above, is that they all are different and each of them is a step forward towards a better understanding of diverse political systems. At the same time none of them gives a full and completely objective measurement of all aspects of democracy.

Probably it is an utopist thought, that a single measurement system covering all aspects of democracy and equally adequate to all democratic systems can be proposed. Still a good evaluation of democracy will definitely benefit from more integrated approach of assessment.

Therefore the greatest challenge for further attempts to evaluate democracy will lie in the capability to develop an integrated approach of measurement, characterized by high degree of objectivity.

Here is a proposal of several ideas for a more integrated approach:

1. The operational definition of democracy should include both institutional factors that are vital for the existence of democratic systems, and factors describing the behavior of citizens within this framework.

Or in other words the extension of suffrage is an undeniably critical feature of democratization, but it is not enough that citizens have a right to participate. To make democracy meaningful, citizens must actually exercise that right. Therefore, indicators of voter turnout have to be included.

2. A clear distinction has to be made between the evaluation of political regimes in general and the evaluation of democracy:

If the research is aimed at evaluating the regime rather than the central question is *whether the regime can be classified as a democracy or not?* The answer to this question can be obtained

²⁵ Gibson, James. *A sober second thought: and experiment in persuading Russians to tolerance*; *American Journal of political science*, July 1998.

²⁶ Inglehart Roland *How solid is mass support for democracy – and how can we measure it?* <http://home.sandiego.edu/~mb5/inglehart.pdf>.

²⁷ To indicate levels of democracy FH ratings are used. As it is mentioned above those scores reflect institutional framework of democracy.

by using a questionnaires of political freedom and civil liberties developed by Freedom House or use methodology developed within the framework of Polity project, for example.

If the aim is to evaluate or measure democracy (“state of democracy” (IDEA), democratization (Vanhanen) or even more controversial quality of democracy (Diamond, Morlino) then the analysis of the institutional frame is not enough. Many other aspects of democracy (e.g. civil society, equality) have to be explored.

3. Participation in elections is a right and privilege of citizens of democratic states, but participation in elections is not the only way in which people can participate in the political process. Presence of dynamic civil society can play crucial role in shaping democracy. Therefore indicators describing civil society should also be included:

The score of social capital can serve as important part of the evaluation of civil society.

The formula for calculation of social capital includes indicators measuring density and participation in voluntary associations or non – governmental organizations (NGO). Those are reliable sources of objective information describing the patterns of a citizen’s behavior. At the same time unlike the attempts to evaluate democracy that commonly involve the evaluation of the institutional factors and broad background information, evaluation of NGOs lack a detailed description of institutional environment (for example, legal framework) and an evaluation of overall development and sustainability of the third sector. Therefore, as possible assessments tool the NGO sustainability index²⁸ could be included.

4. The presence of a certain set of values in the society has to be measured.
5. Assessment of accountability and responsiveness within the system has to be introduced.

One of the indicators, for example, can be how an agenda is formed and to what extend the agenda formulated by elites corresponds to the agenda of the general public.

Another indicator could be how the decisions made by political leaders correspond to what the majority of the population think about this issue²⁹.

6. The quality of public decisions has to be measured.
7. Different aspects of equality should be measured and incorporated in the evaluation system of democracy.
8. Finally, if democracy is not treated as a goal per se, but a tool to make peoples lives better, a complex research tool to measure popular support of democracy has to be measured and incorporated in to the evaluation scheme.

²⁸ For detailed information on NGO sustainability index see

http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2002/executive_summary.pdf.

²⁹ This however implies question of unpopular decisions. Does truly democratic system makes impossible for government to make the decisions which has no public support?

The main challenges in the process of developing an integrated approach will be the introduction of new variables (because a lot of aspects that should be covered are hardly quantifiable) and the weighting of newly introduced variables in the context of existing ones. It is clear that a number of hurdles will be faced in the process of developing an integrated evaluation frame. But if an integrated evaluation frame is applied to democracies it gives us a unique possibility not only to rank democracies world wide, but what is far more important, to detect the main problems contemporary democracies are facing. Hence a significant step towards improvement of quality of democracy will be made.

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Elite Integrity in Post-Totalitarian States: The Cases of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

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INTRODUCTION

Politics have developed differently in the post-communist states. After the fall of Communist dictatorship, a process taking place roughly between 1989–1995¹, it has become obvious that the “Communist bloc” is far from a bloc today. Instead regional differences show themselves clearly (cf. Kitschelt, 2003). In recent years, considerable efforts have been invested in attempts to make sense of the differences developing under post-communism (Lavigne, 1999, Nissinen, 1999, Johnson et al, 2000, King, 2001, Åslund, 2002).

The states of Central Eastern Europe, foremost Poland, Hungary, and to a lesser extent the Czech Republic and Slovakia, have developed their “political societies” (Linz and Stepan, 1996, 8), in a relatively positive direction. Romania, Bulgaria and Albania in South Eastern Europe have encountered greater problems than the former, which for the moment at least, leaves them outside the EU. Large parts of the former Soviet Union however struggle with severe difficulties in upholding even minimal criteria of democratic rule. That goes for Belarus, for the new Central Asian states, and for the Caucasus. But it is also true for strategically important countries like Ukraine and Russia itself. The Baltic States constitute exceptions in this regional setting. In particular, that has been true for Estonia,² regarded as one of the most successful states in the entire post-communist world.

The regional pattern pointed out above is however only a bird’s eye view of developments, painted in order to catch broad trends rather than precise developments. When we look closer at separate states, the cases necessarily contain many more nuances, intra-regional differences and complexities than possibly could be observed through the broad generalisations so common in

¹ Hungary and Poland were fore-runners, starting round-table negotiations in 1989. Ukraine held its first democratic elections five years later, 1994. Belarus followed suit in 1995 (Lewis, 2003, 156).

² Cf. for example the historian Kristian Gerner who considers Estonia, Slovenia, Poland and Hungary as the most democratically developed states (2003).

the literature of post-communism (cf. Eikert & Hanson, 2003, White, Batt & Lewis, 2003, Åslund, 2002, Elster, Offe & Preuss, 1998). My intention in this paper is to demonstrate the necessity of more “myopic” and historically oriented comparative case studies also of informal processes not easily quantifiable if we want to approach the task of in more profound ways explaining observed differences (cf. Mahoney & Rueschemayer, 2003). That I will do by investigating the developments of the three Baltic States from a “close-up” but still comparative approach. Even though these three may state from the bird’s eye view appear to be relative “success stories” politically and economically, in comparison to each other they still demonstrate large differences. These differences become all the more interesting to explain, since the relative similarities between the states historically, politically and culturally (in particular between Estonia and Latvia) would lead to expectations of more pronounced similarities in their post-totalitarian trajectories.

The focus here will be on the prospects for democratic consolidation as captured through the present extent of elite integrity as opposed to elite corruption (Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann, 2003). Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann consider elite integrity as the “factor” which makes democracy effective. They write that “controlling for all other effects in the model, elite integrity proves to be the only factor with a significant impact on formal democracy. This reflects that elites are the prime force in shaping formal democracy” (Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann, 2003, 366-67). I profoundly share the belief on the need to focus on the political elite in the analysis of democratisation, even though structural factors could not be neglected in large-scale comparisons. How should we best capture elite integrity in a comparative study? The most obvious aspect is definitely the level of political corruption. Elite integrity could however also – at least tentatively – be measured through the role attributed by politicians to political parties in decision-making, and also through sentiments of respect, even trust, among elite political actors in contrast to distrust and sheer contempt.³ All three indicators relate to the extent to which an autonomous political arena has been able to establish. Anders Åslund has concluded that the differences between the post-communist states in political corruption, which comes close to elite integrity, are “astounding”, and that the real drama played out during the transition has been the struggle between liberal reformers and rent-seekers of various origins (Åslund, 2002: 356). The true reformers have constituted a minority and rent-seekers in the shape of new entrepreneurs, old nomenclature, or power-maximising politicians threaten democratic consolidation and economic growth by halting legislation and reforms. I think Åslund is right. But the question still remains: why have some countries succeeded so much better in locking rent-seekers out of the political process?

For the political future of these states, elite integrity is intimately related to the prospects for democratic consolidation. This paper will show that

³ As will become obvious in the paper, the analysis of decision-making and respect are still quite incomplete due to lack of relevant data.

Estonia has the most developed elite integrity followed by Lithuania⁴ while Latvia, in stark contrast, is plagued by high levels of elite corruption.

Aim

The purpose of the paper is two-fold. First, I will try to validate the claim that there actually exists a difference between the three states which could be interpreted as a difference in elite integrity. In methodological terms, I will try to show that there exists a variance in the dependent variable. On a superficial level, that may seem a simple enough task. But anyone who has struggled with the problem of trying to get a hold of such a subtle, yet important, phenomenon as elite integrity or elite corruption knows that the closer you get the more complex it becomes. The variance does not just exist, it has to be investigated and argued for. Even though the section on elite integrity is incomplete as it now stands⁵, evidence is presented which clearly points in the direction of Latvia being a “deviant” case.

Secondly, and more important, I will present a tentative discussion on possible explanations for this difference.⁶

PREVIOUS EXPLANATIONS

Naturally, there exist previous explanations which relate more or less closely to what I here call elite integrity. Institutional legacies from the communist period are sometimes argued to have affected the level of democracy (Grzymala-Busse, 2001: 6). Countries with a more rule-of-law tradition during the Communist era should fare better, as should countries with a longer experience with sovereignty (*Anticorruption in transition*, 2000: 25). As for the Baltic States, institutional legacies do not differentiate between them in any substantial way, even considering that Latvia experienced a more harsh suppression under Communism (Misiunas & Taagepera, 1993: 146).

Differences in the transition paths are another recurrent factor in the literature (*Anticorruption in transition*, 2000:29). How the transition proceeded, its social base or lack thereof is believed to be crucial. In most CEE-countries transition took off from broadly based social movements which had formed in opposition towards the communist system. Solidarity in Poland is the most typical example (Wankel, 1992, Berglund et al, 2001, Åslund 2002). In most CIS-countries on the other hand, transition started as an initiative from above, and “even came as a *fait accompli* following the disintegration of the Soviet Union” (*Anticorruption in transition*, 2000: 29). Social organisation has remained weak in many of these countries, leading to severe consequences for the development of public accountability. Again, the explanation primarily relies on a divide between Central-Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. However, the Baltic States in a theoretically and empirically

⁴ The paper will show that I have so far collected much less empirical data on Lithuania than on the other two states. This makes of course the conclusions drawn for Lithuania more uncertain.

⁵ As indicated on the title page, this is work in progress.

⁶ In this paper, only two of these will be empirically investigated.

fascinating way find themselves in between this divide. Transition in all three countries followed the “civil society” pattern of CEE-countries, although the Baltic States formally belonged to the group of former Soviet republics. Transition paths do not differentiate between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, at least if the macro-level development is in the centre of interest.

Privatisation and the methods used in the privatisation process is a factor hard to by-pass, while at the same time its effects are quite hard to measure. Systematic research into the effects of the varying methods of privatisation on the political system is still in demand (*Anticorruption in transition*, 2000: 32). Even though problems have occurred in the Latvian privatisation of large state monopolies such as Latvian Gas, the oil transit monopoly of Ventspils Nafta, Latvenergo, and Lattelekom (Davis, 1996, Nissinen, 1999), the privatisation in all three Baltic States is in comparison to most of the former Soviet republics regarded as successful and in parity with the that of Central and Eastern Europe. Economic reforms have been slower in Latvia (and in Lithuania) but they have not been stalled.

Party strength and the extent to which the party systems congealed into being dominated by one party or being more pluralistic is analysed as an explanation of state politicization, i.e. the extracting of rents from the state by political parties (Grzymala-Busse, 2001). For the Baltic States the patterns of party strength in the first post-independence governments differentiates Lithuania rather than Latvia as one-party dominant.

The extent to which the old communists and the *nomenklatura* have continued to play a significant role in politics is a factor discussed in the literature, both descriptively and sometimes explanatory. In particular, sociologically influenced investigations on elite circulation and elite reproduction have attracted great interest (Lane, 1996a, 1996b, Steen, 1996, 1997). Comparing the Baltic States, representatives of the old Communist elite – who were quite popular – enjoyed a more secure position in Latvia after independence than in Estonia (cf. Steen, 1997). But their strongest position is found in Lithuania, where the reformed Communist party won the first independent elections by a land-slide victory, gaining their own majority in the parliament (Senn, 1995, Pettai & Kreutzer, 1999, Novagrockienė, 2001).

RADICALISM AND PLURALISM

Since elite integrity is a quality manifested at the political elite level, the explanations presented here concentrate on factors which should be of consequence for elite behaviour and elite culture in the new Baltic democracies. What happened in the Communist time, during transition and in the first founding years of democracy is of crucial importance.

The point of departure is a path dependent one. In other words, I presume that earlier developments and choices conditions later behaviour, so that we need to look not primarily at what happens presently but what happened “historically” or in periods which could be considered as formative. The processes I am interested in are mostly of an informal kind and therefore hard to both observe and trace empirically. Here, only a minor part of the interview data will be presented.

How could events and processes taking place maybe as far back as 30 years ago affect later and even present levels of elite integrity? In other words, what possible links could there be between the existence of civil society under Communism, the ideological development under transition and the behaviour of dominating political parties in the first founding years, and the norms guiding the political elite? That is indeed both an important and tricky question. I suggest here that two aspects of importance to democratic rule have been influenced by these processes. The presence of radicalism in the state-building phase is the first one. The development of early *pluralism*, in the sense of political alternatives, is the other. Both radicalism and pluralism could have been, I will argue, important in giving birth to elite integrity. But it is not necessarily so, that these aspects were fostered through the same processes.

Two Formative Periods

In the first period investigated, it is the existence of collective manifestations of opposition and an embryonic “civic community” during Communism that is in focus. The Communist time marked the three Baltic States in decisive ways, transforming them into republics of the Soviet-Union characterised by successive waves of repression followed by more loose phases during the almost fifty years that the occupation endured. Nationalist sentiments were however never completely erased, and the inter-war generation which carried with it experiences of independence and democracy was still around. The existence of an early civil society has been alluded to in the literature on post-communism as a beneficial factor in consolidation (Åslund, 2002, Gerner, 2003). Can differences between the three states in this aspect relate in any intelligible way to later differences in elite integrity? By manifestations of opposition I am not referring merely to outright dissidence⁷ but rather to the pre-democratic existence of collectives and networks organised and meeting for common purposes, which in the historical context of the time could be regarded as implicit challenges of Communist power. The assumption would then be, that a more developed civil society could promote greater ideological preparedness for democratic rule, as well and no less important, more elaborated personal ties among the present elite.

Thereafter, I shift the time focus from Communist time to the time of transition in the Baltic States. That period roughly starts in 1988 when the so called popular movements⁸ were established in all three states, and ends in 1992/93 when the first parliamentary elections as independent states were held. It has been argued (Lauristin & Vihalemm 1997, 89) that a relatively early ideological split between political forces could prove beneficial for later democratic rule since it accustomed future key political actors to harbour ideological conflict. Are there differences in the processes of ideological

⁷ The definition of dissidence and dissidents is a topic in itself which I will not go into here. Suffice it to say that commonly used ways of identifying dissidents have been persons who have been imprisoned one or several times on political grounds.

⁸ In Estonia *Rahvarinne*, in Latvia *Tautas Fronte* and in Lithuania *Sajudis*.

positioning between the three states that relates in any explicable way to later development of elite integrity?⁹

Defining Elite Integrity

How should elite integrity be understood? What I have in mind are three indicators, one behavioural, one institutional and one cultural, which are interrelated but nevertheless could be regarded as separate. Firstly, elite integrity presupposes the absence of “money politics” (Kang, 2002) or “state capture” (*Anticorruption in transition*, 2000), in the shape of too extensive ties between political parties and business which could jeopardise overall political autonomy. That is not to say that such close state-business interests necessarily are detrimental from another point of view, like economically. For example, Kang has shown that while South Korea’s economic boom took place, from 1960–1990s, money politics played a crucial role for the country, and the ties between political power and the large *chaebols* were indeed tight (2002). However, focusing on democratic consolidation, such practices were most probably detrimental.

Secondly, a high level of elite integrity could be indicated by the existence of a political system where political parties are regarded as of major importance and where formal positions coincide with genuine power. That does not mean that parties are uncontested, out of reach for critique or even admired. But political parties are the bearers of political power in representative democracies. If they are attributed only a subordinated role in political decision-making, democracy is not working well.

Thirdly, a high level of elite integrity means that there should exist a spirit of mutual respect for the political adversaries as well as for the political comrades. Trust in other political actors is probably too far-reaching to expect, but a well-working democratic system rests on the actors respecting each others political intentions. Even though parties could be superior in the political system, and not involved in (too) far-reaching money politics there may still be a lack of basic respect in the political system. Lack of respect makes the system more vulnerable to external crises.

Elite Integrity in the Baltic States

During the simultaneous processes of political and economic formation of the 1990s, the relations between the developing power centres of state and capital have congealed into quite different patterns (Keat, 2001, Schoenman, 2001, Frye, 2001, King, 2001). These variations are discernible not only between regions such as East Central Europe or the Baltic States, but appear *within* regions as well, suggesting that regionally based “legacies” and conditions do not alone suffice as explanations. At least in political science surprisingly little attention has been paid to investigating the particularities of the parallel transitions characteristic of Eastern Europe in contrast to other democratic transitions and what those particularities means for democratic development (cf. Huntington, 1990, Diamond, 1999). The development of the interaction between states and business capital in formation is one such

⁹ This hypothesis is *not* discussed empirically in this paper.

particularity, which easily could jeopardise the autonomy of a fragile political society still in the process of creation (cf. Johnson, Macmillan & Woodruff, 1999, King, 2001, Frye, 2001, Keat, 2001, Schoenman, 2001, Schröder, 1999).

Elite integrity focuses primarily on how well the political elite – individuals as well as parties – have been able to establish and preserve integrity towards the business and financial elite. What the World Bank defines as state capture, in contrast to administrative corruption directed at influencing implementation practices, includes the illicit infiltration by powerful economic actors in to the very heart of legislation, regulation and decision-making. The selling of parliamentary votes and presidential decrees to private interests is among the practices falling under state capture, as is the wide-spread practice of illegal party financing by economically powerful interests. The key thing to observe is that political corruption in the form of state capture is endemic rather than incidental in many of the post-communist countries, and that it involves both individual politicians and political parties.

In the discussion on post-communism, the concept of state capture has attracted much interest. State capture and elite integrity could be seen as concepts trying to capture approximately the same phenomena. I will use the somewhat broader term of elite integrity since it indicates not only illegal but also normatively non-ethical behaviour, or behaviour which weakens the position of the political sphere.

How has elite integrity developed in the three Baltic States? Although a number of indicators could, and should, be used, they all seem to point in a similar direction. In the World Bank's ranking on state capture¹⁰ among post-communist countries, both Estonia and Lithuania rank fairly low together with Central Eastern European states like Hungary, Slovenia and Poland. Latvia on the other hand, demonstrates a high level of state capture, almost on parity with Russia (*Anticorruption in transition*, 2000). The state capture index is supported by the results from a number of other sources measuring corruption, governance and rule of law. A governance index shows that Estonia has 78.9 (out of a best 100) on control of corruption and 77.6 on rule of law. Latvia's figures are respectively 55.9 and 65.9. Lithuania 65.2 and 62.9 (<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/>). Transparency International, the non-governmental organisation monitoring perceptions of corruption (i.e. both administrative and political) for many years have ranked Estonia as the least corrupt of the three, with Lithuania rather close behind while the gap to Latvia is substantially larger.¹¹ The extensive economic ties between political parties and domestic entrepreneurs and banks are a recurrent theme in most accounts of the Latvian political system. Regardless of whether it is

¹⁰ The World Bank's analysis is based on a large-scale survey among large and medium-sized enterprises in most of the post-communist countries. The level of state capture is measured through an index including six dimensions: parliamentary votes, presidential office, political parties, commercial courts, criminal courts and central banks (*Anticorruption in transition*, 2000).

¹¹ On a ranking scale where 10 is the best and 1 is the worst, in 2003 Estonia had a score of 5.5, Lithuania 4.7 and Latvia 3.8. The figures for 2002 was Estonia (5.6), Lithuania (4.8) while Latvia scored 3.8. For access to Transparency International, see the homepage www.transparency.org/cpi.

politicians, journalists, or academic analysts that are consulted, the picture remains basically the same.¹²

Measurements of any kind are sensitive and should be interpreted with care. That is not least true for corruption indexes of the kind just presented. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is for example explicitly based on *perceptions* among the general public and risk analysts, which in the worst case could reflect the fact that corruption is more openly discussed in certain countries than in others rather than that the levels of actual corruption is higher. Therefore, it is the similar tendency demonstrated in the different investigations just mentioned that should be given most consideration.

The three Baltic States have developed into multi-party systems after independence in 1991. Freedom House considers the elections held as free and fair, and political rights as respected.¹³ All three states have introduced a threshold for entering parliament (usually five percent of the votes), but nevertheless the number of political parties running for parliament have at times been large. In 2002, Freedom House for example stated that 36 political parties were active in Lithuania. In Estonia however the effective number of parties declined between 1992–2000, while that was not the case in Latvia and Lithuania (Lewis, 2003, 158). Furthermore, the Estonian party system is considered as the best one among the three in preparing properly for the important elections to the EU-parliament coming up in June 2004, where the Baltic States participate for the first time as new EU-members (*Baltic Times*, March 18–24, 2004).

Judging from available evidence, the genuine importance attributed to parties in the process of formulating and deciding on policies also varies between the states. Starting with Estonia, valuable data collected by the comparatively oriented DEMSTAR research program¹⁴ showed that among present and former ministers, in 2002 more than half (54 percent) considered political parties to be very important or important in government decision-making, including parliamentary factions of political parties. In addition, the picture of Estonian high level politics is one of a system where formal position goes hand in hand with actual power: “Furthermore, informal decision-makers seem not to be as important as formal decision-makers. There is thus a high degree of accordance between important formal decision-makers and most important for a with regard to decision-making of relevance for the respondents” (Drengsgaard & Hansen, 2003, 30).

¹² Of all the Latvian top politicians I have interviewed, almost everybody agrees that the economical ties are extensive, and that they are a problem.

¹³ Estonia and Latvia have however a large contingent of non-citizens of mainly Russian origin which lack the right to vote. Furthermore, Estonia has a substantial number of Russian citizens. That is primarily persons who have been denied an Estonian citizenship and therefore aimed for a Russian one instead. From a perspective of democratic inclusion, the situation with large numbers of permanent non-citizens is problematic.

¹⁴ DEMSTAR stands for “Democracy, the State, and Administrative Reforms”. It is a research programme hosted by Århus University in Denmark, focused on the political and administrative development in the post-communist states from a comparative perspective. The project has conducted a large number of elite questionnaires and interviews, reported in various reports. Among them are findings of particular relevance to the Baltic States.

Moving on to Latvia, there is partly a similar and partly deviating picture than meets the eye. Again drawing on the data collected in the DEMSTAR-project through interviews of former and present Latvian ministers, the role of political parties in decision-making is considered as rather important, although importance has been declining over time. 55 percent of the ministers after 1995 consider political parties important in decision-making, as compared to 71 percent of those who were ministers before 1995 (Norgaard & Hansen, 2000, 36–37). But there are interesting differences between the parties which can be seen through the centrality of the Latvia's Way party. "81 percent of the ministers who are members of Latvian Way say that the party is important, while only 53 percent of the ministers from other parties believe that the party is important" (Norgaard & Hansen, 2000, 36). When it comes to a match between power and formal position, it seems clear that informal actors outside the state play a larger role in Latvian politics, in particular in the area of economy and finance. Several ministers, and increasingly so after 1995, mention that informal structures outside the state play a crucial role in decision-making (Norgaard & Hansen, 2000, 36). In Latvia, it is not unusual that the parties are described as primarily front figures for different economic interests, either individuals or financial groups.¹⁵ Even active politicians themselves tend to describe things in this way.

In the case of Lithuania, the available data of a comparative kind is particularly less adequate, which limits the analysis considerably at the present moment.¹⁶ But it seems clear that political parties structure decision-making in a genuine way, with the two political forces of social-democrats and conservatives dominating. "Viable political parties, including members of the opposition, function at all levels of the government" writes Freedom House in a country report (2003, 375).

The third aspect of elite integrity focuses on crucial aspects of elite political culture which could affect political decision-making and political life generally, namely the levels of trust and respect.¹⁷

Comparing again Estonia and Latvia, there is a clear difference. According to DEMSTAR's surveys, present and former ministers in Estonia demonstrate a greater trust in each other which is shown by their willingness to share information between ministries and departments (Drengsgaard & Hansen, 2003). In Latvia, the situation is characterised by the opposite. "On the thorny issue of misuse of position, corruption – or whatever synonyms we can invent – the respondents revealed a deep mistrust in their fellow ministers" (Nörgaard & Hansen, 2000, 40). The more recent political developments in Latvia, where the prime minister Einars Repse and his coalition government was forced to step down due to one of the coalition parties turning against Repse, further indicates that relations between top political actors are strained. Most of the many interviews I myself have made

¹⁵ Interviews with Dainis Auers, political scientist, and Karlis Streips, journalist and political analyst, October 2003, Riga.

¹⁶ DEMSTAR is preparing reports also on Lithuania, both in their "State of the State"-series and in their "Understanding Politics" – series. However, none of these are yet published.

¹⁷ It should again be indicated that the not enough data is so far available, particularly in the Lithuanian case.

over the last couple of years in Latvia points to a political culture of suspicion and outright contempt on the elite level.

Lithuania experiences presently a large political crisis, involving the (former) president Rolandas Paksas, who was just kicked out of office the other week.

FOSTERING RADICALISM: CIVIL SOCIETY UNDER COMMUNISM

The Baltic States were not born the day that independence was re-established, and democracy began to function. As research on the post-communist transitions has advanced, it has become all the more clear that the past matters. By the past is meant not only the more recent Communist period, but also the historical past of centuries gone-by as well as the inter-war period. Suggestions have been made that researchers need to look much more thoroughly into these periods (cf. Kitschelt, 2003). But suffice it for the time being to take a closer look at the Communist time in the Baltic States, with the particular focus on developments which could prove to be of later importance to foster elite integrity among the political elite.

It becomes all the more obvious, that the Communist dictatorship was far from the same everywhere. In a path-breaking study, Grzymala-Busse has for example shown how the differences between the Communist party organisations, their recruitment and level of flexibility in Hungary, Poland, and former Czechoslovakia contribute to explain their varying capacity to regenerate (2002). Kitschelt *et al* have equally convincingly related how the type of Communist regime affected the formation and structuring of the democratic party systems (1999). Through studies such as these, the often used but seldom operationalised concept of “communist legacy” is defined and investigated, and the mechanisms by which it influences is clearly worked out and argued for. Here, I will look into the crucial aspect of the existence of opposition networks and collective mobilisation during Communism in the Baltic States.

In contrast to Central Eastern Europe, the room for outright dissidence and opposition was more limited in the Baltic States.¹⁸ They were parts of the Soviet Union, and furthermore republics where Moscow could expect resistance. Political opposition for that reason, and also since the question of nationalism had been of great importance for the still young Baltic States at the time of Soviet incorporation, often became an opposition dressed in cultural terms, focusing on issues of national heritage like literature, monuments – and of course language. In Catholic Lithuania, the Church furthermore channelled sentiments of opposition (cf. Lane, 2003). Opposition thus took place within the Communist system, and was played out in a sort of tacit negotiation with the authorities, primarily the KGB.

A fact which however may have facilitated the formation of informal networks in the Baltic States. Estonia with 1,5 million, Latvia with 2,5 and Lithuania with 3, 5 million inhabitants constitute societies where intellectuals

¹⁸ Until the beginning of the 1950s, “forest brothers” still operated in the woods, resisting the Soviet army with weapons in hand (cf. Laar, 1992).

and potential opposition groups rather easily would get in contact with each other. Nevertheless, the differences between the Baltic States in the extent to which informal opposition networks were formed and collective mobilisation took place still is large. Estonia stands out among the three as exceptional in the way that it clearly organised networks with in cultural and educational aims.

Estonia

When the literature points to the role played by the civil society in the Baltic States in bringing an end to the Soviet empire, the environmental protests that started in 1986/87 is often taken as a point of departure (Hedlund & Gerner, 1993, Misiunas & Taagepera, 1993).

I have however been able to trace endeavours of implicit, but not outspoken, opposition to the beginning of the 1970s, which even in a comparative post-communist perspective indeed seems quite early (cf. Ruutsoo, 2002, 110–116). In 1974, Moscow launched a “Book lovers campaign” with the intention of increasing reading and improving reading habits in the republics. This act by the authorities provided, quite unexpectedly, the opportunity for a small group of high schools friends from Tartu, to start a club in the capital Tallinn with the name of “Tõru” (english: acorn). These friends were representatives of what Aareleid-Tart calls the generation of the “thaw”, “who matured politically in a liberalized ideological and cultural environment begun by Khrushchev and ended by the invasion of Czechoslovakia” (Aareleid-Tart, 2000, 108). Officially presented as a “Book lovers society”, club Tõru started to meet regularly every month, with strict regulations of admission (only trusted friends were admitted, proposed by at least two other members) to keep the number of members down and to minimise the constant risk of infiltration by the KGB. The name of “Tõru” was symbolically important, as the acorn was taken as the sign of something which would be planted and eventually grow into a mighty oak – the symbol of Estonian nationalism. It is interesting to note that the physical setting of the club’s meeting was quite important. It was to be a fireside club, as fire-places were rare in Estonia and to the founders symbolised informality, honesty – and a British life-style as seen in films. The solution was to meet in a lodge outside Tallinn.

In the club’s regular meetings, Estonian culture, heritage and history was brought back to life. In other words, outright political activities in the sense of ideological discussions or criticism of the Communist rule were never practised. That was too dangerous, so the club balanced on the edge of the allowed by focusing on nationalism, in itself in the officially all-union Soviet context a quite sensitive issue.

Besides the surprisingly early establishment of the Club¹⁹, and its roots in a very small network of close friends, the endurance of the Club Tõru is striking. The Club continued to meet regularly (10–12 times a year) until 1986, that is for nearly 12 years. Thereby, it may perhaps be more correct to

¹⁹ Earlier literature has acknowledged the presence of a civil society in Estonia starting somewhere around 1980 (Gerner, 2003, 160, Ruutsoo, 2002), but the important activities of Club Tõru seem to have gone unnoticed.

see the Club as an institution in Communist Estonia, even though its character was strictly informal. The Club started out from a small network, but through its regular and long-lasting activities it furthermore created a larger social network, tied together by the half-opposition of the Club, the ideas of an Estonian independence and the personal connections which grew over the years. Several of the persons active in Club Tõru have later become leading political actors in independent Estonia, like the founder Trivimi Velliste.

Club Tõru represents a crucial manifestation of collective Estonian mobilisation under Communism.²⁰

In Tallinn a few years later, in 1978, a home-town movement (*Kodulinn*) among high school students started under the leadership of Tiina Mägi. Basically, as with Club Tõru, this was not a movement inspired by outright political ambitions, but centred on ideas of preserving the home-town, i.e. Tallinn, learning about its history and its buildings. Practical work also was part of the picture, for example cleaning church-yards.²¹ But even though the purpose was not to protest Communist rule, the aim of cultural preservation and historic engagement still implied political challenge to the norm of non-nationalism. Young high school student Mart Laar, 18 years old, came in contact with the home-town movement as a student in Tallinn. In 1978, the same Mart Laar started as a student of history in Tartu University. At the time, the history department was considered as the most “oppositional” at the university, and several of the teachers were not even members of the Communist party. The history class of 1979, which studied together for four years and graduated in 1983, became an informal opposition network under the leadership of three prominent young students: Mart Laar, Lauri Vahtre and Heiki Valk.²² All were representatives of another political generation in Estonia, namely the “Brezhnev generation” who was formed politically during the years of “economic stagnation and increased ideological control in 1969–85” (Aareleid-Tart, 2000, 108).

Mart Laar brought to Tartu with him the ideas from Tallinn of the *Kodulinn*-movement and soon set up a movement (but not an organisation with members, that was associated with Communist practice) of similar kind in Tartu, simply called the *Noor Tartu* (english: Young Tartu). *Noor Tartu* was a home-town movement, involved with assignments such as cleaning up old cemeteries, thereby doing service for the community as well as preserving Estonian history. The movement renovated a cellar on the *Ülikooli* Street in central Tartu, and met there regularly for a couple of years.

²⁰ The information about the Club Tõru emanates from one of the three founders, Trivime Velliste, interviewed in Tallinn, 2004-02-20. Trivime Velliste is today a member of the Estonian Parliament, *Riigikogu*, and was also one of the initiators of the Estonian Heritage Societies.

²¹ Interviews with Heiki Valk, Tartu, 2004-02-19, Lauri Vahtre, Tallinn, 2004-01-29.

²² Interviews with Mart Laar, 2001-05-02, Heiki, Valk, 2004-02-19, Lauri Vahtre, 2004-01-29. See also Laar, 2002, 20-22. Mart Laar has played a crucial political role in independent Estonia, as its first prime minister 1992–1994, as prime minister 2000-2002 and as member of parliament. Lauri Vahtre has been member of parliament for ten years while Heiki Valk never aspired for a political career but became professor of archeology in Tartu University.

The group consisted of around 30 people, the core of which were the history class of 1978. The motivations for some of the participants were clearly political, even though the Soviet power had not yet begun to crumble and *perestroika* lay years ahead. “Already in 1979 the group was much targeted against the Komsomol: there were democratic procedures and elections and huge discussions of democracy.”²³ For others, *Noor Tartu* did not represent an attempt to resist Communist power but primarily a spirit of community and the opportunity to come together for some shared purpose.²⁴

The *Noor Tartu*-movement is another fascinating example of an early but quite formalised expression of grass-root activity outside the realms of the Soviet state, with the aim of challenging Moscow’s power through emphasis on historical and cultural activities. Emerging out of the 1960s generation, it was a broad network oriented towards the future, even though its ideological roots were planted in the soil of the late 19th century. In retrospect, since the organisation started to meet in 1979, the individuals that made up the core leadership had almost ten years of preparation behind them when democratisation and liberalisation started in 1988. *Noor Tartu* was closed by the KGB in the beginning of 1984.

The *Noor Tartu*-group was the fore-runner of the *Estonian Heritage Society*, founded in 1986, where also Trivimi Velliste from the *Club Tõru* played a leading role. This organisation, built up around a large number of local societies fulfilling the purpose that had been launched by the home-town movements, has been compared in some respects to a political party and played an important role in the nationalist movement (Misiunas & Taagepera, 1993: 314).²⁵ It is easy to understand the links between the still more informal networks of *Tõru*, *Kodulinn* and *Noor Tartu*, since the *Heritage Society* also rested on ideas of finding the Estonian historical roots in the 19th century national awakening in Estonia. Officially cultural, the organisation still entertained political ambitions of independence.

Tartu University has played a particular role in the growth of the nationalist-minded Estonian opposition, and it is no exaggeration to say that the university’s role as an independent intellectual centre was formative for the Estonian political transition. Besides the history department, the department of journalism under the leadership of the liberal-minded Communist Marju Lauristin, consisted of a cradle of free thought. A crucial informal seminar started to meet in 1988. The *Tartu-seminar* came to serve as a profound learning experience for those who participated. A group of journalism students, among them Jüri Luik and Indrek Kannik, who later became ministers in the first government, decided to arrange this informal and alternative seminar where social science literature, copied from the West was discussed and debated. The feasibility of liberalism and social democracy for future Estonian development was discussed along with economic theory – although nobody was a trained economist.²⁶ “Social science literature was copied, about various roads to

²³ Interview Mart Laar, Tallinn 2001-05-02. Rünno Vissak, 2004-02-19 and also Indrek Tarand, 2004-01-29.

²⁴ Interviews with former participants of the *Noor Tartu*-movement, Kärt Jenes-Kapp, 2004-02-22, Eero Medijainen, 2004-02-19, Madis Kanabik, 2004-02-19.

²⁵ Interview Marju Lauristin, 2001-03-01.

²⁶ Interview Indrek Kannik, 2004-02-20.

developing society; social-democratic way and liberal way. There was a lot of economic theory but not much economic practice”.²⁷ While the activities had at first been focused on rebuilding a national consciousness, especially in *Noor Tartu*, the *Tartu-seminar* took a step further by outlining academic discussions around political alternatives for an independent Estonia.

Finally, there existed one more arena connected to university life where social ties important for subsequent political formation were knit: the *Estonian Student Association*. Restored in 1988, the Student Association seems to have returned to traditions inspired by the German student movement that dominated the student corporations during the first republic in the 1920s and 30s. The corporations focused mostly on the codes of conduct and the social obligations towards other members, the codes of honours within the EUS are strict and the mutual obligations towards fellow members demanding. Ethics played a leading role as well as nationalism, and “if corrupted you immediately got expelled from the organisation: socially among the student friends a very terrible fate”.²⁸ The core group of people active in the *Noor Tartu*, the *Building Troops*, the *Estonian Heritage Society* and the *Tartu-seminar* were also to be found in the *Estonian Student Association*.

When the *Rahvarinne* (Popular Front) was founded in 1988 by the reformed Communist Edgar Savisaar, Estonia had a prolonged history of informal mobilisation behind her. Rapidly, the popular front-organisation was paralleled by a nationalistically oriented and more orthodox “movement”, gathering together many of the individuals from the 1970s and 1980s who had been participating in the various networks.

Latvia and Lithuania

As I stated above, Estonia is an exceptional case in the Baltics, maybe also in the post-communist context, with respect to surprisingly organised “cultural opposition” that in retrospect can be traced back to the early 1970s. Latvia and Lithuania have, as far as I have been able to find out through the many interviews made, no equivalent to these informal networks and collective organisation. That is not to say that there weren’t any dissidents, protest activities or underground activities during the Communist time. In Lithuania, the “Catholic Chronicles” were for example distributed during the 1970s, and individual dissidents like Viktoras Petkus, of Catholic conviction, certainly played an important role (Krickus, 1997, 37).²⁹ But except for the Romuva movement, there are few signs of the type of organised activities which occurred in Estonia. In that sense, the establishment of the *Sajudis*, (the Popular Front in Lithuania), even if partly orchestrated by Moscow, marked something quite new. The philosophy department at Vilnius University played a crucial role in the formation of *Sajudis*, in that several of the core group of founders had a background in philosophy. That goes for Alvyrdas Juozaitis, Bronislavas Kuzmickas, and Genzelis.³⁰ In this respect, a

²⁷ Interview Marju Lauristin, Uppsala 2001-03-01.

²⁸ Interview Mart Laar, Tallinn 2001-05-02.

²⁹ Also interview with Viktoras Petkus, Vilnius, 2004-03-08.

³⁰ Interviews Juozaitis, 2004-03-09, Genzelis, 2004-03-09, Kuzmickas, 2004-03-10.

prominent university group came also in Lithuania to play a certain role, not in the liberalisation as in Estonia, but in the democratisation. In both Lithuania and Estonia it was humanities – history, journalism, philosophy – that constituted the platform.

In Latvia, a more organised club for the protection of the environment was established as late as 1986, by biologists, among them the former prime minister Indulis Emsis (Thomson, 1992, 175).³¹

It was called *Vides Aizsardzibas Klubs* (VAK) (Trapans, 1991, 28). There may have existed a more informal network preceding the VAK in time, as the journalist Clare Thomson writes in 1992 that: “the core of the Green Movement was in existence at least a decade ago when a small group of artists and intellectuals used to meet secretly in private flats where they discussed forbidden topics such as Latvian heritage and the restoration of churches and other historical monuments which Stalin had destroyed” (Thomson, 1992, 175). In my own interviews, I have however not been able to confirm the existence of the network described by Thomson. In contrast to the situation in Lithuania, the Latvian Communist regime was comparatively harsh, which can contribute to the explanation of the lack of a more organised opposition before the mid-1980s. When *Tautas Fronte* was founded in 1988, as in Lithuania it marked the era of something new. In contrast to both Lithuania and Estonia, individuals educated in humanities did not play such a crucial role in Latvia. The popular front engaged broadly speaking the intelligentsia – journalists, artists, writers – as well as more technically skilled natural scientists.

In short, with respect to the extent to which civil society could mobilise under Communism, Estonia differs from the other two Baltic States. Even though the relatively long tradition of networking definitely mattered in Estonia’s later democratisation, the difference identified here does not shed enough light over the three cases taken together, since Lithuania today-despite its lack of civil society under Communism – still has developed fairly well with respect to elite integrity. Let us proceed to the second phase.

INSTITUTIONALISING PLURALISM: IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONING DURING THE TRANSITION

In Estonia, a dualistic structure emerged quickly after 1988, juxtaposing a more pragmatic (Popular Front) and a more orthodox (Citizen Committees, Estonian Congress) way to independence. The pragmatic movement of *Rahvarinne* did not enrol the nationalists but reform-minded communists like Edgar Savisaar, Marju Lauristin and others. It advocated less quick development towards independence, more smooth relations to Russia, while the orthodox side argued for less compromises and not least for a restoration of the former Estonian republic from 1940 by excluding immigrants arriving after that date from automatic citizenship.

In Lithuania, the *Sjudis* internally began to divide into a more pragmatic and more orthodox faction during the time in Supreme Council (1990–92). In the 1990s elections, *Sjudis* received a majority of the votes and hence dominated the Supreme Council. But opposition within the *Sjudis*

³¹ Interview Indulis Emsis, 2003-10-20.

against Vytautas Landsbergis started to develop on the grounds that Landsbergis and his group was being too orthodox in their demands of immediate Lithuanian independence and in their “stubborn reactions” to Russian demands. A more pragmatic and compromise-willing attitude developed, embodied in the leader of the reformed Communist party, Algirdas Brauzauskas. In 1991, an informal organisation, *Forum for the future*, was formed where leading *Sajudis* activists such as A. Juosaitis, K. Prunskiene and P. Genzelis took part. It is possible to regard *Forum for the future* as the final step to a division of *Sajudis*, since it mainly worked for a pragmatic solution to the conflict between Lithuania and Russia. In the parliamentary elections in 1992, *Forum for the future* did not run as a political party but chose instead to support the reformed Communist party, LDDP and Brauzaskas, against *Sajudis* and Landsbergis.³² Thereby it is clear that a dualistic structure³³ developed in Lithuania between 1990–1992, creating a clear division at first between pragmatists (Brauzaskas, Forum for the future) and “radicals” (Landsbergis), developing into a division between left and right.

The political situation in Latvia developed differently from the one in Estonia and Lithuania. The Popular Front played a crucial role in the transition, initially resembling the *Sajudis* in gathering together both reform-minded Communists, opposition, and intellectuals. In a parallel to Estonia, a Latvian National Independence Party was created in 1988, but it never developed into the same clearly rival structure to the Popular Front as was the case in Estonia. During the years of Supreme Council (1990–1993), when Popular Front dominated, embryos of political parties started to form, including the party which later came to dominate Latvian politics, Latvia’s Way. However, there was never any polarisation between pragmatism and radicalism, since pragmatism was the clear winner from the start, and the “nationalists” too weak or too few. Ivans Godmanis, prime minister during the crucial transition years between 1990–1993, describes his idea of Latvia’s relation to Russia in terms of “finlandisation”: a clearly pragmatic view.³⁴ As will be seen, the Latvia’s Way party definitely embodied the pragmatic tradition, not least in its ideas of integrating society and creating an umbrella party much in the tradition of Popular Front. In short, political pluralism never developed in Latvia as there was no strong enough radical force to challenge the pragmatists of Popular Front and later Latvia’s Way. In this respect, the difference between Estonia and Lithuania on the one hand, and Latvia on the other, is quite substantial.

Conclusions

To understand the present post-communist political landscape it is crucial to grasp the historical circumstances surrounding the transition from totalitarianism to democracy. The argument that the informal political formation affected the future development of politicians, party systems and

³² Interviews Juozaitis, 2004-03-09, Genzelis, 2004-03-09.

³³ The left-right division in Lithuanian politics after independence is often referred to as striking. See Ramonaitė, 2003.

³⁴ Interview Godmanis, 2003-10-24.

political institutions, is not only valid in these three cases but of relevance in a larger post-communist context.

Still incomplete, the analysis so far points in a certain direction which could provide clues as to why there is such a different development in the three Baltic States as respect to the level of elite integrity. Initially, I suggested that the presence of radicalism and political pluralism in the formative phases of transition and early democratic years could promote the development of later elite integrity. Starting by radicalism it contributes a certain level of idealism to the political system that sheer pragmatism can not provide. Pragmatism is often seen as the fabric which makes political decision-making smooth. But in the situation of institutional uncertainty, I believe that a certain amount of “orthodoxy” replaces norms with moral. The orthodoxy in the case of the Baltic States often evolved around the issue of relations to Russia (Lithuania) or relations to the Russian minority (Latvia and Estonia).

In the case of Estonia, radicalism had roots “way back”, in the informal and more formal networks established around nationalist and cultural purposes. Hence, when the “orthodox” alternative was formed in opposition to the Popular Front in the end of the 1980s, it had a quite firm base, both ideologically and personally. In the case of Lithuania, radicalism also played a part in the late pre-democratic and early democratic years, with respect to the way how to deal with the harsh Russian threats and the issue of Lithuanian independence. But in contrast to Estonia, it was an orthodoxy much less profound. Latvia, finally, is the state where pragmatism dominated, even though nationalist “alternatives” were established. That may have contributed to less of political conviction being imbued in the system, i.e. less of political idealism. *Noor Tartu*, the *Tartu-seminar*, and the *Heritage Society* in Estonia and the philosophers of Vilnius University founding *Sajudis* were rooted in an academic environment dominated by university and student organisations. Tartu was an intellectual centre in Estonia, partly in opposition to the system. That created an atmosphere of openness and of respect for academic knowledge that characterised the Estonian “learning environment”. In *Club 21* the more or less openly declared ambition was instrumental; to create a “winning party” in the elections to come. A pragmatic, instrumental atmosphere rather than an intellectual one prevailed.

That being said, it also clear is that political pluralism during transition developed least in Latvia, and considerably more in both Estonia and particularly in Lithuania. In Lithuania, a left-right division emerged early (already in the elections in 1992), rooted in the pragmatist-orthodox split. In Estonia, the orthodox line competed against Popular Front in elections of 1992, but still the division was less clear than in Lithuania.

To sum up, Estonia’s more profound radicalism, formed during years of collective mobilisation, was compensated by Lithuania’s more clear ideological division and political pluralism. In Latvia, on the other hand, neither radicalism nor ideological pluralism developed under transition or in the founding years of democracy. That, in combination with a lack of elite separation which I discuss elsewhere (Bennich-Björkman, 2005,

forthcoming), may have opened up for a development in direction of larger elite corruption.

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The Impact of Partial Interests on Policy Making in Latvia: Challenges for a New Democracy and a Policy Proposal

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These remarks aim at suggesting some research questions and some possible hypotheses, which seem to become increasingly relevant in Latvia and some other Eastern European countries that recently joined the European Union. At the end of this text, there are also some suggestions for how the influence of partial interests (or lobbyists) could be regulated in the *Saeima*, Latvia's parliament.

The issue of how to treat partial interests in a democracy is as old as the democracy itself. At times partial interests have been treated as evil (see, for example, Rousseau's *Social Contract*), at times (and nowadays predominantly so) as an indispensable part of the democratic governance.

To be sure partial interests have been active in lobbying throughout the last decade or so. Moreover lobbying in the *Saeima* is an almost unregulated field, which to a large extent remains hidden from the view of the average citizen. Those groups or individuals who are interested in a certain legislative issue cooperate with separate deputies, with whom they happen to have informal ties or previous contacts. This lobbying may take the form of meeting the deputy at the Saeima, inviting the deputy to a private party, hunting or other leisure activities, of bribery and legal or illegal funding of the political parties.¹

As the result the electorate is not informed about the way various groups or individuals influence deputies who have pledged to work for the general public. Moreover, the possibilities for attracting the deputy's interest may be determined by the existence of personal connections or, in a worst case, readiness to give bribes or illegal donations for political campaigns. Under such conditions it is easy to exclude other groups who also have legitimate interest in a certain legislative issue.² Even though there is no systematic

¹ Kalniņš, V. *Lobbying between Civil Rights and Corruption*. Latvian Institute of International Affairs, the Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS. Draft to be published in 2004/2005.

² Ibid.

comparative research on this subject, one may assume that similar trends are present also in other relatively new democracies in Europe.

However, with Latvia and a number of other countries who joined the European Union, I would like to suggest a few points, which may make the issue of partial interests and their impact on policy making more problematic.³ These points are by no means results from any rigorous research but rather suggestions for future enquiries. Moreover some of them are related to accession to the EU while others stem from the internal development of the society.

- Ever since the development of the modern nation state, the remoteness of policy making from the average citizen has been viewed as a point of concern for democracy. The remoteness problem has been addressed by the mechanism of representation but this is hardly a perfect remedy. With joining the European Union, Latvia and other countries have entered a political unit, which largely exceeds the size of any European nation state (save for Russia). This means that for a citizen getting where decisions are made requires increasingly more resources.
- The EU membership contributes also to a greater complexity of public policies. While public policies are becoming ever more complex with or without the European Union, the EU membership does appear to be one of a number of factors, which make policies more complex. The simple fact that the EU regulates a number of sectors in a way that was not known for the new member states before the start of the accession process testifies to this tendency.
- During the last five years or so, certain groups of people in Latvia have greatly enhanced their capacities to influence public policies through knowledge and mastering of advocacy techniques (businesses, experts, professional lobbyists, a few NGOs). Latvia has seen the professionalization of a number of NGOs, policy analysis organizations, lobbying companies but this professionalization has greatly increased the capacity to influence policies of just a minor segment of the society.
- Since the capacity to influence policy making is largely influenced by one's access to, for example, economic resources, economic inequality breeds the potential for some partial interests to overrule equal consideration, which should be given to all interests. With accession to the European Union, one should be aware of the risks that EU membership may pose in terms of increased inequality. This may happen if people with greater resources will be better prepared to benefit from the EU membership than people with more restricted resources.

Meantime some of the older trends, which are associated with partial interests, linger on. These are, for example, influence on policies with the help

³ Here I expect a number of objections based on examples where Latvia's accession to the EU has strongly promoted democratic practices. I fully agree that accession to the EU has greatly contributed to the development of democracy in Latvia and other acceding countries. However, the point that I make here is that the EU provides not only opportunities but also new challenges for democracy in the new member states.

of corruption and influence on policies with the help of personal networks.⁴ These and other tendencies should be studied in-depth to verify the actual impact thereof.

Some of the immediate problems resulting from the uncontrolled influence of partial interests on policy making are as follows: unequal access to decision making by various groups, which leads to the unequal consideration of their interests and consequently distortion of some basic democratic principles. Insufficient transparency alienates the broader public from policy making. Unethical/illegitimate interactions distort policy making in a number of ways again particularly by giving over proportionate weight to some interests on the account of others. These and related problems are by no means new to democratic countries or for the European Union for that matter.⁵

It is not the task of these remarks to suggest well-defined solutions to the above tendencies and problems. However, some policy analysis, which I have carried out on the issue of lobbying in Latvia, suggests that possible activities might be aimed in the following directions.

First is the regulation of lobbying, including codes of ethics for policy makers and statutory transparency requirements. Second is the promotion of citizen-minded behaviour among the broader population. Popular participation is often viewed as a potent element for a well-developed democracy even though many have difficulties in answering how such participation is to be effectively enhanced. The third approach might be called bounded pluralism, which would depart from the "free market" of group influence towards the adoption of certain affirmative practices for less advantaged groups. This would include scanning of the social terrain when developing policies in order to invite for deliberation and consideration all those groups whose interests are touched upon by the policy in mind. Thus it would be possible to involve groups, which are otherwise too resource-poor or too passive to exert pressure without an outside catalyst.

At the conclusion of these remarks, I will present one policy proposal for how partial interests (or lobbying) might be addressed at the *Saeima*. These recommendations are based on the assumption that, for regulating lobbying in Latvia, an unwieldy system of vast restrictions and prohibitions should not be introduced because such system would become a huge extra task for a regulatory institution, which, as it would be known beforehand, would be unable to deal with this task.⁶ Instead – to enhance transparency – only a few focused amendments to the *Saeima* Rules of Procedure should be made, namely:

- The introduction of the register of lobbyists;
- The duty for lobbyists to disclose information (e.g. paying clients, issues of interest) about themselves upon registration;

⁴ For some comparative data on corruption, see: Gray, C., Hellman, J., Ryterman, R. *Anticorruption in Transition 2: Corruption in Enterprise-State Interactions in Europe and Central Asia 1999-2002*. The World Bank, 2004.

⁵ For an account of problems, which are associated with lobbying in European institutions, see: Greenwood J. *Representing Interests in the European Union*. Macmillan Press ltd, 1997, 80, 81.

⁶ Kalniņš, V. *Lobbying between Civil Rights and Corruption*. Latvian Institute of International Affairs, the Centre for Public Policy PROVIDUS. Draft to be published in 2004/2005.

- The duty to reflect in the minutes of the parliamentary committee meetings the summaries or transcripts of all the presentations made by the invited persons and the following debates.
- The duty for members of parliament to provide explanatory notes when they submit proposed amendments to draft laws.

In brief, registration, disclosure, transparency of committees, explanatory notes to the proposals are the essence of these recommendations. In addition to the amended rules of procedure, a code of ethics should be adopted for the members of parliament. Such code might contain the following provisions:

- A duty to disclose the persons or organisations, who have prepared an opinion or provided information that has essentially helped the deputy to formulate his opinion.
- The duty to verify, as far as it is possible, whether the information, used as the basis for making decisions, is true.
- The prohibition to enter into oral or written agreements with third persons that impose upon the deputies commitments with regard to their duties as a deputy or a public official.
- The duty to avoid such situations that might create an impression that the deputy has a conflict of interests.
- The duty when submitting proposals, speaking at the plenary session of the *Saeima* or the meeting of a *Saeima* committee, and voting, to declare if the relevant issue is influencing or might influence the personal interests of this deputy, his relatives or business partners. Such a declaration may be omitted if the influence on the personal interests stems from facts of common knowledge or facts already earlier disclosed in a public official's declaration.⁷

It is fully clear that the adoption of a certain regulatory framework cannot possibly remedy difficulties in the policy making that stem largely from the structure of society as well as from culture and earlier institutional arrangements. Meantime perhaps through such new institutional initiatives it is possible to direct policy making closer to some of the ideals of democratic process. Apart from these immediate policy recommendations, the role of partial interests in countries with relatively new democracies now functioning within the larger political unit (the European Union) remains to be studied in-depth.

⁷ These recommendations are based upon the draft Code of Ethics of the Saeima Deputies, which was drafted by the Centre for Public Policy „PROVIDUS”, commissioned by the Saeima Mandate and Submissions Committee. 21.06.2004. Unpublished document.

3. Social Actors, Visions and Strategies for the Future

European Enlargement and Strategies for Enhancing the Working Environment in the Baltic States

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INTRODUCTION: THE POLITICS OF REGULATION OF THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT

This paper explores the 'politics of regulation' in the context of the new member states of Central and East Europe. It examines the prospects for the transposed European social *aquis*, especially in the area of occupational health and safety, or 'working environment'. Working environment is a key determinant of overall quality of life in employment and a preoccupation of European Union's current Lisbon strategy with respect to building a competitive economy in Europe. In this context, various regulatory models were proposed, at the European level, which attempt to develop more differentiated, responsive, or reflexive regulatory approaches to issues of European workplace safety and health regulation (Knill and Lenschow, 2003). While these models may have some merit in the context of advanced regulatory systems, their appropriateness for the Central and East European new entrants to the European Union, especially, but not exclusively in the Baltic region, is more questionable. It is argued that a number of significant constraints exist in the Baltic new member states, which may compromise the application of innovative regulatory strategies. In particular, the advocacy by the European Commission of so-called 'soft law' may be inappropriate in the area of social policy, working environment. This may have implications for the future quality of working life, both in the Baltic new member states, and in the newly enlarged Europe. The appropriateness of the regulatory model of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in the new member state context is also subject to critical examination. There is an absence of a supporting domestic architecture of the relationships in industrial workplace capable of sustaining participative social dialogue on safety and health at work, especially at enterprise level. Thus, regulatory approaches as the OMC model, predicated on new emerging forms of self-regulatory strategy, may not provide the most effective means of securing health and safety standards in the new member states in general, but also specifically in the Baltic States where social partners and trade unions are weakly developed.

THE BALTIC STATES: A DETERIORATED WORKING ENVIRONMENT?

The massive economic changes that have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe since the early 1990s, have been well rehearsed many times over. These have included, the dissolution of state enterprises, emergent foreign and joint ownership patterns, as well as the massive growth of domestic small and medium entrepreneurial concerns. The transition process to market economies has been accompanied by privatization, bankruptcies, restructuring, and the growth of unemployment, underemployment and a radical 'flexibilisation' of the workforce (Rainnie, Smith and Swain, 2002; Cazes and Nesporova, 2003). All of these factors have created an imbalance in power between employers and employees at the workplace, which inevitably influences safety and health.

The evidence pertaining to the working environment in the new member states, takes both qualitative and quantitative forms. Neither forms of evidence can be said to be entirely adequate. Nevertheless, some striking differences are apparent when we examine the admittedly incomplete evidence. Fatalities at work, however, is a relatively robust indicator, less subject to variable underreporting than serious injuries or occupational illness. Comparing accession country averages with the EU in Table 1, only in Slovakia, is there an observable reported decline in fatality rates. Elsewhere, fatal accident rates appear to be fluctuating, rising moderately or, as in the case of Latvia and Lithuania, increasing significantly. For the new member states as a whole, using the 1998 base year, by 2002 fatality rates can be seen diverging from EU averages. Data from the International Labour Organisation (2002) would tend to support this picture. According to the most recent figures, the incidence rate of work-related fatalities in the ten accession countries (not including Cyprus), is almost three times higher than in the EU-15, at 9.6 per 100,000 persons in employment, compared to 3.4 per 100,000 in the EU-15.

At a more subjective level, in terms of employee perceptions of the quality of working life, previous survey evidence from the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions would suggest that there are also significant differences between the existing member states and the then acceding and candidate countries (ACCs) (Paoli and Parent-Thirion, 2003, p. 13). Data from the survey examine perceptions of whether or not work undertaken is harmful to an individual's health. In the ACCs, 40% reported that their work negatively affected their health or safety. This can be compared to 27% in the EU. The problems most often reported were, in descending order, overall fatigue (41%), backache (34%), stress (28%) and muscular pains' (Paoli and Parent-Thirion, 2003, p. 67). The findings would seem to reflect the much higher overall intensity of work experienced by employees in the period since the introduction of the market economy.

Table 1

Accidents at work; fatal - Index of the number of fatal accidents at work per 100,000 in employment (1998=100). EU 15 and CEE Accession State 8 compared.*

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
EU(15)	115	109	106	100	100	85	82	80	79
Czech Republic	110	103	112	116	100	76	96	96	87
Estonia	Na	120	102	114	100	79	56	78	81
Hungary	106	117	101	97	100	107	95	71	109
Lithuania	Na	98	102	83	100	91	78	105	115
Latvia	Na	Na	Na	Na	100	115	90	140	123
Poland	Na	Na	Na	109	100	83	96	92	89
Slovenia	90	118	118	130	100	88	83	105	97
Slovakia	Na	96	109	81	100	89	71	71	65
CEE (8)	:	:	:	:	100	85	81	94	95

* Source EuroStat, Cronos database.

So far as working conditions in the Baltic countries are concerned, all three have adopted national legislation incorporating the main EU directives on occupational health and safety, with the possible partial exception of certain transitional arrangements in Latvia. A preliminary overview, on the basis of individual country profiles, reveals certain commonalities which aggregated figures conceal. Thus, there appears to be evidence of particularly uncongenial working environments in the Baltic region, suggesting on a subjective attitudinal level, at least, that the social climate of the workplace is deeply problematic. Estonia at 77.9%, Lithuania at 76.0% and Latvia at 78.4% score highest when it comes to *disagreeing* with the statement that ‘work does not affect my health’, compared to a candidate country average of 69.0% (European Foundation, 2002). Levels of reported fatigue are significant in all three Baltic countries. Lithuanian (45%) and Estonian employees (46%) report harmful fatigue levels that are roughly twice as high as the EU average (23%), exceeded only by Bulgaria (51%). Only Latvia (39%) approximates to the overall EU averages (41%) (Paoli and Parent-Thirion, 2003, p. 67). For work-related skin, vision, sleep and allergy problems, Estonia comes highest, again followed by Lithuania. For reported work-related anxiety, Estonia (19.4%) is followed by Latvia (12.3%) and Lithuania (12.2%), (again roughly comparable to Bulgaria at 13.3%). Lithuanian figures regarding work-related anxiety are almost three times the average reported level of 4.5% for the ACCs as a whole. Again, for “trauma” (emotional distress) resulting from workplace abuse, Baltic States register three to nearly five times average levels (2.2%) for the ACCs, with Estonia at 6.6%, Lithuania at 10.5% and Latvia at 9.3% of respondents (European Foundation, 2002). This seemingly anomalous situation, suggesting an especially adverse working environment in the Baltic

countries as a group, is supported by other independent social survey evidence (Antila and Ylostalo, 2002; European Commission, 2003c, p. 35). This, in turn, raises the issue of what are the appropriate strategies of regulatory intervention in bringing about a harmonisation of working conditions and broader European integration.

‘SOFT LAW’ AND THE OPEN METHOD OF CO-ORDINATION

In recent years, at the European level, there has been a reduction in momentum in the policies of social protection, in favour of promoting growth and competitiveness, and consequently, a downplaying of the ‘social dimension’ of European integration. For example, one of the key policy goals of the Lisbon European Council of March 2000, was ‘to reduce the administrative burden of business’ (European Council, 2000). This assertion of business-led priorities may be seen to be in conflict with stated concerns to enhance the quality of work life. Impacts in the area of workplace safety and health have been largely neglected, however, with respect to the new member states. In terms of the broader integration of Europe, it is suggested that existing tensions between the desire to create a favourable regulatory climate for business, and the preservation and enhancement of labour standards, may be further intensified by the arrival of the new member states.

This inherent tension in EU working environment legislation arises from ‘two dominant but not necessarily compatible policy objectives – integration of markets, on the one hand, and improved levels of social protection for workers’ on the other (Baldwin and Daintith, 1992, p. 1) While the market integration objective seeks to avoid ‘barriers to competitions’, and focuses ‘on the need to create a level playing field’, the social protection objective implies the ‘improvement of working conditions as a valuable end in itself’. The Framework Directive on health and safety at work ‘pays heed to both market integrating and social protection rationales’ (Baldwin and Daintith, 1992, p. 2; European Commission, 1989). The original Treaty articles, relating to working environment (EC Article 118A), and on market integration (EC Article 100A), make this an ‘area of potential and actual conflict between a trend towards raising standards of protection for workers and a trend towards deregulation’ (Nielsen and Szyszczak, p. 181 cited at p. 2 in Baldwin and Daintith, 1992). Inherent problems of harmonisation in European health and safety law are, therefore, nothing new (Baldwin, 1992). The Framework Directive creates space for variation, and even variability of means, if not of goals in health and safety laws within the Community (Baldwin and Cave, 1999 p. 161). However, implicit in the Directive, is a required level of provision, which will provide a limitation on the individual states securing competitive advantages through lowering standards of health and safety provision.

Today, such tensions are again being played out with renewed force in the context of the latest round of enlargement. At a regulatory policy level, the Commission has embarked upon a programme of ‘updating’ and ‘simplifying’ the *acquis*, under the banner of ‘Better regulation’ (European Commission, 2003k; See also Smismans, 2003). Whether such regulatory review creates conditions for more effective and rationalised regulatory structures, or

whether it serves to promote future *de*-regulation, has been a matter of continuing debate in Member States (Burrows and Woolfson, 2002). At Commission level, existing legislative areas where 'potential problems' are identified, include health and safety at work. A detailed scrutiny of EU Directives for their simplification potential is being implemented' (European Commission, 2003k pp. 8, 9). The Commission has suggested that 'where the legislative approach may no longer be appropriate', it could be replaced 'by more efficient, flexible and proportionate instruments (for example, framework Directives, new approach regulation or "softer" regulatory alternatives)' (European Commission, 2003 k, p. 8). Under the rubric of 'reflexive law', the intention appears to be to seek for 'reflexive' strategies in the process of harmonisation. In its more optimistic construction, this can be seen as offering a pathway to avoid outright deregulation in the sphere of health and safety regulation (Wilthagen, 1994; Barnard and Deakin, 2000). It has been suggested that 'soft law' offers a flexible alternative strategy, in that, it 'allows the Community institutions to stimulate European integration by building on, or around, existing treaty objectives without directly creating legal obligations. They are a kind of informal law making "by exhortation" (Kenner, 1999, p. 58).

With regard to occupational safety and health and its specific framing within wider industrial relations, 'informal' reflexive law induces 'second order' effects on the part of social actors. Here reflexive law underpins and encourages 'autonomous processes of adjustment' and 'confers rule making-powers to self-regulatory processes' (Barnard and Deakin, 2000, p. 340). Basically, it offers a fallback position, which provides incentives for more powerful parties to enter into negotiations and find arrangements which suit local conditions. The approach has been termed 'reflexive harmonisation' (Barnard and Deakin, 2000, pp. 340–341). As a programme of regulatory renewal, this has re-ignited a long-standing debate between pro-regulatory and anti-regulatory proponents over the appropriate form of regulatory models within Europe, especially with respect to general issues of social protection and employment (Rhodes, 1995; Trubek and Trubek, 2003; Mosher and Trubek, 2003).

Regulatory policy initiatives, following their adoption at the Lisbon summit of 2000, take this debate to a new level. The so-called Open Method of Coordination (OMC) has been endorsed as 'an important tool of EU governance' in achieving social and employment policy goals (European Council 2000; European Commission, 2003 l). Central here, are notions of 'benchmarking' and 'best practice', seen as a way of securing a flexible and decentralised approach to policy creation and implementation (European Council 2000, para. 37). The principle of 'subsidiarity' embodied in the OMC, also implies devolving policy inputs to regional and local levels, thus spreading policy engagement horizontally outwards to the social partners and civil society representatives. These actors will be 'actively involved', in the policy process 'using variable forms of partnership' (European Council 2000, para. 38). It is significant that 'a special appeal' is made, in this specific context, to a 'companies' corporate sense of social responsibility regarding best practices', *inter alia*, on such matters as work organisation,

equal opportunities and social inclusion, and in providing a working environment (quality of work) above the minimum levels (European Council 2000, para. 39; See also Konkolewsky, 2003, p. 1). While the proposed 'self-regulatory' discourse may be coherent in itself, the question remains as to how appropriate an approach based on soft law is, in respect of the current regulatory environment in the new member states. In particular, the viability of any regulatory strategy predicated on the active involvement of employer and employee representatives in social dialogue must be open to question.

BEST PRACTICE IN THE CONTEXT OF WEAK SOCIAL DIALOGUE

One of the signal changes accompanying the collapse of communism has been the decline of centralised trade unions in Central and Eastern Europe (Pollert, 2000; Crowley and Ost, 2001; European Foundation, 2002). Membership figures have radically declined as the element of compulsion has been removed (Crowley and Ost, 2001). This is not to say that trade unions have disappeared altogether, or that the legacy of their identification with the previous system, has been impossible to overcome. Some reports would suggest that there are even the first signs of a resurgent trade union activism, as well as growing underlying support for trade unionism among the working population in the new member states (SIC, 2001; Woolfson and Beck, 2004; Antila and Ylostalo, 2004). However, autonomous collective bargaining between employers and employees, as commonly understood in Western liberal democracies, especially in the new private sector economy, has largely not materialised in the post-communist era (Pollert, 2000; European Foundation, 2002b).

At the national policy level, new member state considerations have limited resonance. Uneven policy attempts, in anticipation of accession, were made to promote the active involvement of employees in safety, health, and social dialogue at workplace level. For example, by extending representational rights to employees in line with European Directives (Woolfson and Beck, 2003; European Commission, 2001; European Commission, 2002d; Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybė, 2003). However, crucial supports in social dialogue mechanisms are often lacking both at managerial and workforce levels. Yet, without 'embeddedness' in a viable framework of workplace or sectoral social dialogue, the necessary basis for self-regulatory 'preventative safety cultures' is unlikely to secure itself. So far, there is little indication that employers in the new member accession states, on other than on a very limited scale, are willing to adopt 'best practice' models, or take on board wider concerns about corporate social responsibility towards employee involvement in the working environment. Seen from the standpoint of the individual employer, 'good health and safety' are not necessarily viewed as 'good business'. Accordingly, the prospect for sustainable harmonisation in the area of the working environment in the new member states, particularly in the deteriorated context of the Baltic region, based on self-regulatory models derived from soft-law perspectives, looks uncertain.

CONCLUSION

Our conclusion is simple therefore: Regulatory strategies should be tailored to realities that exist on the ground. The introduction of 'soft law' and OMC may open the door to further neo-liberal *de*-regulation in safety and health at work. Soft law, far from being complementary to existing EU law, or a means of extending its effectiveness, is no more than 'deregulation in disguise'. It has to be understood that as part of the neo-liberal project of globalisation of which *de*-regulation is a key component. Capital seeks to create for itself the loosest and most sympathetic regulatory environment for business to operate in, free of so-called burdens and restrictions on what it can, or cannot do. Not much is new here. For the EU, and indeed for many member states, desperate for foreign investment (and this certainly applies in the Baltic States), this can seem not only like an attractive option, but a policy necessity in today's world for which there is no feasible alternative. Seen in this light, soft law is part of privatisation of the regulatory functions of the state projected onto the European stage. It is the realisation of a political project to reduce the authority of states, their ability to provide protection for their citizens, and in consequence, to provide a counterbalance to market forces.

However, to those who argue for the inevitability of surrender to globalising imperatives there is another set of policy choices. Such choices would reaffirm the need for effective Community-level and domestic regulation to ensure approximate *acquis* implementation. They would imply appropriate enforcement powers to stimulate 'compliance-seeking behaviour' by all member state and domestic actors. They might even entail consideration of the imposition of commensurate fines and perhaps even the greater criminalisation of health and safety offences. Above all, these alternative policy choices would re-affirm the setting of secure labour standards through the re-invigoration of the European social model and the international standards of labour protection embodied in ILO conventions. Finally, and ultimately decisive, they would mandate the empowerment of workers within the occupational health and safety process in a future that was not 'negotiated' solely in the interests of neo-liberal economic objectives.

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Tolerance and Future*

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TOLERANCE IN LATVIA: BETWEEN ‘OLD’ NEIGHBOURS AND TOWARD NEWCOMERS

We can determine two major areas for study in relation to ethnic tolerance and the integration of Latvia’s society:

- 1) Ethnic or (perhaps more precisely) linguistic splits between the Latvian and the Russian speaking parts of the country’s society (see Table 1), the result of which is the emergence of two more or less separate segments in society, with parallel establishment of stereotypes and ethnic biases;
- 2) Attitudes and ideas about immigrants and foreigners who are long-term residents of Latvia and who have a different appearance and/or religion. The need to study attitudes and biases vis-à-vis immigrants with a different appearance and/or religion is dictated by the fact that several immigrants have spoken to the mass media about negative treatment that is the result of their skin colour (it has to be noted, however, that there has been no officially registered incident of physical violence that is based on ethnic or racist biases).

Table 1

Ethnic Composition of Latvia's Population (1935–2003), %

	1935	1959	1979	1989	1993	2003
Latvians	77.0	62.0	53.7	52.0	53.5	58.5
Russians	8.8	26.6	32.8	34.0	33.5	29.0
Other	14.2	11.4	13.5	14.0	13.0	12.5

Sources: The Ethnic Situation in Latvia. Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Riga, 1992; Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, 2002.

* The publication is based on the study “*Ethnic Tolerance and Integration of the Latvian Society*”, which was carried out by the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences with the financial support of the European Union (PHARE LE01.01.01. /2-6/25).

The research methodology comprises focus group discussions and representative surveys of Latvian and Russian speaking residents, as well as in-depth interviews with foreigners and ethnic minorities who are visually different from most residents of Latvia.

TOLERANCE AND SENSE OF BEING THREATENED

The results of the research tell us that the sense of being threatened is one of the primary sources for ethnic tensions and intolerance. Latvians in particular tend to feel a sense of being threatened, because they still do not feel that they are a majority in their titular nation. On the basis of a concept that has been drafted by Estonian sociologists, as well as by drawing certain comparisons between the societal development and ethnic constitution of Latvia and Estonia, we can say that Latvians feel that they are a threatened majority.¹

The sense of being threatened is exacerbated among ethnic Latvians by a sense of psychological security, by low self-esteem and by a lack of self-confidence. These, too, are factors which are a part of the Soviet heritage. When we analyse the attitudes and social identity specifics of ethnic Latvians, we see that their attitudes, when compared to those of Russian speaking residents of Latvia, are often more similar to positions that are taken by minorities. For instance, Latvians have a more definitive identification with their own ethnic group than Russians do. Latvians are more closed off, they have fewer contacts with representatives of other nationalities, and they feel more threatened.

The Russian speaking segment of the Latvian population, in turn, possesses certain characteristics that are typical of a majority – openness toward others and contacts with representatives of other nationalities.²

Latvia's Russians and Russian speakers, by comparison, cannot be seen as a typical minority. First of all, they constitute a significant segment of the country's society (for 37% of Latvia's residents, Russian is the mother tongue³). Second, the Russian language is self-sufficient in most areas of life in Latvia, while the Latvian language is not necessarily needed. Third, the Russian speakers in Latvia have become accustomed to the privileges which the Russian language enjoyed while the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics still existed.

Competition among groups in society and the sense of being threatened – these factors have very much to do with the attitudes of Latvians and non-Latvians, not least in the desire of the two groups to isolate themselves from one another. Data from the quantitative survey tell us that Latvians are less open than non-Latvians.

ATTITUDES TOWARD EDUCATION REFORMS IN MINORITY SCHOOLS AND TOWARD RUSSIAN AS A SECOND STATE LANGUAGE

Latvians and non-Latvians have very different views when asked about education reforms in minority schools and about the idea that Russian should be a second state language in Latvia. It is clear that attitudes toward language

¹ Kalmus, V. Is Interethnic Integration Possible in Estonia? Ethno-Political Discourse of Two Ethnic Groups. *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 14(6). London: Sage Publications, 2003.

² Hewstone, M. Intergroup Bias (Social Prejudice). *Annual Review of Psychology*, 2002.

³ This information comes from a comparative study of the language use, language knowledge and language environments of the residents of Latvia between 1996–2004. Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, data from 2003.

policy and education policy are closely interrelated. In this case, too, differing views among Latvians and non-Latvians serve to increase the risk of mutual intolerance.

It has to be noted, that since the restoration of Latvia’s independence, Latvia has had language policies which have limited the privileges and importance in public life of the once dominant Russian language. This means that in accordance with Blumer’s concept,⁴ Russian speakers now feel threatened in relation to their “natural” rights.

The fact that the two largest groups in Latvia’s society are competing in the area of language hierarchy means that this is one of the basic conflicts between Latvian speaking and Russian speaking residents in Latvia, because both sides feel that they are threatened.

A significant majority of Latvians support the idea that the Russian language should be limited in Latvia (77% oppose the institution of Russian as a second state language, and 76% support a transfer on 1 September 2004 to a system where a majority of classes in non-Latvian high schools are taught in Latvian), while the Russian speaking part of society has quite the opposite beliefs (84% support the institution of Russian as a second state language, and 68% do not support the aforementioned education reforms).

Most Latvians refuse to accept the idea that Russian could be a second state language in Latvia. Older people have the harshest views about this matter. Correspondingly, a majority of non-Latvians support the introduction of Russian as a second state language, and again – this position is supported most enthusiastically by older respondents (see Figure 1).




Fig. 1. Attitudes toward Russian as a second state language in Latvia

⁴ Blumer, H. Race prejudice as a sense of group position. *Pacific Sociological Review*, 1. 1958.

As can be seen in Figure 2, most Latvians support education reforms, while most non-Latvians do not. Among Latvians, education reforms are more supported by older people, while among non-Latvians, elderly people most often do not support the reforms.

Given that education is a key resource in societies, this conflict of views with respect to reforms can be seen as a significant prerequisite for increased ethnic intolerance among Latvians and non-Latvians alike.




Fig. 2. Attitudes toward education reforms in minority schools

There are widespread negative views in Latvia in relation to the question of minority education. Fully 70% of Latvians agree with the statement “I get angry when I think about the fact that Russian speakers are opposing education in Latvian”. Among non-Latvians, correspondingly, 58% admit that they are angry when “thinking about the fact that Latvians are forcing us to learn in Latvian”.

Among Latvians, the older the person, the more likely he or she is to be angry over the fact that Russians oppose ongoing reforms which are aimed at ensuring that larger proportions of classes in Latvia’s schools are taught in Latvian, as opposed to Russian. Among non-Latvians, people in Riga and Latgale expressed anger about the reforms most often.

The ethnic self-isolation index

The goal in studying ethnic self-isolation is to find out which groups in society tend to be more isolated and how this influences attitudes vis-à-vis other ethnic groups.⁵ An ethnic self-isolation

⁵ As was noted previously, statements about ethnic groups include one statement concerning attitudes toward a religious group – Muslims. That was included in the study as a “control group”, with researchers expecting that attitudes toward people of the Islamic faith might be the most negative in comparison to other groups that were considered.

index⁶ was established by collecting responses to six questions (Figure 3). The results of the survey allow us to conclude that Latvians tend to be cautious in terms of standing aside from other ethnic groups – more so than is the case among non-Latvians.

As can be seen in Figure 3, 48% of surveyed Latvians demonstrated more or less specific signs of ethnic self-isolation. Among non-Latvians, the figure was only 17% (Figure 3).




Fig. 3. The ethnic self-isolation index

The greatest differences between the views of Latvians and those of non-Latvians were found in relation to three statements: “I would not want too many people from other countries to live in Latvia”, “People of different nationalities, with different traditions and habits, cannot really be true residents of Latvia, even if they have lived here for many years”, and “It would be better if people of each nationality were to live in their own country” (see Figure 4).

The cautious attitude of Latvians toward immigrants and the idea that people of each nationality should live in their own country – this can largely be attributed to the sense of being threatened and to the consequences of Soviet-era migration policies insofar as the ethnic composition of Latvia and the attitudes of Latvians are concerned.

⁶ The ethnic self-isolation index is based on six statements:
 1. You cannot fully trust anyone of a different nationality.
 2. The views and traditions of Muslims may be dangerous to Latvia’s residents.
 3. It is not really possible to understand people of other nationalities.
 4. I would not want too many people from other countries to live in Latvia.
 5. People of different nationalities, with different traditions and habits, cannot really be true residents of Latvia, even if they have lived here for many years.
 6. It would be better if people of each nationality were to live in their own country.
 In selecting questions for the index, researchers took into account the dispersion of each indication, the interactive correlation of the indications, and the correlation of each indication with the summed value of the index.
 The Kronbach’s alpha coefficient: 0.65 (this figure represents a measurement of the extent to which the included statements are related to one another, with the scale running from 0 to 1 – the higher the number, the greater the relationship).
 Depending on the answers given by respondents, four groups of respondents were established at various levels, according to the stated level of isolation.




Fig. 4. Statements which characterise ethnic self-isolation

Tolerance measurements tell us that both among Latvians and among non-Latvians, we find a high level of ethnic tolerance when we consider it on the basis of general considerations. For example, almost all Latvians and non-Latvians agree with this statement: “We must respect the national culture, religion and traditions of all of Latvia’s residents, even when these are very much different from our own” – 93% of Latvians and 97% of non-Latvians.

Generally speaking, we can conclude that there are no differences in the way that Latvians and non-Latvians evaluate general statements about various cultures, traditions and individuals from different cultures.

There are, however, differences between Latvians and non-Latvians when they are provided with statements that have to do with a more concrete situation or more concrete action. The greatest differences between Latvians and non-Latvians were found in relation to the following three statements: “The state should support the preservation of the culture and traditions of various nationalities in Latvia”, “People of various nationalities should live separately”, and “I like the fact that there are so many people of various nationalities and cultures who live in Latvia”.

In describing the differences of opinion, it has to be said that non-Latvians are more likely to accept the presence of people of various

nationalities in Latvia, and they are less likely to support the idea that people of various nationalities should live separately. Similarly, they are more likely than Latvians to believe that the state should support the preservation of the culture and traditions of various nationalities in Latvia.

There are several theories, which can help in explaining the more distinct ethnic self-isolation among Latvians, first and foremost, the conflict theory that has been proposed by Esses.⁷ The theory states that potentially competitive external groups are viewed very cautiously and perhaps even are rejected if it appears that they might increase competition among groups. In other words, this represents a desire to avoid conflict. Second, the situation can be explained through the frequency of contacts with people of other nationalities – Latvians have had such contacts less frequently than is the case among non-Latvians (see Figure 5). The ethnic contact index⁸ allows us to understand the extent to which respondents have had experience in contacting with people of other nationalities.




Fig. 5. The contact index

⁷ Esses V. M. Intergroup competition and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration: an instrumental model of group conflict. *Journal of Social Issues*. Winter 1998.

⁸ Here we bring together answers to six questions (the answers to the last two questions were recorded as dichotomous indications in line with the respondent's nationality – are there or are there not people of other nationalities among the respondent's friends and family members):

1. Do you personally know a Muslim?
 2. Do you personally know an African?
 3. Do you personally know a Roma person?
 4. Have you ever spent a longer period of time (at least one month) outside of Latvia?
 5. People of which nationalities are members of your family (i.e., among those people with whom you actually live) – Latvians, Russians, others?
 6. People of which nationalities are amongst your friends – Latvians, Russians, others?
- The Kronbach's alpha coefficient: 0.43.

These results confirm the contact hypothesis of G. Allport⁹ – that the frequency of contacts with people of other nationalities is of great importance in establishing more open attitudes vis-à-vis people from those nationalities. Allport's hypothesis states that contacts with representatives of a different (ethnic) group can reduce biases toward that group, because such contacts enable the development of more appropriate ideas, the discovery of similar views and values, and, by extension, more positive attitudes and relationships. At the same time, however, positive influence emerges only from those contact situations which satisfy certain prerequisites – equal status between those who are involved in the situation, common goals, inter-group co-operation instead of competition, as well as normative support (authorities, leaders, laws, traditions). In other words, it is important that the contact experience be positive in nature.

Many studies have confirmed Allport's contact hypothesis,¹⁰ not only in regard to ethnic groups (even in those cases when contacts are rare and not too intensive – e. g., looking at the distance between a respondent's home and the home of the nearest neighbour from a different ethnic group), but also with respect to other groups that sometimes are rebuffed – the elderly, gay and lesbian people, people with mental disorders, as well as differently disabled people.

TOLERANCE TOWARD PEOPLE FROM ETHNIC GROUPS WHO ARE VISUALLY DIFFERENT FROM MOST RESIDENTS OF LATVIA

Tolerance and social distance

When we seek to find out the attitudes of Latvians and non-Latvians toward people of various nationalities and to study the social distance between the specific target group and representatives of other nationalities, we turn to the Bogardus scale. The use of this scale requires respondents to state the level of social distance that they would like to preserve between themselves and the stated ethnic group (Figure 6).

Negative thinking among Latvians and non-Latvians is focused on the same ethnic and religious groups. These are groups that are uncommon in Latvia (Africans, Chinese people). Second, these are groups which are described negatively in the mass media (Muslims and terrorism, Kurds and other refugees and asylum seekers in Latvia). Third, there have been negative stereotypes about some groups (people from the Caucasus region, for instance) which have existed in Latvia ever since Soviet times.

The responses of Latvians and non-Latvians differ very little, and the differences are not statistically significant. Regarding people from the region of the Caucasus Mountains, Chinese, Africans, Kurds and Muslims most

⁹ Allport, G. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge: Addison-Wesley, 1954/1979.

¹⁰ See, e. g., Verkuyten, M. and Masson K. 'New Racism', Self-Esteem and Ethnic Relations Among Minority and Majority Youth in the Netherlands. *Social Behaviour and Personality*. 1995. No. 23(2), pp. 137–154. See also Bratt, C. Contact and Attitudes Between Ethnic Groups: A Survey-Based Study of Adolescents in Norway. *Acta Sociologica*. 2002. No. 45(2), pp. 107–126.

respondents would like to have contacts with such people only as tourists, and some argue that they shouldn't be allowed to enter the country at all.

This Figure 6 shows only definite responses.




Fig. 6. The level at which respondents would like to have contacts with people of different nationalities

Tolerance toward that which is different

When it comes to tolerance toward that which is different, there are no major differences between Latvians and non-Latvians – 38% of the former and 37% of the latter say that they would not like to be neighbours with gay or lesbian

people. A total of 59% of Latvians and 55% of non-Latvians have a negative attitude toward non-traditional religious organisations such as the Hare Krishna organisation or the Jehovah's Witnesses, among others (see Figure 7).

The fact that more than one-third of Latvians and non-Latvians were ready to say that they would not like their neighbours to be gay or people with AIDS indicates that biases and intolerance in Latvia remain fairly common. We can take a look at the same issue in other European countries, too, however,¹¹ and see that only the people of Scandinavia have a higher level of tolerance toward the aforementioned groups. In other countries, intolerance and bigotry are usually not less common than in Latvia.

The results of the study, in general, allow us to conclude that those who are more open toward other ethnic groups also tend to be more tolerant toward other groups such as homosexuals, representatives of non-traditional religions, etc.

'With which kinds of people would you not like to be neighbours?'




Fig. 7. Undesirable neighbours

¹¹ Loek, H. *The European Values Study: A Third Wave*. Tilburg University, 2001.

Tolerance and the frequency of social contacts

When it comes to ethnic biases between Latvians and Russians and among Latvia's traditional ethnic groups on the one hand and visually different people from other nationalities on the other hand, we can confirm Allport's inter-group contact hypothesis.

In those cases when representatives of different nationalities have close emotional links (friendship or marriage, for instance), attitudes toward contacts are much more positive, because contacts with representatives of other ethnic groups serve to reduce biases toward that group (providing, of course, that the contacts are positive).

Tolerance and dogmatism

In the literature (Rokeach M.), dogmatic thinking is considered as one of the factors which affects human tolerance, because dogmatic people tend to deny differing views and to lack an ability to think in pluralistic terms.¹² The results of this study indicate that many Latvians and non-Latvians view the world in black-and-white terms, living under the conviction that there can be only one truth. Only one-fourth or so of Latvians and non-Latvians are open and free in their thinking. This means that the thinking of both groups can serve as a risk factor in the dissemination of ethnic stereotypes and of ethnic intolerance.

The views of ethnic groups about the future model for Latvia's society

People in Latvia tend to have a considerably different idea about the country's future model than one would think on the basis of major elements of the public space – the mass media and the activities of politicians. Most Latvians (84%) and non-Latvians (82%) support this statement: *“It must be ensured that Latvia is unified, that there is one community in society with people from different nationalities”*. Only 6% of Latvians and 9% of non-Latvians support the opposite idea: *“It would be OK if there were two different communities in Latvia's society, with Latvians and Russian speakers living more or less separately and with few contacts between themselves”*.

Political tolerance

Tolerance measurements tell us that both among Latvians and among non-Latvians, we find a high level of ethnic tolerance when we consider it on the basis of general considerations. Once we look at concrete situations or actions in the area of ethnic issues, however, we find differences in the views of Latvians and non-Latvians. These differences can be explained though the fact that ethnic self-isolation is fairly common among Latvians. It is also true that non-Latvians are more open to contacts with people from other ethnic groups.

¹² Gibson, J. L. and Duch R. M. Anti-Semitic Attitudes in the Mass Public: Estimates and Explanations Based on a Survey of the Moscow Oblast. *Public Opinion Quarterly*. 1992. Vol. 56, pp. 1–28.

Once the matter turns to the inflow of people from other countries into Latvia – whether rich or poor people – Latvians and non-Latvians stand shoulder-to-shoulder against the “others” – people from less developed countries, as well as foreigners who want to buy land in Latvia.

In this case we can say that all of Latvia’s residents are concerned about the possibility that benefits for another group might cause losses to their own group (LeVine & Campbell, 1972).¹³

In general attitudes and behaviour of people in Latvia sometimes have racist properties, which are often hidden – instead of distinctly negative behaviour, it is manifested through an absence of positive and favourable attitudes. Help is not given in an unclear situation, negative information about an ethnic group is accepted unquestioningly.

Also of importance here is the so-called “new racism”,¹⁴ defined as the view that the culture and lifestyle of certain nationalities are too different to be merged into one’s own society. Latvia has been a multi-ethnic country for centuries, but many people still believe that a culturally homogenous society is the norm and the ideal, which should be pursued. This hinders the acceptance of people of other nationalities, particularly if they are visually different and have expressed a desire to live in Latvia.

Future scenarios

We can identify two possible tendencies regarding the level of tolerance in the society:

- According to Allport’s inter-group contact hypothesis, having more contacts with other ethnic groups, people become more tolerant toward them. As a result of the globalization the level of contacts between people of different nationalities is increasing and important preconditions for tolerant attitudes are created. Therefore we can assume that the level of tolerance will rise.
- On the other hand, when proportion of immigrants increases, majority of the population becomes more and more intolerant (the sense of being threatened among majority increases) (Kalmus, V., 2003)¹⁵.

Thomas Pettigrew (1998)¹⁶ calls for an evaluation and specification of those factors that are necessary in a contact situation so that positive attitudes emerge, separating these from those factors which simply facilitate the process. Pettigrew feels that more attention must be devoted to the process in which attitudes emerge – how and why attitudes change. He believes that this process includes four individual sub-processes – getting information about a different group, a change in behaviour, the establishment of emotional links, and then a change in attitude toward one’s own group.

¹³ LeVine, R. A., Campbell, D. T. *Ethnocentrism: Theories of conflict, ethnic attitudes, and group behaviour*. New York: Wiley, 1972.

¹⁴ See Barker, M. *The New Racism*. London: Junction Books, 1981.

¹⁵ Kalmus, V. Is Interethnic Integration Possible in Estonia? *Ethno-Political Discourse of Two Ethnic Groups. Discourse & Society*, Vol. 14(6). London: Sage Publications, 2003.

¹⁶ Pettigrew, T. F. Intergroup Contact Theory. *Annual Review of Psychology*. 1998. No. 49, pp. 65–85.

Ilgstošo bezdarbnieku sociālās iekļaušanas perspektīvas

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EIROPAS SAVIENĪBAS NODARBINĀTĪBAS POLITIKAS STRATĒGIJA UN ILGSTOŠAIS BEZDARBS

2000. gada 23. un 24. martā Lisabonas Eiropas Padome noteica stratēģiju – desmit gadu laikā padarīt ES ekonomiku par viskonkurētspējīgāko un dinamiskāko uz zināšanām balstīto pasaules ekonomiku, kas demonstrē ilgtspējīgu ekonomisko attīstību, sniedz labākas darba iespējas, nodrošina lielāku sociālo saliedētību. Atbilstoši mērķim izvirzītie uzdevumi iedalīti trīs blokos, no kuriem viens paredz sociālā modeļa modernizēšanu, ieguldot lielākas investīcijas cilvēkresursos un veidojot labklājības valsti.¹ Pārmaiņu nepieciešamība tiek pamatota ar augsto bezdarba līmeni (9–10%), lielu nenodarbināto īpatsvaru sabiedrībā, nabadzību un iedzīvotāju novecošanu. Trīs no četrām minētajām problēmām saistītas ar ilgstošo bezdarbnieku skaita samazināšanas nepieciešamību.

Bezdarba samazināšana un nodarbinātības līmeņa paaugstināšana tiek uzsvērti kā svarīgākie ES sociālās politikas uzdevumi, un tās mērķis – pilnīga nodarbinātība, ko paredzēts sasniegt 2010. gadā. Pilnīga nodarbinātība kā mērķis izvirzīta 2000. gadā. 2004. gada beigās ne Latvijas Centrālās statistikas pārvaldes, ne *Eurostat* dati neliecina par mērķa sasniegšanas iespējamību 2010. gadā. Augsts ilgstošā bezdarba līmenis Eiropas Savienībā ir viena no smagākajām problēmām darba tirgū, jo vidēji puse no visiem bezdarbniekiem neatrod darbu 12 mēnešus un ilgāk, tādējādi kļūstot par ilgstošajiem bezdarbniekiem. Latvijā šis skaits ir tikai nedaudz mazāks.² Tiesa, atbilstoši Nodarbinātības valsts aģentūras (NVA) datiem, kas sniedz informāciju par oficiāli reģistrēto ilgstošo bezdarbnieku skaitu, tas ir tikai 25–26%, kaut atbilstoši Eiropas Savienībā akceptētajiem statistiskās uzskaites principiem veiktajās Centrālās statistikas pārvaldes darbaspēka aptaujās šis skaits periodā pēc Lisabonas konferences (2001.–2003. gadā) svārstās 43%–47% robežās.

¹ Lisabonas stratēģija. Skat. internetā (11.11.2004.)
<http://www.em.gov.lv/em/2nd/content/?cat=1500>

² Central European Countries' Employment and Labour Market Review. 2004 (1).

SOCIĀLĀ IEKĻĀUŠANA UN NEOINSTITUCIONĀLĀ PARADIGMA

Ar ilgstošo bezdarbnieku problēmu risināšanu bieži saista jēdzienu “sociālā iekļaušana”, to izmanto gan sociālās, gan politiskās zinātnes. Jēdziena interpretācijā vērojamas atšķirīgas pieejas, kas bieži izriet no pretējas parādības – “sociālās atstumtības” skaidrojuma. Vai sociālo iekļaušanu var saprast kā sociālu normu, utopisku ideoloģisku konstrukciju vai sasniedzamu sociālu modeli?³

Sociālo iekļaušanu var analizēt gan kā procesu, kurā tiek apgūtas jaunas organizācijas formas, gan kā situācijas raksturojumu, kas parāda šībrīža situāciju.⁴ Pirmajā gadījumā sociālās iekļaušanas izpratne saistāma ar neoinstitucionālās paradigmas pieeju. Neoinstitucionālā paradigma uzsver, ka realizētā politika (šai gadījumā – nodarbinātības politika) vienmēr ir sistēmas institucionālā mantojuma rezultāts. Atbilstoši šai teorijai katrai sociālajai grupai ir tieksme “atražot” tās sabiedriskās attiecības, kas tai iepriekš bijušas pazīstamas, un jaunizveidotām organizācijām arī piemīt tendence atgriezties pie jau zināma darbības veida, noraidot inovācijas vai “pārveidojot” tās pazīstamās struktūrās un pierastā darbības veidā. Valsts, pašvaldību un citas organizācijas nespēj savu darbību pakārtot tam, ko no tām gaida dažādi sabiedrības slāņi un grupas (piemēram, ilgstošie bezdarbnieki), jo pastāvošajām institūcijām ir fundamentāls iespaids uz sociālajām un politiskajām attiecībām. Līdz ar to saprotams, ka esošais institucionālais mantojums modificē sabiedriskās darbības struktūru. Neoinstitucionālā paradigma aizstāv viedokli, ka šīsdiēnas lēmumus ietekmē iepriekš, pagātnē, pieņemtie lēmumi, un tas iespaido dažādus sociālās politikas virzienus, tai skaitā nodarbinātības politiku.⁵

Dažādība sociālās iekļaušanas izpratnē saistās ar dažādām politiskajām perspektīvām, interesēm, kas pamatojas uz daudzveidīgu vērtību sistēmu, kas nozīmē atšķirīgu stratēģiju izvēli sociālo pārmaiņu īstenošanai.⁶ Sociālo pārmaiņu stratēģijas var būt vērstas uz stabilitātes saglabāšanu, drošību vai jaunradi – radošu pieeju. Atšķirīga sociālo pārmaiņu izpratne saistīta ar neoinstitucionālajā teorijā lietoto jēdzienu “*path dependence*”, ko var tulkot kā “atkarība no pagātnes”⁷. Atšķirīga sociālās iekļaušanas izpratne saistīta ar dažādu skatījumu, veidojot politiskus projektus sociālās iekļaušanas veicināšanai.

Pirmkārt, tiek analizēts nabadzības jeb resursu sadales aspekts. Šajā skatījumā sociālās iekļaušanas iespējas tiek saistītas ar nabadzības cēloņu novēršanu, sociālās nevienlīdzības samazināšanu, resursu sadales problēmām starp dažāda dzimuma, rases un sociālo šķiru pārstāvjiem.⁸

³ Stewart, A. Social Inclusion: An introduction. In: Asconas, P., Stewart, A. (ed.) *Social inclusion*. London: Macmillian Press, 2000. P. 2–4.

⁴ Turpat. 6.

⁵ Gutierrez, R., Guillen, M. Protecting the Long-term Unemployed. *European Societies*. ESA, 2000 2(2): 198.

⁶ Sennett, R. Work and Social Inclusion. An introduction. In: Asconas, P., Stewart, A. (ed.) *Social inclusion*. London: Macmillian Press, 2000. P. 279.

⁷ Crouch, C., Farrell, H. Breaking the path of institutional development? Alternatives to the new determinism. *Rationality and Society*. Sage Publications. 2004. 16: 5–43.

⁸ Levitas, R. *The inclusive Society? Social Exclusion and New Labour*. London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998.

Otrkārt, var izdalīt morālo, nabadzības kultūras jeb “apakššķiras” jautājumu loku, kas saista sociālās iekļaušanas iespējas ar iekļaujamo morālajiem un kulturālajiem raksturojumiem. Šī joma sociālo iekļaušanu saista ar kultūras normu apgūšanas aspektu, ar atkarības kultūras veidošanos. Tas tiek realizēts politiskajos projektos, kas novērtē algotu darbu, bet nenovērtē neapmaksāto darbu un labklājības sistēmas pabalstus skata kā morālā pagrimuma un sociālās lejupslīdes avotu.

Trešais aspekts raksturo Eiropas Savienībā dominējošo sociālās integrācijas pieeju, kas izvirza priekšplānā tādas prioritātes kā ekonomisko efektivitāti un sociālo saliedētību, ko var nodrošināt algots darbs, kas integrē sabiedrību un individu. Atbilstošie politiskie projekti līdzdalību darba tirgū vērtē kā atslēgu sociālajai iekļaušanai, neakcentējot sociālo nevienlīdzību, kas izriet no atšķirībām darba samaksā un darba apstākļos.⁹

Analizējot sociālās iekļaušanas problēmas, var izdalīt četras sistēmas, kurās darbojas procesi, kas nodrošina resursu saņemšanu. Sistēmu darbības rezultātā tiek nodrošināti sociālās iekļaušanas priekšnoteikumi. Lai varētu runāt par sociālo iekļaušanu, ilgstošajiem bezdarbniekiem jāsaistās vismaz ar vienu no četrām sistēmām.

- Privātās sistēmas, tirgus procesi.
- Valsts sistēmas, varas struktūras, kurās darbojas birokrātiskie, likumdošanas noteiktie procesi.
- Brīvprātīgās sistēmas, kas darbojas kā pilsoniskās sabiedrības elementi.
- Ģimenes un draugu tīkli, kas darbojas pēc atgriezeniskās saites principa.¹⁰

Katra indivīda piederības izjūta sabiedrībai un resursu ieguve ir atkarīga no šīm sistēmām, kā arī no veida, kā tās darbojas. Katras sistēmas resursu pārdale notiek atšķirīgi, bet tas var sekmēt sociālo iekļaušanos, veidojot formālos un neformālos atbalsta tīklus. Tādējādi ilgstošo bezdarbnieku sociālās iekļaušanās perspektīvas ir atkarīgas gan no valsts institucionālās sistēmas, pašvaldību atbalsta, privāto un brīvprātīgo sistēmu elastības un noturības, gan arī no tradicionālā, katrā sabiedrībā atšķirīgā ģimenes un draugu atbalsta. Ilgstošie bezdarbnieki atšķiras no pārējiem bezdarbniekiem ar to, ka viņu aprūtinātā situācija ilgst ilgāku laika periodu nekā tiem, kurus skar tikai īslaicīgas problēmas, tāpēc ilgstošo bezdarbnieku dzīves standarts tiek būtiski pazemināts.

Resursu saņemšanu katrā no sistēmām var analizēt mikro un makro līmenī. Publikācijā attēloti problēmas divi aspekti: makro līmenī valsts institucionālās atbalsta sistēmas īss raksturojums un mikro līmeņa problēma – kā ilgstošie bezdarbnieki uztver un vērtē valsts institucionālo atbalstu.

⁹ Stewart, A. Social Inclusion: An Introduction. In: Asconas, P., Stewart, A. *Social Inclusion*. London: Macmillan Press LTD, 2000. 5.

¹⁰ Shucksmith, M. Young People and Social Exclusion in Rural Areas. *Sociologia Ruralis*. 2004. 44(1): 45.

VALSTS INSTITUCIONĀLĀ ATBALSTA SISTĒMA ILGSTOŠAJIEM BEZDARBNIEKIEM

Latvijā, līdzīgi kā citās agrākā sociālisma sabiedrībās, bezdarba problēma parādījās pēkšņi un institucionālais atbalsts bezdarbniekiem, īpaši ilgstošajiem bezdarbniekiem, visu periodu pēc neatkarības atgūšanas 1990. gadā ir bijis vājš.

Sociālās aizsardzības sistēma bezdarbniekiem Latvijā ir jauns veidojums, jo sociālisma laikā bezdarba problēma nebija aktuāla, tā kā politika reglamentēja pilnas nodarbinātības pastāvēšanu.

Var piekrist F. Rajevska domai, ka jēdziens “sociālā aizsardzība” vairāk atbilst “vecu” ES valstu sociālās politikas modelim, bet Latvijā pareizāk un situācijai atbilstošāk runāt par “sociālās drošības tīklu”¹¹, jo bezdarba, īpaši ilgstošā bezdarba, gadījumā vitāli nepieciešams neformālo tīklu, ģimenes atbalsts. Tas ir tik nozīmīgs valsts institucionālo sistēmu vājā atbalsta dēļ. Tā, piemēram, sociālās apdrošināšanas bezdarbnieka pabalstu var saņemt tikai tie bezdarbnieki, kas atbilst likumā “Par apdrošināšanu bezdarba gadījumam”¹² izvirzītajiem nosacījumiem (iepriekšējās nodarbinātības ilgums, nepārtrauktība, savlaicīgs pabalsta pieprasījums utt.), kas samazina pabalsta saņēmēju skaitu. Pēdējo trīs gadu (2001., 2002., 2003.) laikā pabalsta saņēmēju skaits starp Nodarbinātības valsts aģentūrā (NVA) reģistrētajiem bezdarbniekiem sastāda 40%–44%¹³. Maksimālais pabalsta saņemšanas periods ir deviņi mēneši, kas izslēdz ilgstošos bezdarbniekus no bezdarbnieka pabalstu saņēmēju loka.

Bezdarba apdrošināšanas pabalstu administrāciju veic Valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas aģentūra (VSAA), bet pabalstu aģentūrā var pieprasīt tikai tie bezdarbnieki, kas iepriekš reģistrējušies Nodarbinātības valsts aģentūrā un kuriem piešķirts “bezdarbnieka statuss”, kuru bezdarbnieks zaudē, ja reizi mēnesī neapmeklē NVA. Šie nosacījumi vismaz daļēji ļauj izskaidrot to, ka atšķiras NVA un darbaspēka apsekojumos konstatētais ilgstošo bezdarbnieku īpatsvars.¹⁴ Tā kā ilgstošajiem bezdarbniekiem nav tiesību saņemt bezdarbnieka pabalstu no VSAA, viņiem atliek paļauties uz pašvaldību sociālo dienestu palīdzību, kam jānodrošina ienākums LVL 18 vienam māsājniecības dalībniekam.¹⁵ Tas nozīmē, ka ilgstošajam bezdarbniekam kā indivīdam nav tiesību pretendēt uz pabalstu atbilstoši garantētā minimālā ienākuma līmenim, ja kopējais māsājniecības ienākumu līmenis nav zem šī minimuma, un viņam atliek paļauties uz ģimenes, radu utt. atbalstu. Rezultātā ilgstošie bezdarbnieki bieži cieš no

¹¹ Rajevska, F. Social Safety Net in Latvia. Gr.: *Politika un socioloģija*. LU Raksti 663 sēj. 2004. 40.–59. lpp.

¹² Sk. internetā (22.10.2004.) http://www.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=1495&rel_doc=on

¹³ Sk. internetā (04.11.2004.) <http://www.csb.lv/...>

¹⁴ Atbilstoši ES un SDO akceptētajai pieejai ilgstošos darba meklētājus pamatoti var uzskatīt par ilgstošajiem bezdarbniekiem.

¹⁵ MK 2003. gada 25. februāra noteikumi Nr. 96 “Kārtība, kādā piešķirams, aprēķināms un izmaksājams pabalsts garantētā minimālā ienākumu līmeņa nodrošināšanai”. *Latvijas Vēstnesis*. 2003. 5. marts.

finansiāla un psiholoģiska stresa, kļūst atkarīgi no citiem māsaimniecības dalībniekiem un sociālajiem tīkliem.¹⁶

ILGSTOŠO BEZDARBNIKU DARBA MEKLĒJUMI UN NVA ATBALSTA IZMANTOŠANA

Ilgstošo bezdarbnieku nākotnes cerības bieži saistītas ar iepriekšējo pieredzi saskarsmē ar valsts institūcijām. Ja šī pieredze bijusi negatīva, tad, iespējams, tālākajos darba meklējumos NVA palīdzība netiks izmantota.

Tā kā Latvijā ilgstoši vērojamas atšķirības bezdarbnieku uzskaitē atbilstoši Starptautiskās darba organizācijas (SDO), ES statistikas prasībām un NVA reģistrētajiem bezdarbniekiem, ir svarīgi noskaidrot pamatojumus tam, kāpēc ilgstošie bezdarbnieki bieži neregistrējas NVA. Tāpēc tika veiktas 12 padziļinātas SDO kritērijiem atbilstošas intervijas ar ilgstošajiem bezdarbniekiem. Intervijas tika veiktas dažādos Latvijas rajonos, respondenti meklēti ar “sniega bumbas” metodi, kā informācijas avotu izmantojot paziņu tīklu vietējo iedzīvotāju vidū. Izlasē iekļauti arī tādi cilvēki, kas ilgstoši (vairāk nekā 12 mēnešus) bijuši bez darba pēdējo trīs gadu laikā, bet šobrīd jau strādā.

Tikai viena no respondentiem deviņdesmito gadu vidū darbu atradusi ar NVA palīdzību, jo tolaik veidojušies Sociālās palīdzības dienesti, kam bija nepieciešami darbinieki.

Tas nenozīmē, ka NVA atbalsts netiek izmantots. Tikai četri no aptaujātajiem ilgstošajiem bezdarbniekiem ne reizes nav griezušies NVA. Intervijas laikā (2004. gada oktobrī) NVA reģistrējušās trīs respondentes, no kurām viena (27 gadi) neoficiāli strādā par biroja administratori, bet otra (52 gadi) strādā vīra zemnieku saimniecībā. Viņas gatavas izmantot NVA palīdzību tāda darba atrašanai, kurā būtu nodrošinātas sociālās garantijas.

“Ar manas draudzes palīdzību es atradu darbu. Būtu jau patīkamāk, ja viss būtu oficiāli, būtu vismaz sociālās garantijas.” (Sieviete, 27.)

Visiem respondentiem tika uzdoti jautājumi par darba meklēšanas veidu. Biežāk tiek minētas tādas darba meklēšanas stratēģijas, kas analizētas LU Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūta (FSI) pētnieku M. Prankas, I. Trapencieres un A. Trupovnieces 2002.–2003. gadā veiktajā pētījumā¹⁷ (neformālo avotu – draugu, radu un paziņu – palīdzība; darba meklējumi, kas veikti, izmantojot avīžu sludinājumus).

Ilgstošie bezdarbnieki, kas nav reģistrējušies NVA, min arī tādu iniciatīvu apliecināšanu darba meklēšanas veidu kā CV un iesniegumu izsūtīšana iestādēm, uzņēmumiem.

“Tika rakstīti neskaitāmi CV. [...] Varēja cerēt tikai uz paziņu, draugu palīdzību.” (Vīrietis, 32 gadi.)

Neviens no respondentiem neatzina, ka darbu nav meklējis. Turklāt optimisms vai pesimisms par darba atrašanas izredzēm nav saistīts ne ar darba meklēšanas veidu, ne ilgstošā bezdarbnieka šībrīža situāciju. Tā

¹⁶ Gutierrez, R., Guillen, M. Protecting the Long-term Unemployed. *European Societies*. ESA, 2000. 2(2): 213.

¹⁷ Pranka, M., Trapenciēre, I., Trupovniece, A. Sociālās atstumtības iespējamība un tās iemesli bezdarba riska apdraudētajām iedzīvotāju grupām. LU FSI, 2003.

47 gadus vecs vīrietis, kurš šobrīd nakšņo patversmē, pauž pārliecību, ka darba meklēšanā var palauties uz sevi un paziņām.

“Darbs man būs, ja ne pirmdien, tad nākošnedēļ! Tas man aizrunāts!” (Vīrietis, 47 gadi.)

Respondentu skaidrojums, kāpēc viņi ir reģistrējušies NVA vai nav, ļauj spriest arī par motivāciju, kāpēc tas tiek vai netiek darīts. Šķiet – varētu būt pamatots pieņēmums, ka reģistrēšanās NVA tiek saistīta ar iespējām saņemt valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas vai pašvaldību sociālos pabalstus, gūt iespēju mācīties kursos vai strādāt sabiedriskos darbus.

“Nodarbinātības aģentūrā esmu bijusi vairākas reizes [...] esmu saņēmusi arī bezdarbnieku pabalstu pēc pirmā bērna piedzimšanas.” (Sieviete, 26 gadi.)

Retāk kā motivējošs faktors tiek minēta iespēja atrast darbu ar NVA palīdzību, kaut arī tas var būt viens no motīviem reģistrācijai aģentūrā.

“Man tur nav ko darīt. Ko tad viņi man piedāvās? Par krāvēju, vai? Nu, paldies! Pabalstu es tāpat nevaru saņemt.” (Vīrietis, 20 gadi.)

Starp ilgstošajiem bezdarbniekiem priekšstats par NVA apmeklēšanas nepieciešamību bieži nesaistās ar iespēju atrast darbu, izmantojot šīs organizācijas palīdzību.

“Vienu reizi aizgāju uz Nodarbinātības dienestu. Vienkārši bija interesanti, ko viņi man varētu piedāvāt – atnācu un aizgāju, jo ne ar ko nespēja palīdzēt, saka, ka darba piedāvājumu atbilstoši manām profesijām nav, tādu kā es ir tūkstošiem... tāpēc vairāk negāju.” (Vīrietis, 35 gadi.)

Intervijās paustie viedokļi ļauj izteikt pieņēmumu, ka atšķirības ilgstošo bezdarbnieku procentuālajā īpatsvarā starp NVA reģistrētajiem un neregistrētajiem bezdarbniekiem bieži saistītas ar izpratni par reģistrācijas nepieciešamību NVA, jo ilgstošie bezdarbnieki atbilstoši likumam “Par apdrošināšanu bezdarba gadījumā” nevar saņemt bezdarbnieka pabalstu, tāpēc NVA reģistrējas tad, ja tiesības uz bezdarbnieka pabalstu nosaka piederība pie noteiktas sociālās kategorijas (piemēram, pēc bērna kopšanas atvaļinājuma).

“Noteikti stāšos atkārtoti bezdarbnieku uzskaitē, kad beigsies otrais bērna kopšanas atvaļinājums.” (Sieviete, 26 gadi.)

NVA darbība tiek vērtēta gan pozitīvi, gan negatīvi, vērtējot ne tikai NVA kā darba atrašanas iespēju, bet skatot organizācijas funkcijas plašākā aspektā.

Pozitīvie viedokļi saistīti ar darbinieku laipnību, atsaucību un iespēju saņemt pabalstu vai ar cerību iegūt nosūtījumu uz kursiem.

“Pret mani vienmēr (NVA) izturējušies laipni [...] labprāt apmeklētu kādus kursus [...] arī strādāt būtu gatava.” (Sieviete, 26 gadi.)

NVA atbalstu pozitīvi vērtē Nodarbinātības aģentūrā reģistrējušies šobrīd zemnieku saimniecībā strādājoša darba meklētāja (52), kam bija nodrošināta iespēja mācīties.

“No Nodarbinātības dienesta nosūtīja uz lauksaimniecības darbinieku kursiem [...] sāku nodarboties ar lauksaimniecību, jo vīram bija saimniecība.” (Sieviete, 52 gadi.)

Negatīvs vērtējums saistīts gan ar NVA darbinieku attieksmi pret bezdarbniekiem, gan darba piedāvājumu trūkumu, gan NVA struktūrvienību tehnoloģiskajām iespējām un gatavību atbalstīt darba meklētājus.

“Darbinieki liek saprast, ka viņi ir vieni, bet mūsu (bezdarbnieku) daudz.” (Vīrietis, 23 gadi.)

“Dokumentu pieņemšanā nelaiņns personāls, ar dzīvi neapmierināta darbiniece.” (Sieviete, 29 gadi.)

“Nodarbinātības Valsts aģentūras palīdzība it nekāda. Aizej atzīmēties, ne tev piedāvā kādus kursus, ne kā. No tā dienesta nekāda atbalsta.” (Virietis, 21 gadu vecs.)

“No Nodarbinātības dienesta nav nekāda atbalsta... Darba piedāvājumi – uz tiem vari zvanīt, bet sen jau ir pieņemti. Nodarbinātības valsts aģentūrā nav faksa, kas būtu pieejams ikvienam bezdarbniekam, nav pieejams arī internets, kur varētu pats iet un meklēt darbu.” (Sieviete, 36 gadi.)

Atceroties neinstitucionālo perspektīvu, birokrātisko iestādes darbinieku attieksmi var saistīt ar sociālisma sistēmas institucionālo mantojumu, bet tehnoloģiskā nodrošinājuma problēmas var sasaistīt ar pārlietu lielas centralizācijas tendenci, kas izpaužas arī nodarbinātības politikas realizācijā, jo nodrošinājums ar informācijas tehnoloģijām, faksu, telefona izmantošanas iespējām reģionālajās NVA struktūrās rada problēmas darba meklētājiem Latvijas reģionos.

Interviju analīze liecina, ka NVA uzskaites sistēma nav precīza, jo NVA bezdarbnieki cenšas reģistrēties tad, ja atbilstoši LR likumdošanai var pretendēt uz bezdarbnieka pabalstu vai cer izmantot nodarbinātības aģentūras rīkotos pasākumus.

Ne visi, kas reģistrējušies NVA, tiešām ir bez darba un vēlas strādāt, bet reģistrējas tādēļ, ka apzinās savas tiesības saņemt likumdošanā paredzēto bezdarbnieka pabalstu (piemēram, pēc bērna kopšanas atvaļinājuma).

Tie, kas strādā darbos, par kuriem netiek maksāti nodokļi, reģistrējas NVA tādēļ, lai atrastu legālu darbu vai uzlabotu savas izredzes darba tirgū, papildinot profesionālo sagatavotību.

Latvijas nodarbinātības politikas kontekstā jāpārdomā, kādu veidot NVA – atvērtu pārmaiņām un pretimnākošu visiem darba meklētājiem vai turpināt no iepriekšējās sistēmas pārmantotās indivīda un kontroles iestādes attiecību tradīcijas.

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Internet and E-Business Technologies in Public Administration Environment: The Appliance and Outlook

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INTRODUCTION

Properly prepared and introduced information is the basis of any successful activity or action. This is of major importance nowadays when new technologies are penetrating into all possible fields of our lives. The leading edge, where we find internet and e-business technologies are not new, for some reason we find e-commerce not being able to pick up steam in Lithuania. An enterprise of selling goods on-line is unfortunately not successful. Meanwhile, different kind of tickets or travel proposals meet with high success.

The research performed by “TNS Gallup”, in summer of the year 2004, showed that only 1.4 percent of the population of Lithuania, who were not permanent Internet users (they were on-line only once in half a year), shopped at e-shops. 11.6 % of Internet users visited e-shops but did not buy anything. The indicated facts suggest that the residents of Lithuania aren't users of such kind of services, or they just mistrust the security of the system.

The conception of e-government has been ratified by Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on 31 December, 2002. This resolution came into force on September 1, 2003. The concept includes the prospect of e-government as a new phenomenon in Lithuania. The main consideration was laid on the development of public facilities to government and municipal institutions, residents, business entities.

The European Union funds various e-government projects, and seeks to eliminate the bureaucratic obstacles with the help of these projects. They discuss the possibility of e-voting. The majority of Lithuanian politicians have a very sceptical opinion about it. Even if the prognoses comes true, it will take more than a year until Lithuanians will be able to vote with the help of the Internet.

Viewing the resent situation, a lot of controversial ideas about e-business, e-commerce, e-government and all new e-technologies and their implementation occur. It seems like the government is interested in development of e-facilities and it's important to review how the government, municipality insti-

tutions implement new technologies. For instance, we could analyse a number of state institutions Web sites.

The objective is to present the information concerning the Web sites of the counties with in the Lithuanian Republic, data indicated there and e-facilities.

ANALYSIS METHODS

All the analysed Web sites were sorted and included by criteria – useful information and facilities for Lithuanian residents, who are Internet users, and for those who are not – the information is hardly reachable.

Search engines and sources for the Web sites searches:

- Generic Internet search engines (www.google.lt, www.delfi.lt, www.search.lt etc.);
- Lithuanian central Internet gates www.lietuva.lt;
- Information Society Development Committee at Lithuania Republic Government (www.ivpk.lt).

The Internet gate www.lietuva.lt was used and searches pertaining to information about counties and municipalities. The information regarding the names and exact numbers of the counties was presented there.

With a reference to the information acquired, the next search for counties' Web sites' addresses was completed.

It was discovered that 10 of 10 Lithuanian Counties have their own active Web sites.

Web sites were sorted by the following criteria:

- Web site address informative;
- links to the municipalities Web pages or to the district centres Web pages;
- the possibility of choosing a language on the Web site (Lithuanian, English etc.)

The Web sites were sorted by the indicated criteria, after that grouped and detailed by the following indications:

- content (themes, information);
- links (number, usefulness);
- Web site standing (number of visitors);
- e-facilities (time tables, auctions, date bases etc.);
- Web site structure and ease browsing;
- design (colours, font styles etc.).

RESULTS

7 of 10 addresses have unanimous structure – county name and abbreviation „aps“.

7 of 10 Web sites have links to the municipalities' Web pages or to the district centres Web pages.

Language alternatives: only Lithuanian – 1, English and Lithuanian – 7, Lithuanian, English and Russian – 2.

Useful information was found on all analysed pages: infrastructure, departments, contacts, news, and links. 5 of 10 Web sites have visitor's counters.

The Information Society development Committee at 2002 anticipated the preparation of the general requirements for government institutional Web sites. The analyses showed that institutions constructing Web pages observed a united structure; all published information is actual and comprehensive.

Table 1

E-facilities on Lithuania Republic Counties Web sites

Institution	E-facilities	Web site address
Vilnius County	Conference, FQA, news, e-mail communication, register users, forms and date base	http://www.apskritis.lt/
Kaunas County	N/A	http://www.kaunas.aps.lt
Klaipėda County	N/A	http://www.klaipeda.aps.lt
Šiauliai County	Preparing	http://www.siauliai.aps.lt
Panevėžys County	N/A	http://www.pava.lt
Alytus County	N/A	http://www.alytus.aps.lt
Marijampolė County	N/A	http://www.marijampole.aps.lt
Tauragė County	Registered user, but no providing information about proposal and service	http://www.taurage.aps.lt
Telšiai County	FAQ	http://www.telsiai.aps.lt
Utena County	N/A	http://www.is.lt/Utenos_apskritis

There was a problem in the process of analysis. Only one analysed Web site had attempted to propose e-facilities and services for registered users (Vilnius County). There is no Help support system in any of the Web sites. There is tendency among most Web sites e-services to continually be in the development stage. Development is determined by the low rate of Internet usage at home. It's growing, but not as fast as we expect.

„Lietuvos telekomas“ made a prognosis that at the end of the year 2005 about 20 percent of the population of Lithuania will become Internet users and they will have the internet at home.

With reference to „TNS Gallup“ research data, in the year 2003, a number of Internet users at home grew to 7.7 percent and in Spring of 2004 it reached 9.8 percent. The usage of internet communication at home increased double fold during the last year and reached 12 percent.

With reference to Nielsen//Nepratings data in 2002 in Belgium, 31 percent of the country's population had a computer at home with an internet connection, in Denmark – 51 percent, in Finland – 42 percent, Ireland – 34 percent.

In reference to the analysis data made in 2004, 30 percent of the Lithuanian population had a personal computer at home. They could be potential new internet users in this segment.

CONCLUSIONS

We need to enforce the development of an electronic government. It would determine fast-acting e-services in the implementation into the public sector. We completed only a small analyses of some of the public administration institutions' Web sites – counties' web sites – and a lack of electronic services as well as facilities was mentioned.

First of all, it is necessary to establish a stable infrastructure among relationships between different governmental and municipal institutions, using internet technologies and e-business models. Consequently, it would cause a demand among both services providers and consumers to expand informational infrastructures.

There is a need to establish a solid system for the data accumulated by the government. In order to assure the possibility of informational exchange, the remote computer networks of the European Union should be integrated into this system as well.

Change the management in the way municipal institutions work by using the means and methods of informational technologies and telecommunications. Expand the sphere, where the e-documents can be used.

The most valuable means of a new economy are not very noticeable ones – news, information, services and software. It is very important that internet technologies allow us to save time and to communicate instantly.

Information systems can overwhelm the traditional information systems of today. In this system would be integrated parts of the European Union data systems by using remote access and computer network integration.

Concerning e-economics, the most valuable things are information, knowledge, services, which help to save time, resources and provide the ability to communicate online.

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14. http://www.is.lt/Utenos_apskritis/

Students' Computer Literacy: Historical and Social Context

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INTRODUCTION

What is meant by the concept “literate” in post-modern society? How is the concept “computer literacy” understood by educators, researchers, practitioners and society? Recently the question of computer literacy has received much attention and has been addressed in a number of research works (C. Bruce, 1996; B. Collis, R. Anderson, 1994; M. Hayden, 1999; M. Eisenberg, D. Johnson, 1996; B. Warnick, 2002; S. McMillan, 1996; J. Oderkirk, 1996; A. Otas, 2000; M. P. Šaulauskas, 2001; R. Petrauskas, 1998; D. Šaparnienė, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, et al.). However, despite some significant research contributions in to the field, so far little attention has been given to the impact of social factors on computer literacy. Scarcity of both empirical research and theoretical work focusing on the analysis of the social environment which stimulates the quality and other aspects of computer literacy in higher educational institutions is evident. No research has ever been aimed at answering the question why similar social-educational conditions lead to quite different levels of students' computer literacy, different attitudes towards a computer, etc.

Aiming to provide some answers to the above questions, the historical aspect of computer literacy should be overviewed. Historically, the concept of **literacy** was firstly applied in the context of a person's **ability to read, write and understand a written text** (Boyarin, 1993; Manguel, 1996). The usage of advanced technologies has raised new requirements for reading, writing and understanding abilities. For long time information was understood as knowledge, which was an empowering tool and accessible exclusively to the elite. The expansion of society's needs made literacy a universal right. P. Breivik and E. Gee (1989) state that *literacy contributes to the attainment of wide social and individual goals*. Literacy became accessible not only for the religious and scholastic elite but also for various social strata. Their statement is based on the notion that *literacy reflects the growing need for information in society*. In the course of time literacy has developed the meaning of a social construct, which includes certain skills and a contextual understanding of characteristics for a definite place at a definite time. In the period of transition from rural, agricultural to urban, post-industrial, informational cultures the concept of literacy is defined as **dynamic**.

From the aspect of social development *literacy is the possibility for personal development and the acquisition of quality education, which corresponds to the social needs of society* (Petkevičiūtė, 2001). In P. Jucevičiene's (2001) opinion, literacy is predetermined by the stage society has reached and may be defined as a person's ability to communicate using appropriate means at the level appropriate in a definite society according to the member of which he/she is. Thus from the socio-cultural perspective literacy may be defined as a precondition of being literate in the society of a definite period. Literacy helps people to function in society.

As contemporary society becomes more and more based on advanced technologies, **computer literacy** in the 21st century has gained significance equal to the ability to read, write and do simple arithmetic operations in the 19th–20th centuries (Anderson, 1983). This century may be defined as the age of a continuous, rapid and revolutionary development of information and communication technologies (Harrison & Stephen, 1996; Johnson, 1997). Completely new printing, electronic data storage technologies, multimedia, e-mail and the Internet have developed in the past 20 years thus supplementing the concept of literacy by all those aspects. The development of advanced technologies and a necessity to use them have caused a need to constantly update literacy skills. Literacy development is directly related to the development of technologies as constant introduction of new ones raises requirements for literacy.

Requirements for computer literacy in the age of information are constantly increasing as old technologies are replaced by new ones. It should be pointed out that the advancement of information technologies as well as the mastering of them requires substantial material resources. Social factors in computer literacy become essential. The discussion of social factors in this paper includes very definite socio-demographic aspects: the possibility to work with a computer at home, the contacts of the surveyed who own a computer, their gender, and the socio – economic status of the surveyed families, etc.

One of the analyses of the social context might be from the gender aspect. Being an inherent feature in the process of socialization it becomes socially problematic when discriminatory phenomena becomes evident and a socially disadvantaged person is deprived of equal rights in life and his/her professional activities. One more aspect of this discriminatory phenomena is computer literacy. Gender differences in information technologies today arouse wide discussions in society. They focus on the factors, which influence this attitude: are they cognitive gender features or the consequences of socialization processes? The answer is based on presumptions, opinions and stereotyping, so different opinions exist. The contemporary approach calls for the analysis of gender differences from the perspective of socialization–experience. A thorough study by M. C. Linn and J. S. Hyde (1985) showed that gender differences in spatial and mathematical thinking, problem solving and other activities in connection with cognitive functions were so insignificant that they were neglected. The authors stressed the impact of the social context on gender differences and the necessity of a wide scale research and analysis of such situations, which would minimize gender differences in IT. It should be noted that the most negative factor in the conscience of society is not gender cognitive difference (factual or imaginary) but outdated gender

stereotypes existing in the agrarian society. The empirical research carried out in the country showed that gender stereotypes are most evidently observed among senior students and teachers (Merkys et al., 2001). A hypothesis may be framed that gender stereotypes potentially restrict possibilities for females to develop their computer literacy.

Undoubtedly computer literacy among young people is potentially affected by the socio-economic status of their parents: their incomes, education, and the person's own income. Thus, in our analysis of students' computer literacy and the socio-economic status of their families we may single out the mechanism of the violation of equal rights.

The following aspects predetermine the **scientific significance of this article** – the effect of social factors on computer literacy from the ideological viewpoint of equal rights in Lithuania has not been analysed yet. The authors alongside with regional problems would like to focus on more global scientific problems raised in this article. This social research on computer literacy has been supplemented by definite factual data related to the post-totalitarian society. Thus the paper might be beneficial for further study of computer literacy with in the global arena.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EMPIRICAL BASIS

The aim of the research is to expose the influence of the variables of social character on the level of students' computer literacy.

Empirical basis of the research. The empirical-experimental part of the present study is based on a series of diagnostic studies of students (N=1004). They represented 4 Lithuanian universities (Kaunas University of Technology, Šiauliai University, Klaipėda University, and Vilnius Gediminas Technical University) and 5 high schools and colleges. 84.7% of the sample was university students, 15.3% – students from high schools and colleges. The major part of the sample – 73.1% (N=733) – students in management and economics study programmes. The rest of the respondents (22.9%, N=271) included students from other areas: education, philology, informatics, physics, mathematics, technical, agricultural and health sciences. The study was based on voluntary participation and anonymity.

Research instruments. A test (theoretical and practical) on computer literacy (CL) and 2 anonymous closed type questionnaires “Student and Computer” and “Student and Studies”, which consisted of a series of questions on computer literacy and studies, were designed (Šaparnienė, 2002). Other research instruments (tests) designed by other researchers and applied in order to study the respondents' attention, to rate their general intelligence (BIKT), their knowledge of terminology (BITT) and to measure their verbal and non-verbal intelligence were used.

The presented paper analyses the most significant empirical research findings, which demonstrate the social context of computer literacy. For this reason the respondents' answers to the questions in the questionnaire “Student and Computer” are analysed, namely: socio-demographic parameters; gender stereotypes with the aim to define statistical links

between the aspects noted above and the results of the *test on computer literacy*.

The psychometric validity of the computer literacy test. Using the method of expert analysis a two-part computer literacy test was designed. 19 theoretical questions with the aim of evaluating the respondents' general knowledge of computers were included into the first part of the test. The second part of the test was composed of 24 practical tasks to evaluate the respondents' practical competence in applying software. For every step in the test, the percentage frequency was calculated and the parameters for central tendencies were selected: average, standard error and standard deviation (Table 2). Standard reliability rates to measure computer literacy are presented in Table 1. The rates presented in the table are evidence that the scale constructed to measure computer literacy is fairly reliable (Bortz, 1993; Anastasi, Urbina, 2001; Bitinas, 1998; Merkys, 1999).

Table 1

Reliability Indices of the Computer Literacy Test Scale

	<i>Cronbach</i> coefficient	<i>Gutman Split –</i> <i>half</i> coefficient	<i>Spearman</i> <i>Brown</i> coefficient
Theoretical part of the test	0.73	0.72	0.72
Practical part of the test	0.90	0.84	0.85

Table 2

Parameters of the Computer Literacy Test Scale

	Scale average	Standard error	Standard deviation
Theoretical part of the test	9.7 (maximum 19)	0.26	3.4
Practical part of the test	25.4 (maximum 48)	0.69	9.4

RESEARCH RESULTS

The *Kolmogorov – Smirnov Z criteria* has been used to check the hypothesis on the normality of the test distributions. The score distributions of the theoretical and practical parts of the test are normal (correspondingly $Z=1.29$, $p=0.07$; $Z=1.22$, $p=0.10$), for this reason for the assessment of interactions between gender and computer literacy a parametric hypothesis

checking the procedures has been used: ANOVA, *t-test*, *F-test*. The results of the test are presented in the standardized z scale.




Figure 1. Evaluation of the test on computer literacy by gender

For the hypothesis on the equality of male and female computer literacy, the test results variances and means have been tested. The variance of the female and male test results (both of the theoretical and practical parts¹) is equal (correspondingly $F=1.2$; $p=0.30$; $F=1.6$; $p=0.20$), but the means are different (T_{Theor} : $M_{\text{Male}}=0.79$, $M_{\text{Female}}=-0.27$; $t=7.3$; T_{Pract} : $M_{\text{Male}}=0.68$, $M_{\text{Female}}=-0.23$; $t=5.9$). The difference is statistically significant ($p<0.001$).

The average difference between the groups of male and female students is big, close to the standard divergence. This fact is illustrated in Figure 1. It is evident that the evaluation of the test results of about 60% of the surveyed women and only of about 17% of the men were below the group average, which corresponds to 0 on the abscissa axes. Such big differences were detected while evaluating the practical computer literacy and the theoretical knowledge of the surveyed. The conclusion was made that the factual difference between male and female students' (to women's disadvantage) computer literacy quality does exist. Studies carried out in developed countries reveal greater similarities in general computer competence (Pope-Dawis, Twing, 1994), whereas our study disclosed a statistically significant gender factor effect on computer literacy in the academic community (college and university students) with the coefficient of dotted bi-serial correlation 0.45.

Thus it is evident that although men and women have equal rights (they were raised in families, attended same schools, had equal rights to work with a computer at school) their factual computer literacy differs. Why are men's test results in computer literacy better than women's? Our study points out several reasons.

One of the factors influencing the quality of computer literacy is **contacts of the surveyed with a computer**. The research showed that

¹ The theoretical part of the test marked T_{Theor} , practical - T_{Pract} .

men get familiar with a computer and start constantly using it at an earlier age than women. Women normally have episodic or irregular contacts with a computer at the age of 15–18, i.e. when the subject of informatics is taught at school. After graduation from secondary school about 40% of male students and only 17% of female students use computer regularly (Table 3). The study data indicate that gender-based discrimination and violation of equal rights from a comprehensive school is passed to university. Thus, a comprehensive school has a crucial role developing boys' and girls' positive attitude towards a computer and enhancing their emotional-motivational satisfaction from using it as well as destroying gender stereotypes and eliminating factual knowledge differences in computer competence.

Table 3

Contacts of the surveyed with a computer ($N_{\text{Male}}=294$; $N_{\text{Female}}=706$)

	Gender	Year				χ^2	Contin- gency coeffi- cient	Signi- fiance
		by 10	10–15	15–18	over 18			
First contacts	Male	9.8%	33.2%	47.2%	9.8%	74.7	0.27	<0.001
	Female	2.5%	16.3%	57.1%	24.1%			
Episodic contacts	Male	4.4%	27.6%	50.7%	17.3%	88.3	0.30	<0.001
	Female	1.0%	8.3%	51.8%	38.9%			
Constant contacts	Male	2.9%	6.6%	30.9%	59.7%	64.8	0.28	<0.001
	Female	1.5%	0.2%	15.2%	83.1%			

The ***possibility of working with a computer at home*** has a great impact on computer literacy quality. Statistical data reveal that 14% of Lithuanian families have a PC at home. In the case of our study only 45% of the surveyed students had a PC (59.9% men and only 38.8% – women). The hypothesis about the dependence of students' computer literacy level on the possibility to use a PC at home was proved. It can be stated that the computer environment is enriched by constant work with a computer at home. The graphic analysis (Figure 2) clearly demonstrate that those students who had a PC at home performed much better in the computer test, both in the theoretical and practical parts. We can state a statistically significant difference where $p < 0.001$ in both cases (T_{Theor} : $F=30.0$, T_{Pract} : $F=32.2$).




Figure 2. Evaluation of the test on computer literacy by possession/non possession of PC and gender

Statistically significant differences ($t=-3.3$; $p=0.001$) were observed among women who have and do not have a PC. The results of the computer literacy test were better among those women, who are provided with the possibility to use a computer at home. The test results of men, both having and not having a PC at home, represented a statistical difference of much greater significance ($t=-4.6$; $p<0.001$). Although, it may seem paradoxical but the results of the computer literacy test of women who have a PC and men who do not have it were similar. It can be assumed that women spend less time working with a computer at home than men.

The research data analysis proves that men who do not have a PC did worse in the theoretical than in the practical part of the test. (T_{Theor} : do not have a PC – $M=0.4$; T_{Theor} : have a PC – $M=1.1$; T_{Pract} : do not have a PC – $M=0.1$; T_{Pract} : have a PC – $M=1.2$). A possibility to use a computer at home has greater effect on students' practical skills than on their theoretical knowledge. This influence has a stronger effect on men than on women (difference of averages of the test on computer literacy results of women comprise about 0.5 of the standard deviation, whereas of men – about 1 standard deviation).

Income. A very important social factor is income. The research demonstrated that the computer literacy test results depend on the family incomes per month. (T_{Theor} : $F=3.8$, $p<0.001$; T_{Pract} : $F=5.34$, $p<0.006$). The best computer literacy test results were demonstrated by students from families with lower and average incomes. It may be presumed that for students from families with lower incomes computer literacy has greater value than for those from families with higher incomes. It is probable that students from families with higher incomes lack inner motivation to work with a computer and presume that material status is an essential factor in life, i.e., everything can be bought with money. Meanwhile students from families with lower incomes link deep knowledge in IT with a more successful competition on the job market and, consequently, with better perspectives in social mobility.

Students were asked to give their opinion on *gender stereotypes*. In general the tendency in gender stereotypes, which is evident and very asymmetric, was surprising. It is symptomatic that men and women almost equally tended to attribute 'serious' competence in computers to men (Table 4). Opinion differences were detected in details. 37% of men and 46% of women maintained that women are better at word processing than men, 32% of men and 26% of women supposed that women spend more time studying informatics. In all other aspects men were supposed to be more competent than women. Almost 100% of the surveyed of both genders agreed that men are more competent in technical aspects: detecting defects, repairing them; in general, they demonstrate a deeper interest in computers as compared to women. The research data proves the existence of some paradoxical situation – genders attitudes do exist in reality (Figure 1). It can be stated that *conservative gender stereotypes contribute to the factual formation of such psychosocial reality where equal gender rights are violated*.

The research proved that the survey of both genders did not consider work with a computer to be the activity equally accessible both for men and women. The answers provided by the respondents were quite radical from the gender stereotype aspect in computer literacy.

Table 4

Students' opinion on gender stereotypes (N=1004)

Statements	Female attitudes			Male attitudes		
	F	M	FM	F	M	FM
	%			%		
Better acquainted with hardware	0	94	6	0	96	4
Easier detects and eliminates defects in computers	0	93	7	0	95	5
More interested in IT	0	82	18	0	91	9
Has skills in work with more software programs	3	73	24	0	90	10
Acquainted with IT innovations	0	89	11	0	90	10
More frequently visits IT fares	0	87	13	2	81	17
Provides with deeper consultations on IT	3	62	35	2	81	17
Demonstrate higher academic achievement results in IT	1	61	38	0	73	27
Constantly trains for work with new programs	1	43	54	0	61	39
Demonstrates deeper theoretical knowledge in IT	20	34	46	19	51	30
Reads more literature on IT	18	42	40	19	43	38
Can be a good IT systems manager	0	20	80	0	38	62
Allots more time for IT studies	26	30	44	32	30	38
Gets better grades in IT classes	11	21	68	19	21	60
Has better word processing skills	46	6	48	37	12	48

F – Female, M – Male, FM – Female and Male ≥ 70 % 

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

The research has validated the hypothesis that social factors have negative impact (in the ideological concept of equal rights) on computer literacy level. The facts obtained are reliable (statistically significant) by defined social factors and socio-demographic variables that are reflected: gender; contacts of the surveyed with a computer, possession/non possession of a PC at home, family incomes, gender stereotypes.

The study provided the basis for developing the hypothesis about the existence of a big difference between the level of computer literacy among male and female students. **Male students' actual computer literacy level is higher than female students'**. The former achieved much better results both in theoretical and practical parts of the test.

The research on the respondents' contact with the computer showed that men get familiar with it and start constantly working on it at an earlier age. Meanwhile, women normally have episodic or regular **contacts with the computer** when the subject of informatics is taught at school. The study data indicated that gender-based discrimination and the violation of equal rights comes to university from comprehensive school. Thus, comprehensive school has a crucial role in developing boys' and girls' positive attitudes towards the computer and giving emotional-motivational satisfaction from using it, as well as in destroying gender stereotypes and the factual difference in knowledge in the area of computer competence.

The hypothesis about the dependence of students' computer literacy level on the **possibility to use a PC at home** has been proved. Better results were demonstrated by students (both male and female), possessing a PC at home. Males and females not having a PC at home present less computer literacy differences comparing to those possessing a PC. It can be stated that learning environment being supplemented by constant work with a PC at home has a greater impact on males' computer literacy quality than on females' one.

The research has demonstrated that computer literacy test results depend on the family **incomes** per month. The best computer literacy test results have been demonstrated by students from families with lower and average incomes. It may be presumed that for students from families with lower incomes computer literacy has greater value than for students from families with higher incomes. It is probable that students from families with higher incomes and lacking inner motivation to work with a computer presume that the decisive factor in life is material status, i.e., everything can be bought with money. Meanwhile, students from families with lower incomes link deeper knowledge in IT with a more successful competition in the job market and, consequently, with better perspectives in social mobility.

The study showed a very strong link between computer literacy and **gender stereotypes** discriminating against women that exists among university students'. The fact that both female and male students are equally conservative regarding the issue of gender stereotypes suggests that the latter have deep cultural roots. In relation to computer literacy and gender stereotypes the study data suggest a paradoxical situation. The stereotype that women have much less knowledge about computers than men, unfortunately,

fully corresponds to reality. Of course, this fact does not deny social harm and unacceptability of gender stereotypes, especially those discriminating women, in democratic society. Based on the theory of Social Psychology and Women's Gender Studies, it can be argued that *conservative gender stereotypes alongside with other factors contribute to projecting and actually creating a discriminating psychosocial reality, which violates equal gender rights.*

Computer literacy, like reading, which is deservedly named as socialization of socialization or secondary socialization, is a significant part for an individual's successful socialization, education and training for profession process. The latter deserves further studies from the ideological viewpoint of equal rights. Consequently the obtained ***negative impact of social environment on computer literacy in the post-totalitarian society is a negative phenomenon*** that calls for consideration by the country's education and social policy authorities. Preventive means require deep discussions and considerations.

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The Motivation of the Development Activities in Private Colleges

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In many spheres of life the current situation in the Republic of Lithuania has become challenging, so the analysis of possible activities and the functional role of private education institutions in the future may be viewed as beneficial. The development of advanced information technologies has radically affected the very nature of the economy thus generating a global knowledge-based economy. As the realization of a new type economy lies on the active part of society, education of able-bodied people from all age groups and the training of young people for their professional life has become one of the essential problems.

Contemporary society has raised the demand for a new type of employee: demonstrating knowledge and competences, possessing adequate professional training, flexibly and, what is the most important, positively reacting to changes. Among these new conditions it is not only a person's high level of qualification but his/her ability to continuously expand the knowledge attained and to develop the skills acquired as well as his/her level of adaptation to innovative and advanced technologies. This can serve as a guarantee to getting a job.

In the knowledge economy an essential role is played by human resources. The development of which has been prioritised in countries with both highly and moderately developed economies. Private education institutions have become active market players in the process of the formation of human resources and have found a niche in many countries of the world. Decentralisation of national education systems when its administration, management and financing were moved to the regional level, has become a beneficial practice all over the world. Strengthening of its autonomy allowed the introduction and practice of competitive management models which assured study quality and openness for innovation. Thus, the conditions for private capital to fund private colleges, engaged in training marketable and competitive specialists, have been created.

For this analysis some practical aspects of the development of private education institutions and investment support of for-profit education institutions in the USA since the 1990s should be noted. Experts link these processes with a business decline and general economic slowdown thus stimulating the initiative to look for new and profitable spheres of investment. An increasing number of students in private education institutions also served as a sign to accelerate investment in them: the number of students in them grew 3 times quicker than in non-for profit institutions, a revenue rate reached 30% per year, profit – 20% (admission into for-profit institutions totals 5% of all

admitted students). (2). For-profit institutions accepted the challenge to take a niche in the market training specialists for IT, health care, food and auto repair industries and implemented demand-driven changes. Investments into for-profit education did not face any competition; on the contrary, they proved to be profitable. This situation was called “the gold-fever” by some experts (2).

In China, the first private education institutions were founded in the 1980s-90s as a reaction to an economic reform there. Though their status remained not clearly defined for quite a long time they were tolerated by the state for the revenue they gave. In 2001, state diplomas were awarded to the graduates of 89 private higher education institutions. Not to mention 1,280 illegal private colleges and universities (for comparison, 1,000 accredited state universities are functioning in China). (7). In 2002 the law granting private colleges and state-run higher education institutions equal rights and privileges with the right to a still undefined “reasonable profit” was passed in China. In the opinion of education experts, the law was passed when the state realized its inability to finance education institutions at all levels. It is forecasted that more responsibility in youth training is going to be delegated to the private sector in the Republic of China (one third of its 1.3 billion population is young people) as the necessary funding by the state is not guaranteed. The new law will stimulate the increase of investment into higher education from private persons and limit a profit for the institutions.

Italy is behind with the reforms in the system of education and higher education, as it has been pointed out by some experts. The main reason is political and ideological aspects of the discussion at the national level. The system of education now functioning in Italy does not meet the needs of various groups of the population and real conditions for exercising the right to education are not being created. The results of a survey of college and university students showed that 47% of college leavers and 18% of students do not understand the meaning and cannot use such terms as “to provide income”, or “to give profit.” What demonstrates their low level of knowledge and competence? (3). If Italy followed the world practice of using private colleges, they would realize the need of its society for education and create opportunities to attain it.

As professor A. Janulaitis, a member of the European Science Academy, has noted (4), Lithuania is among the leading states by the number of higher education institutions to the number of its population. It is evidence that young people’s have an ambition to continue their studies. This relative figure shows the growing prestige of higher education in Lithuania and the state can be proud of such attitudes prevailing in our society.

Future Lithuanian society can be characterised as capable of thinking creatively, acknowledging a life-long learning policy and creatively applying gained knowledge. (6). Thus a conscious disposition to transformations in higher education demonstrates a readiness of our society for future change and for a timely investment in education. Such attitudes act as a guarantee to modifying the Lithuanian economy into a knowledge economy.

Private colleges, a constituent of the Lithuanian higher education system, demonstrate their potential to act as the builders of the knowledge economy training a competent and adaptable work force. The dynamics of the number of students in private colleges is shown in Table 1 (5).

Table 1

**The Dynamics of Non-university Higher
Education Institutions and Students**

	2000–2001	2001–2002	2002–2003
Colleges	7	16	24
Private colleges	3	9	9
Students in colleges	3 547	10 337	26 210
Students in private colleges	575	1914	5 281

The analysis of the data in Table 1 shows that in the academic year 2001–2002 the share of private colleges formed was 56% of non-university higher education, the number of students in them was 18.5%. In 2002–2003 the share of private colleges dropped to 37.5%, however, the number of students in them rose to 20.1%. The fact that the number of students in private colleges triples each year proves that the prestige of this type of higher education institutions is growing.

A recent economic boost of the Lithuanian economy (GDP has reached 7.5%), is linked to the development of small, medium and large businesses and the rising demand for qualified and skilled personnel. Private colleges are ready to develop the instruments enabling them to provide realizable and transferable qualifications and competences necessary for many job openings.

Private colleges, as providers of quality higher education services, have planned their development perspectives in the following directions:

- To create opportunities for people to finance studies by themselves or their employers and acquire marketable and competitive qualifications,
- To meet the demand for consecutive studies in higher education institutions,
- To introduce the qualifications in restructuring of the labour force,
- To influence the national economy and socio-cultural life of the state.

Implementation of the directions noted above will determine changes in the state infrastructure, how it will conform to EU regional policy and how it will contribute to its implementation. Private colleges, as institutions of higher education, have assumed the following roles in the processes of integration:

- A policy maker educating and training an active labour market,
- An implementer of a life-long learning policy,
- A promoter of equal rights in the process of integration into labour markets.

Small, medium and large businesses have changed their attitude towards human resources and started recognising their strategic role. Rapid introduction of advanced technologies has reduced demand for non-qualified and semi-qualified personnel engaged in maintenance and construction business, as even for these occupations some knowledge in the related technologies and in their application is necessary. In services, maintenance and management qualified specialists are in demand. Therefore a demand for a qualified labour force is constantly increasing. Namely, private colleges provide the necessary knowledge, competences, training and updated qualifications for an active part of society at the higher education level in several forms of formal education – full-time, evening, extra-mural studies, which may be financed by the students themselves or their employers. In this way private colleges in

Lithuania act as the executers of the employment program and provide training for young people, workers in labour and the unemployed.

The discussion of the development possibilities of private colleges leads to an analysis of the motivational aspects, which reinforce their activities.

Access to education. Possibilities for an active part of society to develop marketable and competitive professional competences are reduced by limitations in state financing. Private colleges, which create conditions to contribute in the form of personal investment while attaining the targeted goal – qualification, are able to fill in this niche.

Formation of informal relations in the study process. Colleges and other small institutions are openly creating an environment favourable to self-expression, establishing and maintaining informal relations based on a mutual understanding, building trust in each other as well as in the academic community. In such an environment, collaborative and complimentary relations are formed.

The ability to meet the needs of today's labour market and to implement the strategic goals of the Republic of Lithuania. The concepts generated by the founders of private colleges conform to the ones formulated by the business community in general and business owners in particular. The advantage of private colleges is their timely reaction to the signals from the environment, readjustment to changes and openness to challenges.

Manifestation of the potential for professional management. Conditions include professionals in the teaching process, development of staff enrichment programmes, updating of the programmes, utilisation of world wide practices and the transfer of it to students are what happens in private colleges.

Living standard as a precondition for the investment in human resources. Knowledge acquisition and development of competences are preconditioned by financial possibilities. The system of state accreditation is targeted by the provision of a wide range of professional studies.

Opportunities to participate in local and international projects. Successful development and implementation of such possibilities make studies in private colleges preferable, arouse interest in them, and contribute to experience transfer and further growth.

Modified attitudes towards private studies. The society's attitude towards education has changed and the growing demand for a qualified labour force is being stressed. One of the gains of private colleges is a prevailing positive attitude towards services provided by them in the context of higher education.

Successful integration of private college graduates into regional businesses. Specialists trained in private colleges are recognised and appreciated by businesses and promoted in their jobs. College graduates' active strive to continue time-tailored studies at universities evidence the advantages of studies in private colleges.

An increasing number of specialists, junior executives and supervisors with in the traditional work structure. An increasing demand for a qualified labour force acts as one of preconditions taking a favourable decision to invest in the development of human resources. Moreover, it also acts as a social guarantee considering the regional development possibilities. In this case private colleges act as trainers of marketable and competitive specialists.

A considerable growth of the average salary for the employees with higher and college education. This aspect is to be related to the growth of the living

standard among the labour force (1). Increased income creates conditions meeting the constantly growing personal economic, social and cultural needs.

It can be concluded that the development activities in private colleges are determined by changes, which occur in the environment and act as positive outer motivators. The mission and the vision of non-university higher education institutions conform to the goals of the employability policy declared in Lithuania and the EU. These institutions act as active agents implementing it, moreover, they are actively involved in the activities realising Lithuania's priorities in this context. The activities of private colleges in the direction outlined, if chosen with proper consideration, will guarantee their successful integration into the system of the providers of higher education and contribute to the implementation of the life-long learning policy. The analysis of the activities of private colleges both in the USA and the Republic of China prove that the strategy chosen in Lithuania is successful – attraction of private investment in training of well-qualified specialists.

Private colleges, providers of professional studies of higher education, focus on practical activities and experience fundamental changes act as promoters of economic, social and cultural development. It also accelerates the transformation to the knowledge-based economy and acknowledges the strategic role of the highly-qualified human resources.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Inflow of private investment into higher education has proved to be a profitable and reliable form of financial investment all over the world.
2. Due to their mission and vision, private colleges have integrated into the Lithuanian market of higher education service providers and contribute to the realisation of employability priorities in Lithuania.
3. Target directions of the activities of these institutions contribute to the implementation of the life-long learning concept.
4. Due to fundamental transformations, private colleges assume the role of active agents in the national economic, social and cultural development.

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The Role of Social Phenomena for Image Formation of Northern Region of Lithuania

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INTRODUCTION

Originally the word region comes from the Latin word 'regio' that means a direction, a boundary line. The term is defined in Webster's revised unabridged dictionary in several ways. The two most common are:

"One of the grand districts or quarters into which any space or surface, as of the earth or the heavens, is conceived of as divided; hence, in general, a portion of space or territory of indefinite extent; country; province; district; tract."

"Tract, part, or space, lying about and including anything; neighbourhood; vicinity; sphere."

A region is a sub national entity and subjective artistic device. Every piece of land smaller than a state and larger than a locality, a department or a small province can be a region. Therefore a region is a conceptual definition of place and space and moreover a social and political construction of a certain territory. Regions can be divided into four major different groups, such as physical-natural, economical-functional, political-administrative or socio-cultural (Zalamans, 2001). In this article we have used the term region as geographical unit that contains several other units or parts of units, both as a political and social construction.

To overcome obstacles of the Northern region of Lithuania such as unemployment, migration, small direct foreign investments the municipalities have began to cooperate in different ways to improve image of region. But, is this the way to meet the future?

The aim of the article is to analyse if social phenomena have a possibility to influence image of Northern region of Lithuania. We will also analyse what is the role of public relations experts for region image formation. The research subquestions are: What is a 'Northern region of Lithuania'? What image of Northern region of Lithuania is today? What is the purpose of image formation?

Object of the research – the role of social phenomena for region image formation.

Research Methodology. The surveys involved 30 official bodies of northern region of Lithuania, with the purpose to learn are there public relations departments and are their activity influences images of region. 30 respondents participated in the research. Specialists, who are concerned about the public relations, from Siauliai town and region national enterprises were interviewed.

Aims of the research:

- To define if activities of public relations are being developed in Siauliai national enterprises for a long time;
- To analyse what are the functions of those specialists;
- To find out if activities of national enterprises influence the social publicity and image.

The article presents the most significant results of the research, links between social phenomena and image formation.

RESULTS AND THEIR ANALYSIS

This northern Country of Lithuania includes portions of both Zemaitija and Western Aukštaitija ethnographic regions.

The Country encompasses: Siauliai City and regional municipalities of Akmene, Joniskis, Kelme, Pakruojis, Radviliskis and Siauliai region.

Population (thousands) – 367,2.

Overall territory – 854 (thousand hectares).

The population of the county is 370,100 people, which is 10% of the total population of Lithuania. Around 1/3 live in the city of Šiauliai. The population of the country is decreasing mainly because of migration and a falling birth rate.

The number of people employed in the county has been falling during recent years and has now reached 218,900. (Around 80% of jobs in the industry sector in Siauliai have been lost during recent years, down from 30,000 in 1980 to 6,800 in 1998). Unemployment has risen sharply since 1992 and has now reached 14% (2003 04 01). Despite of that, unemployment rate of the country remains 2.2 percent higher than national rate. There are many important characteristics of the unemployment situation:

- unemployment is higher in the rural areas,
- long term unemployment is increasing,
- in some districts, unemployment amongst young people exceeds 20%.

The image of Northern region of Lithuania from restoration of Lithuania's independence has changed under influence of the economic and social phenomena. Since 1997 Northern region of Lithuania in local press is named as 'dead region'. There are some other epithets in Lithuania's press about Northern region of Lithuania: 'buried region', 'unattractive for investments', 'unemployment region' and so on. Today in Lithuanian central internet gates Siauliai country is presented as: "Siauliai Country is increasingly developing its intellectual and industrial potential. It is located in northern Lithuania. Agriculture and food processing are important to the county's economic growth.

The county boasts well-developed main road and railway networks. Zokniai airport has a huge potential, and is the basis for the establishment of a free economic zone. The country is very suitable for business development. Siauliai

businessmen are ready to accept new and thought-out ideas and to implement them.” Although during recent years the economy of the region improved, the region is still not correctly presented on the local and world level. Especially great value for image of region has social advertising and articles in the press. It formed stereotypical opinion of a society. Stereotypical “North Lithuanian region is a dead region” opinion prevents growth of the economy, foreign investments and so on.

The fact that Siauliai region needs image making can best be proved by researches performed one year ago.

Analysis of the research results showed that only 6,7% of national enterprises have Public Relations Departments (PRD), which have been working for ten years and which form the image of organization, internal and external communication.

Public relations specialists, working in national enterprises state, that many directors of organizations started caring about the importance of public relations only now. The faster rise of public relations incumbency was noticed only a few years before.

Results of the research show, that 10% of PRD were established only 2–4 years before. 17% of national enterprises have the press representative, who performs the functions of a public relations specialist. 23% of private enterprises, which are subsidized from the national budget, do not have Public Relations Department, but tend to think, that such an incumbency is a necessity. The main motif, why PRD activities are developed slowly, is the lack of funding and shortage of information about such activities.

Many of the respondents stated that the era of public relations have just been started in Siauliai. The concept that open and spread activities of national enterprises is not only evaluated more positively in the society, but represents activities and actions of the organization have just started to be understood now. Results of the research indicate that Ministries care about the spread and development of public relations. 27% of PRD in Siauliai region were established through their initiatives and only 10% through initiatives of the local government.

30% of PRD specialists, when they were asked to name their functions, stated that they are responsible only for the communications with a press, publications’ writing and preparation of press-conferences. 13% handle internal channels of the organization. The same percentage of specialists is responsible for the company’s representation in different events and seminars.

Public relations specialists said that their activities are not so big and effective for the organization and region. That is proved by answers to one of the questionnaire questions. 23% of specialists work only following management orders and 3.3% of respondents organize the work independently. Public relations specialists in questionnaires stated that they could give more benefit by performing different projects and actions, which would grant relish and notoriety to the organization and the town. Public relations specialists in questionnaire said, that they could not point any project through which the image of Siauliai town would be improved. PRD activities of national enterprises could be very useful and effective for the town image formation. Budgetary institutions (police, public health centres, town culture department, environment protection department, etc.) by collaboration with private public relations agencies could perform methodical

politics of Šiauliai town image formation, which should be led by professional PRD agencies. With a help of image specialists, activities of national enterprises would be maintained and pointed to the suitable direction, e.g. public relations specialists could consult directors of budgetary institutions for the questions of sponsorship and self-advertising, could take care of publicizing of organized events and actions, etc. Such centralized job would give positive results in the formation of the region's image. It is useful to cooperate between national enterprises and private image formation agencies. That is proved by successful Vilnius municipality projects.

If cooperation between national enterprises and private image formation agencies will be in Šiauliai region the shared vision for 2010: "an open, well-connected, Šiauliai county, offering high quality education and employment opportunities to people living in the urban and rural areas of the county, with a growing national and international reputation for enterprise, innovation, and quality of life, and an important role in Baltic Europe" becomes reality.

CONCLUSIONS

It is difficult to change stereotypical negative opinion about Northern region, Political forces do not understand the importance of having a positive image of the region in internal and foreign policy. There is no image concept for Northern Lithuania region yet created. Regions and towns will have to compete with foreign markets in the near future. At the present moment, the leader between towns and regions is Vilnius. Other regions, including Šiauliai region, are not so attractive for the foreign investors or for dwellers of the state. That is why the formation of regional brand, as a special trend, becomes very relevant.

Summarizing points of the article, we can make conclusions, that not only the government of Šiauliai region, but also the politicians of other Lithuanian towns have not yet understood the necessity and usefulness of the public relations and town and region image formation.

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Faktori, kas noteica ekonomisko mobilitāti strauju sociālo pārmaiņu apstākļos Latvijā

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Periods, kad Latvijā notika straujas sociālās pārmaiņas un cilvēkiem bija iespēja gūt milzu bagātības vai strauji zaudēt uzkrājumus, drīzāk gan attiecināms uz valsts neseno pagātņi, ne tuvāko nākotni. Tomēr šo tēmu pieteicu konferencei, kas veltīta nākotnes problemātikai. Orvels min, ka tie, kas kontrolē pagātņi, kontrolē arī nākotni¹. Un to var saprast ne tikai kā veiklu demagoģiju – galu galā vienīgais veids, kā mēs spējam prognozēt nākotni, ir pagātnes analīze un tās notikumu ekstrapolācija uz nākotni, veicot nepieciešamās korekcijas. Tātad runāsim galvenokārt par pagātņi, lai arī jāsaka, ka ne visi no šeit apskatītajiem procesiem ir beigušies.

Apskatāmo laika periodu var iedalīt trīs posmos:


- 1) padomju posms;
- 2) strauju sociālo pārmaiņu posms;
- 3) stabilizācijas posms.

Nevēlos norādīt skaidras laika robežas, jo dažādās pārmaiņu sfērās tās atšķiras – ekonomikā ir vienas, politikā citas, kultūrā vēl citas.

Vēl pirms sākt iepazīstināt ar pētījumā izmantoto modeli un rezultātiem, jāmin, ka pētījums ne tuvu nav galā. Šie ir tikai sākotnējie rezultāti. Tāpat arī piedāvātais analīzes modelis pagaidām nav līdz galam “piepildīts”, ir “tukšas” ailes, par kuru aizpildīšanas iespējām vēl jālemj. Tomēr tā ir shēma, kurā šobrīd tiek ievietoti pētījuma rezultāti, lai tos varētu uztvert loģiskā kopsakarībā.

Modelis, kas tiek izmantots, redzams 1. attēlā. Jāsāk ar tēzi, kas var šķist pašsaprotama, tomēr tā ir bezgala svarīga – ekonomiskā mobilitāte ir sociālo pārmaiņu paveids. Uzskatāmi tas redzams attēlā, tajā attēlota sociālo pārmaiņu tipoloģija divās dimensijās. Pirmā – ekonomiskās, politiskās, prestiža un kultūras pārmaiņas. Otrā – pārmaiņu ātrums (galapunkti – straujas un lēnas pārmaiņas). Savukārt izveidotajā sociālo pārmaiņu laukā kā sociālo pārmaiņu paveids novietota sociālā mobilitāte. Attiecīgi ekonomiskā mobilitāte pieder ekonomiskajām pārmaiņām, politiskā – politiskajām, bet prestiža – prestiža pārmaiņām. Pie kultūras pārmaiņām sociālā mobilitāte nav iekļaujama.

¹ Orwell, George. *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Penguin Books, 1990.



1. att. Sociālās pārmaiņas ietekmējošie faktori sociālo pārmaiņu laukā

Pievērsoties ekonomiskās mobilitātes iespējamajiem determinantiem, jāsaprot, ka tie šajā shēmā var būt (sk. 1. attēlu):

- 1) citas sociālās mobilitātes formas – politiskā mobilitāte (a), prestiža mobilitāte (b);
- 2) cita veida politiskās (c) un prestiža (d) pārmaiņas;
- 3) pārmaiņas kultūras sfērā (e);
- 4) cita veida ekonomiskās pārmaiņas (f);
- 5) citi ietekmējošie faktori – respektīvi, tie, kas nepieder sociālajām pārmaiņām (g).

Pārmaiņu sfēru definējums daļēji aizgūts no britu zinātnieka Entonija Smita piedāvātā.

- 1) Ar kultūras sfēru viņš saprot zināšanas un tehniku, mākslas un literatūras stilus un veidus, idejas un ticējumus, bet vispārīgāk – ierastas izturēšanās un rituālu artefaktus un veidus² (šādu skaidrojumu pieņemsim arī mēs).
- 2) Ar politikas sfēru viņš saprot varas un autoritātes sadalījumu, sabiedriskās politikas veidošanu un varas institucionalizāciju organizācijās³ (arī šis skaidrojums mums der).
- 3) Ekonomikas sfēra (Smits izmanto sociāli ekonomisko sfēru⁴) šai darbā tiek definēta mazliet atšķirīgi, atdalot no tās prestiža sfēru (kas ērtāk

² Smith, Anthony. *Social Change: Social Theory and Historical Processes*. Longman, 1976. P. 22.

³ Turpat. 21. lpp.

⁴ Turpat. 20. lpp.

apskatāma atsevišķi, ņemot vērā, ka analizēsim prestiža mobilitāti). Smits kā vienu no sociāli ekonomiskās sfēras komponentiem min resursu izvietojumu, ražošanu un dažādu grupu intereses⁵ (to, kas attiecas tieši uz ekonomiskajām pārmaiņām, un šāda izpratne mums ir pieņemama).

- 4) Prestiža sfēru savukārt izdalīsim atsevišķi, ar to saprotot pārmaiņas sabiedrībā prestiža izpratnē. Sociālo pārmaiņu gadījumā prestiža sfēra nešķiet liekama vienā “svara kategorijā” ar pirmajām trim sfērām, tomēr nepieciešamību to izdalīt atsevišķi nosaka tas, ka atsevišķi ir izdalīta prestiža mobilitāte (tā ir vertikālās sociālās mobilitātes forma, kas saistās ar indivīda “pārvietošanos” starp dažāda prestiža statusa grupām; šis jēdziens ietver Sorokina blakus politiskajai un ekonomiskajai mobilitātei izdalīto profesionālo mobilitāti⁶, taču apskata ne tikai mobilitāti starp dažāda prestiža profesijām, bet starp jebkurām statusa grupām).

Bez jau apskatītajiem jēdzieniem pētījumā nozīmīgu vietu ieņem arī Pareto jēdzieni “spekulanti” un “rantjē”. “Spekulantu” ienākumi saskaņā ar Pareto uzskatu ir mainīgi, tos ietekmē viņu modrība ieguvumu avotu atklāšanā. Savukārt “rantjē” ir fiksēti vai gandrīz fiksēti ienākumi⁷. Pareto šos jēdzienus izmanto pamatā attiecībā uz eliti, kamēr šajā darbā “spekulantiem” vai “rantjē” raksturīgais domāšanas veids analizēts visas sabiedrības kontekstā. Bez tam Pareto piederību kādai no kategorijām uzskata par nemainīgu dzīves gaitā, kamēr mūsu pētījums rāda, ka pastāv indivīdu mobilitāte no vienas kategorijas otrā.

Noderīgi izmantošanai būs arī Burdjē piedāvātie kapitālu jēdzieni:

1. Ekonomiskais kapitāls ir pieeja naudai un kapitālam⁸.
2. Simboliskais kapitāls ir tie simboli un atribūti, kurus nepieciešams apgūt un izziņāt, lai varētu pastāvīgi apliecināt gan savu piederību konkrētam ļaužu lokam, gan savu konkurētspēju⁹. Pie simboliskā kapitāla pieder arī dažādi rangi, gradācijas u. tml.¹⁰
3. Kultūras kapitāls ir iespējas, kas iegūtas izglītības un dažādu kultūras dimensiju apguves rezultātā¹¹.
4. Sociālais kapitāls ir iespējas, ko cilvēks iegūvis, izmantojot savu sociālo izcelsmi¹², taču pie tā attiecināsim arī pozīciju (gan institucionalizēto, gan mazāk formālo), ko cilvēks pirms mobilitātes ieņem (vai ir ieņēmis agrāk), kā arī sociālās saites (pazīšanas) ar citiem indivīdiem.

⁵ Smith, Anthony. *Social Change: Social Theory and Historical Processes*. Longman, 1976. P. 22.

⁶ Сорокин Питирим. Социальная и культуральная мобильность. В кн.: Сорокин Питирим. *Человек, цивилизация, общество*. Москва: Издательство политической литературы, 1992. С. 375.

⁷ Pareto, Vilfredo. *The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology*. NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1983. Vol. 4. P. 1561–1562.

⁸ Карле Ян. Пьер Бурдьё и воспроизводство классового общества. В кн.: Монсон Пер (ред.). *Современная западная социология: теории, традиции, перспективы*. Санкт-Петербург: Нотабене, 1992. С. 409.

⁹ Turpat.

¹⁰ Бурдьё Пьер. *Социология политики*. Москва: Socio-Logos, 1993. С. 70.

¹¹ Карле Ян. Пьер Бурдьё и воспроизводство классового общества. В кн.: Монсон Пер (ред.). *Современная западная социология: теории, традиции, перспективы*. Санкт-Петербург: Нотабене, 1992. С. 409.

¹² Turpat.

Skaidrojot kapitālisma realitāti, noderīgs ir arī amerikāņu ekonomista un sociologa Totsteina Veblena jēdziens “skaudīgais salīdzinājums”. Saskaņā ar viņa skaidrojumu tas ir “cilvēku novērtēšanas process pēc to vērtīguma”. Skaudīgais salīdzinājums, pēc Veblena domām, ir svarīgs mehānisms, kas izraisa bagātības uzkrāšanu¹³. Te darbojas princips, kas ir pretējs sociālistiskajai pārdalīšanas sistēmai – “ja kādam ir, tad man arī vajag”. Savukārt tas, kam ir, kaitina tos, kuriem nav, lepojas ar to, ka viņam ir. Sociālistiskā domāšanas veida loģika ir pretēja – “ja kādam ir, tad vajag, lai viņam nebūtu”.

Tagad pievērsīsimies galvenajiem secinājumiem par ekonomisko mobilitāti ietekmējošiem faktoriem.

Padomju periods kopumā raksturojams kā “rantjē” laiks. Cilvēkiem ar šādu domāšanas veidu valsts garantētā sociālā drošība bija pa prātam. “Spekulanti” šai laikā galvenokārt nodarbojās ar nelegālu uzņēmējdarbību (galu galā LPSR Kriminālkodeksā bija arī pants par spekulāciju).

Viena no straujo sociālo pārmaiņu perioda nozīmīgākajām sastāvdaļām bija valsts uzņēmumu likvidācija vai privatizācija. Makro līmeņa procesi ekonomikas pārveidē izraisīja izmaiņas mezo līmenī (konkrētos uzņēmumos). Tas savukārt tieši ietekmēja mikro līmeni – uzņēmumu darbiniekiem nācās meklēt jaunas darbavietas vai citus naudas pelnīšanas veidus. Tomēr tiem, kuri darbu zaudēja (tika atlaisti vai paši aizgāja) straujo pārmaiņu perioda sākumā, situācija bija nedaudz privilēģētāka, salīdzinot ar tiem, kuru uzņēmumi pārtrauca savu eksistenci vēlāk (vai kurus atlaida vēlāk) – atrast jaunu naudas pelnīšanas veidu (tai skaitā darbu) iesākumā bija daudz vienkāršāk. Tādējādi par daudziem no tiem, kuri darbavietas valsts sektorā saglabāja (izņemot ierēdņus), var runāt kā par cilvēkiem ar “iekonservētu” risku – viņi darbu var zaudēt arī vēlāk, kad iespējas atrast ko citu jau būs daudz mazākas. Protams, zināms “iekonservētais” risks ir arī tiem, kas strādā, nemaksājot sociālo nodokli, jo bezdarba vai pensionēšanās gadījumā sagaidāms straujš ekonomiskās labklājības kritums.

Par lejupvērstu sociālo mobilitāti jārunā attiecībā uz daudzu valsts iestāžu (izņemot augstāko līmeni) darbiniekiem. Viņi darbu nezaudēja, taču notika tā saucamā strukturālā mobilitāte – turpinot darīt to pašu, ko iepriekš, viņi saņēma mazāk, viņu nodarbošanās prestižs arī, visdrīzāk, bija krities. Šai gadījumā makro līmeņa pārmaiņu izraisītās izmaiņas ietekmēja mezo līmeni, taču ietekme uz mikro līmeni nebija tik izteikta kā uzņēmumu likvidācijas un privatizācijas gadījumā. Tādēļ cilvēki bija mazāk motivēti kaut ko savā dzīvē mainīt, viņiem joprojām bija darbs (lai arī ne tik prestižs kā agrāk, bet tas pats) un alga (lai arī ne ar tādu pirktpēju kā agrāk).

Toties straujā sociālo pārmaiņu perioda sākumā brīnišķīgas peļņas iespējas bija cilvēkiem ar “spekulantiem” raksturīgo domāšanas veidu. Tie, kuri nenokļuva pie privatizācijas iespējām, kredītu dališanās un citām augstākā līmeņa aktivitātēm, vajag importēt deficīta preces, spekulēt tirgos, atvērt veikalus, kafejnīcas, jo sākotnēji konkurence bija minimāla. Valsts nespēja kontrolēt naudas plūsmu un efektīvi iekasēt nodokļus no šādas tirdzniecības. Tāpat bija iespējas iesaistīties nelegālajā biznesā (piemēram, ar nelegālo alkohola tirdzniecību varēja nodarboties salīdzinoši brīvi).

¹³ Veblen, Thorstein. *The Theory of the Leisure Class*. Dover Publications, 1994. P. 22.

Ja cilvēki nenodarbojas ar biznesu, viņiem straujās inflācijas apstākļos praktiski nebija iespējas saglabāt savus uzkrātos naudas līdzekļus (teorētiski gan pastāvēja izdevība to ieguldīt precēs, tomēr skaidrs, ka straujas inflācijas apstākļos cilvēki vairāk ir ieinteresēti pirkt nekā pārdot – veiksmīgu naudas ieguldījumus atrast ir grūti). Šeit redzam situāciju, kad makro līmeņa pārmaiņas tiešā veidā ietekmē mikro līmeni – katra iedzīvotāja maciņu. Protams, teorētiski saglabājas zināms taisnīgums – visvairāk zaudē tas, kuram visvairāk ir, zaudējumi ir tieši proporcionāli uzkrājumiem, tomēr tā ir taisnība tikai, ja runājam par cilvēkiem ar “rantjē” domāšanas veidu. “Spekulanti” atrada izeju biznesā, tādējādi savus naudas līdzekļus nereti pat vairojot.

Pārmaiņu periodā iezīmējās zināma pretruna starp sabiedrības daļas kultūras kapitālu un kapitālisma loģiku – daudzi sociālistiskajā sabiedrībā augušie un dzīvojušie nespēja pieņemt merkantilo “mežonīgā” kapitālisma domāšanu. Grūtības bija ar “skaudīgā salīdzinājuma” attīstīšanu. Uzzinot par sabiedrības daļas straujo un ievērojamo dzīves līmeņa kāpumu (pamatā to, kam raksturīga “spekulantu” domāšana), vairumā pārējās sabiedrības radās nevis vēlme (vismaz ne realizējama vēlme) arī pašiem uzlabot savu dzīves līmeni (respektīvi, ne “skaudīgais salīdzinājums”), bet gan populārs kļuva sociālistiskais domāšanas veids, kas par lielāku problēmu uzskata nevis to, ka pašam nav, bet to, ka kādam citam ir. Tas nozīmēja atsvešināšanos no sabiedrībā notiekošajām pārmaiņām, to nepieņemšanu. Virknē gadījumu šāda situācija noveda pie alkoholisma.

Protams, alkoholisms bija problēma arī padomju periodā, tomēr tad to ierobežoja padomju sistēma, kas katram cilvēkam lika strādāt algotu darbu. Nepieciešamība iet uz darbu ievietoja cilvēku ar alkoholiķa tieksmēm zināmos rāmjos, viņš ne tikai dzēra, bet darīja arī kaut ko sabiedrībai derīgu. Kapitālisms tiešu piespiedšanas mehānismu nenodrošina, tādējādi cilvēks (ņemot vērā visai zemās nelegālā alkohola cenas) var vienkārši nestrādāt vai pastrādāt īsu brīdi, kamēr nopelna kārtējai devai. Ja arī citas institūcijas (kā ģimene, dažos gadījumos – draugi) nenodrošina šo funkciju – atturēšanu no pastāvīgas alkohola lietošanas, tad nodzeršanās ir neizbēgama.

Daudzās intervijās ar cilvēkiem, kuri pārdzīvojuši šīs sociālās pārmaiņas, kā nozīmīgs faktors, kas nosaka ekonomiskās mobilitātes iespējas, tiek minēta cilvēka personība, tās iezīmes. Šīs iezīmes, protams, ir ievērojami sarežģītākas par tiem vienkāršajiem rāmjiem, ko esam noteikuši (“spekulanti”–“rantjē”, “skaudīgais salīdzinājums”, kapitāli u. tml.). Šai gadījumā paveras iespējas pētniecībai kopā ar sociālajiem psihologiem, mēģinot sociālā līmenī formalizēt tos noteicošos psiholoģiskos faktorus, kas vienam cilvēkam dod vienas mobilitātes iespējas, bet citam – citas.

Būtiskā mērā indivīdu iespējas noteica tādi sociālā līmeņa faktori kā tautība un vecums. Daudzi nelatvieši kļuva par otrās šķiras iedzīvotājiem, kas ievērojami ierobežoja viņu tālākās augšupvērstās mobilitātes iespējas, bet vēl biežāk virzīja viņus lejup pa ekonomiskās mobilitātes kāpnēm. Sevišķi smaga situācija bija PSRS/Krievijas armijas virsnieku ģimenes locekļiem. Tāpat svarīga nozīme ir vecumam – ja padomju periodā cilvēki, sasniedzot noteiktu vecumu, pensionējās un saņēma pietiekamu pensiju, kas nereti daudz neatpalika no algas, tad kapitālisms ievērojami samazināja pensionāru pirktspēju, bet daudzus cilvēkus pirmspensijas vecumā nostādīja vēl smagākā situācijā, jo, zaudējot darbu, viņu iespējas atrast jaunu bieži vien bija niecīgas.

Nedaudz pievērsīsimies arī stabilizācijas periodam, kas pakāpeniski iestājas visās sociālās dzīves sfērās (vislētāk, protams, kultūras un prestiža sfērās, visātrāk – politiskajā sfērā). Ekonomiskā dzīve šādas stabilizācijas apstākļos nozīmē kapitāla koncentrāciju, kas izraisa mazo uzņēmumu bankrotus vai labākajā gadījumā – nepieciešamību tos pārdot. Arī nelegālajā uzņēmējdarbības sfērā iespējas gūt peļņu mazinās. Savukārt tiem, kuriem tomēr izdodas turpināt savu biznesu, no “spekulantiem” nākas kļūt par “rantjē”.

Jāmin arī tas, ka daļa sabiedrības ir tā pieradusi pie straujajām pārmaiņām, ka to tempu palēnināšanās, attīstība “soli pa solim” viņiem nav pieņemama. Šie cilvēki vēlas visu tūlīt (jeb, kā tas tiek dēvēts, “dzīvot normāli”, par “normu” pieņemot rietumu dzīves standartu, kas neapšaubāmi ir augstākais pasaulē). Tas savukārt nozīmē, ka šie cilvēki meklē darbu ārpus Latvijas vai pat emigrē. Latvijas pievienošanās Eiropas Savienībai šo procesu veicina.

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The Social Construction of Risk: a Debate over Nuclear Technology in Lithuania

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INTRODUCTION

Within the context of the conference “Negotiating Futures – State, Society and the World,” it is important to analyse the topic of risk in emerging modern societies. Risk is not only shaping changes in present day social systems but will also raise challenges for future decisions regarding risk management and risk social acceptance. Another important topic is the public participation in both risk discourse construction and risk management questions that identify the features of civil society and democratic development of the state.

This article discusses the social construction of risk perception. It analyses various factors that can influence differences in risk perception. It also outlines the features of risk society and considers how nuclear power can be viewed as risk society in action. Furthermore, the debate over nuclear power in Lithuania is discussed and the wide range of conflicts associated with the debate are revealed. The article ends with an elaboration of the lack of public involvement in risk management and argues that public ignorance towards these important state related questions can cause future problems.

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF RISK

‘So little did philosophy philosophize about civilization that ... in the hour of peril the watchman who ought to have kept us awake was himself asleep and the result was that we put up no fight at all on behalf of our civilization’

Albert Schweitzer ‘The Philosophy of Civilization’¹

Many Social Science scholars acknowledge that in contemporary society the concept of *risk* plays a much greater importance than *danger* in earlier societies. Recently, sociological theories are concerned with important social, economic and environmental changes behind the emergence of “modern risks”.

¹ Cited in K.S. Shrader – Frechette (1980: 74)

M. Douglas in the essay “Risk and Justice” (1992: 19–30) describes the changes in the meaning of the “risk” concept. The notion of risk emerged in 17th century as a concept of gambling. The original meaning of “risk” was related to the probability of an event occurring, combined with the magnitude of the losses and gains that would be involved. During the 18th century the concept of risk was used in marine insurance and in 19th century it became important in economics, as the theory of “risk - taking.” Douglas states, “the original idea of risk in itself was *neutral*.” However with the changing conditions of modernity, the concept of risk acquired a *negative* meaning, as it started to mean only that with undesirable outcomes. Earlier the word “danger” had the same meaning as “risk” in the contemporary world, however the concept of *danger* does not have the scientific meaning nor does it afford the possibility of precise calculation. (Douglas, 1992: 25). Relating the notion of risk with the culture, Douglas (1992: 22) states, “... *risk* is a word that admirably serves the *forensic* needs of the new global culture.” In Douglas view, the notion of risk has emotional meaning, in addition to neutral and negative connotations.

D. Lupton (1999) also discusses the meaning of “risk” as a concept, comparing medieval and contemporary societies. Medieval societies were primarily concerned with preventing and dealing with danger. Risk was perceived as a natural event (for example a storm) while contemporary society sees risk as deviation from either a norm, misfortune or a frightening event. Lupton explains why the concept of risk has gained such an importance in recent times. She brings up the point not only in public and expert discourses but also in sociological theory. According to her, the decision making process for making future plans has come to rely on risk taking analysis, now dominating the perception about how to actualize ideas for future society. (1999: 12). There has also been a change in the nature of risks as “they became more globalized, less identifiable and more serious in their effects, therefore less easily manageable and anxiety provoking” (Beck as cited in Lupton 1999: 10).

FEATURES OF RISK SOCIETY

The conception of *risk society* was very influential the XX century’s social theory. The main concepts of Beck’s theory (1992) are risk society, reflexive modernization and individualization. The aim of this work was to shed light on what will happen in the future while understanding that it is shaped by the past. The theory of risk society is an attempt to form a model for a new society, i.e. a modern society that exists in the conditions of increasing risk.

Risk is defined as ‘systemic dangers and insecurities that emerge in the process of modernization’ (1992: 21). The consequences of technological development have become unpredictable. Risk is becoming the dominating power in the society. Beck analyses two different forms of division in the society, namely the division of welfare in the industrial society; and the division of risk in the risk society. The distribution of risk does not correspond to the logic of the distribution of the welfare in the industrial societies, as it is not based on the division of social classes. The problem of risk reduction or liquidation emerges. The risks of modernization earlier or later touch those

who benefit from them. Beck calls it “the effect of the boomerang” (1992: 37). The risk society creates new type of inequality first between the Third world and industrial countries, then among industrial countries themselves. The risk society is a global society, because there is no class inequality, as there is in industrial society with the distribution of welfare. Risk is universal and globalizing as it is equally distributed among the members of the society.

Security dominates the motivational structure of individuals, while in industrial society individuals are motivated by welfare. The solidarity of risk society is motivated by anxiety. The deterioration of the environment is becoming a social, political, economic and cultural concern. Beck argues, “that now there is transitional period from an industrial society to a risk society.”

Risk in modern societies can be viewed as a social construct. The perception of risk of different technologies and environmental problems differs depending on various factors, such as the cultural context, socio – demographic characteristics, the proximity of living in a place close to a risky object, the level of knowledge about risky technologies, and the role of the media (amplification or negation of certain topics of risk).

NUCLEAR POWER AS RISK SOCIETY IN ACTION

According to Mehta (1997), the nuclear energy industry can be viewed as risk society in action. Nuclear energy has become both a symbol of industrial progress and energy self-sufficiency, as well as perceived as a threat to human health and the ecosystem. There are two camps in the debate about the nuclear energy industry – simply, those for it (the defenders) and those against (the opponents). The specifics of this debate are concerned with the fact that most decisions in this industry are highly dominated by scientific and technical expertise. That is why it is difficult to create mechanisms for public participation in the governmental decision-making process. According to Mehta (1997: 6), the important questions in the nuclear energy debate are “What is a suitable balance between the influence of technical expertise and the influence of citizens in assessing and managing environmental risks? How much weight should the public perception of risk have in regulating hazardous technologies like nuclear power?”

Opponents to nuclear power often prefer smaller scale technologies which are decentralized, sustainable, enable more equal distribution of wealth as well as political power and allow citizens to understand and then participate in the formulation of social and technological policy. They view nuclear power as unsafe, unnecessary and uneconomical and they oppose it because it produces a range of undesirable social consequences. *Defenders* of nuclear power are more likely to defend technology in general, as well as economic and industrial growth. Also, many of them are against public participation in the nuclear industry discussion because it encourages conflict and discord and the issues are too technical for the public. There are purely environmental arguments that are used for the nuclear energy. Some experts say that nuclear energy is the only large-scale source of electricity that does not produce any of the greenhouse gases that cause global warming.

Public perception of risk from nuclear energy in the context of other kinds of risk is distinctive. As public opinion research showed (Slovic, 1987),

society evaluated the benefits of nuclear energy as rather low, however risk from this technology is evaluated as unacceptably high. Nuclear risk is perceived as unknown, uncontrolled, catastrophic and potentially harmful to future generations and comparing to other technologies, nuclear technology is perceived as the most dangerous.

It is important that the public is well informed about the risks coming from nuclear power industry, and that society could have an objective, non – senses based opinion about these issues. Tellegen and Wolsnik state, that

“The risks people associate with the facilities are the main reasons for opposition. Risk judgements become salient factors as a result of the decisional context. Decision – making on facility sitting is putting environmental risks on the political agenda. In these political processes the differences between the assessments of risks by experts and the social rationality of public perceptions become apparent”. (Tellegen and Wolsnik, 1998: 160)

In the case of the nuclear power debate in Lithuania, there is an interesting example of how the environmental, economic and social motives are revealed at various levels.

DISCURSIVE CONFLICTS OVER NUCLEAR POWER IN LITHUANIA

The problem of environmental risks has become urgent in Lithuania after the declaration of independence in 1991, when Lithuania overtook the management of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant² from the Soviet Union. Lithuania is a country which currently possesses two nuclear power plants that are currently the world’s largest considering their installed capacity³. The plant generates over 70% of the total of the countries electricity. After Lithuania expressed an aspiration to enter the EU, a difficult decision about INPP had to be made. The EU demanded the decommissioning of INPP, because the RBMK reactors installed in the plant are considered principally unsafe. They are the same type of reactors which were installed in nuclear power plant located in Chernobyl. Under the pressure from the EU, Lithuania has signed an agreement to close the first reactor in the beginning of 2005, and the second in 2009. This decision involves huge economic, social and technical problems.

Considering the theory of risk society (Beck, 1992), outlined above, we could expect that the decision to close the nuclear plant would be highly motivated by the environmental issues and ecological concerns would be given priority against economic needs. Moreover, the public should also be motivated by the need to reduce nuclear risks if safety is dominating society’s primary concerns. However, the debate over nuclear power future in Lithuania reveals different motivations in various levels and contradictory perceptions concerning nuclear risks among the political actors, experts and society. Picture 1 schematically indicates the interactions between various actors in the nuclear power discourse.


The EU official position was that the reactors installed in INPP are principally unsafe and it is not possible to build a protective shield, which

² Further INPP.

³ 1500 MW each.

is characteristic to Western reactors, therefore the plant should be closed unconditionally. Interestingly, this opinion was affirmed by all the political actors, but not by Western experts. In 1997 the international group of experts carried out the safety analysis in INPP according to Western safety standards⁴. The conclusions of the report are rather in the nature of a compromise. The report stated that Lithuania will not need to close the plant immediately under the condition that the expert's recommendations are fulfilled. In order to discuss the long-term operation of the plant, several safety improvements should be made. On the other hand, the report does not conclude that the plant fully corresponds to Western safety standards.

On the *political level*, the aspiration to enter the European Union was primary motivation to close the plant. Environmental concerns were only vaguely elaborated as party of the justification. Furthermore, it was often mentioned, that there was a considerable investment made into the safety of the plant and it no longer has safety problems. The concern about financial commitments, related to the plant's decommissioning, was distinct in the political arena, and this was the primary topic in the negotiations with the EU.



Picture 1. The nuclear power debate in Lithuania

Lithuanian *scientists* expressed their support for the nuclear industry in Lithuania. For example, in February 2002, 118 scientists signed an open letter to Lithuanian President and Parliament expressing their concern about the closure of INPP, stating that the plant is safe and there would be huge economic and social problems following the decommissioning. However, it is important to note that the majority of these scientists have a conflict of interest due to the fact that they are employed by or related to the nuclear industry.

⁴ Review of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant Safety Analysis Report (1997) – Riskaudit No 55.

Finally, how does *society* perceive the risks from nuclear power and the closure of the plant? In March 2002, a public opinion survey was carried out⁵. Two questions were formulated; “Do you agree with V. Adamkus’ opinion that INPP should not be closed until 2009 as the EU demands⁶?” and “Do you agree, that Lithuania should remain nuclear power country?” 64% answered ‘yes’ to first question, but only 42% answered ‘yes’ to the second question. These results identify, that part of the population perceives the EU position as not well grounded. There are also remarkable differences in the perception of nuclear risk in the population of the surrounding INPP regions and the town of Visaginas, which is inhabited mainly by the workers of the plant and their family members. Sociological research (Čiužas, 1998) revealed that the largest part of the population in the surrounding regions of INPP feel a psychological discomfort about a possible accident in the plant. However only 6% of Visaginas’ inhabitants are concerned about a possible accident. As it was outlined above, risk perception is socially constructed and is influenced by various factors. The inhabitants of Visaginas are more closely related to the plant and have more knowledge about technology. This could shape their positive attitudes. On the other hand, these attitudes could also be motivated by personal interests. The closure of the plant would mean social and economic insecurity for many of plant’s workers and their families.

It is important to mention that risk discourse is highly shaped by the media. Society receives the largest part of their information through the media. The media has the power to emphasize or to play down certain topics. The media is able to focus on particular interests and ignore other ones. The media could show the sad stories from Chernobyl, or explore the strengths of the state as nuclear power country.

CONCLUSIONS

The debate over the nuclear power industry in Lithuania not only identifies the conflicting discourses among various social groups, but also raises the question as to what is the role of society in the decision making processes about vital state questions. In Western countries, society is involved in risk discourse construction and the decision making processes. Society is recognized as an equal partner among politicians and experts (Strydom, 2002) and it has the power either to evaluate risk management issues or decide on vital questions (for example by means of referendum). In Lithuania society is not participating in the decision making process. It has neither consultative nor deciding voice. The decisions about vital questions of the state are made on the political level. Even experts who are supposed to be the ones who can provide an unbiased and professional opinion are not allowed significant involvement in making the decisions. A parallel could be drawn with the ratification of the EU constitution. In November 11, 2004 Lithuanian Parliament ratified the EU constitution and became the first country to ratify it. Society was not even

⁵ By public opinion research company ‘Spinter’, total 500 respondents from biggest cities.

⁶ In February 2002, Lithuanian president V. Adamkus expressed an opinion that INPP should not be closed until 2009, as he is not convinced with EU claims about plant’s unsafety.

introduced to the constitution and to the changes it would bring. Furthermore, even on a political level wider discussions involving lawyers, political scientists and other experts were not held. Where does the EU constitution get its justification on a foundational level for Lithuanian state? What process is behind the disallowance of society's role in the decision making process about these important questions to whole population? Does it show underdevelopment of the democratic system and a lack of civil society? This kind of experience could lead to a society where there exists a state of ignorance towards the important processes of the state. The future challenge will be to involve society in the discussions and decisions about key questions of the state, such as environmental risks management or the changes to the constitution. But primarily the state should demonstrate that it has trust in democratic principles and believe that society is able to determine its own future.

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4. Europeanization of External and Internal Policies

Boundary, Identity and the European Union "New Neighbourhood" Policy

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With the biggest ever enlargement ("big bang") in its history in May, 2004 the European Union is undoubtedly becoming more conscious of the question of boundaries. This can be recognized from a number of documents and discussions made public since 2002 when at the Copenhagen European Council (12/13 December, 2002) the enlargement by adding ten new countries got a final go ahead. Before, external boundary questions received rather low attention with the exception of the *Schengen* cooperation and maybe the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership agreement in 1995. Whereas, if we go back to before '89, what was then the European Economic Community (EEC) was simply not "political" enough to raise the boundary question, apart from the fact that Europe was divided by the "Iron Curtain" which in many ways appeared to be the ultimate border (cf. Langer 1999; Paasi 1999). Hence, it is not surprising that it took the EU some time to cast its full attention on this problem. But it was obviously the decision for a "big bang" enlargement which provided the final kick. Now, it will be interesting to see how the awareness of this question will unfold as a policy in the coming ten or fifteen years. Given the character of the phenomenon, the attention for how the EU will conceptualise its external boundaries can never be high enough. In short: Boundary issues can quickly be understood through the metaphor of "skin". Like the "skin" of any entity, the boundaries can give us important information about the state of a political/societal system. It can indicate petrification as well as dissolution of an entity or system. In any case, boundary issues remain an indispensable part of something called *identity*. Hence a discourse on boundary issues always includes aspects of identity. It is its mirror picture.

IN SEARCH FOR THE LIMITS OF EUROPE

Taking this into account, it is not surprising that in an agenda setting speech which the President of the Commission *Romano Prodi* delivered on December 6th, 2002 before the Copenhagen European Council, he outlined the policy approach to dealing with this problem. The speech is titled "A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the key to stability" (SPEECH/02/619). It can be understood as an attempt to initialise a new policy. Although the

main thrust of the speech is simply that enlargement will enable the Union to project “sustainable stability and security” beyond its new external borders from which a “ring of friends” should evolve which will have the perspective of “sharing everything with the Union but institutions” the text contains a number of more tacit policy aspects which deserve a closer scrutiny in my opinion. One is the question, “Where does Europe end?” which *Prodi* shortly points out as a reason behind the need to come up with something like a neighbourhood policy. The President of the Commission recognizes that the EU “cannot go on enlarging forever”, because this would “water down the European political project”. Unfortunately he leaves the reader puzzled about his own answer to this vital question. Quoting the Treaty on European Union (TEU, Art. 49), the Copenhagen Criteria (about the problematic of these criteria see Kochenov 2004) and a “ring of friends” from Russia to Morocco in one breath is somehow confusing.

Art. 49 defines that “any European State” may apply for membership but it does not define “Europe”. Although most people probably follow a geographical definition of Europe, in politics this seems not always to be the case. Example: The acceptance of Turkey with geographically 97 per cent of area in Asia as a candidate for EU membership at the Helsinki *Intergovernmental Conference* (IGC) in 1999, whereas Morocco with a similar historical linkage to Europe has been refused before. On the other hand, the Copenhagen Criteria as such have no geographical reference at all. They are universalistic criteria which could permit any country to apply for membership in the EU. Finally, the “ring of friends” is an emotional expression rather than a political concept – *Prodi* uses it more or less synonymous with “our future backyard”. It appears as if each of these parameters for an EU identity policy represent different interests, assumptions and historical constellations (cf. Somek 2003; Olsen 2003). This might explain why the terminology used to suggest new relations with countries remains ambiguous, metaphorical and confusing. The clearest of all the key terms in this context is probably that of “proximity” which appears in the headline of *Prodi’s* speech, whereas “Wider Europe” and “neighbourhood” which in the twin construction of “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood” later became the title of a related *Communication of the Commission* (11.3.2003) contain plenty of room for interpretation and misunderstanding.

Although the new policy is intended to stop “enlarging forever” by offering “more than partnership” and “less than membership”, surprisingly, according to *Prodi* it should not preclude the latter either. “A proximity policy would not start with the promise of membership and it would not exclude eventual membership.” How then should the reader understand the statement proclaiming that the EU cannot go on enlarging forever? If this is not ambiguous what is ambiguity then? There is even more confusion, when we read in the “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood” Communication from the Commission a few months later, that for the Mediterranean partners the issue of “prospective membership has already been resolved. Accession has been ruled out ...” What then is the “eventual membership”? But, again, like in *Prodi’s* speech, this quest for a final boundary does not leave any trace in the policy outlined. Again, neither in the policy objectives nor in the details

does the text differentiate between the neighbours which are geographically in Europe and those beyond the Mediterranean in Africa or the Middle East, although one could be inclined to assume that “Wider Europe” designates first of all the European neighbours, whereas “Neighbourhood” points to the whole “ring” from Russia to Morocco. But this is only a guess, because most of the time the terms are used synonymously. Indeed, the policy as it is emerging, appears to be obsessed with *not* to differentiate between European and other neighbours. Instead, it emphasises the fact that every country should be treated individually. Whereas, the term “Wider Europe” seems to continue the dubious custom to speak of “Europe” when actually only the European Union is meant. Then geographical Europe, which is not “the EU”, could be understood as “Wider Europe”. However, in the context of the discussion scrutinized here, it could well be that the term is understood to designate all those countries who are recognized as “neighbours”. The latter would mean an evolution of the term “Europe” from a geographical definition to an entirely political one. However, for the time being it rather looks like a deep uncertainty about EU identity.

A “RING OF FRIENDS”

Similarly, like the question “Where does Europe end?” also the term “neighbourhood” is dealt with ambiguously. It is worth noticing that it does not yet appear in the title of *Prodi’s* key speech (02/619) where he prefers “Proximity Policy” instead. And in the text he even calls for a “workable concept of proximity” and not of neighbourhood. On the one hand *Prodi* admits that he uses “our neighbourhood in the literal sense of the word, our backyard” only. One could argue with *Prodi* if “backyard” is really the “literal” sense of neighbourhood and at the same time agree that a concept of proximity is needed after enlargement. However, in the Communication from the Commission to the Council (11.3.2003) this suggestion was not taken up, instead “neighbourhood” became the overriding concept already highlighted in the title – “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”. Now, one can wonder whether this happened more or less incidentally or if there is a deeper paradigmatic meaning behind it. Be it as it may, in any case the Communication clearly indicates what kind of policy is intended and planned. And this can be compared with the literal meaning of the word as well as with “neighbourhood” as an academic concept. Such a comparison not only will tell us something about the appropriate use of the word but should also provide additional insight into latent dimensions of the policy under discussion.

The term “neighbour” or “neighbourhood” usually points to a spatial proximity of entities *or* stands for a concept describing relations between certain actors. In the latter case “proximity” is a major parameter but the emphasis is put on pattern of “relations”. The closest example for comparison here would come from “community studies” in the social sciences. There “neighbourhood” can be seen as something between “family” and “social circle” if we decide for *choice* as a criteria. Whereas family is something of a *fate*, social circles (friends, golf clubs, associations etc.) can be

freely joined and left. Neighbourhood is something in between. Although, to some extent it can be chosen, at least in a modern society, as soon as we have made the choice proximity becomes our fate. Its prototype is the village community. At this point it becomes clear that using the term in relations between actors like states is rather metaphorical. It reminds of talks about the EU as a “family”. Such terminological choices for metaphors are usually made when it is either difficult to find a genuine term or due to an existing favourable semantic aura of the metaphor or simply to hide something.

In any case, spatial proximity is an indispensable part of the definition. Besides, key variables like size, the common good, respect of boundaries, exchange of information, social control and degree of cohesion are important. Neighbourhood in this sense implies reciprocity, mutual responsibility and a feeling of belonging. The basic units of neighbourhood are families (households) and village institutions (e.g. church, fire guard, municipality). What is a good neighbour? There are three expectations central to the role of neighbour: a) reciprocity, b) hands off the other’s property and internal affairs (maintaining boundaries) and c) care for the common good. Reciprocity means mutual help when needed. Other than within a family the values and customs of a neighbour have to be respected. Villages can still show a lot of regularity, even on the level of families and households. However, this is due to common socialisation and not to neighbours interference. The common good again is something which neither the family nor the market can provide for the village dwellers. In the prototype neighbourhood a lot of it would be contributed free of charge (e.g. fire guard, road repair). But, in modern times, such services are increasingly sustained through the tax system. To define “neighbourhood” as one’s “backyard” is probably not very inviting. Even more hostile, it can appear the *conditionality* of adopting one’s own values and way of life – if we stay with the concept of neighbourhood.

ENLARGEMENT IN DISGUISE

Having made these distinctions, it is becoming clear that “neighbourhood” is certainly not the most valid term to designate the policy which the EU is suggesting. To deserve the term “neighbourhood policy” the suggestions made contain too much conditionality. Honestly, to demand “shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including in aligning legislation with the *acquis*” in return for favourable economic exchange is far beyond any reasonable neighbourhood concept. What can be expected in the framework of a neighbourhood policy is that the neighbouring states behave in accordance with international law. And, of course, it would be of advantage for the EU if the neighbours are doing economically well, whether they are EU type market economies or not. “Common values” are not something we can demand from a neighbour. Not to mention, that such demands become particularly delicate when the EU itself fails to meet the criteria. This is, for example, increasingly the case with the value of “democracy” where on the supranational level democratic representation of citizen interests are

replaced by oligarchic bargaining, non-binding information sharing and lobbyism (cf. Langer 2004).

If the new policy doesn't fit conceptually into a neighbourhood framework what is it then? It is a proximity policy without a “substantive and workable concept of proximity” for which *Prodi* in his speech (see above) was pleading. Instead, it is semantically sailing under the umbrella of a metaphor in which the “neighbourhood” criteria is not met. And finally, the measures suggested show us most clearly we are embarking on another enlargement without the promise of membership, although membership is not categorically excluded either. Without doubt, the EU is facing severe challenges (environmental, political and social hazards) beyond its external borders. But the question is whether the strategy to ask countries just to duplicate EU institutional arrangements or the *acquis* is an efficient response to these challenges. Behind this question still linger other more fundamental questions which have to be answered first. Questions like, “What forces are driving the EU to expand?” or “Why is the EU so ignorant, even hostile when facing the reality of cultural differences?” Although the Commission is recognizing that there “cannot be a one-size-fits-all policy” it is at the same time strangely avoiding taking into account that the Mediterranean proximity is Muslim and that in the east are post-communist societies of mainly Orthodox Christian faith. Instead, it is trying hard to find similarities on the basis of very general economic indicators and the claim that both regions have a “history of autocratic and non-democratic governance”.

To recognize the *cultural dimension* would introduce different variables, raise new questions, produce unconventional answers and finally change policies. Without being able to go into detail here, I would like to sketch an example. The Mediterranean targets of the new EU proximity policy have all been for some time colonies of European powers. Now most of them are involved in more or less open civil wars, which seem to be fed by disagreement over the adoption of Western values. Unfortunately, in its communication concerning the “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood” the Commission is completely blind towards this reality, although it is making “shared values” a condition for a closer economic relationship. Is it too far fetched to claim that in North Africa and the Middle East the EU is challenged by another spiritual power? And, how much is this relevant for a proximity policy? Turning to the new boundary in the East the picture is completely different. There we rather find a void of values accompanied by social disintegration. The heritage of the Soviet Union seems to be the disintegration of society on all levels. Besides, there is the new Russia, which sometimes is seen by the EU as a partner, sometimes even as a future member and rarely as an opponent. In its proximity policy the EU is neglecting these different potentials of Russia, although Russian foreign policy has a similar concept as the EU's “new neighbourhood” and this is the “near abroad”. In fact, this should ring a bell about conflicting interests. To see Russia only through economic indicators like GDP/C or FDI is strongly misleading. For example, how relevant for proximity policy is an information in the Annex of the “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood” Communication in which Russia has the same GDP/C as Tunisia? Not

much! Why not take the more complex UN Human Development Index, where in 2003 Russia ranked 63rd and for example the EU candidate Turkey only 96th place.

FROM NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY TO FRONTIER STABILIZATION

Although the new “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood” policy indicates a greater awareness of the external boundaries in the EU and the challenges looming from behind, the suggested measures that are visible from the available documents are highly questionable. Both seem to derive from an amalgam of universalistic assumptions, humanistic values, global ambitions and a concern for what has already been accomplished in European integration. In combination with numerous conflicting interests inside the EU, this produces highly ambiguous and conceptually constraining views of reality. Such policy concepts read like this, “We want a secure external border, but it must be completely permeable.” or “Our neighbours must adopt EU institutions to the extent that they can be considered part of the ‘family’ without being it.” and “We want a ‘ring of friends’ who follow the same objectives although they are very different.” Such views completely neglect the fact that if subjects from both sides of a boundary are treated the same, it becomes irrelevant, because it goes against all what boundaries are about. Reality, of course, will be different, because no political system can survive with such an inconclusive approach. Like in the past we will observe border incidents reminding us more of a “Fortress Europe” than of the respective policy documents. But, nobody should underestimate the universalistic and global minded part of the EU elites who lack the certainty about boundaries which was so characteristic for the elites of nation states. The most likely compromise between their obvious despise of any limitations and the danger of disintegration of the Union could be a frontier seen as a more or less broad zone of identity uncertainty, contrary to a boundary which is rather a single line. In the frontier we will find “neighbours” (see documents quoted) who might comply better with EU regulations than even some of the real members. For example, let’s think about Norway (frontier) and Romania (soon member) or Israel (potential frontier) and Turkey (potential member).

The EU documents on the “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood,” point in this direction. With respect to identity it is important to recognize that “frontier” is a type of border historically common with empires. Frontiers are by definition instable, they move forward and back depending on the actual power of the empire in relation to its opponents. In the past opponents were Barbarians or Savages. Who could emerge as an opponent of an Imperial EU? First of all, officially the EU does not have “Empire” as an objective. It is even seen as being more associated with “Venus” (peace). The shared self perception would probably be that of a “political structure *sui generis*”. Some also recognize in it a new type of *network state*. Although European states were divided with respect to the Iraq war EU institutions either kept a low profile or showed preference for multilateralism and peace. Is this the way empires are born? Empires usually enlarge by force or recruit vassals who expect protection, whereas the EU recruits candidates by

deliberately adapting to certain criteria. Maybe “protection” is historically a motive of vassals – EU candidates seeking protection from economic hardship? Still, the process is too messy to give us a concrete answer whether the EU will move toward an empire. Nevertheless, if we just stay with the rhetoric coming out of EU institutions, a lot of it hints in that direction. To be fair, we have to admit that the visible intention behind is to become a “Good Empire”.

Historically, Europe went through long and short waves of *expansion* and *contractions*. For example, the post Second World War (WWII) era could be seen as a short wave of contraction, whereas the latest long wave of expansion can be recognized as beginning with the Renaissance. After WWII Germany was destroyed and other European powers with colonial ambitions began to withdraw from their global ‘properties’. For fifty years Europe was mainly looking inwardly, rebuilding her capability to act. Currently, is the EU just an institutional metamorphosis to pursue an age old imperial and global ambition? Is the EU going to inherit the “wing powers” of the second half of the twentieth century, the USA and the Soviet Union? Is the official image of an enlightened and peaceful political structure *sui generis* nothing else than a wolf in sheep’s clothing? The signs that point in this direction are plenty but only history will show where slogans like “Europe has to become a real global player” as used by Romano *Prodi* in his address on “Wider Europe” will lead. The “ring of friends” envisaged might not become the stable zone of security and shared prosperity as intended when using such a metaphor, but rather a part of a wider frontier in which the rules and values of the Union will be continuously challenged if not openly despised or abused. As with past empires, this frontier could swing forward and back depending on the compliance with EU rules. The frontier is always a provisional border. If this is the future, “neighbours” can turn into vassals as well as enemies (e.g. harbouring terrorist). There are alternatives but they must be discussed, cast into a political program and finally turned into a new reality. In any case, the first question must always be, “What do we want the European Union to be like?”

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Can We Not Cooperate? New Risks and the Challenge of International Cooperation

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I INTRODUCTION

„Every day, people face a variety of risks that may result in the damage to what they value: their life, their health, the lives and health of others, their property, or the environment.”¹ Some of these risks are old, some are new. But, and this is the focus of my interest in this paper, risks which people face are increasingly generated outside the political jurisdictions in which they live.

Table 1

Scope of Risk Problems and Scope of Policy Solutions

Type of Risk	Scope of Risk	Scope of Policy Solutions	Problems
Peace and security (terrorism, organized criminality, nuclear proliferation)	G, R	G, R	Prioritizing threats, financing risk prevention
Environment (climate change, supply of drinkable water, biodiversity)	G,R, N	G, R, N	Distribution of costs of policies
Immigration (demographic ageing, cultural tensions)	R,N	N	Harmonizing the control of migration
Food safety and the increase of international trade in food	R,N	N	Credibility of domestic inspections systems
Public health (transborder contagious diseases)	G,R,N	G,R,N	Setting minimum level of safety control

Source: Own elaboration

Note: G – global; R – regional; N – national; L – local

The table below gives the examples of risks, which are faced by contemporary societies. The reduction of these risks is perceived as desirable

¹ OECD. *Emerging Systemic Risks in the 21st Century*. Paris, 2003, 9.

by most of the citizens and political authorities are held accountable for actions aiming to reduce them. In an era of economic openness and, in a member state of the European Union, which legally guarantees freedoms of movement of goods, services, capital and labour, no individual state is able to reduce the risks its citizens face without cooperation with other countries. Such a statement is of course nothing new. What is new, as I will try to show in this short paper, is that the requirement of international cooperation leads to the interest in the capacity of cooperating countries to effectively implement and enforce international agreements, that external credibility in international cooperation requires internal administrative effectiveness.

II STAGES IN DEALING WITH RISK

To understand the problems of international cooperation in risk prevention and risk reduction we should start by setting an appropriate conceptual framework to understand the specificity of risk reduction policies.

The experts of international organizations, like the EU and the WTO and the OECD, stress the necessity of systematically differentiating risk assessment from risk management and risk communication.²

Risk Assessment

Risk assessment denotes the scientific identification and scientific estimation of the existence and level of risk. The EU stresses the need for the science based risk assessment³. The WTO focuses on the use of science in limiting the scope for trade disputes over domestic food safety regulations.⁴

The idea both organizations share is to aim at objective quantification and ranking of risks in order to avoid to the largest possible extent the politicization of risk assessment and the use of risk regulations as a hidden protective barrier – a barrier to trade.

But, it seems not very likely that the science based risk assessment will entirely preempt disputes about the need for and the stringency of risk reduction policies. It is so, because, firstly, some risks cannot be scientifically assessed as they have *trans-scientific* character, that is they cannot be answered by science,⁵ and secondly because the public might not trust science. The latter reason is well supported by the differences in the attitudes of the US and the EU to genetically modified (GM) food. According to the current state of knowledge genetically modified food does not threaten human health. Americans seem to trust this scientific verdict, but

² Trichopoulou, A., Millstone, E., Lang, T., Eames, M., Barling, D., Naska, A., van Zwanenberg, P., Chambers, G. *European Policy on Food Safety*. Report to the European Parliament's Scientific and Technological Options Assessment Programme (STOA). September 2000, 69 PE number: 292.026/Fin.St., <http://www.europarl.eu.int/dg4/stoa/en/publi/default.htm>.

³ The General Principles of Food Law in the European Union COM. 1997. (97) 176 30 April.

⁴ Skogstad, Grace The WTO and Food Safety Regulatory Policy Innovation in the European Union. In *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2001, September. Vol. 39, № 3, 485–505 (21).

⁵ Weinberg, A. Science and trans-science. In *Minerva*. 1972. Vol. 10, 209–222.

Europeans show major distrusts in it and strongly favour the ban on the sale of GM food.

Risk Management

If we believe that the scientific assessment of risks should be separated from the way these risks are managed, we assume that science produces an input into the management process and there its role ends. But, it seems that there are other cases in which risks are not entirely independent from the ways they are handled. Thus, the risk of terrorism might be increased as a side effect of inappropriate policies implemented to reduce it. Furthermore purely scientific approach to risk policies put much faith into technological solutions and usually does not take into account either the changes in the behaviour of individual risk-takers, or the cost tradeoffs (that is when the reduction of one risk leads to the increase of a different risk). At an individual level this is evidenced by the fact that people might inadvertently incur higher risks when they think they are fully protected by the government, because they start behaving less cautiously.

A proper risk management starts with the question of the institutional architecture of risk managing bodies: their positioning in the system of government and in particular the institutional location of responsibility for management and the degree of their independence from purely political bodies (the question like this one: should there be a specialized and independent agency in charge of managing a given risk?). It also tackles such issues as structuring of the process of risk identification and assessment of risk management options, the choice of stakeholders to consult, the analysis of trade-offs among risks and management options and decisions about the degree of the transparency of the risk management.

The quality of domestic institutional structures and procedures is of special importance for international cooperation in risk reduction policies. Commitment to the cooperation in risk reduction policies is credible for other countries (in fact for all bodies external to the risk management process), if these countries receive a clear signal that the institutional architecture and management procedures are effective in reaching the goals of risk reduction policies.

Risk Communication

Risk communication is not strictly speaking a separate stage of addressing risks. It rather permeates risk assessment and risk management and it should not be seen as a stage following the earlier two.

Effective communication practices are important for the public understanding of scientific results and scientific uncertainties, and are of crucial importance for building trust in science based risk assessment.

Effective communication is even more important for risk management as it not only serves to build trust in managing institutions, but also it informs citizens how they can contribute to risk reduction, and thus it can be called an instrument of risk policy coordination.

The risk communication is not an easy task since societies differ in attitudes, perceptions and beliefs regarding risks. Thus the information about

risk should be tailored to suit a given cultural and social context and to take account of people's cognitive capacities.

In contemporary societies trust in the effectiveness of risk reduction policies has a cross-national dimension. Citizens have to trust their domestic risk reduction institutions and they have to trust such institutions in other countries, if the efforts to reduce risks are not to be doubled.⁶ The lack of trust makes citizens vulnerable to the scares and panics stimulated by the media. In the age of informational openness such panics spill-over through national frontiers and are difficult to stop.

III MECHANISMS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN RISK REDUCTION POLICIES

It has been already stressed that many risks contemporary societies face have transnational characteristics: they spill-over through political frontiers and generate negative externalities even for countries that make an effort to reduce them.

International cooperation is a necessary condition for effective and efficient risk reducing policies. But, such cooperation cannot be assumed as emerging automatically. For a variety of reasons such as for instance the asymmetry of negative external effects, free riding, which are well known to social scientists, the international cooperation to prevent, reduce or eliminate risks is usually sub-optimal both in terms of its intensiveness and with regards to applied methods.

In what follows I will list and shortly describe mechanisms of international cooperation in the three stages of dealing with risks.

The soundness of scientific analysis and trust in science has been identified as chief obstacles to the science based risk assessment and the use of its results for risk reduction purposes. The scale of these problems is reduced by the existence of international scientific programmes, the existence of transnational "epistemic communities"⁷ and in general by all ways of sharing the knowledge and technologies across the countries. Besides this general mechanism, countries undertake multilateral dialogue (within the European Union or the World Trade Organization) to standardize the ways they assess risks, the ultimate purpose being the reduction of conflicts over the meaning of risk assessment outcomes.

The features of an institutional architecture of risk managing institutions, such as the degree of their autonomy from political principals, and the characteristics of risk management procedures, such as their transparency, have been shown to matter for the quality of risk

⁶ This idea can be illustrated by the following example: a country can allow for imports of foods from other countries by relying on safety certificates issued by inspection services of the exporting country or can set up a border inspection system which would test all imported food.

⁷ Epistemic community means a group of specialists who interact among them selves pursuing scientific purposes, setting criteria of research excellence and judging with them scientific outcomes – for the analysis how epistemic communities influence risk regulations see: Braithwaite, John, Drahos, Peter. *Global Business Regulations*. Cambridge UP, 2000, 17 and furthers.

management and the credibility of a risk management system in the eyes of external actors. These problems can be reduced if countries agree to and apply in practice similar criteria in constructing the institutions for risk regulation. The proliferation of regulatory agencies is just one example of such commonalities, in which the European Commission and the member states of the European Union seem to follow the example of the United States.⁸ The international cooperation is also facilitated if the rules of policy transparency are consistently applied as this serves to enhance transnational trust in risk reduction policies.⁹

The main task of good communication is to prevent international scares or panics.¹⁰ This can be done if the flow of risk related information between policy makers in cooperating countries and between them and general public is systematic and reliable.

The three stages of risk reduction policies are equally important for the efficiency of risk reduction policies. To all of them we can also apply the criteria, which are shortly described in the table below.

Table 2

Basic Criteria for Evaluating International Risk Reduction Policies

Old approach	New (recommended) approach
<i>Reactivity</i> : when policy measures risks which have already occurred	<i>Precaution</i> : when policy measures try to prevent risks
<i>Virtual comprehensiveness</i> : when policies try to address all threats	<i>Selectivity</i> : when policies intervene in critical points
<i>Fragmentation</i> : when policy measures differ according to different risks	<i>Completeness</i> : when policy instruments address lacunas and cancel overlapping
<i>Centralized financing</i> : when costs are asymmetrically born by one actor	<i>Dispersed financing</i> : when costs of risk reduction fall mostly on those who benefit from them

Source: Own elaboration

A good international risk regulation policy would have to be preventive, selective, complete and sharing its costs among all its beneficiaries.

⁸ Majone, G. The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe. In *West European Politics*. 1994. Vol. 17 (3), 77–101.

⁹ Claudio Radaelli writes that “Transparency is a principle of openness. It covers both the process by which regulations are produced (think of systematic consultation, regulatory agendas, formulation of transparent standards for the use of science and advice in the policy process), and the quality of regulations (opaque regulations that are difficult to find produce high compliance costs).” – Radaelli C. Indicators of Regulatory Quality. Interim Report to the European Commission. June 2004.

¹⁰ GAO Communication About Technology-Based Innovations Can Be Improved. In *Regulatory Management*. February 2001.

CONCLUSIONS

The short analysis developed above shows that international cooperation in risk reduction is necessary if the countries are not to react to “the false sense of insecurity”¹¹ or to not fall into “a false sense of security”. Both situations lead to misallocation of resources: overspending on policy measures which are unnecessary or under spending on areas which in fact need policy intervention.

The complexity of risks faced by contemporary societies leads to the need of various and complex arrangements necessary to carry on international risk reduction policies. Further theoretical and policy oriented research is required.

¹¹ John Miller argues for instance that the US is overacting to the terrorist threats out of such a misperception. Miller J. A False Sense of Insecurity. In *Regulation Magazine*. 2004. Vol. 27, № 3, Fall. Other examples are easy to recall.

Social Work and Housing in a Norwegian Context

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Norwegian authorities are making great efforts to house homeless people and to find decent housing for all of its inhabitants. Social workers are among the many professional groups that are engaged in this work.

HOUSING – A HUMAN NEED AND A WELFARE PROVISION

Normalising and integrating people that are functionally challenged, mentally and/or physically, by securing housing for them within ordinary residential communities is a central goal for Norwegian welfare policy. People who need assistance should first and foremost receive that help in their own neighbourhoods. This policy was put into practice in the 1980's and 1990's after the *Law Governing the Treatment and Aid Provided to Developmentally and/or Functionally Challenged Individuals* was reformed. As a consequence of that reform, many large institutions were closed down and former patients were returned to their own municipalities and were established in ordinary apartments in local communities. When that task was accomplished, similar reforms were made in the *Law Governing the Care and Treatment of Psychiatric Patients* and the *Law Providing Care and Rehabilitation for Drug-Abusers*. Finally, the practices governing the care and treatment of the aged have changed and many more are able to remain in their own homes even when they are in need of care. Municipal authorities have greatly expanded *Home-Help Services* and the service provisions in the local *Centres for the Elderly*.

The authorities have now given priority to the homeless. *Project Homeless* was established by the national government in 2000. At present, the 7 largest city-municipalities are included in this 4 year project, which aims at developing better housing and better social services for the 6000 homeless people in Norway. A series of programmes are being tried-out in order to benefit people whom for one reason or another are without housing or have sub-standard housing. The programmes are being financed by the state. The National Mortgage Bank in Norway administers these programmes, which are put into practice locally, within the city-municipalities.

HIGH STANDARDS FOR HOUSING IN NORWAY

Everyone knows how important housing is for the general experience of living a satisfactory life. Living in one's own home provides the individual with a sense of freedom and with choices that all people value. We find rest and calm in the bosom of our own homes.

Norwegians are known to place a great deal of importance upon their homes. The general housing situation in Norway is, for the time being, very satisfactory. More than 2 of every 3 inhabitants of Norway live in their own roomy houses. The average space per housing unit in Norway is higher than in any other place in Europe. Each and every resident has 50 square meters at his (or her) disposal, on average. There are very few countries in the world that can point to figures this high for space per inhabitant per housing unit. In addition, fewer people are sharing homes these days. According to Norway's Central Bureau of Statistics, 3.4 people lived on average in each housing unit in 1950. Fifty years later, the numbers were lowered to 2.3 people per housing unit. Norwegians live in roomy and beautiful homes and enjoy housing standards that are at the very highest levels in the world (Aftenposten – *The Evening Post*, November 7, 2003). One can readily assert that housing problems in Norway are relatively small when compared to the much larger problems that most other countries have to tackle.

REGIONAL DIFFERENCES

Even though the average person in Norway has very good housing, there continue to be regional and local differences. Because so many Norwegians live in their own houses, the averages I have presented hide the fact that there are many people in Norway who reside in simple and rather cramped quarters. This is particularly true in the larger cities. Housing prices in larger cities have risen to such heights that many people really have to struggle to make ends meet.

A MERCILESS HOUSING MARKET

In recent years, market forces have been allowed to determine prices in the housing market. This has resulted in a very expansive growth in prices for housing in the larger cities. Many resource-poor groups have had great difficulties in being able to secure a roof over their heads, on their own, to a price that is commensurate with their incomes. There is a need for a large number of low-cost housing units and a greater number of flats that can be rented, for people with limited resources who are entering the housing market for the first time.

Many people have experienced that whether or not they entered the housing market at a fortunate or unfortunate moment in time has been decisive, for their own personal economic situation and standard of living. There are great beneficial consequences for anyone who is able to buy an apartment or home when prices are low and employment rates are high. Being

a few years too early or too late, as a first time buyer, can result in a huge drop in your standard of living, immediately, and for many years to come. Buying at the right moment may determine whether or not you become an economic *slave*, i.e. one who works primarily to pay-off mortgage debts and who has little money to spend on anything else.

Norwegian housing policies are based upon the idea that everyone should own their own home. The tax system favours those who own their own home. Public housing is an alternative for very few, and only a few per cent of the population live in public housing projects. Renting a home or apartment is possible, but the rental market is relatively small and there are few advantages for those who rent. Everyone needs a place to live and it is a bit perplexing that the Norwegian Welfare State allows market forces to be so prevalent in the field of housing. Housing is, after all, one of the things that people value most. Good housing is an essential value for the general welfare.

IS GOOD HOUSING A RIGHT?

The right to live in decent housing is connected to our ideas about human rights. The UN Declaration of Human Rights and other conventions concerning economic, social and cultural rights assert that good housing is a basic value and on a par with food and clothing. Still, no one in Norway can simply quote the law and make a demand for decent housing. The individual's right to decent housing is only indirectly referred to in the *Law Governing Social Services*. This law requires municipalities to "contribute to the efforts to provide housing for people who are unable to secure their own interests in the housing market, and this includes housing that accommodates people who need special care due to their advanced age, functional incapacity, or for other reasons" (Paragraph 3-4). Another place in the same law we find that municipalities are "obliged to find temporary housing for those who are unable to manage for themselves" (Paragraph 4-5).

The formulations in the *Law Governing Social Services* are relatively vague and the specifics are left to the discretion of local municipalities. The Municipal Office of Social Welfare shall first and foremost provide temporary and short-term help for those who find themselves in acute crisis situations. The law does not require municipalities to provide people with permanent solutions to their housing needs. Temporary housing includes apartments for rent and hospices. In practice, however, the law has had great importance for those people with incomes that are too low to secure housing. In many city municipalities, social assistance for housing costs accounts for half or more of all social assistance payments. The yearly costs are 2.5 billion Norwegian Crowns, for all of Norway, and more than a half billion, just for Oslo (NOU 2002:2, Stamsø & Østby 2000). Even though the law does not provide one with the right to permanent housing, the newly asserted welfare goals – to find housing for the homeless and to combat poverty throughout Norway – will mean that all needy residents, at some point in the near future, will be offered a decent place to live.

THOSE WHO HAVE DIFFICULTIES TACKLING THE HOUSING MARKET

“ Those who have difficulties tackling the housing market are those who, for one reason or another, are without housing, live under unstable housing conditions, or have difficulties coping with the tasks and duties that accompany dwellers.” (NOU 2002: 2)

Housing problems can be temporary or more permanent and they can be caused by a host of complicated conditions, including low-income, changes and crises in one’s private life, discrimination and different social and health-related matters. Anyone may, at various points in their life, have difficulties in acquiring decent housing for an acceptable price. The many (newly graduated) students, who are without jobs or funds, are one example. However, the general rule is that better times do follow, and cramped quarters and a tight budget are, more often than not, temporary phenomena. This is not true for everyone, unfortunately. There are those who never are able to buy their own home and there are many others who are unable to keep the homes they have purchased.

Particular groups of people have a great deal of trouble finding suitable housing. These are single parents, young people on the verge of establishing themselves, refugees and immigrants, people with mental problems, people with learning disabilities, drug-abusers, and those who have physical disabilities.

The situation for the relatively few, that do have difficulties tackling the housing market, contrasts significantly to the housing situation for most people. The feeling that one is poor and underprivileged is a relative one. People tend to compare themselves to their neighbours. It is particularly difficult to be without means and to have to accept substandard housing when one lives in a wealthy society.

CLEAR DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ROLES IN NORWAY’S HOUSING POLICIES

The overriding goal for housing policy in Norway can be stated in one simple sentence: all residents of Norway shall live in suitable and secure housing. The following strategies have been agreed upon to meet this goal:

- Provide the supports that are needed for a well functioning housing market
- Provide housing for those who have difficulties coping with the housing market
- Increase the number of environmentally sound housing units and housing areas

(Report issued by the Norwegian Parliament / Nr.23: 2003-2004)

The national objection is to secure decent housing for each and every one in Norway. In order to do so, a rather far-reaching co-operative effort must be undertaken. Different roles must be played by the public and private sectors and different elements within the public sector need to co-ordinate their

endeavours. The following tries to capture the roles that need to be played by the different actors that constitute housing policy and its practice:

The government and Parliament decide upon the central goals for housing policy, legislate laws and determine the framework for putting housing policy into practice. The Norwegian Mortgage Bank, which is wholly funded with public monies, provides for favourable financing and supportive programmes for the specially designated groups who have problems coping with the housing market. This function is a new one for the Norwegian Mortgage Bank. Its former role was to stimulate housing construction by providing favourable loans for all prospective homeowners. This is no longer true. Its primary function, these days, is to provide goal-oriented help for those groups who are particularly hampered in their dealings with the housing market. The Norwegian Mortgage Bank also plays a role by funding research, by spreading information and by providing counselling services.

The municipalities have primary responsibility for the practical work that is done to execute housing policy. The municipalities must generate plans for housing, and in so doing, they must secure areas for new construction and provide these with an adequate infrastructure. The municipalities are responsible for stimulating new building projects and for the maintenance of already existing buildings. The municipalities are responsible for realising the goals that underpin housing policy and must provide housing for those people who are unable to secure decent housing on their own.

The private sector, more specifically, housing co-operatives and private entrepreneurs in the building industry, have long played a key role in housing policy. These groups will continue to co-operate closely with public authorities. In addition, voluntary and humanitarian organisations, like The Lutheran Church's Social Services, The Salvation Army, and The Lutheran Church's City Mission, have become important partners for municipal public authorities, through their activities to provide housing for the most vulnerable groups in Norway.

Many of the public programmes are experimental and they have an element of *trial and error*. The educational component is a very important one in experimental projects. How well different projects work and what really happens when projects are undertaken, are questions that have to be asked and answered. This function is carried out by independent research institutions, like the Norwegian Institute for Building Research, and others, which are asked to evaluate the experimental projects.

SOCIAL WORK IN HOUSING CO-OPERATIVES HELPS INDIVIDUALS

Social work in housing co-operatives is a contemporary field of practice, in Norway, that is limited to projects and programmes that help people who have difficulties coping with their housing needs. Successfully coping with your housing needs consists of the following:

- Being able to acquire decent housing
- Being able to fulfil the duties and requirements of Norwegian law, and the rules and practices that govern housing co-operatives

- Being able to do the expected and everyday tasks that those who reside in an apartment or home must do, to maintain the property's value
- Being able to employ the social and practical skills that are necessary, to live harmoniously with others, in a housing co-operative that is a community of neighbours, and in a manner that can be accepted by that community of neighbours.

All of these skills are necessary ones for maintaining the existing material and social housing standards. Failure to live up to these expectations will ordinarily result in the loss of the apartment. The capabilities an individual has, for living together with others, in a housing co-operative, is the fundament upon which all social work in this field of practice is built.

HELPING PEOPLE TO BETTER COPE WITH THE EXPECTATIONS AND DEMANDS OF LIVING IN AN APARTMENT

Social work in housing co-operatives aims at helping people with varying backgrounds and experiences. Examples include, former prisoners who are now re-entering society and who may need help to cope with the requirements of independent living after years of incarceration, drug-abusers who have recently been released from hospitals or treatment facilities, women who have been living in collectives for battered women, newly arrived refugees, youths who have just arrived in the city from rural venues with the hope of establishing themselves, etc. Social work in housing co-operatives includes working with many people who suffer from poor health, who have few personal resources and little or no income. Many of these people need the help and support of others to tackle their situation.

The need for help and support will vary from person to person. Some need so much help and assistance that we need to think about more permanent forms for care. In such cases, the municipality's health authorities and its home-help assistance programmes are necessary allies. Others can manage with less help or with supportive help for a limited period of time. Sometimes volunteer helpers can be induced to do this job. A good deal of the help that is provided must be made available by resources other than those found in the public sector.

The goal is to aid the individual to better cope with the challenges that arise in everyday living. To do so, it is only fitting that helpers begin with the desires expressed by those who need help, and with their understanding of what is needed. This point of view will affect the helper-role and the helper's relationship to the individual receiving help.

Ideas of *empowerment* and *participation* fit well, together with the ideologies that dominate helping professions and with existing Norwegian laws. Ideally, the person receiving help should play a central role in the selection of services to be provided. Those who receive help should be able to formulate their own requests and participate in the decisions that affect their lives. These ideals are not always realised in practice. There are many reasons why practice can fall short of these ideals. One reason has to do with limited resources in the public sector. Another reason has to do with restrictions

within the different categories of housing that are made available for groups with limited resources. A third reason has to do with the helpers themselves, who frequently believe that they are better able to evaluate the needs of the people they are there to help. A fourth reason points to the limits in choice that constrain all of the parties involved. A fifth reason has to do with the realities of the situation. Some applicants for housing simply must accept a certain amount of decision-making by social service authorities, and this is particularly true for drug-abusers. Still, even though all of the above reasons *do* constrain the practice of social work, in housing co-operatives, individual plans and co-operative agreements, between helpers and those seeking help, *have* become an important tool, for clarifying the needs and hopes of individuals and for shaping social service provision.

For those who seek help with their housing needs, the following services may prove to be helpful:

- Counselling and supervision for those who need help to be able to find suitable housing, to acquire a mortgage, to discover if there are existing financial supports that they can utilise
- Supports for those who need help to manage their personal budgets and to pay the rent on time
- Supports to find and participate in social activities
- Supports to keep appointments
- Supports for maintenance and house-cleaning
- Supports for buying and carrying groceries, etc.
- Supports for daily meals and personal hygiene.

Where an apartment is placed, and the quality of its facilities can directly affect an individual's capabilities for managing without help. An elderly gentleman with heart problems, that lives on the third floor in an apartment building without an elevator, and who has a long distance to travel to reach shops and other services, can have a great need for help. The same gentleman would have much less need for help if he were living in a first floor apartment and if the distances to shops and other services were greatly reduced.

TAINED NEIGHBOURHOODS

Many big cities throughout the world have neighbourhoods consisting of desperately poor people living in horrendous housing conditions. These are slums that most people will avoid if they are able to do so. The inhabitants of these neighbourhoods score low on all of the standard of living indicators. Conditions in these places are characterised by a great deal of unemployment, low educational attainment, serious health problems, low life-expectancy, large numbers who are dependent upon disability payments, social assistance and other forms of public provision, great numbers of single parents and immigrants, a high degree of crime and property damage, social disarray, weakly developed social networks and little in the way of local leadership.

Fortunately, In Norway, conditions in the larger cities are much better. There are no slums, but there are neighbourhoods and housing complexes that have greater problems than others, when social and physical environments are scrutinised and compared. It is not difficult to recognise housing estates and

neighbourhoods that are run down and that have high numbers of people who are dependent upon social assistance and other social services. Rumours are spread about areas that have a high-degree of “problem-families”. Neighbourhoods are stigmatised and receive demeaning nicknames.

Politicians react whenever conditions are seen to be *sufficiently* run-down and whenever social problems become too visible to be ignored. In the 1970’s, central neighbourhoods in several Norwegian cities were terribly run-down and were referred to as “eye-sores”. As a consequence, Parliament agreed to fund a programme to renovate the larger inner-cities. Huge amounts of money were channelled into urban renewal projects. The investments have paid off and these formerly run-down inner cities have become good neighbourhoods with attractive housing estates and with a large variety of social and cultural activities.

A city neighbourhood is never static. It can be compared to an organism that experiences great changes in the course of its own development. Neighbourhoods that are on a downward spiral get caught in a vicious circle. A few buildings may be run-down and people start talking about the local eye-sores. The housing nearby is seen as being less attractive and prices fall. Families move in that have lower incomes and fewer resources than the families that move out. This can affect the provision of services in the area. Shops close or move away. The desire to invest in building maintenance is reduced and this can lead to general decay in the neighbourhood. Social work in housing co-operatives is a contribution among many that attempts to stop the vicious circle from spreading.

SOCIAL WORK IN HOUSING CO-OPERATIVES AS A WAY OF STRENGTHENING LOCAL COMMUNITIES

It is not enough to simply house people. Efforts have to be made that enable people to enjoy their lives. Physical surroundings and the social environment are important factors that can enable or retard an individual’s quality of life. “Housing policy should contribute to the development of good local communities, which promote integration, community feeling and participation” (NOU 2002: 2, s.197). By working for improved physical standards for housing estates and their surroundings and by contributing to good relationships between neighbours and better developed social networks, social work in housing co-operatives gets a geographic and environmental dimension.

Prahl and Olsen (1997) view social work in residential environments as ways to mobilise and develop a threatened population’s resources. The general goal is to strengthen the local community. This includes strengthening the identities and the feelings of self worth of its residents. It includes increasing the integration of less resourceful groups into the community. The strategy is based upon the insight that even very tainted neighbourhoods room the human resources that can strengthen the local community’s abilities to solve its own problems. Three things are needed. They are: a) the development of the social network within the community, b) a greater tolerance for difference among the residents of the community, and c) an organisation that can co-

ordinate the area's resources and make sure that its needs and desires are acknowledged and validated by public authorities.

DECENTRALISATION AND "GRASS-ROOT" ORGANISING

The Norwegian experiences in neighbourhood work and/or community work have, by and large, been organised as experimental projects with a limited period of time at their disposal. The common denominator for all grass-root projects is the desire to be as un-bureaucratic as possible and to work in accordance with premises that are articulated by the residents themselves. This does not mean that these projects represent an alternative to municipal services. The projects are simply a supplement to the public services that are provided by municipalities.

Contemporary social problems in many local communities are simply too widespread for neighbours and for housing co-operatives to solve on their own. Successful projects, within struggling local communities, can provide new opportunities for service delivery and can act as a catalyst in the social environment and as an important link between residents and the public sector.

The primary goal of these projects has been to improve standards of living in neighbourhoods that have a large number of residents who are ill-equipped to tackle the everyday challenges of life in contemporary Norwegian society. The professional approach is based upon enabling the *empowerment* and *participation* of residents, in decision-making processes that affect the ways in which their lives are lived. Activities are undertaken to give expression to the interests and desires of residents. Helpers take the time to talk to residents and to help them carry out the necessary activities that they find difficult to manage on their own. These practices develop confidence. Social workers in housing co-operatives often function as mediators when neighbours experience conflicts of interest. As mediators, the professional approach is based upon the following:

- Solution-oriented work rather than problem-oriented activities
- Underscoring the importance of activating the resources and the engagement of local residents
- Underscoring the importance of the understandings, desires and suggestions for solutions that flow from the residents themselves in all the work that is undertaken by project workers

The projects have a broad mandate. Social work in housing co-operatives includes; *social work with individuals*, who need help adjusting to and coping with housing demands and expectations, *a territorial orientation*, by promoting and carrying out concrete programmes for specific housing estates, and *a systems-approach to housing policy*, since project workers mediate information about services and needs to housing authorities and to residents.

Project workers help individual residents when they are asked to do so. They accompany residents to public agencies and are a guide through the service apparatus. In order to promote the self-help capabilities of residents, project workers act *together with* residents and not *for* residents. The project has stimulated and supported programmes that bring people together in or

around the housing estates, and this includes neighbourhood co-operative activities and other kinds of social and cultural activities. The project has helped the housing estate boards to stimulate residents to take their own initiatives.

This combination of individual help and local community work has promoted a host of results, and has increased the safety of residents in their neighbourhoods, and helped individual residents to become less isolated. The systems- approach has resulted in the greater availability of community services and more contact between those services and community residents. In practice, a long list of public services, such as, neighbourhood medical care, health stations, offices of social welfare, child-care services, public housing administrators, home services, etc., co-operate on concrete matters. The public services have also received feedback on the consequences of different programmes, on bottlenecks in service provision, and in regards to the needs for better co-ordination between various public services.

This grass-roots project has filled an empty space between public services, and has provided care for people with the fewest resources in the neighbourhood (Unstad & Sæter 2000). Local community based social work, in co-operative housing estates, is a demanding form of professional practice, because neighbourhoods are far from being coherent social units. Neighbourhoods consist of many different residential groups and formal and informal communities, which sometimes live side by side in harmony, but which can also be engaged in deep conflict with one another because of their different interests. When a neighbourhood is the frame of reference for organisational activities, many questions are raised concerning residential democracy and democratic practice. Who should represent the neighbourhood at housing meetings, at meetings with municipal organisations, and with politicians at the municipal level (Saugestad 1996)?

Social work in housing co-operatives requires flexibility and the ability to do different kinds of things. The *process* develops itself as time passes. It takes time to establish contact with residents and to initiate co-operative processes. A range of problems need to be tackled before projects are locally established and accepted by residents. The *process* changes as residential needs change and as municipal economic supports either increase or dwindle. Changes in the local political situation affect budgets and funding and these will impinge upon the process of social work in housing co-operatives.

LOCAL COMMUNITIES ARE UNDER PRESSURE

Local communities in the larger cities are under a great deal of pressure. They must integrate the functionally disabled and other groups with few resources into the general population and into apartments of their own. They have to tackle a difficult situation, where a steady stream of refugees and immigrants arrive, and need assistance, in order to successfully integrate into the general population and into apartments of their own. Many of the daily problems that occur in these urban local communities simply cannot be adequately handled by neighbours and by board members of various housing co-operatives. Professional help is needed. Even when it is true that neighbourhoods do their utmost, to help the different groups of people who

need help in order to successfully integrate, one simply cannot ignore the public sector's responsibility, to help those with the greatest health and social problems. In order to help individuals, in their struggles to cope with the requirements of normal life, competent counselling and care are needed that goes far beyond the scope of voluntary neighbourhood community work.

The social worker in housing co-operatives has to compete with the recreational pursuits of residents in order to successfully promote participation. As a consequence, the challenges today are much greater than they were thirty years ago. These days, the work-world is more demanding. Individualisation has greatly increased, since then, due to the rise in living standards and the increased mobility in society. In a day and age with satellite antennas and mobile telephones, the world has closed in upon neighbourhood communities. We live hectic lives, with a variety of activities and choices, and this situation affects the ability of social workers to engage residents in projects that demand time and energy. Participation becomes more sporadic.

PARTICIPATION AND EMPOWERMENT

The most radical aspect of the first community work projects in Norway was their demands for participation and empowerment. There was a concern about developing human resources and channelling those resources into decision-making processes. There was a concern about securing dignity and equality in the co-operative efforts that united community workers and the residents they were trying to help.

Empowerment and *participation* are ambiguous concepts. Originally, *citizen participation* was a rallying call *after* professionals and experts, in a variety of social fields, had lost much of their legitimacy and prestige. Those who were affected by the problems being addressed demanded *a say* in defining means and ends. Doing so, was a way to maintain their dignity as citizens. No one wants to be defined as being the *problem*. No one wants to be an *object* for the calculated plans and activities of others. No one wants to be without any decision-making power when important questions that have an effect upon one's life are being decided. This is the radical understanding that underpins efforts to empower others.

The *economic liberalist* understanding can lead the discussion about empowerment elsewhere. Voices demand that we stop coddling people by providing them with too many resources. We hear that people should not become too dependent upon other people. They must learn how to take responsibility for themselves. In this discourse, empowerment becomes an argument for reducing social programmes and universal public provision. An active citizenry can call for privatisation, reducing citizens to consumers and relieving the state of its responsibilities. A system with universal provision, one that is based upon solidarity, can be transposed to something quite different, where individual efforts and a customer perspective may determine service provision.

Understandings regarding participation vary extensively. For some, participation is not a goal in itself. It must have a purpose. For others, participation is sometimes justified because it is seen as being a human right, a value in itself. Still others, point to the positive effects that participation has

on *body* and *soul*. Participation is justified because of its therapeutic qualities. There are those who point out that participation provides one with an education in democracy. Voices still argue that we need to listen to those who are “wearing the shoes”. They ask “how else are we to discover where and how their feet get sore”?

It is not unusual to speak about empowerment as being a psychological process, with the individual at its core, or to hear admonishments insisting that the individual human being must have more control over his or her own life. But we must not forget that there is a connection between empowerment at the individual level and the empowerment of resource-poor groups. Individual efforts at coping and participation must be seen in their proper contexts.

The community worker is concerned about possibilities and resources and his or her understanding of human nature has an optimistic and idealistic quality. But community workers recognise that even though most people have the resources and capacities to tackle their own problems, some will always need a helping hand to function well in a complicated society.

The question is whether or not the increased participation of groups in neighbourhood communities is always beneficial for those who have the greatest needs? Can we expect solidarity from the well-established sections of a neighbourhood community? Will increased participation at the local level primarily benefit those who are most resourceful and best equipped to speak out in their own interests? Is it possible that continued calls for participation will only result in the fact that the weakest groups will become even weaker? Many functionally impaired people have difficulties mobilising politically at the local level, but the national organisations that represent people who suffer from functional impairments are well developed.

When everyone speaks out *for* increased empowerment and participation, there may be reasons to be a bit wary. Everyone doesn't have the same interests. The motivations for participation can differ widely. Part of a community worker's competency is the ability to analyse and distinguish between those differing motivations. Politicians and the public services tend to support participation in order to carry out their own policies and plans. But grass-root sentiment wants to influence plans and decisions. Participation for the grass-roots is a means to influence and change policy. Professionals must be able to relate to both parties and both understandings.

A POLITICAL MINEFIELD

Social work in housing estates is a form of neighbourhood community work, and the important functions include, spreading information and establishing contact and co-operation between residents and diverse organisations. The list over possible roles and functions for this kind of work is quite long. The literature in the field, more often than not, underscores roles like *initiator*, *contact-establisher*, *counsellor*, *mediator*, and *advocate* (Thomas 1983, Kaasa 1989, Thyness 1999).

Experiences in the field underscore the importance of personal engagement, strong loyalty, and a deep respect for the needs and desires of residents, as being necessary pre-conditions for successful intervention.

Confidence can disappear rather quickly, in a residential setting, and social workers in housing estates are judged by their actions. There is little room for mistakes or failure when co-operating with residents. As a link between the municipality and the local community, the neighbourhood community worker is in a difficult position. On the one hand, the authorities *do* recognise the need for improved service delivery and alternative ways to solve problems. The community worker is heartily welcomed when he or she can solve recognised problems, and when contributing to the effective exploitation of public resources by reaching those who have the greatest needs. On the other hand, grass-root projects challenge the belief that the authorities *always know what is best* and that the formal political system functions adequately to meet all situations. This can generate discontent in political parties and in the municipal bureaucracy. This is especially true if and when a publicly employed local community worker actively supports groups that openly criticise decisions made in the responsible political bodies of the municipality. Discontent can even be expressed when these groups bring up unsolved problems or point out mistakes and failures in existing regulations.

However, if grass-root community work is to have any meaning at all, and be a stimulant for improvements and reform, the local community worker must be able to function as an *opposing expert* and *watchdog* against possible abuses or failing within the political and administrative systems. The social worker in housing co-operatives should have more room to manoeuvre and not be held accountable to the same standards of loyalty and control that are usual for employees in municipal administrative positions.

The local community worker can quickly find himself (or herself) in a political minefield. "What health and social workers do can be defined as political activity, and when this happens practitioners are seen as being suspect and they lose their credibility as professionals" (Halvorsen 2002:197). There are more questions than answers regarding just how far local community workers can go, how critical and "on the offensive" they can be, in practice, before their loyalty is questioned. The absence of clear norms for practice demands a great deal of good judgement from community workers, and this reality, no doubt, has a constraining effect upon them.

Local community work, in general, and social work in housing co-operatives, in particular, are and will continue to be compensatory activities, and a supplement to social policy and to other policies that have consequences for local communities. The projects are a short-term way to stimulate *social change*. But the meaning of social change is limited here. The focus is on changing social relationships and conditions that are *close-by*, or close to home.

It is the fate of social work and its historical role to be a mediator of society's programmes of aid and at the same time to communicate the needs and desires of those who are less privileged or who have fewer resources. These combined roles make the practice of social work full of compromises, ethical dilemmas and conflicts of interest. Local community workers are unable to avoid these very same dilemmas and the same problem-filled choices. But this does not mean that local community work is a still-born activity or that this field of practice should not be further developed.

When we are discussing the most demanding and burdensome requirements of care, in society, there is no reason to believe that network strategies and voluntary activities in local communities are a good solution. But for solving other kinds of problems, this work can provide a great deal of help. Local community work in housing co-operatives can make contributions that the market-place and public bureaucracies often cannot provide. What might that be? A possible answer is; new ideas, solutions that put local human resources to use in a simple and un-bureaucratic manner, a greater portion of creativity, idealism and wherewithal, than many professionals are able to muster during office hours. These aspects of local community work are well worth further development, even though the activity will continue to be small-scaled reform work, from a broader societal perspective.

Voluntary work is built upon altruistic motivation and idealism. Still, there is a Norwegian saying that points out that voluntary work *thrives* whenever the activities are enjoyable and *dies* whenever a sense of duty or obligation enters into the picture. This insight should have consequences for plans and expectations connected to voluntarism within local communities.

Social workers who want to actively participate in projects and activities that rely upon the voluntary efforts of residents and neighbours should ask themselves the following questions:

Am I ready to meet and work with people in their own backyards? Am I ready to share my knowledge with others? Am I willing to abandon or share my power to determine how conditions and situations should be defined? Am I willing to reduce my own importance and become less of an expert? Am I able to tolerate the uncertainty that accompanies anyone who tries out new ways of working? If the answers are *yes* to all of these questions, then perhaps the time is right to enter into co-operate relationships with local residents and to engage oneself in ways to improve their everyday lives.

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When Everyone Loses – But Some More than Others

A Priori Voting Power in the EU25

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INTRODUCTION

Analysis of the development of power distributions is one of the core tasks of political science. How much do the EU member states have a priori voting power in the Council of Ministers? In particular, what have the modifications in the voting weights after the various enlargements meant for the distribution of *a priori* voting power in the council? We will in the following use the standardized Penrose-Banzhaf-index when analyzing the distribution of power among member-states (Banzhaf 1965 and Penrose 1946) (cf. Raunio and Wiberg 1998 and 2002).

A few words on the method for evaluation voting power are in order. Any voting system can be identified with the corresponding set of winning coalitions, i.e. those collections of voters sufficient to guarantee the passage of a decision, such as a bill in a parliament. The power of an actor in voting bodies is best conceptualized as and measured by that actor's control over voting outcomes. The more an actor controls voting outcomes, the more voting power that actor has. Control over outcomes depends crucially on how frequently one can pool one's votes with those of others to ensure that an outcome is favourable to oneself.

The Council of Ministers makes her decisions with majority rule. In these votings the member states have a fixed set of votes at their disposal (Table 1).

In voting games it is assumed that there are only two kinds of coalitions: losing ones and winning ones. The voting power indices measure the actors' power in an abstract sense, i.e. they analyze the properties of the voting body rather than the actual game played in it. Power indices are thus based on *a priori* considerations: they do not reflect the actors' real possibilities in influencing the outcome in shaping the agenda (introduction of alternatives, decision of the voting order, and other forms of agenda manipulation), but focus upon their probability of influencing the outcome of voting when the number of votes every actor has and the decision rule are taken into account. Since in the institutions where voting takes place, the voters change and one cannot know the issues to be voted in the future, the probabilistic approach offered by the power indices is an effective and informative tool for analyzing the power of the voters and their coalitions. Power indices have been

normalized for reasons of comparability so that they range from 0 to 1. An actor with no voting power at all (index value=0) is called a dummy.

Table 1

Development of the Distribution of Votes in the Council

Country	EEC6 1957-	EEC9 1973-	EEC10 1981-	EEC12 1986-	EU15 1995-	EU25 1.5.-31.10. 2004	EU25 1.11.2004-
Belgium	2	5	5	5	5	5	12
France	4	10	10	10	10	10	29
Germany	4	10	10	10	10	10	29
Italy	4	10	10	10	10	10	29
Luxembourg	1	2	2	2	2	2	4
Netherlands	2	5	5	5	5	5	13
Denmark		3	3	3	5	3	7
Ireland		3	3	3	3	3	7
UK		10	10	10	10	10	29
Greece			5	5	5	5	12
Portugal				5	5	5	12
Spain				8	8	8	27
Austria					4	4	10
Finland					3	3	7
Sweden					4	3	10
Poland						8	27
Czech Rep.						5	12
Hungary						5	12
Slovakia						3	7
Lithuania						3	7
Latvia						3	4
Slovenia						3	4
Estonia						3	4
Cyprus						2	4
Malta						2	3
Qualified Majority	12/17	41/58	45/63	54/76	62/87	88/124	232/321
(%)	70.59	70.69	71.43	71.05	71.26	70.97	72.27
Blocking Minority	6	18	19	23	26	37	90

THE MEASURE

There is a vast literature on various voting power indices. In this paper we apply the Penrose-Banzhaf index for simplicity. A few words of clarification on this index are in order.

The Penrose-Banzhaf index (B) is based on a coalition concept and focuses upon the swing, critical or pivotal voter, whose input in votes makes a losing coalition into a winning one. The Penrose-Banzhaf index of a voter is the number of winning coalitions in which her defection from the coalition would render it losing – which is also called a critical defection – divided by the total number of critical defections for all voters. The Penrose-Banzhaf index simply counts the number of coalitions in which an actor *i* is a swing voter. Briefly, if *C* is a winning coalition under a given decision rule *d* with actor

$i \in C$, then i swings if $C - \{i\}$ is losing, that is, if the same coalition without i would be losing. The Penrose-Banzhaf index of a party group equals the contribution of that group to all possible coalitions divided by the sum of contributions of all party groups to all coalitions. Stated otherwise, player i 's Penrose-Banzhaf index is defined as the number of swings for voter i divided by the total number of coalitions containing voter i . A swing occurs when the defection of voter i changes a coalition from winning to losing. When using the Penrose-Banzhaf index it is assumed that all coalitions are equally probable.

THE RESULTS

Let start with taking a look at the historical development of the distribution of *a priori* voting power in the Council of Ministers¹.

Table 2

Distribution of Standardized Penrose-Banzhaf –Voting Power in the Council

Country	EEC6 1957-	EEC9 1973-	EEC10 1981-	EEC12 1986-	EU15 1995-	EU25 1.5.-31.10. 2004	EU25 1.11.2004-
Belgium	.1429	.0915	.0820	.0666	.0587	.0420	.0391
France	.2381	.1672	.1577	.1287	.1116	.0765	.0857
Germany	.2381	.1672	.1577	.1287	.1116	.0765	.0857
Italy	.2381	.1672	.1577	.1287	.1116	.0765	.0857
Luxembourg	dumm y	.0158	.0410	.0180	.0226	.0172	.0132
Netherlands	.1429	.0915	.0820	.0666	.0587	.0420	.0423
Denmark		.0662	.0410	.0459	.0359	.0255	.0231
Ireland		.0662	.0410	.0459	.0359	.0255	.0231
UK		.1672	.1577	.1287	.1116	.0765	.0857
Greece			.0820	.0666	.0587	.0420	.0391
Portugal				.0666	.0587	.0420	.0391
Spain				.1089	.0924	.0641	.0813
Austria					.0479	.0329	.0327
Finland					.0359	.0255	.0231
Sweden					.0479	.0255	.0327
Poland						.0641	.0813
Czech Rep.						.0420	.0391
Hungary						.0420	.0391
Slovakia						.0255	.0231
Lithuania						.0255	.0231
Latvia						.0255	.0132
Slovenia						.0255	.0132
Estonia						.0255	.0132
Cyprus						.0172	.0132

¹ All voting power computations in this paper were made by the software Power 1.4, designed by Ph Candidate Tommi Meskanen (Department of Mathematics, University of Turku, Finland).

Malta						.0172	.0099
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


Fig. 1. Distribution of a priori voting power in EU25.


There are no strong countries: all are weak, but some weaker than others. It is noteworthy that even the strongest players have less than one tenth of the *a priori* voting power. On the other hand, some players are next to dummies. Malta with her less than one percent of *a priori* voting power is the weakest country.

Having established the current distribution of *a priori* voting power, we now turn to take a closer look at the differences in the voting power before and after the most recent enlargements. We start with the changes between EU15 and the current situation.

Table 3

Differences in *a priori* voting power EU15 vs EU25 (1.11.2004)

Country	EU15 1995-	EU25 1.11.2004	Difference	Difference (%)
Belgium	.0587	.0391	-.0196	-33.4
France	.1116	.0857	-.0259	-23.2
Germany	.1116	.0857	-.0259	-23.2
Italy	.1116	.0857	-.0259	-23.2
Luxembourg	.0226	.0132	-.0094	-41.6
Netherlands	.0587	.0423	-.0164	-27.9
Denmark	.0359	.0231	-.0128	-35.7
Ireland	.0359	.0231	-.0128	-35.7
United Kingdom	.1116	.0857	-.0259	-23.2
Greece	.0587	.0391	-.0196	-33.4
Portugal	.0587	.0391	-.0196	-33.4
Spain	.0924	.0813	-.0111	-12.0
Austria	.0479	.0327	-.0152	-31.7
Finland	.0359	.0231	-.0128	-35.7
Sweden	.0479	.0327	-.0152	-31.7
Poland		.0813	.0813	
Czech Republic		.0391	.0391	
Hungary		.0391	.0391	
Slovakia		.0231	.0231	
Lithuania		.0231	.0231	
Latvia		.0132	.0132	
Slovenia		.0132	.0132	
Estonia		.0132	.0132	
Cyprus		.0132	.0132	
Malta		.0099	.0099	

Fig. 2. Differences in *a priori* voting power EU15 vs EU25 (1.11.2004).

The figure shows that every old member state loses power compared to the EU15-situation. In other words: every old EU-member state loses *a priori* voting power, but some more than others. Hence the title of this paper.

Let us now proceed with a look at the differences that have occurred during this year, when the weights were modified starting 1st of November.

Table 4

**Differences in *a priori* voting power 1.5.2004 – 31.10.2004 EU25 vs
 1.11.2004- EU25**

Country	EU25 1.5.-31.10. 2004	EU25 1.11.2004	Difference	Difference (%)
Belgium	.042	.0391	-.0029	-6.9
France	.0765	.0857	.0092	12.0
Germany	.0765	.0857	.0092	12.0
Italy	.0765	.0857	.0092	12.0
Luxembourg	.0172	.0132	-.0040	-23.3
Netherlands	.042	.0423	.0003	0.7
Denmark	.0255	.0231	-.0024	-9.4
Ireland	.0255	.0231	-.0024	-9.4
United Kingdom	.0765	.0857	.0092	12.0
Greece	.042	.0391	-.0029	-6.9
Portugal	.042	.0391	-.0029	-6.9
Spain	.0641	.0813	.0172	26.8
Austria	.0329	.0327	-.0002	-0.6
Finland	.0255	.0231	-.0024	-9.4
Sweden	.0255	.0327	.0072	28.2
Poland	.0641	.0813	.0172	26.8
Czech Republic	.042	.0391	-.0029	-6.9
Hungary	.042	.0391	-.0029	-6.9
Slovakia	.0255	.0231	-.0024	-9.4
Lithuania	.0255	.0231	-.0024	-9.4
Latvia	.0255	.0132	-.0123	-48.2
Slovenia	.0255	.0132	-.0123	-48.2
Estonia	.0255	.0132	-.0123	-48.2
Cyprus	.0172	.0132	-.0040	-23.3
Malta	.0172	.0099	-.0073	-42.4




Fig. 3. Differences in a priori voting power 1.5.2004 – 31.10.2004 EU25 vs. 1.11.2004- EU25

The results are mixed: some lose, but some also win, quite remarkably. Especially the large countries win as compared to the previous situation. And they win by no means modestly. Some smaller countries win, too. The new member states, bar Poland, loose.

Winners are: Sweden, Spain, Poland, France, Germany, Italy, UK, Netherlands.

Losers are: Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Belgium, Austria.

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“Hot Zones” of the Security of Latvian Population

Vladimir Menshikov

The primary aim of this article is to evaluate the level of human security in the fast and complicated circumstances of Latvian society in the beginning of the 21st century. In this connection the project of the UNO representatives in Latvia “Human Security”, the main aim of which was the sociological analysis of the theme, is cited.

In the author’s opinion the task of sociologists is to elaborate on the methodology, methods and instruments of the investigation of human security problems, the ability to link these problems both with the fast and wide changes in human existence and with the changes on macro and micro levels, including both deep and complicated mental disorders and an attitude to the surroundings and “the I”. It has been found out, that the attitude is influenced by such social characteristics of the respondents as gender, age, place of residence, level of family’s well-being etc. This approach allows sociologists to work out significantly more concrete and well-grounded recommendations.


Well-being + security = peace – this motto was heard in the last forum in Davos. Let us assume, if the actuality of **well-being can not be felt** by the well-to-do and millionaires, then the problem of **security concerns** every person irrespective of the level of his/her wealth. Sending a child to school, crossing a street, boarding a plane, even going to a concert or to any entertainment, we come across the problems of security. It is natural that the problems of human security are the primary concern of many social thinkers (Beck 1986; Buzan 1991; Bauman 2001; Kuznecov 2001, 2002).

For the first time the concept of human security was fully analyzed in the Human Development Report, in 1994, which subtitle was “New Dimensions of Human development” (*Human Development Report 1994*). An idea that human security has 2 basic aspects:

- 1) freedom from chronic threats, for example, from starvation, illness and oppression;
- 2) protection against sudden and painful changes in everyday life, place of work, home and environment.

The seven realms of human security are listed in this report (see Figure 1).

Figure 1



In 2002–2003 order made by the UNO representation in Latvia, Latvian experts came to realize the “Human Security” project (*Latvia. Human Development Report 2002/2003. Human Security*). The author took part in the project’s realization, first of all paying attention to the sociological aspects of human security, as well as to the problems of the methodology and methods of empirical investigation. A similar project was realized in December 2003, in Daugavpils.

As early as the 90ies, Daugavpils University and the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of Lithuanian Academy of Sciences carried out an investigation which was devoted to one of seven human security dimensions – of ecological security (*Meņšikovs and Peipiņa, 1999*). It was discovered in the research that the ecological problems, which are connected with the work of Ignalina Nuclear Power Station (NPS), are understood by the inhabitants of Daugavpils region on the level of personal senses and observations. It was concluded that the biggest number of the inhabitants could not define their social behaviour and specify adequately the real ecological situation in the region. The intuitive level of ecological awareness is based on objective information, and the local inhabitants’ idea about the ecological situation in the NPS area is formed on not numerous information materials, which appear in mass media, or on the rumours from the neighbour regions of Lithuania.

In Latvia Human Development Report 2002/2003 human security is evaluated in all seven realms, based on both objective and subjective indices of human security. For instance, economic security is evaluated according to the following indices:

- Sufficient, predictable income
- Predictable employment
- Social insurance coverage
- Satisfaction with one’s level of income
- Income disparity
- Competitiveness

MEASUREMENT OF THE SENSE OF SECURITY

The subjective side of the most important security problems that a person has, can be characterized with the help of the following **measurement**:

a) the attitude of the respondents to real or possible threats, evaluating them from the position of person’s outer threats $D_{(a)}$ – **the coefficient of the sense of security at social level**;

b) the evaluation of the personal fears of the respondents makes it possible to define the security coefficient from the position of personal sense and emotional experience $D_{(sd)}$ – **the coefficient of the sense of security at personal level**;

The coefficients are calculated in the following way:

$D_{(a)} = 4$ – an average level of the sense of the threat at a **social level** by averaging of all reasons of anxiety (possible threats) (see Table 1);


$D_{(s)} = 4$ – an average level of the sense of the threat **at personal level** by averaging of all reasons of anxiety (possible threats) (see table 2).

The analyses of sociological data shows that the average level of the sense of security at personal level is a characteristic of all the respondents in Latvia (see Figure 2): **the coefficient of the sense of security at personal level $D_{(sd)} = 1.48$** (on the scale, where 0 is sense of absolute insecurity and 3 is sense of absolute security). It is significant that **the coefficient of the sense of security at social level $D_{(a)} = 1.12$** is lower than the average one.

One can see that the coefficient of personal level $D_{(sd)}$ in all significant statistical groups, to a certain extent, is higher than the coefficient of social level $D_{(a)}$.

The lowest coefficient of security $D_{(a)}$ is primarily a characteristic of women (**1.01**), a group of the lowest family income (**1.03**), and the respondents of Latgale (**1.04**).

Figure 2



The investigation of the security coefficient makes it possible:

- a) to find out both the level of the coefficient of security of all state inhabitants at any time and the structure of the coefficient;
- b) if it is necessary, to find out the dynamics of the coefficient (the level of security in a year, 5 years time period etc.);
- c) to find out the most significant factors, which influence both the sense of security of the inhabitants and the characterization of the inhabitants, which essentially influence their sense of security.

It is clear that, based on these coefficients, it is hardly possible to compare the level of the sense of human security in the countries of different cultural and social-economic development, first of all in those, where there are civil wars, immense nature disasters etc. However, generally in countries or groups of countries, where comparatively gradual changes are happening, these coefficients can be very useful.

THE SOURCES OF THE SENSE OF SECURITY

The question of how to make oneself secure against any possible misfortune is always urgent, because security has become one of the highest values in society. The sense of absolute security is not possible; therefore, the eternal question will be “how secure is secure enough?” It seems that it is not possible to answer this question. However, while the answers are being searched for and the mechanisms of the sense of security creation/maintenance are being improved, people have to live and create a secure environment in so far as it is possible, because the necessity of security is natural to every person. One of the ways to create a secure environment around oneself is to establish different social networks. The sense of community and membership in various communes is one of the main sources of the sense of security. Self-reliance, confidence in the near relation, confidence in the understanding and support from other people, membership in different organizations all together create individual security.

The opinion of many Latvians make it possible to conclude that the sense of security is increased and provided mainly by family relations (29%), material well-being (29%) and activities and sources of individual security (13%). The support of relatives, friends, neighbours, stable family relations and love are the primary base for the sense of security.

Table 1

Perception of threats at the social level: the urgency of 31 possible threats in September, 2002

Existing and potential threats capable of contributing to feelings of insecurity	Degree of concern*			Percentage expressing concern, %*		
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women
	coefficients	coefficients	coefficients	%	%	%
The spread of narcotics	3.55	3.46	3.63	91	88	93
Organized crime in Latvia	3.44	3.34	3.52	88	84	91

Existing and potential threats capable of contributing to feelings of insecurity	Degree of concern*			Percentage expressing concern, %*		
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women
	coefficients	coefficients	coefficients	%	%	%
The spread of HIV/AIDS in Latvia	3.40	3.30	3.49	88	85	90
Rapid price increases	3.32	3.20	3.43	84	80	88
Hazardous waste dumps in Latvia	3.31	3.22	3.40	87	84	90
Clear-cutting of forests in Latvia	3.27	3.21	3.32	86	83	88
Environmental pollution in Latvia	3.26	3.13	3.37	87	82	91
The spread of HIV/ AIDS worldwide	3.24	3.12	3.35	82	78	85
High amount of preservatives in food	3.17	3.02	3.30	81	73	87
Food poisoning	3.14	3.00	3.25	78	72	53
Environmental pollution worldwide	3.05	2.94	3.14	79	74	83
The abandonment of farmland in Latvia	3.03	2.97	3.08	76	73	79
An environmental disaster in Latvia	2.99	2.79	3.17	73	64	81
Foreign producers forcing local producers out of the Latvian market	2.92	2.79	3.04	70	64	76
Foreigners buying up land in Latvia	2.87	2.76	2.97	67	62	72
The devaluation of the lat	2.86	2.75	2.96	65	61	69
Exodus from rural areas	2.82	2.72	2.91	67	62	71
Global warming	2.77	2.59	2.93	66	56	75
Latvian producers losing their market share in other countries	2.76	2.70	2.81	64	61	67
Nuclear threats	2.71	2.48	2.91	58	50	65
Threats to the survival of one's own language and culture	2.66	2.55	2.76	59	54	63
Population decline	2.65	2.53	2.75	59	53	65
Influx of refugees in Latvia	2.61	2.53	2.69	58	54	61
Terrorism in Latvia	2.50	2.24	2.72	51	41	60
Limitations on democracy and freedom of speech in Latvia	2.48	2.35	2.59	50	43	56
Manifestations of international terrorism in Latvia	2.47	2.23	2.67	50	40	58
Partial loss of Latvia's sovereignty	2.40	2.27	2.52	48	42	54
Internal unrest	2.39	2.17	2.58	47	38	55
Armed conflict in Latvia	2.38	2.14	2.59	47	37	56
Ethnic conflict in Latvia	2.33	2.18	2.46	44	37	50
The occupation of Latvia	2.29	2.10	2.45	41	34	47
Average degree of concern about all perceived threats	2.88	2.74	2.99			
Average coefficient of the sense of security D_(a)	1.12	1.26	1.01			

* Respondents were asked to rate their level of concern about each threat as follows: 1 – not at all afraid, 2 – mostly not afraid; 3 – slightly afraid; 4 – very afraid. An average level of concern was rated by all answers for (all, men, women). On the other hand, the perception of threats among the respondents are shown in the part of %, where the respondents evaluated the threats at the level of 3–4 – “slightly afraid” or “very afraid”
 Source: the project of the UNO representatives in Latvia “Human Security”, 2002.

Table 2

**Perception of threats at the personal level:
the urgency of 32 possible threats in September, 2002**

Potential threats	Degree of concern*			Percentage expressing concern, %*		
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women
	Coefficients	Coefficients	Coefficients	%	%	%
Inability to pay for medical care in the case of illness	3.28	3.14	3.39	83	78	87
Not receiving an adequate standard of medical care in the case of illness	3.27	3.15	3.37	83	80	86
Becoming seriously ill	3.26	3.10	3.39	83	78	88
Not receiving a large enough retirement pension to live on	3.08	2.98	3.15	75	72	78
Being unable to support oneself	3.08	2.93	3.20	73	67	78
Being involved in an accident	3.08	2.95	3.19	77	72	82
Inability to pay one's rent or other household bills	3.03	2.87	3.17	72	65	79
Becoming the victim of aggressive and unsafe driving practices	3.01	2.84	3.15	77	71	83
Being attacked on the street	2.94	2.73	3.13	72	62	80
Being subject to theft	2.87	2.72	3.00	70	64	74
Contracting deer tick encephalitis	2.84	2.67	2.98	67	60	72
Losing one's job / being unable to find work	2.68	2.66	2.70	61	60	62
Inability to pay for one's children's or one's own education	2.68	2.64	2.71	58	55	61
Falling victim to organized crime	2.61	2.48	2.71	58	54	60
Not having a place to live	2.57	2.39	2.72	54	48	60
Contracting HIV/AIDS	2.55	2.46	2.64	54	51	56
Not having enough to eat / starving	2.53	2.37	2.68	52	45	58
Becoming a victim of a terrorist attack	2.52	2.36	2.65	50	42	57
Being left on one's own	2.49	2.40	2.57	51	48	54
Inability to compete in the job market	2.40	2.35	2.45	50	46	52
Being emotionally abused by civil servants	2.31	2.26	2.35	45	42	47
Needing to bribe someone in order to obtain a service	2.27	2.16	2.38	42	38	47
Loosing the understanding and support of one's family and friends	2.25	2.16	2.33	42	36	46
Being left on one with dependent children	2.19	2.03	2.32	38	31	45
Being emotionally abused by police officers	2.17	2.19	2.16	37	38	37
Losing the understanding and support of one's colleagues	2.06	2.00	2.12	33	28	37
Being sexually assaulted	1.89	1.48	2.25	28	12	43
Being emotionally abused at work	1.84	1.73	1.94	24	16	30
Being in conflict with relatives or others over property issues	1.81	1.80	1.82	23	22	25
Losing one's savings in the bank	1.80	1.81	1.80	24	25	24
Being emotionally abused in the family	1.68	1.58	1.77	19	14	23
Being emotionally abused at home	1.53	1.42	1.62	14	11	18
Average degree of concern about all perceived threats	2.52	2.40	2.62			
Average coefficient of the sense of security D_(a)	1.48	1.60	1.38			

* See notes for Table 1

Source: the project of the UNO representatives in Latvia "Human Security", 2002.

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A Critical Assessment of the Impact of Globalization on the Economic Transition Process in East-Central Europe

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I INTRODUCTION

The 2002 Freedom House Report qualifies the Hungarian economic transition since 1989 as a steady improvement. As the report suggested, the subsequent transition from ‘goulash communism’¹ to market economy under a democratic government proceeded rapidly as Hungary quickly moved to privatise its state owned properties, abolished price controls, and opened its markets to foreign capital. Poland, similarly, after a few years of economic problems in the post-1989 period reached positive GDP growth by 1992, and could sustain it on average 5 percent annually since then. The Polish economic growth was at the fastest rate among all formerly communist countries. The inflation rate fell from several hundreds of percent in the early 1990s to less than 10 percent by the end of the decade². On the other

¹ Under communism, on the basis of central planning, Hungary achieved rapid output growth and primary industrialisation. From 1956 onwards, the most important political priority was to ensure a stable and visible increase of living standards on a year-to-year basis. This policy provided the basis for ‘goulash-communism’ in which people were encouraged to have their own houses and second houses, furnish them and travel to Western countries once every three years. In this context, 1968 onwards, the New Economic Model of Hungary aimed at reforming certain basic features of the traditional central planning model without undermining the basic tenets of socialism. The most important change was the elimination of directives from the centre, in particular the allocation of inputs and outputs. Enterprises were given autonomy to make micro-economic decisions subject to uniform regulations. Still, the informal hierarchical relationship between enterprises and their supervisory bodies continued to be crucial after the introduction of NEM, since the methods of appointment, evaluation and remuneration of managers were unchanged and the allocation of a significant proportion of investment resources was centralised. For more information see Czaban, Laszlo. Hungarian Economic Transformation: Gradual Progress towards Accession? In Mannin, Mike (ed.) *Pushing back the Boundaries. The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. 1999, 276–295, 277–278.

² Kowalik, Tadeusz. The Ugly Face of Polish Success: Social Aspects of Transformation. In Blazyca, George and Rapacki, Ryszard (eds.). *Poland into the New Millennium*. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 2001, 33–53, 34.

hand, results of a survey in 1999 in Hungary showed that 45 percent of the population thought that economic changes had brought over more loss than wins. Only 15 percent of the respondents felt the opposite³. Under the light of these two separate assessments, this paper argues that one should further delve into the results and the processes of first the transition to capitalism and second the impacts of globalisation in East-Central European countries. Notwithstanding the fact that my discussion is mostly centred on the experiences of Hungary and Poland, I find my findings easy to generalise to the other states in the region.

Before the regime change, the socialist states were constantly on the verge of capsizing through concessions made to political liberalisation, national independence, decentralised forms of ownership and competitive price formulation. Yet, as were shown by the results of the debates of the sixties and seventies over economic reform in the Eastern bloc, their regimes did not manage to incorporate their opposite principle, that is, capitalism, in both sufficient and harmless dosage. That is why, during the period of transition, in contrast to other rounds of democratisation in Latin America or Southern Europe, there was an additional task, namely, to reform the economy in East-Central Europe (ECE). In this respect the Soviet Union and its former satellites on the eve of their transition to market economies, faced the processes and consequences of the problem of transferring the previously state-owned productive assets to other forms of proprietors, and the creation of an entirely new class of entrepreneurs and owners⁴.

Hence, unlike in Western Europe, in ECE capitalism did not mature slowly. There was no time for experience and learning along the evolutionary road of nation-building, constitution-making and the politics of allocation and distribution. On the contrary, there was simultaneity during the formation of capitalism in the ECE. At stake during this simultaneity were: (1) the issue of democracy; (2) the issue of economic and property order and (3) in some cases, the territorial issue⁵. On top, simultaneous revolution had also had to deal with historical legacies; thereby, the transition period contained the flavour and identity of previous regime(s). The confluence of various identities – to name a few communist, western, neo-liberal, global and post-communist – had an impact on the transition process in the ECE. The emergent system remained under the influence of the previous system withstanding the fact that the previous system demonstrated the traits of the emergent system. Among these traits, reliance on informal links is probably the most worthy of mentioning. What is more, through transition to capitalism the ECE states also wished the mirrors to reflect them as West European. As such, a myth of leap forward to European affluence took precedence.

³ Frege, Zsuzsa. A rendszerváltás társadalmi hatásai nemzetközi összehasonlításban [The Social Effects of the Transition in International Comparison]. *Elszabaduló egyenlőtlenségek*, Társadalompolitikai Olvasókönyvek, Hirscher Rezső Szociálpolitikai Egyesület: Budapest: 2000, 364–432.

⁴ Offe, Claus. *Varieties of Transition. The East European and East German Experience*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, 31–32.

⁵ P. 34.

II MIXED IDENTITIES OF TRANSITION IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

Almost all political scientists agree that the transition in the ECE materialised at the cusp of democratisation, establishing a market economy, Europeanisation as well as globalisation. While the transition was rapid, perhaps unconsciously, the process also carried certain traits of the previous regime(s) into the new emerging regimes. As such, there was an injection of the ‘thesis’ into ‘anti-thesis’ to reverse the course of the dialectics. In this process, the conditions preparing for the emergence of capitalism were different compared to what prepared for the emergence of capitalism in the West. The initial scholarship on the origins of capitalism (Adam Smith, Marx, and to some extent Max Weber) assumed – and to some extent demonstrated – that the emergence of a propertied bourgeoisie was the first necessary step in the emergence to capitalism. It was self-evident for all of them that an original accumulation of capital in private hands had to take place before market capitalism could emerge.

Nevertheless, in the ‘political capitalism’ of the ECE, the state – alongside the enlightened state elites – implemented the capitalist institutions ‘from above’. Indeed, the state perceived the role of a propertied bourgeoisie⁶. Moreover, granted the lack of propertied bourgeois, the foreign capital also became an active and integral party to the establishment of a free-market economy. Hence for peripheral latecomers, such as ECE states, we can no longer analyse the emergence of capitalism, but the way ‘diffusion of capital and capitalist relations across the globe’ affected them. In this sort of analysis, one should question how the ECE states imitate the existing models of capitalism, and which elite groups maintained the need for an imitation as such. Therefore, in order to understand the concrete results of capitalist transformation in the ECE we first need to recognise that an analysis of capitalism based on what we know from capitalist economic institutions of the West will be abstract in effect to the formation of capitalism in the East. We then need to recognise that capitalism is not only a ‘system’, but also a *class society* composed of differing constellations of classes and class fractions. Additionally, the characteristics of these classes and the alliances between them are historically, conjuncturally, and contingently formed, and are highly consequential for the end result⁷.

Although the communist regimes had pretensions of a classless society, personal networks mattered a great deal to them in resemblance – to a certain extent – to modern capitalist societies. Mostly wealth, and additionally by one’s certificate of education define one’s position in social space. Furthermore, traditionally the dominance of social capital as a by-product of interactions and networks marked pre-capitalist societies⁸. It is also pretty crucial to recognise the relevance of social capital to post-communist contexts to fully appreciate the impacts of globalisation. The

⁶ Eyal, Gil, Szelenyi, Iván and Townsley, Eleanor. *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists. The New Ruling Elites in Eastern Europe*. London and New York: 1998, Verso, 47–48, 50–51.

⁷ P. 55

⁸ Pp: 63–64.

processes of transition, globalisation, Europeanisation and internal elite formation were inter-related during the transition process in the ECE. Given especially the pressures of globalisation and Europeanisation, the governments were also no longer able to use the wide range of policy instruments that they formerly employed without hesitation. This became the case since the governments lost autonomy to supranational authorities without any compensating gain in shared control. On top, they did not formally participate in the decision-making of these supranational authorities and did not even have any informal influence. Complicating the situation even further, these supranational authorities and especially the international capital supplemented their influence on the ECE states by informal networks or associational linkages with various economic actors. The result was increasingly undermined national autonomy and defiance of national control. Informal rules of the game prevailed alongside the more formal agreements reached through supranational organisations⁹.

On top, the formal agreements of international capitalism were in place long before the ECE states opted for capitalist economies. The larger world into which the successor regimes entered in 1989 was remarkably consensual in its ideological messages. By the close of 1980s, liberalism in politics and economics had become the hegemonic standard; few alternative incentives were available and the international order, due to unprecedented consensus and the resources of international institutions, had become a very powerful influence on domestic developments¹⁰.

I should hereby qualify my understanding of globalisation. Globalisation was not anything new for the ECE states on the eve of their transition to capitalist economies. However, their globalisation had Marxist implications. Marx thought that the rise to power of the proletariat will destroy all bourgeoisie institutions including the nation state. National differences and antagonisms between people are daily more and more vanishing. The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action, of the leading civilised countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat¹¹. Nevertheless, in the liberal version of globalisation what Marx foresaw could not be the case. Globalisation along the lines of liberal economics demanded from the governments to give up significant amounts of national autonomy and national control; hence, the ability to make decisions independently, without regard to external economic forces and actors and the power to influence economic forces and actors operating in the national territory, whether externally or internally based¹². As a result, globalisation prescribed certain kinds of policies, primarily the low government deficits, debts, and inflation that are the cornerstones of

⁹ Schmidt, Vivien. *The Futures of European Capitalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 37-38.

¹⁰ Bunce, Valery. Postsocialisms. In Antohi, Sorin and Tismaneanu, Vladimir (eds.). *Between Past and Future. The Revolutions of 1989 and their Aftermath*. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2000, 122–153.

¹¹ Marx, Karl. *Selected Writings*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

¹² Schmidt. *The Futures of European Capitalism*, 2002, 14.

monetarist policies, as well as deregulation, privatisation, decentralisation of labour markets, and welfare state retrenchment¹³.

Hence, on the eve of its transition, the CEE found itself with a *fait accomplie* to conform with the rules of the game prepared previously by the Western states. This was unlike the period in which capitalism emerged in the West where the Western states basically formulated their own conditions for the emergence of capitalism. Along with their capitalist revolutions, the Western European countries fostered political systems which spurred on their economic development. In contrast, in the ECE, historically, strong feudal and post-feudal structures and the accompanying submission of national economies to the dominance of foreign empires paved the way towards the frail and crippled nature of economic and social development. The weak middle class and poorly developed capitalist class (often of foreign origin) reinforced the general backwardness¹⁴. On top, the Soviet Union introduced to the region after the 2nd World War an unusually invasive and regionally encased state-socialism. In socialist property regimes, the most important relationship after the prerogatives of the state as owner was based in the right of direct administration. Still, by means of granting administrative rights the state retained its claim to supreme ownership, but exercised that ownership by allocating use and administrative rights downward to smaller entities. After all, it assigned parts of the property of the ‘whole people’ to lower levels in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Recipients of these rights could further parcel them out to others still lower down the scale¹⁵. This system reduced private initiative to the level of a dwarf: it plotted restricted limits for its functioning and reduced the number of those working in the sector. Yet, it did not eliminate it completely. It viewed that private forms of ownership as a sector, which was ‘still necessary’ for the satisfaction of some needs. The communist regimes, at least in Poland and Hungary, began to change their attitude towards private entrepreneurship as early as the 1960s¹⁶. Nevertheless, as I mentioned above, the private entrepreneurship was enmeshed with informal links. Especially Hungary presented the most extensive and varied elite effect¹⁷ on its – in relative terms – private economy of goulash communism.

Out of this rather complicated picture of what is otherwise socialist economy, my intention is to qualify informal relations. I think that out of what continues well into the post-transition economics of ECE, the informal relations among the indigenous and the internal elite is the most interesting. Strathern¹⁸ characterises the nature of persons in a gift economy as not autonomous possessive individuals, but those who are deeply embedded in interdependent

¹³ P. 17.

¹⁴ Wesołowski, Włodzimierz. *Trend Report. Polish Sociological Review*. Vol.1, 1996, issue: 113: 79–96, 79.

¹⁵ Verdery, Katherine Privatization as Transforming Persons. In Antohi, Sorin and Tismaneanu, Vladimir (eds.) *Between Past and Future. The Revolutions of 1989 and their Aftermath*. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2000, 175–197, 186.

¹⁶ Wesołowski. *Trend Report*. 1996, 80.

¹⁷ See Eyal *et al.* “Making Capitalism Without Capitalists” for a further discussion. 1998.

¹⁸ Strathern, Marilyn. “Subject or Object: Women and the Circulation of Valuables in Highlands in New Guinea” in Renee Hirschon (ed.), *Women and Property, Women as Property*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988, 188. In Verdery. *Privatization as Transforming Persons*. 2000, 188.

relations. According to Verdery¹⁹, individuals as such are network-embedded actors. Hence, the 'persons' who participated in widespread exchanges – both individuals and firms – constituted robust networks. As a result, their personhood rested on their embeddedness in social relations, not on their autonomy. At the end, all facets of daily life depended on one's ability to mobilise contacts. Under socialism, these realities implied a socialist 'person' very different from the autonomous, self-actualising, possessive individual characteristic of capitalism. Socialist persons were embedded; instead of being self-actualising individuals, they were dependent upon one another and upon the paternalist state. They do not accumulate things, but accumulate people with whom to exchange things and favours. Hence, after all the citizens of the former Eastern Bloc were tailored for the informal networking environment of globalisation before the end of the communist regime. On top, this system also rendered the individual to take the initiative into one's own hands even more attractive. Hence, active individualism got the better of passivity and collectivism imposed by the socialist state²⁰.

What is more, although there was a simultaneous transition to democracy in the CEE along with the establishment of market economy this transition was crippled. Those states, which are in the periphery of the global world capitalist systems, such as the ECE states, the problems of liberal democracy are more visible since they do not have well-established traditions of liberal democracy²¹. As I will explain in the coming sections, the new political elite carried out the process of transition without delegating the process to respective institutions. For now it suffices to say that the result was continuity in elitist informal practices rather than extending the scope of participation in the ECE politics during the process of economic change.

What appears out of the discussion above is that, the ECE states found themselves in a *fait accomplie* to accept a capitalist system. The western states prepared this system long before the ECE acceded to it. In this respect, the diluted socialist system of the ECE bore prevalent informal links. These links prevailed into the post-transition phase of economic restructuring. Especially, the informal links between the indigenous elite and the western economic elite became prominent in the emergence, formation and build-up of capitalism in the region. In the next section, I need to mention how this transition failed to represent the wishes of the populations comprehensively and proceeded in the absence of their participation.

III PROCESSES OF ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN HUNGARY AND POLAND

It appeared that in ECE economic reforms were more likely to be introduced, implemented, and sustained had the former communists lost the initial election following the collapse of communist party hegemony. Thus, a liberal opposition with no stake in the old order would prefer economic reform

¹⁹ Verdery. *Privatization as Transforming Persons*. 2000, 188.

²⁰ Wesolowski. *Trend Report*. 1996, 81.

²¹ Szalai, Erzsébet. Posztoszocializmus és globalizáció Magyarországon. *Politikatudományi Szemle*. Vol. 10, issue 1, 2001a, № 2: 9–22.

to the alternatives. When joined with an electoral mandate, desire for economic reforms was then combined with considerable capacity to carry through such reforms. In Hungary, Poland, the Baltic States, Czechoslovakia, and Slovenia, the opposition enjoyed a mandate to rule. This encouraged the decision makers to introduce economic reforms while giving them the luxury of assuming that they had some political time to show economic results. In this context, the public had an understanding of capitalist liberal economy in these states as the welcome and eagerly anticipated ‘other’ of state socialism. The question then becomes whether we should see the economic reforms as a commitment to a liberal economy or alternatively, as a powerful mechanism to root out the old order. The latter makes more sense if one considers the absence of either classes or sectors with vested interests in a capitalist economy in ECE²².

Nevertheless, the economic costs of the transition to capitalism were high. Continuing difficulties associated with privatisation of large state enterprises²³; substantial public dissatisfaction with the newly created political and economic institutions; a working class that is weak, disorganised and dispirited are one of the few²⁴. Those charged with privatisation began from the premise that socialist production was inefficient and wasteful due to the structure of ownership. They saw the transformation of ownership as essential to increasing productivity and the efficiency of factor allocation, enhancing motivation and quality of output. Privatisation serves goals other than improving economic performance through changing ownership²⁵.

Hungary went through a transition to market economy, similar to almost all states in the ECE region. As I mentioned above, this transition process was connected to the international power relations deriving from globalisation. With respect to the informal links, the position of Hungarian elites in this scheme deserves a particular attention. In Hungary, the late Kadarian technocracy relinquished a piece of its domestic economic capital to expand its international social and cultural capitals – so that the ‘superstructure’ (of international capitalism) would acknowledge and remunerate its achievements, and certain members of the Hungarian elite could become the elements of the ‘superstructure’. As a result, multinational investors and their representatives massed up a major part of economic capital. This sector soon established its institutions to constitute the central sphere of the economic field. The result was a difference between the situation of those who had links with the foreign capital and those who with links to domestic elite groups. Yet, the strong individualisation of this system hindered it from developing sensible social functions²⁶.

²² Bunce. *Postsocialisms*. 2000, 131–133.

²³ See Stark, David and Bruszt, László. *Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for a further discussion regarding the problems of voucher privatisation, 1998.

²⁴ Bunce. *Postsocialisms*. 2000, 124–125.

²⁵ Verdery. *Privatization as Transforming Persons*. 2000, 176.

²⁶ Szalai, Erzsebet. The Economic Elite and Social Structure in the Hungarian New Capitalism. *Central European Political Science Review*. Vol. 2, № 5, 2001b, 115–151, 116, 143–144.

Despite the positive aspects of ‘goulash-communism’ and ‘new economic mechanism’²⁷, by 1979 Hungary was at the brink of insolvency. This was a combined effect of the unfavourable external climate and the decision to base economic development on foreign loans at a time when the country was not ready for the efficient use of large amounts of additional resources. In 1982, in an attempt to ease external debt, Hungary joined the World Bank and IMF, a move which corresponded with the interests of the growing financial bureaucracy. From this date, monetary and fiscal policy, and the bureaucracy associated with it, have acquired an overwhelming importance in the macro-economic management of the Hungarian economy. The bureaucracy gained a *de facto* veto on any economic policy issue and focused on a full transformation of the state socialist economic system. The transformation required preventing the political leadership’s intervention and gaining the support of the large companies. These steps axiomatically came from the logic of reforms, the disintegration of the state planning system, and the direct and personal aims of emerging new elite – in addition to pressure from the IMF. As well as company directors and factions within state bureaucracy, the new stratum of private entrepreneurs was another crucial contributory factor to the disintegration of the remains of central planning²⁸.

In the early period of economic liberalisation after 1989, the only economic programme supported by the IMF in return for credits was shock therapy. In short, this meant that the government had to try to achieve its structural aims (reduction in state ownership and budgetary transfers, reinforcing financial disciplines and capital imports) while attempting, simultaneously, to stabilise the economy²⁹. Yet, the developments in Hungary in 1990 and 1991 forced the government to retreat from *laissez faire* perspectives. 1993 saw a complete change in the privatisation strategy for the Hungarian government. This move achieved a series of political compromises among several elite groups and offered assets to those who were the potential source of the Hungarian bourgeoisie: that is, the management of the state-owned companies and technocrats moved from central bureaucracy to business; the entrepreneurs of the 1980s and to a lesser extent, the descendants of the traditional upper middle class³⁰. The Hungarian government introduced a drastic austerity programme in 1995, which started the third round of privatisation. Out of this programme came an ownership structure characteristically different from other former state socialist countries. Of the 200 largest companies in Hungary, 80 percent are partly or wholly foreign owned and the share of these companies in Hungarian exports exceeded 70 percent. Also, despite shrinking Hungarian GDP until 1997, the elite could secure its accumulation. The aggrieved party of this process, however, was the middle classes – subsequent to 1998 the poorest groups of the society³¹.

²⁷ See fn. 1.

²⁸ Czaban. *Hungarian Economic Transformation: Gradual Progress towards Accession?* 1999, 279.

²⁹ P. 282.

³⁰ P. 285.

³¹ Szalai. *The Economic Elite and Social Structure in the Hungarian New Capitalism.* 2001b, 121.

In line with Hámor's research³², one can claim that Hungary is entering upon a social structure composed of two more and more detached groups: those who are able to cling on to the labour market and those who lose ground for good. The Hungarian society and, in particular, some large groups of the employees are in much more vulnerable position today than in the classical epoch of state socialism. They cannot even use their legal opportunities to pursue their interests³³. The winners and the leading forces of the regime change were the late-Kádár technocracy and the intellectual groups. And these people re-occupied leading positions once again after the victory of the social-liberal coalition in the 1994 elections³⁴. Yet, what is very crucial is that, the employees remained as the main losers of the transition. No weighty political power articulates their interests. Although the civil rights are extending, the citizens have no right to have some insight or a word in the crucial decisions. In Hungary, therefore, with dominant foreign capital and concentration during the first ten years of the regime change, there came a certain societal and political structure. This structure shows dependence on the west³⁵. Hence the process of globalization and the ongoing economic transition made the Hungarian system weaker, and as such the impacts of globalization could leak into the system easier. This process paves the way towards an overrepresentation of the interests of the multinationalist firms. There becomes the current political elite captive of the multinational capital. As a result, the uneducated and untrained labour force did not receive their share from development. The bright statistics of economic development only affect the upper classes. Finally, there is no sign from the part of the upper classes that they care much about poverty³⁶.

Therefore, despite continuous economic growth in the region since 1997, in most of the cases the steady economic growth did not help the overall population very much. To give an example, an exceptionally large and uneven differentiation of earnings accompanied mass unemployment and widespread poverty. Poland has experienced the most acute income discrepancy. The income share of the bottom decile in Poland was around one half of that was found in Hungary³⁷. Further evidence of workers' impoverishment was provided by the fact that even towards the end of 1996, and therefore in the fifth year of the economic boom, real wages were approximately lower than in 1989. Many workers were earning in the mid 1990s one-third less than they did 10 to 15 years earlier. The income inequality in Poland was similar to the USA rather than Europe. A greater degree of differentiation occurred only in Albania and Russia. At the top end of the scale we could find a greedy managerial group whose earnings could reach 60 times the average wage. A

³² Hámor, Szilvia. Az Nyer, aki otthagya a kaptafát (Win but Leave your Last). *Népszabadság*, 2001, February 10: 23–24. In Szalai. *The Economic Elite and Social Structure in the Hungarian New Capitalism*. 2001b, 126.

³³ See the amendments on the Hungarian Labour Code in 2001.

³⁴ Szalai. *Posztoszocializmus és globalizáció Magyarországon*. 2001a, 11.

³⁵ P. 10.

³⁶ P. 11.

³⁷ Milic-Czerniak, R. (ed.). *Gospodarstwa domowe w krajach Europy Środkowej*, Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Społeczny. In Kowalik. *The Ugly Face of Polish Success: Social Aspects of Transformation*. 1998, 35.

situation of this sort could not have arisen without the silent acquiescence of both the previous SLD-PSL administration with its leftist logo and the post-1997 AWS-UW authorities alike³⁸.

On the other hand, the Polish citizens, similar to their brethren in the other CEE countries going through similar transitions, were interested in capitalism as long as it guaranteed in a relatively short time an improvement of standards of living for society as a whole or at least for a significant majority of the society. Any conception where improvement was only for a small minority cannot count on lasting support³⁹. Hence, as it appeared, there was a discrepancy between the expectancies of the Polish population and the end results of Polish capitalism. It is sensible to associate this end result to the liberty of action that the political elite took for granted in the aftermath of transition to liberal economics. I will expose this point a little bit further in the next section as this will allow me to demonstrate why lack of participation in ways the political elite tailored capitalism was crucial.

In order to appreciate the full extent to which the people were disappointed with the new emergent economic system, one should listen to the Polish historian Marcin Kula.

Already under the *ancien regime* during the seventies, Edward Gierek had opened a western life perspective by his political imports. Nevertheless, under Solidarity, the unemployment was unthinkable and nobody expected privatisation. In this paradox, whereas the syndical movement became the initiative of transformations, it has almost disappeared especially in the privatised enterprises. The people have been let down by Europe since the fall of communism (translated from French)⁴⁰.

The decrease in the influence of trade unions and the agricultural decline are also central to my discussion. Especially, the latter has resulted in the almost complete pauperisation of the peasantry. In the first phase of transformation, private farmers' incomes fell by almost half and were only partially restored in the following years. With no 'home-grown' programme for agriculture all hopes for agricultural modernisation lie in the framework of the European Union⁴¹. Merely 19 percent of the farmers perceive the changes taking place as opening new possibilities. This is the lowest optimism ranking in the entire population⁴². Authoritarian industrial relations at the micro level in private enterprises and the appropriation of the trade unions by alternate governing parties at the macro level has led to a dramatic in trade union power and an equally dramatic fall in union membership⁴³. One question that comes to our mind should be given the negative social costs of the transition to

³⁸ Kowalik. *The Ugly Face of Polish Success: Social Aspects of Transformation*. 2001, 35.

³⁹ Dziewiecka-Bokun. *Tygodnik Solidarność*, 27, 1990. In Kowalik, Tadeusz. *The Ugly Face of Polish Success: Social Aspects of Transformation*. 2001, 37.

⁴⁰ Samary, Carherine. A l'Est, une transition et le citoyen. *Le Monde Diplomatique*. November, 1999, 13.

⁴¹ Kowalik. *The Ugly Face of Polish Success: Social Aspects of Transformation*. 2001, 36.

⁴² Kowalik. *The Ugly Face of Polish Success: Social Aspects of Transformation*. 2001, 40.

⁴³ P. 38.

market economy⁴⁴, how come the citizens still put up with the way things work. This can be the topic of the next and the final section.

IV CONCLUSION: LACK OF PARTICIPATION OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND ECONOMIC REFORM

During the beginning of the democratisation period, there was ‘passive tolerance’ of respective societies for the reform policies. The governments were very well served by the social attitude of passivity and passive permissiveness⁴⁴. Hence, the regime transformation lacked sufficient rebuilding of the political and economic institutions. And the citizenry did not shape the post-communist political order, but rather had to accept it. Even in the language of contention, such as strikes, one would find evidence of broad support of labour, as an example, for market economy⁴⁵. The implication of the strong belief in post-communism was that, one must be obedient, even though it is difficult, because it is *our state*⁴⁶. A possible cause of passive support can be people’s initial trust in *our state* after the regime change, which makes them personalise the changes. What I mean by personalisation is that, the citizenry consider changes as an organic element of their lives, carried out by an avant-garde elite but not delegated to institutions. Hence, they attribute changes not with institutions but with particular personalities. A possible cause of the absence of civic engagement is a new tide of conformism at the level of the citizenry⁴⁷. In my opinion, the personalisation of changes and conformism explain the prevalence of general feeling of passivity among the citizenry. In this context of prevalent passivity, the new elite adopted a moral role and became pivotal for changes.

Moreover, this new elite determined the limits of their avant-garde roles themselves. The panacea for passivity would be enabling citizen involvement into decision-making through formal institutions. In contrast, uncertainties of post-communism have fostered an ever-greater reliance on networks and informal links⁴⁸. On the other hand, civil society retained its underdevelopment of socialist years. It tunnelled most of its reserves to hasty party formations. The fact was soon realised that the majority of the society was practically shut

⁴⁴ Rychard, Andrzej. Polish Membership in the European Union Problems of Institutions and Social Structures. *Polish Sociological Review*. Vol. 1, 2003, issue: 141: 77–82, 78.

⁴⁵ See Gardawski Juliusz, Gąciarz, Barbara, Mokrzyzewski, Andrzej, and Pańków, Włodzimierz. *Rozpad Bastionu? Związki zawodowe w gospodarce prywatyzowanej [The Fall of the Bastion? Trade Unions in a Privatised Economy]*, Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 1999, 153, 157, 159. For 1998 data for trade union leaders’ reaction to economic changes in Poland. Also see Ekiert, Grzegorz and Kubik, Jan. Contentious Politics in New Democracies: East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia 1989–1993. *World Politics*. Vol. 50, 1998, issue 4, July: 547–581.

⁴⁶ See Rychard, Andrzej. *Reform, Adaptation, Breakthrough*. The Sources of and Limits to Institutional Change in Poland. Warsaw: IFIS Publishers, 1993, especially pp: 119, 127, 130.

⁴⁷ See the survey results in (Slomczyński *et al* 1999: 136). Although this data is limited to Poland, I find it plausible to generalise it to other East-Central European societies, which were also amidst similar serious changes.

⁴⁸ See Sik, Endre and Wellman, Barry. Network Capital in Capitalist, Communist and Postcommunist Countries. In Wellman (ed.). *Networks in the Global Village Life in Contemporary Communities*. Oxford: Westview Press, 1999, especially 225, 243–244.

off from the decision about the main question of the system change⁴⁹. At the same time, the reformers did not really understand the need to develop a legal and institutional framework of negotiations with social actors⁵⁰. Even worse, as in Hungary, the reformers began their activity by creating the constitutional conditions for insulating economic decision-making from the parliamentary opposition⁵¹ through a model of top-down elite reform. Thus, as Arató put it, “the aims of elite democracy and economic liberalism virtually coincided [during the democratic consolidation period], and the greatest enemy was an organised civil society”⁵².

In this context, globalization and Europeanization became opportunities for national actors to impart desired or needed changes. Hence, the elite made the most of lack of citizen participation in politics to push changes related to neo-liberal restructuring of ECE economies. These changes also resulted from the complex interaction of liberalizing institutions and actors, spurred by liberal capitalist ideas, pushing and ultimately pulled by external market forces and so on. Although national governments, whether operating alone or in concert through supranational trade organizations, are largely responsible for instituting the liberalizing changes that made globalization possible, by eliminating capital controls, reducing tariff barriers, and deregulating markets, they are increasingly subject to the globalization pressures that they have themselves set loose⁵³. It is small wonder that Marx developed an early theory of capitalist internationalization. Marx writes of the way in which the capitalist seeks to transsect national boundaries restlessly seeking to expand markets throughout the world and to appropriate ever greater trenches of labour power⁵⁴. In summary, the East Europeans now belong to internationalism of peripheral capitalism instead of communist internationalism.

⁴⁹ Szalai. *The Economic Elite and Social Structure in the Hungarian New Capitalism*. 2001b, 124.

⁵⁰ Gorniak, Jan and Jerschina, Jarosław. From Corporatism to . . . Corporatism: The Transformation of Interest Representation in Poland. In Hausner, Jerzy, Jessop, Bob and Nielsen, Klaus (eds.). *Strategic Choice and Path-Dependency in Post-Socialism: Institutional Dynamics in the Transformation Process*. Aldershot, Brookefield: Edward Elgar, 1995, 177.

⁵¹ Bruszt, László. Reforming Alliances: Labour, Management and State Bureaucracy in Hungary's Economic Transformation. In Hausner, Jerzy, Jessop, Bob, Nielsen, Klaus (eds.). *Strategic Choices and Path Dependency in Post-Socialism. Institutional Dynamics in the Transformation of Practices*. Aldershot, Brookefield: Edward Elgar, 1995, 276.

⁵² Arató, András. Forradalom, civil társadalom és demokrácia Kelet-Európában [Revolution, Civil Society and Democracy in Eastern Europe]. *Mozgó Világ*. Vol. 16, 1990, № 8. In Lomax, Bill. The Strange Death of Civil Society in Post-Communist Hungary. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transitional Politics*. Vol.13, issue 1, March: 1997, 41–63, 42.

⁵³ Schmidt. *The Futures of European Capitalism*. 2002, 21.

⁵⁴ Waters, Malcolm. *Globalization*. 2nd Edition. London and New York: Routledge, 2001, 27.

Disorder in the Remuneration System – Challenge for Latvia’s Europeanization Policy

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European integration has reached a phase where the core areas of the welfare state are directly and indirectly affected. The full implementation of an economic and monetary union has increased. Economic interdependence, fiscal policies, labour markets and social policies are, due to the risk of externalities, no longer considered merely national but common concerns.

The statutory minimum wage has long been a source of intense political and economic controversy. Seen by many as the ultimate source of social protection against exploitation and poverty, it has been seen by generations of critics as a “market distortion, pricing working out of jobs and denying the freedom of employment contracts”¹.

Remuneration systems are a very important instrument for social and labour market policy in each country. Latvia is not an exception. Therefore we’ll look in two issues: 1) Minimum monthly wages; 2) the reform of the remuneration system. Both of these issues fall under the area of national responsibility. However, there are some standards established by ILO, OECD and the European Social Charter.

Minimum monthly wages were established to regulate remuneration for work in the country. In May 4, 1990 Latvia’s Parliament together with the Declaration about Renewal Independence joined the 1970 Convention of the International Labour Organisation No. 131 “On Establishment of Minimum Wages” and has ratified it in 1993. This convention stipulated that the following factors were to be taken into account, as far as possible and as long as they corresponded to the national conditions:

- 1) The needs of workers and their families, taking into account the overall wage level in the country, living costs, social benefits and the relative living standards of other social groups;
- 2) The economic factors, among them demands of the economic development, the productivity rate and the desirability to achieve and maintain a high employment rate.

¹ “Minimum Wages in Central and Eastern Europe: from protection to destitution” edited by Guy Standing and Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead; prepared by The International Labour Office Central and Eastern European Team – Central European University Press, Budapest, London, New York, 1995, p.1.

In 1990-ties Latvian Labour Code (article 84) regulated the minimum monthly salary in Latvia. Under the Labour Code of Latvia, minimum monthly wages were defined – as the lowest monthly salary given for work provided within the framework of a normal working time and it *must not be lower than the subsistence minimum* established in the country. There was no contradiction among the norms in ILO convention and Latvia’s legislation concerning the relationship between minimal salary and the subsistence minimum.

According to the established monitoring procedure, the ILO Committee of Experts on 1996/67th session evaluated the information supplied in the first report from the Government and the observations made by the Free Trade Union Federation of Latvia (LBAS). The Committee notes from the observations made by LBAS show, according to trade union experts, the state-determined minimum wage is 1.7 times less than that of the state-determined crisis living wage and three times less than the living wage necessary for one working person. The Committee notes that the Government has not communicated its comments on these observations and has requested that they do so.

Here are figures illustrating the changing relationship between the minimal salary and subsistence minimum.

Table 1

**Remuneration, Minimum Monthly Wages and Subsistence Minimum
(1991–2003)**

Year	Minimum monthly wages on average per year LVL	Subsistence minimum on average per year LVL	Minimum monthly wages % of subsistence minimum	Average monthly wages of employees working in national economy	Minimum monthly wages % of average monthly wages of employees working in national economy
1996	35.50	73.78	48.1%	98.73	36.0
1997	38.00	78.78	48.2%	120.03	31.7
1998	42.00	82.43	50.9%	133.30	31.5
1999	50.00	83.18	60.1%	140.99	35.5
2000	50.00	84.47	59.2%	149.53	33.4
2001	55.00	86.93	63.3%	159.30	34.5
2002	60.00	88.76	67.6%	173	34.7
2003	70.00	91.75	76.3%	192	36.6

Source: CSP; <http://www.csb.lv>; LR Labklājības ministrija. Informatīvais pārskats par galvenajam sociālās politikas pārmaiņām 2002. gadā. Rīga, 2004, 38. lpp. – <http://www.lm.gov.lv>

We can conclude from the figures in Table 1, that there was a positive trend in the correlation between minimum wages and subsistence minimum. The sum of minimum wages in gross has increased from 48% in 1996 to 76% in 2003. Nevertheless, it was not (and is still not) equal to the subsistence minimum.

According to the Labour Law accepted by Saeima in June 2001 (in force since June 1, 2002) a minimum monthly wage should not be lower than the

officially established minimum. The term subsistence minimum is no longer in use with the new Labour Law in connection with minimum wage.

The Committee noted concerning the Observation of ILO 2002/ 73rd session that the “Government’s report from Latvia has not been received. The Government adds that in 2001 the national minimum wage amounted to 63.3 per cent of the subsistence level calculated by the Central Statistical Bureau and that 93,800 workers, or 16 per cent of the total working population, are estimated to receive a gross monthly salary at the level of the minimum wage”. After the acknowledgement these facts the evaluation followed. “In this connection, the Committee is obliged to recall that the principal objective of a minimum wage system is to contribute to the eradication of poverty by ensuring a decent standard of living for all working people and their families and that consequently a minimum wage which manifestly fails to cover such basic needs as housing, food, education, health or social security, scarcely serves as an adequate tool of social protection”.

Recommendations and requests to the authorities of Latvia in 2002 ILO session were expressed in diplomatic but clear language: “The Committee trusts that the Government, in consultation with its social partners, will make every effort to ensure that minimum wage increases adequately reflect the needs of workers and their families, for instance by maintaining their purchasing power in relation to a basic basket of essential consumer goods and requests the Government to continue to provide up-to-date information on the evolution of minimum wage rates as compared to the evolution of other indicators such as the average subsistence level or the inflation rate”. The basic principles for determining any increase in the minimum wage are defined by “**The Concept Paper on the Minimum Wage**” accepted by the Government in 2003.² According to this concept minimum wage should increase gradually during the next 7 years until it will reach 50% of the average salary. In such a way Latvia will become closer to the standards established by the European Social Charter. According to the OECD recommendations, the minimal income of employees should be equal to 68% of average level of salaries and wages in the country.³

Table 2

**The Planned Increase of Amount of Minimal
Salary as % of Average Salary**

Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Minimal salary as % of previous year average salary	43	44	46	47	48	49	50

Source: *Ministru kabineta noteikumi Nr. 413, Rīgā 2003. gada 22. jūlijā. Kārtība, kādā nosakāma un pārskatāma minimālā mēneša darba alga. Izdoti saskaņā ar Darba likuma 61. panta trešo daļu.*

² *Ministru kabineta noteikumi Nr. 413, Rīgā 2003. gada 22. jūlijā. Kārtība, kādā nosakāma un pārskatāma minimālā mēneša darba alga. Izdoti saskaņā ar Darba likuma 61. panta trešo daļu – <http://www.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=77636>, 04.11.21.*

³ *LR Labklājības ministrija. Informatīvais pārskats par galvenajām sociālās politikas pārmaiņām 2002. gadā. Rīga, 2004, 40. lpp. – <http://wwwlm.gov.lv>.*

There is a specially established and very complicated procedure, time-table and participants for revision of the amount of minimal salary. According to these rules, every year prior to May 1st, the Ministry of Welfare together with the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy, State Chancellor's Department of Policy coordination, Latvia's Association of Local Governments, Latvia's Free Trade Union Association and Latvia's Confederation of Employers should evaluate the economic situation in the country and make an agreement concerning the amount of minimal salary and data. After that the National Trilateral Cooperation Council should make its own decision about amount of minimal salary and finally Cabinet of Ministers has power to accept the new increased amount of minimal salary and the timeline as to when the new rules will be in force. It is still not the end of the procedure. During the following month after the decision has been made by the Cabinet of Ministers the Ministry of Finance should prepare proposals (more than one version) of how to review (in connection with new minimal salary) the scale of the salary increase for all persons working in ministries and state institutions. All ministries should prepare their own proposals for the Ministry of Finance. All these proposals will be submitted together to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Regional and Local Development.

Government's affairs should send to the local governments, because local governments are supposed to review the scale of salaries and wages as well. There is clear defined time-table for making these procedures. All ministries should prepare their financing schemes three weeks after receiving the proposals from the Ministry of Finance. After receiving the decisions, they should evaluate their financial capacity and impact assessment on the state budget and prepare these proposals for final decision-making by the Cabinet of Ministers. This is still not the end. After approval by the Cabinet of Ministers by September 1st, the Ministry of Welfare should prepare new minimal hour tariffs and the Ministry of Finance by December 1st, should prepare amendments to the bills connected with the remuneration system.

All these rules were established by the government coalition associated with prime-minister Einars Repše (New Era) in the mid of summer 2003. This government voluntarily dismissed in February 2004 and new government with prime-minister Indulis Emsis (Green Party) started its activities in March 2004, two months prior to Latvia joining the EU on May 1, 2004. The Government had to prepare and accept many legislative acts in connection with joining EU. There were no radical changes in any of the key actors which should review the amount of minimal salary except one, very important figure – the Minister of Finance. The new government (ruled by Emsis) rejected the previous government's (ruled by Repše) plan to increase the amount of the minimum wage and left the minimum wage for 2005 the same as it was in 2004. The minimum wage for 2004 is 80 LVL or 42% from average gross salary in 2003. The economy of Latvia is growing rapidly, more than 6% per year, however the level of inflation was extremely high – 7.3% in 2004. Even though the economic indicators are relatively high, the increase in the level of public welfare is still extremely low. In 2005, there will be a decrease in the minimum wage as a percentage of average monthly wages instead of planned increase. Such is the social cost of discontinuity in the policy of government in the area of the minimum wage.

The Household Budget Survey data shows that in 2002 the average income per household member in a month was 80.00 Ls⁴ (137.22 EUR). It means, that the average income per household member was only 90% of subsistence minimum. In 2002, 20% of the poorest households had just 10% of the total income of households, the average income per person in these households was 31.41 Ls (53.87 EUR) or 35% of subsistence minimum and 27% of all residents came from those low-income households. In contrast, 20% of the more prosperous households with just 18% of the population had 40% of total household income⁵.

Latvia is the poorest country among new EU member-states with the lowest minimum wage. In October 2002 the number of employees whose salary was less than or equal to the minimum wage was 89,700 (79,700 in the private sector and 10,000 in the public sector). According to the data from the Ministry of Finance, the shadow economy accounts for 14–20%⁶. Even if we take into account the data from “Working Life Barometer” (2002) that around 20% of employees have received additional (illegal) payments in envelopes, the group of people with low salary is still too large. 66.9% of all employees in survey data in 2002 have received 150 LVL and less (average salary in 2002 was 173 LVL). It means that about 70% of employees have received less than average salary. Such proportion indicated high level of polarization, because there isn't any reasonable explanation as to why some people in the public sector can receive salary on a daily basis which is equal to another person's monthly salary.

Table 3

**Employees according to their gross monthly wages and salaries
(excluding payments not made on a regular basis)**

	Employees, '000	% of total
Total	334.8	100.0
of which calculated wages and salaries, lats:		
59.99 and less	3.3	1.0
60.00 (minimum in 2002)	76.4	22.8
60.01 – 70.00	36.2	10.8
70.01-80.00	23.6	7.1
80.01 – 100.00	33.6	10.0
100.01-120.00	21.8	6.5
120.01-149.99	23.6	7.0
150.00	5.6	1.7
150.01-200.00	33.1	9.9
200.01-250.00	22.9	6.9
250.01-300.00	16.8	5.0
300.01-400.00	16.5	4.9
400.01-500.00	8.4	2.5
500.01-600.00	4.5	1.4
600.01-1000.00	6.0	1.8
1000.01-5000.00	2.5	0.7

⁴ Bank of Latvia defined exchange rate in 2002 was 1 EUR = 0.583 Ls.

⁵ Household budget survey data as of 2002.

⁶ Joint Assessment Paper, p. 6.

over 5000.00	0.0	0.0
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Source: Joint Inclusion Memorandum, Annex 1 CSB, Reports of enterprises and institutions
 Note: Survey data concern employees in the main job who worked full-time for a full month. (October 2002, private sector)

Latvia’s Association of Free Trade Union didn’t have enough political power to oversee the fulfilment of established complicated procedures in the management of the minimum wage. Rapid increase of inflation in 2004 and the activities of Federation of Pensioners (more than 20% of Latvia’s population) forced the Ministry of Welfare to initiate serious indexation (around 6 LVL) of small pensions in 2004, but it did not try to motivate the government in to looking for mechanism of compensation for employees. The increase of the tax-free sum from 21 LVL to 26 LVL (that means additional 1.25 LVL or almost 5 times less than for pensioners) for each employee since 2005 was the only achievement of all of the bargaining in 2004. The year when Latvia joined the EU. Even though the activity of Trade Unions contributed to their popularity.

So the defeat of any hopes of preserving an adequate minimum wage was rather predictable in Latvia’s circumstances and this was not only due to the weakness of Latvia’s Association of Free Trade Unions.

There is a long history of the **development of the remuneration system in Latvia**, which started in the first months after renewed independence in 1991. In the early transition to the market economy in order to regulate remuneration for employees working at institutions financed by national budget, on 13 November 1991 the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia approved Rules No. 318 “*On Uniform Remuneration System at Institutions Financed by the National Budget*”.⁷ Remuneration was based on the division of positions by qualification categories with their respective coefficients. *The levels of wages were determined by multiplying the minimum monthly wage established in the country by these coefficients.* The ratio of the highest and lowest wages was 13,86 : 1. Due to the rapid inflation and a generally low remuneration level caused by constrained national budget resources, the above coefficients were ignored and the Cabinet of Ministers established wage grades according to the qualification categories. The ratio of the highest and lowest wages shrank to 3,3 : 1; i.e. the “scale” was compressed.

In 1994, in order to improve the situation, the uniform remuneration system was altered, excluding large groups of employees from the system and establishing **special remuneration systems** for these groups, e.g. pedagogical staff and employees of public administration institutions. Under the Law “On State Civil Service” a separate remuneration system was set up for the candidates for the Civil Service. These systems were not established in an economically justified way nor were they formulated in a legally appropriate manner. As, for the most part, they were based on political decisions. The remuneration for Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, ministers, state ministers, parliamentary secretaries was established by the Cabinet of Minis-

⁷ Latvijas Republikas Ministru Padomes lēmums Nr. 318 „Par vienotu darba samaksas sistēmu no budžeta finansējamo iestāžu darbiniekiem. LR AP un MP Ziņotājs, 1991, 488.–513. lpp.

ters while the Saeima establishes the remuneration for President of the State, members of the Saeima and employees of institutions of the Saeima.

A special methodology was developed for the appraisal of intellectual work that was approved by Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers. A methodology was drafted for the appraisal of physical work. (Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 185 in 28 May 1996 “On Basic Methodology for Appraisal of Intellectual Work and Establishment of Qualification Categories”).

The Ministry of Welfare drafted the “**Concept on Remuneration**” approved by the Cabinet of Ministers on 30 June 1998. The purpose of the concept was to promote remuneration appropriate for the work done and for the employee’s qualifications by establishing a flexible and mobile remuneration system that would be able to react to labour market demand. Moreover, it was declared essential to ensure the competitiveness of institutions financed by the national budget with the private sector in the area of remuneration. It would also solve the problem of attracting qualified specialists, provide a higher motivation level among employees, link remuneration with the contribution and the overall performance of the employee.

In 2000, the analysis of the development of the above remuneration system had already identified the following problems in the area of remuneration:

- Low wages.
- Considerable differences in the wages and other costs for similar jobs among the current remuneration systems for institutions financed by the national budget. In one system, the difference in basic wages between the lowest and highest positions is not large, in another additional payments (100% and more of the basic wage) form a considerable proportion where the amount of payments does not always depend on the employee’s performance results.
- Insufficiently wide scales of basic wages, thus making it difficult to differentiate wages depending on performance.
- The existing scales of basic wages in institutions financed by the national budget are compressed, i.e. the ratio of the lowest wages in the lowest qualification category and the highest qualification category is small. There is an insignificant difference between the payment for qualified and less qualified employees.
- Wages are not reconsidered on a regular basis⁸

The existing problems generated the following consequences: (1) qualified specialists left public agencies for private entities and institutions with higher remuneration; (2) the size of the wages is not always directly linked to performance results thus the employee is not interested in improving performance results and encouraged to work more efficiently; (3) the principle of equal remuneration for work of the same value is not followed.

In order to address the above problems in the area of remuneration it was necessary to develop a uniform remuneration system for employees of institutions financed by the national budget which would be *transparent, fair, able to adapt to changes* in the surrounding business environment. The basic task in formulating the national policy on remuneration, which was under-

⁸ Social report 2001. Ministry of Welfare, Republic of Latvia. Rīga, 2001, p. 63.

taken by the **Ministry of Finance** in 2000, was to develop and coordinate remuneration systems for employees working at institutions financed by the national budget. On January 1, 2001, there were *13 different remuneration systems* at institutions financed by the national budget, established by the Cabinet of Ministers, besides the remuneration of specific groups of employees, regulated by special laws.

Now we’ll provide a list of different concepts accepted by the Cabinet of Ministers since January 2000: (1) Concepts about Remuneration systems for employees in Institutions financed by the state budget was accepted January 11, 2000; (2) Conceptual Report about Ground Rules Elaborating Remuneration System to Civil Servants and employees in Public Administration System, accepted January 2, 2001; (3) Concepts “The Remuneration System for Judges and employed in Courts”, accepted November 26, 2002; (4) Concept about regulation in remuneration system in the institutions financed by state budget to the health care persons in state enterprises and statute societies and to the social work specialists, accepted by the Cabinet of Ministers, May 27, 2003; changes May 26, 2004.

Since 2002, the State Chancellery is the basic institution responsible for the introduction of the remuneration system. The primary change was from the uniform system to the system based on competence which means a different system for different ministries and an individual approach. We can mention as example the changes that have already happened in the Ministry of Justice. Since July 2003 the average salary was increased for region judges from 341 LVL to 558 LVL, district judges from 290 LVL to 472 LVL and for judges in land book departments from 292 LVL to 427 LVL.⁹ State Chancellery plans to finish the reform of the remuneration system for civil servants until the year 2005. This reform anticipates creating the level of remuneration similar to that of private sector. The State Chancellery provides to make changes in 3 stages – 23 millions each year starting with 2006.¹⁰

Such a fragmented system and delays with introducing a remuneration system to all employees in State institutions already means serious threats to the labour market. In autumn 2004, doctors and nurses were the first who started to strike and demanded that the government rapidly increase their salaries. They had temporary victory, the Government increased their salaries for two months at the end of 2004 until the new budget was accepted.

Representatives of other professions are not so organised. They cannot use an ultimatum. However, they are looking for other opportunities that were available to them since May 1, 2004. The day when Latvia became a new EU member state. In the modern 21st century world, EU member states are so closely linked that one member state’s policy mistake (or delay with problem’s solution) will have an impact on the others. The education level of the employed in Latvia is comparatively high. On average 21.6% of those employed in basic work in 2002 had higher education (24% in the EU), 64.3% had secondary education, including vocational education (46% in the EU).¹¹ Many employees lack the skills necessary for work in the fields that are in highest demand in the la-

⁹ The website of the Ministry of Justice <http://www.tm.gov.lv>.

¹⁰ Irina Jesina Ierēdņu algu celšana varētu notikt 2006. gadā. *Diena*, 2004. g. 11. nov.

¹¹ Joint Inclusion Memorandum. Latvia, p. 9 <http://www.lm.gov.lv>

bour market – information technologies, communications, marketing and entrepreneurship. Nevertheless they are ready to compete in European labour market taking unqualified and low qualified job but with acceptable payments. The experience of the first months (since May 1, 2004) proves our thesis that citizens and non-citizens (residents) of Latvia view the whole of Europe as a possible labour market and don't think in terms of national labour markets. Moreover, the common currency is expected to facilitate price comparisons between countries and evoke consumer demands for price convergence, based on a conception of being "European consumers". It will be a challenge for Latvia's labour market in these new circumstances of europenization when there will be free vacancies else where in Europe. People will leave Latvia due to the fact that they do not want to apply for positions with low wage and salary. At the same time will be a challenge for the whole area of the EU labour market, because the threat for social dumping is becoming very real.

Two Danish authors Mikkel Mailand and Jesper Due have evaluated social dialogue in Central and Eastern Europe¹² and gave their recommendations how can the dialogue be improved. Authors argue, that social dialogue in this area, including the three Baltic States, does not measure up to the minimum criteria for effectiveness and has failed to counteract serious reductions in real wages and employment opportunities. Even more, they are very skeptical concerning the capability of these countries to improve substantially the social dialogue using their own resources. "Many of the proposals for improvement of the social dialogue seem trapped in a vicious circle which can be described as follows: weak organizations (and weak states lack the means to exert pressure on employers; strong employers can avoid serious negotiation and can fail to implement the terms of legislation and any agreement that may be reached; lack of achievement discredits unions in the eyes of their constituents and employees lack material incentives to become members; thus weak organizations are perpetuated"¹³. Therefore this would require more forceful intervention by the European Union enacting labour market directives, applying open methods of the coordination and sponsoring projects supporting social dialogue institutions.

¹² Mikkel Mailand and Jesper Due "Social Dialogue in Central and Eastern Europe: Present State and Future Development"// *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, vol. 10 number 2, pp. 179–197, 2004 SAGE.

¹³ Op.cit. p. 195.

Dollars, Disequilibrium, and Distress: Disturbances in the TransAtlantic System

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Since the end of World War II the US and West Europe have enjoyed a peace and prosperity unique in world history. The twin and complementary engines of peace and economic growth produced these enviable conditions. Yet, while both Europe and the US desire continued TransAtlantic cooperation and harmony, there are growing pressures placing strains on this system. The collapse of the Soviet threat, the economic slowdown, and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods economic order together have produced new challenges to maintaining good TransAtlantic relations, while perhaps making it more necessary than ever that ways be found to continue cultivating cooperative interactions

This article focuses on the following tensions in the EU/US relationship:

- Dollar Dominance & the Twin Deficits
- Euro as Reserve Currency
- German/French/Russian Potential Axis (energy/guns/euros)
- Neoliberalism vs. Keynesianism/Social Democracy
- Stakeholder vs. Shareholder Models
- US courting Central Europe
- Migration of NATO East
- European Defense Force
- International Law

In engaging this material the author uses a realist perspective to analyze these issues.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

From its birth the US rejected entanglement in Europe's affairs. Its foreign policy was guided by George Washington's famous farewell address. In that declaration he articulated an isolationist path for America. Yet, in reality, this policy was limited to avoiding conflicts in Europe. From the conquest of

the American frontier, to the engagement of pirates in the Mediterranean under Thomas Jefferson, to Commodore Matthew Perry's opening up Japan in 1853 and access to China, along with moves to consolidate power in Hawaii and later the Caribbean, the US proved itself proactively interventionist outside Europe. Of course, there was also the consolidation of power over the 500 indigenous nations in the continental US along with growing interference in Latin America's affairs in this history of intervention.

Europe, for all the talk of its democratic traditions, was a place continually plagued by war in its history. The Napoleonic Wars were so destructive that relative peace was constructed on the remains of those ruins only with the Congress of Vienna. The 19th century was a time of relative peace between states in Europe, with the exception of the Prussians flexing their newfound industrial muscle in the Franco-Prussian War. European military adventures at this time were largely limited to struggles within European empires, or more accurately, the nationalisms unleashed by the French Revolution that created much of Europe's modern map of nation-states. Moreover, in the 19th century, Europe's established powers found an outlet for their adventurist impulses with imperial activity in Sub-Saharan Africa, and what used to be called the Orient, stretching from North Africa to China.

The limits of empire and the unfinished business of nation-state building in Europe resulted in the horrors of World Wars I. In reality World War II was merely a continuation of the unresolved issues of the former conflict, plus the introduction of fascism and Stalinism as reactions to economic liberalism and imperialism that reached their limits of sustainability. In the future historians will surely see this as Europe's second "Thirty Year's War."

Thus, while some democratic seeds fell to the ground in the past two centuries, they remained a few isolated trees, whereas the forest of democracy is a relatively recent phenomenon only emerging after World War II. It is doubtful whether it would have emerged at all if not for the horrors that preceded it, or the challenge, both ideological and military, posed by the USSR. Referencing the latter, as one Finish commentator noted, "the Soviet Union created a workers' paradise, just not in Russia, but Finland!"

THE US AND EUROPE: FROM COOPERATION TO COMPETITION

EU expansion must be seen within two contexts. One, is in the competition that emerged between the US and West Europe in the 1970s. The other is the collapse of the Soviet bloc.

For a time after WW II the US and West Europe were engaged in an enlightened relationship in which the prosperity, and even democracy, of both were enhanced. There were exceptions, of course. Greece saw its nascent leftwing democratic movement strangled by the US and Britain for fear it might go beyond the acceptable limits of social democracy. French political affairs were also influenced by the US. Italy, perhaps, was only second to Greece in attracting American attention.¹ Yet, in addition to these acts of subversion the US supported social democracy throughout much of West

¹ Kolko, Gabriel. *The Politics of War*. Pantheon: New York, 1968, 1990, 172–93.

Europe as a hedge against movements that were either communist, or nationalist, that might pursue autonomous economic development limiting outside investment or serve as “bad examples” to the rest of the world.²

The consensus among business in the US, especially of the National Association of Manufacturers variety, was that the US would return to its 1930s policies and economic depression. They almost got it. Despite the protestations of John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, the Bretton Woods planners, influenced by finance, were creating a liberal economic order resembling the very one that helped bring on World Wars I and II. Keynes and White eventually prevailed over that camp as a consequence of fear of further war, economic collapse, and labour militancy. Specifically, though, it was the 1946/47 economic recession that convinced US planners the “old” economic liberalism was too risky, as it portended a return to the Great Depression of the 1930s, just as Keynes predicted a post-war return to economic liberalism would.³ Instead, they introduced the Keynesian Bretton Woods Order (KBWO). It was unique in its counterintuitive principle that international trade could only grow if national development was encouraged. This meant taking such steps as cooperating with national capital controls, an anathema to finance, but healthy to manufacturing and employment. Further promoting this prescription to resuscitate the global system was great the credibility of the Soviet system coming out of World War II. The USSR experienced rapid economic growth when much of the capitalist world was mired in economic depression.⁴ Successful West European economic integration and development served US ends. Strategically important nations, such as Germany and Japan, saw a full complement of grants and policy tools extended to them by the US to ensure their successful development. The Marshall Plan, cooperation with capital controls and the related issue of cheap credit creation, along with tolerance of state-directed development efforts generally, led to their great success in exports. The US wholeheartedly supported construction of a European Union in the 1950s and 1960s when it meant uniting France and Germany against the Soviets in the Cold War. West Europe and Japan recovered, thanks to the enlightened and self-interested policies of the US (at least among foreign policy makers and manufacturers; many economists and bankers were hostile to this Keynesianism). Nobody envisioned the defeated powers could eventually compete with the US, except John Maynard Keynes, whose ideas almost always ran contrary to the mainstream of “informed opinion,” and whose predictions all too often proved right. Yet, it was this very success in export production that led to the crisis of overproduction and profitability by the 1970s.⁵

The crises of profitability and governability that struck the world order in the late 1960s through the 1970s and on revealed the contradictions and

² Frances Stonor Saunders. *Who Paid the Piper?* London: Granta, 1996.

³ Helleiner, Eric. *States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994, 1–50.

⁴ Although the level of economic pain varied widely within the capitalist world, much of the world knew not the scale of the human costs of the Soviet accelerated industrial experiment in the 1930s, or chose to ignore what information they did possess.

⁵ This delicate order encouraging the development of West Europe and East Asia could only be sustained while the US was the unquestioned economic global power and while the Soviet Union existed as a potential alternative model to capitalism.

limitations of the KBWO. That system depended on strong economic growth to reconcile the growing demands of democracy with a system of social relations based on inequality. The US facilitated the development of West Europe and parts of East Asia after World War II and now, from the perspective of the US, it was only fair that in time of need the US should be allowed to share the burden by exporting its crisis. As Richard Nixon's Treasury Secretary John Conally asserted, "We had a problem and we are sharing it with the rest of the world – just like we shared our prosperity. That's what friends are for."⁶

France and Germany, in the near term, had no power to resist. The alternative was a long-term response to the crisis represented by the euro. France and Germany would use the EU to create a viable counter-currency to the US dollar that would surmount the deutschmark's limitations – or, really, to increase the DM's global influence under a different currency title. In the mean time, however, France and Germany had large trade surpluses with the US and were essentially disciplined by the US treasury. They could hold their surpluses in dollars never to be cashed out, or risk destroying the global financial architecture. Of course, Japan, that other state benefiting from the "invitation to develop" by the US after World War II, would also bear the cost of the US twin deficits in government and trade.⁷ The same can be said for Japan and now even for China. China actually uses many of its dollars to cover trade with other Southeast Asian nations, thus exporting part of their problem to their neighbours. The American crisis was to be partly paid for by those holding trade surpluses with the US. Dependent on exports for their continued growth, countries such as Germany and Japan had to pay the bill for America's crisis through three mechanisms. One, they would either not cash in their dollars earned on exports from the US. They would merely hold them as IOUs from the US that were never to be paid back. Or, two, they might purchase US Treasury Bills with their dollar surpluses to finance US government deficits. Three, they could seek suitable investment opportunities inside the US. While Germany and Japan would bear a disproportionate share of the burden for the US's twin deficits in trade and government spending, the load would be spread over the entire globe. Henry Kissinger cut a deal with the Saudis in 1975 to ensure oil would be priced in dollars. The world needed energy. But, to get it they first had to send the US ship loads of raw materials and manufactured goods to buy paper dollars to purchase oil. The glut of dollars ensuing from oil price rises led to another mechanism for dealing with the trade deficits. Petrodollar recycling, much of it through New York banks, meant debt service payments to the US, priced in dollars. Moreover, given the increasing dominance of the dollar, nations the world over would hold it as a reserve currency, thus at the very least extending a free loan to the US.⁸

Thus, the Americans had jujitsued this crisis to their advantage. The industrial world would send goods to the US in exchange for dollars they

⁶ Clyde Prestowitz. *Rogue Nation*. New York: Basic Books, 2003. 71.

⁷ Bruce Cumings. Webs with No Spiders, Spider with No Webs: The Genealogy of the Development State. In *The Developmental State*, ed. Meredith Woo-Cumings. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996, 61–92.

⁸ Frank, Andre Gunder. "Paper Tiger, Fiery Dragon," *Andre Gunder Frank's Website* <http://rrojasdatabank.info/agfrank/paper_tiger.html> (11 May 2004).

would merely hold as paper. Moreover, West Europe and Japan would finance US deficit spending through the purchase of US Treasury-Bills. The US had solved, for the moment, its twin deficit problem. Moreover, as its own industrial capacity shrank, its consumption of goods rose, again, thanks to the power of the US dollar. This bought political stability for US governments in the 1980s and 1990s as it masked America's declining economic fortunes in the "real" economy of production

In this environment, creating the euro was essential for France and Germany's long-term viability as advanced economies. They had to make an alternative currency to the US dollar. This became increasingly clear to them in 1978 when the US acted irresponsibly and selfishly (from the perspective of Europeans) to deal with its economic problems by devaluing its currency, thus exporting its inflation to Europe.⁹ Eventually, they could then begin receiving real goods from the rest of the world in exchange for digital or paper dollars, as the US enjoyed by virtue of its issuing the global currency: the dollar. This would stop the flow of their real goods to the US while receiving nothing of value in return. The medium-term price was continued subsidy of their economic competitor, the US, while France and Germany eventually created the euro zone. The EU was central to the euro project. The bigger and more viable the euro zone the greater its gravitational pull would be to attract global holdings into the euro and make the dollar less attractive. Enlarging the euro zone would be critical to this project of creating a more robust euro, and thus German and French autonomy from the US. In the meantime West Europe's position would weaken, while the prospect of the Soviet collapse would provide a chance to escape the crisis. But, it is by no means certain that the US and EU can reconcile their differences as they pursue their respective interests.

SOVIET COLLAPSE: THE RETURN OF EAST/CENTRAL EUROPE'S RESOURCES TO THE WEST

The collapse of the Soviet bloc is central to understanding the acceleration of competition between West Europe and the US. Its fall provided short-term relief for the crises of profitability and unemployment in the trans-Atlantic world, especially for West Europe. It also dissolved the stable geopolitical order existing during the Cold War that maintained cooperative US/West Europe relations.

With the disappearance of the USSR we are seeing a return of the Soviet bloc's raw materials and markets into the world system. The Soviet bloc helped the West deal with its crisis of profitability and over-accumulation by devaluing Soviet bloc assets, and then picking them up at fire-sale prices. They also opened their markets to Western goods, thus removing competition by eliminating those few Soviet bloc industries that were competitive. This process of reintegration really began in the 1970s when the Soviets began selling energy and raw materials to the West, and when the Soviet bloc began taking loans from outside the bloc. From the late 1920s, through the mid

⁹ Kenneth, Dyson and Kevin, Featherstone. *The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 83.

1960s the Soviet bloc withdrew much of its resources from the world system. At the same time the Soviet bloc collapse provided a significant boost with new markets, along with capital and natural resources flowing out. The world has changed since the 19th century. The US is now a global power. In this respect the EU and NATO represent an unresolved, ongoing attempt at how to organize East/Central Europe into the current world system in ways ensuring that neither loses influence.¹⁰ The EU enlargement area has historically been contested terrain. In the 19th century West Europe and Russia pulled at the middle. After World War II, the Soviets extended control over it. Now, the US and West Europe vie for influence, while the Russians at best bide their time in hopes for future revival.

The Soviet collapse was cheered by both the US and West Europe. At the same time, its failure caught the US by surprise. What was not understood was that, the system, minus the Baltics, West Ukraine, Georgia, perhaps Moldova and some Central Asians, was still supported by most of its people, although with criticisms.¹¹ It was the nomenclature that wanted to dissolve it in a revolution from the middle and to some extent from above.¹² While that elite had privileges, those perks paled in comparison to what their contemporaries enjoyed in the West.¹³

While the US celebrated the Soviet collapse a certain anxiety gripped some US foreign policy makers as the familiar and stable bipolar world was evaporating before their eyes. While the Soviet Union presented many challenges to the US, it also kept West Europe and East Asia within the orbit of US influence, as they feared Soviet power. Indeed, this situation frustrated Baltic nationalists as George Bush's administration clung to the Cold War Order when the Soviet bloc unraveled. Bush promised not to expand NATO anywhere in the Warsaw Pact zone, let alone in the former USSR itself. The Americans quick reversal and subsequent ultimate Baltic entry into NATO a decade later resulted in Russians feeling betrayed. In undertaking this expansion they recreated Russia's fear of encirclement as the US fully ringed Russia with potential bases, stretching from the Baltics, to Rumania and Bulgaria, to Georgia and Central Asia, to South Korea and Japan. Militarily, the noose around Russia's neck has never been tighter.¹⁴

The Soviet collapse also conferred several benefits on the US and West Europe. West Europe had been wrestling with overcapacity problems and related unemployment.

The Soviet collapse gave West Europe a market for its consumer goods. West Europe and the world got the benefits of increased supplies of raw

¹⁰ Wallerstein, Immanuel. U.S. Weakness and the Struggle for Hegemony. *Monthly Review* 55, № 3, July/August, 2003: 23–9.

¹¹ Kotz, David with Weir, Fred. *Revolution From Above: The Demise of the Soviet System*. London: Routledge, 1997, 43.

¹² Some prefer the term a revolution from the middle, rather than above, to describe the nomenklatura revolt against the Soviet system.

¹³ As one journalist characterized it, a Soviet director may have enjoyed a Czech toilet, a Bulgarian holiday, and a Volga with a driver, under the new order they might have a Western renovated apartment, holiday in Switzerland, drive a Mercedes 600, and take advantage of Moscow's flesh trade.

¹⁴ At the same time, Russian influence has increased in the wake of the Iraq debacle, with few short-term prospects for brining Iraqi oil online.

materials from the East, thus helping depress commodity prices. Moreover, hundreds of billions of dollars flowed out of East Europe either through or into the banks of West Europe and the US. Indeed, some \$250 billion has flowed out to date.¹⁵ It is estimated that at least \$150 billion, perhaps more, found its way from Russia to US equity markets, in part contributing to 1990s economic boom. Competition from the East in areas such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, etc., was mostly removed.¹⁶ Japan least benefited from the Soviet collapse and in the 1990s had to engage in massive deficit public spending to counter stagnation. By contrast, the EU kept to tight spending and monetary guidelines to ensure the viability of the euro currency project, thus limiting European economic growth in the short to medium term. This course may have only been made possible by the investment and rent-seeking opportunities introduced by the Soviet bloc's collapse, which represented a massive "accumulation by dispossession" that helped the West by infusing the global system with cheap new raw materials from the East, and new consumer markets throughout the old Soviet zone.¹⁷

The Soviet collapse provided West Europe with new markets to relieve its ailing economy, while extending the chance to expand the EU project to realize the goal of a euro that might eventually compete with the dollar. The East sought escape from economic sclerosis. Stagnation, in part, was a global phenomenon, as much as a problem an outdated Soviet economic model. Matched by a desire for security and political independence, Central Europe embraced entry into the EU and NATO.

THE NEOCOLONIAL NATURE OF EU ENLARGEMENT

EU enlargement is often presented as an expansion of democracy across Europe. The enlargement, however, has a neocolonial dimension as well, which exists in tension with the EU's democratic ideals. There are many reasons for the candidate countries' desire to be included in the EU, chief among them being: 1) protection from future Russian imperial ambitions through economic and political integration with West Europe, 2) to be included in a democratic regional system, and 3) to get rich.

Conversely, West Europe sees the possibility of East/Central Europe returning to its historical subordinate role, with the latter, in a world-system's context, existing as an economic periphery serving the former. As previously mentioned, US exercise of asymmetric power further propels West Europe toward imperial behavior as it competes with the US.¹⁸

There are several ways that the relationship between West to East/Central Europe displays neocolonial characteristics. The first surfaced with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, as previously stated. A modern form of the colonial missionary impulse existed in the proselytizing of "free markets," "democracy," and "civil society" as a kind of secular religion. Conveniently,

¹⁵ Standard Schaefer. An Interview with Michael Hudson: An Insider Spills the Beans on Offshore Banking. *Counterpunch.org* March 25, 2004
<<http://www.counterpunch.org/schaefer03252004.html>> (11 May 2004).

¹⁶ Gowan, Peter. *The Global Gamble*. London: Verso, 1999, 187-247.

¹⁷ Harvey, David. *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 149-253.

¹⁸ Amin, Samir. Confronting the Empire. *Monthly Review* 55, № 3, July/August, 2003: 15-22.

these ideas served to depoliticize people by removing the state as a site for political action.¹⁹ Although the USSR and Soviet bloc regimes did much heavy lifting here, they cleansed their society of meaningful politics through repression and top-down rule.

Another reflection of unequal power between East and West Europe within the EU can be observed with fiscal and monetary policy. Enlargement nations have to make transparent their economies and records accessible to the EU. Monitoring of enlargement nations, as IMF does with the third world, is done while Germany and France ignore with relative impunity the fiscal and monetary restrictions they have placed on their Central EU brethren. Estonia, Poland, and others may demand France and Germany adhere to the neoliberal economic standards, such as those recently embodied in the “Lisbon criteria,” but to little avail.²⁰ East Europe has internalized the colonizers neoliberal policy from West Europe as a guiding ideology, but wants the preacher to practice what it preaches. On the ideological front, Central Europe has adopted American norms, although ones the latter often ignores, as evidenced by its massive military Keynesian deficit spending and cheap credit policies.

Perhaps it is trade that most embodies the neocolonial relationship between West and East/Central Europe. In 1999 EU trade surplus with candidate countries was 26 billion euros. Trade between East and West was a lopsided affair. For example, in 1991 the then existing Czechoslovakia witnessed a 2% rise in exports to France, while France saw its exports rise by 180%. West Europe had turned its traditional deficit with East/Central Europe into a trade surplus with the fall of the Soviet bloc. Moreover, this development was not merely the result of market forces. West Europe used government subsidies through export credits and guarantees to provide their producers with relative risk-free expansion opportunities in East/Central Europe. By bringing this region into the EU West Europe could fix in place this imbalance in its favour through creating a liberal barrier free trading order. This would guarantee no future experiments in national development in the East that might limit the West’s access to their markets.

Further stressing the neo-colonial economic relationship between East and West Europe is the role of Foreign Direct Investment. Most assume FDI is related to production. Indeed, both the capitalist press and traditional Marxist thought see FDI as revolutionizing production in colonial lands.²¹ Yet, in the 1990s FDI in East/Central Europe production was minimal, aside from a few large exceptions such as Volkswagen’s purchase of Skoda. Instead, FDI went primarily into consumer market penetration, introducing West European booze, sweets, smokes, and electronic gadgets.²² Retail is another area for West European expansion. For example, the Baltic states have become a periphery integrated into Scandinavian retail circuits. Finn supermarkets, such as City Market dominate the landscape. Norwegian gas stations, such as Statoil are

¹⁹ Wedel, Janine. *Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe 1989–1998*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, 1–14.

²⁰ Gunter, Aleks. Estonia signs on to chide Europe’s heavyweights. *The Times*, 19-25 Feb, 2004, № 395. 1.

²¹ Warren, Bill. *Imperialism, Pioneer of Capitalism*. London: NLB, 1980.

²² Gowan, Peter. *The Global Gamble*. London: Verso, 1999. 224.

big players, and even department retail stores, such as the Finnish Stockman's are present.

Those arguing in the tradition of David Ricardo that regional specialization is a good thing might balk at the characterization that this market penetration from West to East is bad, or mischaracterize those doing so as unreconstructed advocates of autarky. They would, however, miss the point. East/Central Europe had industries that with restructuring could have been competitive regionally and globally. Yet, West Europe used its power to shut them down, or restructure them to suit their own needs. Citing Peter Gowan, German investment in Skoda fell far short of promises in the early 1990s. Skoda was, as VW's president Ferdinand Piech described it, as its "loveliest daughter," because it was their only profitable division and the one capable of competing with East Asian production. Skoda fell victim to VW's need to maintain production in Germany. Worse yet were outright closures of profitable enterprises in the East to remove competition. Hungarian cement industries were purchased and then prevented from exporting to the West. Similarly, steel plants were purchased only to remove what was an already oversaturated market keeping prices down. A restructuring was surely in order, but in this unequal relationship the burden and pain was born mainly by the East. General Electric purchased Tungsram in Hungary only to close down their profitable production of floppy disk, magnetic tape and electronics.²³ Soviet telecommunication giants, such as Latvia's National Electronics Factory (VEF) produced much of the phone systems for the entire Soviet bloc. With outside assistance they were best positioned to be the closest thing the Soviet bloc had to Nokia, but were instead immediately dismantled.²⁴ EU expansion has provided the institutional, procedural, and legal framework to continue this restructuring of Europe's economy in favour of West European capital.

In sum, coexisting with the democratic ideals espoused for the EU has also been a push by West Europe to grab markets in the East, while also restructuring the former Soviet bloc's industry to serve the exigencies of West Europe. In doing so, West Europe has increased its economic power, but while not consolidating equal dominance politically.

PROSPECTS

West Europe exploited the full reintegration of the former Soviet bloc into the world-system to its advantage in the 1990s. It provided a temporary palliative to the constrictive monetary and fiscal policies required by the Maastricht Treaty to create the euro.²⁵ While this process began in the 1970s, by the 1990s its full potential was realized with the collapse of Soviet communism. Through market penetration and the restructuring of its industry to limit competition with West European firms, East/Central Europe played a significant role in slowing West Europe's accelerating unemployment

²³ Ibid. 225–50.

²⁴ This VEF case requires the caveat that their strength was in knowledge of Soviet telecommunication systems, but would have required foreign partners to realize their potential.

²⁵ Schettkat, Ronald. U.S. Sclerosis? *Challenge* 47, № 2, March/April, 2004: 39–52.

and balance Europe's sclerotic growth produced by the tight fiscal and monetary policies required to launch the euro. The twenty-first century, however, introduced new dimensions to this relationship with the Bush administration's aggressive pursuit of US national interests. This served to clarify the competitive nature between it and Germany/France. In the process it became evident that Central Europe would become contested terrain between the US and Germany/France (and perhaps even Russia too, should Moscow ever ally with Paris and Berlin). This provides Central Europe with potential negotiating power, while also placing them at the center of any future conflict that emerges between these powers.

Contested Terrain: the EU/Euro and US/NATO in East/Central Europe

Presently, the weak dollar increases the export position of the US. Given many Asian currencies are linked to the dollar, West Europe bears the brunt of the current US strategy for dealing with both an election season ploy to generate jobs, but also a longer-term effort similar to the Plaza Accords in 1985 to resuscitate American industry.²⁶ This further pushes the EU to "reform" and adopt further "structural adjustment," along with movement toward US shareholder form of capitalism. This is vital for two reasons. One, the US wants to penetrate European business, made much easier in a shareholder model. Two, this curbs long-term extra-market investment strategies, made possible by the stakeholder model, that threaten US competitiveness in the longer term. East/Central Europe becomes even more important to West European business in the weak US dollar environment. West European profits have contracted as their products become more expensive in US markets. Therefore, East/Central Europe becomes even more important as an investment opportunity and market for West European business. Although not the only investment opportunity, as both the US and China are important in this regard too, and for the same reasons: cheap labour. Latin America was important in this regard also, as IMF/World Bank restructuring policies led to both US and European transnational firms grabbing Latin America's airline, oil, and telecommunications and utilities.²⁷

In this context Central Europe has leverage over West Europe because of the latter's aspirations to become a global power the cooperation the West needs from its neighbours East to achieve it. Power will come with size and the West will make concessions with the East to get it. The trick is to determine how much they will give before rejecting the enlarged EU project. West Europe needs Central Europe to realize its long-term euro project to challenge to the US dollar that delivers a massive competitive advantage to the US economy, currently in the form of a half-trillion dollar a year deficit financed by the rest of the globe because of dollar dominance in the pricing of energy, debt, and the need to hold it as a reserve currency. In this

²⁶ Which in Japan resulted in the rise of the yen, diminished profits in manufacturing, thus a move by capital into real estate speculation. This bubble burst in the 1990s and 13 years out their economy still has not recovered. This leaves the question of whether Europe could suffer the same fate as the US again tries to devalue its way out of the crisis, but this time make Europe pay the bill.

²⁷ Duncan Green. *Silent Revolution: The Rise and Crisis of Market Economics in Latin America*. New York: Monthly Review, 2003 2nd ed, 68.

environment East/Central Europe is contested terrain between the US and West Europe where they possess both competing and complementary interests.

West Europe has more direct economic interests in East/Central Europe, while the US has greater geostrategic goals related to energy in Central Asia/Caspian, which may require a transit route through Southeast Europe and the Black Sea. The US government likes tight EU monetary policies designed to create a monetary union and the euro. This starves Europe of consumer demand and cheap credit for investment. It slows growth and makes Europe less competitive as it strives to achieve the goal of increased competitiveness with an enlarged euro zone.²⁸ It is a gamble and in the short run US investment capital and the complex of institutions interested in extending America's military reach, win.²⁹ Moreover, the US wants to erase all vestiges of state-planning in economies, knowing that in times of economic turbulence they can be both popular and effective economic strategies, and thus a threat to an open global order dominated by US capital and interests. The EU facilitates this project by ensuring East/Central Europe's resources will never again retreat from the world system. The EU removes the possibility of a return to the KBWO era of capital controls and national development by further ensconcing it in a neoliberal framework designed to increase global investor confidence in the euro. Moreover, the erosion of Europe's stakeholder model of capitalism privileges US rentiers over industrial managers and engineers. US investors will be able to further extract profits from Europe under this model.

The US possesses two advantages in curbing France and Germany's aspirations of an EU united enough to challenge the US dollar. One, is England. Tony Blair was often characterized as Bill Clinton's butler by Blair's critics and maintains his fidelity to the President US George Bush. To be sure, England has been America's faithful ally, but for reasons going beyond mere fealty. During World War II England impressively doubled its production and ended up out producing even Germany. With the war's end, however, it owed India money, its colonies rebelled, and it lacked the funds to modernize its industry. A critical juncture came in 1976 when labour Prime Minister John Callaghan had to choose between pouring state resources into modernizing their economy, or liberalize. William Simon at the US Treasury read Callaghan the riot act and used the IMF to threaten their cash-strapped government. Callaghan backed down and England, before many third world nations, was the first to face IMF discipline. Margaret Thatcher embraced neoliberalism and England shifted toward its strength in finance and services. Tony Blair continued this neoliberal program.

England, with its strength in finance pulls the EU toward neoliberalism, which serves Washington's interests. England is also fully committed to NATO. An EU that is both neoliberal and fully ensconced within NATO serves

²⁸ While the US wants vigorous European growth to create demand for US products and services, it does not want strong European economic growth based on increased European productive capacity for home and export markets autonomous from links to the US.

²⁹ See Chalmers Johnson's *The Sorrows of Empire* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004) for an extended discussion of the constellation of military, foreign service, and the businesses who serve them that benefit from the extension of America's empire of bases.

Washington's ends as it provides both markets for the US economy while maintaining a military presence in Europe.³⁰ The latter gives the US both the means to protect its Transcaucasian pipeline interests, while helping it to maintain the "New/Old" Europe split, should France, Germany, and Russia find further means of exercising autonomy and resistance to US policies. Moreover, under Blair, English relations with France and Germany have been tense. This is the EU enlargement the US supports. France and Germany, of course, have different ideas based on their long-term euro project, and in the immediate term are profiting from access and dominance of markets to the East.

In the geopolitical realm, the US has used its leverage to create an East/West divide (Rumsfeld's New/Old Europe). Moreover, through NATO's extension, the enlarged EU is under greater US influence.³¹ In a sense the US has penned Germany and France in between England and the "New Europe." Yet, it is too early to tell who has the upper hand, nor where Russia will throw its weight.

The former US Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill reports that Dick Cheney told him "Reagan proved deficits don't matter." Presumably, this is because foreigners, primarily France, Germany, and Japan, finance them. As Halevi and Vaourfakis ask in the *Monthly Review*, given that the US will control Iraqi oil contracts, while it continues its binge spending in both private and public sectors, while giving massive tax "relief" to the wealthy, "there is only one possible conclusion that the leaders of 'old Europe' must come to: the rest of the world (of which continental Europe bears the highest burden) must speed up the rate at which it finances the U.S. deficit."³² Given that many Asian currencies are tied to the dollar, US attempts to boost exports by allowing the dollar's fall are falling primarily on Germany and France. Japan has suffered too, but since it is not launching a counter currency to the dollar, it lacks the burden of maintaining tight fiscal and credit policies that aggravate an already bad situation with the strong euro in Germany and France. These can only be viewed as hostile acts, which will colour US/West European relations accordingly, with an acceleration of competition over the EU enlargement zone, even as there is a simultaneous interpenetration of US and EU capital in the larger Trans-Atlantic zone.

The worst-case scenario for the US is an emerging Paris/Berlin/Moscow axis, and there is real cause for fear.³³ In October 2003 Putin and Schroeder met and discussed pricing Russian energy in euros.³⁴ This would be the largest

³⁰ Saed Engel-Di Mauro. The enduring national state: NATO-EU relations, EU enlargement, and the reapportionment of the Balkans. In *The Empire's New Clothes: Unveiling EU Enlargement*. J. Böröcz and M. Kovács, ed., *Central European Review*. Rutgers, 2001, 179–217 <<http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~eu/Empire.pdf>>.

³¹ Watkins, Susan. A Weightless Hegemony: New Labour's Role in the Neoliberal Order. *New Left Review*. 25, January/February, 2004, 10–11, 20.

³² Halevi, Joseph and Varoufakis, Yanis. The Global Minotaur. *Monthly Review* 55, № 3, July/August, 2003, 74.

³³ Wallerstein, Immanuel. U.S. Weakness and the Struggle for Hegemony. *Monthly Review* 55, № 3, July/August, 2003: 23–9.

³⁴ Belton, Catherine. Putin: Why Not Price Oil in Euros? *The Moscow Times*, 10 Oct, 2003. <www.themoscowtimes.com/stories2003/10/10/012.html> (10 Oct 2003) and Associated Press, "Putin, Schroeder Meet in Yekaterinburg," *The Moscow Times (web)* 9 Oct. 2003 <www.themoscowtimes.com/stories2003/10/09/012.html> (9 Oct 2003).

advance to date in challenging US dollar hegemony. It would return huge sums to West Europe at the expense of the US. It would be difficult to achieve immediately, because it would further inflate the euro and depreciate the dollar. It would also make worthless the huge dollar holdings of Japan and China. Conversely, those dollars are largely worthless anyway as the US expects them to be held or invested in US debt instruments anyway. China and Japan might ultimately benefit by a euro order if they created their own East Asian monetary bloc. In the mean time, the Chinese are hedging their bets and are beginning to hold euros to as a currency reserve. From the long-term perspective of the Chinese none of this appears too worrisome, as they busily go about the business of building a massive manufacturing infrastructure that perhaps one day could detach itself from dependence on the US market given China's huge potential internal consumer market.

Of course, Washington realizes Germany's ambitions, and the limits to achieving this. Germany put in the strictest monetary controls in place to create the euro. An entire generation of central bankers and economists are wedded to this principle. To take advantage of the euro's ability to replace the dollar, however, the EU would have to relax monetary controls to correspondingly weaken the euro to counteract its rise if used increasingly as a global currency reserve and currency for energy pricing. Still delicate, it is unlikely the EU will begin this experimentation with the euro any time soon. Moreover, Central Europeans are fully steeped in neoliberal economic tradition, making it unlikely they will depart from these policies. Thus, they may fail to realize the gains the euro project could deliver, and thus, preserve the advantages Washington enjoys from its dollar dominance.

Because the euro project is finally realizing its goal of becoming a competing currency to the US, the EU, in particular its West European leadership, are a potential threat to American elite interests. NATO is, thus, useful as a Trojan horse for American interests within the EU against West Europe, but has uses beyond that too. There certainly was no increased threat from an ever militarily weakening Russia to justify NATO expansion. Indeed, it was widely recognized within the US military that Central Europe offered nothing in terms of new military capability if thought of as merely the defence of Europe. This new terrain represented a liability with the extra terrain now included in the security umbrella. Yet, politically, it provided several advantages. One, it gave the US leverage over Central Europeans, who having lived under four decades of Soviet control, an incentive to cooperate with the Americans. Objective observers easily dismiss the idea of Russia militarily threatening Central Europe and those who maintain such views as "fighting the last war" as a distraction from the very real social and economic problems they face today. Yet, the memory of occupation in the Baltics, and control in the former Soviet bloc, remains strong. Therefore, the US can deploy this fear of Russia by Central Europeans to its advantage in maneuvering them to adopt positions favourable to Washington in its struggle with West Europe.

As Donald Rumsfeld has announced the migration of NATO bases East to Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, in addition to their presence in Hungary and the former Yugoslavia, the US is placed to control vital Caspian energy resources in transit to Europe, and puts them that much closer to Central Asian energy resources needed by Europe and Asia. Moreover, it provides the

US with the ultimate hedge against the possibility of future conflict with West Europe: military bases on its border in the East within the EU. Additionally, it gives the US further markets for its military hardware, as nations, such as Poland's purchase of expensive F-16s. It is no mistake that on the cusp of NATO's 50th anniversary Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer of the F-16, placed full-page celebratory ads in policy journals, such as *Foreign Affairs*. Moreover, a complete retreat from the early 1990s US position on non-expansion of NATO is represented by the position of the influential US Senator, John McCain. Visiting the Baltics on McCain asserted that not only should NATO expand into the Soviet bloc, including the former USSR itself with the Baltics, but that Russian complaints regarding this show Russian bad faith for both interfering with these sovereign nations and doubting the intentions of the US. To add further spice, he declared Belarus' president, Alexander Lukashenko a veritable Saddam Hussein who must be removed.³⁵ Whatever Lukashenko's faults may be on the democracy and human rights score, they pale in comparison to regimes the US supports in Central Asia. Lukashenko's greatest sins appear to be possession of the infrastructure, technical and industrial, to make advanced weapons, and then selling them to US enemies. Unlike much of the Soviet bloc, Belarus had a restrained privatization and actively worked to retain its industrial base. Consequently, it has observed respectable economic growth that has already begun to surpass its Soviet era GDP, a rare achievement in the CIS.³⁶ That said, much of its wealth appears to escape through offshore zones, which in part sustains Baltic economies to the West as offshore banking centers and intermediaries. Belarus is the bad example. It sells weapons to rogue states, just not the US's rogue states, and demonstrated economic growth since 1996 through 2004 in ways completely at odds with Washington Consensus norms. It did so by ignoring IMF/World Bank prescriptions to privatize its economy and through its independence from IMF loans, thus making them independent of conditionality. These factors make him a medium threat to secure total Western control (economic and military) over East/Central Europe and into the Balkans. This has implications for US and West European attempts to control future energy supplies from Central Asia.

NATO expansion into the eastern periphery of the EU gives the US an instrument to use against an increasingly uppity West Europe, military bases from which to police the world's most vital suppliers of energy, and better position from which to pressure insolent states, such as Belarus. Indeed, it is the military sector where the US has its largest comparative advantage. Nostrums about free trade and economic liberalism aside, it is state-sponsored economic activity where the real high-value added competition takes place. France's Ariane rockets have challenged NASA. Remarkably, Airbus has overtaken Boeing in global aircraft sales.³⁷ Most know that the internet and the micro-processing chip at the heart of personal computers are both products of the state, with the US military and NASA respectively developing the above technologies. US leadership in the military sphere is potentially

³⁵ Staff. Last Days of European Tyranny *The Baltic Times*, 2-20, Dec 2003, № 394, 19.

³⁶ *Indexmundi*, <<http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=bo&v=65>> (11 May 2004).

³⁷ Amin, Samir. Confronting the Empire. *Monthly Review* 55, № 3, July/August, 2003: 15–22.

challenged by European discussions of creating and independent military force. This would increase European military spending and make them more competitive in the global arms trade.

In short, the terrain is shifting under the feet of the main actors in this jockeying for position by the US and West Europe, where East/Central Europe has become a contested zone important to achieving their respective goals.

Democracy and Law

The consolidation of an expanded EU presents the possibility of an inter-bloc rivalry between Europe and the US.³⁸ Both will take measures to increase accumulation in ways that may adversely affect the majority of their respective populations, in addition to creating circuits of global exchange that empower their own elites, perhaps at the expense, rather than to the benefit, of the world's people. Yet, while democracy has often been managed by elites it has not been entirely controlled. Democratic movements have the *potential* to curb the excesses of this inter-imperialist competition, and in the best-case scenario, curb their appetites.

Indeed, it has been observed that West Europe has tried to curb US power through forcing it to adhere to international law, or exposing its undemocratic proclivities in the process. In this context the EU is attempting to use international law and democracy as weapons against US hegemony and unilateralism. The most recent example of this strategy was Europe's use of the Security Council to check Washington's ambitions, or in the process exposing American policy as imperial. Of course the US will try to evade this legal check on its power. Yet, it also needs international law for at least two reasons. One, the US needs international law to gain maximum economic advantage in the field of intellectual property (IP), where it has dominance in entertainment and high technology. Promoting and protecting intellectual property is one of the main activities of US State Department abroad, and is attended to by ambassadors and economic officers of the US' most important embassies.³⁹ The American ambassador typically plays good cop to the economic officer's bad cop, who threatens Sec 301c of US trade law if the ambassador's "reasonable" suggestions for implementation of economic policy are resisted. Intellectual property is a fragile foundation on which to build economic hegemony. While expensive to develop, many IP give this acronym earlier in parentheses goods, such as entertainment and software, are easy to copy.⁴⁰ Second, are ideological reasons for the rule of law. The twentieth century established the dominance of democratic nationalism as the ideal form of government in the wake of World War I. Indeed, even Joseph Stalin had Nikolai Bukharin produce one of the world's most democratic constitutions in 1936 shortly before the latter's execution.

³⁸ Indeed, one disturbing prospect would be the US playing the same role as Britain did in the American Civil War, in which the English supported the less-developed South as a free-trader, against the stronger potential rival North. The US might conceivably play a similar role in political battles between the East and West halves of the EU.

³⁹ Vershbow, Alexander. Pirates Against Progress. *The Moscow Times*, 25 Nov, 2003 <<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2003/11/25/006.html>> (25 Nov 2003).

⁴⁰ Jeff Sommers. Piracy for Progress. *The Moscow Times*. 19 Dec, 2003 <<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2003/12/19/009.html>> (19 Dec 2003).

Just as West Europe is using international law to curb US ambitions, Central Europe might take note of this strategy when engaging their powerful European neighbours to the West, Central Europeans, however, have their own agenda. They will not merely be acted upon. Their ability to exercise agency will depend on their ability to subtly play the EU and NATO off each other in ways to seek maximum benefit. At first glance it would appear that Central Europe is bargaining from a position of relative weakness, yet it does have considerable strengths, and needs to recognize them to secure maximum advantage. Frictions will arise over division of the spoils by the West. The East could adroitly exploit this to its advantage. Indeed, the East could even become like the South in the US: an economically weak region that exercised disproportionate political power. Indeed, in the US it was also an area in which outside investment, from the North, both private and public, helped develop its economy, albeit, arguably to the detriment of workers in the North and South. While West Europe investors have benefited from the expansion of the EU as they develop an internal offshore zone of sorts, along with a market to dump goods, social democracy is placed at risk. Yet, Central Europe can strike at West Europe too. For example, Estonians taunt Finn businesses to escape “socialism” and move to Estonia where no social obligations exist. While damaging social democracy it can also serve West European capital. This limits demands Scandinavian workers can make against employers, as they now can exercise the equivalent option American industry has used for decades: move south, or in the case of Scandinavia, east. While West Europe has exploited economic opportunities to the East throughout the 1990s, this new decade has finally witnessed West Europe breaking with one of the last tenants of their post-WW II social democratic experiment in overtly using the threat of cheap labor to the East to discipline their labor by threatening to move rather than negotiate. The threat is no longer merely implicit. In March 2004 VW has recently broken unilaterally moved production East to Bratislava when workers in Spain and Germany refused company offers on wage and working condition.

European Union is now largely complete with the latest accession of Baltic and Balkan states, and with it the European experiment in social democracy is now coming to an end. European actions are now in full accord with global neoliberal norms. Yet, while there are many anti-democratic implications for this experiment, the EU has heavily relied democracy to justify this experiment, and no doubt many have taken this seriously. It is too early to tell how this will shape the character of the EU, but it could prove a challenge to elite political legitimacy if the dissonance between rhetoric and reality becomes too great.

CONCLUSION

The relationship between the US and EU, along with the role EU expansion plays, has many complicated dimensions. The simple plunder of the East by the West in the 1990s has now become more complicated. Central Europe may prove to have more power in this relationship than Germany and France envisaged in the 1990s. Rather than merely being controlled and exploited by rich nations, Central Europe may use its leverage to secure

concessions from the US and West Europe that better their economic position. Yet, this could be accompanied by returning them to their historically vulnerable position as a contested zone, as they have so many times in the past. Any future conflict that emerges between a united Berlin/Moscow/Paris alliance against the US, would place the enlarged EU area right in the middle.

While there is certainly an imperial character to the EU's expansion, it is difficult to assess the impact on democracy in Europe. But, it does portend a move toward creating a bloc able to compete more effectively on what Zbigniew Brzezinski calls "the Grand Chessboard." To be sure, larger political units are less democratic by their very nature as the degree of mediation is necessarily greater in proportion to the size of the political unit. Or, in plain English, more people and more territory means the distance between citizen and the top politicians and bureaucrats is longer. In this super sized political unit, politics will likely take on an increasingly spectator character managed by public relations specialists. Conversely, the rhetoric of democracy under which the EU has enlarged may provide real limits to West European elites who may have hoped merely to govern as enlightened despots. Complicating all this will be geostrategic developments that require further centralization of the EU for West European elites to achieve their goal of an economy that can compete with the US, but that in order to get, must discard the very Keynesian social democracy they so carefully crafted in the 20th century. Indeed, Chou En Lai's maxim regarding what the implications of the French Revolution and democracy were still holds: "too early to tell."

As of December 2004 the most significant dimension of these tensions is the dollar crisis. Repeating the patterns of 1971, 1978, and the Plaza Accords of 1985, from the perspective of West Europe, the US has refused to impose structural adjustment upon itself, but instead to impose the costs on others. The US, by contrast, sees itself as having done the heavy lifting in creating a stable order with its expensive military. The US seems content to allow the dollar to fall and gives the impression it cares not how far. It continues to hope its economic competitors will pay the bill by actually buying US dollars, as Japan did in the winter of 2004, to prevent the dollar from collapsing too far, thus shoving the costs of defending the dollar off on others. Presumably, it would like Germany to follow suit. What is clear is the growing resentment and distrust between the US and the EU and the prospects for relations to deteriorate, as competition increasingly displaces cooperation.

**5. The Developing
Communication and
Information Environment
in the Baltics: the Impact
of Cultural, Social,
Technological
and Political Factors**

Informācijas vides izpratne Latvijas kontekstā

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Mūsdienu cilvēka informācijas vide ir fenomēns, kas ir salīdzinoši maz pētīts. Latvijas kontekstā šis ir pirmais raksts. Pat termins “informācijas vide” tiek samērā maz lietots, vairāk orientējoties uz “informācijas telpa” un “publiskā sfēra”. Rakstā ir nosaukti informācijas vidi veidojošie komponenti – laiks un telpa, komunikācijas infrastruktūra un sabiedrības struktūra, aktori un saturs – un analizēta to loma un funkcijas informācijas vides veidošanā un pastāvēšanā.

Šodien Dullu Dauku Latvijā nez vai kopiena iezīmētu kā “dullo”, varbūt tikai kā mazliet afektētu puisi, kas ar neatbilstošiem līdzekļiem cenšas rast sasaisti starp vienas kopienas pieredzi un komunikācijas tīklu, kas indivīda dzīves telpu un informācijas vidi lokalizē, un citu kopienu pieredzi un komunikācijas tīklu, kas indivīda dzīves telpu un informācijas vidi gluži pretēji – globalizē. Līdz šim cilvēks vēl nekad nav sastapies ar šādām pretrunām – dažos aspektos būt cieši saistītam ar “redzamo”, bet citos aspektos – ar “neredzamo” dzīves telpu un informācijas vidi. Robežas izzūd. Un mūsdienu cilvēkam jēdzienam “horizonts” ir nozīme tikai dabas ainavās, tas vairs nav simbols, kas apzīmē šķirumu starp pieredzēto un zināmo un vēl nepieredzēto un nezināmo. Līdz ar to indivīdam mainās priekšstati par savu dzīves telpu un informācijas vidi. Ar dzīves telpu šī raksta kontekstā tiek saprasts fenomēnu un simbolu kopums, ko indivīds izzina, lieto un maina tiešā vai mediju pastarpinātā interakcijā ar citiem indivīdiem un grupām un kuram ir indivīdam zināmas robežas. Informācijas vide ir sociāls fenomēns, kuru nosaka sabiedrības struktūra un komunikācijas infrastruktūra, aktori un komunikācijas saturs un kuram telpas un laika dimensiju piešķir individuālā vai kolektīvā apziņa.

LAIKS UN TELPA INFORMĀCIJAS VIDĒ

Mūsdienu cilvēks ikdienas pieredzes līmenī vienlaicīgi operē ne tikai informācijas vidē, ko nosacīti var nosaukt par “redzamo”, bet arī “neredzamajā” informācijas vidē, un tas arvien biežāk un būtiskāk ietekmē indivīda eksistenci. Šis dalījums gan jāautver kā ļoti nosacīts, turklāt trausls un mainīgs. “Redzamā” vide veidojas indivīda personiskās pieredzes rezultātā. Būtiski uzsvērt, ka tiešajai indivīda klātbūtnei šajā vides interpretācijā nav nozīmes, jo indivīdu realitāti veido gan viņu pašu pieredze, gan arī mediju pārraidītā pieredze. Mediju informācijas plūsma par notikumiem, cilvēkiem, procesiem utt. ir tik pierasta un visaptveroša, ka indivīds to vairs nešķir no informācijas, ko iegūst tiešā izziņas procesā. Vēl vairāk – šo efektu pastiprina indivīda atkarība no mediju piegādātās informācijas, jo dzīves telpa ir tik plaša un ar tik mainīgām robežām, ka cilvēks bez mediju palīdzības to nemaz nespētu uzraudzīt.

Ikdienas dzīves realitāte organizējas ap cilvēka paša ķermeņa “šeit” un cilvēka pašreizējo laiku “pašlaik”, un “šeit-un-pašlaik” fokusē cilvēka uzmanību uz ikdienas dzīves realitāti¹. “Neredzamā” vide ir informācijas resursi un struktūras, ko indivīds “šeit-un-pašlaik” neizmanto un nav izmantojis. Par to indivīdam var būt priekšstati atbilstoši tā zināšanām par informācijas iespējamo saturu, struktūru, veidiem, avotiem utt., vai arī indivīds šo vidi var pat nenojaust. “Neredzamā” vide, jāuzsver, vienmēr ir eksistējusi, bet tā ir bijusi indivīdam praktiski nepieejama (attālums, izglītības trūkums, piederība pie cita sociālā slāņa, kastas u. tml.), laika ziņā šķirta no “redzamās”, vai arī tā bez indivīda paša apziņas piepūles jau ir bijusi iekļauta “redzamajā” kā kultūras normas, tradīcijas, rituāli utt.

Tādējādi kultūra komunikācijas procesā (izmantojot medijus) vienmēr noteikusi robežas, kas iezīmēja orientierus indivīda orientācijai laikā un telpā. Džeimss V. Kerijs (*James W. Carey*), apcerot Herolda Innisa (*Harold Innis*) spiedumus par kultūras laika un telpas sakarībām, spiež, ka kultūras, kam ir laika saistības, zaudē vietas saistības, un otrādāk. Šī sakarība darbojas mediju kontekstā un atkarībā no tā, kuri mediji dominē. Mediji, kas nodrošina vietas saistību, ir portatīvi, mobili, un tos iespējams telpā paplašināt, savukārt mediji, kas nodrošina laika saistību, ir smagi un izturīgi vai arī stabili un grūti iznīcināmi (mutvārdu komunikācija)². Mūsdienu mediji šo sakarību pārvar, jo tiem piemīt mobilitāte kā kodētājiem/dekodētājiem, bet to resursu aizsardzību nodrošina gandrīz neierobežotās multiplicēšanas un uzkrāšanas iespējas, turklāt tiem piemīt lielas informācijas pārraidīšanas iespējas neierobežotā apjomā lielām auditorijām. Tādējādi mediji vairs neveicina kādas kultūras noteiktos laika un telpas orientierus, bet gluži pretēji – tos grauj.

Viens no uzskatāmākajiem piemēriem ilgstoši pastāvējušajai laika un telpas saistībai publiskajā komunikācijā ir klasiskā ziņu rakstīšanas piramīda. Šis žurnālistikas kultūras fenomens ir veidojies, lai racionāli pārvarētu laika un telpas barjeras. Tas ir – nodrošinātu iespējas secīgi pārsūtīt vispirms svarīgāko, tad mazāk svarīgāko, bet avīzes redaktoram dotu iespēju tekstu publikot atbilstoši telpas iespējām. Ziņu aģentūru interneta portālos šis ziņas diskurss, kas nosaka sakarību starp svarīgāko un mazāk svarīgo, arvien vairāk un vairāk izzūd, jo ziņa tajos no noteiktas struktūras, kas mazina negaidītību, ir pārvērtusies par negaidītību plūsmu, kas visu laiku mainās, jo tiek papildināta. Kļūst gandrīz neiespējami noteikt, kas ir svarīgākais.

Mūsdienu informācijas vidē informācijas laiks vairs nav saistīts ar informācijas telpu. Interneta portālā ziņas apjomam nav telpisku ierobežojumu, jo telpa praktiski ir bezgalīga, un laiks ir zaudējis jebkādu ritualitāti (rīts un vakars, dienas laikrakstu “pēdējās ziņas” nodošanas laiks utt.).

Ātrums rada konveijera efektu³, kas, protams, izsauc visaptverošas izmaiņas komunikācijas saturā. Šis konveijera efekts turklāt realizējas ļoti lielā ātrumā un strauji izplatās.

Notiekot krasām izmaiņām cilvēka dzīves telpā un sabiedrībai mainoties no masu sabiedrības uz informācijas sabiedrību jeb tīkla sabiedrību, sāk izzust arī

¹ Бергер П., Лукман Т. *Социальное конструирование реальности: трактат по социологии знания*. Москва: Академия-Центр Медиаум, 1995. С. 42.

² Carey, James W. *Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society*. New York, London: Routledge, 1992. P. 161.

³ Ēriksens, Tomass Hillans. *Mirkļa tirānija. Straujš un gauss laiks informācijas sabiedrībā*. Rīga: Norden AB, 2004. 223. lpp.

tradicionālās kopienas. No vienas puses, daudzu cilvēku ikdienas dzīves un darba telpa sašaurinās un kļūst heterogēnāka, jo viņi dzīvo un arī strādā savās mājās (teledarbs), bet no otras puses – notiek dzīves un darba telpa paplašināšanās, jo cilvēki iesaistās dažādās virtuālās interešu kopienās un strādā izvērstos komunikācijas tīklos. Tādējādi veidojas īpaši kompleksa sociālā un komunikācijas infrastruktūra⁴, bet “sabiedrība kļūst arvien abstraktāka”⁵.

“Pirms-informācijas-sabiedrības” vidē kopienas jēga bija komunikācijas izmantojums vides veidošanai, kas nodrošināja iesaistību līdzdalības demokrātijā, bet, sabiedrībai attīstoties, kopiena transformējās par informācijas kā plaša patēriņa preces patērētāju auditoriju⁶. Turklāt operativitāte kā laika simbols un izplatība kā telpas simbols ir zaudējuši tās nozīmes, kas līdz šim piešķīra informācijai kā precei lielāku vērtību. Tagad izplatība ir tikai viens no informācijas kā preces ražošanas standartiem, bet operativitāte kā jēdziens ir zaudējis savu jēgu, jo informācijas tūlītējības vērtēšanā zuduši vērtēšanas kritēriji. Distance starp notikumiem informācijas plūsmā arvien vairāk un vairāk sarūk, un šķirums starp jaunām un jaunākajām ziņām cilvēkam kļūst grūti jaušams. Ziņu plūsma par cilvēku dzīvi sacenšas ātrumā ar pašu dzīvi, un ātrums noved pie vienkāršošanas⁷. Ne žurnālistiem tekstu radīšanai, ne arī lasītājiem, skatītājiem un klausītājiem to aptveršanai vairs nav laika. Laiks, “kas savā veidā rada attālumu un tuvumu”⁸, vairs nepastāv.

KOMUNIKĀCIJAS INFRASTRUKTŪRA UN SABIEDRĪBAS STRUKTŪRA: LOMAS INFORMĀCIJAS VIDES VEIDOŠANĀ

Informācijas vides novērtēšanā liela uzmanība tiek pievērsta tās tehnoloģiskajai infrastruktūrai un izmaiņām informācijas tehnoloģijās, pat – izvirzot šos faktoros kā noteicošos sabiedrības procesu izmaiņās. Šo uzskatu pamatā ir tehnoloģiskais determinisms. Arī Latvijā informācijas sabiedrības attīstības konceptuālajā izpratnē tehnoloģiskie faktori ilgstoši prevalē pār citiem, un šāda pieeja pat tiek ietverta valsts politikas dokumentos (piemēram, Nacionālā programma 1999.–2005. gadam “Informātika”). Latvijas kontekstā gan šīs izpausmes būtu vērtējamas nevis kā tehnoloģiskā determinisma atbalsis, bet drīzāk kā sistēmteorētiska pieeja, kurā ir orientācija uz makro līmeņa parādībām un netiek ņemta vērā komunikācijas sociālā daba. Protams, ka tiklu tehnoloģiskā infrastruktūra ietekmē sabiedrības sociālo struktūru, bet tajā pašā laikā konkrēta sociālā struktūra ietekmē arī tiklu infrastruktūras dizainu un lietojumu⁹. Tādējādi informācijas vides infrastruktūra mūsdienās kļūst arvien saistītāka¹⁰, un tās kapacitāte ir bezgalīga¹¹.

⁴ Dijk, Van Jan. *The Network Society. Social Aspects of New Media*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1999. P. 24.

⁵ Ēriksens, Tomass Hillans. Mirkļa tirānija. Straujš un gauss laiks informācijas sabiedrībā. 73. lpp.

⁶ Braman, Sandra. Harmonization of Systems: The Third Stage of the Information Society. *Journal of Communication*. 1993, 43(3): 138.

⁷ Ēriksens, Tomass Hillans. Mirkļa tirānija. Straujš un gauss laiks informācijas sabiedrībā. 84. lpp.

⁸ Turpat. 74. lpp.

⁹ Dijk, Van Jan. *The Network Society. Social Aspects of New Media*. P. 142.

¹⁰ Braman, Sandra. *The Changing Information Environment*. In: John Nerone (ed.). *Last rights: Revisiting four theories of the press*. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1995. P. 166.

¹¹ Turpat. 168. lpp.

Šajās savstarpējās ietekmēs, kas izraisa būtiskas izmaiņas it visās indivīda un sabiedrības dzīves jomās, arvien pieaugoša loma ir komunikācijas aktoriem (indivīdiem un organizācijām), jo daudzi infrastruktūras mezglu punkti ir individuālo lietotāju pārziņā¹².

Šie procesi Latvijas sabiedrības kontekstā praktiski nav apcerēti. Latvijā informācijas tehnoloģijas (programmatūras un tehnikas) indivīdu un sabiedrības dzīvē ienāca kā gatavi globālie produkti. Tādā veidā tika un tiek pārņemtas arī idejas par informācijas sabiedrības attīstības procesiem un nākotnes vīzijām. Kaut arī šiem procesiem ir saprotami izskaidrojumi – pagājušā gadsimta 60. un 70. gados, kad rietumu pētnieki, rakstnieki, žurnālisti un jebkurš intelektuālais sapņotājs zīmēja nākotnes sabiedrības vīzijas vai garāžā ķērās pie personālā datora montēšanas, Latvijā par šiem procesiem nerunāja, bet datorus un automatizētās vadības sistēmas izstrādāja, galvenokārt domājot par padomju militārisma vajadzībām. Arī rietumos daudzas izstrādes radās militāro interešu dēļ. Bet internets kļuva publisks, kad tika aptverts tā sabiedriskais labums. Latvijā kā padomju totalitārās sistēmas daļā publiska kļuva tikai neliela inovāciju daļa, turklāt – nelielam lietotāju lokam un aizkavēti. Tādējādi pat Māršala Makluena simboliskie un mediju diskursā viegli iekļaujamie darbi ar spriedumiem par “pasaules sādžu”, “Gūtenberga galaktiku” u. c. zināmi tikai šauram speciālistu lokam, turklāt – tie, protams, netiek īpaši diskutēti, jo zaudējuši savu aktualitāti un galvenokārt tiek izmantoti tikai kā teksti akadēmiskajās studijās.

Mūsdienu Latvijas attīstība vēl joprojām saistās ar neapgūtā mācīšanos. 20. gadsimta 60.–90. gadi ir viens no tādiem zaudētā laika posmiem, kas traucē veicināt sabiedrības un valsts attīstības vīzijas un liedz saprast procesus, kas radušies un turpina attīstīties sabiedrības struktūru un informācijas tīklu saskares un ietekmes krustpunktos.

Ar 60. gadiem saistās informācijas sabiedrības otrais attīstības posms (pirmais bija komunikācijas elektrifikācija), ko raksturo tehnoloģiju konverģence un informācijas apzināšanās (datoru un komunikāciju tehnoloģiju konverģence, otrais globālās infrastruktūras izveides posms, eksperimenti jauno tehnoloģiju daudzveidības vairošanā, informācijas plūsma kļūst visaptveroša, palielinās tās kapacitāte, ātrums, manipulācijas, pieejamība un adresāta sasniedzamība, jaunās tehnoloģijas veicina jaunu organizāciju formu – transnacionālu korporāciju – rašanos)¹³.

90. gadi ir trešais posms, kurā notiek sistēmu harmonizācija – savā starpā tiek harmonizētas komunikācijas sistēmas (elektronisko mediju pārraidīšanas sistēmas ar telekomunikāciju sistēmām) nacionālās komunikācijas sistēmas ar pārrobežu komunikācijas sistēmām un komunikācijas sistēmas ar citām sociālajām sistēmām (finanšu sistēmas transformācija par starptautisku informācijas plūsmu utt.). Vienlaicīgi pieaug kapacitāte, ātrums un aptvērums¹⁴.

¹² Braman, Sandra. *The Changing Information Environment*. In: John Nerone (ed.). *Last rights: Revisiting four theories of the press*. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1995. P. 166.

¹³ Braman, Sandra. *Harmonization of Systems: The Third Stage of the Information Society*. *Journal of Communication*. 1993. 43(3): 135.

¹⁴ Turpat. 137. lpp.

Līdz ar šiem procesiem sākās virkne informācijas vides izmaiņu – vēstījuma faktu izolēšana ne tikai no konteksta un lokālas piesaistes, bet arī no jebkādam materiālām vai garīgām avotu atsaucēm; informācijas plūsma saturā atsaucas tikai uz citu informācijas plūsmu saturu vai hiperrealitāti; faktu eksaltācijas rezultātā sākas fakta iznīcināšana, jo virtuālajā realitātē zudusi sasaiste ar realitāti un faktu avotu nozīmi ieņem autori (autortiesības)¹⁵.

Sociālās struktūras izmaiņas saistās ar izmaiņām tradicionālo procesu centralizācijas un decentralizācijas kombinācijās, organizāciju savstarpējā atkarībā (tikla organizāciju veidošanās), tikla ekonomikas attīstībā, bet sadarbība un koordinācija kļūst tikpat svarīgas kā konkurence, cena sāk zaudēt dominējošo nozīmi, jo darījumi notiek viena tikla ietvaros.

Jāievēro, ka Latvijā šie procesi risinās ne tikai bez pietiekamas to teorētiskas apcerēšanas un prognozēšanas, bet arī apstākļos, kas būtiski ierobežo vai pat liedz indivīda aktīvu līdzdalību. Bet mūsdienu informācijas vidē tieši no paša indivīda ir atkarīgs iegūtās informācijas daudzums un kvalitāte, kā arī pārējo informācijas tehnoloģiju doto iespēju izmantošanas efektivitāte.

Sabiedrības un indivīdu labklājības līmenis un salīdzinoši zemais ienākumu līmenis neļauj indivīdiem iegādāties atbilstošu datortehniku un lietot internetu. Kaut arī datoru un interneta lietotāju skaits Latvijā stabili un strauji aug, tomēr gandrīz puse no Latvijas iedzīvotājiem (46%) nekad nav izmantojuši datoru. No tiem, kas datoru kaut reizi izmantojuši, internetu ir lietojuši 72%, un tā ir turīgākā sabiedrības daļa (personīgie un ģimenes vidējie ienākumi pārsniedz 250 latus mēnesī). No datoru lietotājiem, kas izjūt ierobežojumus to izmantošanā, puse nevar atļauties iegādāties datoru, lai varētu to lietot mājās¹⁶. Tas arī ir visbiežāk minētais iemesls, kāpēc cilvēki nevar izmantot internetu, nākamie ir – datoram nav interneta pieslēguma un interneta izmantošanas/ekspluatācijas izmaksas ir pārāk augstas¹⁷.

Cilvēkus ierobežo arī zināšanu un prasņu trūkums. Tikai 32% datoru lietotāju savas prasmes vērtē kā labas, bet 27% tās atzīst par vājām. No interneta lietotājiem savas prasmes kā labas vērtē 35%. 1997. gadā Latvijā sāka realizēt Latvijas izglītības informatizācijas sistēmas projektu. Tā rezultātā katrā skolā izveidota vismaz viena datorklase, 60% skolu ir ierīkots tiešsaistes interneta pieslēgums, datoru skaits uz simt skolēniem audzis no diviem datoriem 1998. gadā līdz gandrīz sešiem 2003. gadā, apmācīti 70% Latvijas skolotāju utt. Kopš 1997. gada izglītības sistēmas informatizācijā valsts ir ieguldījusi 13 miljonus latu, bet pēdējos gados “finansējums strauji tuvojas nullei”¹⁸, kas pie augstāk izklāstītajiem ekonomiskajiem faktoriem ir ļoti liels risks, jo jauniešiem var strauji samazināties datora un interneta lietošanas prasmes, jo tās nebūs kur apgūt. Viņi sāks ierobežoties tikai ar spēju un citu izklaižu lietošanu, jo intelektuālās vajadzības netiks stimulētas un to realizācijas iespējas netiks nodrošinātas.

¹⁵ Braman, Sandra. Harmonization of Systems: The Third Stage of the Information Society. *Journal of Communication*. 1993. 43(3): 137.

¹⁶ Informācijas sabiedrības pētījums. Nikolo grupa, 2004. 16.–18. lpp.

¹⁷ Informācijas sabiedrības pētījums. Nikolo grupa, 2004. 25. lpp.

¹⁸ LIIS projekts Latvijas skolu informatizācijai. Sk. internetā <http://www.dtnet.lv/printphp?sadala=6&id=3223>

Šajā jomā bīstams kavēklis ir arī tas, ka Latvijā ir vāji attīstīti publiskie interneta pieejas punkti, bet 25% no cilvēkiem, kas ir par tiem dzirdējuši (un tas ir 81% no aptaujātajiem Latvijas iedzīvotājiem), būtu ieinteresēti šos punktus lietot. Viens no iedzīvotākajiem tuvākajiem interneta punktu veidiem ir Latvijas publiskās bibliotēkas, bet no apmēram 1000 bibliotēkām interneta pieslēgums ir tikai 600.

Papildus jau nosauktajiem faktoriem, kas ietekmē Latvijas informācijas vidi, var nosaukt vēl arī citus – visās Latvijas vietās nav nodrošināta moderna telekomunikāciju infrastruktūra, arvien lielāka nelīdzsvarotība komunikācijas infrastruktūras pieejamībā veidojas starp Rīgu, citām pilsētām un Latvijas lauku reģioniem; notiek sabiedrības noslāņošanās elektronisko informācijas resursu pieejamībā pēc vecuma un ienākumiem, kas, ieviešot e-pārvaldi, var arvien vairāk nobīdīt malā vairākas riska grupas – lauku iedzīvotājus, vecus cilvēkus un cilvēkus ar zemu izglītības līmeni. Bet kopumā tas globalizācijas apstākļos palielina “Latvijas risku pārvērsties par provinci, kurai ir patērētāja, nevis radītāja funkcijas”¹⁹.

Diemžēl šie riski publiskajā sfērā netiek ne nosaukti, ne arī analizēti. Mediju interesei par šīm problēmām ir gadījuma raksturs, turklāt parādības tiek nevis diskutētas, bet stereotipizētas vai noklusētas. Tā, piemēram, tradicionālie mediji jaunās informācijas tehnoloģijas un internetu rāda galvenokārt komerciālā kontekstā (kaut arī komerciāliem nolūkiem Latvijā tos lieto vēl salīdzinoši maz), kā arī demonstrē to negatīvos raksturojumus (bērnu aizraušanās ar datorspēlēm, spēļu atkarība, bažas par masu kultūras un globalizācijas ietekmi uz Latvijas kultūru utt.).

Latvijā aizvadītajos neatkarības gados tikai vienu reizi ir bijusi tendence orientēties uz atvērtu un plašu diskusiju par informācijas resursu nozīmi mūsdienu sabiedrībā, tas ir – diskusiju par Latvijas Nacionālās bibliotēkas celtniecību, bet tā diemžēl izplēnēja strīdīņos par ēkas celtniecības izmaksām, nevis orientējās uz to, ka apjomīgu, labi strukturētu un ērti lietojamu resursu esamība

- ir viens no pamata nosacījumiem, lai tradicionālās kopienas un sabiedrības neizšķīstu globālajā informācijas vidē;
- jebkurai valstij var kalpot par tās pazīšanas zīmi.

Modernu informācijas vidi veido labi organizēta komunikācijas infrastruktūra, izglītoti un aktīvi aktori un spēcīgi informācijas resursu centri, kas var iezīmēt jaunas virtuālās auditorijas. Bez šiem nosacījumiem pastāv draudi, ka arvien vairāk un vairāk Latvijas interneta lietotāju “emigrēs” uz citām informācijas vidēm, kas izraisa draudus ne tikai Latvijas mediju pastāvēšanai, bet arī informācijas vides attīstībai nacionālās kultūras kontekstā.

Otra iespējamo risku grupa saistās ar ekonomiku, jo informācija veidojas par ekonomikas sektoru, kas sāk dominēt ekonomikā kopumā, jo informācijas patēriņš izraisa ekonomikas sfēras paplašināšanos.

¹⁹ Brikše, Inta, Vasiļjevs, Andrejs. Informācijas sabiedrība un jaunās tehnoloģijas. Grām: *Latvija. Pārskats par tautas attīstību*. Rīga: UNDP, 1999. 71. lpp.

INFORMĀCIJAS VIDES AKTORI

Latvijas informācijas vidē aktoru skaits strauji palielinās, atspoguļojot vispārējās tendences:

- 1) tradicionālie mediji izmanto internetu kā papildu kanālu sava satura pārraidīšanai;
- 2) informācijas aģentūras pārvēršas par medijiem, jo iegūst kanālu un līdz ar to sāk konkurēt ar pārējiem medijiem, ar kuriem vēsturiski bijušas piegādātāju–klientu attiecības;
- 3) rodas jauni interneta mediji;
- 4) par ļoti apjomīgu aktoru veidojas valsts ar savām institūcijām, kam, no vienas puses, demokrātiskā sabiedrībā ir pienākums informēt pilsoņus, bet, no otras puses, šīs mājas lapas kļūst par spēcīgiem sabiedrisko attiecību rīkiem;
- 5) veidojas publiskie vai maksas informācijas resursu centri;
- 6) virtuālajā vidē pārceļas daudzas ierastas cilvēku darbības (izglītošanās, finanšu darbības, iepirkšanās);
- 7) publiskajā komunikācijā iesaistās visdažādākās organizācijas un uzņēmumi, kas izveido mājas lapas, lai sniegtu ziņas par sevi un arī veicinātu savu darbību, līdz ar to publiskajā komunikācijā parādās līdz šim nebijis ietekmējošas un savas intereses veicinošas informācijas daudzums;
- 8) publiskajā komunikācijā aktīvi sevi piesaka atsevišķi indivīdi vai grupas, radot savas mājas lapas, kurās saplūst publiskās un privātās dzīves diskursi.

Viens no būtiskākajiem ieguvumiem, kas gan nereti slēpj arī daudzus draudus, ir katra indivīda iespēja līdzdarboties publiskajā komunikācijā, turklāt iemantot un izmantot varu, kas masu komunikācijā līdz šim vienmēr ir bijusi tā profesionālā komunikatora priekšrocība, kas pārvaldīja komunikācijas kanālu. Uzskatāms piemērs ir *Delfi* portāls, kur salīdzinoši neliela diskutētāju grupa ne tikai dienas, bet vēl ilgākā laika periodā spēj uzturēt publisku diskusiju un kur tradicionāli tiek pausti visai pretrunīgi viedokļi un pretēji spriedumi tiem, kas izteikti tradicionālajos medijos. Indivīdiem ir liela brīvība izvēlēties līdzdalības pakāpi un arī lomu atkarībā no savām interesēm vai emocionālajām vajadzībām. Lielākajā daļā *on-line* diskusiju grupu tikai kādi 10% dalībnieku aktīvi piedalās diskusijā, bet pārējie tikai seko tai līdz²⁰.

Indivīdiem publiskajā komunikācijā ir strauji palielinājies iespējamo lomu daudzums un lomu veidi – informācijas radītāji, publicētāji, organizētāji, saglabātāji, pārvaldītāji, lietotāji utt. Vienlaicīgi vērojami divi procesi, kas turklāt nereti ir savstarpēji noliedzoši. Tie ir – indivīda informatīvās neatkarības palielināšanās un neatkarības realizācijas nosacījumu kā savstarpēji saistītu faktoru tīklu veidošanās. Būtiskākos indivīda neatkarības nosacījumus var sistematizēt vairākās grupās:

- a) ekonomiskie, sociālie un tehnoloģiskie nosacījumi, kas ietekmē indivīda kapacitāti informācijas vides izmantošanā;

²⁰ Barnes, S. B. Computer-Mediated Communication. Human-to-Human Communication Across the Internet. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2003. P. 34.

- b) likumi un publiski akceptētas normas, kas starppersonu, grupu un masu komunikācijā atsevišķos aspektos indivīdam ir visai ierobežojošas (piemēram, likumu normas, kas liedz kāda veida informācijas izplatīšanu, aizsargā citu indivīdu tiesības utt.);
- c) zināšanas un prasmes, kas nosaka iespēju būt ne tikai par informācijas patērētāju, bet arī par radītāju, attiecīgi – piesaistot vai nepiesaistot citu interesi.

Latvijā, spriežot pēc iedzīvotāju aptaujas, internets gan vēl ir tikai salīdzinoši mazas iedzīvotāju daļas neatņemama ikdienas sastāvdaļa (17%), vēl mazāk, domājams, ir to, kas internetā maina savu tradicionālā informācijas patērētāja lomu uz informācijas radītāja lomu. Un šajā aspektā pētniecības intereses uz indivīdu vēl vispār netiek koncentrētas, par ko liecina, piemēram, arī šajā rakstā izmantotā pētījuma “Informācijas sabiedrības pētījums” struktūra un saturs – visi jautājumi ir orientēti uz to, kā cilvēks lieto un patērē pieejamos resursus, bet nav neviena jautājumu – kā cilvēks tos papildina.

Interneta iekļaušanās informācijas telpas komunikācijas struktūras nodrošināšanā būtiski izmaina indivīda lomu, funkcijas, iespējas utt. komunikācijas procesos, bet komunikāciju no visai šaura profesionāļu loka pārvaldītas jomas pārvērš plašā publiskā darbībā. Viena no problēmām, kas šo parādību rezultātā parādās vairāk un vairāk, ir publiskās un privātās sfēras nešķiršana un elementāru ētikas normu neievērošana (apmelojumi, rupjības utt.).

Līdzīgi indivīdiem publiskajā informācijas vidē nepastarpināti (tas ir, neizmantojot masu medijus) iekļaujas arī daudzas organizācijas, kas sastopas ar visai līdzīgām problēmām. Latvijas Interneta asociācija veikusi Latvijas pilsētu mājas lapu analīzi, izmantojot 45 dažādus kritērijus. Tikai 14 no 26 mājas lapām atbilda 30 pašiem svarīgākajiem kritērijiem. Mājas lapās realizēti tik daudzi un dažādi izpausmes veidi, ka tās kopumā rada haotisku iespaidu²¹.

Tādējādi gan indivīdu, gan organizāciju darbību rezultātā strauji palielinās komunikācijas satura apjoms, bet proporcionāli tajā samazinās

- 1) profesionāļu sagatavotais saturs,
- 2) kvalitatīvais un oriģinālais saturs.

Un tas vairāk vai mazāk ietekmē arī profesionālo komunikatoru darbību un to sagatavotā satura kvalitāti.

Kopumā jaunās parādības liecina, ka arvien vairāk un vairāk organizāciju un indivīdu uzņemas līdzšinējās mediju funkcijas, līdz ar to sāk veidot publiskās komunikācijas saturu. Tāpēc, lai novērtētu jaunās komunikācijas parādības, aktori un to veidotie tikli informācijas vidē būtu pētāmi kā mediji, jo vairāk tāpēc, ka daudzu izraisītie efekti²² var aptvert lielāku un dažādāku indivīdu kopumu nekā tradicionālie un visiem pazīstamie masu mediji.

²¹ Pētījums. Puse pilsētas mājaslapu internetā neatbilst Interneta asociācijas kritērijiem. Leta, 01.12.2004.

²² Braman, Sandra. Harmonization of Systems: The Third Stage of the Information Society. *Journal of Communication*, 1993. 43(3): 139.

INFORMĀCIJAS VIDES SATURS

Informācijas vidē, palielinoties masu mediju skaitam un daudzveidībai, jau pēdējās desmitgadēs vērojami fragmentācijas procesi, ko internets vēl vairāk paplašina un pastiprina. Ātrums, kādā informāciju var pārraidīt auditorijai, rada izjūtu, ka tādā pašā ātrumā informācija ir arī jāražo, lai auditorija nepaliktu bez kārtējiem jaunumiem. Taču tā ir maldīga izjūta, jo, palielinoties informācijas apjomam, indivīds to nemaz nav spējīgs patērēt laika trūkuma dēļ, līdz ar to – informāciju nav arī iespējams pārdot.

Ātrums izraisa vairākas parādības, kas publiskajā informācijas vidē ir ļoti bīstamas. Lai palētinātu informācijas ražošanas izmaksas, tiek samazinātas prasības pret teksta kvalitāti, informācijas avotiem, faktu drošumu utt., tādējādi “ātrums un piedāvātās informācijas daudzums vājina kritisku attieksmi pret avotiem un pastiprina konkurences cīņu par lasītāju uzmanību”²³. Informācijas daudzums un blīvums arvien vairāk piesātina vidi, un tas ir tikai komunikatoru pašu uzturēts mīts, ka operatīvitātei piemīt vērtības un viņi šīs vērtības nodrošina auditorijai. Patiesībā “ātrums rada nepieciešamību pēc vēl lielāka ātruma”²⁴ un komunikācijas saturs vairs netiek vērst uz procesu izziņu, bet uz informācijas plūsmas ražošanu, vērojot, lai tā apjomā neatpaliktu no konkurentiem. Bet, samazinoties distancei starp atsevišķiem informācijas fragmentiem, indivīdiem nepietiek laika izziņas procesam – novērtēt jauno informāciju, salīdzināt ar iepriekšējām zināšanām un, atzīstot to par derīgu, paturēt ilglaicīgajā atmiņā. Tā kā nav laika šo operāciju veikšanai, tad indivīdi informāciju filtrē un no tās izvairās.

Bet mediju tekstos notiek žanru saplūšana, informācijas dekontekstualizācija un delokalizācija, avotu ģeogrāfiskā un kulturālā konteksta paplašināšanās un attālināšanās no indivīda fiziskās dzīves telpas, tādējādi informācijas plūsmas dažādos medijos kļūst arvien līdzīgākas. Problēmas, notikumi, cilvēki, procesi utt., kurus cilvēks uztver kā vairāk vai mazāk savstarpēji orientētus, izrietošus citam no cita un kādās noteiktās secībās (rituālās vai strukturālās), informācijas vidē kļūst par epizodēm, tie uztverami kā fragmenti, un cilvēkam izveidot kopainu kļūst arvien grūtāk un grūtāk.

Savukārt informācijas “piegādātāji” informācijas vidi piepilda ar jauniem un jauniem fragmentiem, kam trūkst vienojoša naratīva – vai nu tāpēc, ka nav bijis laika to saprast vai izdomāt, vai arī – trūcis zināšanu, ka tas jāveido, lai cilvēki saprastu vēstījumu. Tomass Ēriksens izsaka bažas, ka “acīm redzami virkne pazīmju liecina, ka mēs drīz jo drīz radīsim sabiedrību, kurā gandrīz nebūs iespējams atšķetināt dziļākas domas. Mazi sadrumstaloti fragmenti piepilda starptelpas, iedzen ķīli ikvienā kopumā un to sašķel, atvairā visu, kas ir vecs, apjomīgs un rāms”²⁵.

Vēl viena no izplatītākajām informācijas vides satura problēmām ir oriģinalitātes trūkums – teksti, jo sevišķi īsās ziņas, masu medijos ir citu mediju tekstu un informācijas aģentūru pārstrādāti vēstījumi, bet dažkārt – pat plaģiāti. Daudziem tekstiem ir tik maz kādas jaunas pievienotas vērtības, ka nav jābrīnās, ka medijiem tos ir grūti pārdot.

²³ Ēriksens, Tomass Hillans. Mirkļa tirānija. Straujš un gauss laiks informācijas sabiedrībā. 93. lpp.

²⁴ Turpat. 97. lpp.

²⁵ Ēriksens, Tomass Hillans. Mirkļa tirānija. Straujš un gauss laiks informācijas sabiedrībā. 7. lpp.

Informācijas vides saturā Latvijā acīmredzams ir naratīva trūkums, kas ir pamata veids, kā radīt priekšstatu par reālo²⁶, turklāt naratīva struktūra demonstrē, ka cilvēki un vietas nav anarhistiskas un nejaušas, bet jēgpilnas²⁷ un spēj apvienot kopīgos priekšstatos vietas un cilvēku nozīmes ar notikumu un laika nozīmēm.

Informācijas vide mainās, un tās saturu, protams, būtiski iespaido jaunās komunikācijas infrastruktūras elastīgums un pieejamība, kā arī aktoru skaita un veidu vairošanās. Līdz ar to sarežģītāka kļūst šīs vides pārzināšana, kas ietver ne tikai konkurentu darbību uzraudzīšanu, bet arī citu komunikatoru balsu sadzirdēšanu un saprašanu un jaunā laika rituma un telpas dimensijas aptveršanu.

²⁶ Fiske, John. *Television Culture*. London: Routledge. 1997. P. 128.

²⁷ Turpat. 129. lpp.

Konkurēt? Ar ko? Kur? Un kā?

Latvijas žurnālu tirgus struktūras analīze (2002–2004)

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Latvijas mediju tirgū, kurā vairāku gadu laikā nav notikušas būtiskas pārmaiņas, tieši žurnālu segments attīstās visdinamiskāk. Tomēr Latvijas žurnālu tirgus procesi nav daudz pētīti un daudzas parādības, kas tos raksturo, nav fiksētas. Katru gadu tirgū parādās un savu vietu atrod vairāki jauni žurnāli, pēdējo gadu laikā katru gadu Latvijas lasītājiem tiek piedāvāti vairāk nekā desmit jauni žurnālu tipa izdevumi. Arvien uzskatāmāks kļūst žurnālu tirgus internacionalizācijas process – Latvijas auditorijai tiek piedāvāti citās valstīs jau popularitāti ieguvuši, ārvalstu izdevēju radīti žurnālu modeļi. Ievērojami mainījusies žurnālu īpašnieku “uzvedība” un struktūra. 2004. gadā Latvijas lasītāji varēja abonēt vai pirkt ap 160 mēneša un nedēļas izdevumu, vēl aptuveni 40 žurnāli bija pieejami tikai mazumtirdzniecībā. Tas ir par 23% vairāk nekā 2003. gadā. Šis raksts analizē Latvijas žurnālu tirgus attīstības tendences pēdējo divu gadu laikā, īpašu uzmanību pievēršot konkurences aspektiem un modeļiem. Tas sniedz informāciju par aktuālajiem procesiem un apskata statistikas datus, kā arī pētījumus par žurnālu tirgus procesiem, ilustrējot tos ar piemēriem. Rakstā, kurā Latvijas žurnālu tirgus kopumā analizēts no mediju ekonomikas pozīcijām, tiek skatītas arī ekonomisko izmaiņu veicinātās izmaiņas žurnālu saturā un kultūrā.

Lai analizētu Latvijas žurnālu tirgus procesus, šajā rakstā izmantota duālā tirgus koncepcija, savukārt tirgus procesi tiek skatīti, izvērtējot tirgū ienākšanas barjeras, žurnālu konkurences līmeņus un tirgus, kā arī žurnālu kā produktu diferenciācijas iespējas. Rakstā izmantotā informācija iegūta, salīdzinot mediju ekonomikā aprobētus teorētiskus konceptus par žurnālu attīstību un mediju tirgus parādībām, vērtējot dažādu avotu sniegtos datus par tirgus procesiem un veidojot kvalitatīvās intervijas ar žurnālu izdevējiem.

LATVIJAS ŽURNĀLU TIRGUS

Mūsdienu Latvijas pilsētu iedzīvotāju ikdienu pavada dažādi mediji. Taču ikviens sastopas ar žurnāliem: katrā kioskā vai cita veida preses tirdzniecības vietā tie aizņem vislielāko tirdzniecības platību. Pat ja nav nepieciešamības iegādāties presi kioskā, žurnāli, izvietoti atraktīvos stendos, savu lasītāju gaida pārtikas lielveikalos, higiēnas preču tirgotavās, interjera un būvniecības

preču veikalos, apģērbu šūšanas salonos, frizētavās, kosmētiskajās dziednīcās, izklaides vietās, benzīna uzpildes stacijās, ārstniecības iestādēs, lidmašīnās un daudzviet citur. Abonēšanas rādītāji liecina, ka žurnālus regulāri lasa un abonē ļoti daudzi Latvijas iedzīvotāji. Žurnāli ir kļuvuši par ietekmīgiem Latvijas mediju tirgus dalībniekiem, jo tiem pieder ļoti liela auditorija un katru gadu pakāpeniski pieaug reklāmdevēju interese par žurnāliem, tādējādi nostiprinot to pozīcijas tirgū.

Redzot plašu un daudzveidīgo žurnālu klāstu, vērojot arvien jaunu žurnālu ienākšanu tirgū, laikrakstu izdevēju pievēršanos žurnālu izdošanai, auditorijas gaumes nosvēršanos žurnālu lasīšanas virzienā, neatbildēti paliek vairāki jautājumi, kas saistīti ar konkurenci šajā tirgū.

Lai gan aktīvi tirgus dalībnieki ir visu tipu mediji, bet reklāmdevēju un auditorijas uzmanības lielākā daļa pieder televīzijai, ārkārtīgi strauji attīstās arī jaunie elektroniskie mediji internetā. Vērtējot žurnālu tirgus attīstību, būtiski atbildēt uz šādiem jautājumiem:

- Kas ietekmē konkurenci žurnālu tirgū?
- Kāda ir žurnālu tirgus struktūra?
- Kādi ir konkurences modeļi?

LATVIJAS ŽURNĀLU TIRGUS ATTĪSTĪBAS PROCESU RAKSTUROJUMS

Latvijas žurnālu tirgus savā attīstībā atkārtο pasaulē pazīstamu modeli. Žurnāli tik plaši attīstījušies tāpēc, ka tie spēj reklāmdevējiem piedāvāt nacionālo auditoriju. Turklāt, pieaugot ekonomikas stabilitātei un patērētāju maksāspējai, kā arī iedzīvotāju skaitam pilsētās, palielinās to cilvēku skaits, kuri cenšas apdomīgi, izsvērti tērēt naudu. Vienlaikus palielinās izglītotu cilvēku skaits, pieaug brīvā laika apjoms, parādās nepieciešamība pēc specializētas informācijas gan biznesā, gan brīvā laika pavadīšanas jomā¹. Visas minētās un arī citas pazīmes raksturo Latvijas žurnālu tirgus attīstības procesu. Turklāt to ļoti izteikti raksturo žurnālu kā nišas mediju attīstība un iespēja specializēties auditorijas un satura aspektos. Latvijas žurnālu tirgus attīstības procesu visizteiksmīgāk demonstrē izmaiņas žurnālu auditorijā un žurnālu reklāmu apjomā.

Žurnālu skaita palielināšanās, to apjoma pieaugums, auditorijas atsaucība pret žurnālu piedāvāto saturu atspoguļojas arī informācijā par reklāmas tirgu. Latvijā pieaug reklāmu apjoms presē, reklāmdevēji arvien biežāk dod priekšroku savu reklāmu izvietošanai žurnālos. 2003. gadā žurnāliem piederēja 13% no reklāmas tirgus, bet 2004. gada pirmajā pusē – jau 18% reklāmas tirgus².

Nacionālā Mediju pētījuma 2003. gada rezultāti liecina, ka 97% Latvijas iedzīvotāju vecumā no 15 līdz 74 gadiem ir lasījuši vismaz vienu no aptaujā iekļautajiem 232 preses izdevumiem. Viens Latvijas iedzīvotājs vidēji dienā ir izlasījis 0,8 dienas laikrakstus, nedēļā – 1 nedēļas avīzi, 0,7 laikrakstu pielikumus un 0,9 nedēļas žurnālus, savukārt mēnesī – 1,2 mēneša žurnālus³.

¹ Click, J. William, Baird, N. Russell. *Magazine Editing and Producing*. USA: WCB, 1990. P. 21.

² TNS/BMF. Rīga: 2004.

³ Turpat. (Latvijas Pasts, Press A Pasts)

Žurnāli var lepoties arī ar stabilu abonētu bāzi, tas nozīmē, ka tie var rēķināties ar noteiktu auditoriju, ko daudz vieglāk definēt un piedāvāt reklāmdevējiem.

2003. gada beigās Latvijā bija iespējams abonēt 125 žurnālus, 2004. gada beigās – 164 žurnālus. To abonētu skaits svārstās no 23 255 (*Ieva*) līdz 1 (*Baltijskij Kurss*). Vidējais žurnālu abonētu skaits ir 2700–400⁴.

Latvijā lielākā preses auditorijas daļa pieder žurnāliem. Absolūtais tirgus līderis – žurnāls *Ieva*, kuru lasa 18,5% līdz 27,6% no visiem Latvijas iedzīvotājiem⁵. Šie rādītāji apsteidz lielāko Latvijas laikrakstu *Diena*, *Lauku Avīze* un bezmaksas reklāmas avīzes *Rīgas Santīms* auditorijas rādītājus. Latvijas populārāko preses izdevumu reitinga pirmajā divdesmitniekā ir 9 žurnāli (~49% no visiem preses izdevumiem), preses izdevumu reitinga pirmajā piecdesmitniekā ir 26 žurnāli (~51% no visiem izdevumiem).

Modernā realitāte un sadzīve ir pietiekami komplicēta, preču un pakalpojumu klāsts tik plašs un daudzveidīgs, lai savu lasītāju spētu atrast arvien jauni žurnāli, kas dod padomus, kā iekārtot dzīvokli vai māju, kā pareizi gērbties, kā rūpēties par savu veselību, audzināt bērnus, kopt dārzu... Iespējas ir ārkārtīgi plašas, tāpēc katru gadu rodas arvien jauni žurnāli. Tā, piemēram, 2003. gadā Latvijas tirgū ienāca 14 jauni izdevumi. Žurnāli dod iespēju ne tikai saņemt informāciju, tie sniedz relaksāciju, taču vizuāli apmierina nepieciešamību pēc praktiskiem padomiem un pieredzes dažās jomās. “Žurnāli pieder pie ikdienas rutīnas, bet vienu no to vērtībām veido iespēja gūt praktiskas zināšanas, tas arī ir veids, kā padarīt leģitīmu naudas tērēšanu žurnālam,”⁶ uzskata žurnālu pētniece Džoki Hermesa.

Žurnālu izveidošanas pamatā visbiežāk ir mārketinga pētījumi, ar kuru palīdzību tiek noskaidrotas jauna žurnāla pastāvēšanai atbilstošākā lasītāja pazīmes un reklāmdevēju segmenti, kas būtu piemēroti jauna izdevuma eventūālajai auditorijai. Dažādu auditorijas grupu dzīves stils ir viens no kritērijiem žurnāla veidošanai, bet visai bieži tieši reklāmdevēju interese par iespēju sasniegt noteikta tipa auditoriju ir primārā, lai rastos jauns žurnāls.

Savukārt no iepriekšminētajiem konceptuāli atšķirīgus žurnālus veido personības vai indivīdu grupas, kam ir noteikts skatījums uz procesiem sabiedrībā, noteikta pasaules uztvere, kas, izteikta žurnāla formātā, dažādu rakstu veidā varētu būt interesanta noteikti auditorijas daļai. Šiem cilvēkiem ir kāda ideja, un, to realizējot, veidojas tāda tipa žurnāli, kāds Latvijā ir *Rīgas Laiks* vai 2003. gada jaunienācējs *Kabinets*. Tie aizstāv noteiktas vērtības un idejas, bet reti spēj sasniegt lielu auditoriju un būtisku reklāmdevēju uzmanību. Tomēr šādiem žurnāliem ir liela nozīme alternatīvu ideju virzīšanā sabiedrībā, netradicionālu žurnālistikas darbu radīšanā, neordināras diskusiju telpas veidošanā un dažādu viedokļu atbalstīšanā publikajā telpā. “Žurnālus izdod divu iemeslu dēļ: to modeļus izstrādā atbilstoši mārketinga stratēģijām vai arī domubiedru grupa izdod savam dzīves un pasaules uztveres stilam atbilstošu žurnālu, cerot, ka tas patiks arī citiem.”⁷

⁴ Abonēšanas centra *Diena* informācija.

⁵ BMF rudens pētījums. 2003.

⁶ Joke, Hermes. *Reading Women's Magazines*. Polity Press, 1997. P. 37.

⁷ Compaine, M. Benjamin, Gomery, Douglas. *Who Owns the Media?* Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 2000. P. 148.

Dažādās valstīs veiktie pētījumi rāda, ka tehnoloģiskās izmaiņas mediju tirgū ienes jaunus konkurentus⁸. Lai arī elektronisko mediju un interneta attīstība no vienas puses apdraud žurnālu kā tradicionālu mediju pastāvēšanu un attīstību, tomēr vienlaikus ir vairāki tehnoloģiski jauninājumi, kas palīdz žurnāliem vēl izteiktāk parādīt savas priekšrocības. Papīra un tipogrāfiju industrijas attīstība dod iespēju žurnālus veidot ļoti augstā poligrāfiskā kvalitātē, nodrošināt operatīvu to izdošanu un informācijas dinamiku. Savukārt informācijas tehnoloģiju izmantošana padara žurnālu izdošanu par ļoti ātru procesu, kurā nepieciešami salīdzinoši nelieli materiālie ieguldījumi. Digitālās fotogrāfijas izplatība palīdz nodrošināt vizuāli iespaidīgu un atraktīvu žurnālu saturu. Visi minētie tehnoloģiskie jauninājumi ir pievilcīgi arī no reklāmdevēju viedokļa, jo tieši žurnāli spēj nodrošināt ļoti augstu reklāmu tehnisko un māksliniecisko izpildījumu, kas pastiprina reklāmas ietekmi.

Žurnālus var iedalīt pēc dažādām pazīmēm, taču ļoti būtisks ir to iedalījums pēc satura. Atsevišķi tiek izdalīti patērētāju žurnāli, interešu žurnāli, mākslas žurnāli, zinātniskie žurnāli, klientu žurnāli⁹. Latvijā visaktīvāk attīstās tā sauktie patērētāju žurnāli, proti, izdevumi, kas konceptuāli orientējas uz tādu auditoriju, kas varētu kļūt par noteiktu reklāmdevēju izplatītu preču vai pakalpojumu patērētājiem¹⁰.

Žurnālu pastāvēšanā ļoti būtiska ir tā saucamā žurnāla formula. Pēc Rolanda Volseleja¹¹, žurnāla formula ietver vairākus svarīgus faktoros, to skaitā žurnāla izdošanas mērķi; žurnāla tirgu; potenciālo lasītāju dzīves, izglītības un kultūras līmeni; konkurentus un viņu formulas; pārbaudītās žurnālu formulas; jau esošas formulas, kas sevi pierādījušas kā veiksmīgas; sabiedrībā esošo noskaņojumu, galvenos viedokļus un to, kā tā varētu reaģēt uz jauno žurnālu; žurnāla izdevēju finansiālās situācijas noteiktās finansiālās iespējas un ierobežojumus. Lai atbildētu uz jautājumiem par konkurences formām žurnālu tirgū un apkopotu minētos faktoros un procesus dinamiska žurnālu tirgus attīstības kontekstā, jānosaka galvenās šī tirgus attīstības tendences.

LATVIJAS ŽURNĀLU TIRGUS ATTĪSTĪBAS TENDENCES

Žurnālu tirgus izmaiņas pēdējo divu gadu laikā iezīmē vairākas būtiskas, iepriekš šajā mediju sektorā nebijušas parādības. Līdztekus žurnālu tirāžu pieaugumam un reklāmas līdzekļu īpatsvara pieaugumam žurnālu sektorā, šajā mediju segmentā parādās jauni “spēlētāji” un jauna tipa izdevumi.

Žurnālu tirgu var raksturot pēc dažādām pazīmēm, bet to vidū divas ir nozīmīgākās:

- īpašnieku struktūra;
- žurnālu saturs.

Pirmkārt, Latvijā mainās žurnālu izdevēju struktūra. Pasaulē žurnālu tirgus ir iezīmīgs ar to, ka žurnālu īpašnieki visbiežāk ir grāmatu izdevniecības, lielas dažādu izdevumu “portfeļu” žurnālu izdevniecības, kas neizdod laikrakstus, un

⁸ Albarran, Alan. *Media Economics*. 1996. P. 53.

⁹ Johnson, Sammie, Prijatel, Patricia. *The Magazine from cover to cover. Dynamic Industry*. USA: McGraw-Hill, 1999. P. 42.

¹⁰ Stevenson, Nick. *Understanding Media Cultures*. SAGE Publications Inc, 1995. P. 176.

¹¹ Click, J. William, Baird, N. Russell. *Magazine Editing and Producing*. USA: WCB, 1990. P. 152.

viena žurnāla izdevniecības, kas nodrošina tikai viena žurnāla iznākšanu. Arī Latvijā žurnālu tirgū darbojas viena žurnāla un vairāku žurnālu izdevniecības, kas iesaistās tirgū ar vidēji 5 žurnāliem. Latvijā, pirmkārt, tirgū strauji ienāk jaunas viena žurnāla izdevniecības un žurnālu tirgū sāk ienākt laikrakstu izdevēji. Redzot auditorijas interesi pret žurnāliem un šī mediju tipa produktu pievilcību reklāmdevēju skatījumā, lielākie laikrakstu izdevēji, lai nezaudētu savu ietekmi tirgū, sāk pievērsties žurnālu biznesam. Sākotnēji par žurnāliem pārtop laikrakstu tematiskie pielikumi (a/s *Diena* izdevumi *Sestdiena* un *Izklaide*, laikraksta *Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze* izdevumi *Māja*, *Atpūta TV*, *Mēs*), bet laikraksti sāk producēt arī patstāvīgus, iepriekš neizmantotus žurnālu modeļus (a/s *Diena* uzņēmuma *MG Tops* ražotie žurnāli *Dārza Pasaule*, *ExPiedzīvojumi*, a/s *Lauku Avīze* izdotās *Latvijas Avīzes* pielikumi *Mājas Viesis* un žurnāls *36,6* u. c.).

Otra tendence, kas iezīmē Latvijas žurnālu tirgus briedumu, ir sabiedriski politisku nedēļas izdevumu veidošana – *Nedēļa*, *Kas notiek* (iznāca tikai no 2003. gada aprīļa līdz septembrim). Tas nozīmē, ka Latvijas žurnālu tirgū sevi piesaka ne tikai šauri specializēti un atsevišķu reklāmdevēju interesēs precīzi izveidoti nišas žurnāli, bet veidojas jauni vispārējo interešu izdevumi, kas adresēti plašai auditorijai un piedāvā arī jauna tipa saturu, pretendējot uz kvalitatīvās žurnālistikas īpatsvara pieaugumu mediju tekstos (*Nedēļa*, *Kabinets*).

Treškārt, būtisks ir process, kad, redzot atsevišķu žurnālu tirgus spēlētāju panākumus, tirgū ienāk žurnāli, kuru izdevēji izvēlējušies stratēģiju “sekošana tirgū”, kas nozīmē mēģinājumus atdarināt populārāko žurnālu formulas un iegūt kādu auditorijas un reklāmdevēju daļu. Šādu pieeju izvēlējušies izklaides žurnāla *Septiņi* veidotāji, cenšoties atdarināt ļoti populārā žurnāla *Privātā Dzīve* formulu, savukārt jauniznākušais krustvārdu mīklu žurnāls *Mezglis* cenšas pārdalīt šīs nišas žurnālu auditoriju (tirgū jau stabili pastāv 5 līdzīgi žurnāli), bet žurnāls *Apelsīns* cenšas ienākt veselīga dzīvesveida žurnālu nišā. Šo procesu rezultātā konkurence par auditorijas uzmanību un reklāmdevēju līdzekļiem dažādu žurnālu vidū kļūst asāka.

Ceturtkārt, žurnālu izdevēji veido jaunas žurnālu nišas, laižot klajā žurnālus, ar kādiem Latvijas auditorija nav pazīstama. Piemēram, izmantojot tādu dzīves stila un kultūras tendenci, ko raksturo ekstrēmo sporta veidu popularitātes pieaugums gados jaunākajā auditorijas daļā, izveidots jauns interešu žurnāls, kam nav konkurentu – *X Piedzīvojumi*. Savukārt izdevums *Labu Apetīti*, kas raksta par ēdienu gatavošanu, ir pirmais savā nišā un konkurē ar Latvijā visai ienesīgo un populāro pavārgrāmatu segmentu. Jāmin arī starptautisks žurnāls jauniem vīriešiem *FHM*, kas sāka iznākt 2003. gada beigās un ar oriģinālas žurnāla formulas palīdzību cenšas piesaistīt auditoriju, kurai līdz šim netika adresēts atsevišķs kopējo interešu žurnāls.

Pēdējos divos gados padziļinās jau iepriekš novērotā internacionalizācijas tendence. Latvijā sāk iznākt arvien jauni starptautiski pazīstamu žurnālu modeļi, savu darbību uzsāk jauna starptautiska izdevniecība.

Palielinoties žurnālu skaitam un konkurencei to vidū, strauji attīstās paņēmieni žurnālu virzīšanai tirgū. Tāpēc būtiskas norises raksturo arī žurnālu izdevniecību marketinga stratēģijas. Daļa žurnālu, lai piesaistītu auditoriju un iepazīstinātu plašāku lasītāju loku ar savu saturu, ievieto žurnālu rakstu publikācijas interneta portālos (*Nedēļa*, *Septiņi* un *Kino Pauze* – portālos *Delfi* un *TVNET*). Šī pieeja gan varētu radīt arī pretēju procesu – žurnālu kanibalizāciju, jo, izlasot saturu interneta vidē, lasītāji var attiekties no žurnāla

pirkšanas vai abonēšanas. Žurnālu mārketingu raksturo arī konsekventa tendence izmantot starpmediju projektus – radio un TV raidījumus, kuru saturu veido saistībā ar žurnālu saturu (žurnāla *Next* saturs televīzijās *TV5*, *LNT* un *European Hit Radio*, žurnāla *Nedēļa* veidotais raidījums *Septiņas naglas* programmā *Radio SWH*).

Apskatot žurnālu tirgus attīstības tendences, jāmin arī to saistība ar žurnālu satura izmaiņām, ko raksturo šādi procesi:

- globalizācijas procesa veicināta internacionalizācija,
- satura stereotipizācija,
- patērētāju filozofijas izplatīšanās.

Starptautisko izdevumu un to satelītu – starptautisku rakstu un fotogrāfiju aģentūru – piedāvātais saturs, kura izmantošana ir lētāka nekā oriģinālu rakstu veidošana, vienādo Latvijas žurnālu saturu, pastiprinot stereotipizācijas tendenci. Žurnālu izdevējiem ir daudz vienkāršāk iegādāties gatavus materiālus un fotogrāfijas, kas stāsta par cilvēku attiecību problēmām, par dizainu un interjeru, dārzkopību, bērnu audzināšanu, ēdiena gatavošanu un daudzām citām jomām, nekā tos veidot savās redakcijās, izmantojot vietējo žurnālistu uz speciālistu resursus.

Savukārt lielā atkarība no reklāmdevēju labvēlības, veicina tādu žurnālu veidošanos, kuru saturs tiek arvien vairāk pakļauts reklāmdevēju interesēm. Tādējādi pastiprinās žurnālu loma patērētājkultūras veicināšanā. Reklāmas apjoma pieaugums žurnālu saturā padara reklāmu par cieši saistītu ar “patēriņa kultūru [...] un nostiprina patērētājkultūru kā mūsdienu ideoloģijas pamatu”. Žurnāli pieder tiem medijiem, kas orientējas uz reklāmdevēju mērķiem un “konsekventi popularizē patērētāju ideoloģiju”.¹² Žurnāli, parādot patērētāju dzīvesveidu, demonstrējot skaistuma, modes, seksualitātes un karjeras paraugus, parāda, ka sociālo statusu **var pirkt** kopējā patēriņa tirgū. Sociālās problēmas no patērētāju ideoloģijas viedokļa tiek definētas kā personiskās problēmas, kuras var risināt, **nopērkot noteiktus produktus**. Žurnāli tādējādi redz savus lasītājus kā specifiskas sociālas grupas, identificējot tās kā patērētājus ar vajadzībām pēc specifiskiem produktiem.¹³

Tendence, ka auditorija tiek uztverta nevis kā indivīdu kopums, bet definēta kā patērētāja, ir ļoti svarīga tieši žurnālu satura veidošanā. Taču veiksmīga auditorijas kā reklāmdevēju preču patērētāju piesaiste ir viens no priekšnoteikumiem žurnālu tirgus attīstībai, kuras galvenā pazīme ir konkurentu pieaugums, konkurences saasināšanās un konkurences modeļu daudzveidība.

ŽURNĀLU TIRGUS KONKURENCES MODEĻI

Žurnālu tirgus ir tik daudzveidīgs, un konkurencei tajā ir ļoti dažādas izpausmes. Ir nepieciešams atrast kritēriju konkurences analīzei, jo savā starpā konkurē gan lieli izdevumi, gan nelieli nišas žurnāli, kuru saturs ir radikāli atšķirīgs. Nedrīkst neievērot arī tos žurnālu konkurentus, kas darbojas citos mediju biznesa segmentos, – laikrakstus, radio, televīziju un interneta medijus.

¹² Croteau, David. *Media/societ'y: industries, images, and audiences*. Sage Publications Inc., 2003. P. 184.

¹³ Turpat. 189. lpp.

Šeit veiktajā Latvijas žurnālu tirgus struktūras analīzes pamatā ir koncepcija par mediju tirgus duālo raksturu¹⁴, kas skata atsevišķi informācijas tirgu un reklāmas tirgu, ievērojot, ka mediji darbojas *duālā produkta* tirgū, jo auditorijai piedāvā informāciju, izglītošanos un izklaidi, bet reklāmdevējiem pārdod savu telpu, lai tie, izmantojot medijus, varētu sastapt savu preču iespējamās patērētājus.

Konkurences procesi tiek skatīti, izdalot dažādos mediju tirgus dalībniekus, atsevišķi izvērtējot intermediālo konkurenci, ko raksturo konkurence starp dažāda tipa medijiem, un intramediālo konkurenci, ko raksturo konkurence viena mediju tipa ietvaros.¹⁵

Šajā rakstā Latvijas žurnālu tirgus konkurences procesi tiks analizēti pēc šādiem kritērijiem:

- 1) tirgū ienākšanas barjeras (iziešanas barjeras);
- 2) dažādi konkurences līmeņi (konkurences tirgi);
- 3) žurnāla tirgus produktu diferenciacijas iespējas.

Jāatzīmē, ka viens no būtiskākajiem faktoriem, kas veicina žurnālu tirgus attīstību un konkurences palielināšanos, ir zemās tirgū ienākšanas barjeras – tās nav pārāk nozīmīgas ne finansiālā, ne likumdošanas barjeru aspektā. Lai sāktu darbību žurnālu biznesā Latvijā, nepieciešams vidēja lieluma apgrozāmo līdzekļu kredīts – atkarībā no tirāžas un iznākšanas biežuma aptuveni 4000 līdz 7000 latu, kas nosegtu žurnāla reģistrācijas un pirmā numura iznākšanas izmaksas. Lai izdotu žurnālu, ir vajadzīgs viens nelielas jaudas dators, žurnāla iznākšanu var koordinēt viens cilvēks, arī tā satura veidošanai nav vajadzīgi nozīmīgi cilvēkresursi. Tāpat nav nopietnu likumdošanas barjeru, kas kavētu žurnālu izdošanu, jo šis mediju sektors lēģislatīvā līmenī ir ļoti maz regulēts.

Žurnāliem ir plaša reklāmdevēju bāze, kas, attīstoties valsts ekonomikai, arvien pieaug – reklāma veido lielāko daļu žurnālu ienākumu struktūrā.

Zemās tirgū ienākšanas barjeras raksturo process, ka noteiktā žurnāla attīstības posmā un atsevišķās žurnālu tirgus nišās reklāmas pieaugums nav tieši saistīts ar auditorijas pieaugumu – galvenais sasniegt un veiksmīgi uzrunāt reklāmdevējam nepieciešamo auditoriju.

Darbība žurnālu tirgū nav finansiālā ziņā pārāk riskanta, un neveiksmes gadījumā ir viegli pamest tirgu, iepriekš gada beigās izdodot vienu numuru, lai izpildītu saistības pret reklāmdevējiem un abonentiem.

Var noteikt četrus žurnālu tirgus konkurences līmeņus.

1. Intermediālā konkurence informācijas tirgū. Tas ir veids, kā žurnāli sevi diferencē, salīdzinot ar citiem tradicionālajiem un arī jaunajiem medijiem. Šajā konkurences līmenī sevi jāpierāda jebkuram žurnālam, izceļot tās priekšrocības, kuras tam ir, salīdzinot ar citu tipu medijiem. Tātad jāizvēlas tāds satura un tā pasniegšanas veids, kas raksturīgs tieši žurnāliem.

Šajā līmenī vērojama ļoti sīva konkurence, jo citi mediji, ievērojot žurnālu panākumus, sāk saturā izmantot žurnālu formātus – satura un tehnoloģiskās iespējas. Žurnāliem raksturīgās tēmas un vizuālie risinājumi parādās laikrakstos, televīzijas raidījumos, interneta portāli veido tradicionālo žurnālu kopijas, jo arī ļoti veiksmīgi spēj sasniegt atsevišķus auditorijas segmentus.

¹⁴ Allbarran, Alan. *Media Economics*. 1996. P. 14.

¹⁵ Biagi, Shirley. *Media/ impact: an introduction to mass media*. Wadsworth, Inc. 1998. P. 56.

2. Intermediālā konkurence reklāmas tirgū. Žurnālu reklāmas tehnoloģiskās iespējas un pat auditorijas fragmentarizācijas iespējas cenšas izmantot, pirmkārt, laikraksti un interneta mediji, kā arī televīzija. Konkureējot šajā līmenī, žurnālu izdevējiem jāpiedāvā tādas kvalitātes tehnoloģiskie un mākslinieciskie risinājumi, kā arī netradicionālie reklāmas produkti, lai varētu izcelties citu mediju vidū. Šo konkurences līmeni raksturo arī nepieciešamība precīzi definēt auditoriju un sasniegt tos lasītājus, kuri ir atbilstīgi reklāmdevēju interesēm.

3. Intramediālā konkurence informācijas tirgū. Pārvarot intermediālās konkurences līmeni, žurnāliem jākonkurē savā starpā.

Šo konkurences līmeni raksturo žurnālu formātu saplūšana, to satura vienādošanās. Žurnālus piepilda vienas un tās pašas tēmas, rakstu varoņi un līdzīgi viedokļi. Šajā konkurences līmenī vērojama galvenokārt viena tipa žurnālu konkurence, piemēram, interjera un dizaina žurnāli konkurē ar citiem līdzīga satura izdevumiem. Savā starpā visasāk konkurē sieviešu un vīriešu auditorijai paredzētie žurnāli, jo tie orientējas un vienādu auditoriju. Šajā līmenī izšķiroša ir spēja radīt tik unikālu žurnāla saturu un tā intonāciju, veidot tik ciešu saistību ar savu lasītāju, ko nespētu sasniegt citi līdzīgi izdevumi. Satura atjaunināšanu un tā nemitīgu papildināšanu parasti izvēlas lielākie žurnālu tirgus “spēlētāji”.

Uzdevums radīt unikālu saturu apstākļos, kad mediju darba tirgū trūkst augsta līmeņa menedžmenta speciālistu, ir diezgan sarežģīts, un šāda stratēģija prasa arī lielākus finansiālus ieguldījumus. Tāpēc liela daļa žurnālu izvēlas stratēģiju “niša tirgū”. Tā ir viena no izplatītākajām un var būt ļoti veiksmīga, ja tiek atrastas arvien jaunas nišas, kādas sev radījuši, piemēram, žurnāli – *Rīgas Laiks*, *Copes Lietas*, *NEXT*, *Dari Pats*, *Dārza Pasaule* utt.

Niša ir šauri definēta grupa tirgus segmentā – šaurs, mazs tirgus, kura vajadzības nav pietiekami apmierinātas. **Nišas tirgū visi mārketinga resursi ir fokusēti uz specifiskām vajadzībām vai noteikta tipa pircēju.**¹⁶

Medijus, to skaitā arī preses izdevumu tirgu un tieši žurnālu tirgu, nereti min kā nišu tirgus spilgtāko piemēru, jo daudzi specializēti izdevumi tiek radīti ļoti šaurām un specifiskām mērķauditorijām. Piemēram, tipiski nišu izdevumi ir dažādu tautību, seksuālās orientācijas, speciālu vajadzību, kā arī hobiju un interešu žurnāli. Piemēram, žurnāli gejiem, zvejniekiem, melnādainajiem amerikāņiem, topošajām māmiņām u. c.

Tirgus nišu raksturo šādi rādītāji:

- 1) patērētājiem nišā ir atšķirīgas vajadzības;
- 2) patērētāji par produktu ir gatavi maksāt mazliet vairāk nekā parasti, lai viņu vajadzības tiktu apmierinātas;
- 3) tirgus niša ir tik šaura, ka nepiesaista citus konkurentus;
- 4) tirgus niša ir īpaša specializācijas dēļ;
- 5) tirgus nišai piemīt paplašināšanās, ienākumu un izaugsmes potenciāls.¹⁷

Minētajai aspektu klasifikācijai vēl var pievienot šādu būtisku aspektu: tirgus ietilpībai un pirkjspējai jābūt pietiekamai, lai bizness nišā būtu rentabls.

¹⁶ Porter, Michael. *Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing and Competitors*. New York: Free Press, 1990. P. 67.

¹⁷ Porter, Michael. *Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing and Competitors*. New York: Free Press, 1990. P. 67.

Tirgus nišai ir raksturīgi, ka tajā pēc būtības **nav konkurentu**, jo nišas tirgū vietas pietiek tikai vienam vai varbūt dažiem konkurentiem, tāpēc ka nišas patērētāju skaits ir ļoti ierobežots. Gadījumā, ja niša ievērojami paplašinās, ja tajā jūtams ienākumu potenciāls, tā sāk piesaistīt konkurentu uzmanību un līdz ar to zaudē nišas statusu.

“Nišas organizācijas” (*nichers*) nereti neinteresējas par plašāku mērktirgu, nekā ir konkrētā niša, tomēr viņu priekšrocība ir tā, ka viņi labāk par citiem pārzina savas nišas patērētāju specifiskās vēlmes, vislabāk pārvalda savu mērķauditoriju. Nišas tirgus šajā gadījumā ir diezgan droša iespēja būt līderim, atrodoties pastāvīgās, stabilās pozīcijās šaurā tirgus nišā, kurā valda zināma drošība. Lielās kompānijas reti izvēlas tādu mazu, nelielu tirgu, jo peļņa tajā nebūs ievērojama. Līdz ar to mazākām kompānijām nav konkurences un tās var baudīt tirgus nišas līdera priekšrocības.

Būtiski atzīmēt, ka nišas izdevumiem daudz būtiskāki ir intramediālās konkurences līmeņi, jo to galvenie konkurenti ir citās, pēc satura tiem radniecīgās nišās esoši žurnāli.

Lai gan nišas ietvaros var pastāvēt salīdzinoši harmoniski, Latvijas žurnālu tirgū esošās nišas ir visai nelielas un nišu izdevumi konkurē savā starpā, vienlaikus cīnoties par izdzīvošanu ar kopējo interešu žurnāliem, kas piesaista plašu žurnālu auditoriju.

4. Konkurenci intramediālajā reklāmas tirgū raksturo reklāmdevēju līdzekļu sadrumstalošanās, kas rada situāciju, ka katram atsevišķam žurnālam ir mazāk ienākumu, lai gan kopumā vērojams reklāmas apjoma pieaugums; paplašinās dažādu reklāmas produktu piedāvājums.

Būtiski atzīmēt, ka intramediālās konkurences tirgus līmenī vērojama prakse, ka lielās žurnālu izdevniecības, kurām pieder noteikta auditorija, sāk izdot arvien vairāk tās interesēm piemērotu izdevumu, palielinot žurnālu skaitu. Tas nozīmē, ka izdevēji cenšas “**pārdot**” jauniem reklāmdevējiem vienu un to pašu auditoriju, mudinot katru atsevišķu lasītāju patērēt arvien vairāk mediju.

Lai pastāvētu, dažādos konkurences līmeņos nepieciešama žurnālu kā produktu diferenciācija, kas var izpausties vairākos veidos.

1. Intermediālais informācijas tirgus – satura diferenciācija, salīdzinot ar citiem medijiem; auditorijas diferenciācija.
2. Intermediālais reklāmas tirgus – specifisku reklāmas produktu un reklāmas pasniegšanas tehnoloģisko iespēju tālāka diferenciācija.
3. Intramediālais informācijas tirgus – satura diferenciācija, salīdzinot ar citiem žurnāliem.
4. Intramediālais reklāmas tirgus – sasniegtās auditorijas paplašināšana un diferenciācija, jaunu nišu veidošana.

Apkopojot Latvijas žurnālu tirgus struktūras analīzē minētos faktus, jāsecina, ka šajā tirgū izceļas atsevišķi līderi, kas piesaista lielāko auditorijas un reklāmdevēju daļu. Ņemot vērā, ka kopējais žurnālu auditorijas un reklāmdevēju pieaugums ir lēnāks nekā žurnālu ražošanas izmaksu pieaugums, konkurence šo tirgus dalībnieku vidū ir ļoti izteikta. Ir iespējams definēt četrus galvenos konkurences līmeņus, ko, darbojoties vai ienākot tirgū, sastop katrs žurnāls.

Taču vienlaikus žurnālu tirgū dzīvotspējīgi ir nišas izdevumi. Žurnālu tirgus attīstība uzrāda tendenci, ka arvien pieaug jaunu nišu žurnālu skaits

un veidojas konkurence arī starp nišas izdevumiem. Konkurences rezultātā tirgū tiek radītas jaunas žurnālu nišas, taču to un esošo nišas izdevumu pastāvēšanu apdraud nelielais auditorijas apjoms un žurnālu izdevēju vēlme uzrunāt vienu no 25 līdz 45 gadiem, jo tādu sev pievilcīgāko patērētāju redz noteicošā daļa lielāko reklāmdevēju. Šis apstāklis veicina konkurences pieaugumu žurnālu tirgū, tāpēc var prognozēt, ka, attīstoties esošajiem un veidojoties jauniem žurnāliem, konkurence visvairāk pieaugs abos intramediālās konkurences līmeņos – tieši žurnālu cīņā par savu lasītāju un reklāmdevējiem, kuri savu preču virzīšanai tirgū izvēlas žurnālus.

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“Rietumu modelis” bez vīzijas (Replika Dr. phil. A. Dimantam)

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Baltijas valstu sabiedrības līdz ar iestāšanos NATO un pievienošanos ES sagaida straujākas kvalitatīvas pārmaiņas ne tikai ekonomiskās un kultūras, bet arī politiskās un sociālās dzīves norisēs. Šos pārmaiņu un diferenciācijas procesus parasti mēdz apzīmēt, izmantojot tādus jēdzienus kā “modernizācija” un “panākšana” vai arī “panākošā modernizācija”, ja tiek runāts par laiku, kurā Latvijas sabiedrība spētu sasniegt ES vidējos radītājus. Šiem aspektiem saistībā ar Latvijas masu mediju funkcijām un valsts politiskās elites pieteikto un realizēto panākšanas (*catching up*) kursu savā filozofijas doktora disertācijā pievērsies arī Ainārs Dimants. Taču vismaz daļa no saistībā ar Latvijas sabiedrības panākošo modernizāciju izvirzītajām A. Dimanta tēzēm, kurām turklāt piemīt spēcīga normatīvisma ievirze, ir pelnījušas kritisku aplūkošanu.

Disertāciju par tēmu “Masu mediju attīstība Latvijā pēc otrās neatkarības”¹ A. Dimants 2003. gada jūlijā ar izcilību aizstāvēja Berlīnes Brīvajā universitātē. Raksturojot savu teorētiski metodisko pozīciju, viņš disertācijā norāda, ka “mediji ir svarīgs sabiedriskās transformācijas faktors, ja transformāciju saprotam kā **panākošas modernizācijas procesus** (izcēlums – O. S.), kuru mērķis principā ir zināms un centrālie aktori uz to apzināti tiecas – proti, moderno (Rietumu) sabiedrību paraugs ar politisko demokrātiju, tirgus ekonomiku un labklājību plašiem iedzīvotāju slāņiem. Tas viss tieši skar arī mediju attīstību Latvijā, un masu medijiem kā modernas sabiedrības funkcionālai sistēmai jāspēj atbilst šiem izaicinājumiem”².

Šo normatīvi interpretēto “panākošas modernizācijas” tēzi A. Dimants atkārtoti formulē arī rakstā “Latvijas masu mediju nākotne paplašinātajā Eiropā”, kas iekļauts 2004. gadā klajā nākušajā T. Jundža rediģētajā krājumā “Latvija Eiropā: nākotnes vīzijas”. Latvijas ZA Baltijas stratēģisko pētījumu centrs krājuma izdevēja lomā liecina, ka lasītājam darīšana ar reprezentīvu un nopietnu publikāciju kopu. Taču raksta variantā A. Dimanta normatīvā pozīcija piedzīvojusi nopietnas redakcionālas korekcijas un papildinājumus, kā to apstiprina citāts: “.. mediji ir svarīgs sabiedrības transformācijas faktors, ja transformāciju saprotam kā **modernizācijas**

¹ Die Entwicklung der Massenmedien in Lettland nach der zweiten Unabhängigkeit. Dissertation zur Erlangung des Grades des Doktors der Philosophie (Dr. phil.) am Fachbereich Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften der Freien Universität Berlin vorgelegt von Ainars Dimants aus Riga – Lettland. 2002.

² Turpat. 22. lpp.

procesus (izcēlums – O. S.), kur sasniedzamais mērķis principā ir zināms un galveno procesa dalībnieku mērķtiecīgi veicināts, proti – moderno (Rietumu) sabiedrību modelis ar politisko demokrātiju, tiesisku valsti, tirgus saimniecību un labklājību plašiem iedzīvotāju slāņiem, bet vienlaikus arī ar tam raksturīgajām problēmām – piemēram, mediju koncentrācijas, vienveidības un izklaides pieaugumu. Tas viss tiešā veidā skar arī mediju attīstību Latvijā, un masu medijiem kā modernās sabiedrības funkcionālai sistēmai jāapmierina šīs prasības un jātiek galā ar šiem izaicinājumiem.”³ A. Dimants rakstā vēl pasvītro, ka viņa izmantotais T. Parsona strukturāli funkcionālais un N. Lūmana funkcionāli strukturālais sistēmteorētiskais modelis, “kopumā ņemot, uztver transformācijas procesus kā attīstību no tradicionālās uz moderno sabiedrību”⁴.

Kritiskas iebildes saistībā ar A. Dimanta visumā izvērsti formulēto panākošās modernizācijas tēzi iegūstamas, meklējot atbildes uz vismaz trīs jautājumiem: pirmkārt, vai nepamatoti tiek ignorēti tie atjaunotās Latvijas Republikas politiskās un ekonomiskās elites grupējumi, kuri pirmajos atjaunotās neatkarības gados drīzāk orientējās uz 20. gs. 20. un 30. gadu tradicionālajām vērtībām? Otrkārt, vai pati modernizācijas problēma netiek interpretēta pārāk šauri vai pat vienkāršoti? Treškārt, vai masu mediju funkcionālā loma netiek pārspilēta, turklāt neņemot vērā divu publisko viedokļu – populārā jeb masu un informētā jeb elites aprindu – pastāvēšanu Latvijas sabiedrībā?

Pievēršoties tradicionālistu lomai, vispirms jāmin A. Dimanta izmantotā transformācijas procesu periodizācija saistībā ar pārmaiņām Latvijas sabiedrībā un politiskajā sistēmā. Balstoties uz raksta tekstu, ir izdalāma padomju sistēmas liberalizācijas fāze, kas aptver laiku no 1986. gada līdz 1988. gadam, un demokratizācijas fāze, kas aptver laiku no 1989. gada līdz 1991. gadam. Tālāk bez norādes uz konkrētiem laika periodiem tiek minētas demokrātijas institucionalizācijas un demokrātijas konsolidācijas fāzes.

Pirmais uz kritiskām iebildēm vedinošais jautājums par tradicionālistu lomu atjaunotās Latvijas Republikas politiskajā dzīvē attiecas uz demokrātizācijas un demokrātijas institucionalizācijas periodiem. Par šo nozīmīgo aspektu katrs savā laikā ir izteikušies Latvijas politiskajā dzīvē pazīstamie V. Birkavs un U. Osis, kā arī “Baltijas revolūcijas” pētnieks A. Līvens.

Ja aplūkojam šo autoru liecības hronoloģiskā secībā, kā pirmais jāmin V. Birkavs, kurš, būdams LR AP priekšsēdētāja vietnieka amatā, savu viedokli pauda 1992. gada novembrī Rīgā notikušajā starptautiskajā konferencē. Norādījis uz to, ka “etniskais jautājums ir politiskās varas jautājums Latvijā par varas distribūciju starp etniskajām kopienām”⁵, V. Birkavs uzsvēra, ka “tuvākajā nākotnē politiskās partijas nebūs pietiekami stabilas, lai kļūtu par garantiju demokrātijai”⁶. Tā kā “tranzīta masu viedoklis ir orientēts uz personībām, ne partiju programmām”, tad tā laika Latvijā “populāri

³ Dimants, A. Latvijas masu mediju nākotne paplašinātajā Eiropā. Grām.: Jundzis, Tālavš (zin. red.). *Latvija Eiropā: nākotnes vīzijas*. Rīga: LZA Baltijas stratēģisko pētījumu centrs, 2004. 296. lpp.

⁴ Turpat.

⁵ Birkavs, V. The government and society: the problem of legitimacy in the context of transition. Grām.: Semanis, E. (ed.) *The Transition towards Democracy: Experience in Latvia and in the World. Proceedings of the Conference*. Rīga: University of Latvia, 1994. P. 7.

⁶ Turpat. 10. lpp.

harizmātiski līderi būs pieprasīti⁷. Ir jāpiekrīt, ka tolaik kā no akadēmiskās analīzes, tā arī no politiskā procesa analīzes viedokļa bija pareizi izvērtēt situāciju Latvijā, izmantojot dalījumu populārajā jeb masu un elites jeb informētajā publiskajā viedoklī. Nodalīt partiju līderus un partiju programmas arī mūsdienās var ne mazāk pamatoti, kā to, piemēram, apstiprina partijas *Jaunais laiks* darbība. V. Birkavs 1992. gada konferencē runāja par trim "ekstrēmi komplicētām dilemmām", kuras nāksies risināt "harizmātiskajiem līderiem", tai skaitā "nepieciešamība sargāt nacionālo identitāti, zemes pagātni un vēsturi un nepieciešamība realizēt **radikālu modernizācijas programmu** (izcēlums – O. S.), tādējādi atverot to pasaules ekonomiskajām, informatīvajām un kultūras ietekmēm"⁸.

Ekonomists, pagājušā gadsimta 90. gadu sākumā arī aktīvs politiķis, Uldis Osis par tā laika "radikalismu" savā grāmatā "Starp divām pasaulēm" raksta: "Kapitalisms bija aizsācies tik mežonīgi, tas bija tik trakajošs, gandrīz visur tik krimināls un amorāls, ka jebkurš ar kaut cik veselu saprātu apveltīts cilvēks saprata, ka ilgi tā nevar turpināties."⁹ Pārejai uz tirgus ekonomiku tātad piemita arī ļoti negatīvi tiesiskie un sociāli ētiskie aspekti.

Taču bija arī vēl citi aspekti, kas ir ne mazāk svarīgi 90. gadu pirmās puses Latvijā aizsākušos jauna tipa modernizācijas procesu izpratnei. Pats U. Osis, piemēram, raksta: "Stipri traucēja arī tas, ka daļā sabiedrības un arī deputātu (LR AP – O. S.) priekšstats par ekonomiskajām un valsts pārvaldes reformām nereti asociējās ar Ulmaņlaiku vai pat vēl senāku kārtību. Šo veco laiku sistēmu mehāniski, bez kritiskas pieejas reizēm mēģināja lietot mūsdienās, un tas bieži vien radīja problēmas."¹⁰

Konceptuāli līdzīgā veidā politiskos procesus Baltijas valstīs un līdz ar to arī politiskās elites lomu modernizācijas procesos apraksta Anatols Līvens. Par partijām un frakcijām parlamentos viņa grāmatā lasām: "'Partijas' valstī un tāda paša nosaukuma "frakcijas" parlamentos parasti ir tikai visai vāji saistītas, bet dažkārt pilnīgi nevienādas. Baltijas politikas tumšajā senlaicīgajā zupā šīs politiskās amēbas dalās, formē jaunas pārejas savienības un dalās atkal."¹¹ Par Ulmaņlaiku gara tradicionālistu lomu A. Līvens atšķirībā no U. Oša jau 1993. gadā, kad iznāca grāmatas pirmais izdevums, rakstīja: "Baltijas nacionālās izjūtas pamattonis kopš tās atdzimšanas 1980. gados bija vēlēšanās "atgriezties Eiropā". Baltieši jūtas – un pamatoti – tā, ka pārējai Eiropai ir pienākums palīdzēt viņiem tā darīt. Problēma – Eiropa, kurā daudzi Baltijas politiķi rauga atgriezties, ir nevis mūsdienu, bet gan 1920. un 1930. gadu Eiropa, kad Baltija pirmo reizi bija neatkarīga."¹² Tamlīdzīgu tradicionālistu centienus raksturojošu liecību netrūkst, tāpēc ir jāapšaubā A. Dimanta tēze par to, ka līdz ar LR neatkarības atjaunošanu modernizācijas mērķis principā bija "zināms" recirkulācijas procesu apņemtajām elitēm un medijiem, it īpaši jau nacionālajai preseī. Modernizācija kā orientieris un

⁷ Birkavs, V. The government and society: the problem of legitimacy in the context of transition. Grām.: Semanis, E. (ed.) *The Transition towards Democracy: Experience in Latvia and in the World. Proceedings of the Conference*. Rīga: University of Latvia, 1994. P. 12.

⁸ Turpat. 13. lpp.

⁹ Osis, Uldis. *Starp divām pasaulēm*. Rīga: Jumava, 2004. 87. lpp.

¹⁰ Turpat. 81. lpp.

¹¹ Lieven, Anatol. *The Baltic Revolution. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence*. 2nd ed. New Haven and London: Yale university Press, 1994. P. 215.

¹² Turpat. 374. lpp.

mērķis tika noskaidrots un konkretizēts Latvijas politiskās un ekonomiskās elites grupējumu iekšējās cīņās un diskusijās. Galvenajos vilcienos tas izkristalizējās un guva vairākuma atbalstu tikai pagājušā gadsimta 90. gadu vidū. Šajā sakarā būtu jāņem vērā arī tas apstāklis, ka tikai pēc Krievijas karaspēka pilnīgas izvešanas mēs LR valstisko suverenitāti varam uzskatīt par patiešām pilnvērtīgu.

Šaubas izraisa arī paša modernizācijas procesa interpretācija. Parasti tas tiek darīts, izmantojot atkarības vai attīstības teorijas. Ļoti vispārējos vilcienos ar modernizāciju tiek saprasts uzņēmumu, ekonomikas, pārvaldes un citu vienību pielāgošanās process tehniskā progresa, ekonomiskā pieauguma un racionālas pārvaldes standartiem, kas tiek uzskatīti par moderniem un nepieciešamiem. Tas ir racionalizācijas, diferenciacijas, sekularizācijas un sociālās mobilizācijas process, kura rezultātā paaugstinās nāciju labklājība un uzlabojas cilvēku vispārējie dzīves nosacījumi.

Savukārt modernizācijas teorijas skaidro jaunattīstības valstu attīstību kā procesu, kurā tās savas nepietiekami attīstītās sabiedrības **atdarināšanas ceļā** padara līdzīgākas Rietumu industriālo valstu attīstītajām sabiedrībām. A. Dimants ļoti eksplīcitā formā ir pārņēmis modernizācijas teorijām raksturīgo pamatpieņēmumu par jaunattīstības valstu un industriālo valstu attiecību raksturu, jo “modernizācijas teorijās industriālās zemes veido attīstības procesa kā atdarinājuma paraugu un **mērķi** (izcēlums – O. S.)”¹³. No teorijas viedokļa šo pozīciju jāuzskata par problemātisku jau tā iemesla dēļ, ka mūsdienu vadošās Rietumu sabiedrības tiek raksturotas kā postindustriālas, informācijas un zināšanu vai postmodernas sabiedrības, kas nozīmē arī to, ka šīs augstākajā mērā modernās sabiedrības ietver sevī plurālā, diskontinuitātes, lūzumu un antinomiju aspektus, tādējādi “reaģējot uz modernizācijas procesa revolucionārajām pārmaiņām”¹⁴.

Par spīti tam, ka modernizācija atbilstoši “Rietumu modelim” tiek pasludināta par pašsaprotamu mērķi un, sliktākajā gadījumā, no elites prasa tikai tā pazīšanu, A. Dimants savā disertācijā nav pievērsies T. Parsona jau tālajā 1971. gadā publicētajam darbam “Moderno sabiedrību sistēma”. T. Parsons tolaik ASV uzskatīja par vēlinā modernizācijas etapa līderi, jo “iespēju vienlīdzība” tajā sasniegta augstākā līmenī nekā citviet pasaulē, ieskaitot PSRS, un tas noticis tādu faktoru dēļ kā tirgus sistēma, stipra tiesiskā kārtība, kas relatīvi neatkarīga no valsts, “valsts–nācija”, kas brīva no kontroles, kuru realizētu kāda etniskā grupa vai kāda konkrēta reliģija. Taču īpaši T. Parsons akcentēja izglītības revolūcijas nozīmi, saistot to ar brīvprātīgo asociāciju kā īpaša tipa organizāciju un jaunām iespējām.¹⁵

Saistībā ar A. Dimanta modernizācijas procesu interpretāciju vēl svarīgākas ir divas citas T. Parsona tēzes. Pirmkārt, viņš norāda, ka “padomju režīms realizēja daudz ko no tā, kas raksturīgs demokrātiskai revolūcijai”, bet “partija un valsts kļuva par modernizācijas aģentiem”¹⁶. Otrkārt, T. Parsons tolaik bija pārliecināts, ka “kustība uz modernizāciju šodien aptvērusi visu

¹³ Nohlen, Dieter und Schultze, Rainer-Olaf (Hrsg.). *Lexikon der Politikwissenschaft: Theorien, Methoden, Begriffe*. Band I: A – M. Zweite, aktualisierte und erweiterte Auflage. München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2004. S. 562.

¹⁴ Turpat. 561. lpp.

¹⁵ Парсонс Т. *Система современных обществ*. Москва: Аспект пресс, 1998. С. 152.

¹⁶ Turpat. 165. lpp.

pasauli”, jo vairākumā modernizēto sabiedrību elites “uztver svarīgākās mūsdienu vērtības”, galvenokārt tās vērtības, kas attiecas uz “ekonomisko attīstību, izglītību, politisko neatkarību un dažām “demokrātijas” formām”¹⁷. Pamatojoties uz šādu T. Parsona sniegto modernizācijas procesu interpretāciju, pilnīgi pamatoti varam noraidīt jebkādas vulgarizējošas koncepcijas par pāreju no tradicionālās uz moderno sabiedrību to sistēmtransformācijas procesu rezultātā, kas Latvijā norisinājās pagājušā gadsimta 80. un 90. gadu mijā.

Sarežģītāks ir jautājums par tā dēvēto “panākošo modernizāciju”, ja uzskatām, ka LR centieni sasniegt ES vidējos ekonomiskās attīstības rādītājus būtu saistāmi ar modernizācijas un postmodernā attiecībām sociālajos, ekonomiskajos un kultūras procesos. Kā daļējs paskaidrojums šai problēmai var noderēt citāts no globālās un attīstības komunikācijas pētnieka M. Tehranjana grāmatas “Globālā komunikācija un pasaules politika: dominēšana, attīstība un diskurss”, kurā raksturotas diskursa, attīstības un demokrātijas normatīvās teorijas:¹⁸

Skola	Filozofija	Norma: mediji	Modelis	Analīzes vienība	Fokuss	Metodoloģija
Modernizācija	Ideālisms	Brīvība: komerciālie mediji	Konsenss	Nācijas valsts	Iekšējs	Empīriskā
Atkarība	Materiālisms	Vienlīdzība: partijas mediji	Konflikts	Šķira	Ārējs	Kritiskā
Pasaules sistēma	Materiālisms	Vienlīdzība: jauktie mediji	Hegemonija	Pasaules sistēma	Iekšējs/ ārējs	Politiskā ekonomija
Totalitārā	Voluntārisms	Kārtība: valsts mediji	Hierarhija	Rase, dogma	Griba	Inženierija
Komunitārā	Savstarpējā atkarība	Kopiena: kopienas mediji	Konstrukcija	Kultūra	Emancipācija	Eklektiskā
Postmodernā	Skepticisms	Pluralitāte: multiplie mediji	Diskurss/ prakse	Zināšanas/vara	Pretestība	Interpretējoša

Neiedziļinoties modernā un postmodernā attiecībās saistībā ar Latvijas sabiedrības “panākošo modernizāciju”, tomēr nepieciešams aplūkot šīs panākšanas jeb *catching up* procesa izpratni Latvijā un tā dēvētajās “vecajās” ES valstīs.

Par aptuvenu Latvijas politiskās un ekonomiskās elites viedokļu atspoguļojumu panākošās modernizācijas jautājumā varētu uzskatīt LR Ekonomikas ministrijas divreiz gadā publicēto Ziņojumu par Latvijas tautsaimniecības attīstību, kuru ar savu parakstu akceptē ekonomikas ministrs. Veicot tikai daļēju šo ziņojumu satura analīzi, iespējams iegūt datus, kas ļauj spriest par evolūciju, kas pēdējo desmit gadu laikā notikusi Latvijas politiskās un ekonomiskās elites uzskatos jautājumā par panākošo ekonomisko modernizāciju.

1994. gada septembrī publicētajā ziņojumā, kuru akceptējis ministrs O. Kehris, tiek piedāvāti trīs Latvijas ekonomiskās attīstības scenāriji: līdz

¹⁷ Парсонс Т. Система современных обществ. Москва: Аспект пресс, 1998. С. 182.

¹⁸ Tehranian, Majid. *Global communication and world politics: domination, development, and discourse*. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999. P. 93

2000. gadam ar IKP pieauguma tempu 17,3% gadā, līdz 2005. gadam 10,9% un līdz 2010. gadam – 8,1%.¹⁹ Latvijas ekonomikas attīstības prognoze tuvākajiem pāris gadiem tolaik sastādīta, izmantojot LMD modeli (*Latvian macroeconomic model for the development of the economy*), kas izstrādāts sadarbībā ar Orhūsas Universitātes profesoru E. Ingārdū. Vēl jāpiebilst, ka visi trīs scenāriji paredzēja 1990. gada Latvijas iekšzemes kopprodukta līmeņa pārsniegšanu laikā no 1999. gada līdz 2004. gadam.

1995. gada jūlijā (ministrs J. Zvanītājs) publicētajā ziņojumā tautsaimniecības attīstība tiek saistīta ar to, “kā izdosies pārvarēt komercbanku krīzi”, bet rekomendācijās “uz tirgus saimniecību **orientētas** (izcēlums – O. S.) ekonomiskās politikas īstenošanai” par mērķiem teikts: “Ekonomiskās politikas pamatmērķis ir izveidot Latvijā tirgus saimniecību, kas nodrošinātu tautas un valsts labklājības pieaugumu, veicinātu sabiedrības un personības harmonisku attīstību, orientētos uz iekļaušanos Eiropas Savienības ekonomiskajā struktūrā.”²⁰ Tātad līdz 90. gadu vidum panākošās modernizācijas mērķis netiek izvirzīts.

Vēl pēc pāris gadiem, 1997. gada decembrī (ministrs A. Sausnītis), tiek konstatēts, ka “ir stabilizēta makroekonomiskā situācija un izveidoti tirgus ekonomikas funkcionēšanai nepieciešamie pamatelementi”. Taču, raksturojot valsts ekonomiskās attīstības stratēģiju, tiek norādīts, ka “ne starptautisko organizāciju rekomendācijas, ne politisko partiju programmas un valdības programmdokumenti neveido pietiekami aptverošu un sistematizētu Latvijas vidēja un ilgtermiņa ekonomiskās politikas aprakstu (plānu) stabilas, sabalansētas un ilgtspējīgas ekonomiskās izaugsmes nodrošināšanai”²¹.

Ar mērķi novērst šos trūkumus Ekonomikas ministrijas speciālisti sadarbībā ar LU un RTU zinātniekiem veic pētījumu, kura rezultāti tiek apkopoti dokumentā “Valsts ilgtermiņa stratēģija (ekonomiskās attīstības iespēju izvērtējums)”. Ministrijas 1998. gada decembra (ministrs A. Šlesers) ziņojumā norādīts, ka “valsts ilgtermiņa attīstības perspektīvas **šādi Latvijā vērtētas pirmoreiz** (izcēlums – O. S.)”²². Ziņojuma autori ir pārliecināti – “jo ātrāk Latvija iesaistīsies ES, jo straujāka un noturīgāka būs Latvijas izaugsme”²³ un argumentē šo savu pozīciju ar Latvijas ekonomiskās attīstības pamatscenāriju un paātrinātās attīstības scenāriju. Izstrādājot paātrinātās attīstības scenāriju, tā autoriem “bija vēlme pārbaudīt, vai ir iespējami tādi mūsu ekonomikas attīstības tempi, kas ļautu pārskatāmā nākotnē līdz 2025. gadam sasniegt **ES valstu vidējo IKP līmeni** (izcēlums – O. S.) uz vienu iedzīvotāju”²⁴.

Radikāli jauns pavērsiens Latvijas ekonomikas un sabiedrības modernizācijas procesu un to nākotnes tendenču vērtējumos iezīmējas pēc

¹⁹ LR Ekonomikas ministrija. *Ziņojums par Latvijas tautsaimniecības attīstību*. Rīga, 1994. gada septembris. 90. lpp.

²⁰ LR Ekonomikas ministrija. *Ziņojums par Latvijas tautsaimniecības attīstību*. Rīga, 1995. gada jūlijs. 94. lpp.

²¹ LR Ekonomikas ministrija. *Ziņojums par Latvijas tautsaimniecības attīstību*. Rīga, 1997. gada decembris. 88. lpp.

²² LR Ekonomikas ministrija. *Ziņojums par Latvijas tautsaimniecības attīstību*. Rīga, 1998. gada decembris. 126. lpp.

²³ Turpat.

²⁴ Turpat. 128. lpp.

Latvijas ilgtermiņa ekonomiskās stratēģijas akceptēšanas 2001. gada 18. jūnijā. Stratēģija bija nepieciešama, lai "Latvija sekmīgi integrētos pasaules ekonomiskajā un drošības sistēmā; politiskie un ekonomiskie lēmumi būtu saskaņā ar valsts ilgtermiņa mērķiem; sabiedrībā radītu pārliecību un ticību nākotnes izaugsmes iespējām un dzīves uzlabojumam, kas dotu valsts politikas veidotājiem atbalstu visos sabiedrības slāņos, tādējādi veidojot pilsonisko saskaņu un sadarbību"²⁵. Ministrijas ziņojumā (ministrs A. Kalvītis) norādīts, ka "mērķis ir nākamo 20–30 gadu laikā sasniegt Eiropas Savienības valstu vidējo iekšzemes kopprodukta līmeni uz vienu iedzīvotāju"²⁶. Taču pats galvenais šajā ziņojumā ir tas, ka izvirzītā mērķa sasniegšanas vārdā "**jāatsakās no Latvijas ekonomikā pašlaik dominējošā modeļa** (izcēlums – O. S.), kam raksturīga lēta darbaspēka un pieejamo dabas resursu priekšrocību izmantošana, produkcijas ar mazu pievienoto vērtību ražošana. Šis modelis nespēj nodrošināt augstus ekonomikas attīstības tempus un veicināt augstāka labklājības līmeņa sasniegšanu nākotnē. Ņemot vērā ierobežotos dabas resursus, mazās tautsaimniecības jaudas un mazo tirgus apjomu, kā arī nelabvēlīgos demogrāfiskos apstākļus, reālākais tautsaimniecības attīstības ceļš, kas var nodrošināt nepieciešamo IKP pieaugumu, ir zināšanu un augsto tehnoloģiju intensīva izmantošana, pārorientēšanās no darbietilpīgas ekonomikas uz zināšanu ietilpīgu ekonomiku. Tam nolūkam jāveido *jaunās ekonomikas* funkcionēšanai labvēlīgi nosacījumi, jāveic Latvijas tautsaimniecības pārstrukturizācija, vienlaikus veicot reindustrializāciju tradicionālajās tautsaimniecības nozarēs (t. i., to attīstību uz jaunas tehniskās un tehnoloģiskās bāzes), kā arī **attīstot jaunas postindustriālas nozares un veicinot informācijas sabiedrības veidošanos** (izcēlums – O. S.)"²⁷.

Šī ziņojuma rindkopa tiek atkārtota arī nākamajos Latvijas Republikas Ekonomikas ministrijas ziņojumos, kaut arī ministri mainās.

2003. gada jūnija ziņojums (ministrs J. Lujāns) min četrus Latvijas ekonomikas attīstības scenārijus laika periodam līdz 2040. gadam, saistot tos ar LR pievienošanos vai nepievienošanos ES sakarā ar tā paša gada septembra referendumu pievienošanās jautājumā. Ziņojuma autori uzsver, ka "Latvijas iestāšanās ES ir vienīgais attīstības scenārijs, kas dod iespēju nākamo 20–30 gadu laikā sasniegt rietumvalstu labklājības līmeni"²⁸.

Tā paša gada beigās publicētajā ziņojumā tiek konstatēts, ka nav izveidota ekonomiskās attīstības stratēģijas dokumentu piramīda, taču, lai tas notiktu, "viens no neatliekamajiem uzdevumiem ir izstrādāt *Tautsaimniecības vienoto stratēģiju*. Tai būtu jāklūst par dokumentu, kas kopīgā sistēmā definētu valdības ekonomiskās politikas ilgtermiņa mērķus un prioritātes (10–30 gadiem), saistot tos ar vidēja termiņa uzdevumiem (5–10 gadiem) un kārtējiem pasākumiem (1–3 gadiem)"²⁹.

²⁵ LR Ekonomikas ministrija. *Ziņojums par Latvijas tautsaimniecības attīstību*. Rīga, 2001. gada jūnijs. 100. lpp.

²⁶ Turpat.

²⁷ LR Ekonomikas ministrija. *Ziņojums par Latvijas tautsaimniecības attīstību*. Rīga, 2001. gada jūnijs. 100. lpp.

²⁸ LR Ekonomikas ministrija. *Ziņojums par Latvijas tautsaimniecības attīstību*. Rīga, 2003. gada jūnijs. 109. lpp.

²⁹ LR Ekonomikas ministrija. *Ziņojums par Latvijas tautsaimniecības attīstību*. Rīga, 2003. gada decembris. 110. lpp.

Standarta frāzi par Latvijas ilgtermiņa ekonomiskās stratēģijas piedāvājumu “mainīt Latvijas ekonomikā pašlaik dominējošo modeli” 2004. gada jūnijā publicētajā ziņojumā (ministrs J. Lujāns) papildina būtiskā atziņa par to, ka “Latvijas konverģences (tuvošanās) procesā uz ES valstu vidējo attīstības līmeni svarīgs ir ne tikai sasniegtais ražošanas līmenis (IKP uz vienu iedzīvotāju), bet arī tas, kāda ir patiesā pilnīgā konverģence visās dzīves kvalitāti raksturojošās jomās – sociālajā attīstībā, vides aizsardzībā, inovācijās un pētniecībā, infrastruktūras nodrošināšanā, tirgus integrācijā u. c.”³⁰.

LR Ekonomikas ministrijas ziņojumi, protams, ir tikai viena no Latvijas politiskās un ekonomiskās elites uzskatu izpausmēm saistībā ar panākošās modernizācijas problēmu. Citu skatījumu demonstrē, piemēram, Latvijas ārpolitikas pamatvirzienu projekts 2005.–2009. gadam. Projektā norādīts, ka “Latvija vēlas būt atpazīstama kā moderna, uz tradīcijām balstīta un atbildīga starptautiskas sabiedrības locekle”, jo mūsu valstī “ir sācies ekonomiskais uzplaukums un **drīzumā mēs ceram panākt citas ES valstis savā attīstībā** (izcēlums – O. S.)”³¹. Kaut arī, īstenojot politiskās, ekonomiskās un administratīvās reformas, “valstī pamatā ir noslēdzies pārejas periods uz brīvu tirgus ekonomiku”, tai jau “pārredzamā nākotnē ir jāpanāk tāds labklājības līmeņa pieaugums, kas atbilst attīstīto valstu rādītājiem”³². Dokuments gan pasludina Latviju par “attīstības sadarbības donorvalsti”, kas, popularizējot savu tēlu, būtisku vietu ierāda “arī laikmetīgajām un inovatīvajām modernās pasaules vērtībām”, taču vienlaicīgi atzīst, ka tā ir “valsts, kurai pietrūkst savu finanšu resursu”³³.

Ieskats Ekonomikas ministrijas ziņojumos ļauj secināt, ka tikai aptuveni pēdējo trīs gadu laikā, lielā mērā saistībā ar iestāšanos ES, Latvijas politiskajā un ekonomiskajā elitē ir noformējies un konkretizējies konceptuāls priekšstats par panākošās modernizācijas procesa būtību un ar to saistīto problēmu kvalitatīvajiem raksturlielumiem.

Berlīnes sociālo zinātņu pētniecības centrs 2001. gada jūlijā publicēja pētnieka J. Deleja (*Jan Delhey*) rakstu “Jauno ES dalībnieku izredzes panākšanā”, kurā viņš secināja, ka “integrācija ES ietekmē dzīves kvalitāti un mazāk sekmīgo dalībvalstu izredzes panākšanā galvenokārt trīs “kanālu” ceļā ar atšķirīgām operēšanas loģikām: ar reģionālo politiku (distribūcijas loģika), institucionālo pielāgošanos (regulēšana) un ekonomisko integrāciju (veiktspēja)”³⁴. Savos secinājumos J. Delejs norāda, ka, pirmkārt, “līdzdalība ES negarantē, ka tiks sasniegti vienlīdzīgi modernizācijas līmeņi, bet tā padara panākšanas procesu vieglāku”, otrkārt, kā liecina agrākie ES paplašināšanās raundi, “daļēja konverģence var tikt sasniegta, pilnīga panākšana, t. i., bagāto, postindustriālo Eiropas sabiedrību “premjerlīgas” sasniegšana, ir sarežģīta”, un, treškārt, “pievienojušās zemes iegūs no

³⁰ LR Ekonomikas ministrija. *Ziņojums par Latvijas tautsaimniecības attīstību*. Rīga, 2004. gada jūnijs. 107. lpp.

³¹ Sk. internetā (26.11.2004.) <http://www.mfa.gov.lv/lv/Arpolitika/arpolitikas-pamatvirzieni-2009/>.

³² Turpat.

³³ Turpat.

³⁴ Delhey, Jan. *The prospects of Catching Up for New EU Members Lessons for the Accession Countries to the European Union from previous Enlargements*. Berlin: Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), July, 2001. P. 20

līdzdalības ES, bet tomēr tām jābūt sagatavotām piederēt semiperifērijai vismaz vienu vai divas paaudzes. ES reģionālā politika ar stingrāku fokusu uz restrukturizēšanos atbilstoši postindustriālo, uz zināšanām balstīto sabiedrību līnijām var paātrināt procesu, bet par spīti tam ceļš tik un tā būs ilgs”³⁵.

Bambergas Universitātes (VFR) profesors M. Heidenreihis uzskata, ka, saasinoties ES iekšējai konkurencei par uzņēmēju un kapitālieguldījumu piesaisti, vecajām savienības dalībvalstīm jāorientējas uz darba tirgus un nodokļu reformām, kā arī jāveicina inovācijas procesi izglītības un zinātnes jomās atbilstoši topošās pārrobežu, uz inovācijām balstītās zināšanu sabiedrības nosacījumiem. To pašu, protams, savu iespēju robežās mēģinās darīt arī jaunās ES dalībvalstis, taču “ekonomisko transformācijas, integrācijas un panākšanas procesu rezultātā saasinājās sociālā nevienlīdzība jaunajās dalībvalstīs. Pieaugošas bezdarbnieku kvotas, spēkā pieņemošās reģionālās nevienlīdzības un ievērojamas ienākumu nevienlīdzības nākamajos desmit gados varētu apdraudēt jauno dalībvalstu sociālo satvaru. Līdzīgi kā 90. gados, šīm zemēm arī nākotnē nāksies meklēt līdzsvaru starp ekonomisko modernizāciju un sociālo integrāciju”³⁶.

Noslēgumā vēl nepieciešams īsumā aplūkot jautājumu par masu mediju lomu panākošās modernizācijas procesos.

A. Dimants savā disertācijā raksta: “No komunistiskās kontroles atbrīvotie zemes mediji tomēr pa lielākai daļai ir nonākuši jaunās politiskās un ekonomiskās elites ietekmē. Tam ir kompleksi, ne tikai ekonomiski, bet arī mediju politikas, juridiskie un žurnālistiski profesionālie cēloņi.”³⁷ Tā kā Latvijā nav konstatējama “aktīva un mērķtiecīga valsts mediju politika”, nevar arī sagaidīt to, ka šajā jomā “ekonomiskā konkurence realizēsies publicistikajā konkurencē”³⁸.

Vēl noteiktāk šo pozīciju A. Dimants formulējis rakstā, norādot, ka “no komunistiskās kontroles atbrīvotie mediji lielā mērā ir nonākuši jaunās politiskās un ekonomiskās elites kontrolē”³⁹. Taču ne disertācijā, ne rakstā tāda politiskās un ekonomiskās elites “ietekme” vai “kontrolē” attiecībā uz lielāko daļu Latvijas plašsaziņas līdzekļu netiek eksplīcīti pierādīta un faktiski paliek tālākas pētniecības darba uzdevums.

Atzīstot privāto mediju īpašnieku tiesības noteikt attiecīgā medija idejiski politisko ievirzi, jāpiekrīt Šveices Itāļu universitātes (*Universita della Svizzera italiana*) profesora S. Rūsa-Mola atsauksmē paustajam viedoklim par A. Dimanta disertāciju, ka “arī žurnālisti nav pasargāti no pašlabuma un varas ļaunprātīgas lietošanas kārdinājumiem (*homo oeconomicus* liek no jauna pasveicināt...)”⁴⁰. Citiem vārdiem formulējot, tas nozīmē to, ka nevarēja un joprojām nav pamata cerēt, ka Latvijas masu mediji un to žurnālisti, atbilstoši

³⁵ Delhey, Jan. *The prospects of Catching Up for New EU Members Lessons for the Accession Countries to the European Union from previous Enlargements*. Berlin: Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), July, 2001. P. 21.

³⁶ Sk. internetā (10.11.2004.) [http://www.uni-bamberg.de/~ba6se1/dokumente/modernisierungmitteleuropa\(gmh2004\).pdf](http://www.uni-bamberg.de/~ba6se1/dokumente/modernisierungmitteleuropa(gmh2004).pdf)

³⁷ Die Entwicklung der Massenmedien in Lettland..., S. 224.

³⁸ Turpat.

³⁹ Dimants, A. Latvijas masu mediju.. 306. lpp.

⁴⁰ Russ-Mohl, Stephan, Prof. Dr. *Gutachten zur Dissertation von Ainars Dimants*. Citēts no autora rīcībā esošā atsauksmes teksta.

kādam idealizētam normatīvam priekšstatam kļūs par pilnīgi patstāvīgiem, neatkarīgiem, kritiskiem un dziļi analītiskiem panākošās modernizācijas procesu skaidrotājiem savām publikām.

Jāpiekrīt arī S. Rūsa-Mola tēzēm par to, ka “Rietumi dažkārt pārāk nekritiski tiek uzrādīti kā “paraugs” – it kā tur nebūtu daudz (disertācijā) ieskicēto žurnālistisma deficītu un problēmu”, bet paša A. Dimanta pamattēze par to, ka Latvijas masu mediji pārdzīvo attīstības procesu, kas vērstas uz “neatkarības un kvalitātes” sasniegšanu, “iespējams” vērtējama kā “pārāk optimistiska”⁴¹.

Šādu piesardzīgu pesimismu balsta arī N. Lūmana uzskats, “ka masu mediju funkcija izpaužas konstantā kairinājuma ģenerēšanā un apstrādē – un nevis zināšanu palielināšanā vai cilvēku socializēšanā, vai izglītošanā konformistiski normām”⁴². Taču N. Lūmanam pieder arī doma par to, ka “masu mediji ģenerē vajadzību aizstāt lieko informāciju ar jaunu informāciju: svaiga nauda un jauna informācija ir modernas sociālās dinamikas divi centrālie motīvi”⁴³.

Šajā rakstā paustās šaubas un kritiskās piebildes par panākošās modernizācijas procesu un ar tiem saistītās Latvijas masu mediju sistēmas funkcionēšanas analīzi filozofijas doktora A. Dimanta publikācijās, protams, ir jāuztver vispirms un galvenokārt kā aicinājums uz jaunām un diferencētākām akadēmiskām refleksijām par panākošās modernizācijas, “refleksīvās modernizācijas”, neomodernizācijas procesiem un/vai multiplām modernitātēm⁴⁴ Baltijā, Eiropas Savienībā un Eiropā, rēķinoties ar globalizācijas procesu seku arvien noteiktāko ietekmi uz Latvijas valsts un sabiedrības vitāli svarīgajām dzīves sfērām.

⁴¹ Russ-Mohl, Stephan, Prof. Dr. *Gutachten zur Dissertation von Ainars Dimants*. Citēts no autora rīcībā esošā atsaukšanas teksta.

⁴² Luhmann, Niklas. *The Reality of the Mass Media*. Cambridge: polity Press, 2000. P. 98.

⁴³ Turpat. 21. lpp.

⁴⁴ Skatīt, piemēram: Kaya, Ibrahim. Modernity, openness, interpretation: a perspective on multiple modernities. *Social Science Information*. 2004. 43(1): 35–57.

6. The Library of the Future

Publiskā bibliotēka – vietējās sabiedrības informācijas centrs

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Latvijas bibliotēkas, darbojoties tirgus ekonomikas apstākļos, virza tirgū savu preci – sakārtotas zināšanas, informāciju. Sabiedrības dzīvē arvien vairāk tiek ieviestas jaunās informācijas tehnoloģijas un pakalpojumi. Līdz ar pāreju uz informācijas sabiedrību kļuvis aktuāls jautājums par publisko bibliotēku tālāko attīstību Latvijā. Kā tas notiek, notiks un kādā virzienā? Kāda orientācija nepieciešama publiskajai bibliotēkai, jo tieši tā nonāk visciešākajā saskarē ar iedzīvotājiem. Mūsdienu sociālpolitiskie un sociālekonomiskie apstākļi Latvijā liek atrast vietu bibliotēkām un nostiprināt to sabiedrisko nozīmi līdzās citām kultūras un informācijas iestādēm. Lai nodrošinātu savu eksistenci, publisko bibliotēku funkcionēšanas pilnveide ir īpaši aktuāla, jo pastāv dažāda veida konkurējošas informācijas iestādes.

Rakstā aplūkota tirgzinību teorija kā bibliotēkzinātnes jaunā filozofija, raksturots viens no ceļiem, kā nodrošināt iedzīvotāju tiesības brīvi iegūt informāciju – vietējās sabiedrības apkalpošanas koncepcija, kā arī publisko bibliotēku nākotnes attīstības perspektīvas PULMAN konferencē pieņemto vadlīniju ietvaros publisko bibliotēku pakalpojumu attīstīšanai informācijas sabiedrībā. Rakstā aplūkoti jautājumi atspoguļo publisko bibliotēku kā vietējās sabiedrības informācijas centru attīstības iespējas.

Līdz ar bibliotēku iesaistīšanos tirgus ekonomikā tām jācenšas paaugstināt savu pievilcību lietotāju vidū. Tāpēc pastiprinātu interesi izraisījusi **mārketinga (tirgzinību) teorijas** apgūšana un lietošana bibliotēkārājā vidē.

Termins “mārketings” ir veidots no angļu valodas vārda *market* – tirgus un tādējādi nozīmē darbību tirgus un pakalpojumu sfērā. “Mārketings ir visplašākā darbība ar tirgu: izpēte, prognozēšana, analīze, vērtēšana, iedarbība, pārbaude utt.”¹

Latviešu valodā “mārketinga” jēdziena izteikšanai izmanto divus vārdus: tirgzinības un tirgvedība. Tirgzinības – saistītas ar preču sadali un maiņu, savukārt tirgvedība – ietver preču realizāciju, apgrozījumu, pieprasījuma un piedāvājuma attiecības. Tā kā ikdienā biežāk lieto terminu “mārketings” nekā “tirgzinības” un “tirgvedība”, tas ir saprotamāks un pilnīgāks.

¹ Pavloviča, Agnese, Praude, Valērijs (sagat.). *Mārketings*. Latvijas Uzņēmējdarbības un menedžmenta akad., 2003. 11. lpp. (ISBN 9984-708-10-1)

Mārketings kā ekonomiskās darbības sistēma aplūkojams no divām pusēm.

No vienas puses, tā ir tirgus, pieprasījuma, pircēju gaumes un vajadzību izpēte; ražošanas orientācija uz šīm atklātajām jaunajām vajadzībām; ražotās produkcijas orientācija uz noteiktu patērētāju grupu, kas šīs preces vislabprātāk pērk. No otras puses – tā ir aktīva iedarbība uz tirgu un esošo pieprasījumu, uz vajadzību veidošanos un patērētāju priekšstatiem par firmu, preci, sniegtajiem pakalpojumiem.²

Citiem vārdiem varam teikt, ka plašā nozīmē ar jēdzienu “tirgzinības” saprot tirgus izpēti un savu iespēju piedāvāšanu, izmantojot publicitāti. Ja vispārējā tirgzinību teorijā galvenais jautājums ir – kas man no tā būs, tad, attiecinot to uz bibliotekāro vidi, jājautā – kas no tā būs manas bibliotēkas lietotājam.

Kopš 20. gadsimta 80. gadu beigām bibliotēku praksē tiek izmantotas tirgzinību teorijas galvenās atziņas. Tieši ar vēlēšanos kardināli izmainīt bibliotekāro vidi izskaidrojama pastiprinātā interese par mārketinga kā bibliotēkzinātnes jaunās filozofijas teorijas un prakses apgūšanu, kas virza apkalpošanu uz reālajām iedzīvotāju vajadzībām.³

Galvenā tirgzinību atziņu lietošanas vērtība bibliotekārajā vidē – zināšanu integrācija par dažādiem bibliotēkas funkcionēšanas virzieniem, vadoties no konkrētās bibliotēkas lietotāju reālajām vajadzībām. Jēdziens “vajadzība” ir viens no galvenajiem atslēgas vārdiem tirgzinību teorijā. Tā būtība – nepieciešams izpētīt potenciālo lietotāju dzīvei svarīgas vajadzības, pieprasījumus kopumā, lai varētu izvēlēties tās, kuras bibliotēkas spēj apmierināt. Dīemžēl šobrīd vēl daudzas bibliotēkas piedāvā nevis to, kas lietotājam ir patiesi nepieciešams, bet gan to, kas ir bibliotēkas rīcībā. Tikai lasītāju apmierinātības pakāpe ar piedāvātajiem pakalpojumiem ir patiesais bibliotekārā darba kvalitātes un bibliotekārā pakalpojuma sociālās vērtības kritērijs.

Vēsturiskās attīstības gaitā ir mainījušies priekšstati par bibliotēkas funkcijām. Sākotnēji dominējošā bija informācijas vākšanas un glabāšanas funkcija. Šobrīd galvenā nozīme tiek piešķirta informācijas pieejamības nodrošināšanai – tātd **apkalpošanai**, kas īstenojas dažādu bibliotekāro, informācijas un bibliotēku pakalpojumu formā. Līdz ar to mainās bibliotēkas orientācija no krājumu veidošanas uz lietotāju apkalpošanu. Rodas jauna bibliotēku kultūra – uz informācijas lietotāju orientēta bibliotēku kultūra. Tai raksturīgi:

- formulēti vadības mērķi;
- dokumentu un pakalpojumu plaša izpratne;
- augsta segmentācijas pakāpe;
- bibliotēkas kā sabiedrības, organizācijas, firmas funkcionāla elementa izpratne;
- profesionalitātes saistība ar informācijas vadību;
- augstākās vērtības – elastīgums, atvērtība pret novitātēm un pārmaiņām, profesionalitāte;
- ieinteresēts un atbildīgs skats uz pienākumiem un lietotājiem.⁴

² Pavloviča, Agnese, Praude, Valērijs (sagat.). *Mārketings*. Latvijas Uzņēmējdarbības un menedžmenta akad., 2003. 261 lpp. (ISBN 9984-708-10-1)

³ Осипова И. П. Библиотечное обслуживание: тенденции и проблемы (1990-е годы). *Библиотечковедение*. 1997 (2): 18–31.

⁴ Glosiene, A. *Sabiedrisko attiecību ABC bibliotekāriem*. Rīga: Zvaigzne ABC, 2001. 23. lpp. (ISBN 9984-17-943-5)

Tā nomaina veco bibliotēku kultūru – uz krājumu orientēto bibliotēku kultūru, kurai raksturīga:

- hierarhija un birokrātija;
- krājuma un dokumenta šaura izpratne;
- kārtība kā augstākā vērtība;
- bagātu un pilnīgu krājumu augsts novērtējums;
- princips “viss visiem”; segmentācijas vai nu nav vispār, vai tā ir ļoti vāja;
- bibliotēkas pasaules ierobežotība – tikai pati bibliotēka;
- profesionālās identitātes un kvalifikācijas ierobežotība – ziņas par krājumu un tā kārtošanas iemaņām;
- neitrāli sakari un skats uz saviem pienākumiem un bibliotēkas lietotājiem.⁵

Šobrīd notiek pāreja uz jaunu – progresīvu, uz pakalpojumiem un lietotāju orientētu, lietotājam draudzīgu un atvērtu – bibliotēkas vidi. Katra bibliotēka, arī publiskā, pilda četras funkcijas: vāc, apstrādā, glabā un piedāvā dokumentus un informāciju. Jaunajā tūkstošgadē tieši apkalpošana, iedzīvotāju nodrošināšana ar informāciju kļūst par galveno bibliotēkas funkciju. Apkalpošanai ir būtiska nozīme arī bibliotēkas tēla veidošanā.

Tēls – tā ir mērķtiecīgi radīta vai stihiski radusies forma, kas atspoguļo noteiktu objektu cilvēku apziņā. Parasti tēls tiek radīts pēc pazīmēm, kas konkrētajai parādībai ir būtiskas. Šīs pazīmes var eksistēt objektīvi, tās var būt arī radītas, sagrozot realitāti. Tēls – dinamiska parādība, kas mainās atkarībā no objekta vai cilvēku grupas pārmaiņām apziņā. Jebkuri secinājumi par iespējamo tēlu ir nosacīti, daudznozīmīgi un riskanti. Pēc būtības tēls var būt aktīvs, t. i., ietekmēt gan atsevišķu cilvēku, gan grupu apziņu, emocijas, darbību un izturēšanos⁶. Tātad informācijas lietotāju apkalpošana veido priekšstatu par bibliotēku, tās vietu un nozīmi sabiedrībā. Augsta apkalpošanas kvalitāte veido pozitīvu bibliotēkas tēlu un piesaista jaunus lietotājus. Citiem vārdiem, laba, pieprasīta mūsdienīga bibliotēka – tā ir bibliotēka lietotājam, bibliotēka, kas prot un vēlas kvalitatīvi un profesionāli apkalpot.

Tādējādi informācijas lietotāju apkalpošanas darbs aplūkojams ciešā saistībā ar sabiedriskajām attiecībām bibliotēkā. Sabiedriskās attiecības ir viens no veidiem, ar ko sabiedrība pielāgojas pārmaiņām un tās pieņem, saskaņo atšķirīgus un konfliktējošus viedokļus, vērtības, idejas, institūcijas un individuus. Sabiedriskās attiecības ne tikai rada priekšstatu par institūciju, bet arī palīdz tai iegūt ārējo veidolu. Bibliotēku sabiedriskās attiecības ir prasme gūt nepieciešamo, bibliotēkai svarīgo cilvēku (apmeklētāju, darbinieku) un finansējošo institūciju atbalstu.

Ikvienas bibliotēkas pamatuzdevums ir **informācijas pieejamības nodrošināšana** tās lietotājiem un ikvienam iedzīvotājam. Īpaši aktuāli tas ir publiskajās bibliotēkās, jo tās ir pieejamākās bibliotēkas, kas apkalpo dažādu sociālo grupu iedzīvotājus. Tas tiek uzsvērts

- gan nacionālā līmeņa dokumentos – LR Bibliotēku likumā⁷, Nacionālās programmas “Kultūra” apakšprogrammā “Bibliotēkas”⁸, Nacionālajā programmā “Informātika”⁹;

⁵ Glosiene, A. *Sabiedrisko attiecību ABC bibliotekāriem*. Rīga: Zvaigzne ABC, 2001. 22.–23. lpp. (ISBN 9984-17-943-5)

⁶ Glosiene, A. *Sabiedrisko attiecību ABC bibliotekāriem*. Rīga: Zvaigzne ABC, 2001. 51 lpp. (ISBN 9984-17-943-5)

⁷ Latvijas Bibliotēku likums. *Latvijas Vēstnesis*. 1998. 9. jūn. (167/169): 2.–3. lpp.

- gan arī starptautiskajās vadlīnijās – Kopenhāģenas Deklarācijā¹⁰, UNESCO Publisko bibliotēku manifestā¹¹, IFLA publisko bibliotēku darba rekomendācijās¹².

Ikvienā no minētajiem nacionālā līmeņa un starptautiskajiem dokumentiem ir uzsvērts, ka publisko bibliotēku galvenais uzdevums ir informācijas pieejamības nodrošināšana ikvienam sabiedrības loceklim

- neatkarīgi no vecuma, rases, dzimuma, reliģijas, tautības, valodas vai sociālā stāvokļa;
- dzīves vietai vai fiziskiem traucējumiem nevajadzētu būt par šķērslī bibliotēkas pakalpojumu izmantošanai;
- nepieciešams piedāvāt īpašus pakalpojumu un dokumentu veidus tiem lietotājiem, kuri kādu iemeslu dēļ nevar izmantot parastos bibliotēkas pakalpojumus un materiālus.

UNESCO Publisko bibliotēku manifestā (1994)¹³ un PULMAN konferencē “Publiskās bibliotēkas, vietējie muzeji un arhīvi e-Eiropā” Oeiras (Portugāle) 2003. gadā pieņemtajās vadlīnijās publisko bibliotēku pakalpojumu attīstīšanai informācijas sabiedrībā¹⁴ uzsvērts, ka publiskā bibliotēka ir vietējais informācijas centrs, kas tās lietotājiem padara viegli un ātri pieejamas visa veida zināšanas un informāciju.

Lai publiskā bibliotēka informācijas sabiedrībā būtu orientēta uz lietotāju, tajā jābūt lietotājam draudzīgai un atvērtai videi, tai jāņem vērā vietējās sabiedrības intereses. Publisko bibliotēku attīstībai informācijas sabiedrībā jābūt virzītai uz sabiedrībai tuvinātu apkalpošanu. Šajā sakarībā jāmin **vietējās sabiedrības apkalpošanas koncepcija**. Tā tika izstrādāta 20. gadsimta 80. gados, par pamatu ņemot ASV un Anglijas publisko bibliotēku darba pieredzi. Koncepcijas pamatā ir ideja par publiskās bibliotēkas veidošanu par vietējās sabiedrības informācijas centru.

Jēdziens “**vietējās sabiedrības apkalpošana**” ietver trīs pakalpojumu sniegšanas jomas:

- 1) publisko bibliotēku veikto faktogrāfisko apkalpošanu no vietējo iedzīvotāju interešu viedokļa, kas saistīts ar viņu ikdienas vajadzībām;

⁸ LR Kultūras ministrija. Nacionālās programmas *Kultūra* apakšprogramma *Bibliotēka*. Sk. internetā http://www.mk.gov.lv/lat/ministru_kabinets/default.htm (sadaļā – MK akceptētā koncepcija, resurss pieejams, izmantojot alfabētisko meklēšanu).

⁹ LR Satiksmes ministrija. Nacionālā programma “Informātika” 2000. Sk. internetā http://www2.acadlib.lv/grey/garais_saraksts.htm#informatika (resurss pieejams, izmantojot alfabētisko meklēšanu).

¹⁰ Public Libraries and the Information Society: the Copenhagen Declaration. Agreed by the Pan-European Conference 14–15 October 1999 in Copenhagen, initiated by PubliCA. Sk. internetā <http://www.publica-europe.net>.

¹¹ UNESCO Publisko bibliotēku manifests. *Vadlīnijas publiskajām bibliotēkām*. Rīga: Latvijas Nac. bibl., 1993. 81.–86. lpp. (ISBN 3-598-21766-8)

¹² The Public Library Service: IFLA/UNESCO Guidelines for Development. Prepared by a working group chaired by Gill, P., Saur, K. G. Munchen: 2001. Sk. internetā <http://www.ifla.org/VII/s8/proj/publ.97.pdf>.

¹³ UNESCO Publisko bibliotēku manifests. *Vadlīnijas publiskajām bibliotēkām*. Rīga: Latvijas Nac. bibl., 1993. 81.–86.lpp. (ISBN 3-598-21766-8).

¹⁴ The PULMAN Guidelines: PULMANweb, 2003. Sk. internetā <http://www.pulmanweb.org/DGMs/>.

- 2) bibliotēkas apkalpes rajonā dzīvojošo iedzīvotāju ar īpašām vajadzībām apkalpošanu, ievērojot viņu specifiskās vajadzības;
- 3) bibliotēkas apkalpes rajona specifikai atbilstošu prioritāru lasītāju grupu apkalpošanu, ievērojot viņu specifiskās vajadzības.¹⁵

1. Publisko bibliotēku veiktā faktogrāfiskā apkalpošana no vietējo iedzīvotāju interešu viedokļa, kas saistīts ar viņu ikdienas vajadzībām, piedāvā

- informāciju par brīvā laika izmantošanas iespējām, vietējām organizācijām;
- informāciju par ikvienu jautājumu, kas skar noteiktās teritorijas iedzīvotāju dzīvi, piemēram, sociālās, mājsaimniecības, veselības, izglītības iespējas, ziņas par vietējām kultūras aktivitātēm, klubiem, sabiedrībām u.c.

2. Bibliotēkas apkalpes rajonā dzīvojošo iedzīvotāju ar īpašām vajadzībām (cilvēkiem ar ierobežotām iespējām – mazizglītotiem, nacionālo minoritāšu pārstāvjiem, invalīdiem, veciem, nespēcīgiem cilvēkiem, slimiem, ieslodzītajiem) **apkalpošana**, ievērojot viņu specifiskās vajadzības, paredz

- krājumu komplektēšanu ar speciāliem materiāliem – skaņu ierakstiem, ilustrētiem izdevumiem mazizglītotiem cilvēkiem, grāmatām nacionālo minoritāšu valodās, “vieglajā” valodā u. c.;
- nestacionārās apkalpošanas formas skolās, slimnīcās, cietumos, mājās;
- speciāli aprīkotas lasītāju vietas cilvēkiem ar invaliditāti (uzbrauktuves un pacēlāji invalīdu ratiņiem u. c.);
- pārrunas, lasīšanas stundas, seminārus, lekcijas lasītāju kategorijām ar ierobežotām iespējām.

Šo pasākumu mērķis – palīdzēt cilvēkiem pārvarēt subjektīvos faktorus, kas apgrūtina lietot publisko bibliotēku un iegūt nepieciešamo informāciju. Tādējādi visiem būtu nodrošinātas vienādas iespējas izmantot bibliotēkas pakalpojumus, turklāt tādā veidā, kā tas viņiem ir visērtāk un vispieņemamāk.

3. Bibliotēkas apkalpes rajona specifikai atbilstošu prioritāru lasītāju grupu apkalpošana, ievērojot viņu specifiskās vajadzības.

Publisko bibliotēku lietotājus iespējams dalīt šādās potenciālajās prioritārās apkalpošanas grupās: pirmsskolas vecuma bērni; mācību iestāžu audzēkņi, personāls, vecāki; saimniecisko iestāžu (firmu, uzņēmumu) darbinieki, pašvaldību deputāti un administratīvais personāls; pieaugušie, kas nāk uz bibliotēku brīvajā laikā; zinātniskie darbinieki; pensionāri; bezdarbnieki; sociālās aprūpes grupas; mazākumtautību pārstāvji u. c. Vadoties no savām iespējām, katra bibliotēka izvēlas tās potenciālās prioritārās apkalpošanas grupas, kuras būs iespējams apkalpot.¹⁶

Veiksmīgai apkalpošanai katrai grupai būtu jāizstrādā plāns, kas domāts katras konkrētās grupas potenciālo informācijas lietotāju piesaistīšanai un

¹⁵ Gerkena, V. Vietējās sabiedrības apkalpošanas koncepcija un tautas bibliotēku attīstības perspektīvas. Grām.: *Bibliotēka un sabiedrība*. 3/LU, Bibliotēkzin. un inform. zin. nod. LU Zinātniskie raksti, 646. sēj. Rīga: 2002. 84.–105. lpp.

¹⁶ Sporāne, Baiba. Publiskās bibliotēkas misija informācijas sabiedrībā. Grām.: *Bibliotēka un sabiedrība*. 3/LU. Bibliotēkzin. un inform. zin. nod. LU Zinātniskie raksti. 646. sēj. Rīga: 2002. 56.–73. lpp.

apkalpošanai. Piemēram, viena no prioritārajām apkalpošanas grupām varētu būt bezdarbnieki.

Ja bibliotēka ir izvēlējusies **bezdarbniekus kā grupu**, kurai veltīt īpašu uzmanību, tad sastāda tai speciālu apkalpošanas programmu, par sadarbības partneriem uzaicinot sociālās nodrošināšanas darbiniekus un pārkvalifikācijas dienestu speciālistus. Grupai domāto pakalpojumu plānu veido, ietverot pasākumus, kas sniedz informāciju par iespējām apgūt citu profesiju vai darba iemaņas. Šai grupai rīko, piemēram,

- izstādes par profesijām;
- nodarbības interneta tīkla izmantošanā, lai meklētu darba iespējas;
- juridisko konsultāciju pēcpusdienas;
- tematisko sarīkojumu ciklu “Kā rakstīt CV un kā gatavoties uz tikšanos ar iespējamo darba devēju” (stāja, gērbšanās, sarunas risināšana, darba līguma parakstīšana);
- literārus sarīkojumus, kas veltīti literatūrai par stipriem cilvēkiem.

Ja bibliotēka ir izvēlējusies **pirmsskolas vecuma bērnus kā grupu**, kurai veltīt īpašu uzmanību, tad programma un realizācijas ceļi varētu būt šādi:

- grāmatu izsniegšana pirmsskolas vecuma bērniem;
- iespēja ieiet bibliotēkā ārpus darba laika;
- dalība pasaku stundās, filmu skatīšanās utt.

Sadarbības partneri darbā ar pirmsskolas vecuma bērniem varētu būt auklītes, bērnu vecāki. Bibliotēkai jāveido tiešs kontakts ar pirmsskolas bērnu iestādēm un vecākiem. Viena no formām varētu būt vēstule vecākiem vai arī vēstules bērniem dzimšanas dienā, pievienojot skaistu grāmatas bildi un tekstu priekšā lasīšanai.

Ja bibliotēka ir izvēlējusies **pensijas vecuma cilvēkus kā grupu**, kurai veltīt īpašu uzmanību, tad grupai domāto pakalpojumu plānu veido, ietverot pasākumus, kuros iesaistīt pensionārus. Tā ir nozīmīga bibliotēkas lietotāju grupa, kurai ir tendence palielināties, jo sabiedrībā vispār ir vērojama iedzīvotāju novecošanās. Piemēram, Latvijā jau tagad 1/5 daļu no kopējā iedzīvotāju skaita veido pensijas vecuma cilvēki. Tāpēc ir jādomā, kā viņus piesaistīt bibliotēkai un ļaut justies nozīmīgiem. Ir noskaidrots, ka šiem cilvēkiem vissvarīgākais ir bibliotēkara kontaktēšanās spēja, gatavība sarunāties ar cilvēku, runāt par viņa problēmām. Programma un realizācijas ceļi varētu būt šādi:

- izveidot pensionāru darbā iekārtošanas birojus, kas cilvēkus iesaista darbā uz nepilnu slodzi, vai piedāvā darbu, kuru var strādāt, neizejot no mājas;
- veidot kartotēku “Cilvēks cilvēkam”, ar kuras palīdzību pensionētie cilvēki var citām ieinteresētajām personām piedāvāt savas zināšanas un prasmes. Cilvēki ir gatavi mācīt dažādus amatus, sniegt padomus, kā remontēt dzīvokli, konsultēt mūzikas jautājumos utt., dot savu ieguldījumu dzimtā novada vai ciema vēstures rakstīšanā, piedalīties darbā ar bērniem un vecākiem;
- rīkot ekskursijas un teātra izrāžu apmeklējumus;
- organizēt pasākumus ar pašdarbības aktivitātēm, piemēram, amatniecības izstādes (adišana, izšūšana, pinumi u. c.), derīgo padomu stundas (kulinārija, dabas dziedniecība u. c.), tikšanās ar interesantiem cilvēkiem u. c.

Ņemot vērā iepriekš teikto, jāsecina, ka piedāvātās iespējas ir daudzveidīgas. Reizēm, lai tās realizētu, nav nepieciešami lieli materiālie resursi, bet vairāk gan bibliotēkāru ieinteresētība, vēlēšanās darboties un izdoma.

Par šādas pieejas – apkalpošanas no vietējo iedzīvotāju interešu viedokļa – pareizību un dzīvotspēju liecina arī **PULMAN konference** “Publiskās bibliotēkas, vietējie muzeji un arhīvi e-Eiropā” Oeiras (Portugāle) 2003. gadā pieņemtās vadlīnijas publisko bibliotēku pakalpojumu attīstīšanai informācijas sabiedrībā. Šajās vadlīnijās pausts atbalsts publiskajām bibliotēkām kā sabiedrības centriem, kas apkalpotu visu iedzīvotāju grupas, turklāt ievērojot viņu individuālās vajadzības un intereses¹⁷. Informācijas sabiedrības publiskajai bibliotēkai vajag kļūt par digitālo pakalpojumu informācijas centru, kas attīsta piedāvātos pakalpojumus, ņemot vērā visu informācijas sabiedrības iedzīvotāju vajadzības.

Lai publiskās bibliotēkas veiksmīgi realizētu savas iespējas informācijas sabiedrībā, tām jāpiedāvā jauni pakalpojumi, kas dod iespēju iedzīvotājiem veiksmīgi sasniegt viņu personīgos mērķus un sniegt ieguldījumu uz zināšanām pamatotas sabiedrības attīstībā.

PULMAN vadlīnijās ir norādīts, kādi pakalpojumu veidi būtu jāattīsta, un tās iezīmē ceļu, kā tos vislabāk attīstīt un piedāvāt. Uzsvars tiek likts uz arvien plašāku jauno informācijas tehnoloģiju lietojumu. Kāda loma paredzēta publiskajai bibliotēkai informācijas sabiedrības un Eiropas kontekstā? Tas atspoguļojas četros galvenajos darbības virzienos: sociālās atstumtības mazināšana, digitālās atstumtības mazināšana, mūžizglītības nodrošināšana, darbība sociālajā jomā.

SOCIĀLĀS ATSTUMTĪBAS MAZINĀŠANA

Šodien sabiedrībā notiek dažādas izmaiņas: bērnu un jauniešu, veco cilvēku, bezdarbnieku un nepilno ģimeņu vidū pieaug nabadzības līmenis; sakarā ar virzību uz zināšanām balstītu sabiedrību notiek izmaiņas darba tirgū; pagarinoties cilvēka dzīves ilgumam un samazinoties dzimstības līmenim, mainās demogrāfiskā situācija; notiek izmaiņas mājsaimniecības struktūrā; mainās vīriešu un sieviešu lomas. Tas var novest pie vēl lielākas nabadzības un sociālās atstumtības.

Jauno informācijas tehnoloģiju un tiešsaistes pakalpojumu izmantošanai ir potenciālas iespējas nojaukt barjeras, kas ierobežo sabiedrības atstumtos. Jaunās tehnoloģijas var kalpot vienlīdzīgākai zināšanu izplatīšanai. Tās sniedz ātrāku un vienkāršāku pieeju publiskiem pakalpojumiem. Publiskās bibliotēkas var palīdzēt nodrošināt sociālo atstumtību. Tās ir informācijas pieejas punkti, kas atvērta ikvienam, kam informācija nepieciešama, lai risinātu savas dzīves problēmas.

Publiskās bibliotēkas ir unikālas: tās ir pieejamas, draudzīgas un patīkamas vietas. Tās sniedz unikālu resursu un pakalpojumu dažādību, ir atbalstoša sabiedriska vieta, kurā laipni gaidīti visi uz vienlīdzīgiem noteikumiem, tās ir vārti uz zināšanām un veicinošs spēks mācībām.

¹⁷ The PULMAN Guidelines. PULMANweb, 2003.
Sk. internetā <http://www.pulmanweb.org/DGMs/>.

DIGITĀLĀS ATSTUMTĪBAS MAZINĀŠANA

Digitālā atstumtība ir aizvien pieaugoša barjera cilvēku dzīvē. Pieejamības un mācību trūkums, kā arī pretošanās ir galvenās barjeras, kas traucē izmantot internetu. Bet, lai izmantotu e-izglītošanās un jaunas darba iespējas zināšanu sabiedrībā, ir nepieciešamas digitālās prasmes. Interneta lietošana pieaug, bet palielinās plaša pieejamība – starp vīriešiem un sievietēm, strādājošiem un bezdarbniekiem, cilvēkiem ar augstiem un zemiem ienākumiem, augsti izglītotiem un mazizglītotiem, veciem un jauniem. Tiem, kam nav interneta pieejas, trūkst iespēju.

Publiskās bibliotēkas var mazināt digitālo atstumtību. Publiskās bibliotēkas ir piemērotas, lai apmierinātu iedzīvotāju dažādas vajadzības. Piemēram, bezdarbniekiem nepieciešama informācija par jauna darba iespējām, jauniešiem vajadzīgas tikšanās vietas, bērniem vajadzīgas attīstošas programmas, kas papildina skolā apgūtās prasmes, vecākiem cilvēkiem vajadzīga vieta, kur uzzināt vietējos jaunumus, izlasīt periodiskos izdevumus, ko viņi vairs nevar atļauties nopirkt, cilvēkiem ar īpašām vajadzībām vajadzīga vieta, kur pret viņiem izturētos ar cieņu un kas būtu pielāgotas viņu vajadzībām.

Publiskās bibliotēkas ir piemērotas, lai apmierinātu visas iepriekšminētās vajadzības: tās var kļūt un tām ir jākļūst par vietējās sabiedrības centru.

MŪŽIZGLĪTĪBAS NODROŠINĀŠANA

Mūžizglītība kļūst par vadošo principu uz zināšanām balstītā sabiedrībā. PULMAN vadlīnijās mūžizglītība definēta kā vienots mācīšanās cikls, kas ietver mācības bērībā, oficiālo izglītību skolās un neatkarīgu izglītošanos mūža garumā (ieskaitot tālmācību).

PULMAN vadlīnijās publiskās bibliotēkas ir noteiktas kā mūžizglītības procesa neformālās izglītošanās galvenie centri un vienas no visbiežāk apmeklētajām institūcijām ārpus mācību iestādēm. Bibliotēka papildus var piedāvāt mācību saturu, apmācību un atbalstu katram pilsonim izglītošanās procesā. Publiskā bibliotēka veicina personības attīstību sociālā kontekstā un dod tiešu ieguldījumu dzīves kvalitātes uzlabošanā. Tāpēc publisko bibliotēku galvenais uzdevums ir darboties izglītībā gan formāli kā oficiālai iestādei, gan neformāli – vietējā sabiedrībā. Mūžizglītības jēdziens ietver sevī prasmi meklēt informāciju un apgūt zināšanas aktīvi un patstāvīgi. Tāpēc mācību telpa un tradicionālā mācību grāmata jāpapildina ar darbu bibliotēkā, jo tā ir institūcija, kas piedāvā plašu līdzekļu izvēli un profesionālu palīdzību informācijas meklēšanā, tā paplašinot izglītošanās iespējas.

Lai bibliotēka kļūtu par katra pilsoņa informācijas vajadzību apmierināšanas centru, jāņem vērā visu lietotāju vajadzības.

SOCIĀLĀS POLITIKAS VADLĪNIJAS

1. Sociālā iesaistītība. Vadlīnija apskata veidus, kādos publiskās bibliotēkas var darboties, lai risinātu sociālās atstumtības problēmas, kas skar dažādas lietotāju grupas.

Ilgstošs bezdarbs, zemi ienākumi, zems izglītības līmenis, konflikti ģimenē, invaliditāte, slikta veselība, atkarība no narkotikām un alkohola, dzīvošana atpalikušā reģionā, bezpajumtniecība ir riska faktori, kas palielina

nabadzības un atstumtības draudus. Uzņemoties iniciatīvu “priet pretī” vietējiem iedzīvotājiem, kas cieš no sliktām komunikācijām un nepietiekamas informētības, publiskās bibliotēkas var stiprināt sociālo vienotību reģionā.

Publiskās bibliotēkas var veicināt sociālo iesaistītību, piemēram,

- veidojot speciālus pakalpojumus, lai apmierinātu minoritāšu grupu vajadzības;
- sniedzot pakalpojumus tur, kur ir pieprasījums;
- izvietojot bibliotēku sniegtos pakalpojumus vietējo pašvaldību pakalpojumu sniegšanas vietās;
- nodrošinot mobilos pakalpojumus vistālākajās nomalēs;
- lietojot informācijas un komunikāciju tehnoloģijas, lai nodrošinātu pakalpojumus tiem, kam nav stacionāro vai mobilo bibliotēku izmantošanas iespēju;
- izmantojot informācijas un komunikāciju tehnoloģijas, lai nodrošinātu pakalpojumus, kas vērsti uz sociāli atstumto grupu vajadzībām.

2. E-pārvalde un pilsoniskums. Vadlīnija paredzēta, lai palielinātu izpratni par publiskās bibliotēkas nozīmi pilsoniskas sabiedrības veicināšanā, demokrātijas atbalstīšanā un līdzdalībai politikā.

Ir vērojama pieredze, ka pilsoņi jūtas attālināti no lēmumu pieņemšanas procesa. Īpaši tas raksturīgs jauniešiem un sabiedrības zemākajām sociāli ekonomiskajām grupām. Lai to novērstu, tiek akcentēta informācijas sabiedrības tehnoloģiju izmantošana un nepieciešamība nodrošināt pieejamību tiešsaistes publiskiem pakalpojumiem un sabiedriskām ēkām.

PULMAN vadlīnijās pausta nostāja par publisko bibliotēku izveidošanu par vietējās sabiedrības centru, kas darbotos kā pieejas punkts e-pārvaldībai, nodrošinātu pieeju vietējās un valsts valdības informācijai u. c.

3. Informācijas pieejamība un pakalpojumi cilvēkiem ar fiziskām, sensorām un mācīšanās problēmām. Šajā vadlīnijā akcentēti jautājumi, kas saistīti ar piekļuvi informācijai tiem cilvēkiem, kam ir grūtības izmantot iespējas, kuras ir nodrošinātas vispārējai publikai. Šeit iekļaujami arī tie, kas guvuši invaliditāti tikai uz laiku, piemēram, satiksmes negadījumu rezultātā, kā arī cilvēkiem ar vecuma izraisītiem traucējumiem.

Vairumā publisko bibliotēku pieejamības un pakalpojumu nodrošinājums cilvēkiem ar īpašām vajadzībām pašlaik vēl ir nepietiekams. Cilvēki ar īpašām vajadzībām nevarēs izmantot publisko bibliotēku pakalpojumus, ja netiks nodrošināta atbilstoša fiziska un intelektuāla pieejamība.

Publisko bibliotēku sniegtos pakalpojumus, to pieejamību un piemērotību cilvēkiem ar īpašām vajadzībām var iedalīt četrās galvenajās jomās:

- fiziska pieejamība (ēkām, apkalpošanas letēm, darba stacijām – ar datoru aprīkotām darba vietām, lasītavām, plauktiem utt.);
- intelektuālā pieejamība (informācijas nesēju saturs, ieskaitot alternatīva formāta pieejamību, piemērotas, pielāgotas darba stacijas un speciāla programmatūra);
- personāla apmācība darbam ar cilvēkiem, kam ir īpašas vajadzības;
- virtuālā pieejamība (lai nodrošinātu pieeju pakalpojumiem tādiem cilvēkiem, kas paši nevar apmeklēt reālo celtni; šeit ietilpst arī brīvprātīgo veikums mājai piesaistīto cilvēku apmeklēšanā, kā arī digitālā pieeja).

PULMAN vadlīnijās ir uzsvērts, ka cilvēki ar īpašām vajadzībām ir jāiekļauj par pilntiesīgiem pakalpojumu lietotājiem. Viņiem jānodrošina vienlīdzīga pieejamība visiem pakalpojumiem, bet jo īpaši informācijas pakalpojumiem un jādod iespēja piekļūt un lietot pakalpojumus neatkarīgi un bez starpniekiem.

Tuvākajos desmit gados viens no publisko bibliotēku galvenajiem pienākumiem būs “informācijas nabagas” šķiras veidošanās novēršana, visiem sabiedrības locekļiem nodrošinot atbilstošu pieejamību informācijai. Ir uzsvērts – ja publiskās bibliotēkas vēlas būt konkurētspējīgas, tām jārēķinās ar cilvēkiem, kam ir īpašas vajadzības, kā potenciālajiem klientiem.

4. Publisko bibliotēku pakalpojumi bērniem un skolām. Vadlīnija aptver publisko bibliotēku pakalpojumus un aktivitātes, kas palīdz bērniem veidot pozitīvu attieksmi pret izzināšanas procesu. Bērniem nepieciešami pakalpojumi, kas veicina viņu intelektuālo un emocionālo attīstību, pilnveido valodas, sociālās, izglītības un kustību prasmes. Publiskās bibliotēkas to var nodrošināt ciešā sadarbībā ar skolām un skolu bibliotēkām un citām organizācijām vietējā līmenī.

Publiskās bibliotēkas var nodrošināt:

- tikšanās vietu vietējai sabiedrībai, lai veidotu attiecības ar skolām, ģimenēm un citām sabiedrības grupām;
- mācībām labvēlīgu vidi;
- mājasdarbu sagatavošanas iespējas;
- iespējas kopīgiem bērnu un pieaugušo pasākumiem, kas organizēti, izmantojot grāmatas, datorus, mūziku, kino u. c.;
- ar mācību programmu saistītas mācīšanās iespējas u. c.

5. Publisko bibliotēku pakalpojumi mūzizglītībā. Vadlīnija aplūko uz informācijas sabiedrības tehnoloģijām balstītus pakalpojumus un aktivitātes, ko publiskās bibliotēkas veic, lai atbalstītu pieaugušo tālākizglītību, augstāko izglītību, tālmācību, digitālās prasmes.

Jaunās informācijas sabiedrības līdzekļu izmantošana mūzizglītībā sniedz jaunas iespējas, bet arī palielina risku sociālajai atstumtībai un sabiedrības digitālajai sašķelšanai digitāli izglītotajos un neizglītotajos. Vadlīnijas aicina publiskās bibliotēkas uzņemties vadošo lomu digitālās sašķeltības novēršanai, piedāvājot pieeju tehnoloģijām, speciālu uzmanību veltot cilvēkiem, kam nav pieejams dators mājās vai darbā. Vadlīnijas paredz Sabiedrisko interneta pieejas punktu (SIPP) skaita palielināšanu.

6. Informācijas pakalpojumi sociālajai un ekonomiskajai attīstībai. Vadlīnija aplūko, kā bibliotēkas sadarbībā ar citām organizācijām atbalsta ekonomisko un sociālo attīstību, sniedzot informācijas pakalpojumus. Īpaši būtu jādomā par

- uzziņu izpildi, izmantojot tradicionālos un elektroniskos līdzekļus;
- tehnoloģiju izmantošanu nepārtrauktas pieejas informācijai nodrošināšanai;
- informācijas pieejamības nodrošināšanu visu diennakti u. c.

Kā redzams no iepriekš teiktā, publiskajai bibliotēkai ir plašas un daudzpusīgas iespējas darbībai, lai tā kļūtu par vietējās sabiedrības informācijas centru, kas apkalpotu ikvienu, kam tas ir nepieciešams un ievērojot katra informācijas lietotāja intereses un vajadzības.

Bibliotēkas krājuma kvalitātes pilnveidošana

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IZPĒTES NEPIECIEŠAMĪBA

Aktuāla, kvalitatīva krājuma iegāde ir ikvienas bibliotēkas galvenais uzdevums, lai varētu veikt bibliotēkas funkcijas, kas gadu laikā ir pieaugušas un kļuvušas ļoti nopietnas, – tādas kā digitālās plaisas mazināšana, vispusīgu informācijas pakalpojumu nodrošināšana un sabiedrības mūžizglītības veicināšana.

Pēdējos 15 gados Latvijas bibliotēkas strauji pilnveidojušas savus krājumus ar mašīnlasāmiem dokumentiem un interneta pieslēgumiem, arvien vairāk automatizējot krājumu apstrādi un iegūstot informāciju ar elektronisko katalogu starpniecību. Arī sabiedrība kļuvusi prasīgāka pret bibliotēku, un bibliotekāri jūt nepieciešamību arvien vairāk uzlabot sava darba kvalitāti. Katras bibliotēkas galvenais pakalpojums ir veidot kvalitatīvu, lietotāju pieprasītu krājumu, tāpēc svarīgi noskaidrot, kas nosaka krājuma kvalitāti un kā pilnveidot šo bibliotēkas pamatpakalpojumu. Protams, bibliotēkām būtu daudz vieglāk atbildēt uz šo jautājumu, ja tās varētu iepazīties ar valsts dokumentiem par bibliotēkas krājuma attīstības vadlīnijām un standartiem atbilstoši katras bibliotēkas tipam. Diemžēl šādu dokumentu Latvijā vēl nav.

Latvijas Akadēmisko bibliotēku asociācija (LATABA) 2003. gada aprīlī starptautiskā konferencē diskutēja par nepieciešamību izvērtēt krājuma kvalitāti atbilstoši IFLA (*International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions*) vadlīnijām ar *Conspectus* metodi, kas ir “jauna domāšana” bibliotēkas krājuma izvērtēšanā. *Conspectus* metode standartizē bibliotēkas krājuma satura līmeņu aprakstīšanu, norādot komplektēšanas dziļumu pagātnē, tagadnē un perspektīvu nākotnē. Izmantojot nozares un priekšmetus, bibliotekāri un lietotāji tiek informēti par bibliotēkas krājuma saturu, kas sekmē bibliotēku kooperāciju un līdzekļu ekonomiju. Lai gan iecere bija laba, izrādījās, ka nepieciešams laiks, lai apgūtu šo metodi. Šai nolūkā 2004. gada aprīlī tika organizēts seminārs, kuru vadīja Mērija Bušinga, viena no *Conspectus* metodes izstrādātājām.

Conspectus metode ir ļoti būtiska, lai aprakstītu krājuma kvalitāti, taču arī ļoti darbietilpīga. Čehijā šīs metodes ieviešana prasījusi turpat 15 gadus, vairākus gadus skaidrojot sabiedrībai par krājumu izvērtēšanas nepieciešamību un līdzekļu atvēlēšanu šim procesam. Arī Latvija nav izņēmums. Sākotnēji LATABA Komplektēšanas komisijai likās, ka samērā ātri varēs izvērtēt bibliotēku krājuma saturu. Taču, saduroties ar bibliotekāru

neizpratni un reizēm pat negribēšanu, bija skaidrs, ka vispirms jāveic izskaidrošanas un izglītošanas pasākumi un krājums jāsāk izvērtēt vispirms ar vienkāršākām metodēm.

Pārsvarā bibliotekāri piekrit, ka bibliotēkas krājums ir jāpilnveido, ka nepieciešams vairāk jaunu izdevumu un ka vajag vairāk līdzekļu to iegādei. Tomēr, reāli saprotot, ka bibliotēkām līdzekļi tik strauji nepalīelināsies, ir nepieciešams izvērtēt to, kas mums jau ir un kā tas atbilst lietotāju kontingentam.

Ja negribam palikt zaudētājos, agri vai vēlu ikvienai bibliotēkai būs jādefinē krājuma iegādes principi, nosakot komplektēšanas kritērijus un popularizējot tos bibliotēkas lietotājiem. Ja bibliotēka neattīstīs savu krājumu, var gadīties, ka lietotāji uzgriezīs muguru, bet bibliotēkas īpašnieks – valsts vai pašvaldība – var slēgt šādu nerentablu iestādi. Tātad, ar ko sākt? Visvienkāršākais ir apzināties esošo situāciju un izpētīt savu krājumu atbilstoši pasaulē vispārpieņemtām metodēm.

STATISTISKĀS METODES

Krājumu var pētīt gan no krājuma satura, gan no krājuma izmantošanas viedokļa. Par krājuma izmantošanu šoreiz nerunāšu, jo to pārsvarā bibliotēkas dara. Galu galā katru gadu jāiesniedz statistikas atskaite, uzrādot izsniegumu, lasāmību, apgrozību. Vai izsniegums tiešam nozīmē, ka attiecīgais dokuments ir lasīts un lietotājs saņēmis nepieciešamo informāciju, ir strīdīgs jautājums. Taču vispārīgām ieskatam šie dati noder, kaut arī tas neliecina neko par bibliotēkas krājuma kvalitāti.

Lai mēs varētu spriest par krājuma kvalitāti, mums tas labi jāpazīst, tāpēc vispirms būtu jāizmanto dažādas statistiskās metodes. Vispirms būtu jānosaka bibliotēkas krājuma lielums. Jūs droši vien esat pārliecināti, ka zināt, cik liels krājums ir jūsu bibliotēkā. Bet vai tiešām tā ir? Faktiski mēs zinām krājuma eksemplāru skaitu, bet svarīgi zināt krājuma nosaukumu skaitu, kas ir viens no kritērijiem krājuma kvalitātes izpētē. Piemēram, Biznesa augstskolas *Turība* bibliotēkā ir 100 000 eksemplāru grāmatu. Tas liekas iespaidīgs skaits. Bet ja pasaku, ka grāmatu nosaukumu skaits ir 12 tūkstoši? Attieksme pavisam cita. Faktiski mums nevajadzētu baidīties paskatīties patiesībai acīs. Ne jau daudzumā ir nozīme, bet gan kvalitātē. Dokumenta daudzie eksemplāri nodrošina iespēju vienlaicīgi izmantot šo dokumentu daudziem apmeklētājiem, bet tas nevairo krājuma satura kvalitāti. Vajadzētu šķirt šos kritērijus – kvalitāti un pieejamību. Ja visās Latvijas bibliotēkās ir aptuveni 62 miljoni dokumentu, cik daudz ir nosaukumu? Diemžēl pagaidām uz to neviens nevar atbildēt.

Kad esam noskaidrojuši krājuma dokumentu nosaukumu skaitu, nākamais solis ir noskaidrot katras nozares dokumentu skaitu un katras nozares procentuālo attiecību. Pēc tam varam izrēķināt, cik daudz spējam piedāvāt ikvienam bibliotēkas lietotājam vai mikrorajona iedzīvotājam gan konkrētā nozarē, gan kopumā. Mums ir tikai jāzina lietotāju skaits vai iedzīvotāju skaits, kā arī krājuma nosaukumu skaits. Izdalot krājuma nosaukumu skaitu ar bibliotēkas lietotāju skaitu, iegūstam skaitli, kas norāda, ar cik dokumentiem mēs varam nodrošināt ikvienu bibliotēkas lietotāju. Protams, varam izrēķināt arī atbilstoši eksemplāru skaitam, ja pieņemam, ka

katrs gribēs lasīt vienu un to pašu darbu. Nosaukumu skaits uz vienu iedzīvotāju vai lietotāju ir ļoti labs rādītājs, lai noskaidrotu, cik dažāda literatūra ir mūsu bibliotēkas krājumā.

Nākamais solis ir izpētīt dokumentu lingvistisko struktūru gan krājumā kopā, gan katrai nozarei atsevišķi. Labi, ja tas tiek noteikts gan atbilstoši nosaukumu skaitam, gan eksemplāru skaitam, sevišķi procentuālajā iedalījumā, lai varētu salīdzināt nozaru īpatsvaru gan nosaukumu, gan eksemplāru skaita ziņā. Šādi statistiskie dati ir viegli veicami un skaidri norāda lietotājam, kādu literatūru bibliotēka piedāvā.

Vēl viens ļoti svarīgs statistiskais rādītājs – krājuma kopējais un atsevišķo nozaru dokumentu izdošanas vecums. Tieši šis rādītājs vislabāk varēs atbildēt uz jautājumu, vai bibliotēka konkrētajā nozarē piedāvā aktuālu informāciju. Bibliotēkas, kas izmanto IT *Alise* moduļus, viegli atradīs atbildi uz šiem jautājumiem, bet tikpat labi var strādāt arī ar kartīšu sistemātisko katalogu. Ir jāskatās kopā grāmatu visu nosaukumu izdošanas gadi un jāizdala ar nosaukumu skaitu, tādējādi iegūstot statistiski vidējo dokumentu izdošanas gadu.

Ja mums ir visi šeit minētie statistiskie mērījumi, mēs labāk varēsim izprast sava krājuma veidošanas īpatnības un secināt, kuras nodaļas dokumenti atjaunojami vai papildināmi, kā arī kuras nozares dokumenti papildus analizējami ar citām metodēm. Šādi mērījumi ļauj labāk izprast savas iespējas bibliotēkas uzdevumu izpildē, kā arī argumentēti pierādīt bibliotēku īpašniekiem krājuma papildināšanas nepieciešamību ne vien skaitliski, bet arī finansiāli.

BIBLIOGRĀFISKĀS METODES

Šīs metodes izmantošana ir svarīga kvalitatīva krājuma izpētē. It kā jau vienkārši, paņem valsts izstrādātu standartu, kādam dokumentu krājumam jābūt konkrēta tipa bibliotēkā, un salīdzini ar savas bibliotēkas krājumu, nosakot procentuālo īpatsvaru, cik daudz no standarta ir konkrētās bibliotēkas krājumā. Visu sarežģī tas, ka Latvijā pagaidām nav šādu standartu. Nav arī standartu, kas nosaka, kādam krājumam jābūt vietējas nozīmes, reģiona vai valsts nozīmes bibliotēkā. Ja nav standartu, bibliotēkas nevar arī savstarpēji salīdzināt. Bibliotēkām nepieciešams salīdzināt savu krājumu ar nopietniem bibliogrāfiskiem rādītājiem, kuros būtu ietvertas nozares autoritātes un viņu nozīmīgākie darbi, lai varētu spriest par sava krājuma kvalitātes līmeni. Diemžēl atkal jāskatās, ka nozaru bibliogrāfija Latvijā varbūt arī ir, taču to produkti nav pieejami. Ko darīt? Meklēt kādu citu bibliogrāfisko izdevumu, teiksim, kādas grāmatas tapšanā izmantoto avotu bibliogrāfiju vai izdevniecību katalogus, arī kādas citas valsts izdotos nozaru bibliotēku katalogus, lai gan tos vairāk var izmantot, lai salīdzinātu, cik daudz no izdotajiem dokumentiem bibliotēka ir iegādājusies atbilstoši savam profilam. Jebkurš salīdzinājums krājuma kvalitāti palīdz pilnveidot ar nozares jaunieguvumiem.

Var, protams, salīdzināt savu katalogu ar autoritatīvas bibliotēkas katalogu, lai izvērtētu, vai pietiekami apgūti jaunumi. Tomēr praksē bibliotēkas maz izmanto bibliogrāfiskās izpētes metodes. Jo, lai cik savādi tas arī nebūtu, Latvijā nav institūcijas, kas atbildētu par bibliotēku krājumu

kvalitāti un veicinātu to. Ja neviens to neprasa, bibliotēkām liekas, ka bez tā var iztikt. Nepievēršot krājuma kvalitātei pienācīgu uzmanību, var gadīties, ka bibliotēkas iegādājas vairāk reklamēto, nevis kvalitatīvāko precī atbilstošajā nozarē.

Valsts līmenī nav institūcijas, kas centralizēti izvērtētu un komplektētu bibliotēkas krājumus, tāpēc bibliotēkas var brīvi rīkoties pēc pašu ieskatiem. Taču, trūkstot ieteicošajai nozaru bibliogrāfijai un valsts standartiem, pavisam viegli varam iebraukt purvā. Šo dokumentu trūkums bremzē Latvijas bibliotēku attīstību līdzvērtīgu rietumu bibliotēkām. Ministru kabineta izstrādātie finanšu noteikumi savā ziņā ir bibliotēku finansēšanas standarts, kas stāsies spēkā ar 2006. gadu un nosaka, ka pašvaldību bibliotēkās jaunieguvumu iegādes minimālais standarts ir Ls 0,30 uz vienu iedzīvotāju, bet augstskolas bibliotēkās – Ls 8 uz vienu studentu un mācībspēku. Protams, ir labi, ka standarts vispār ir izstrādāts, taču tas ir pārāk niecīgs, lai rastu nopietnu ietekmi krājuma kvalitātes pilnveidošanā. Pasaulē informācija ir būtiska ikvienas tautsaimniecības nozares attīstībai, taču Latvijā diemžēl vēl pagaidām to neattiecinā uz bibliotēkām. Iespējams, ka bibliotekāri paši daļēji vainīgi, jo maz publiski debatē par savu krājumu saturu un atbilstību vai neatbilstību lietotāju vajadzībām, vairāk lepojoties, ka bibliotēka, neraugoties uz nepietiekamo finansējumu, lieliski ar visu tiek galā, tādējādi biežāk uzdodot vēlamo par esošo. Ar katru gadu arvien aktuālāks kļūst jautājums par krājuma sastāvu, tā atjaunošanas iespējam, salīdzinot savus krājumus ar nozarē izdotajiem dokumentiem. Ja mēs varētu izmantot procentuālus kritērijus, cik daudz no gadā izdotajiem dokumentiem Latvijā un pasaulē ir nācis klāt mūsu bibliotēkas krājumā ne vien konkrētā bibliotēkā, bet visās Latvijas bibliotēkās, tad varētu objektīvi spriest, vai Latvijas nacionālais krājums ir aktuāls, pilnvērtīgs un kalpo bibliotēkas lietotāju interesēm.

EKSPERTMETODE

Lai noteiktu bibliotēkas krājuma kvalitāti, vēlams izmantot ekspertus, kas pie plaukta izvērtētu katru konkrēto dokumentu. Šīs metodes priekšrocība ir tā, ka uzreiz var noteikt, vai konkrētais dokuments pēc satura ir aktuāls vai morāli novecojis. Tāpat var uzreiz noteikt, kas norakstāms, kas restaurējams, kuram dokumentam nepieciešams iegādāties papildu eksemplārus. Protams, ekspertam ir labi jāpārzina konkrētā nozare. Arī bibliotekārs var būt eksperts. Galvenais nosacījums, lai eksperts labi orientētos nozarē, pārzinātu nozares autoritātes, viņu darbus un nozares tematiku.

Izmantojot šo metodi, iespējams noteikt kādas nozares pietiekamību ar dokumentiem, pārpilnību vai tieši pretēji – mazu nodrošinājumu, kā arī kādas būtiskas nozares daļas trūkumu. Ja bibliotēkas padomē vai bibliotēkas komplektēšanas padomē darbojas nozares speciālisti, viņi var palīdzēt izvērtēt krājumu. Iespējams, ka ekspertu var atrast arī bibliotēkas lietotāju vidū. Ekspertu var būt daudz, katrai nozarei savi un pat vairāki, lai izvairītos no neobjektivitātes. Praktiski apskatot katru dokumentu, var konstatēt arī tā fizisko stāvokli, vai tas bieži izmantots un tādējādi nedaudz cietis, vai arī rāmi gulējis plauktā. Tāpat var secināt viena nosaukuma eksemplāru pietiekamību vai pārpilnību. Katrā ziņā šī metode ļauj labi iepazīt bibliotēkas konkrētās

nozares kvalitāti. Protams, tā ir diezgan darbietilpīga metode. Balstoties uz ekspertu atzinumiem, bibliotēkām ir vieglāk izstrādāt kvalitātes uzlabošanas programmu.

CONSPECTUS METODE

Kad bibliotēkas krājums izpētīts, izmantojot visas iepriekšējās metodes, var beidzot ķerties klāt *Conspectus* metodei, kas pēc savas būtības ir visu iepriekš minēto metožu kopsaucēja, jo piedāvā izvērtēt krājumu pēc nozaru principa, klasificējot visu bibliotēkas krājumu 24 nozarēs, kuras sīkāk iedala 500 apakšnozarēs, bet tās savukārt vēl sīkāk 4000 priekšmetos. IFLA vadlīnijas iesaka izmantot šo metodi savu krājumu komplektēšanas politikas izstrādē.

Conspectus metode definē 6 kritērijus, pēc kuriem nosaka, kādā līmenī tiek komplektēta literatūra: 0 – bibliotēka apzināti neko nekomplektē; 1 – minimāls informācijas līmenis; 2 – pamatinformācijas līmenis; 3 – studiju līmenis; 4 – pētniecības līmenis; 5 – visaptverošs līmenis. Katra bibliotēka nosaka savas vajadzības, kādā līmenī konkrētā nozare krājumā ir pārstāvēta un līdz kādam līmenim tā vēlas to palielināt vai samazināt. Ar šādu informāciju bibliotēkām ir iespējams sadarboties savā starpā, gan sniedzot informācijas pakalpojumus, gan koordinējot krājumu iegādi un to izmantošanu. Šī metode sniedz ļoti detalizētu ieskatu sava krājuma sastāvā arī ikvienam interesentam. Taču šī metode ir ļoti darbietilpīga un to nevar veikt, pirms krājums nav izvērtēts ar iepriekš minētajām metodēm.

SECINĀJUMI

Pētīt krājuma kvalitāti var ar vairākām metodēm vienlaicīgi. Tomēr katrai bibliotēkai pašai būtu jāizvēlas, ar ko sākt, lai sasniegtu savus mērķus. Vislabāk ir kombinēt metodes. Var, protams, veikt vienkāršotu *Conspectus* metodes izmantošanu, lai radītu vispārīgu ieskatu sava krājuma saturā, sevišķi, ja galvenais mērķis ir krājuma attīstības politikas izstrāde. *Conspectus* metodi pilnībā varēs izmantot tikai tad, ja būs izstrādāti valsts standarti, jo nepieciešams ne tikai izpētīt konkrēto krājumu, bet arī procentuāli salīdzināt rādītājus ar valsts standartiem. Tāpēc var prognozēt, ka tik ātri Latvijā šo metodi neieviesīs.

Krājuma izpētes rezultātus nepieciešams fiksēt, analizēt un izveidot krājuma pilnveidošanas programmu. Protams, ir jāiegulda liels darbs, taču tas atmaksāsies, jo, pirmkārt, būs iepazītas krājuma stiprās un vājās puses un, otrkārt, šos datus varēs izmantot dažādos veidos, gan domājot par krājuma kvalitātes pilnveidošanu, gan bibliotēkām savstarpēji sadarbojoties, gan apkalpojot bibliotēkas lietotājus, gan veicinot bibliotēkas publicitāti. Būs iespēja argumentēti un objektīvi analizēt komplektēšanas procesu un labāk definēt bibliotēkas misiju un uzdevumus.

Kvalitatīva krājuma komplektēšana ir katras bibliotēkas pamatpakalpojums, jo no tā atkarīgi citi bibliotēkas pakalpojumi. Tāpēc, izvērtējot un iegādājoties dokumentus, jāņem vērā bibliotēkzinātnes pieci likumi:

1. Grāmatas ir domātas lietošanai.
2. Katram lasītājam savu grāmatu!

3. Katrai grāmatai tās lasītāju!
4. Taupi lasītāju laiku!
5. Bibliotēka ir augošs organisms.

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Bibliotekāra ētikas vīzija

Baiba Sporāne
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Katrs cilvēks, t. sk. lasītājs (lietotājs, klients) un arī bibliotekārs, vēlas zināt, kā orientēties šodienā un ko viņam gatavo nākotne. Orientēšanās sabiedrības norisēs nav vien notiekošā interpretācija, tā ir paša indivīda zināšanu, prasmju, sajūtu, vēlmju izmaiņu specifiska pieredze. Sabiedrības norisēs reizēm grūti orientēties pat tiem, kam nav sveša konceptuāla sociālo procesu apjēgsme. Laiks ir relatīvs, domāšana subjektīva – vai iespējams rast objektīvu pasaules ainu un adekvātu pozīciju? Autore uzdrošinās apgalvot – jā, caur zināšanu un zināšanām, ko piedāvā cilvēces informacionālā atmiņa, kas eksistē bibliotēku sistēmās jeb bibliotekārajā telpā. Tādēļ izpētei pakļaujams gan bibliotekārs kā personība un viņa ētiskā bāze, gan bibliotēka kā sociāla un kultūras parādība jeb fenomens, tās vēsture, funkcijas, ietekmes sfēras, eksistences jēga un formas. Izpētes laukus var sadalīt četrās nosacījumu grupās:

- izcelsmes nosacījumi;
- eksistences nosacījumi;
- attīstības nosacījumi;
- funkcionēšanas nosacījumi.

IZCELSMES NOSACĪJUMI

Bibliotēka, līdzīgi valodai un rakstītprasmei, radās cilvēces vēstures pirmsākumos:

- zīmējumi uz alu sienām kā savdabīgi enciklopēdiju krājumi zināšanu nodošanai ciltsbrāļiem;
- Romas impērija, kurā pat pilsētībūvniecības normatīvajos nosacījumos līdzās valdības ēkām, veikaliem, pirtīm un izklaides namiem kā obligāts elements bija ietverta arī bibliotēka un kurā demokrātijas apstākļos bija paredzēta zināšanu izplatīšana;
- klosteri, kuru galvenā sastāvdaļa līdzās lūgšanu telpām bija bibliotēka, un tās galvenā funkcija – pārrakstīt un saglabāt krājumus nākamajām lasītāju paaudzēm.

Bibliotēka (latviski: grāmata + krātuve) – sākotnēji kā telpa grāmatu (tīstokļu, plāksnīšu) glabāšanai, vēlāk pats grāmatu krājums. Bibliotēku sistēmā, kas nemitīgi pārdzimst, pastāvīgi mainīgas ir bijušas telplaika dimensijas. Sākotnēji tā bija telpa ar **krātuves** kultūras iezīmēm – krāt, kolekcionēt, savākt ap sevi vērtības, sargāt. Krāšanas, kumulēšanas tieksme – kā tas bija Ašurbanipalam Asīrijā, Ptolemajam Ēģiptē, Mediči Itālijā, Jānim

Misiņam Latvijā. **Memoriālā** un **kumulatīvā** funkcija bija tās, ko sabiedrība vai atsevišķa personība piešķir bibliotēkai tās sākotnē. Mūsdienu apstākļos šīs funkcijas atvirzās tālākā plānā, kā pirmo izvirzot **komunikatīvo** funkciju, jo bibliotēka kļūst nepieciešama kā institūcija, kas kalpotu un nestu labumu viena, desmit, simts utt. personību vajadzībām pēc zināšanām, kalpotu kā starpnieks un zināšanu sakārtotājs un izplatītājs.

EKSISTENCES NOSACĪJUMI

Otrā izpētes lauka funkcija, kas ietver saprāta un uztveres diapazona izpratni, sociālās vides, sabiedrības un personības mijsakarības, bibliotekāra personības un **bibliotekāra ētikas** skaidrojumus.

Saprāts. Mūsu eksistence vai pasaules kārtība mums lēmusi būt saprātīgiem. Saprāts paplašina cilvēka aktivitātes amplitūdu gan pozitīvā, gan negatīvā aspektā. Bibliotēkas eksistences nosacījums vēstures pirmsākumos un šodien – tā ir cilvēka saprāta pozitīvā aspekta rezultāts jeb izpausmes forma, radot savai attīstībai nepieciešamos priekšnosacījumus un veidojot atmiņas krātuvi, un izmantojot resursu ārpus pašas atmiņas – bibliotēkā.

Uztveres diapazons. Katram dzīvo būtņu, arī personību, kopumam ir savs uztveres diapazons. Mēs aizņemam tādu pasaules nišu, kurai esam vispiemērotākie. Mūsu uztvere nosaka bibliotēkas parametrus: grāmatu veidolu, informācijas veidolu, strukturējumu, informācijas izguves kvalitāti, tehnisko aprikojumu, tehnoloģijas, telpisko struktūru utt., **lai mums būtu ērti bibliotēku uztvert un izmantot.**

Sociālā vide. Sabiedrība. Personība. Ciktāl šobrīd ir izpētīts, citas dzīvās būtnes nelieto otrās pakāpes zīmju sistēmu informācijas pārraidīšanai un saglabāšanai. To funkcionēšanas pamats ir iedzimtības ceļā iegūtā informācija, ko papildina un izmaina no vecākiem un ciltsbrāļiem iemācītā un pieredzē gūtā informācija. Informācijas pārraides un uztveres sistēmās mēs, protams, varam ieraudzīt kodētās zīmju sistēmas aizmetņus, taču tās ir tikai analogijas. Nedz putnu, nedz vilku bara pastāvēšanu neapdraud ilgmūžīgā materiālā fiksētu zīmju glabātuves, citiem vārdiem – bibliotēkas, trūkums. Ar cilvēku ir citādi. To, kas ir noticis pirms individuālā un kolektīvā (sabiedrības kultūras) saprāta ģenēzes, var vien rekonstruēt mītā. Katrā ziņā ir skaidrs, ka bez otrās pakāpes zīmju sistēmas (informācijas, kas nav pārmantojama iedzimtības ceļā) un tās pārraides–uztveres mehānisma (kurā ietilpst arī bibliotēka) cilvēka un sociāla eksistence nav iespējama.

Taču līdz ar informacionālās sistēmas attīstīšanos un sarežģīšanos rodas nepieciešamība pēc aizvien pastarpinātākiem tās saglabāšanas un pārraides paņēmieniem. Šīs funkcijas pilda bibliotēka un bibliotekārs kā tās eksistences pamats. Bibliotēku aizmetņus var vērot jau alu zīmējumos – tādā veidā pašas alas varētu saukt par savdabīgām pirmajām cilvēces atmiņas glabātuvēm.

Bibliotekāra personība un ētika. Viss, kas kalpo personībai (tās attīstībai, ne devalvācijai), ir ētikas joma un jāpēta kā ētikas izpausmju un materializācijas lauks.

Informācijas pieejamība, robežu nojaukšana starp laiku un telpu, ģeogrāfisko atrašanos un etnisko piederību paver plašas iespējas

- informācijas ieguvei,
- zināšanu uzkrāšanai.

Cilvēks sāk justies kā visvarena būtne izdevību pārpilnā pasaulē. Izmantojot izdevības istajā laikā un vietā, ir iespējams realizēt sevi un savas idejas. Šajā procesā bieži aizmirstas jēdzieni “labs” un “ļauns”, “atļauts” un “aizliegts”. Ētikas normas, kas par to atgādina un veido cilvēka dzīves morālo un tikumisko uztveri, ir vadlīnijas, kas noteikušas cilvēka rīcību gan Senajā Grieķijā, gan arī šobrīd – informācijas sabiedrības attīstības lielceļā. Aktuāli kļūst jautājumi, ko drīkst, ko nedrīkst, cik tālu drīkst iet un kur ir galējā robeža.

Ētikas normas gadu tūkstošus ir regulējušas sabiedrības uzvedību un noteikušas priekšstatus par to, kas ir labs un kas ļauns. Vai šīs normas darbojas arī informācijas sabiedrībā? Ētikas formulējums skan: ētika ir mācība par cilvēka izturēšanos un par cilvēka atbildību, kas pamatojas uz viņa iekšējo nostāju un principiem (ar piebildi: šie iekšējie principi ir jāizstrādā, tie automātiski neietilpst cilvēka principu kopumā). Aristoteļa laikā (384.–322. g. p. m. ē.) ētika tika piepulcēta filozofijas mācībām. Aristotelis ētiku iekļauj praktiskajā filozofijā – disciplinā, kuras centrā ir jēdziena “labs” noskaidrošana, “labā” un “ļauņa”, “atļauts” un “aizliegts” attiecību problēmas pētījumi un teorijas, kas to interpretē, kā arī tiecas pamatot labas rīcības principus un orientierus, jo ētika ietver sevī arī zināšanas par morāli un tikumību. Aristotelis no vārda *ethos* atvasina *ethicos* – ētisks, raksturs, tikums. Viņš ētiku iekļauj praktiskajā filozofijā, saistot to ar politiskiem, tiesiskiem un ekonomiskiem jautājumiem. Ētika kā praktiskā filozofija atbild uz jautājumiem, ko izvirzīja I. Kants. Kas es esmu? Ko es varu zināt? Kas man jādara? Ētika kā praktiska filozofijas nozare ir mācība par dzīves gudrību, par labākas dzīves un sadzīvošanas meklējumiem, cilvēka dzīves jēgu, dzīves ceļiem, orientācijas iespējām pasaulē. Tas ir saistīts ar konkrētu cilvēka dzīvi, noteiktu telpu un laiku, situāciju un izvēli, vērtībām, ideāliem. Ētika ir daļa no filozofiskās antropoloģijas, jo aplūko cilvēcisko un potenciālo cilvēkos, to attiecībās – kas varētu kļūt cilvēks, ja izmantotu savas iespējas vislabākajā, humanākajā veidā.

Terminus “ētika” un “morāle” bieži lieto kā sinonimus, lai gan ētika vairāk centrēta uz teorētisku jautājumu risināšanu, bet morāle – uz to realizēšanu dzīvē. Kā uzsver filozofs A. Rubenis, ētika ir mācība, kuras priekšmets ir morāle, bet morāle – likumu, normu un vērtību sistēma, kas nosaka, kāda rīcība tiek uzskatīta par pareizu noteiktā sabiedrībā, arī informācijas sabiedrībā.

Izšķir principu ētiku, nozaru lietišķo ētiku un dzīves mākslas ētiku. Pēc izziņas interesēm ētika dalās deskriptīvajā, normatīvajā (teoloģiskā, utilitārisma, egoistiskā, deontoloģiskā u.c.) un metaētikā.

Morālē kā ētikas praktiskās izpausmes veidā apvienojas trīs darbības – izziņa, vērtība un prakse. Cilvēki nepārtraukti aktualizē dažādas vajadzības, intereses un motīvus, tādēļ cilvēku regulācijas sistēmu raksturo ar normu, vērtējumu un darbības palīdzību. Morālo spriedumu mērķis ir vadīt praktisko dzīvi, cilvēka reālo darbību ikdienā. Vārda “morāle” lietojums mūsdienās bieži ir pretstats tā sākotnējai nozīmei, un tam ir negatīva pieskaņa – “moralizēšana”, “morāles sprediķis” u. tml. Morāla izturēšanās esot izturēšanās, kas tikai ārīgi pielāgota novecojušām sabiedrības normām. “Ētika” principā ir kaut kas labs, atbilstošs sabiedrības normām, turpretī vārds “morāle” šādā pretstatījumā ir ar negatīvu nokrāsu, tam ir pilsonības

aprobežotības un liekulības piegarša. Vērtējot šos abus vārdus pēc to īstās nozīmes, nav būtiskas atšķirības starp abiem jēdzieniem, un jo sevišķi nav pamata jēdziena “morāle” satura devalvācijai.

Pastāv valsts noteiktas normas – t. s. “tiesības”. Jēdzienu “etos” vai “morāle” lieto, kad apzīmē cilvēka rīcību, ko nosaka viņa iekšējās prasības. Turpretī “tiesības” rīcību nosaka no ārpuses. Tiesības tāpat apzīmē šaurāku jomu: visu, kas atbilst tiesību prasībām, prasa arī morāle. Priekšnosacījumi, lai kāda morāles norma sabiedrībā kļūtu par tiesību normu, ir šādi:

- morālei jābūt tādai, kuras principus izprot ikviens;
- jāregulē to, ko nepieciešams regulēt, lai cilvēku saskarsme būtu pietiekami sakārtota.

Ētika, morāle, tikumība – jēdzieni, ko bieži nešķir citu no cita un tikpat bieži lieto kā sinonīmus. Ētikas pamatjēdzieni vienlaikus ir arī vērtības: labais un ļaunais, pienākums, atbildība, gods, cieņa, dzīves jēga, taisnīgums, etiķete, sirdsapziņa, lojalitāte u.tml. Šie jautājumi skar visas profesionālās jomas, tai skaitā arī bibliotekārus un bibliotēkzinātni. Aizvien aktuālāks kļūst jautājums par morālo atbildību, kas jāizjūt bibliotekāram, veidojot sabiedrības garīgo potenciālu. Strādājot tik mainīgā vidē, kāda ir informacionālā vide, bibliotekāram šī atbildība ir ne tikai jāapzinās, bet arī jākontrolē.

Viens no bibliotekāra morālās stabilitātes apliecinājumiem, profesionālo ideālu atklāšanas un kopšanas veidiem ir savs profesionālās ētikas kodekss. Profesionālā ētika iekļaujas vispārpieņemtajā ētisko vērtību sistēmā un cenšas izstrādāt savas profesionālās jomas ētisko vērtību kritērijus un vērtību shēmu, kuru visbiežāk atspoguļo profesionālās ētikas kodeksos.

Nodrošināt pakalpojumus, izmantojot jaunāko tehnoloģiju sasniegumus, nav vairs nekas neparasts. Taču jāatzīst, ka ar to ir par maz, lai nodrošinātu ētisku attieksmi pret klientu, darba devēju, kolēģiem un nezaudētu morālo atbildību pret sabiedrību.

Bibliotekāram, kura uzdevums ir visu uzmanību veltīt cilvēkam, pēc iespējas labāk un pilnīgāk apmierinot viņa informacionālās vajadzības, nepieciešama stingra un pārliecinoša morālā stāja, kas garantē kvalitāti un rada uzticību. Tā ir nepieciešamība pēc profesionālās ētikas, kuras apzināšanās rezultāts ir ētikas kodekss. Šāds ētikas kodekss ir daudzām bibliotekāru profesionālajām organizācijām pasaulē, un kopš 2001. gada 21. novembra – arī Latvijas bibliotekārajai sabiedrībai¹.

Bibliotekāra darba būtiska problēma nav informācijas ieguves iespēja, bet gan attieksme pret to, pret pareizu un godīgu informācijas pieejamības un izvērtējuma nodrošinājumu. No vienas puses – informācija, kurai jābūt brīvi pieejamai jebkuram interesentam, nodrošinot personības informācijas brīvību un tiesības, bet no otras puses – bibliotekārs, kas ir atbildīgs sabiedrības priekšā par informācijas sniegšanu (vai nesniegšanu) un izmantošanu sabiedrības un cilvēces labā, nenodarot viņiem ļaunu. Bibliotekārs ik uz soļa savā darbā saskaras ar ētiskas dabas problēmām, ko viņam jārisina vienam pašam un nekavējoties. Bibliotekāram jāizšķiras par pareizu rīcību, nepārkāpjot lietotāja tiesības, un vienlaikus jārikojas saskaņā ar vispārējās un profesionālās ētikas normām. Bibliotekāra profesionālās ētikas normas

¹ Latvijas bibliotekāra profesionālās ētikas kodeksu skatīt pielikumā!

likumiski nereglementē, tikai atvieglo profesionālo darbību, bet šo normu trūkums vai neievērošana sarežģī bibliotekāra profesionālo izvēli, kad jārisina profesionāli ētiskas dabas jautājumi. Bibliotekāram, kas operē ar informāciju, iesaka, meklē, izvērtē un apkopo, ir jābūt stabilai morālai nostājai, jābūt izpratnei par ētiskām normām un vērtībām, lai, darbojoties informācijas telpā, nenodarītu ļaunu katram cilvēkam atsevišķi un visai sabiedrībai kopumā. Bibliotekāram kā vadlīnijas jāizmanto ētikas kategorijas un atziņas, kas materializētas ētikas kodeksa pantos un pamatjēdzienos. Ja mēs izprotam, ko nozīmē tas vai cits pamatjēdziens (piemēram, cieņa, dilemma, etiķete, gods, konfidencialitāte, lojalitāte utt.), tad mēs šo jēdzienu saturu varam lietot ikdienas darbībās un iekļaut domāšanas sistēmā.

Profesionālā ētika

1) no vienas puses (**priekšrocības**)

- izvirza konkrētās profesijas ideālus un atbildību,
- veido *de facto* iedarbības efektu, kas aizsargā gan lietotāju, gan bibliotekāru,
- uzlabo profesijas prestižu,
- motivē un paaugstina pašapziņu,
- formulē darba būtību,
- dod iespēju nosodīt neētisku rīcību;

2) no otras puses (**trūkumi**) jāapsver

- vai vispārnoteiktais profesionālais standarts ir obligāts vai tikai mērķis, uz ko tiekties,
- vai ētikas kodekss ir tikai vēlams – vai arī iespējams,
- vai ētikas normas ir universālas vai relatīvas.

Bibliotekāra profesionālajai ētikai ir sava specifika, ko nosaka bibliotekārā darba pamatbūtība: lietotājdraudzīgums, lojalitāte, vērtību sistēma un vērtības apziņa. Bibliotekāra uzdevumu informacionālajā apkalpošanā sarežģī vairāki faktori: *bibliotēku tipu daudzveidība* (kas gan ar digitalizāciju, elektronisko kopkatalogu sistēmu un virtuālo bibliotēku attīstību pamazām izzudīs); *bibliotekāra profesijas daudzo aspektu virzieni*, jo bibliotēka iekļaujas sabiedrības visdažādākajās darbības un nozaru sfērās. Tas nozīmē, ka bibliotekāram jābūt ne tikai stingrai nostājai un izpratnei par ētikas normām attiecībā uz savu profesiju, bet arī jāiekļaujas apkalpojamās sabiedrības daļas morāles normās – juridiskās, medicīnas, ekonomikas, finanšu, statistikas, diplomātiskās, valdības un dažādās speciālās nozaru jomās.

Mūsdienu sabiedrības sarežģītība padara tādus procesus kā informāciju un saskarsmi ļoti komplicētu. Informācija vienmēr ir bijusi saistīta ar morālajiem aspektiem:

- cik tā ir precīza;
- kurš to izplata;
- vai tā ir maksas;
- vai tā aizskar kāda autortiesības vai privātās tiesības.

Šie ir galvenie strīdu jautājumi, kuru risinājums ir atkarīgs no profesionāla ētiskās izglītības. Bibliotekāri, tāpat kā jebkurš cits, nav piedzimuši ar noteiktiem ētiskiem priekšstatiem, bet daudzi no viņiem saprot, ka labs profesionāls darbs lielā mērā ir balstīts uz ētikas pamatprincipiem.

Piemēram, būt ētiskam nozīmē

- nodrošināt skolas bibliotēku ar materiāliem par apkārtējo vidi, medikamentiem vai dzīvnieku tiesībām;
- publiskajā bibliotēkā nodrošināt apmeklētājus ar materiāliem par kristietību un citām ticībām.

Profesionālie standarti jeb ētika ļauj lasītājiem ticēt, ka viņu vēlnes un pieprasījumi tiks izpildīti profesionāli, konfidenciāli, netiks ļaunprātīgi izmantoti un ka viņi paši netiks dalīti sociālajās grupās un tipos atkarībā no maksātspējas, valodas prasmes, profesijas un citiem kritērijiem.

Šie ētiskie jautājumi, kas saistīti ar informācijas nozares profesionāļu darbu, sevišķi aktuāli kļuvuši pēdējos gados. Profesionālā ētika izvirza priekšplānā šādus jautājumus:

- kas ir pareizi,
- kas ir labi?

Lai atbildētu uz šiem jautājumiem, parasti tiek veidoti profesionālās ētikas kodeksi. Parasti ētikas kodeksos nosaka, kas ir “pareizs”, kādas ir vērtības, kuras nedrīkst aizskart vai neņemt vērā. Dažreiz rodas sarežģījumi, kad personīgā vērtību sistēma nesaskan ar institūcijas, kurā strādā, vai amata noteiktajiem ētikas kritērijiem. Piemēram, bibliotēkās tas ir saistīts ar cenzūru vai uzskatiem par to, kas ir minoritātes vai ko būtu ieteicams lasīt noteiktām lasītāju grupām un ko nē, kādu informāciju uzskatīt par konfidenciālu utt.

Ir izstrādātas vairākas pieejas bibliotekārajai un informācijas ētikai.

1. Daudzas situācijas un lēmumi informācijas darbā ir saistīti ar tā sauktajiem seku jautājumiem.
 - Kas notiks, ja es izplatišu informāciju, kas ir konfidenciāla?
 - Vai man ir jāmaina savas tiešsaistes sistēmas nodrošinātājs, ja ir iespēja izmantot citu uz izdevīgākiem noteikumiem, tādējādi nodrošinot plašāku pakalpojumu klāstu interesentiem?
2. Pieeja, kas balstīta uz pienākumiem un saistībām. Piemēram, ētikas pamatprincipus var balstīt uz viedokli, ka nekad nevajag melot vai ka vienmēr ir jāizpilda solījumi. Vārds “pienākums” ir visbiežāk lietotais vārds dažādos profesionālajos kodeksos. Kā piemēru var minēt ASV Bibliotēku asociāciju, kas izvirzījusi šādus pienākumus:
 - pildīt līgumsaistības;
 - nodrošināt pieeju informācijai;
 - nodrošināt informācijas konfidencialitāti.
3. Taisnīguma pieeja, kas balstīta uz sociālo sadarbību starp dažādiem sabiedrības locekļiem. Pamatā ir divas nostādnes:
 - tiesības uz informatīvo brīvību;
 - tiesības uz intelektuālo aizsardzību.


Ētiskums jeb būt ētiskam – ir dažādu procesu komplekss, kas attīstās atbilstoši sabiedrības attīstības līmenim. Būtiskākie informācijas ētikas jautājumi, kas informācijas sabiedrībā izvirzās informācijas telpā, ir šādi:

- Vai ētika ir tas, ko pauž reliģiskās vai juridiskās autoritātes? Vai tas ir sabiedrības viedoklis?

- Vai ir absolūtas patiesās vai nepatiesās vērtības? Vai tas viss ir relatīvs?
- Vai rezultāts attaisno rīcību?
- Vai bibliotekāram ir jāizpauž tas, ka kāds lasītājs izmanto bibliotēkas materiālus savā darbā, nedodot atsaucē uz avotiem?
- Vai bibliotekāram ir tiesības palīdzēt kredītiestādēm, sniedzot informāciju par iedzīvotājiem?
- Vai bibliotekāram ir tiesības komplektēt savos fondos grāmatas, kurās paustās idejas var būt bīstamas kādai lasītāju grupai?
- Vai informācijas iestādes pakalpojumu cenas drīkst būt augstas, ja tādējādi atsevišķiem interesentiem šīs iestādes piedāvātā informācija kļūst nepieejama finansiālu apsvērumu dēļ?

Profesionāliem informācijas nozares pārstāvjiem ir sava profesionālā atbildība. Viena no svarīgākajām atbildībām ir cenzūra – gan komplektējot literatūru, gan sniedzot informacionālos pakalpojumus. Cenzūra attiecas uz materiāliem, kuri ir nepieņemami vai var nodarīt kādu ļaunumu – taču kas to noteiks un kādi būs kritēriji? Ētiskie apsvērumi, kas ir saistīti ar cenzūru, ir daudz sarežģītāki, nekā tas liekas sākumā. Nav viegli pateikt, kāpēc konkrētā informācija jeb materiāls nav pieņemams. Te var pastāvēt gan juridiska, gan reliģiska un morāla, gan zinātniska rakstura aizspriedumi.

Daudzas izmaiņas bibliotēku un informācijas iestāžu ētiskajos principos ir radušās sakarā ar bibliotēkas statusa un nozīmes maiņu sabiedrībā vispār, ar sabiedrības attieksmi pret bibliotēkām un bibliotekāriem. Būtiska ir arī pašu bibliotekāru attieksme pret savu darbu, priekšstati par darba nozīmi nākotnē, ētiskās nostādnes. Lai bibliotēku un informācijas iestāžu attīstība neapstātos, bibliotekāram vajadzētu apvienot četrus raksturlielumus, kas ļautu katram strādāt pilnvērtīgi, nepārkāpjot ētiskos principus.



Cilvēka faktoram ir vislielākā nozīme. Bibliotēku nākotne informācijas sabiedrībā ir pilnā mērā atkarīga no tā, vai strādājošajiem šajā vidē ir priekšstats, motivācija un ētiska pārliecība, vai viņi spēj mainīt sabiedrības stereotipus, ko var panākt tikai ar pašapziņu, augstu motivāciju un vērtības apziņu, kas ir būtiska profesionālās ētikas daļa.

Bibliotēkas nākotnes attīstības priekšnoteikumi ir saistīti ar četrām attiecību grupām, kuru pamatā ir ētikas principu ievērošana:

- bibliotekārs – lietotājs (lasītājs, klients): profesionāla saskarsme; patiesības mirklis, kas veido bibliotēkas un bibliotekāra stereotipu sabiedrībā (diemžēl ne pozitīvā virzienā, jo bibliotekārs radījis un atražo priekšstatu par sevi kā kustu, nevarīgu un pelēku būtni); bibliotekāra–personības un bibliotekāra–profesionāla īpašības; tolerances principu ievērošana, nevis lasītāja klaja “audzināšana”;
- bibliotekārs – sabiedrība;
- bibliotekārs – darba devējs: lojalitāte, iekšējās sabiedriskās attiecības;
- bibliotekārs – kolēģi.

Ētikas kodekss visās iepriekš iztīrātajās jomās sakārto attiecības, priekšstatus, ļauj pilnveidoties un izprast vietu sabiedrībā.

Bibliotēkas **eksistences nosacījumi** nav saistīti tikai ar dažādām funkcijām, ar bibliotekāru kā personību un bibliotekāra profesionālo ētiku, bet arī ar **grāmatu**. Ar grāmatu nosacītā izteiksmē jeb fiksēto informāciju. Ja grāmatu vispārinoši var pieņemt par cilvēces kultūras atmiņas pamatvienību (sīkāk nedalot zīmju sistēmās) – sava veida kolektīvo smadzeņu atmiņas šūnu, tad bibliotēku var nosaukt par šādu pamatvienību kopumu, citiem vārdiem – kolektīvo smadzeņu daļu, kas atbild par atmiņu. Tātad *bibliotēka ir cilvēces radītā informācijas kosmosa jeb universa sastāvdaļa, kuras pamatuzdevums ir saglabāt un translēt informāciju, kas specifiski fiksēta ilgmūžīgā materiālā ar otrās pakāpes zīmju sistēmas palīdzību. Tādā veidā bibliotēku var aplūkot arī kā šīs zīmju sistēmas (grāmatas vai dokumenta) metasistēmu.*

Bibliotēka pati ir autonomas sakārtots kosmos, taču tas ir sakārtots tādā veidā, lai tajā ietvertais informācijas apjoms/resursi būtu pieejams un izmantojams lielā informācijas kosmosa (globālā tīmekļa) funkcionēšanai un personības vajadzībām. Tas nozīmē, ka līdzās pamatfunkcijai “**glabāšana**” svarīgas ir arī informācijas vākšanas (informācijas sabiedrībā arī “rasmošanas”²), apstrādes, sistematizācijas un izplatīšanas funkcijas. Taču ar funkcionālo aspektu vien nevar izprast fenomena būtību.

Jebkuram cilvēka darbības fenomenam ir **racionālā un iracionālā puse**. Cilvēka eksistence ir iekārtota racionāli, taču pats cilvēka pastāvēšanas fakts nav racionāli izskaidrojams. Tas, ka kaut kas vispār ir, neatbilst nekādiem ekonomijas nosacījumiem. Esamība kā tāda ir kaut kas ļoti neekonomisks. Tāpat ir arī ar bibliotēku. Ja mēs atbilstoši mūsdienu galējībām uzskatām bibliotēku vien par funkcionālu iestādi – par kaut ko līdzīgu ūdensbākei ar krānu, tad mums uz sevi jālūkojas tāpat. Jānosauc sevi par dzīvniekiem, kas slimi ar domāšanu jeb domām. Tas, kas padara cilvēku par cilvēku, nāk no pārcilvēciskās (dievišķās) sfēras. Saskaņā ar mītiem rakstu zīmes sākotnēji bija saistītas arī ar sakrālo sfēru. Arī bibliotēkas pirmsākumos bija sakrālo institūciju sastāvdaļa. Nav jāatgādina, cik lielu lomu viduslaikos spēlēja klostera bibliotēka. Tātad bibliotēka ir nesaraujami saistīta arī ar kultūras sfēru – sfēru, kura, pati būdama racionālu metožu, sabiedrības

² Rasmošana – no angļu val. *harvesting*, vērtīgo interneta materiālu izguve un glabāšana lietošanai bibliotēkas serveros.

iekārtojuma pamats (radīt mājas, normēt, standartizēt un – iracionāli noārdīt), ir racionāla.

ATTĪSTĪBAS NOSACĪJUMI

Noslēgtā bibliotēkas telpa laika pārmaiņās pārkāpj slēgtās telpas robežas, iziet ārpus sevi ierobežojošās platības. Ir sācies bibliotēkas atklātības un attīstības ceļš, kura mērķis – komunikācija starp personību un zināšanām laikā un telpā, **lietotājoorientācija, lietotājdraudzīgums, labuma nodrošināšana sabiedrībai un personībai.**

Bibliotēku attīstību nosaka *gan* objektīvie sociālie procesi (informācijas sabiedrības attīstība, informatizācija, digitalizācija un to ietekme uz dzīves stilu, domāšanas stilu dažādību, patērētājsabiedrības izveidošanās, mūzizglītība), *gan* pašu bibliotēku attīstība, kuru jauno tehnoloģiju un sistēmu attīstība padarīja par būtisku sabiedrības stūrakmeni, par **sakārtotu zināšanu bāzi** (informācijas “cunami” savaldīšanas funkcija). Pieaugusi bibliotēkas krājumu daudzveidība. Līdztekus tradicionālajiem izdevumiem (kuru sākotne ir rokraksti un citi senie fiksēšanas veidi un formas) – grāmatām, periodikai – ienākušas kasetes, diski, audio, video, elektroniskie dokumenti, datu bāzes, globālie katalogi u. tml., veidojas radniecīgu institūciju integrētās sistēmas: muzeji, arhīvi, bibliotēkas. Rodas **virtuālā telpa un virtuālā bibliotēka**. Informācija tūlīt un tagad, jebkurā daudzumā un vietā, apsteidzot pieprasījumu. Ātrums, ērtums, relevanta informācija.

FUNKCIONĒŠANAS NOSACĪJUMI

Tā kā bibliotēka ir sistēma, kas darbojas, attīstības izpratnei jāpēta bibliotēkas **funkcijas**. Jāievēro, ka problēma allaž paliks atklāta, jo bibliotēkas funkcijas pakāpeniski mainās, transformējas, un kārtējais sabiedrības attīstības loks radīs kārtējo diskusiju par bibliotēkas ilgtspēju un vietu sabiedrībā.

Funkcijas var apzīmēt gan darbības veidus, gan lomas, uzdevumus – iekšējās, sistēmveidojošās un ārējās funkcijas. Lai izprastu bibliotēku funkcijas un misiju, būtiski aplūkot iekšsistēmiskās funkcijas, ko varam apzīmēt arī vienkārši ar vārdu **funkcijas**. Ārējās funkcijas parasti sauc par *sociālajām*, bet lomas apzīmējošās – par *sabiedrisko uzdevumu*.

Bibliotēkas sabiedriskais uzdevums jeb **misija** ir saglabāt un nodot esošajai un nākamajām paaudzēm sociālo (t. i., personības radīto) informāciju, kas fiksēta materiālajos nesējos. Tādējādi bibliotēkas misija ir *būt par cilvēces informacionālo atmiņu*, vākt un glabāt informāciju jeb pildīt **memoriālo** funkciju. Tā laika gaitā nav izzudusi (daļēji savulaik tika nodota arhīvam un muzejam), bet kļuvusi par palīgfunkciju, dodot vietu iekšsistēmiskajai funkcijai – **dokumentu izmantošanas organizācijas funkcijai**, kas savukārt noteica ārējo sociālo funkciju – **nodrošināt informācijas pieejamību**. Tieši pieejamība lietotāju vidē tiek uztverta kā bibliotēkas dominējošā funkcija.

Patlaban atkal notiek bibliotēkas dominējošās funkcijas maiņa. Pirmajā vietā izvirzās **informācijas analīzes funkcija** – satura sapratnes un formalizēšanas, un sakārtošanas funkcija izmantošanai sistēmā personība–bibliotēka–dokuments. Informācijas analīzes funkcija nav radusies pēkšņi

šodien, tās aizsākumi veidojās jau bibliotēkas sākotnē, kad dokumentu sakārtošanas nolūkā tika veikta to satura analīze un veidotas dažādas klasifikācijas jeb zināšanu sakārtošanas sistēmas. Sistēmiskums – faktors, kura dēļ bibliotēka nav pārvērtusies par noliktavu, pilnu ar lietošanai nepieejamām zināšanām. Informācijas sakārtotība – visbūtiskākais priekšnoteikums tās izgvei. Šodienas apstākļos šī funkcija attīstās un kā galveno iezīmi uzrāda nevis pašu dokumentu, bet dokumentu satura sistematizāciju. Nākotnes bibliotēkas galveno funkciju nosaka viens kritērijs – tās sabiedriskais uzdevums, kas paliek nemainīgs neatkarīgi no mainīgajām tehnoloģijām un bibliotēku fiziskās eksistences nosacījumiem. Šis kritērijs, misija un funkcija ir **cilvēces informacionālās atmiņas esamības un izmantošanas nodrošināšana**, ko spēj veikt tikai bibliotekārs ar skaidru vērtību sistēmu un stingru ētisko stāju, ko viņam palīdz nodrošināt profesionālās ētikas kodeksa izpratne un akcepts.

“Šeit ir sasniegta robežlīnija, no kuras sākas bibliotēkas jaunā misija – nodarboties ar grāmatu nevis kā ar materiālu objektu, bet kā ar dzīves funkciju.” (Ortega I Gaset. Bibliotekāra misija.)

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Pielikums

BIBLIOTEKĀRA PROFESIONĀLĀS ĒTIKAS KODEKSS

Kodeksa mērķis ir apliecināt bibliotekāra profesijas ideālus, principus un pamatnostādnes demokrātiskas un cilvēktiesību ievērošanā balstītas sabiedrības attīstībā.

Ar šo kodeksu Latvijas bibliotekārs izsaka gatavību nodrošināt katras personības tiesību respektēšanu, intelektuālās brīvības aizsargāšanu, cilvēces atmiņas fonda saglabāšanu, informācijas brīvības nodrošināšanu personības un sabiedrības pozitīvai attīstībai.

Ētikas kodekss ietver visiem bibliotekāra profesijas pārstāvjiem ieteicamos standartus. Kodeksu iespējams izmantot ētiska rakstura problēmu apspriešanai un konkrētu risinājumu meklējumiem Latvijas bibliotekārajā sabiedrībā.

1. Bibliotekārs izturas ar cieņu pret savu profesiju un apzinās tās vērtību un nepieciešamību sabiedrības attīstības procesā.
2. Bibliotekārs ar savu profesionālo darbību un izturēšanos veicina profesijas attīstību un paaugstina profesijas prestižu sabiedrībā.
3. Bibliotekārs izrāda lojalitāti un uzticību bibliotēkai, tās politikai un darbības principiem.
4. Bibliotekārs neizmanto viņam pieejamos informācijas avotus un tehniskos resursus savtīgiem nolūkiem.
5. Bibliotekārs atbalsta un aktīvi darbojas profesionālajās organizācijās un asociācijās.
6. Bibliotekārs piedalās profesionālā darba pilnveidošanā, kas orientēts uz profesionālo izaugsmi.
7. Bibliotekārs rūpējas par tādu personisko kvalitāšu izkopšanu, kas sekmē viņa personības attīstību un profesionālo darbību.
8. Bibliotekārs darbā ievēro vispārpieņemtās ētiskās un estētiskās normas.
9. Bibliotekārs glabā bibliotēkā esošos informācijas resursus un veicina to aktīvu izmantošanu.
10. Bibliotekārs garantē informācijas izguvi un nodošanu, to racionāli organizējot, darbojoties objektīvi un profesionāli.
11. Bibliotekārs izvēlas un piedāvā informāciju bez informācijas avotu cenzūras, bez reliģisku, politisku, dzimuma, sociālu, seksuālās orientācijas, rasu piederības diskriminācijas, ievērojot bibliotēkas misiju, mērķus, uzdevumus un informācijas komplektēšanas politiku.
12. Bibliotekārs atbalsta un veicina vārda, informācijas izplatīšanas un saņemšanas brīvību.

13. Bibliotekārs nodrošina augsta līmeņa pakalpojumus, sniedzot lietotāja vajadzībām atbilstošu un objektīvu atbildi uz katru lietotāja jautājumu, izturoties ar cieņu pret bibliotēkas lietotāja pieprasījumu.
14. Bibliotekārs nodrošina konfidencialitāti, kas attiecas uz personiska rakstura ziņām, kuras sniedz lietotājs, kā arī attiecībā uz lietotāja izmantotajiem informācijas avotiem.
15. Bibliotekārs izturas ar cieņu pret saviem kolēģiem un viņu darbu, aizstāv viņu intereses, ja tās nav pretrunā ar profesionālās ētikas normām.
16. Bibliotekārs dalās ar kolēģiem pieredzē un zināšanās, veicinot profesionālo attīstību.
17. Bibliotekārs respektē intelektuālā īpašuma tiesības.

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