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Identitātes maiņa, pārklāšanās un mijiedarbība

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Political Science

Changing, Overlapping and Interacting Identities

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

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Preface and Acknowledgements

Juris Rozenvalds

This collection of essays explores different aspects of the complex problem of identity, placing special emphasis on ethnic and political identity. The idea for the book arose out of the Department of Political Science at the University of Latvia and was closely connected with intense debate in society in Latvia concerning EU accession. Latvia was among those candidate states with the highest percent of eurosceptics. One of the main sources of the euroscepticism in Latvia was fear that the specific identity of Latvia and Latvians will be endangered within the European Union. As the referendum on EU accession in September, 2003 showed, there were also substantial differences between Latvian and Russian-speaking citizens of Latvia with respect to "yes" or "no" voting. In order to discuss relations between different types of identity as well as to compare the experience of the Baltic states and other "old" and "new" members of the European Union, as international conference Changing and Overlapping Identities: Latvia Facing EU Enlargement took place on September 17–18, 2004 at the University of Latvia with participation of scholars from Latvia, the United States, Estonia, Lithuania,Germany, Finland, Russia, and Ukraine. This collection of essays includes most of the papers presented within the conference, as well as discussion on David Laitin's book Identity in Formation: Russian-Speaking Polulations in the Near Abroad (Cornell University Press, 1998.), which concluded the conference.

Organizers of the conference are very grateful to the Representation of the European Commission in Latvia for awarding us a PHARE grant which made possible organization of the conference as well as publication of this book. At a time authors of the book are fully responsible for its content and ideas expressed in this book can not be viewed as position of the European Union. Gratitude has to be expressed to the U.S. Embassy in Latvia for financial support which made possible the simultaneous translation of all the papers from Latvian to English and the reverse. Organizers of the conference appreciated successful cooperation with the Secretariat of Minister for Special Assignments for Society Integration Affairs and Minister Nils Muižnieks personal participation in the conference. Last but not least it has to be pointed out that organization of the conference as well as publication of this volume would not be possible without substantial support from the prorector for scientific work of the University of Latvia Professor Indriķis Muižnieks as well as the administration of the Faculty of Social Sciences.

Opening Address by Nils Muižnieks, Special Assignments Minister for Social Integration

The topic of this conference – identity – has always been of great interest in Latvia. How are we changing? How will changes in our identities affect our ability to coexist with each other? What can the government do to influence changes in a positive direction? Research and conferences like these can help answer these questions.

My office, the Secretariat of the Special Assignments Minister for Social Integration, has tried to maintain close relations with researchers and base our work on research. The National Programme for the Integration of Society was based on a large survey, and my office has conducted various initiatives only after serious research. Prominent examples include our direct mail campaign aimed at the parents of non-citizen children, the new National Programme for the Promotion of Tolerance, our recommendations for priority funding to the Social Integration Foundation, and more.

Many of the speakers at this conference will address the very intriguing issue of the identity of Russians or Russian-speakers in Latvia in comparative perspective. Since the international environment affects our identities, we will also explore the potential impact of the ongoing enlargement of the European Union on our identities. How is European Union membership changing the way we look at ourselves and others? What will it mean to have the Bulgarians, Romanians, Croats and maybe even the Turks in the European Union?

Our foreign guests have arrived in Latvia in the wake of the most sustained mobilisation of Russians, particularly Russian youth, that we have seen in the last 10 years. We have also just witnessed the creation of a new organisation, the United Congress of Russian Communities in Latvia (OKROK) with pretensions of uniting a significant number of Latvia's Russians. The question arises: what is the relative strength of ethnic versus linguistic identities in Latvia? Is what unites Russians more powerful than their many differences?

I have always argued that Russians are diverse. Their group boundaries are not rigid about 40% enter mixed marriages with Latvians and others. They are not homogeneous in their religious affiliation and observance – about 70% are Orthodox, 15% are Old Believers, and 7% are Catholic. Virtually all have Russian as their native language, but their level of linguistic integration is highly dependent on age and region. According to the 2000 census, about 53% speak Latvian. According to surveys, about 4% speak no Latvian at all and 43% speak it at a basic level. Household budget surveys suggest that economic inequality is more pronounced among Russians than among Latvians. Until now, Russians have not been very well organised on the social or political level – slightly more than one half are citizens, slightly less than one half are not, and a small number have citizenship of Russia. Latvia has more than

40 non-governmental organizations and several parties claiming to represent the interests of Russians. Is the mobilisation surrounding education reform and the formation of a new would-be umbrella organization a sign that this is changing?

A related but distinct question is: are Russians more similar to Latvians or to Russians in Russia in terms of their values? My former assistant, Olga Pisarenko, just finished an interesting master's thesis in sociology on this topic. She reworked data from the European values study, the Baltic and Russia Barometers and the ISSP. She found that in the realm of family values, gender roles, attitudes towards God, work and many aspects of politics, Latvia's Russians are closer to Latvians in Latvia than to Russians in Russia. However, much of the data is several years old and some values probably changed over the last several years.

Latvia and the Baltics are a big social science laboratory – there are few countries to have tread such an interesting integration path so quickly, there is a significant amount of data available, as well as a growing pool of local expertise on identities, ethnicity, and ethnopolitics. From my perspective, a key question is the extent to which identity change is subject to policy intervention. How can we best promote a sense of belonging to a democratic, European Latvia?

I am very pleased to have such distinguished foreign guests and friends participating, in particular Professor David Laitin. I am told that his book Identity in Formation is the point of departure for many doctoral dissertations in the United States. At one point, I was solicited to do a review and read the book very carefully – it is a frustrating, fascinating mix of methodologies, it has a controversial definition of assimilation, and there is little discussion of the international context (EU membership, Russia's policy) on identities. But it is very stimulating and has not received the attention it deserves in Latvia. I am gratified that this conference features Professor Laitin and a discussion of his work. I wish you all a successful conference.

I

Ethnic and national identities

The De-Cosmopolitanization of the Russian Diaspora: A View from Brooklyn in the "Far Abroad" *

Krievu diasporas dekosmopolitizācija: skats no Bruklinas uz "tālajām ārzemēm"

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This paper builds on the author's findings in Identity in Formation (Cornell, 1998) where he examined the integration of Russians into the new states of the near abroad. It examines the Russian diaspora in Brighton Beach, New York, to investigate how the context of the receiving country conditions the Russian diaspora's political identities. Based on family interviews conducted in Spring 2004, the paper first provides a "modal life history" of the current waves of Russian-speaking migrants from the former Soviet Union. It then discusses why "Russian-speaking population," a new identity category shaped in the near abroad, has not become the focal or primary identity in the New York area. Third, the paper discusses the solid emergence of a Jewish-American identity for those who were identified as Jews on the 5th line of their Soviet passports. Fourth, the paper relates these findings to the author's theoretical approach to identity choice, and the "tipping" model. Finally, implications for Latvia's policy regarding its Russian-speaking populations are drawn.

Key words: Russian diaspora, Russian Jews, Latvia, Brighton Beach.

This paper was originally prepared for the conference on "Changing and Overlapping Identities: Latvia facing EU Enlargement". I was invited to speak at this conference because my book *Identity in Formation: The Russian-speaking Populations in the Near Abroad*[1], based on field research in 1993-94, identified the emergence in the republics of Russia's "near abroad" a new identity category with political implications: viz. *russkoiazychnoe naselenie* – a category that combined Russians, Belarusans, Ukrainians and Jews who faced the common cataclysm of linguistic minority-status in light of the 1988-89 language laws. This emergent identity category was specific to the conditions of late- and post-Soviet nationalism, and the new political opportunities available to titular nationalities.

My results pointed both to the common cataclysm that affected Russian-speakers in all republics but pointed out as well the significant differences among Russian integration strategies in four of the fourteen newly independent republics. From the data collected for this project, I speculated that there would be an assimilationist dynamic among Russian-speakers in the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia. This would be different from Ukraine, where I speculated there would be a Belgium-like modus vivendi between Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking zones; and different again from Kazakhstan where I speculated that there would be a long-term emigration dynamic in which Russian-speakers would leave the republic of their birth and move either to the West or to a country that was more welcoming to Russian-speakers.

* Thanks to Anna Gurfinkel for her research assistance.

The book was premised on a conjecture that "Russians" would not have fixed cultural propensities to resist integration into the republics onto which they had been "beached" (after the Soviet collapse). Rather, I assumed, the social, cultural, economic and political context of their resident republics would influence how Russians integrated into their republics of residence.

The book theorized that Russians would condition their behavior on three external factors when they considered integration: the economic returns, the gain or loss in in-group status, and the gain or loss in out-group (i.e. titular) acceptance. While conditioning their behavior on these factors, Russians would seek to coordinate with other Russians in their republic, and that these coordination dynamics, when examined on the micro level, could trigger cultural cascades or "tips". In the long term, I argued, there would be a cultural cascade in Estonia and Latvia by Russian-speakers to becoming (culturally) Estonians and Latvians.

To develop the theme of the political context of Russian integration – and thereby to further discredit the notion that Russians or Russian-speakers have a cultural proclivity that makes them resistant to integration – I sought to learn how Russians handled assimilation pressures while living in the "far abroad". I therefore conducted field research on Russian migrants (coming from the late Gorbachev period and thereafter) in Brighton Beach, Brooklyn, New York, USA, with an implicit comparison with Russians who migrated to Israel, also from the late Gorbachev period till the present day. Although I have relied on some secondary sources and newspaper archives, my data are principally interviews in New York that I collected in Spring 2004. These interviews elicited twenty-five distinct family histories.

The preliminary findings – reported herein – are surprising yet supportive of my conjecture. The (mostly Jewish) Russians who left Russia in the last quarter century had a choice when they reached Vienna to emigrate to Israel or to wait longer, but eventually reach (through Italy) the US. Presumably, those who chose the US were more secular, and less imbued with religious ideals than those who went to Israel. However – to exaggerate the difference for purposes of setting up the implicit comparison -- the Russians in Brighton have principally identified themselves as "Jews"; while the Russians in Israel have principally identified themselves as "Russians". As I had argued, there is no single Russian route to integration in all societies; indeed, the focal point of their identity choice is not predictable ex ante, and is highly contingent on (often unexpected) local factors. Only after a period of uncertainty can a single identity choice show itself to be preeminent and serve as a focal point for new immigrants.

My question for this paper remains the same as it was in Identity in Formation: How has the context of minority status conditioned the Russian diaspora's political identities? To answer this question, I will first provide a "modal life history" of the current waves of Russian-speaking migrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU). I will then discuss why "Russian-speaking population" has not become the focal or primary identity in the New York area. Third, I will discuss the solid emergence of a Jewish-American identity for those who were identified as Jews on the 5th line of their Soviet passports. Fourth, I will relate these findings to my theoretical approach to identity choice, and the "tipping" model. Finally, I will relate the findings to issues today facing Latvia.

I. A Modal Life History of the Third and Fourth Waves of Immigrants from What is today the FSU to the USA

For the elder generation of immigrants, the trip to the US was a second migration from their homelands in the pale of settlement. Many of the respondents report in their family histories an emigration from their hometowns to the Urals and Kazakhstan in response to the German invasion in World War II. Here is but one such story:

"In 1941, I finished ten years of school, in which the medium of instruction was Ukrainian, graduating the day of the occupation. The Germans bombed the bridge on the Dnieper, and we built a temporary bridge, and we were evacuated, and waited at an open railroad platform, with the sick and elderly, and for protection, they put us in carriages.

There were four in our family while everyone was evacuated to Kazakhstan, my mother, my brother and my sister (my father was on the front).

My father's sister lived in Orsk, in the southern Urals near Chilabinsk, on the border with Kazakhstan. My family sought her out in Orsk. We had no news of her, no links, but decided to find her. We arrived at Orsk, and couldn't find a trolley or bus, so walked to the town. Our relative was married to a railroad worker, who directed us to her home, and we all moved in with her family, eight people, lived together. There was a flood that fall, announced on the radio, as Orsk was in a gorge, and we all sat on their houses above the flood level. But eight people in a small wooden house was too much.

In the Urals, I worked for the Ministry of Black Metallurgy, demolishing the factories from the west, and reconstructing them in the Urals, and storing engines and such for re-use after the war. All the equipment was listed, and I made these lists, and sent them to Moscow. In this way, they could send spare parts to factories operating all over Russia during the war. We lived in tents doing that work, twenty people to a tent.

My boss went to Moscow, and then the workers began applying to return to their home areas, but needed permission. My boss was head of the komsomol, and said it was too dangerous to return, and everything was destroyed. I applied twice and was denied permission, as they were afraid that there would be no one to do the work there. [DL: I asked if it were because she was Jewish. She laughed and said *"no one cared about those things then. We were 80% Ukrainian there and 20% Jewish, but no one there knew who was who and we all spoke Ukrainian. It was after the war that religion mattered."*]. *I then joined the communist party. My boss then advised me to "just go" and not to worry about permission or paperwork. I returned to Ukraine in October 1943, a month in journey.*

With my mother and little sister, we went to our old apartment that was watched over by a friend who stayed in Ukraine. My brother died in the Urals. My father went from Poland to the Japanese front and then returned to Ukraine. My boyfriend died in Stalingrad" [Interview 9].

If anti-Semitism was absent in the internal refugee camps in Kazakhstan and the Urals, the Russian Jewish immigrants whom I interviewed are very emphatic that anti-Semitism became a serious problem in the FSU. In a survey of these immigrants, 85% of the respondents point to this anti-Semitism in the FSU as serious.[2]

But it began for many of them after the war. As one interviewee explains:

"There was no anti-Semitic discrimination in the army; that came later. Everyone was treated equally in the army; no one had time then to find out what nationality you were. In January 1944, I was taken as a war prisoner. I hid from the Germans

that I was Jewish [he had money from an Islamic country on him, and convinced the Germans he was a Muslim] *and that is how I survived. We were taken to Rumania, and then to Russia, as POWs...But upon arriving home, I was questioned by SMERSH for four days, first by lower officials and then to a regional center, where they wanted to know how I was alive, what I was doing in Europe during the war. They thought I must be an anti-Soviet spy"* [Interview 13].

As a complement to the interview concerning Orsk, where the arduous work in factory rebuilding was described, in an article "13 Years Later" published in the Russian-language New York newspaper Novoe Russkoe Slovo n.d. there is a personal memoir of *rufusnik* times: "Nothing will erase the memories of my childhood, from which I remember bitter anti-Semitic remarks that 'they' only like to visit doctors, and Russians have to work for them, and during the war 'they' all went to Tashkent, and Russians had to fight for them..."

Interviewees reported the feeling of anti-Semitism as part and parcel of everyday life.

"In Russia, very little children hate Jews, I don't know why. I told my children that they must study in school, better than everybody, because your grade will be lowered. When I tried to pass examination to Leningrad University, it was difficult, because the special tribunal put two hours more questions to me than was required, only for me personally, and the head of the tribunal said, 'unfortunately, I haven't found the question that you don't know the answer' and they had to give me a '5'. And of my friends, even with high grades, due to the special situation for Jews, it was hard to get jobs" [Interview 2].

This led to real fear for their security, as explained by another interviewee:

"I did not leave Kiev for financial reasons. I was doing well there. In Kiev, I was living across from Central Stadium, at the Central Square. During perestroika, many mass meetings took place there. I heard a lot of promises that the Jewish people would be killed (and many anti-Russian speeches as well). I became afraid, as many friends compared Ukraine then to Germany in 1932, and we heard the same messages coming from Krimenchug, from Kharkiv and elsewhere in Ukraine. My friends started leaving, and I decided to follow, in large part out of curiosity, like jumping out of a parachute. (I was wrong about the future, but those were still scary times, with the waning of Soviet power. But as independent Ukraine, with the collapse of the USSR, there is no longer a cultural life, due to lack of money. The Soviet Union was good to me. I was from a poor family, yet I got educated and went to a technical institute)" [Interview 8].

In Novoe Russkoe Slovo, Odessa-born Iakova Smirnov, who came to the US in 1977, at age twenty-six, tells the following joke summarizing the feeling Jews had in Soviet times: There is a long line in a grocery store for sausage. Due to shortages in supply, the manager tells all Jews to leave. Three hours later he tells all non-communists to go home. Three hours later he says all is gone, and everyone else must return home. One of the remaining communists complains, "the Jews have all the luck again." Today his Odessa-style humor is appreciated in NY, as it is simple and intellectual at the same time.

Survey research by Samuel Kliger captures a genuine irony about this firm consensus about anti-Semitism: Although the 1970s wave of emigrants from the Soviet Union faced real discrimination, the wave that has gone through the post-Soviet period faced even stronger feelings of anti-Semitism. In 1991, more than

50% of polled Soviet citizens wanted Jews to leave the country. An irony of all these feelings is that "Those Jews who now live in Moscow (including 'half-Jews') comprise a significant part of the new Russian elite…their weight in Russian politics and business is much more significant than in any other Christian country…"[3]. Thus, according to Kliger, it was *perceived* discrimination, not the actual fact of doing worse than others in the Soviet Union, that conditioned Jewish restlessness.

Restlessness along with a new political opportunity to emigrate based upon a series of agreements signed with American administrations, led to visa applications for emigration to Israel. But these applications were in the early years taken as signs of disloyalty to the Soviet state with grave consequences for the applicants once their applications were refused (and thus they lived as *refusniki*. For example, *"Upon application for a visa, I immediately lost my position in the Russian Academy of Sciences. I survived by writing dissertations for Central Asian graduate students who paid me because there is no way their abilities in writing Russian would allow them to get advanced degrees"* [Interview 25].

Refusniki created new life-styles living in the Soviet Union. They created "Jewish" circles, where beforehand they were largely secular. *"As refusniki, we tried to celebrate Jewish holidays, but it was pretty dangerous. We tried to learn Hebrew and the Jewish religion, because the Russian government oppressed it. Each time we changed place for our group studying Hebrew, for fear that the police would suppress us"* [Interview 2]. They used their savings to learn English. As one refusnik reported, *"We studied English for many years before coming. The instruction of course was very mediocre. While we were waiting for an invitation, we started taking private lessons, contracting a very successful English teacher from Leningrad, who had tutored generations of immigrants. I had connections with teachers in the US who would send me teaching materials. We studied for a year with her. We didn't study any Hebrew. We knew all along that we were going to NY."* Yet to get to the US, they first had to receive an invitation from Israel. To get invited to Israel, potential migrants had to procure an invitation from Israel, from an Israeli, saying that they are relatives seeking to join their families. In ninety percent of the cases [a guess from interview 22], it was a false connection, but Soviet authorities did not pay attention, as all knew it was a fraudulent document. *"We received such an invitation from 'cousins', and we brought it to the Special Department of the KGB, and filled out detailed forms, and we had to specify the family connections with our invitees. We were then known as potential immigrants, but our jobs were in jeopardy immediately upon receiving the invitation… My husband was a research physicist, and he was fired. First, he was denied permission to consult secret data archives. Then a British scientist came to his lab to consult with him; we invited him to our house, with members of the lab. This was forbidden without KGB approval, and this was used as the pretext for firing him…I was then teaching Latin, French and History at a vocational school for nurses, and I too was fired… After my husband was fired, we filed our documents. There were dramatic consequences of this application. My husband's father has access to highly secret strategic military documents, and was a long-term member of the communist party, going back to his youth. Being an honest man, after we applied, he went to the head of his department to inform him, even though he had no intention of emigrating, and did not share our views on the future, but as a grandfather he 'understood'. The next day he was sent into retirement, even though he was the leader of a major project."*

In the mid-1980's, the fourth and final Soviet wave of Russian-Jewish emigration began. Under deals with Secretary Gorbachev, the gates were open to Jews wanting to go to Israel to rejoin families – those who created such fictions got visas. And Gorbachev got wheat! In 1989, the US Congress designated Soviet Jews as a category eligible for admission to the US as refugees if they could demonstrate a credible fear of persecution if they remained in the USSR[4].

From Moscow, those who received visas went to Vienna to be processed to go to Israel. In Vienna, those wanting to emigrate to the US got support from HIAS (Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society), to travel to Rome (where HIAS was headquartered) and to apply for *refugee* status in the US. As one interviewee explained:
"We went first to Austria, paid for by HIAS. We had already made plans that we were going to NY, because two years earlier our best friends emigrated, and we decided to join them in NY... We went from Vienna to Rome. Everything was well-organized. We stayed for two weeks in the vicinity of Rome (in a lovely town Monticello), in August. (Rome was the home of HIAS, on Regina Margarita street). Once you received your package of money from HIAS, you had to find and rent an apartment, which was paid for by HIAS, and we found one in a lovely city near Rome. My son was knowledgeable about Roman history, and he knew everything by heart, and loved touring Rome... Everyone was seeking to extend their Italian vacation complementary of HIAS" [Interview 22]

The migrants traveled in three-generation modules, although in most cases the grandparents were reluctant taggers-on. *"I came to the US because of this daughter. I didn't want to go, because I had this work in the Ukraine, and I was a member of the Union of Lawyers in the USSR, which gave me status. But here I can't work as a lawyer not until my language is good. This language thing is a very big problem for me"* [Interview 4].
Another case is similar: *"I was a military officer, a colonel, and served for 29 years, a veteran of WWII. I finished my military service in Tashkent. There was big anti-Semitism there. My children did not want to live there, and came here. So what should I do, I came with them"* [Interview 10]. Or again: *"I had a "mother's heart" to be near my younger son. The older son* [DL: who also did not want to emigrate] *came with us to keep the family united"* [Interview 19].

These integrated family units made rapid economic and linguistic progress in the US. As reported on the web-site of the International Union 'United Russia' ["Russian immigrants in America. Statistical and social portrait." V. Supian, from the US and Canada Institute], in 1990, the average income of the Russian household was $32,500, about average for the country. "The adaptation process is quick and relatively painless for most of them—two thirds find work during the first year in this country."

This is no surprise. Not only did self-supporting family units come together. But in terms of human capital, these immigrants were amongst the highest ever to enter the US. In one survey, 60% of the interviewed Russian Jewish immigrants (RJIs) had five or more years of higher education, in contrast to 35% of American Jews (as surveyed by the 1998 Annual Survey of American Jewish Opinion)[5]. The parents of the mid-generation migrants were also very highly educated: 84% had at least one parent with a college degree; 61% had both parents with college degrees[6]. A different study, this by the National Foundation of American Politics, shows that children of recent immigrants excel. They had the best results in math and science, and children of those who have H1B visas (granted to those

with Ph.D.'s) – 100,000 coming annually – had eighteen of forty finalists in the contest "scientific talents". Second place in 2004 went to Boris Alexeev, whose father arrived from Russia with a H1B visa. And at the International Physics Olympiad held in South Korea in 2004, the American team consisted of two recent immigrants, among them the only female participant Elena Ydovina, whose father has a H1B visa (as reported in Novoe Russkoe Slovo July 26, 2004 "The Country where talents blossom").

The Russian-speaking local press inundates its readers with stories of Russian economic success. A story entitled "The teacher with golden hands" (by Vadim Iarmolinets in Novoe Russkoe Slovo May 8, 2001) reports on Vladimir Deming, who emigrated twenty-seven years ago from St. Petersburg, where he worked in jewelry design. But his passion was restoration, and educated himself in it and is now teaching these skills, and taking American students to Russia to observe restoration projects, at the Fashion Institute of Technology. In Novoe Russkoe Slovo, there appears an interview by Alexander Grant with Semen Zakharovich Kislin. Kislin was born in December 1935 in Odessa, and emigrated from the USSR in 1972. He was there a director of a supermarket and is now head of a company, Transcommodity, with a 1.1 billion dollar annual revenue stream. When he came to NY, he spoke no English; he polished cars and cleaned vegetables. His company is the largest supplier of cast-iron in the world.

Immigrant ambition "o'erleaps itself". For example, in my interview 13, a parent reported proudly that her child had passed the exam to enter Stuyvesant High School, a prestigious public school open only by examination. However, the parents knew they were moving out of the city, and knew the son would not therefore be eligible to enroll. But they nonetheless had their son take the exam, as a kind of proof of his academic success.

Not only do the RJIs have impressive human capital; they also had Soviet training in breaking bureaucratic barriers, quite a useful skill for immigrants seeking to make it in a new country. One of my interviewees reported that after Vienna, everyone was seeking to extend their Italian vacation complementary of HIAS. *"We were called to the US consul on the day when I had plans to lead an excursion* [for which she was receiving a wage, mostly to lead trips for Russian-speaking tourists, many of whom were on HIAS stipends]. *We called the consulate and said I was sick. We didn't come. Next week, we found that our HIAS subsidy was withdrawn because we did not come for the appointment. We went to HIAS to straighten things out and our reception there was horrible. They knew we had two children and an aged parent. How can they do it without warning? They refused to reinstate it. My husband and I sat in their offices and said we were not going anywhere until our financial aid was restored. It paid off, and it was restored. We got what we wanted, and very soon after we left"* [Interview 22]

Or as reported in the press: "As one of the Russian comedians once said that if somebody learned to steal from and deceive his own country, it would be easy to succeed in doing it elsewhere. This seems to be the case with the Russian mafia—even Italians are amazed at their schemes and fearlessness" ("The school of communism is the best place to learn to be a professional criminal." Ogonek N23, June 3, 1996)

Old-fashioned corruption was hardly absent from the Russian Jewish repertoire. American analysis of the Putin presidential election in 2003, including that of Secretary of State Powell, saw it as a sham. Yet some Russians living in NY went to

vote, both in the Russian consulate in Manhattan and in the "Millenium" theatre in Brighton. Passports were needed, and one young man submitted two, and a consulate employee joked to use just "the live one" (Novoe Russkoe Slovo "One election and two fires", by Vladimir Kozlovskii, n.d.).

Even though success was derived from a combination of human capital, ambition, and cunning, there was unequivocal thankfulness for the country that offered them refuge, and a near unanimity among those interviewed that they felt total loyalty to the US. *"All the Russians who appear here older than twenty-five have an accent, but they achieve a lot; they are doctors, lawyers, have huge businesses, a great country and God Bless America"* [Interview 4]. One interviewee complained about the conditions under which he was receiving "social security". He and his group of veterans wanted it to be called "veteran pensions", as this would give them the feeling that they had a right to it, because they "earned it." Yet, amid his statement of indignity, he blurted out, *"I am grateful to the US. I have received medicine without payment, gotten social security, and many other benefits. God bless America"* [Interview 15]. Or again, one immigrant nostalgically recalls Crimea and the Black Sea (which she moved away from, but came back regularly for vacation) more beautiful (more natural) than what we were then looking out upon, the beach at Brighton. Yet her loyalty is unquestioned: *"Upon arrival to the US, we rented a room in a private house in Brooklyn. But we joined a lottery, where we were on a line for eleven years before we got this apartment in the Center for the Aged, and when we got it, my husband was dead. This was from Program 8, and we also got SSI and food stamps. For that we didn't have to work. God bless America"* [Interview 19]. A typical expression in the interviews was the following: *"So we are very thankful to ... the American people. We gave nothing to America, but America gave us social security"* [Interview 10]

In a newspaper story, a reporter wanted to know how the "Russian speaking" [*russkoiazychnye*] immigrants celebrated July 4. One respondent answered the interview question: "I spent independence day with my husband. We went to Brighton Beach. I am a doctor, so I cold not switch off my cell phone. But fortunately all of our patients felt well that day. In the evening we met up with friends and went to Battery Park to watch the fireworks." And the author writes: "celebration is over. I am sure that all Russian immigrants felt a surge of patriotism and an enhanced feeling of belonging during Independence Day."

I believe the immigrants were coached to utter "God Bless America" for their citizenship interview, because they nearly all recited it as if it were part of a catechism. But there is no question that they felt an unbounded gratefulness to America. Indeed they were becoming super-loyal Americans. But most Americans have a hyphen before American – what would it be for this wave of immigrants? I address this question in the next two sections.

II. Not Becoming "Russian-speakers" (as in the *Near* Abroad)

Conditioning their social and political behavior as that set of "Russian-speaking population" living in the United States (and thereby becoming part of a supra-ethnic community that would have included Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusans who also migrated in large numbers) was a distinct possibility. Indeed this was a move made

by many Jews in the republics of the near abroad. And for a variety of reasons, adaptation to America as "Russian-speaking Americans" was attractive.

First of all, in the New York area especially, there was full support for the Russian language and its community of speakers. Indeed there was by the early 1990s a critical mass of speakers. In 1990, there were about 300,000 RJIs in NYC, and about 400,000 in the metropolitan area. According to official NYC sources, new arrivals from the FSU were the largest source of immigrants in the later 1990s[7]. And this facility was passed on to the next generation naturally. A report in 1991 showed that although 53% [of 2nd generation migrants] reported preferring to use English at home, 85% claim to speak Russian "well" and 93% report that they can understand spoken Russian (Kasinitz et al 2001, 10).

One of my interviewees explained: *"Maintenance of Russian cultural life in Brooklyn is very good, because of the large numbers who came in the second wave. I consider myself an immigrant in the second wave, in 1989-92; the first wave was in 1978-79. That first wave the people didn't have knowledge, didn't have information; they suffered more than our wave of immigration. In 1989, the influx of immigrants was huge. We arrived here through the old route, Israel visa, Vienna, Rome (for two months) and then to the United States. When we arrived here there was such an influx of immigrants that we couldn't rent an apartment. Now they are lawyers, doctors, programmers, engineers, and artists. The first wave didn't have theater, there was no Millennium here in Brighton. These people have been able to preserve the Russian language, support newspapers, theaters, two radio stations (which we did not have ten years ago)"* [Interview 3].

Institutional support to sustain a community of Russian-speakers was strong. As one interviewee reported, *"When I came here, at the Brooklyn Public Library, there was one shelf of books in Russian. Right now there is a whole huge section for Russian literature. Half the readers in the library here are Russian, as Russians are avid readers; everybody goes to the library and they read a lot; the libraries here in Brighton, in Sheepshead, and in Garritson, all have Russian-speaking staff. There was only one Russian bookstore when I came, and now there are several, with many children's books. It made me cry, because in Russia, you had to know someone in the bookstore to get children's books; and now (here) you can buy anything you like for Russian children, and I'm going to buy these books for my grandson. The libraries have all current fiction from Russia; and classics; and you can order what you want on line"* [Interview 1]. Russian-speaking Americans don't even need these bookstores. They have no trouble getting any Russian book on ozon.ru, perhaps easier for the immigrants than for the Russians in Russia.

Other media are also available. Russian language newspapers are plentiful. TV in Russian is varied and easy to get. *"On TV I have four Russian language stations. The last Russian movie we saw was* Brigada [a soap opera popular in Russia now, about mobsters in Leningrad; indeed Brigada is available for rent in all local video stores as well as on TV]" [Interview 2]. There is ubiquitous availability of Russian radio programming in the New York metropolitan area, from talk shows to music to news. Theatre too is plentiful, often with shows that have just recently played in Moscow and St. Petersburg. *"As for Russian spectacles, we go sometimes, because it*

is convenient, walking distance from my home. The Millennium theatre plays before a full house always" [Interview 1]. Telephone connections to the Russian-speaking world are as cheap as calling New Jersey. "In 1989 we paid $2 per minute, it is now cheap; right now we pay three cents maximum, but St. Petersburg is now 1.9 cents per minute" [Interview 1]. Thus the cultural foundation for a self-sustaining language community, that sees itself as having a common identity as Russian-speakers, exists in New York.

All these media opportunities support the formation of a "Russian-speaking" identity community. "We use the increasingly popular term 'Russian Speaking' Jews to include people from throughout the former Soviet Union as well as the emerging 'Russian speaking' Jewish communities in Western Europe and Israel." – reports one sociological study. It continues: "The second generation makes far fewer distinctions about which Soviet republic they or their friends come from than did the original immigrants themselves. There is evidence in this report (and several nice biographical statements) of Russian kids abjuring the language, but then as young adults studying it and regaining competence in it, in hopes of teaching it to their own children[8].

There was as well a strong emotional attachment to the language from several of my interviewees. *"We speak Russian at home, I insist. In 1998 when I took my son to St. Petersburg, and my son Julian was impressed by the city and noted with glee that 'everyone speaks Russian here. Thank you for making me speak Russian. Now I can understand what is going on around me.' My children spent three summers in Lithuania with their former nanny, so they brushed up on their Russian, and my daughter just spent the summer with her former nanny in Kiev, Ukraine, and then to the Black Sea. She came back not speaking a word of English, and her Russian was so good, but it all ended about a week later. She did not mix the two languages, but every word she had to say in Russian was very funny. My son downloads contemporary Russian music from the internet, and they listen to CD's in Russian"* [Interview 11].

Russian-speaking communities live in distinct neighborhoods like Brighton and Key Gardens (Queens). And for the more successful Russians from Brighton Beach, they move to larger houses and more opulent neighborhoods in Manhattan Beach (Novoe Russkoe Slovo, March 22, 2004 by Joseph Berger). Still they cluster among one another. Estern Schwartz, a schoolteacher, reported that, "Most Russians stick to each other because they prefer speaking their native language." To give symbolic significance to the emergence of this historical language community in the US, the newspaper Novoe Russkoe Slovo gave publicity to someone attempting to create a monument to the Russian-speaking immigrant community: "There is no decent monument to the Russian-speaking immigrants", wrote Leonid Oloviannikov. He portrays this immigration in world-historic significance of the three generations of immigrants who brought to the USA their talents, their knowledge and experience, and deserve for their names to be remembered forever."

For all this, Russian-speakingness is not becoming a community of fate, at least among the RJIs. This is so for several interrelated reasons. First, there is a social class divide between the (largely Jewish) third and (largely Russian) fourth wave of immigrants, preventing a common cultural front. Many of my respondents deny the divide, but it is a real one. Again and again my interviewees insisted that they had close non-Jewish friends in their circles, but when asked to provide names and

phone numbers (to allow me to increase my "snowball" sample) they directed me elsewhere, admitting they had no such reference in their cell phone directories. One interviewee, who admitted to the divide, pointed out that the Russians who came to Brighton after 1991 were different. They were poor and came to the US for financial reasons; while the earlier wave were well-to-do and came for political reasons. The more recent ones therefore were having more problems assimilating [Interview 8]. Another interviewee had the same argument. She did not "blame" the members of the new wave; but she found little in common with them [Interview 22].

A second reason for the failure of a consolidated Russian-speaking community of fate in NY was the undeniable intergenerational loss in the Russian component of community language repertoires. Consider the following snippet of on-line doggerel, representing the Russian abilities of the second-generation kids (From January 1989, "Weekend" The New Russian American.)

Zarentovav dvych*bedrumnyi apartment* [I rented a two-bedroom apartment]
I dlia nachala bziav pol*paunda* ikry [And purchased a half-pound of caviar]
Ia ponial srazu-nado mnoi ne kaplet [I realized--I'm doing fine]
Moi *velfer* dast eshe nesmetnye daru [Welfare will help me out]

An intergenerational loss occurs despite high levels of ethnic endogamy. This was routinely supported in many of the interviews, basically a loss of ability to read and write in the generation born in the US. The parents sadly admit the overarching reality of monolingual English being one generation away. *"Our older son's best language is English, then Russian, and then Hebrew which he learns in school. At dinner we speak in English. If we have the energy, we force him to answer in Russian; if not, he replies in English and we just accept it"* [Interview 17]. Another interviewee pointed out a subtler shift. Those born in the US or those who leave Russia at under age seven lose the "soul" of the language, and it becomes a means of communication rather than a component of culture. Once this occurs, the psychological motivation of the elder generation to maintain the language attenuates.

A third reason that the Russian-speaking identity has not consolidated is due to neighborhood mixing, especially as Russians move out to New Jersey, and to the wider job market in the US. Once they leave the neighborhoods of high Russian-speaking concentration, children in public schools lose attachment to the language, especially in light of the overwhelming economic and social incentives to learn English well.

A fourth reason is that in America, anti-Russian stereotypes are common and act as a constraint for young Russians, eager to make it in America, to foreshadow their Russian-speaking heritage. Survey respondents even in the NY area show a great ambivalence about being known as "Russian". One respondent says, "in my neighborhood, in Brighton Beach, the general Russian population I consider bad people." Another corrects friends who call him Russian, and demands to be thought of as a "Russian Jew". And another says, "Americans…look down on Russians because they aren't so religious and being religious is a status symbol." One girl fears for her value on the marriage market, as many Americans "look at them [Russians] as lower."[9]

A final reason for the possible end of a Russian-speaking cultural consciousness in the US is the end of "intelligentsia" culture in an American environment that doesn't reward high culture. *"In Russia,"* one respondent told me, *"we used to be theatre-*

goers, but here much less. At first we had language deficiencies in understanding. Also the acting level in Russia was higher than we saw off-Broadway and in Chelsea, so we stopped going" [Interview 1]. Or in a more damning statement, *"America is boring with no intellectual or poetic consciousness - this was the glue to the Russian language, that is now being thinned out"* [Interview 8].

III. Becoming Jewish-Americans (And Much to Their Surprise)

The data show that the Russian Jewish immigrants into New York are becoming Jewish-Americans as part of a community of fate. This is a surprise for several reasons, most impressively due to the fact that the population living in Brighton constitutes the sub-set of *refusniki* that refused to go to Israel!

But there are other reasons to see this as an unexpected outcome. For one, most of these immigrants were raised in a secular Soviet culture, quite ignorant of the practice of Judaism. One immigrant reported to me, with humor in his voice, that on the emigration trip to the US from Vienna, on Swiss Air, the *refusniki* passengers were all presented with kosher food, since they were known to the airline officials as Jewish refugees. He had no idea what kosher meant. They complained to the stewardesses that they no longer wanted to be discriminated against as Jews, and that they should eat as normal people do [Interview 25]. In another interview, the respondent tried to emphasize his religious orthodoxy. Yet when I asked if he had a *bar mitzvah*, he was ignorant of that core ritual, one that turned boys into men [Interview 18].

American Jews have been stunned by the resistance of Russian Jews to standard religious practices. As analyzed by Samuel Kliger[10]: "American Jews have tried to reach Russian Jews as Jews while derogating or failing to understand their distinctive Russian identity." Indeed for the Russians, socialized into a society that is Eastern Orthodox and once communist, the idea of a communal Jewish life is unfamiliar. Many upon arrival couldn't understand paying for membership in a synagogue, and even wearing a *yarmulke* was seen by many immigrants as shameful. The Russians wouldn't speak of their religion (*religia*) as do American Jews but rather their faith (*vera*); to Russians *religia* connotes tiresome rituals, whereas *vera* refers to individuals contemplating their fate.

In a poll of Jews in St. Petersburg, only one percent of the respondents connected their Jewish identity with "professing Judaism"; this is the same for those who emigrated to Israel. And in the US study of migrants, only 3.4% saw their identity as connected to "professing Judaism". In America, they explain their identity and religion in a way that does not require or imply major changes in behavior, lifestyle or religious practice. Russian Jews in America scorn the synagogue, saying such things as "God can hear me without synagogue."

In another study, when able to give multiple answers to the meaning of being Jewish, only 11% of the Russian Jewish immigrants say "to practice/profess Judaism"; only 17% say they observe Jewish customs. So Jewish has an ethnic flavor, as 33% say the meaning of being Jewish is "to feel oneself part of the Jewish people"[11]. Kliger summarizes this situation well: "As …seen by mainstream American Judaism, Russian Jews in America continue to be as indifferent to Jewish heritage and Jewish communal life as they were while they were living in the Soviet Union"[12].

Jewish communitarian practices are foreign to these immigrants. The vast majority of young Russian Jews were not circumcised. A rabbi who has performed some 8,000 *bris* operations, reports that he gets cancellations on 20% of the appointments, suggesting a kind of taboo against this standard Jewish ritual among Russian immigrants. Russian Jews place little importance on keeping the Sabbath. Passover is the most observed holiday ritual, yet in a 1993 publication, it was reported that less than 20 percent in Russia actually participated in a seder that year. There is some data in the US of very high participation in fasting on the holiday of Yom Kippur and attending a seder for Passover, but the methods used may have inflated the numbers.

Not only were Russian Jews acculturated to a secular environment, but they cultivated highly cosmopolitan friendship networks in the Soviet period. *"My closest friends, I think, are all Russian Jews, even though in Russia my closest friends were non-Jews. But here, practically everyone I know, and everyone I communicate with is a Jew from Russia"* [Interview 1]. *"All my relatives in the US are married to Russian-speaking Jews. In Ukraine, many friends and colleagues were not Jewish, but here, I don't see any "Russians" here. I like the Russians, they're good people: the Ukrainians, they're good people but I don't see them"* [Interview 4].

Despite their rather incomplete and insouciant relationship to religious practices and faith, Russian Jewish immigrants into New York are becoming *Jewish*-Americans as their principal identity in which they condition their social and political behavior. Why should this have happened?

For one, there is the historical power of the 5th line on Soviet passports that indelibly classified them as Jewish by nationality in the context of Soviet social and political life. To be sure, due to their secular Soviet upbringing, they developed a secular version of Judaism, often to the chagrin of the American Jews who sponsored them. Yet Soviet passport policy in part helped reify their identity as Jews, a reification that had long-term consequences. Thus the Soviet bureaucratic heritage is a part of the explanation.

Second, there are instrumental reasons for a Jewish identity. After all, those who could make a claim to be Jewish got a free ticket out of the "madhouse" that was the Soviet Union. Interview data speak directly to this theme. *"In 1989 was the first time any kind of Jewish life was allowed in the USSR. People then could openly gather and study things Jewish. In Perm, over that five-year period before we left, we had a chance to get well-acquainted with aspects of Jewish life. A rabbi came to Perm from Israel in 1991. He was there for three years, and I helped him, as I spoke English. I helped get him an apartment and get settled.* [Now his wife interjects]. B*efore that time, three young people from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came from Israel, telling local Jews what they would receive were they to emigrate to Israel. People then in Perm couldn't believe there were people from the West standing before them in their town. At that time, you needed coupons for sugar, and we were giving these young people our names to receive an invitation from Israel"* [Interview 17].

"I came to the US in October, 2000. My wife's father was Jewish. But my wife's mother was not. This allowed her and therefore us to get the status of refugees. I was afraid to come because I lacked knowledge of the language and was old – even today it is difficult for me... [Vasily's wife interjects] *When Vasily turned 60, it was time to retire. His pension was not enough to survive, so he started collecting stuff from the*

garbage to get money. He didn't want to come to the US; but we received refugee status, and one day we received a telegram allowing us to leave before November 2000, and we had to go. In US, we get SSI ($400 per month each), food stamps, Medicaid (and he's had several operations, including a heart operation, without any need for payment), 50% reduction for use of public transport" [Interview 23].

Another interviewee [Interview 20] came to the US in 1992. In the US, he did blue collar work in construction. He had a heart attack, and couldn't work in construction. He then got a job in the US working in a jewelry store. He went to a business college hoping to learn programming. He didn't finish because he had two more heart attacks, and then he got heart surgery at Lenox Hill Hospital, paid for by Social Security. He became a manager of the jewelry store.

With refugee status (available only to Jews of all Soviet passport holders), RJIs had access to free world-class health care and other benefits. This is summed up nicely: "*We gave nothing to America, but America gave us Social Security*" [Interview 10].

Third, in the US, synagogues, Yeshivas, and other Jewish associations played key organizational roles as assimilating agents, more or less as substitutes for the services provided by the 19th century Democratic Party. "*Upon arrival HIAS (Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society) met us at the airport and got us into a hotel*" [Interview 7].

There is, to be sure, a low level of community participation in general among the second-generation migrants, but high levels of participation in Jewish communal activity. 71% of the US born participated in activities of the Jewish Community Centers and 38% in Jewish summer camps[13]. Or again: "*It was very interesting, the way it was all set up, because at the time NYANA (New York Association for New Americans) was giving first month's rent and a security deposit to the proprietor, which new arrivals did not have to pay back as this was a fund from voluntary contributions. But these people whatever they lent us, we paid them back, and then some [laughs]. In the meantime, they wrote off what they gave us as charitable contributions, which I found out later, which is OK)*" [Interview 11].

The support from the Jewish communities was astounding to the immigrants. One interviewee [number 16] arrived in the US in 1993. She is Jewish, and got status as a refugee, and she was accepted by a Jewish community in Indiana that invited her family…She had an elderly brother already here, and he did not have the money to bring the rest of his family here. He appealed to this community in Indiana which came up with the money for Anna, her son, his wife, and their daughter. The Indiana community in Fort Wayne took them under their wing for a year. They got a beautiful two-bedroom apartment, and in the closet were excellent clothes, and it was fully furnished, with a full refrigerator, and an envelope with $300. It was a small town, yet people came with their cars and took them everywhere. She kept on expressing her thanks to this community. She lived in NY for eight years, and waited on a queue for an apartment in a house for elderly people where she has been living for two years and pays only $158 per month for a room. She gets Social Security and Food Stamps, and medicine provided, all which came as part of getting refugee status. She is now studying in a Hebrew college at a synagogue every Thursday to learn English [which is still rudimentary].

Or again: "*NYANA found me a job in four weeks, and got a job in Strawberry's, a chain, as a salesperson, and that is how I learned English, together with a fellow-*

worker from Bosnia. I worked there, I was studying accountancy in a school, and then found a job as an accounts payable clerk... My younger child was born here, and went to nursery school. We didn't go directly to a Jewish Center. Igor is not a registered member of a Jewish Center; he doesn't have the patience to sit through the prayers. But last year we went on a trip with a Jewish organization to Israel for a week". Jewish but not Russian was a relevant category for this couple. [Interview 17]

Meanwhile, many of the immigrants with school-aged children enrolled them in Yeshivas based on idea that they should learn something about the once-forbidden religion. In interviews of second-generation Russian Jewish migrants in the New York area, 83% attended public high schools. 17% went to private, mostly Jewish schools (a higher figure for parochial schools for any immigrant group in a larger study of second generation immigrants in America sponsored by the Russell Sage Foundation). 66% of those born in the US ("true" second generation) attended a Yeshiva for at least one year. From the one-on-one interviews, a clear impression that the Yeshivas were not academically demanding, but they were emotionally supportive and left a residue of ideology on the students who attended them.

The Orthodox schools were not complete failures. Irene, one of the interviewees in this sociological study, attended Yeshivas from 1st grade through High School, and she became and remains (in her twenties) quite orthodox: "It was traumatic ... My parents...did not want to be religious. They explained to me that they have been this way for this long and were not going to change. They said that when I grow up and have my own house I could do whatever I wanted, but that I am not going to change their life."

I heard similar stories in my interviews. *"We have met new people here in Brooklyn, mostly at the Yeshiva – where we take English lessons. Someone from Belarus, from Kishinev, from St. Petersburg, all of them Russian-speaking Jews, no Russian-Russians or Russian-natives (as we call them). Sometimes Russian-Russians come to the Yeshiva to learn English, and we get to know them and those from mixed marriages. But at the Yeshiva classes 95% is Judaism; 5% is English"* [Interview 5].

Upon arrival, Galina spoke a bit of English, and Alexander some German. They had taken a course in English before leaving, but it didn't work very well. Her granddaughter (who just graduated from High School in Brooklyn, and was ten upon arrival to the US) was sent to a Yeshiva because they felt she would learn English more quickly there than in the public schools [Interview 9].

"I registered our daughter in a Jewish kindergarten in Brooklyn, on Coney Island Avenue and Avenue U... We chose religious school for our kids, even though we felt that the quality of education would have been higher in a public school. But we felt we could help our kids in the secular subjects, no problem. But we knew nothing about Jewish subjects, so we had to rely on the school for that. We discussed this issue with our friends and thought about it a lot. Several friends feared that if our kids became religious, we would be separating ourselves from them, as they would have a different culture. But somehow I didn't believe this would happen, and we took a chance, and it didn't. We're as close to them as we always were" [Interview 24].

In the study of the identities of second-generation migrants, the strongest effect on each of these identities is attendance in a Yeshiva for more than a year, being a Yeshiva graduate, and having visited Israel. It is reasonably positive for all aspects of the identity,

but more powerfully explanatory for the religious identity scale (where the r-squared is 25.7, about twice as high as the other r-squares). The Yeshivas, for whatever reason parents chose to place their children in them, efficiently turned young Russians into Jews[14].

Taught in Yeshivas, or socialized in other synagogue programs, children begin to convert their parents. In the Kazinitz study, we learn of Juliana, aged 18, born in the US shortly after her parents emigrated. After her birth, her mother became increasingly observant and joined the Orthodox community. "She wanted me to get Jewish education because in Russia she was not able to. The Jewish schools wanted a woman who was religious, who kept all the laws, who covered her hair. So my mother conformed a bit. She did that just so I can go to a Jewish school. And then as I learned the customs, I started prodding my parents to follow them."

This same theme came through in several of my interviews. *"But if the grandchildren are losing full facility in Russian, they have remembered what they got in synagogue as children."* At this point, her daughter interjects: *"What she is trying to say is that the grandchildren are more Jewish than me. We were not taught the religion, but our children were"* [Interview 4]. *"My closest friends, however, became Orthodox. And so are their children. They observe everything. Their children, influenced in the local synagogue, induced them into Orthodoxy. Their parents followed them"* [Interview 22]. *"In the US, we became interested in Judaism, and it became part of our lives. Our children not only became interested, but they became religious"* [Interview 24].

The data on Table 1 lend support to this idea that over time, the Russian Jewish immigrant community in New York is becoming more self-identified as Jews.

The interpretation of the data on Table 1 is not straightforward. One possible interpretation might be that those who left the Soviet Union earlier were more religious to start with. More probably, the data suggest that the longer they stayed in the US, the more religious they got. Here is the interpretation of the authors: "it is our feeling that the number who adhere to Judaism has increased…This may indicate a real increase in the belief and practice of Judaism or an assimilation into American habits of ethnic-religious identification"[15].

Table 1

Evidence of Identity

Choice Religious Attitudes of Russian-Jewish Immigrants in New York
(Percentage who Agree)

	Freshmen (<3 years in NY)	Sophomores (3-6 years in NY)	Juniors (6-9 years in NY)	Seniors (>9 years in NY)
Being Jewish is important or very important	63	65	65	79
Judaism is Most Attractive	41	46	54	64

Source: RINA 2000, p. 9.

Data on the religious attitudes of second-generation migrants (from Kazinitz et al, 2001, p. 41-48) helps confirm the latter interpretation. The data suggest an over-time religious consolidation in terms of principal identity:

* 10% considered themselves Orthodox or Hasidic, but 40% of the US born did so.

* 56.7% feel it is "very important" to marry a fellow Jew (compared with only 11% of native Jews).

* 94% agree that they are proud to be a Jew
* 80% feel a sense of "belonging to Jewish people".
* 45% say they give to Jewish charities.
* Many display Jewish religious objects in their homes.
* 30% have visited Israel (and 5% for more than six months). Israel is described by them as "fascinating", in which you can feel a sense of "homeland" impossible to feel in the US.
* 15% report going to synagogue at least once monthly – thus Judaism is more ethnic than religious among these children of migrants

Further sociological survey findings:
Nearly half of the 2nd generation migrants report listening to Russian media "rarely" or "not at all". Only a third does so frequently. (And this is largely a function of those who arrived after age 12)[16].
30% of the RJIs in NY think that support for Israel is an essential part of being Jewish, while only 5% of American Jews reported similarly[17].
"Those born in the US are the least likely to report that most of their friends are Russian but the most likely to report that most of their friends are Jewish"[18]. These data support the view that the second-generation migrants are quite strongly attached to Jewish symbols, organizations, and way of life, far more so than their parents.

In my interviews in New York, I found ethnographic evidence that is consistent with the data on increasing identification of RJIs as Jewish-Americans. Most in evidence was an interest by my interviewees far more in Middle East politics than politics within Russia. Three typical examples follow.
"I have no ties left in Russia. I don't miss anyone still there. But we do a reunion of people who emigrated from home. I have a Russian channel on TV, but I'm not interested in what is going on in Ukraine (when I left Ukraine, nobody cared about me; I only met anti-Semitism, forget it, I now have my country), but I'm interested in what is happening in the US, with terrorism, and with Israel. Last year I helped collect $200,000 for Israel. I support people who care about us… I know what's happening in Chechnya, but I'm not interested. Why I care about Iraq is that it is not far from Israel, and this is our soldiers in Iraq. We need this war for Israel" [Interview 7].
"We don't have Russian TV here; we don't watch much TV. We go to the Russian internet sites. We don't follow closely Russian politics. Igor [her husband] *logs on to Russian news sites a few times a month, but he follows Israeli politics on the internet everyday"* [Interview 17].
"I'm interested in what goes on today in Russia, and Putin's totalitarian directions, but most of my friends find themselves interested more in the Israeli situation" [Interview 22].

These feelings are more than mere interest. They reflect a kind of deep concern for one's own people. For example, to interviewee 1, I made a joke that the immigration flow would continue as the next generation of Jewish migrants would likely be those evicted from the occupied territories of Israel. She didn't laugh, and said that Israel is a very sensitive subject, and she did not want to talk about it in this context.

But it was not only Middle East politics that revealed their cultural identities. In their more-or-less accepted as cliché requirements for endogamy, they were also

clear as to who their in-group was – the relevant set of marriage partners was *Jewish* Americans. One interviewee said explicitly what generally need not be said: *"It's my dream that my grandchildren will marry inside the Jewish community. We are a Jewish family. We have the opportunity here to continue my 'nation'. This is very important"* [Interview 7].

Finally, the organizational network of Jewish associations sets a leisure time agenda for these immigrants to be with other Jews. There is of course the synagogue. *"When I arrived in NY, NYANA gave us a hotel for three weeks, until I found a flat on Avenue K and 31st Street. I went to the synagogue behind Hudde School. Every Saturday for two years I went to that synagogue. I didn't understand anything, but had it translated. They gave me a Talmud in English, and I read it in English"* [Interview 10]. This is so even when the immigrants had little interest in what the synagogue has to offer. *"When I lived in Bayside, I relied on contacts at the synagogue, where I went to services every Sabbath [laughs]. I was a good Jew then. I'm not so good now. They did not provide social services, but I learned to read Hebrew, without understanding. I learned about the holidays which was very enlightening because I could not learn about them back home"* [Interview 11].

Not only the synagogue. Interviewees revealed membership in a panoply of Jewish organizations: Jews from the Former Soviet Union (Interviewee 4); the United Jewish Federation (Interviewee 7); American-Jewish Veteran's Association (Interviewee 21). These Jewish associational opportunities connect immigrants to the wider society, but draw them together as Jewish-Americans.

All these ethnographic points add up to a clear choice in cultural identity. As one interviewee puts it: *"Everyone calls us 'Russian Jews'. Nobody mentions us as 'Jews'. In Russia, everyone who mentions Jew, says 'go to Israel'. Here we came, and they call us 'Russian'. We are not satisfied with 'Russian'. We would like to be 'Jew', not 'Russian'"* [Interview 7].

Thus the identity paradox: in the secular US, Russian-speaking Jews have come to see themselves both socially and culturally primarily as "Jews". Meanwhile in the religiously defined Israel, Russian-speaking Jews have come to see themselves both socially and culturally primarily as Russian-speakers!*

IV. Theoretical Implications

The NY RJIs that form the basis of this paper, as would be true for any identity group, have multiple cultural repertoires, and many possible identities. In the RINA 2000 survey (16-18), respondents were allowed to self-identify among fourteen possible identities. The result:

* 71% of the respondents had Jewish in the category-mix.
* 31% said merely Jew. This was by far the highest identity.
* 6% said merely American.

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* For more on Russian immigrants in Israel, see Gitelman, Zvi. *Becoming Israelis* NY: Praeger, 1982 and Gitelman, Zvi. *Immigration and Identity: The Resettlement and Impact of Soviet Immigrants on Israeli Politics and Society.* Los Angeles: Wilstein Institute, 1995, pp. 34-37, showing that in Israel the younger cohorts are less "Jewish" than their elders.

* 4% said merely Russian.
* 56% connected their Jewish identity to some nationality.

Which aspects of one's cultural repertoire becomes activated as the primary identity that conditions social and political behavior is contextually driven. In the case of Brighton, the importance of the English language for social mobility combined with the associational pay-offs for being Jewish created a context for assimilating into America as Jewish-Americans for those who could make a claim for Jewishness in their repertoires.

If Jewish-American becomes the preferred mode of self-identification for many migrants, and if other migrants know that it is becoming a trend, the identity category "Jewish-American" becomes a "trend". It takes on an obvious flavor, as if this population was obviously and primarily Jewish-American (as opposed, for example, to Russian-speaking American). While the initial choices were contextually driven, once the trend was set, identity politics became a cascade towards a common Jewish-American identity.

V. Implications for Latvia

After the restoration of independence in Latvia precipitating the collapse of the Soviet Union, Latvians had to face the difficult public policy problem of nation-building in the context of a multi-national population, with a substantial fraction of the population neither Latvian by citizenship or by nationality. Many of these are Russian-speakers.

Official discussions of the so-called Russian problem tend to discount the variety of paths that these Russians could follow on their route to citizenship in Latvia. And more important, that the paths that Russians will follow can be influenced by incentives set by Latvians and their government. One set of incentives involves setting up difficult barriers to entry into Latvian cultural life. Consider the following passage from one of my interviews:

"My father was born in Moscow in 1929, but it said "Latvian" on the 5th line of his passport. His mother was Russian. My father's father was a real Latvian. But he left Latvia in 1913, a year before World War I intending to study in St. Petersburg, but he became an officer in the Russian army. My mother was born in Belarus, and she is Russian. I did not speak very much Latvian as a kid, and began studying it in high school. I lived in Riga, and the city had a large Russian population. I worked in a predominantly Russian area, and used Latvian rarely, e.g. sometimes watching TV, or maybe newspapers. My wife is Russian [and he laughed when I asked if she spoke any Latvian]. *Our daughter was 12 when we left. She studied Latvian in school, got good grades, but the past five years in America erased all memories of the language. We speak Russian at home, but she complains that it's easier for her to speak in English.*

"We keep in regular touch with my parents and my wife's mother in Riga. They are all retired. My parents were both physicians. I worked with computers in Riga before I left, and work in programming here. In the 1990s, the economy was in a shambles, and with so many out of work, there was literally nothing to eat. But the bigger reason for dissatisfaction was political. I feel I'm Russian, despite my [Latvian] name. My

wife is Russian. And we felt uncomfortable and you (who wrote this book on the topic) know why. I got Latvian citizenship because of my ethnicity. It was shameful for me, but I needed it to travel, and it was impossible to travel with the old Soviet passport. You can't get a visa, for they look at your passport in a foreign embassy and won't acknowledge its validity. My daughter got citizenship, but my wife did not. She has a so-called alien's passport. She couldn't even apply for several years because of the quota. It was uncomfortable, and we were willing to migrate anywhere, to Canada, to Australia, to the US, and applied to them all" [Interview 14].

In this case, Latvia lost an extremely talented and ambitious co-citizen because he felt ashamed in the way his wife was treated by the state compared to him. This suggests that there is a second set of incentives for dealing with the problem of immigrant minorities, viz., to make the route to assimilation as rewarding as possible.

In my 1993-94 field-research leading up to my (Laitin 1998) *Identity in Formation*, I found many incentives for Russians in Latvia to become Latvians. But Latvians may nonetheless, due to a false view that identities are fixed and not sensitive to incentives, be missing an opportunity for assimilating a population that is fully capable of reforming their national identities and playing a productive role in Latvia's future.

NOTES

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[1] Laitin, David D. *Identity in Formation: The Russian-speaking Populations in the Near Abroad.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.

[2] Research Institute for New Americans (RINA) Russian Jewish Immigrants in New York City: Status, Identity, and Integration. New York: American Jewish Committee, 2000, 32–3.

[3] Kliger, Samuel. The Religion of New York Jews from the Former Soviet Union. In: Carnes, Tony and Anna Karpatakis (Eds.). *New York Glory.* New York: NYU Press, 2001, p. 150.

[4] Ibidem, p. 149.

[5] Research Institute for New Americans (RINA) Russian Jewish Immigrants in New York City: Status, Identity, and Integration. New York: American Jewish Committee, 2000, 12.

[6] Kasinitz, Philip, Zeltzer-Zubida, Aviva and Simakhodskaya, Zoya. *The Next Generation: Russian Jewish Young Adults in Contemporary New York.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation, Working Paper #178, p.13.

[7] Research Institute for New Americans (RINA) Russian Jewish Immigrants in New York City: Status, Identity, and Integration. New York: American Jewish Committee, 2000, 1–2.

[8] Kasinitz, Philip, Zeltzer-Zubida, Aviva and Simakhodskaya, Zoya. *The Next Generation: Russian Jewish Young Adults in Contemporary New York.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation, Working Paper #178, pp. 10–11.

[9] Ibidem, pp. 49–50.

[10] Kliger, Samuel. The Religion of New York Jews from the Former Soviet Union. In: Carnes, Tony and Anna Karpatakis (Eds.). *New York Glory*. New York: NYU Press, 2001, pp. 152-157.

[11] Research Institute for New Americans (RINA) Russian Jewish Immigrants in New York City: Status, Identity, and Integration. New York: American Jewish Committee, 2000, 21.

[12] Kliger, Samuel. The Religion of New York Jews from the Former Soviet Union. In: Carnes, Tony and Anna Karpatakis (Eds.). *New York Glory*. New York: NYU Press, 2001, p. 152.

[13] Kasinitz, Philip, Zeltzer-Zubida, Aviva and Simakhodskaya, Zoya. *The Next Generation: Russian Jewish Young Adults in Contemporary New York*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, Working Paper #178, p. 30.

[14] Ibidem, Appendix.

[15] Research Institute for New Americans (RINA) Russian Jewish Immigrants in New York City: Status, Identity, and Integration. New York: American Jewish Committee, 2000, 4.

[16] Kasinitz, Philip, Zeltzer-Zubida, Aviva and Simakhodskaya, Zoya. *The Next Generation: Russian Jewish Young Adults in Contemporary New York*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, Working Paper #178, p. 10.

[17] Research Institute for New Americans (RINA) Russian Jewish Immigrants in New York City: Status, Identity, and Integration. New York: American Jewish Committee, 2000, 18.

[18] Kasinitz, Philip, Zeltzer-Zubida, Aviva and Simakhodskaya, Zoya. The Next Generation: Russian Jewish Young Adults in Contemporary New York. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, Working Paper #178, p. 30.

Kopsavilkums

Raksta pamatā ir grāmatā "*Identity in Formation*" (Cornell 1998) publicētie atklājumi par krievu integrāciju tuvo ārzemju jaunajās valstīs. Krievu diaspora aplūkota Braitonbīčā, Ņujorkā, lai pētītu, cik lielā mērā mītnes zemes konteksts nosaka krievu diasporas politisko identitāti. Pamatojoties uz 2004. gada pavasarī ģimenēs veiktajām intervijām, rakstā analizēta no bijušās PSRS ieceļojušo, krieviski runājošo migrantu pēdējo viļņu "modālā dzīves vēsture". Ir apskatīts jautājums, kāpēc "krieviski runājošie", šī jaunā identitātes kategorija, kas izveidojusies tuvajās ārzemēs, nav kļuvusi par galveno vai primāro identitāti Ņujorkas vidē. Tiek aplūkota arī masveidīgā ebreju izcelsmes amerikāņu identitātes parādīšanās starp tiem, kuri padomju pasu "piektajā ailē" tikuši identificēti kā ebreji. Šie atklājumi iztirzāti sasaistē ar autora "identitātes izvēles" modeli, kā arī ar "galotnes" [*tipping*] modeli. Noslēgumā tiek izdarīti secinājumi par Latvijā realizēto politiku attiecībā uz krieviski runājošajiem iedzīvotājiem.

Identity Change in the Baltics: EU-zation, Diversification, or Both?

Identitātes pārmaiņas Baltijā: ESizācija, dažādība vai abi veidi?

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The paper hypothesizes about long-term implications of EU membership for the identities of Baltic inhabitants (EU-zation) by referring to some identity-related trends in old and new member countries of the EU and in Russia. It is noted that young Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Russians, and representatives of other ethnic communities seem to embrace more eagerly the new options provided by European integration and globalization than the older generations. The paper assumes that both the EU-zation and diversification (or fragmentation) of identities in the Baltic States are likely to occur, while in some ethnic communities and in some age groups the changes might take place more quickly and extensively than in others.
Key words: identity, European integration, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Baltic Russians.

The membership of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the European Union (EU) is a very recent development. But it has changed the legal status of the Baltic inhabitants; it has already given them some additional rights. The question is how do the Baltic inhabitants adapt to this new situation. Do they feel more European after having become citizens of the EU? Will they be proud to be citizens of the EU, or would they prefer to be just Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Russians, etc.?

European identity remains a highly debatable concept. The problem is that such an identity cannot be promoted by using nationalism that created nations and national identity. Apparently, European identity will not replace national identity; rather it will put national identity on a broader civic and territorial basis, which will eventually add new dimensions to national identity and modify it by creating a sense of a shared community. This sense of a shared Europe is an important source of motivation for people to get involved in the affairs of the continent through a democratic process.

By the preservation of the language-based cultural identity, ethnic communities in the Baltic States fall into two main categories. The first category includes Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians who live in their historical homelands, Baltic Russians, and Poles of Lithuania. These communities have overwhelmingly preserved their native languages as mother tongues, many up to 98 per cent. They can benefit from a whole set of educational, cultural and religious institutions, and mass media outlets that operate in their respective mother tongues. This category encompasses almost 93 per cent of the current population of the Baltic States.

The second category, around seven per cent of the Baltic population, includes other non-titular groups of the Baltic States, such as Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Jews,

Roma, etc., that, due to limited educational opportunities in their native language, have largely abandoned the latter as mother tongue. In this way they have already undergone a considerable change in their identities. Some individuals belonging to this category have changed their cultural identity through assimilation into titular Baltic nations; some others have chosen education in the Russian language and are now often treated as belonging to the Russian speaking population.

Below, I will focus on the groups belonging to the first category which are going to face a new challenge of Europeanization (in the form of EU-zation) to their identities that have so far remained relatively intact due to their mother tongue environments and limited contacts with cultures, languages and business styles of other European nations.

It is difficult, if not impossible altogether, to tell today what will be the long-term implications of EU membership for the identities of Baltic inhabitants. Therefore, in what follows, I can only hypothesize about possible long-term implications of EU membership for the identities of Baltic inhabitants by referring to some identity-related trends in old and new member countries of the EU and in Russia.

Promotion and rejection of identities in the Baltic States

After independence, the identities of different population groups in the Baltic States were exposed to a highly charged political atmosphere. At the state level, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania sought to maximally distance themselves from the Soviet past and strongly reclaimed their ethnic identities with demands to redress injustice done to them under the Soviet rule, which was proclaimed illegal. Actually, they went further, trying to prescribe to the rest of the world how they should be perceived. First and foremost, there was a wish to ban the designation of 'a former Soviet republic'. Then Lithuania came up with a concept of its Central-European identity, whereas Estonia started to promote actively its newly construed Nordic identity. In both cases this was done to dissociate themselves from the concept of the Baltic States, which was considered as a hindrance to their political aspirations to join Europe as quickly as possible. The results of these initiatives were limited and partly counterproductive. The terms 'a former Soviet republic' and 'the Baltic States' continue to be used. The Nordic countries finally embraced all three Baltic States into the newly formed regional interstate structure Nordic-Baltic-8 despite the attempts of Estonia to get the exclusive rights of admittance; and Lithuania did not become a part of the Central-European region—the so-called Vyshegrad initiative.

The identity formation of Baltic Russians has been even more complicated. This process was influenced by the nationalizing Baltic States, by Russia and by the major international organisations such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, OSCE, NATO and the European Union.

Estonia and Latvia were imposing their official views on the group identity of local Russians. Analysis of the battles over definitions and discourses in Estonia and Latvia reveal that certain definitions of Russian-speakers, such as 'illegal immigrants', were preferred by local policy makers while the others, such as 'national minority', were suppressed (Pettai 2001).

International organizations have not sided with the terminology preferred by Estonia and Latvia. Instead, they use such terms as 'national minority', 'Russian

minority' and 'Russian-speaking population', or 'Russian-speakers' when referring to Baltic Russians in numerous reports and other documents. Estonia and Latvia had no other option but to use the international minority rights terminology, especially during the accession process to the EU and NATO.

However, having obtained membership in these organizations, Estonia and Latvia may now be reconsidering their former acquiescence. As reported by *Latvijas Avize* on 28 July 2004,[2] several prominent members of Latvian Parliament have worked out a Draft declaration "On the condemnation of crimes of communist totalitarianism and Soviet occupation" to be considered by the Parliament. The draft includes a conclusion that "The citizens of the USSR brought to Latvia during the military and political occupation by the USSR should not be considered as a national minority but as a consequence of the Soviet colonialism". The draft calls to decolonize Latvia and repatriate these former Soviet citizens from Latvia.

The Russian Federation has introduced a category of 'compatriots', which is not confined to ethnic Russians only but has a broader appeal to all former Soviet citizens who feel affiliated to Russian culture and the Russian state. This seems to be related to an ongoing debate in Russia over the ethnic and civic identity of its inhabitants. Think tanks in Russia propose that the unifying idea for the inhabitants of the Russian Federation, i.e. the point of reference for their identity, should not be based on ethnic but on territorial principle—it should not be *Russkaya ideya* (a 'Russian idea'), which has ethnic connotations and cannot be embraced by all peoples inhabiting Russia, but *Rossiiskaja ideya* (an 'idea of Russia').[3] Professor Tishkov, the leading Russian scholar on nationality issues and an ardent promoter of the civic-territorial approach has often suggested that in English the word 'Russia' in the sense of territory and state should be replaced by 'Rossija'.

In Russia, the official preference of civic (territorial) principle has already removed ethnic identification from the new passports of the Russian Federation. Several peoples in the Russian Federation have protested against such official policy which could endanger their ethnic identities. Radical Russian nationalists ("Russia for Russians!") are also not satisfied with the official support for civic identity. It all tends to be a prolongation of the old Slavophile-Westernizers debate that sends mixed signals to Russians abroad—both civic and nationalist aspirations seem to be endorsed.

Defensive nationalism and identities of the Baltic peoples

The identities of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians have been very much determined by ethnic considerations in the process of nation-building which started in the 19th century. It led to the establishment of nation states in the wake of WW I, which were frozen after WW II for half a century by the Soviet rule under which the three Baltic States became increasingly concerned about the sustainability of their languages and cultures because of extensive immigration from the Soviet Union. This has brought strong elements of defensive nationalism into the process of nation building and identity development of the Baltic titular nations.

The restoration of independence in the beginning of the 1990s, reinforced in 2004 by the membership in NATO and the EU, created new conditions for nation

building and identity development of the Baltic nationalities and other ethnic groups which inhabit Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. While Lithuanians may now feel much more confident about their identity (the census of 2001 revealed the highest share of Lithuanians ever in the whole population of the country), Latvians and Estonians are still very much in the defensive, afraid of aggression from Russia and suspecting that local Russians may act as Moscow's fifth column.

The Estonian debate before the referendum of 2003 on EU membership once again showed that defensive nationalism is still omnipresent; both the supporters and opponents of EU membership justified their stance by the need to protect the country against the Russian threat in order to preserve culture and language. The supporters of the EU advocated immediate membership in order to get more protection against Russian influence, while the opponents warned that such a membership could backfire in a longer perspective if Russia becomes a member of the EU.

It is understandable that the smaller the nation, the more watchful and defensive it tends to be concerning its identity. In this sense membership in the EU may be a real test for the Baltic nationalities. It is true that they have always regarded themselves, and were regarded by many others, as Europeans. But this 'being a European' remained for a long time a declaration without much substance.

EU-zation, in contrast, means something real, such as free movement of labour-force, capital and information. This opens up new opportunities for the Baltic inhabitants in other EU member states, but it also exposes the Baltic States to various outside influences which relate to intensified competition in the labour market, new immigrants, multiculturalism, a growing linguistic diversity, etc. all of which have bearing on local identities. EU-zation will deprive 'being a European' of its abstract nature by affecting the everyday life of millions in the Baltic States. It is bound to make people feel different about themselves. A question remains how many of them will like it and how many will dislike it. For some people the battle for national and cultural survival, known too well from the recent past, may have started again. Therefore, their reaction in regard to their identity might well be very conservative. At the same time, anecdotal evidence suggests that some younger cohorts of Baltic peoples, especially after having moved to the West, are rather indifferent toward their 'inherited' identity and, in stark contrast to the emigrants of previous generations, are even trying to escape from it.

A study of European identity in the old EU countries has revealed an interesting phenomenon—the more non-nationals there are in a country the less European the nationals feel as compared with all residents (van der Veen 2002). Taking into account the considerable numbers of non-citizens in Estonia and Latvia, this phenomenon might inhibit the Europeanization of the identities of Estonians and Latvians.

Identity of Baltic Russians

Ethnic identity has not been a very prominent issue for Russians. Russia has never been fully occupied by a foreign power, neither have the Russian language and culture faced the danger of extinction. The state and the dominant religion have existed for more than a thousand years. As a result, Russian nationalism has been relatively weak, confined to radical and marginal political movements.

Russian identity was not promoted by Soviet propaganda. Instead, the aim of the Soviet nationality policy was to create a "new historic community" – the Soviet people. The Soviet culture and the corresponding identity were to be based on the Russian language. This made it relatively convenient for many Russians to identify with Soviet culture and consider themselves as belonging to Soviet people. As a result, 42 per cent (in 1992) and 59 per cent (in 1993) of Russians in Estonia indicated that Soviet culture was part of their identity. But many more Russians, 85 and 96 per cent respectively, indicated that Russian culture was part of their identity (Geistlinger and Kirch 1995: 74).

After Baltic independence, people with 'Soviet' and/or Russian identity, and other Soviet era immigrants discovered that they were living in small states that gradually constituted themselves as countries in which the Russian language had become *lingua non grata* and in which they, at best, could be treated as minorities, but could be also perceived as former occupants, or aliens, even if born in these countries. This introduced new options into the development of the identity of Russian-speakers in the Baltic States (Laitin 1998).

A recent overview of minority policies in Estonia notes that Russians in Estonia have moved a long way from rejecting the designation 'national minority' to making such claims for their group. More recently they have started to articulate their minority rights not as group rights but in terms of human rights for the members of the group (Poleshchuk and Helemäe 2004).

Vihalemm and Masso studied sociologically the transformations of identity of Russians in Estonia (however, without touching the issue of European identity) and arrived at four different groups of Estonian Russians: 1) local political identity (Estonian citizens); 2) wider civic identity (members of Estonian society); 3) beached (stranded) diaspora group (torn between a civic attachment towards Estonia and a cultural attachment towards Russia); and 4) minority identity (members of Russian community; the strongest attachment to Russia among Estonian Russians) (Vihalemm and Masso 2002: 194-196). Thus, the identity of Russians in Estonia appears already quite diversified.

Common to these groups of Russians in Estonia is that they all feel a certain tension, because their culture and language are different and do not fit well into Estonian political and cultural frameworks. This places them somewhere between Estonians in Estonia and Russians in Russia. Differently from Estonia, the EU has recognised cultural diversity as its constitutional principle. It can be hypothesized that the EU, with cultural diversity as one of its major values, might ease this culture-related tension of Estonian Russians. At this point it is worth noting that during almost the whole period of the accession of Estonia and Latvia to the EU, opinion polls showed that Russians in those countries were more supportive of EU membership than were Estonians and Latvians.

Research on the identity of Russian youth in Moscow has shown that the basis of their identity includes the following characteristics: language, history, and culture (Omelchenko 2004: 29). This partly explains the passions around the reform of minority education in Latvia – the change of the language of instruction is affecting the core elements of the identity of Latvian Russians, let alone the fears of a lower quality of education and reduced competitiveness in the job market.

As established by Rose and Maley in the early 1990s, the European dimension played a modest role in how the representatives of Baltic nationalities and Baltic Russians described their identity. Only one per cent of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, and three per cent of Baltic Russians indicated that "European" describes best how they usually think of themselves. When asked of which other group they sometimes think of themselves as a member, five per cent of the representatives of Baltic nationalities and six per cent of Baltic Russians indicated "European". According to Rose and Maley 'Soviet' identity scored lower than 'European' not only among Baltic nationalities but also among Baltic Russians. Moreover, 50 per cent of Baltic Russians considered city and locality as the best description of identity, while nationality (Russians) was the best description only for 29 per cent of them (the corresponding percentages for Baltic nationalities were 22 and 68) (Rose and Maley 1994: 51).

Thus, the identity of Baltic Russians was more de-nationalized and de-ethnicized in comparison with Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians for whom ethnic origin was predominantly the best description of their identity. This might help Baltic Russians adapt to other non-ethnic components of identity which relate to Europe in general and to the EU in particular.

Meanwhile, the European identity is gaining ground in Russia as well. A recent comparative study of three regions (Primorye, Kirov and Kaliningrad) by the Central Russian Consulting Centre at the request of the Ebert Foundation, Germany, established that from 43 to 57 per cent of the people define themselves as inhabitants of the region. In addition, from 25 to 45 per cent of those questioned in each region and age group see themselves as Russians, and 13 per cent of the residents of the Kaliningrad region consider themselves to be Europeans (Rosbalt 2003).

It was reported with a reference to a well-known Russian sociologist, Juri Levada, that 55 per cent of Russians do not feel and do not want to be Europeans (*Телеграф*, 14 September 2004). This number is higher but quite comparable with the share of Euroskeptics in Estonia and Latvia as revealed by the EU referenda of 2003.

Laitin (1998) used tipping and cascade models to analyze the Russian-speakers' possible identity change in Estonia and Latvia. He theorized that at some point in time Russians might find it increasingly beneficial to assimilate linguistically, which would bring about a major change of their identity. Laitin referred to 19th century New York, where his grandparents decided upon arrival not to pass Yiddish to the next generation, and the descendents assimilated choosing English. This remote situation is, however, quite different from the 21st century Baltic States, where employment ads often demand that applicants know three 'local' languages: titular, English and Russian; where mass media, books, movies, etc., are easily available in all these languages; where people travel extensively, study and work abroad.

A more recent survey by Laitin in Estonia has depicted precisely the intentions of those who seem to realize how to cope successfully with the challenges of European integration and globalization. The survey indicated that up to 40 per cent of Estonian and 50 per cent of Russian parents wished to educate their children in three languages (in Estonian, Russian and English), which hints that the next generation may be moving increasingly towards multilingualism and more diverse identities by adding new language repertoires, instead of giving up one language and replacing it with another (Laitin 2003).

Concluding remarks

The identity of Russians in the Baltic States is undergoing more radical changes than that of the titular nations. While the titular nations seek to consolidate and fortify their previous national and ethnic identities, Russians need to develop new identities in which political, civic and territorial elements play an important role.

The EU membership of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania poses additional challenges to the identities of different ethnic communities living in these countries, especially to the identities of titular nations who may feel reluctant to open up to significant influences from outside after a somewhat similar period of Soviet impact has just ended.

At the same time young Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Russians, and representatives of other ethnic communities seem to embrace more eagerly the new options provided by European integration and globalization. Their eagerness is sometimes watched with concern by older generations who regard it as irresponsible negligence towards the identity which they have nourished and preserved for many decades.

In short, the evidence available so far seems to indicate that both the EU-zation and diversification (or fragmentation) of identities in the Baltic States will occur, while in some ethnic communities and in some age groups the changes will take place more quickly and extensively than in others.

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[1] For example, the *Resolution on National Minorities* adopted at the 13th annual session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE in Edinburgh, 5 to 9 July 2004, uses the term 'national minority' when it calls upon Latvia and Estonia to take necessary measures, such as "excluding decision-making directed towards assimilation of national minorities" www.oscepa.org (16 July 2004).

[2] http://www.latvijasavize.lv/index.php?la=286&li=2081413 (5 August 2004).

[3] http://www.regnum.ru/allnews/282301.html

[4] Analysis of the Russian press in Estonia since 1947 shows that propaganda of 'Soviet' identity was constantly on the rise between 1969 and 1987 even at the expense of 'Soviet Estonian' identity (Jakobson 2002: 176).

[5] This support must have been largely encouraged by the attention that various European organizations, including the EU, paid to the unresolved problems of national minorities in Estonia and Latvia. However, this support declined sharply just before the EU referendums in Estonia and Latvia after the representatives of the EU declared that the situation of national minorities is in agreement with the EU requirements.

Kopsavilkums

Rakstā tiek izvirzīta hipotēze par ES ilgtermiņa ietekmi uz Baltijas iedzīvotājiem (ESizācija), atsaucoties uz dažām, ar identitāti saistītām tendencēm ES vecajās un jaunajās dalībvalstīs un Krievijā. Jāpiezīmē, ka gados jauni igauņi, lietuvieši, krievi un citu etnisko kopienu pārstāvji daudz labprātāk pieņem jaunās iespējas, kuras piedāvā integrācija Eiropas Savienībā un globalizācija, nekā to dara vecākās paaudzes. Šā raksta autors uzskata, ka ir sagaidāma gan ES ietekmēta identitāšu vienveidošanās, gan dažādošanās (jeb fragmentarizācija) Baltijas valstīs, turklāt dažās etniskajās kopienās un vecuma grupās šīs pārmaiņas var notikt ātrāk un visaptverošāk nekā citās.

Identity Changes and Interaction in Latvia: Europeanization and/or EU-ization
Identitāšu maiņa un mijiedarbība Latvijā: eiropeizācija un/vai ESizācija

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The aim of this article is to analyze the impact of Latvia's integration in the European Union to the changes of identities of the main ethnic groups of society of Latvia. In this connection the distinction is made between "EU-ization" as transformation of legal norms and political institutions in accordance with Copenhagen criteria, on the one hand, and "Europeanization as transformation of the very basic attitudes and patterns of political behaviour. These different aspects of "return to Europe" differ with respect to their "vectors" and "speed", therefore temporal contradictions between them may emerge within popular consciousness, which. in its turn. become an important factor of transformation of ethnic identity in its interaction with European identity. Within this context the distinction between three different meanings of "normality" as well as the importance of "normalization" of society as the establishment of a set of basic principles recognized by the main segments of society is pointed out.
Key words: Europeanization, EU-ization, identity, normality. normalization, democratization.

About eight years ago I travelled from Riga to Oslo via Tallin and Stockholm. In order to save money I decided not to use an expensive SAS flight and chose the ferry (boat) from Tallinn to Stockholm. A that time the *Tallink* terminal in Frihamnen harbour was under reconstruction; therefore there were only two lines for passport control – one for Swedish citizens and citizens of the European Union, and the second one – for all others. For quite understandable reasons the second line was much longer, and after a short time it remained the only one. A Swedish policeman started to circulate along the line and invited those who were amiss to stand in the wrong line with the following message: "Sverige, Europeans....". After his third appearance near the place were I was standing, I tried to tell him that my understanding of "Europeanism" differs from his, that Europe ends somewhere around the Ural mountains or, at least, on the Eastern shore of the Baltic Sea, that all my conscientious life I used to feel myself European, but he was not inclined to proceed with this discussion.

Since historical events of the end of the eighties – beginning of the nineties, the break-up of the Soviet Union and of "real socialism", one of the main goals for the former "socialist" countries and a great part of the former Soviet republics was the "return to Europe". The question may be stated in this connection, what does "return to Europe" mean, what does "Europe" mean. It has to be pointed out that European identity is a highly debatable concept. One can speak about Europe in different senses – geographical,

historical, cultural, economical, political, the common destiny of the European nations may be mentioned, and last but not least – creation of the European public space. These multiple visions of European reality coexist, but relations between them is a matter of debate among academics, politicians, and the general public. European identity raises the question of the borders of Europe. How can one draw the line between Europe and non-Europe? Is Russia, Ukraine or Byelorussia a part of Europe?? Samuel Huntington pointed out that Europe finishes where Eastern Orthodox Christendom and Islam start. This understanding raises a question about Greece as a member state of the EU or Bulgaria as a candidate state. What about Turkey as a hard case of EU enlargement? What about muslims in many member states of the European Union? On the other hand, looking from the Western side of Huntington's line, Rokas Bernotas, Permanent Representative of Lithuania to the OSCE, stated during the colloquy "Europe tomorrow: shared fate or common political future" held in Strasbourg April 18th – 19th, 2002, "the idea of Europe is still too often linked to Western Europe only, or to the European Union"[1]. As he sees it, closer attention to the regional components of the continent, with a variety of complementary entities such as "northern Europe" and the "Baltic countries", will also help to boost European identity.

The Swedish policeman was right stretching the political aspect of the "Europeanness", which nowadays together with economical considerations dominates over all others mentioned above. Coming closer to the political aspect, one may remember Jürgen Habermass, who pointed out that in a liberal democracy, citizens should not be identified with a common cultural identity, but with some constitutional principles that fully guarantee their rights and freedoms and promote their involvement in democratic deliberation on essential social issues. In this connection it has to be pointed out that alongside with the cultural plurality of Europe, Article 2 of the Draft Constitutional Treaty adopted by the European Convention sets out as the main values of the Union political relevant ones: human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights[2]

In order to decribe changes in politics and society of European countries as well as transformation of international politics in connection with the development of the European Union, the term "Europeanization" became often used during the last years[3]. As Kevin Featherstone points out, "'Europeanization' ... is not a simple synonym for European regional integration or even convergence, though it does overlap with aspects of both. As a term for the social sciences, it can range over history, culture, politics, society, and economics. It is a process of structural change, variously affecting actors and institutions, ideas and interests"[4]. Four general trends in the literature on "Europeanization" are pointed out[5]:

- "Europeanization" as an export of cultural norms and patterns alongside with the expansion of European great powers;
- diffusion of cultural norms, ideas, identities, and patterns of behaviour on a cross-national basis within Europe;
- domestic institutional adaptation to the pressures, emanatingdirectly or indirectly from EU membership;
- public policies and policy processes impacts of EU membership

Featherstone distinguishes also between "maximalist" and "minimalist" senses of "Europeanization". He writes: "In a maximalist sense, the structural change .... Must

beof a phenomenon exhibiting similar attributes to those that predominate in, or are closely identified with, 'Europe'. Minimally, 'Europeanization' involves a response to the policies of the European Union (EU)."[6]

Asking the question what did "return to Europe" with respect to its political aspect mean for Eastern European societies as an idea and as a goal, the distinction between "minimalist" and "maximalist" understanding of "Europeanization" as proposed by Fethersone, seems no to be fully sufficient. It seems necessary to distinguish between two interconnected, but nevertheless different moments which deserves conceptual distinction..First of all, the transformation of legal norms and political institutions in accordance with criteria formulated by The European Council meeting in Copenhagen on 22 June 1993 has to be mentioned. Candidate states were required to develop what may be called legal and institutional framework of democracy, respect for human rights, develop a viable market economy and the ability to face up to the pressure of competition and the market forces within the Union, and undertake obligations in connection with movement towards political, economic and monetary union. This process will be referred to in this paper as "EU-ization". At the same time, as Roland Ingelhardt points out, cultural changes are of crucial importance for stabilizing democracy. Whether or not democratic institutions survive through good times and bad depends on whether they have built up deep-rooted cultural attachments among the citizens, and among them interpersonal trust is one of the most important issues[7]

Therefore a deeper level of transformation may be pointed out. Here one may speak about "Europeanization" as a transformation of the very basic attitudes toward the outer world and other members of society, and as patterns of political behaviour to be compatible with humanistic traditions of Europe. It is hard to believe that "Europeanization" in this sense may be imposed by any outer authority, it is a matter of self understanding for individuals and social groups. Probably in this sense Thomas Mann, after his return to Germany after World War II from exile in the United States, called on Germans to struggle no longer for a German Europe but for a European Germany[8].

These different aspects of "return to Europe" differ with respect to their "velocity" and "vectors". Taking into account that, at least in Latvia, movement toward the European Union for a long time was clearly an elite project, the "EU-ization" was mainly directed from the top downward, whereas "Europeanization" of society seems to be mainly directed from the bottom upward.

In explaining relations between "Europeanization" and "EU-ization", an the analogy with the idea of double standard influential in Medieval scholasticism may be useful.. In accordance with the concept of double truth, faith and reason have the same goal, but they achieve this goal using different means, therefore in each concrete point there are possible contradictions between them. Similar conclusions may be made about relations between "Europeanization" and "EU-ization", which justifies distinction between "Europeanization" and "EU-ization" vis-à-vis Featherstone's distinction between "maximalist" and "minimalist" senses of "Europeanization". One may speak not only about two consecutive phases of the same process, but also about relatively independent processes of transformation. The ultimate goals of "Europeanization" and "EU-ization" are the same but uneven "velocity" may create contradictions, which in their turn may be a considerable factor of identity dynamics

in societies of the new member states of the European Union in general, and Latvia in particular.

It has to be pointed out that not only changes of identities, but also interaction between changing identities of the main groups of society has to be taken in account. For this purpose I propose to use concept of "normality" and its counterpart – "minority". Three possible understandings of the term "normality" may be distinguished:

- The first possibility presupposes that something may be described as "normal" on the basis of its conformity to more or less universal criteria, like "human nature", "legal norms", "rules of economy" etc.
- The second way of understanding "normality" is to define it on the basis of belonging to the dominant culture.
- Last but not least, the third possibility of understanding "normality" is connected with emphasis on the question whether there is a set of basic conventions in society as a basis for its stability and sustainable development.

The first approach of understanding "normality" in connection with post-Communist Latvia is developed by Daina Stukuls Eglitis[9]. She understands the concept of "normality" not as replacement, but as supplement for the explanatory concept of nationalism, and links the concept of "normality" to questions of elevation and salvation of a nation on the basis of "normal" political, legal and economical conditions. Within this understanding "...part of the process of change has been a struggle between different groups to define and redefine what is socially "natural" and "normal"[10]. Four ideal types of normality in post-Communist society of Latvia are pointed out as follows:

	Revolutionary	Conservative
Progress	Spatial / Modern West	Evolutionary / Immediate Past
Return	Temporal / Distant Past	Reactionary / Immediate Past

The spatial type of normality takes as its primary model of transformation the modern West, the temporal type of normality focuses not on modernization but on restoration and re-creation of the institutions, norms and values of the interwar period of independence, and both of them are based on the conviction that fifty years of Soviet power were a deviation from the normal path of political, economic and cultural development of Latvia. The evolutionary type of normality, in accordance with Daina Stukuls Eglitis, highlights an evolutionary transformation of Soviet structures such as the socialist economy and citizenship regime, whereas the reactionary narrative is concerned with the legacy of the immediate past in order to return to the heritage of the "real socialism"[11], but both cases prescribe to the Soviet time some degree of normality. The Post-Communist development of Latvia may be characterized by fluctuations between spatial and temporal types of normality.

The second understanding of "normality" is based on the belonging to the dominant culture. In this sense the "normality – minority" distinction is closely connected with the structure of identity. Within "normal" identity the role of ethnic questions, such as survival of language, education in the native language etc., usually play a less important role compared to social and economical questions, identification with the state, community, region or religion. This separates "normality" from "minorities" (or "abnormalities") – other ethnic and cultural groups claiming for their language,

cultural, sometimes also – political and economical rights and recognition. It has to be pointed out that the status of "minority" is not directly dependent on a group's specific weight in the whole of the population.

The historical experience of Latvians is that of a centuries-long minority experience. It was, on the one hand, the real basis for the extremely high level of the mass participation during the years of the "singing revolution", and, on the other hand, it produced various stable everyday stereotypes that even in the present situation retain their impact upon discourse in the social-political sphere. The most important of them are:

First of all, the mainly retrospective approach to society and its relations with the outer world, the intention to understand the solution of the current political and social problems mainly in terms of overcoming the injustices performed in the past.

Secondly, the belief about the uniqueness of Latvia's situation that in its turn interrelated with the idea about Latvians as negatively marked chosen people, that they had suffered more than any other nation in the 20th century may be pointed out. Consequently, the assumption was widespread that the Western countries had some specific obligations with regard to Latvians and Latvia, and in the name of overcoming the injustice of the past, Latvians have no obligation to act only in conformity with the standards of political behaviour accepted in the Western world.

On the basis of these popular attitudes, a specific kind of political culture, one may call it a monologue culture, emerged. One of its important features may be called "moral antipolitics". In my understanding of antipolitics I follow ideas of Andreas Schedler, who defines moral antipolitics as attempts to radically reduce the sphere of political debates by juxtaposition of the material (e.g., moral) to the procedural (political). Moral antipolitics proclaims certain values (moral, cultural, ethnic etc.) to exist outside any form of discussion.[12] In postcommunist societies in general and in Latvia in particular such attempts often become a way to cast politics into the shade in situations which demand involvement of all interested parties in order to achieve compromise necessary for sustainable development of society. In this connection it would be useful to mention the idea of the irony of democracy formulated in the middle of the last century by so-called democratic revisionism, which asked the question why democratic regimes worked quite well when a large part of the electorate did not support basic democratic values and norms. The answer was that despite the famous assertion that democracy is government "by the people", the responsibility for the survival of democracy rests on the shoulders of the elite. The problems with the Latvian case are connected with the fact that "antipolitical" attitudes are widespread among representatives of the political elite, and it becomes clear in connection with debates about Russian school reform, that the level of confrontation between Russian-speaking and Latvian-speaking part of the political elite is higher than in society in general.

The identity of Russian-speaking inhabitants of Latvia in the last years of Soviet power may be characterized, unlike the identity of Latvians, as an example of "normal" identity, partly due to the historical tradition of prevalence of self-identification with the state ("empire") over ethnic components of identity, partly due to objective social preferences of Russian-speakers in any corner of the former Soviet Union, and in Latvia in particular. Therefore the questions which dominated in self-understanding of Russian-speakers were not ethnic, but social and economic ones,

and attitudes of the majority of the Russian - speaking population were on a different "level" in comparison with the demands of Latvians for the preservation of Latvian language and culture as well as the independence of Latvia or, at least, were not in direct contradiction with them. This avoided the emergence of ethnic conflict in the beginning of the nineties and produced (so to speak) 'momentum of normality", which played an important role in ensuring the peaceful nature of the renewal of independence of Latvia.

Still in the middle of the nineties there were substantial differences in the identity structure of Latvians and Russians in Latvia. As data of the New Baltic Barometer shows, Latvians identified themselves first of all with ethnic belonging, whereas Russians of Latvia, contrary to Latvians, as their first choice mentioned attachment to city/locality. It has to be mentioned that three surveys – in 1993, 1995, and 1996 showed a tendency of slow decrease in the number of Latvians who mentioned ethnicity as their first choice (63% in 1995, and 57% in 1996) and an increase in the number of Latvians who mentioned belonging to the city/locality as their first choice (17% in 1993, 27% in 1995, and 32% in 1996). Unfortunately, in the 2001 New Baltic Barometer survey, the option of ethnicity was replaced by the option of attachment to the country/state, therefore it is hard to judge if this tendency continued to manifest itself. The strong sense of ethnic identity among Latvian intellectuals and artists was expressed in broad discussion which took place in November 1997 – April 1998 in the newspaper "*Diena*" after publication of an article by sociologist Tālis Tisenkopfs, where he underlined the necessity to analyse multiplicity of individual identities, where ethnic identity is only one of several identities. A Great majority of Tisenkopfs' opponents underlined that any attempt to devalue ethnic identity threatens the very foundations of the state and the Latvian nation[13].

Russians of Latvia, contrary to Latvians, as their first choice mentioned attachment to city/locality (47% as the first choice in 1993, 59% – in 1995, and 53% in 1996). Ethnicity is the first choice of approx. 30% of Russians in Latvia (30% in 1993, 22% in 1995, and 29% in 1996), as well as the second choice for 31 % of Russians in 1993, 33% in 1995, and 36% of Russians in 1996. Unfortunately, in the 2001 survey, the question of ethnic identity was replaced by the question of attachment to Russian/ Soviet, where it is not clear, what does Russian mean – ethnicity of attachment to the country.

Changes of identities of Latvia's main ethnic groups during the years of renewed independence of Latvia may be described as the mixture of two processes. On the one hand, one may speak about transformation of Russian identity from "normality" to "minority", sometimes a rather painful process of recognition of a new nonpriviliged social situation, that, in its turn, strengthens the ethnic identity of the Russians. On the other hand, there are changes of Latvian identity from "minority" to "normality". These changes were slowed down by various subjective and objective factors. Here two of them may be mentioned: first of all, reaction to "EU-ization" efforts, especially because the argument of "Europe's pressure" was widely used by the political elite in the nineties in order to justify sometimes rather painful consequences of adopted policies, as well as a lack of clear understanding of the prospects for distinctive Latvian culture within the European Union, and, last but not least, reaction to strenghthening of the ethnic identity of the Russian-speaking part of population.

What about attachment to Europe, mentioned in the beginning of this article? Marju Lauristin points out in his well-known book "Return to the Western World", "the most decisive role in the collapse of the Soviet Union was played not by ethnic nationalism... but precisely by the civilizational conflict between the Russian-Soviet Empire, the "New Byzantium" of the 20th century, and the Baltic and East-European nations, representing the Western tradition"[14]. One may say that this belonging to the Western world, being European remained for the general public for a long time a declaration without much substance. Nevertheless this drive to come back where Latvians had been more than fifty years before ("return to Europe") was an important driving force for overcoming the stress of social and economic reforms.

On the other hand, the transformation of the vision of Europe from an abstract hope towards a more concrete and contradictional understanding of real European institutions and obligations connected with them substantially changed popular attitudes. As a survey "On the Road to Civil Society" conducted by the Baltic Social Science Institute shows, between 1995 and 1997 the number of those who identified themselves with Europe decreased from 30% to 13% percent among citizens of Latvia and to 10% among non-citizens[15]. In 2000 these numbers decreased to 11% and 7% accordingly[16].

It is a well known fact that Latvia, together with Estonia, was among those candidate states with the highest percent of eurosceptics. It is widely recognized that one of the main sources of the euroscepticism in Latvia (probably the same is true for Estonia) is defensive nationalism, fear that ethnic identity will be endangered within the European Union. As focus group discussions organized by the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences in June – September, 2003 showed, Latvians expressed concern about intervention of EU institutions in language usage questions, that the role of the Latvian language within the Russian community will decrease[17]. On the other hand, immeaditely after the referendum on membership in the European Union the negative vote of the Russian-speaking citizens of Latvia was a matter of broad discussion in the media and society. Compared to 57% of positive votes among Latvians, only 20% of Russians voted for membership in the European Union, 44% voted against (compare with 18% of Latvians), and 36% of Russians did not take part in the referendum (compare with 24% of Latvians) (see graph, No.1).

Attempts to explain the negative vote of Russians – citizens of Latvia on the basis of their attachment to Russia and nostalgia for the Soviet past comes in contradiction with the fact that as far back as in 2002, Russians in Latvia expressed a more positive attitude towards membership in the European Union than Latvians (see graph, No. 2).

The most plausible explanation of this fact may be based on the tendency towards strengthening of the ethnic identity of Russians in Latvia and their dissatisfaction with official policies of Latvian authorities, especially in connection with the reform of Russian schools. In this connection there were certain hopes that pressure on Latvia as a candidate state from EU institutions will soften reform requirements or will lead to its postponement. These hopes failed and the reaction wasanegative vote in the referendum. One of the main sources of euroscepticism among Latvians were fears that ethnic identity will be endangered within the European Union.

On the other hand, immeaditely after the referendum on membership in the European Union the negative vote of the Russian-speaking citizens of Latvia was a

matter of broad discussion in media and society. Compared to 57% of positive votes among Latvians, only 20 % of Russians voted for membership in the European Union, 44 % voted against (Latvians – 18%), and 36% of Russians did not take part in referendum (24% of Latvians).

Graph No. 1. Ethnic dimension of Referendum on Membership in the European Union Source: Post-Referendum Survey. Citizens of Republic of Latvia, N=675, age 18-74, Baltic Social Science Institute, 2003



Attempts to explain negative vote of Russians – citizens of Latvia on the basis of their attachment to Russia and nostalgia for the Soviet past comes in contradiction with the fact that as far back as in 2002, Russians in Latvia expressed more positive attitude towards membership in the European Union than Latvians. Here the concept of EU-ization may be useful again. Strengthening of ethnic identity of Russians in Latvia and their dissatisfaction with official policies of Latvian authorities, especially in connection with education and language issues produced certain hopes within Russian community that pressure towards Latvia as candidate state from EU institutions will soften reform requirements or will lead to its postponement. These hopes failed and the reaction was negative vote in referendum.

Graph No. 2. Changes in attitudes toward EU accession Source: Baltic Social science Institute 2001–2003, Baltic Data House, 1995–1998



	1995 X	1998 X	2001 VII	2002 I	2003 IX
Latvians	70	58	47	51	57
Russians	69	64	45	55	20
Others	65	77	50	61	33

The stability of society in Latvia may be challenged by the uneven "velocity" of identity changes within the main linguistic groups. Russian-speakers move from "normality" to "minority" faster than Latvians are able to "normalize" their identity. Therefore the possibility of the collision of minority feelings exists, and the conclusion may be made that nowadays in Latvia the probability of ethnic conflict is higher than it was in the beginning of the nineties.

The prevention of ethnic conflict is at the same time an important part of the "normalization" of society in the third sense mentioned above, namely, as the establishment of the set of basic conventions in society as a basis for its stability and sustainable development. In this connection it is clear that possibilities of external pressure with respect to minorities, language etc. issues diminished after Latvia became a member state of the European Union. On the other hand, as human rights expert and member of the Latvian Saeima Boris Tsilevich correctly states, "the broad diversity of practices in 'old' democracies – all of which used to be recognized as legitimate and corresponding to liberal – democratic standards – creates confusion for those diligently working to build ethnic policies in accordance with 'civilized Western patterns'"[18]. Therefore the articulation of a set of basic principles recognized by all important segments of society of Latvia more and more becomes an internal problem. Further political development, especially debates on implementation of school reform, will show to what extent EU-ization of political practices in Latvia will be followed by their Europeanization.

NOTES

[1] http://www.c oe.int/T/E/Com/Files/Themes/Identity/Col3_bernotas.asp

[2] See: http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00797en03.pdf

[3] Kevin, Featherstone. Introduction: In the Name of Europe. In: *The Politics of Europeanization*. Ed. by Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli. Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 3.

[4] Ibidem.

[5] Ibidem, pp. 6–12.

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[11] See: pp. 16–19.

[12] *The End of Politics? Explorations intoModern Antipolitics*. Ed. By Andreas Schedler. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1997.

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[16] Ibidem, p. 43.

[17] Latvijas iedzīvotāju motivācija un ekspektācijas attiecībā pret Latvijas iestāšanos Eiropas Savienībā. Baltijas Sociālo Zinātņu institūts, Rīga, 2003. www.bszi.lv/downloads/news/ES_kvalit.pdf

[18] Tsilevich, Boris. New Democracies in the Old World. In: *Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported?* Ed. by Will Kymlicka and Magda Opalski. Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 165.

Kopsavilkums

Raksta mērķis ir analizēt Latvijas sabiedrības galveno etnisko grupu identitātes izmaiņas, ko radījusi Latvijas integrācija Eiropas Savienībā. Šajā sakarā rakstā ir izmantots nošķīrums starp "ESizāciju" un "eiropeizāciju". Ar "ESizāciju" tiek saprasta likumdošanas, ekonomiskās dzīves un politisko institūciju transformācija atbilstoši t. s. Kopenhāgenas kritērijiem. "Eiropeizācija" savukārt ir politiskās kultūras un politiskās uzvedības pamatraksturojumu transformācija saskaņā ar Eiropas humānistiskās kultūras tradīcijām. "ESizācija" un "eiropeizācija" ir dažādi "atgriešanās Eiropā" aspekti, kas virzīti uz vienu un to pašu stratēģisko mērķi, taču atšķiras pēc to "vektoriem" un norišu ātruma. Līdz ar to atsevišķos sabiedrības attīstības posmos tie var nonākt savstarpējā pretrunā, kas kļūst par būtisku faktoru sabiedrisko grupu identitātes transformācijā, it īpaši etniskās un eiropeiskās identitātes mijiedarbības kontekstā. Šajā sakarā rakstā tiek aplūkotas latviešu un Latvijas krievu identitātes transformācija un tās ietekme uz attieksmi pret Eiropas Savienību sakarā ar balsojumu 2003. gada septembra referendumā par iestāšanos Eiropas Savienībā. Par pamatu etniskās identitātes transformācijas aplūkojumam tiek izmantots nošķīrums starp "normalitāti" un "minoritāti", nošķirtas trīs dažādas "normalitātes" nozīmes un uzsvērta svarīgāko sabiedrības grupu atzīto savstarpējo attiecību pamatprincipu nozīme sabiedrības "normalizācijā".

(Re)construction of Collective Identities among Estonian Russians after Dissolution of SU
Igaunijas krievu lolektīvo identitāšu (re)konstrukcija pēc PSRS sabrukuma

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We may explore the historic changes and transitional culture on the basis of public texts (ie artifacts), but we may also explore how individuals "process the culture". The premise of the paper is that self-identification is an important form of individually "re-worked" culture as subjects' response to the changes. Both old and new meanings, ideologies and relevant symbols "circulating" in the public sphere are embedded in identities (Castells 1997).
The article focuses on the question is there potential for the formation of a new civic identity among Estonian Russians shared with ethnic Estonians.
On the basis of representative survey data from 2003, I will analyse how Estonian Russians, in comparison with Estonians, place in their mind the identification categories connected with recent political processes: the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rapid rise of national ideology and the extension of the Estonian geo-cultural space.
The data reveal that the dominating identity among Estonians is the national identity in which civic, ethnic as well as territorial dimensions are represented. Among the Estonian Russians the dominating collective identity is territorial-ethnic.
There exists a certain basis for formation of civic identity in the wider sense among Estonian Russians, but there also exists a tension between particularistic (ethno-cultural) and civic-territorial allegiances. Thus there are good grounds for the formation of a defensive communal identity among Estonian Russians as a reaction to the mixed process of transition, globalisation and EU-integration.
Key words: collective identity, self-categorisation, Estonian Russians.

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Theoretical basis

In order to discuss the potential for the formation of a new civic identity among Estonian Russians (1), we have to define the term 'civic identity' and explore the context of Estonia more precisely.

We may distinguish different approaches to the civic identity concept. One we may call the centric approach, taking political citizenship as a central point from where all other dimensions proceed. For Barber (cited in Page 1997), civic identity is a genuine adherence to the political community, which, in spite of distinctive identity references, unites everyone in preoccupations which affect all.

The majority of authors point out that the concept of citizenship is widening in the course of a general social change: a shift from modern to post-modern-type (network) societies (Miller 1995). David Miller sees citizenship as practised in several modes: right to association, civil right to relative freedom, social right to a minimum standard of living guaranteed by the welfare state, and a post-modern guarantee of access to the technologies of communication (Miller 1995). Bryan Turner defines citizenship as a set of practices within civil society (Turner 1993: 131-133).

We agree with the wider understanding that civic identity embraces one's feeling of being included in the social agreement within the society (see ie Ahluwalia 1999, Page 1997). Derek Heater (1999) explains that political and community affiliations do not exclude each other on the individual level. He argues that this situation can lead to a multiple-identity: one can be at the same time a member of the state (through citizenship) and a member of civil society.

Two approaches can be distinguished in political theory in relation to cultural and civic identity. The so-called homogeny / hegemony (2) approach sees the cultural and civic (citizen / political) identity in super-and subordinate relationship, assuming that one cannot be salient without oppressing the other. Empirical research has supported this thesis when the elite (spokesmen) of an ethnic minority are considered, but does not reveal the same result about the "ordinary" minority group members (Tismenau & Turner 1995, Laperriere, cited from Page 1997). This approach supports the thesis that in the in the private sphere, the different cultural practices are welcome, whereas in the public sphere, the civic (political) common values should dominate. I.e. Donald states that: "status of citizenship is contingent on an operative symbolic order that needs to be distinguished from any claims to a cultural identity for a citizen" (Donald 1996:175).

The other, so called pluralistic approach is based on the idea that civil and civic participation can link the citizenry and the ethno-cultural or other diversity of the society. The notion of civic identity embraces one's awareness of being a member of a particular social group, one of many in the political community (see i.e. Page 1997, Ahluwalia 1999). The awareness about the others is important in this approach, as the civic consciousness is assumed to be achieved in the process of everyday practice and negotiation between the different groups. It is rather a process than a certain end state. If the participation is oppressed, the common citizen identity strengthens in other forms of identification, for example, ethnic, religious or other aspects may become predominant, and the values arousing from this membership may become nonnegotiable with the "mainstream" society (Mouffe, cited from Page 1997). The key concept here is pluralistic (multicultural) citizenship education. Bhikhu Parekh distinguishes between several models here, e.g.. *the procedural model* of a formal state, with minimal regulation of the civic and cultural life of the members of society, and the *millet model*, where the primary loyalty belongs to one's cultural community, and where the state is instead a loose federation of cultural communities, a basic

framework of engagement of necessary political and economic interactions. This model bases a lot on the collective rights of community members and assumes that the state should create the framing institutions to support the culturally non-mainstream groupings. The bearers of those collective rights thus have additionally a *cultural citizenship* (Parekh 2000).

Many authors who have analysed the post-Soviet transition have regarded the building up of a civic society the biggest challenge, and the ethnic problems the most problematic in solving this task (ie Szporluk 1998, Shabad & Slomczynski 1999). Schöpflin has pointed out that when self-identifications of majority and minority derived from historical experience have met a conflict or crisis, then the stability of the political community depends on the degree it is possible to overcome the division between them (Schöpflin 2000: 239). According to Roger Brubaker (1996) the national question in post-communist Europe represents a triadic dynamic relationship between new 'nationalizing' states, national minorities in these states and the 'homeland' of national minorities.

Brubaker has seen three possible ways for alternatives of a new nationalizing state: (1) *civic state*, that is independent of ethnicity of the citizens; (2) *bi* or *multinational state*, where there exist two or more publicly acknowledged and institutionalised main nationalities; (3) hybrid model of minorities rights, where the state is treated as national but not as nationalizing and that does not guarantee equal rights to minorities not only as being citizens, but gives them as minorities some specific rights, above all in the field of education and language (Brubaker 1996: 104-205). Brubaker points out that in the previously ethno-culturally defined societies it is difficult to imagine a civic self-understanding. He also considers as improbable a multinational state model. Better prospects are given, according to Brubaker's model of minorities' rights, to integration models such as those formed by western democracies.

On the other hand, the concepts of knowledge society (Stehr 1992), network society (Castells 1997), and risk society (Beck1999, 2002) in some sense counter-argue against the above-referred political theorists. Despite different arguments, many social theorists say that Western countries face a new period of societal development characterized by the emancipation of actors; decline of authority and power of state and social institutions; loss of legitimacy of rational planning and control. Thus we may ask whether the building up of civic society in post-Soviet states should follow the Western, 'classical' pattern of civic society? Maybe they cannot ever 'catch this train' but have to adapt their policy to the new historical challenges of high modernity? In the discussion how well people in the postcommunist societies are equipped with the social capacities for "managing" the changed reality, the lack of reflexivity, higher threat of atomisation and "cultural bias" towards the private world, low trust in institutions and interpersonal trust in everyday life (Sztompka 1999) is often mentioned (Korts forthcoming).

In analysing the problems connected with the formation of civic identity of Estonian Russians, we approach civic and cultural identity from the pluralistic view, based on the idea that civic participation can link the roles of citizens and members of an ethno- cultural group, and the two identities may reinforce each other, not compete. We understand within this paper the *civic identity* as a feeling of attachment to the state and society, shared interests with all co-members of society (including

political citizenship). Thus we assume that the questions of civic participation, beliefs and trust should be included in the discussion about the perspectives of formation of civic identity in a larger sense.

The case of Estonia: factors that shape the formation of civic identity

Studies have indicated that feelings and cognition in Estonia are ambiguous within the framework of regional, historical, linguistic, and other symbolic references (see eg Kirch et al 1995; 1997, Kruusvall 1998, Valk *et al* 1997, Vihalemm 1999).

In analysing the questions related to the civic identity of Estonian Russians and perspectives of the formation of civic society in the post-Soviet Estonia, there are several factors which should be considered: a) post-Soviet atomisation and (new) differentiation of Estonian society; b) the complicated citizenship situation in Estonia and competing nationalizing ideologies targeting Estonian Russians; c) different historic patterns of formation of collective identity of Estonians and Estonian Russians. Here we are going to analyse briefly all three factors.

The post-Soviet transition process, especially the shock therapy in the economic sphere – the sharp changes in the pension system, labour market etc – has caused in-depth social trauma in Estonian society (see Neal 1998, Sztompka 2002, 2004). The consequences are atomisation and (new) differentiation of Estonian society. Estonia has gained financial stability etc from the quick adoption of free market liberalism, but the intense marketisation has also caused the formation of new transitional hierarchies (*winners* and *losers*) and hindered the development of social solidarity (see ie Ruutsoo 1998, Lauristin 2004 a,b). The Soviet state, with the centralized Party and State regulation of all spheres of life, created (artificial) social cohesion which dissolved together with Soviet Union. The narrative of loss of the social cohesion has also become a part of the transition culture (Kennedy 2000).

Thus we have included not only the structural, but also the mental indicators, such as attitudes toward social changes in Estonia during the last 10 years, liberal and social orientation etc. into our analysis.

The second complicating factor concerns citizenship policy and 'competing' nationalising ideologies.

Among the ethnic Russians in Estonia, 141907 have Estonian citizenship, 73379Russian citizenship, 1048 have citizenship of some other state, and 133346 do not have any citizenship (aliens' passports). Thereby many authors have regarded the mobilisation of Estonian Russians, related to political citizenship, to be likely (ie Szporluk 1992, Linz & Stepan 1996, G. Smith & Wilson 1997, Ponarin 2000). However, Estonia is characterised by a much greater degree of social stability than some other post-Soviet states that granted citizenship to all their Russian-speaking residents (G. Smith et al.1998). One reason for this might be the fact that the *social citizenship* (Marshall, cited in Heater, 1999) is guaranteed for Estonian Russians. Authors have also pointed to the 'form of civil rights which, whilst falling short of full political citizenship, nevertheless conferred basic political freedoms, including the right to vote in local elections' (D. Smith, 1998: 10).

Thus there exists a minimal basis for the formation of attachment to the state and society among Estonian Russians. However, the nationalising ideology of the Estonian state makes the choices of Estonian Russians somewhat more complicated. Launched in the mid-90's, the Estonian State Integration Program does not offer simply 'replacement' for the previous Soviet state identity, but principally claims for individual acculturation, especially the acquisition of the Estonian language (the language requirement will be discussed further). The discourse of the Integration Program, as well as its legal basis, is individualistic-liberal.

An alternative for the restoration of one's self-esteem is offered by the Russian Federation. Albeit being more vague and unsystematic compared to the Estonian Integration Program, this supports the formation of a diaspora identity by offering Russian citizenship and the newly invented "Russianness" as a unifying ideology (e.g. Chinn & Kaiser 1996, Kolsto 1999). This ideology constructs all Russians as one group (Kosmarskaya 2003) and offers rights and protection on the group basis. In general, the Diaspora Ideology promotes collective strategies, the Integration Programme vice versa, promotes individual choices. The two state-led ideologies paradoxically help to maintain each other. They stimulate mutual reconstruction serving as opposites to each other. They are intertwined with the basic choice between the individual and collective strategies of adaptation with societal changes.

Research (Vihalemm and Masso 2002a) shows that both state-led ideologies – Integration ideology by Estonian Republics and diaspora ideology by the Russian Federation – are utilized in individual identity construction patterns only by one part of the Estonian Russians. The two main alternative patterns are regional and ethno-cultural patterns which have a quite specific historical background.

Soviet policy manifested itself in order to follow the *civic assimilationist model*, according to the terms of Bhikhu Parekh, expressing the belief that no state can be stable and cohesive unless its members share a common national culture, including common values, ideals of excellence, moral beliefs, and social practices (Parekh 2000: 197). Surveys conducted at the end of the Soviet period showed that the Estonian community did not accept the state identity but retained its ethnic identity. Marju Lauristin and Peeter Vihalemm argue that 'efforts to preserve the Estonian language in education, science, literature and journalism, and the fight against the forcible Russification of public life and culture formed the most important areas of cultural resistance to the Soviet regime' (Lauristin and P. Vihalemm, 1997: 74–75). We proceed from the premise that the power context in the Soviet era favoured the formation of an Estonian identity as a *resistant type* of identity according to Castells (1997). Researchers agree that, in the Soviet era, the vast majority of Russians identified themselves as 'Soviet people'; the primary allegiance belonged to the Soviet state. The basis of this civic identity was wiped out with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Research has shown that there is little possibility that the earlier civic affiliation will be 'replaced' *in corpore* with the new civic identity offered by the Estonian Republic (ie Vihalemm & Masso 2002 a,b). Rather, there are prerequisites that one part of Estonian Russians may 'take over' from Estonians a minority resistant pattern in the form of ethno-cultural or political particularism (ie Vihalemm 1999, Vihalemm & Masso 2002 a,b).

Following the argumentation of some authors (ie Melvin 1995), we may suppose that the collapse of the Soviet Union, which wiped away the basis of (civic) identity

of Estonian Russians, did not leave an 'empty place' but maintained at least a territorial meaning. Melvin says that: "'Russian speakers' appeals for recognition as a community have been based primarily on human rights rather than on group consciousness. Their calls for participation stress their attachment to Estonia as people who simply live and work there. It is an identity with amorphous boundaries, and is generally tolerant and inclusive in its attitudes". (Melvin 1995: 55). This scenario is in concordance with the global trends of individualisation and atomisation discussed above. Thanks to the spread of electronic media and the general political-cultural opening of Estonia to the West, the Estonian population's opportunities to (virtually) participate in the globalising post-modern cultural context are becoming wider and may create a new public discourse, shaped by post-modern developments which embrace multiple individual identities and both separate and overlap collective identities. We do assume that the *heterogenisation* of the general cultural and power context shape the patterns of construction of collective political and cultural identities in Estonia and the formation of certain civic solidarity.

Proceeding from the above-mentioned broader understanding of civic identity, the focus of the study presented in the following chapters is the question of possible prerequisites for the formation of civic identity among Estonian Russians either on the public or individual level. This formation of a civic identity is discussed in terms of the whole Russian population of Estonia, without limiting it to only those who have political citizenship, albeit this is assumed to be an influential factor.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the re-establishment of the Estonian Republic gave rise to the relatively diffuse assemblage of Russian speakers in today's Estonia. Most local and Western social researchers agree that Russians are differentiated by their future aims, social capital, and cultural and political allegiances (e.g. Hallik 1997, Kirch *et al* 1997, Laitin 1998, Kolsto 2000, Valk & Karu 1997, Vihalemm 1999, Vihalemm & Masso 2002a). Also the Russian speakers in other post-Soviet republics tend to follow rather different paths of their political and cultural allegiances than to one group consciousness (Kosmarskaya in print).

About the possible future developments authors have different opinions. The main principal dimensions can be distinguished: a) the rise of political or ethno-cultural particularism, b) further fragmentation of the Estonian Russians, which can also lead to c) formation of certain common solidarity in the longer time horizon.

Earlier surveys reveal that there exists some cognitive basis for civic identity defined in this context as a bond created between people by the feeling of belonging to a single inclusive community but there seem to be best grounds for development of in-group solidarity with Estonian Russians as a bond created by the shared language and civic framework (Vihalemm & Masso 2002a).

The mentioned survey was conducted among 15-40 year old Russian-speaking city dwellers in 1999. The question was asked, which attributes are sensed by the respondents to conjoin, unite them *personally* with Estonians, Estonian Russians, and Russians in Russia. In the same manner it was asked which attributes are sensed to dissociate, separate them personally from Estonians, Estonian Russians, and Russians in Russia. The analysis shows that the attributes like homeland, (daily) economic interests, state, laws; rights & obligations are sensed by most of the respondents in all the groups as to conjoin, unite them with Estonians and Estonian Russians. Those

attributes are not sensed to be shared with Russians in Russia. By the same token, the attributes like language, lifestyle and manners, and culture (interests) are sensed by most of the respondents in all the groups as to conjoin, unite them with Estonian Russians and Russians in Russia, but separate them from Estonians. However, the cultural and civic attachment of Estonian Russians seems to be oriented towards different poles: the civic attachment towards Estonia and the cultural attachment towards Russia. Thus, there seem to be best grounds for development of in-group solidarity with Estonian Russians as a bond created by the shared language and civic framework. (Vihalemm & Masso 2002a).

In this paper I will analyze Estonian Russians' ethno-cultural, civic and regional collective self-identification, more precisely on the present-day and retrospective self-categorization. The premise of the analysis is that during the post-Soviet transformation certain, 'embryonic' identification patterns start to form. I will discuss how the construction of identity on the individual level does echo, in its specific way, the process of interaction of market-driven liberalism with historically formed cultural patterns of minority-majority relations, and opening up of the geo-political and cultural space of post-Soviet Estonia.

Methodological considerations and data sources

It is generally argued that the process of identification involves the publicly offered *external* definition, called social *categorization*, and the *internal* process or the (partial) acquisition or rejection of identities, called *internalisation* (Jenkins 1996, 2000). Thus, one possibility of exploring identity is via self-categorization, which has fed several empirical studies of political and cultural identity of minority groups and is also utilized in the study (3).

There are diverse groups and communities, but this dynamism and multilayered nature of social relations may give rise to the need for certain hierarchies – emergence of dominant and peripheral solidarities (Yadov & Danilova 1997). Some groups and communities dominate and are 'cross-situational', while others are peripheral. Constructions in group solidarities vary in their degree of rigidity. Thus I do assume that the categories more frequently selected are more rigid and, vice versa, the identification categories that carry symbols that are not strong enough are not internalized. I assume that when people start to give a meaning to what has happened to their group solidarities, the society is no longer as turbulent and the process of 'crystallization' of certain identity patterns and trajectories has begun.

Internalization of various identification categories was utilized in the empirical research. Some of the identification categories were first analysed in the course of prior qualitative in-depth interviews (Masso 1999). The willingness of individuals to use a specific category for self-designation today and 15 years ago was measured in the questionnaire:

Two questions were asked of the respondents:

1. *There are various ways of answering the question 'Who you are?'. With which groups do you identity yourself?* Respondents had to indicate if they felt themselves to be a part of a particular category "*certainly*", "*at times, partly*" or "*not at all*"

2. *Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the regaining of independence, the Estonian Republic has witnessed many societal changes. Please try to recall how you used to feel, and describe yourself 15 years ago, at the time of the Soviet Estonian Republic?* Respondents had to indicate if they felt a member of a particular category *"certainly", "at times, partly" or "not at all"* Also the variable *"don't know; don't remember"* was available.

The following categories were presented to respondents: *Estonian/Russian, Estonian-speaking/ Russian- speaking person, inhabitant of (previous) Soviet Estonian Republic, citizen of Estonian Republic, inhabitant of Estonia, Baltic inhabitant, Soviet person, northerner, European, world citizen.*

Empirical analysis was based on the representative survey "Me, the Media and the World", carried out by the Department of Journalism and Communication of the University of Tartu in co-operation with the research company Faktum during December 2002 and January 2003. The survey covered the use of media, interests, values and identity, attitudes towards the changes in Estonia during the past 10-15 years, life-style and life conditions. The sample was composed of 15-74 year-old inhabitants, according to a territorially representative population model of Estonia. The sample was comprised of 1470 persons, with 940 answering in Estonian and 509 in Russian.

Different age groups in the sample were also proportional to the whole population. The sample structure of Russians is given in Table 1. Demographic variables (gender, age, education, and place of residence) are given here merely as a description of the sample structure of the survey. The question about self-designation 15 years ago was not asked of respondents who were under 30. Thus the analysis including past self designations and strategies of combining the self-identification in the past with present-day self-identification, is done on the sub-sample of persons aged 30-74.

Results

I will compare the answers to the question about today's self-identification with retrospective self-designations 15 years ago, thus prior to dissolution of the Soviet Union and the transformation. Respondents aged 30 to 74 form the total sample here. I do not assume that the respondents really felt so 15 years ago. Rather, I intend to measure how people now see (interpret) the development paths of their self-identification.

I am going to analyse how extensively the aforementioned identification categories are utilized in the self-identification of Estonians and Estonian Russians today and retrospectively 15 years ago, and how heterogeneous or homogeneous the perceived identity-structure is. The overview about the changes in the internalisation of various identification categories is given in **Figure 1.**

In a more detailed manner, the frequencies of retrospective self-categorisations of Estonians and Estonian Russians are given in **Appendix 1** and the frequencies of today's self-categorisations of Estonians and Estonian Russians are given in **Appendix 2**.

Changes in identification categories among Estonian Russians. Per cent of those who answered "certainly" or "sometimes"



Changes in identification categories among Estonians. Per cent of those who answered "certainly" or "sometimes"



Figure 1. **Perceived changes in identification categories among Estonian Russians and Russians during the transiotion period**

National categories are clearly dominating in self-identification of the Estonians today: "Estonian" (93% definitely feel that they are Estonians), "citizen of the Estonian Republic" (88% definitely feel that they are Estonians and inhabitants of Estonia (86% definitely feel that they are inhabitants of Estonia). Thus civic, ethnic as well as territorial components are represented in the collective national identification of the Estonians.

Also, the linguistic identification category "Estonian-speaking" (66% definitely feel that they are Estonian-speaking people) is used quite often, yet this category is less dominant than the others. Based on the premise that the historical identity construction pattern of the Estonians has been the defensive minority pattern around language and culture, it may be interpreted as a shift of the collective identity of the Estonians towards the nation with statehood. However, it may also be interpreted differently – as the category "Estonian" includes, due to the historical development of group consciousness, implicitly more components of culture and language than those related to a state then merely linguistic identification may seem for an Estonian to be too "poor" and unimportant, and therefore has not achieved general legitimacy at the grass-roots level.

Retrospective components dominating in the identities of the Estonians are in principle the same: ethnic (88% definitely felt that they were Estonians), territorial (77% definitely felt that they were inhabitants of Estonia), linguistic (67% definitely felt that they were speakers of the Estonian language), civic (64% definitely felt that they were inhabitants of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic).

Thus, the main change in the dominant categories of the identity of the Estonians has occurred in the civic dimension – the Republic of Estonia and civic identity have become clearly more dominant than the Estonian SSR.

The components dominating in self-identification of the Estonian Russians today are territorial-ethnic categories: "inhabitant of Estonia" (84% definitely feel that they are inhabitants of Estonia), "Russian" (79% definitely feel that they are Russians), "Russian-speaker" (74% definitely feel that they are speakers of the Russian language). Thus the territorial and ethno-linguistic components are represented in collective identification of the Estonian Russians. Compared to the Estonians, ethnic identification is not so dominating in the case of the Russians. This is explained by the fact that not all Russian-speaking respondents are Russians – among those who responded to the Russian-language questionnaire were Ukrainians, Byelorussians and representatives of other nationalities.

Retrospective components dominating in the identities of the Estonian Russians are mainly civic (78% felt that they were inhabitants of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, 73% felt that they were Soviet persons), ethnic (76% definitely felt that they were Russians), territorial (61% definitely felt that they were inhabitants of Estonia). Thus, contrary to the dynamics of the identification of the Estonians, the "self" representations of the Russians are limited to the civic dimension.

Taking into account a theoretical (4) thesis that the dominating identity of the Russian-speaking population during the Soviet era was the Soviet identity, the territorial-ethnic identity dominating in the present collective identification indicates quite clearly to the ethno-territorial minoritization process.

The civic category "citizen of the Republic of Estonia" has been firmly accepted by 48% of the Estonian Russians, a little more than the share of the Russians who actually have the Estonian citizenship (36%). Considering that 17% of the Estonian Russians feel that they are citizens of the Republic of Estonia, we may say that civic identity at the subjective level is not deterministically related to political citizenship. Previous empirical studies have shown that, when identifying oneself as an Estonian citizen, the prevailing reasons are territorial (being born in Estonia, living in Estonia).

Thus, many Estonian Russians perceive this category to be cognitive rather than institutional. However not having citizenship was the main reason why the category was considered unacceptable (Vihalemm and Masso 2002b).

Regional categories are in today's identity space of the Estonians situational rather than dominant identification references. For example, the categories "Baltic inhabitant", "European", and "Northener" are accepted by about 1/3 and firmly rejected by about 1/5 of the Estonians.

Compared with the retrospective identification, the categories "European" and "Northener" have moved from the zone of rejection in the past (42% felt that they were definitely not Europeans, 36% felt that they were definitely not Northeners) into today's zone of situational identification (about 40% admit that sometimes they feel that they are partially Baltic, European or Northener).

Regional categories are more dispersed in the identity space of the Estonian Russians. For example the category "Baltic inhabitant" is perceived as dominant by a large part of the Estonian Russians – 52% feel that they are 'definitely Baltic inhabitants'. "Baltic" as an identity reference is more important for the Russians than for the Estonians. Thus we may suggest a hypothesis that in addition to logical territorial connection, "Baltic" also connotes for the Russians socio-cultural meanings. The media have probably helped to create these connotations (for example, there is a special television channel Pervoi Baltjiski Kanal for the Russian-speaking audience in the Baltic countries) and the image of Pribaltika as the most western region of the Soviet Union, which had a higher standard of living than the rest of the country, has been preserved in the memory of people.

The categories "European" and "Northener", which have became more important along with the geo-cultural extension of Estonia, are in the identity structure of the Estonian Russians more often placed in the zone of rejection (when thinking about both the past and the present 40–50% of the Russians definitely do not feel that they are Europeans or Northeners). Also, these categories are more often perceived by the Russians as situational rather than dominant. Thus we may say that the opening of the geo-cultural space of Estonia has influenced the self-identification of the Russians less than it has influences the self-identification of the Estonians.

In general, shifts in the self-image of the Estonian population related to the geo-cultural opening up of Estonia may be characterised as gradual rather than sudden, and they are differentiating (e.g. there is an opinion that Estonia's accession to the EU is a project of the elite) rather than universal.

The global category – "citizen of the world" - is creating more opposition than other regional categories. As many as 40% of the Estonians and 47% of the Russians find that they definitely do not feel that they are citizens of the world and 23% and 14% respectively feel that they are definitely citizens of the world. Thus, global self-determination is rather unfamiliar for the inhabitants of Estonia despite the spread of global media and mass culture.

Categories related to the past and history – "Soviet person" and "inhabitant of the (former) Estonian SSR" have been expelled from the self-image of some people. The category "inhabitant of the (former) Estonian SSR" is rejected firmly by 48% and accepted as an important category (feel that I definitely was…) by 19% of the

Estonians. Thus the local version of the Soviet identity (ESSR identity) is used by part of the Estonians to interpret the post-Soviet cultural space. The identity "Soviet person" has been completely expelled from the identity repertoire of the Estonians.

In the identity space of the Estonian Russians, both categories are represented equally – one fourth of the Estonian Russians feel definitely or from time to time that they are Soviet people or inhabitants of the Estonian SSR.

In general, the dominating identity among the Estonians is the national identity in which civic, ethnic as well as territorial dimensions are represented. Among the Estonian Russians, the dominating collective identity is territorial-ethnic.

The geo-cultural opening of Estonia is reflected in the identity space of the Estonians (it must be taken into account that interviews were conducted at the beginning of 2003, before Estonia joined the EU) more clearly than in the identity space of the Estonian Russians – the Estonians use relevant categories as a basis for situational self-identification more often than the Estonian Russians, who consider these categories as unsuitable references of self-identification. Identity categories related to the Soviet Union have not entirely disappeared – part of the Estonians and the Russians continue to use these categories in situational self-identification. The only difference is that for the Estonians, a legitimate symbol of identification is the Estonian SSR rather than the Soviet Union.

Conclusions

We may conclude from this study that societal context is rather ambiguous and enables different dimensions of identity development. This paper discussed the potential of building up the civic society in post-Soviet Estonia from one aspect - the perspective formation of a new civic identity among Estonian Russians in comparison with Estonians and considering the various global and local social, cultural and historic factors which may shape this process. The paper proceeds from the wider sense of civic identity - one's feeling of being included in the social agreement within the society, awareness of being a member of a particular social group and one of many in the political community.

The data reveal that national categories are clearly dominating in self-identification of the Estonians today. Civic, ethnic as well as territorial components are represented in the collective national identification of the Estonians. Retrospective components dominating in the identities of the Estonians are in principle the same: ethnic, territorial, linguistic, civic. Thus, the main change in the dominant categories of the identity of the Estonians has occurred in the civic dimension – the Republic of Estonia and civic identity have become clearly more dominant than the Estonian SSR had been.

The components dominating in self-identification of the Estonian Russians today are territorial-ethnic categories: "inhabitant of Estonia", "Russian", "Russian-speaker". Retrospective components dominating in the identities of the Estonian Russians are mainly civic, ethnic, territorial. Thus, contrary to the dynamics of the identification of the Estonians, the "self" representations of the Russians are limited to the civic dimension.

Taking into account a theoretical thesis that the dominating identity of the Russian-speaking population during the Soviet era was the Soviet identity, the territorial-ethnic

identity dominating in the present collective identification indicates quite clearly the ethno-territorial minoritization process.

Regional categories are in today's identity space of the Estonians situational rather than dominant identification references. Compared with the retrospective identification, the categories "European" and "Northener" have moved from the zone of rejection in the past into today's zone of situational identification.

Regional categories are more dispersed in the identity space of the Estonian Russians. "Baltic" as an identity reference is more important for the Russians than for the Estonians. Categories "European" and "Northener" which have became more important along with the geo-cultural extension of Estonia are, in the identity structure of the Estonian Russians, more often placed in the zone of rejection.

Thus we may say that the opening of the geo-cultural space of Estonia has influenced the self-identification of the Russians less than it has influences the self-identification of the Estonians.

In general, in further analysis of the civic identity of Estonian Russians and the civic society in Estonia, there are three main factors which should be considered:

1. Different historic patterns of construction of collective identity of Estonians and Estonian Russians.
2. Post-Soviet atomization and (new) differentiation of Estonian society in the course of intense marketization which hinders the development of social solidarity.
3. Global geo-cultural flows of high modernity, the new period of societal development characterized by emancipation of actors; decline of authority and power of state and social institutions; loss of legitimacy of rational planning and control.

In general, the perspectives of formation of civic identity among Estonian Russians are rather modest. In analysing the mental world of Estonian Russians, there exists a certain basis for formation of civic identity in the wider sense among Estonian Russians, but there also exists a tension between particularistic (ethno-cultural) and civic-territorial allegiances.

Thus there are good grounds for formation of defensive communal identity among Estonian Russians as a reaction to the mixed process of transition, globalisation and EU-integration.

Notes

1. By the term 'Estonian Russians' I do not only refer to people with a Russian ethnic or linguistic origin, but also to the Ukrainians, Byelorussians and other ethnicities whose mother tongue or everyday language is Russian. I seek to avoid the negative connotations of the term 'non-Estonians'. Russian-speakers form about one third of the whole Estonian population – about 351 000 Russians and about 46 3000 Ukrainians, Byelorussians and other ethnicities.

2. The term is "borrowed" from Friedman (1994).

3. I do not assume that the retrospective categories echo the situation prior to the transformation process. Neither do I assume that this method covers fully the identity topic. The study of identifying categories is only one way to address the problem that can at best 'scratch the surface'. The findings are interpreted by keeping in

mind that the respondents might share the category but not necessarily its meaning. However, we assume that a general overview of the reception of the most commonly used categories will bring out the most general lines for further ethnographic and other types of research on identity development. The self-categorization concept is discussed by Abrams & Hogg 1990, Hopkins & Reicher 1996, Brady 2000, Haslam *et al* 2000, etc.

4. Unfortunately, studies on ethnic issues, which were conducted before 1991, are not a very reliable source of comparison.

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Appendix 1. **Retrospective internalization and rejection of identification categories among Estonians (N=680) and Estonian Russians (N=358) aged 30 to 74**

I felt 15 years ago, that I was...		certainly	sometimes, partly	not at all	don't remember	No answer
...an inhabitant of the Estonian Soviet Republic	Estonians	64	17	8	5	7
	Estonian Russians	78	7	4	3	6
...an Estonian / a Russian	Estonians	88	4	2	2	5
	Estonian Russians	76	10	6	3	5
...a Soviet person	Estonians	32	23	34	5	7
	Estonian Russians	73	8	5	5	8
...an inhabitant of Estonia	Estonians	77	10	3	3	7
	Estonian Russians	61	11	9	8	11
...a Russian / an Estonian language speaker	Estonians	67	12	8	6	7
	Estonian Russians	58	12	16	6	9
...a Baltic inhabitant	Estonians	45	31	11	5	8
	Estonian Russians	53	18	9	9	10
...a citizen of the Republic of Estonia	Estonians	19	13	49	10	9
	Estonian Russians	14	5	51	16	14
...a European	Estonians	16	24	42	11	7
	Estonian Russians	13	14	46	15	13
...a world citizen	Estonians	12	16	52	13	7
	Estonian Russians	13	11	47	17	12
...a northerner	Estonians	16	29	36	11	8
	Estonian Russians	11	16	46	15	12

Source: *Survey "Me, the Media and the World", December 2002- January 2003. Dept. of Journalism and Communication, University of Tartu.*

Appendix 2. **Present-day internalization and rejection of identification categories among Estonians and Estonian Russians in 2003**

Today I feel that I am...		certainly	sometimes, partly	not at all	non-answer
...an inhabitant of Estonia	Estonians	86	6	2	1
	Estonian Russians	84	7	3	6
...an Estonian / a Russian	Estonians	93	1	1	4
	Estonian Russians	79	11	6	4
...an Estonian/ a Russian language speaker	Estonians	66	13	13	8
	Estonian Russians	74	14	6	6
...a Baltic inhabitant	Estonians	39	40	14	7
	Estonian Russians	52	27	15	6
...a citizen of the Republic of Estonia	Estonians	88	6	1	4
	Estonian Russians	48	17	26	8
...a European	Estonians	34	41	18	7
	Estonian Russians	22	30	39	8
...a northerner	Estonians	28	44	21	8
	Estonian Russians	20	24	50	6
...a world citizen	Estonians	23	30	40	7
	Estonian Russians	14	23	54	8
...an inhabitant of the Estonian Soviet Republic	Estonians	19	24	48	9
	Estonian Russians	13	12	62	13
...a Soviet person	Estonians	1	7	83	10
	Estonian Russians	8	15	66	11

Source: *Survey "Me, the Media and the World", December 2002- January 2003,* Dept. of Journalism and Communication, University of Tartu

Kopsavilkums

Mēs varam pētīt vēsturiskās izmaiņas un pārejas laika kultūru, balstoties uz sabiedrības veikumu (t. i., artefaktiem), taču mēs varam pētīt arī to, kā indivīdi virza kultūras "procesu". Šis raksts pamatots uz pieņēmumu, ka pašidentifikācija ir svarīga individuāli "pārstrādātās" kultūras forma – kā subjekta reakcija uz pārmaiņām. Gan vecās, gan jaunās jēdzienu nozīmes, ideoloģijas un attiecīgie simboli, kas "cirkulē" atklātībā, ir sakņoti identitātēs (Kastells 1997).

Mans uzdevums ir aplūkot jautājumu, vai Igaunijas krievu vidū pastāv kāds potenciāls, kas varētu veidot jaunu – ar etniskajiem igauņiem kopīgu pilsonisku identitāti.

Balstoties uz reprezentatīviem 2003. gada aptauju datiem, esmu analizējusi jautājumu, kā Igaunijas krievi salīdzinājumā ar igauņiem veido tās identifikācijas kategorijas, kuras ir saistītas ar nesenajiem politiskajiem procesiem: Padomju Savienības sabrukumu, ātru nacionālās ideoloģijas izvirzīšanos un igauņu ģeokulturālās telpas izplatību. Šie dati atklāj, ka starp igauņiem dominējošā identitāte ir nacionālā identitāte, kuras ietvaros tiek reprezentētas pilsoniskās, etniskās un teritoriālās dimensijas. Starp Igaunijas krieviem dominējošā kolektīvā identitāte ir teritoriāli etniska. Igaunijas krievu vidū pastāv noteikti priekšnoteikumi pilsoniskās identitātes izveidei plašā nozīmē, taču tāpat ir vērojama spriedze starp partikulārām (etniski kulturālām) tendencēm un pilsoniski teritoriālo lojalitāti. Tāpēc pastāv vērā ņemami iemesli defensīvas kopienas identitātes izveidei Igaunijas krievu vidū – kā reakcija uz pārejas, globalizācijas un ES integrācijas procesu sajaukumu.

The Changing Discourse of Minority Identities: Latvia
Mainīgais minoritāšu identitātes diskurss: Latvijas gadījums

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The article is written from the perspective of social constructivism, by applying critical discourse analysis (R.Wodak. Discursive Construction of National Identities). The critical discourse analysis attempts to comprise all possible information on historical and socio-economic conditions that are integrated in the process of discourse construction.

Discourse analysis is performed through group discussions prior to the EU accession. Two interlinked dimensions are singled out during the process of analysis: first, themes related to national identity; second, strategies involved in the discursive construction.

The article uses quantitative data as well characterizing the changes of the social identification of inhabitants of Latvia from 1990 to 2004.

Key words: Social identity, social constructivism, critical discourse analysis.

The issue of minority identities has been intriguing to Baltic researchers ever since the early 1990s. Karklins, in studying national identity, has stressed links between ethnic, state and regime identities.[1] Karklins and Zepa have accented changes in state-based identity in the context of the state's status and of changes in the political regime.[2] Tabuns, Tabuna and Broks have focused the minority identity problem on the fact that national identity emerges against the background of multi-ethnic identities, providing empirical evidence about that which Latvia's largest ethnic groups (Latvians and Russians) have in common and that which separates them.[3] Kirch and Kirch have focused attention on the way in which the identity of Estonia's Russians has changed in the context of integration in society.[4]

In his work "Identity in Formation"[5], Laitin has looked at the way in which the identity of Russian speakers is developing in four post-Communist countries, including Estonia and Latvia, thinking about the strategies that the minorities are choosing: "As Russians in the near abroad decide whether to assimilate, to organise politically as Russians, or to return to their putative homeland, the basic identity categories that guided them in the past become eroded. Russians in all four republics are, with varying degrees of self-consciousness, inventing new categories of identity to help them make sense of who they are."[6]

For empirical illustrations, authors have commonly turned to data from quantitative surveys. Leitins also employs content analysis of the mass media, as well as experiments. Tabuns, Tabuna and Broks also have engaged in content analysis of newspapers in addition to their survey work.

Changes in identity: the 1990s and the start of the 21st century

In the early 1990s, Karklins and Zepa found that there was a visible change in identities among Latvia's residents. Data from October 1990 and April 1991 indicated that even over the course of just half a year, the number of people who thought of themselves as residents of Latvia had increased significantly. There were fewer people who counted themselves among the residents of the USSR, fewer people who linked their place of residence first and foremost to their neighbourhood or their city. In other words, the restoration of Latvia's independence strengthened the sense of belonging to Latvia among minorities.

Table 1

Territorial identity: Latvians and minorities (1990-1991) Percentage of respondents who defined themselves as residents of ...

	October 1990		April 1991	
	Latvians	Others	Latvians	Others
Resident of:				
An area or city	37	44	23	31
Latvia	55	31	65	43
The USSR	1	15	0	10
Europe	0	2	1	2
The world	1	3	1	5
Hard to say	3	3	1	8
No answer	3	2	9	1

Source: Latvian Social Research Centre, 1990, 1991.

More than 10 years later, another study was conducted – "Ethnic Tolerance and Integration of the Latvian Society" (BISS, 2004). Data from that survey show that among Latvia's minorities, and particularly among Russians, people often feel a sense of belonging not only to Latvia, but also to Russia (25%). The sense of belonging to Europe is much less common among minorities in Latvia than is the sense of belonging to Russia (5%). That may be one reason why Latvia's Russians were somewhat doubtful about the country's accession to the European Union.

Table 2

Territorial identity: Latvians and minorities, 2004

How closely linked do you feel you are to ... (% shows those answering "very closely" and "closely")	**Latvians**	Russians	Others
... your area	66	67	64
... your city	76	79	82
... your region	57	48	40
... Latvia	82	74	74
... Russia	3	25	18
... the Baltic States	15	8	15
... Europe	12	5	7

Source: Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, 2004.

In the more than 10 years since the restoration of Latvia's independence, a new generation has grown up, one in which people have shaped their identities against the background of shifting identities among their parents. The issue of identity among

minority young people attracted particular attention once it was found that the greatest number of Euro-sceptics could be found specifically in this group when it came time for the referendum on joining the EU.

In a post-referendum study (BISS, 2003), it was found that there were quite a few more Euro-sceptics among young people than in the population at large, and this was particularly true among minority young people – among them, only 10% had voted in favour of joining the EU, while 45% did vote in the referendum at all. Among young people who are citizens of Latvia, 40% voted "yes", and 30% did not participate. Among all citizens, 50% voted "yes", and 25% abstained; among citizens who participated in referenda, 67% voted "yes".

Table 3

The vote on joining the EU

	Voted "yes"	Did not vote at all
Minority young people	10%	45%
All young people	40%	30%
All citizens	50%	27%
Citizens, participated in referenda	67%	-

Source: Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, 2003.

Constructing identity

The primary purpose in writing this article is to gain an understanding of the way in which identities among Latvia's minorities are established and how they change, taking a particular look at that which hides behind the quantitative survey data in this area. Discourse analysis is used as a method here, using it to look at the way in which minorities construct their identities through everyday discourse.

The basic study of identity here is based on the approach of Erikson – one that is used by many other researchers, too: "Identity formation [is] a process ... by which the individual judges himself in the light of what he perceives to be the way in which others judge him in comparison to themselves and to typology significant to them; while he judges their way of judging him in the light of how he perceives himself in comparison to them and to types that have become relevant to him."[7]

Other authors, too, have stressed the dual nature of how ethnic identities emerge: "Ethnic identity is the result of a dialectical process involving internal and external opinions and processes, as well as the individuals' self-identification and outsiders' ethnic designations-that is, what *you* think is your ethnicity, versus what *they* think is your ethnicity".[8]

In this article, I will use the results of focus group discussions. The goals of these groups have been different. Some have looked at attitudes vis-ą-vis accession to the EU – something which provoked the revelation of one's identity in a broader context. Others have dealt with attitudes toward minority school reforms, which provoked people into talking more about the discourse of power. Questions which touched directly upon identity were not particularly detailed in this case, but the benefit is that the focus group discussions were held with various kinds of people:

1) Young people who are non-citizens
2) Non-citizens who are older than 40

3) Students in minority schools
4) Parents of students in minority schools
5) Teachers in minority schools

This article is based on the approach which De Cillia, Reisigl and Vodak have used in analysing focus group results, as reflected in the article "The Discursive Construction of National Identities".[9]

The following are the assumptions on which analysis of focus group texts is based:

1) National identity is not an inborn aspect of identity such as race, one that is explained through "primordialism". It is socially constructed through interaction among family, school, the mass media and the influence of others.
2) Identity is a malleable phenomenon, particularly at times when there have been changes in the status of the state, the political regime or the economic system.
3) The construction of identity involves interaction between the personal and the public space, because the construction of an identity represents both an evaluation of oneself and the evaluation of "others" about "me" and about the group to which "I" belong.
4) The construction of identity is based on emphasising one's own unique nature, separating one's identity from others who are different in one way or another.

As did De Cillia, Reigl and Vodak,[10] I will conduct an analysis which separates out three interrelated dimensions: contents/topics, strategies, and linguistic means and forms of their realisation.

Subjects which participants in focus group discussions decide to debate allow us to look at the aspects which participants in the discussion find to be meaningful. This allows researchers to classify subjects in accordance to their meaning and to get a sense of how the researched phenomenon is constructed: "Through discourse, social actors constitute knowledge, situations, social roles, as well as identities and interpersonal relations between various interacting social groups."[11]

Major topics of discussion when talking about one's sense of belonging to Latvia

If we look at the major topics which appeared in focus group discussions, we find that discourses via which participants expressed their belonging to Latvia were expressed through comparison and contrast. The construction of an identity discourse is a complicated process, one that is imbued with internal conflict. These are the contrasts which were used most often:

1) Latvia vs. Russia (the Soviet Union)
2) The past vs. the present day
3) The private vs. the public space
4) The land vs. the state
5) Positive things that attract vs. negative things that repel

In search for a minority identity: Latvia compared to Russia

The construction of a minority identity is based on what the individual says about his or her belonging to Latvia and on what his or her statements repeat from things that "others" have said about Latvia.

Both in the things that participants said and in the things that "others" have said about Latvia, there is often a comparison between Latvia and Russia, with people speaking about factors such as economics, social security and geopolitical considerations (proximity to Europe). The views of "others" who reside in Russia are mentioned most often, and a great deal of importance is attached to these statements. It is precisely with Russia that Latvia's minorities have the closest links. Many people have friends and relatives whom they visit in the neighbouring country, and when they talk, one hears the views of "others" about Latvia.

There were many situations like that. I used to live in the East, during Soviet times, and Latvia was seen very much as a foreign country there. When I said that I was from Rīga, everyone fell silent for a long time. (A teacher)

I have relatives in Russia, and they believe that Latvia is a part of Europe. Then I feel a true sense of pride in relation to them. (A teacher)

Some respondents compared Latvia and Russia on the basis of their own experience, and that has allowed them to develop a positive discourse about Latvia:

When I travelled around, I came to understand that we are quite a bit ahead of them [Russia]. (A teacher)

It's even worse there [in Russia]. Salaries also aren't paid there, but for longer periods of time. Here in Latvia, if it's a state-owned company, the salary is paid every month, but not over there. You don't even get child support subsidies for a long period of time, while here something is paid out every month. I wouldn't want to return to Russia. (A young non-citizen)

The discourse of a new identity: Latvia's Russians are "different from Russia's Russians"

Latvia's Russians are fond of stressing the fact that as far as "others" are concerned, they differ from Russia's Russians in language, behaviour and culture. This serves as an emotional foundation for a new identity.

We had been there for a while, perhaps for a week, and then they said that we really were different in outer terms. We spoke in some special way. Perhaps we don't feel that here, but when we find ourselves amidst real Russians, those who live in Russia, they say that we are completely different people. Perhaps we are a bit more cultured, more unique, and then we are always proud that we are from Latvia. (A parent)

Comparing the past and the present

In talking about their sense of belonging to Latvia, many respondents spoke about the past, about the era of the Soviet Union:

When I served in the army, it was international. When they found out that we were from the Baltic republics, from Latvia and Estonia, they treated us like people from the West. There was a period of that kind. (A teacher)

Respondents were pleased to call up memories about the unified country that was the Soviet Union and about the popularity of products from the Latvian SSR therein. This can be seen as a "nostalgic discourse" of identity, one which

simultaneously covers a sense of belonging to the entire USSR and to Latvia as one of its components:

Everywhere we went along Latvia's borders (St Petersburg, Brest), when people found out that we were from Latvia, from Rīga ... of course, we brought along souvenirs, our famous chocolates. We were immediately recognised because of the chocolates, the Laima company and so forth. The Uzvara company was still operating back then. (A teacher)

When comparing the past to the present, respondents stress not only Latvia's economic achievements during the Soviet period, but also the Soviet ideology of internationalism, one which respondents prefer over the nation state ideology that is implemented by independent Latvia:

In Soviet times I was really proud, I thought that ethnic relationships here were more acceptable, more harmonic, more tolerant, patient and calm. Recently, if you assign a grade to ethnic relations, then the grade for the state (the government) is negative. (A teacher)

During Soviet times, the assessment which "others" – those who lived in Russia – produced about Latvia's Russians tended to be positive. They were seen as different, but attractive. When Latvia regained its independence, attitudes shifted toward the negative. As far as "others" in Latvia are concerned, their evaluation is perceived by minorities as being negative. Often this represents bitterness over the fact that the sense of belonging to Russia and to Latvia alike is under threat. This could be defined as a "crisis discourse" for the identity of Latvia's minorities.

Attitudes have been changing recently. A while ago I spent one year working in Russia. Attitudes were very different toward me, a Russian, a person who had come from Latvia. We are treated poorly here, now we are also treated poorly there. It was with sadness that I returned. (A teacher)

In St Petersburg they say, 'You are not one of ours, you speak differently. [..] You are no longer one of us.' (A parent)

People in Moscow get tired when they listen to me, they say, 'You speak so slowly that it is impossible to listen to you!' (A parent)

The ideas of minorities vis-ą-vis their belonging to Russia are also changing, one notices alienation from Russia, but also a sense of difference from ethnic Latvians. This indicates that a search is afoot for a new identity. We are dealing with a group that might be called "Latvia's Russians", these are neither "Russians" nor "Latvians". One senses an emotional desire to demonstrate a new identity.

I went to visit my parents in Russia. [..] For a long time now, I have not been needed there. I differ from Russians who live there, and I differ from Latvians who live there. I think that I have to be proud of [belonging to Latvia]. (A parent)

By monitoring the discourses which serve to construct the minority identity, we can produce a summarising matrix which compares the "past vs. present" discourses, as well as what minorities think "others" are saying about them, and what they feel about themselves. We can see that if there was a "positive discourse" about the past, then the discourse about the present differs both by virtue of the negative position of "others" and by virtue of the fact that only the self-evaluation discourse is positive in nature.

The matrix of Latvia's minority identity: "Past vs. present", "Others vs. us"

	"Others" in Russia	"Others in Latvia"	Self-evaluation
Soviet times	+	0	+
Now	-	-	+

A new identity: State-based, ethnic or another ...

Minorities today are facing a dilemma. Should their new identity be based on the state, on ethnicity or on some other factor? The evaluation by "others" differs in foreign countries and in Latvia. When they are abroad, minorities find that the evaluation of "others" allows them to feel a sense of belonging to Latvia, i.e., to feel a state-based identity. Here in Latvia, however, the evaluations of "others" tend to stress that which is different – ethnic identity, as well as differing citizenship status:

Whenever we are abroad, then we are from Latvia. When we are here, then each of us has a separate nationality - we are Russians or Latvians. (A parent)

The search for a new identity is also evidenced by efforts to separate oneself from Russia, the desire to receive confirmation from "others" of one's belonging to Latvia. At the same time, however, the new identity is still fragile – the evaluation of the "others" does not meet expectations:

Once our group travelled to Poland, and the Poles looked at us peculiarly, why had we gone there in the first place? When our people started to speak Polish, then it turned out that the Poles had thought that we were Russians. That was offensive – why Russians? Latvia, that is where we were from. No, right away we're Russians. Not that Latvia is a separate country, no – we're immediately Russians. They know very little about our country. It's humiliating. (A student)

In the search for identity, minorities also repeat the "labels" which radical nationalist politicians attach to them – the word "occupant", for instance:

I am an ***occupant****. My mother had a profession which meant that in Soviet times, she travelled all around the Union. It turned out that in the last few years we lived in Jēkabpils.*

Minorities do not wish to link their identity to the status of citizen or non-citizen, because they consider the situation to be unfair. As counter-arguments, they use discourses that have often been presented in the Russian language media: "Automatic granting of citizenship", "living in this country for several generations", "working on behalf of the state", etc.

First of all, there is the fact that I am a non-citizen, and in some way I feel that I am not needed. (A non-citizen)

The fact that they ***won't give citizenship*** *to people who have lived here for their whole life or half their life* ***is a direct indication that we are nothing here****. We are not Latvia's residents, we simply populate this territory. That is not too good either.* (A non-citizen)

So why cannot we automatically receive citizenship in this country in which we live? We work for the state, our children are born here, but we still have to go and fight to get citizenship. I don't know – that doesn't seem right. (A non-citizen)

Young people from ethnic minorities find the discourses which prevail in the Latvian public space to be alien and incomprehensible – the idea that citizenship is a confirmation of loyalty, that loyalty is manifested through the naturalisation oath. Things which minority young people said in the focus group discussions suggested that they have very poor understanding of the institution of citizenship as such. The word "discrimination" that is often used in the Russian language mass media is used in an absurd sense – "discrimination in undertaking responsibility":

The point is neither the money nor the effort. The point is that you have to take an oath when you go to be naturalised. Latvians who are our peers do not have to take this oath before the state. They are automatically citizens of the state. We have to take the oath. That means that we have to undertake a certain amount of responsibility. We face discrimination in undertaking responsibility by swearing an oath before this country. (A student)

In terms of feeling a sense of belonging to Europe, too, minorities feel quite distanced, and that is basically for two reasons – one is the highly different standard of living in Western Europe as opposed to Latvia, and the second is the fact that democracy has not yet fully developed in Latvia. Only in geographic terms to minorities feel a sense of belonging to Europe. It is of importance here that in discussing their attitudes vis-ą-vis Europe, Russian speaking minorities use comparisons with Russia:

This place [Latvia] *has nothing to do with Europe. In 15 or 20 years, no sooner, we will be able to feel that we really live in Europe. If you compare us to Russia, then we are living in Europe. Over there you get the feeling that you've gone back in history – 15 years if not more. Here, however, we are far from feeling like Europeans who have the rights of Europeans.* (Young non-citizen)

I think that given that everything that is happening here, all of the different kinds of discrimination – well, we are far from Europe, very far indeed. (Young non-citizen).

Europeans. To me, a European is someone who is normal and rich ... well, not quite rich, but a normal person who makes a good living. There aren't many such people in Latvia. It's just in geographic terms that I say "yes". (Young non-citizen)

Belonging to Latvia as a land and as a state

Survey data (BISS, 2004) show that 74% of Russians and other minority representatives in Latvia declare a sense of belonging to Latvia. That clearly demonstrates the close links of minorities to Latvia. The survey does not, however, allow us to understand clearly what the minority people think when they say that they feel a sense of belonging to Latvia. Qualitative research and focus group text analysis reveals the fact that minorities understand this sense of belonging in two different ways. Minorities may stress their sense of belonging to Latvia, but they differentiate between Latvia as a land and Latvia as a state. Respondents speak of Latvia as an attractive land, one which differs from Russia with its Western ways.

I still feel proud of Latvia as a land. When I travel to Russia, I understand that Latvia is closer to Western culture, the spirit is free here. (A teacher)

When the Soviet Union broke up, minorities lost their state-based identity vis-ą-vis the USSR and Russia, but a new state-based identity that emerged in the period

before Latvia's restoration of independence has not developed into an identity vis-ą-vis Latvia as a state in the later years of independence:

I feel nostalgia for the late 1980s, when there was a very great sense of freedom, of pride in the state. There was no division between the concepts of 'strana' ("land" in the Russian language) and 'gosudarstvo' (state). (A teacher)

The public vs. the private space – positive vs. negative

When talking about their belonging to Latvia, participants in the focus group discussion quite strictly differentiated between discourses that describe Latvia as a public space and those which describe Latvia as a space for personal life. When talking about Latvia as a public space, most respondents strictly divided up those subject areas in which they had positive things to say about Latvia and those in which evaluations of Latvia were mostly negative. Positive statements mostly had to do with achievements in sports or in international competitions. Focus group participants were happy and proud to speak about such things:

In the Eurovision Song Contest, we always support our performers. (A teacher)

Recently awards were given to students from Latvia, at the embassy right here in Rīga. These were students who won prizes in the Russian language Olympiad in Russia. They said that students from the Baltic States, from the former republics of the Soviet Union, were among the best when it comes to Russian language skills. Of course, I feel pride in Latvia. (A teacher)

Respondents also like it when guests have positive things to say about Rīga, Latvia, people in Latvia and their culture, when they compare Rīga to Prague or Paris:

They always say that people from Latvia are always very accurate. For instance, in the hotels, in dormitories where we stayed at school, we always left everything in good order when we departed. (A teacher)

They say that our drivers are very disciplined. I know how they drive in Russia, with no rules at all. (A teacher)

I had relatives who came from abroad when Rīga celebrated its 800th anniversary. It was a fairy tale, of course. I felt such great pride of living in this country. It was very nice for everyone. (A teacher)

Negative subjects vis-ą-vis the political space in Latvia mostly have to do with politics. Particular criticism is waged against politicians for the decisions that they take, the reforms that they institute and the selfish goals that they pursue:

I guess that I feel ashamed not about the state as such, because the state is not to blame, but about specific people who run our country, about their thoughtless actions as manifested in concrete laws – the law on education, the decision to close down children's homes, Latvia's participation in the war in Iraq. (A student)

I criticise the government for the way in which it pursues its selfish interests. The government's primary job should be to facilitate the economy and to care for the people, but they forget that, they play political games. The goal that is being pursued by the politicians is to divide up our society into two strata. (A student)

I think that certain politicians turn this into a political farce, they use it for their own purposes, they don't have any noble or fine goals. (A student)

I don't know if anyone who is elected to the Saeima [the Latvian parliament] from a political party continues to think about problems instead of starting to grab benefits for himself. Greed starts to appear – this for you, this for me, but no thought for everyone else. (A student)

I found it very unpleasant, I was very ashamed when a few weeks ago, an MP from PCTVL [the left wing For Human Rights in a United Latvia party] left and joined a different party. (A student)

In stressing the selfish interests of politicians, focus group participants conclude that their own interests are not being defended by anyone. It is understandable that among minorities, this creates more of a sense of alienation than of belonging when it comes to society in Latvia:

I cannot name a single concrete individual who specifically defends our interests. At meetings, PCTVL, Pliners [a well known left wing politician] and other politicians defend our interests, but what is the goal – to defend us or to achieve the political goals of their parties? (A student)

Even as they criticise Latvia's politicians, however, minority respondents do not want "others" to speak negatively about Latvia:

I don't like it when people say bad things about Latvia, when Russian Television, for instance, displays Latvia in a bad light, when it produces a very negative evaluation of the actions of politicians. (A student)

I don't like it that Russia's central television channels have recently been showing only negative things about Latvia. If they show a demonstration, something negative, then there is a lack of any counter-weight, something light. (A student)

A differing interpretation of history

One reason for negative attitudes toward Latvian politics and politicians and for the delay in the strengthening of a state-based identity among Latvia's minorities is that there are different views about history. This most often has to do with the way in which Latvia ended up a part of the Soviet Union. Minority people have all learned the Soviet version of history, one that was backed up by the totalitarian ideology of Soviet times. These are people who are disgusted when they hear the "new" interpretation of history – that the Soviet Union occupied Latvia in 1940 in accordance with the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany:

I don't like it when Latvian politicians often accuse Russia of things that are the fault of the Soviet Union. Latvia was in the Union, after all. Why should Russia be held responsible for this? (A student)

I felt uncomfortable when I read my child's 5th grade textbook about Latvian history. They force the child to learn all of these things. It's so incompetent. We lived in the era which that book describes, and we perceived it differently. (A parent)

If I compare Russian and Latvian schoolbooks, I become confused. I read that Latvia was occupied. As far as I have lived, as far as I know, then Latvia was a part

of the Soviet Union, part of a big country. Now I read in books that it was occupied. I know from my own experience that this is not true, but the next generations will read this and think so, too. History is supposed to make people learn from their mistakes. Then let's do that, let's not rewrite history on behalf of some goal of our own. (A student)

Among minorities, there is the very widespread view that the Soviet Union made a great contribution toward the development of Latvia's economy and culture. Here is an excerpt from the focus group discussion among parents:

What's more, the Soviet Union invested a great deal in Latvia.

Yes, indeed – a great deal.

This was the gate to Europe.

Discourses in these minority discussions have not only been influenced by the Russian language press in Latvia, they also serve as multipliers for the discourses of the mass media in Russia proper:

Why should Latvia not take positive aspects from Russia? In addition to the state, Putin also understands education. Each country tires to politicise history in its schoolbooks, to reflect itself as positively as possible. As far as Putin is concerned, I've heard that he has ordered the publishing of schoolbooks without politics, reflecting only facts. As far as I know, the Latvian government has said that it does not need such schoolbooks. It is provoking a split. (A student)

A fragment from the student discussion:

I think that we should have a nationally elected president, like in Russia.

I agree. Russia sets an example for me as a country in which the president understands his country. Latvians should step back from the West and take a look at Russia, at how the state system is organised there, they should borrow a few ideas for themselves. There is real experience, and we can learn from Russia's mistakes.

Content analysis of the Latvian and Russian language press, as conducted by Broks, Tabuns, Tabuna,[12] showed that the two offer a differing reflection of Latvia's history, not least of the events of 1940. With the mediation of the media and of parents, therefore, many young people reproduce differing knowledge about history. As a result, the history that is taught at school does not convince minority young people.

Latvia as a private space: "Biographic identity"

People feel the closest links to Latvia via their memories from childhood, the time that they have spent in Latvia and its accustomed environment and culture. When thinking about the possibility of leaving Latvia, many focus group participants talked about family members and friends whom they would not like to leave. This kind of sense of belonging can be called a "biographic" identity:

When I was in New York, in this great global metropolis, I looked at the city and wanted Old Rīga. I was being pulled back toward Rīga, not toward Moscow or Russia. In foreign countries, you sit around and feel sad for the places that you know. I cannot explain this. (A student)

It's internal belonging. I was born here. When I was little, I was taken to the park, I remember lots of different things. This internal belonging is there, and I can't do anything about it. In foreign countries you sit around and feel sad for the places that you know. That is something that cannot be explained. (A student)

This is the land of our birth, we have lived here all our lives. That is something that is our own. In other countries, we feel as if we are not in our own skin. Different cultures, we don't know how to behave, what's happening there. I went to visit my grandma for a week. I talked to people, I went out into the street and understood that it was not mine. I've lived here for so many years, I feel that everything is mine. (A student)

First of all, this is the land of my birth. I respect the people who live here, I respect their interests. If I live in another country, I will worry about Latvia, I will be pulled back toward these streets. Inescapably, this is the land of my birth. (A student)

I will be sad, for instance, to leave people, my friends in particular. I will feel most sorry for leaving Latvia, not the state, but the land – the nature, the specific places. This is Latvia, after all. Rīga is the city of my birth, and I link so many things to it. (A student)

Rīga is the city of my birth, I have lived here all my life. I walk down the street and remember – here there used to be this, over there – something else. Memories are precious. If you go somewhere else, there are alien circumstances, unknown people, and you think, my God, where am I now? (A student)

It is very hard to gain the trust of people, very hard to find work and, by extension, to find your place in society – only a few people achieve that. It's much simpler here. You were born here, you are accustomed to everything to a greater degree. If you find yourself in trouble, then you know that literally a few kilometres away there are close people whom you will be able to ring and say what you're feeling. You can go visit those people and gain real support. (A student)

Here there are my friends, my parents, people who are close to me, but I guess I could go away to earn some money. (A student)

I intend to stay here, because I understand that no one really needs me over there. (A student)

The search for a desirable identity

Seemingly in contrast to the ethnic divisions in society that are forced upon them by "others", young people want to stress that which young Russians and Latvians have in common, thus constructing an identity that stands above ethnic differences, one which can unify the two groups. Here is a fragment from the student discussion:

I think that Russians and Latvians have similar problems, and we should not be divided up. Politicians are the ones who divide us up and position us against one another.

I have friends who are Latvians. In our group, there is no thought about going out to fight. Politicians are the ones who are firing us up.

I read Russian and Latvian magazines which contain completely different views. That's a matter of politics.

The interpretation of the minority identity here is closely linked to the desire to avoid conflicts in Latvia. This could be called a "strategy of adaptation", as proposed by the minority young people:

In Bolderāja [a neighbourhood of Rīga],we have a pact. The Russians don't touch the Latvians, the Latvians don't touch the Russians. Someone new moved into the neighbourhood. One evening, a Russian was beaten up, his gold chain, his mobile telephone and other valuable property were taken away from him. Immediately a Latvian was beaten up. Everyone paid for that. After all, we can all live in peace. Why shouldn't we be able to live in peace in a big city? (A student)

Don't touch us. Don't sow the seed of hatred, because aggression will not emerge from nothing, no physical aggression, no aggression at all. Knowing the Russian people, aggression will be manifested as self-defence. Seeking a compromise, I believe that it is possible to co-exist peacefully, to have friendship. I don't understand why the politicians are trying to get us to hate one another! (A student)

When asked what minority young people would wish for Latvia, they first and foremost talked about the subject of ethnic harmony, and they also expressed the desire to see Latvia as an economically developed country:

The state must seek to ensure that people – Russians and Latvians alike understand one another to a greater degree, that they are not split, that there is no mutual aggression. Then there would be fewer problems. If people feel happy, they do not want to do anything bad. (A student)

I would wish Latvia consolidation and unity, so that people aren't divided up between Latvians and Russians, so that everyone understands that we have one country and that we are a force when we stand together. Then we'll achieve the economic flourishing and democracy about which people in Latvia are so very worried. (A student)

I would like the energy that is devoted to disputes and to reforms that cannot be understood instead to be devoted to truly serious issues – manufacturing, economic development. We shouldn't have this cyclical running in place, this effort to explain who is right and who is wrong. (A student)

I would like to wish economic progress for Latvia so that it reaches the American and German level. Many problems emerge not only because of not knowing the language, but also from the economy. That's no secret to anyone. (A student)

Conclusion

If we monitor the way in which the identities of Russian speaking minorities have changed over the last 10 years, we find that this has been a period during which the lives of minority people have involved a great search and a lot of emotion. This is true because there has been a need to study the contradictions that have emerged in the construction of a new identity as a result of historical events in Latvia. If we assume that the establishment of an identity is a process in which of equal importance is the way in which someone views himself or herself and the way in which that person

thinks about the views of "others" with respect to himself or herself, then we must remember that over the last 15 years, there have been radical changes in the lives of minorities and "others", as well. In many cases, former majorities have turned into minorities, while the "others", who in Soviet times were all the residents of a very big country, have now become the residents of a variety of different countries, Latvia included.

Analysis of the discourse which underpins the construction of minority identities shows that over the last decade, the view of "others" vis-ą-vis minorities has become radically negative. Latvia's minorities are aliens in Russia's eyes, and they have faced negative attitudes even in their own "land" – Latvia. This could be called an identity crisis for minorities, or perhaps the "individualisation" of identities. The fact is that this identity was most strongly rooted in the emotional links of an individual with his or her land and biography – family, friends, years spent in Latvia. This is an identity which lacks a positive "external view". In the event, the external view leads to dissatisfaction, criticism and protests (e.g., the participation of young people in protests against education reforms).

We could also talk of an identity crisis for other reasons. On the one hand, minorities wish to feel a sense of belonging in Latvia, but on the other hand, they do not want there to be an ethnic division in this process – Latvians, Russians, etc. Neither do they want any emphasis on the division between citizens and non-citizens. It is, however, exactly these "identity boundaries" that are put into place by the majority.

It is also true that minority people wish to feel a specific identity which allows them to feel different both from Russian speakers in Russia and from the majority in Latvia. This is a process of searching out a new identity for Latvia's Russian speakers. For the time being, there is no clear answer to the question of what the identity of Latvia's minorities might be.

If we seek to reveal the strategies which Russian speaking minorities use in the construction of their identity, the most important ones, it appears, are "opposing any identity that is forced upon me from the outside" – a strategy which manifests itself in an attempt to emphasise that which minorities have in common with the majority (the same country, unified strength, the same interests) – and also the strategy of "adaptation", which is seen through attempts to seek out compromise and to reach "agreement" on conditions for co-existence. A part of this second strategy is also the "biographic strategy" or the "standing apart strategy" – one that is manifested through a sense of belonging to Latvia because of one's own biography – life in Latvia, family and friends.

Kopsavilkums

Šis raksts ir veidots sociālā konstruktīvisma perspektīvā, izmantojot kritisko diskursa analīzi *(R. Wodak. Discursive Construction of National Identities)*. Kritiskā diskursa analīze mēģina aptvert visu iespējamo informāciju par tiem vēsturiskajiem un sociālekonomiskajiem nosacījumiem, kas rod izpausmi diskursa konstruēšanā.

Diskursa analīze ir īstenota, balstoties uz grupu diskusijām pirms Latvijas pievienošanās ES. Analīzes procesā tiek izdalītas divas, savā starpā saistītas dimensijas: pirmkārt, tēmas, kuras attiecas uz nacionālo identitāti, otrkārt, diskursa konstruēšanas gaitā izmantotās stratēģijas.

Pētījumā tiek lietoti arī kvantitatīvi dati, kuri raksturo izmaiņas Latvijas iedzīvotāju sociālajā identifikācijā no 1990. līdz 2004. gadam.

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Ethnic Groups in Contemporary Lithuania: Dimensions of Adaptation

Etniskās grupas mūsdienu Lietuvā: adaptācijas dimensijas

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This paper presents a study that analyzes the adaptation strategies among various ethnic groups in Lithuania. The four variants – assimilation, integration, separation, and marginalization – are seen as the specific outcome of status, social relationships, and ethnic identity. The context of the four strategies is conceptualized through discussion of ethnic factors, the importance of status groups, and adaptation challenges. The specific contents of the four are analyzed on the basis of survey and interview materials that cover the topics of identification, social distance, closure of social networks, and civic activity. The specific sampling approach was worked out in order to achieve a reliable cross-group comparison of five ethnic samples (Lithuanian, Russian, Polish, Jewish, and Tatar).

The paper relies on a broader study (Kasatkina and Leončikas 2003) and aims to demonstrate how the focus on adaptation helps to understand the specific situations where ethnic differences seem apparent. This endeavour seeks to overcome the tendency to see minority integration as an issue that can and has been solved politically and to reveal the contents of ethnic relations and remaining social challenges through sociological analysis. The text below discusses various research findings and presents the assessment of adaptation.

Key words: ethnic group, ethnic minority, adaptation, social distance.

For many people in Lithuania today, "ethnic relations" do not seem to be an important issue. There are no evident ethnic clashes or massive tensions. Ethnicity is, metaphorically speaking, mollified and calm. Does this mean it has lost all social impact? A closer look reveals that ethnicity remains quietly present in social life, influences interpersonal relations, and is reflected in opinions about various groups in society. Obvious or less visible, ethnicity remains in everyday life. Ironically, often it does so without any efforts from cultural activists.

I. Adaptation: concept and methodological assumptions

We understand social adaptation as a process of the combination of an individual's aspirations and expectations with his/her possibilities and expectations and the requirements of society. Why is adaptation so central for researching ethnic processes? It has to be noted that it used to be very popular to discuss so-called ethnic relations in post-communist countries, and especially the Baltic States, in terms of citizenship

and minority rights. Understanding adaptation in broader terms is important because an individual may have not only more, but also quite different aims than acquiring a particular civil or national identity. The expectations of most traditional and liberal nationalists that minorities should follow the majority and learn its culture prevents them from seeing what really matters to minorities themselves. A non-dominant population may have wishes other what than the majority wants to see: for instance, instead of active loyalty to the state, a minority may only wish to have social security. Civil virtues may be of secondary importance – that is why debate concerning civil society does not help to understand what the goals and perceptions of the adapting minority members are. Legal formalities related to civil status, place of residence, or property can be handled *as* formalities – without greater effect on identity, attitudes, or loyalties. Formally granted rights and orderly civil status does not tell much about civic virtues or the civic skills to use the rights and fulfil the duties. To extend the frame in which ethnic group adaptation can be better grasped, we shall present a theoretical scheme.

We are mostly interested in socio-cultural adaptation, which encompasses both "external" social conditions and individual skills to participate in the surrounding society. For representing the links between cultural identity and social adaptation we turn to the typology of J.W. Berry (1992; 1997), who worked in the field of cross-cultural psychology and has distinguished four variants of acculturation. His scheme concentrates on individual attitudes along two lines: whether an individual wishes to sustain his/her cultural identity and whether contacts with groups of another culture are free and regular. According to the specific combination of the above two, assimilation, integration, separation, and marginalization emerge as specific strategies. Our study builds on the former typology, but extends it to the social sphere, rather than merely discussing personal attitudes.

What matters for adaptation is not merely acculturation attitudes, but also how the surrounding social environment reacts. When there are informal obstacles to an individual's advancement, acculturation does not necessarily guarantee successful adaptation. The opposite is also true. If there are large groups that do not acquire the necessary skills (i.e. acculturation is limited) for maintaining their welfare and participating in the larger society, their adaptation cannot be considered entirely successful. Both on an individual and a group level, the success of adaptation depends on expectations and aims and on whether a person finds a way to realize them in his/her society. If an individual has any particular ethnic features, implementation of his/her aims in social life has an extra dimension. There is the encounter with majority attitudes, and there is the question of maintaining (or not) the background identity – via family traditions, via choosing a school for children, via choosing friends, etc.

Types of adaptation

Berry's scheme concentrates on individual attitudes and assumes that they are consciously chosen – therefore it is quite legitimate for psychological research to consider the acculturation variants as strategies. In this study we emphasize the social context: not everything is up to individual; the type of adaptation is therefore more

than a strategy of individual behaviour. What can be considered a strategy is a bid for status: Everyone seeks success according to one's understanding. But the results of this attempt can vary: the desired status is either achieved or not, it gives satisfaction or not, ethnic identity either changes or not. The result of adaptation is the complex outcome of the pursuit of status and the social environment. In other words, when an individual strives for status and society reacts to his behaviour, the outcome is a result, or a type, of adaptation. And this result can be aptly grasped with Berry's concepts: integration, assimilation, marginalization, and separation, as long as their contents include the social dimension. The adjusted scheme of adaptation types:

Adaptation type	Satisfaction with the achieved status	*Maintained ethnic identity*
Integration	+	+
Assimiliation	+	-
Marginalization	-	-
Separation	- / +	+

Having the above considerations on status and adaptation in mind, we come to designing the methodology for adaptation research. The assessment of adaptation is based on a comparative analysis of responses given by five samples, each of which was drawn from a particular ethnic group. The main topics of the survey covered questions on identity, social ties, and self-assessment of one's social position. Identification tendencies were registered via a suggested list of categories and via the Twenty Statements Test. The character of social ties was analyzed by comparing the ethnic composition of the circle of friends, relatives, and job colleagues. Besides that, the degree of civic activity was assessed by answers about membership in organizations, participation in public events, interest in politics, and trust in public institutions. The attitudes of tolerance were measured with the help of the Bogardus scale. The perception of how one's social position has changed during the last 10 years was distinguished as one of the central indicators of adaptation success. The aforementioned theoretical scheme of adaptation types is a means to see what all those differences on a number of dimensions actually mean.

II. DIMENSIONS OF ADAPTATION

II.1. The ethnic composition of Lithuania

Population structure and migratory processes are objective elements in the context of adaptation. In comparison to the census of 1989, which was carried out on the eve of the great transformations related to the collapse of the Soviet block and the reemergence of an independent state of Lithuania, the 2001 census registered the highest rate of ethnic Lithuanians in the territory of contemporary Lithuania ever. In that sense, there is a small move towards ethnic homogenization. The numbers and often the rates of other groups, most notably Russians, have decreased. Poles have replaced Russians as the second biggest ethnic group in the country. The reasons behind the ethnic changes have not yet been studied systematically, yet emigration and decreasing fertility are considered to be among the main factors; we also assume that some assimilation may have taken place as well.

Table 1

Population of Lithuania by ethnicity, 1923-2001 (per cent)

Ethnicity / year	1923	1959	1969	1979	1989	*2001*	
						Perc.	*thousands*
Lithuanians	69,2	79.3	80,1	80,0	79,6	83,45	2907.3
Poles	15,3	8.5	7,7	7,3	7.0	6,74	235.0
Russians	2,5	8.5	8,6	8,9	9,4	6,31	219.8
Belorussians	0,4	1,1	1,5	1,7	1,7	1,23	42.9
Ukrainians	0,0	0,7	0,8	0.9	1,2	0,65	22,5
Jews	8.3	0,9	0,8	0,4	0,3	0,12	4,0
Latvians	0,6	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,08	3.0
Tatars	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,09	3,2
Roma	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,1	0.1	0.07	2,6
Germans	3,4	0,4	0.1	0.1	0,1	0,09	3,2
Armenians	-	-	-	-	-	0,04	1,5
Others	0,2	0.2	0.1	0,4	0,4	0,18	6,1
Not indicated	-	-	-	-	-	0,94	32,9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	3483.9

Sources: *Population Censuses in Lithuania.* Statistics Lithuania. Vilnius, 1999.

Data for 2001 from: *Population by Sex, Age, Ethnicity and Religion.* Statistics Lithuania, Vilnius 2002.

Ethnic diversity has a regional dimension. While most counties have 90 percent or more Lithuanians, some are different. A few areas have a significant Polish population; this prevails in the Šalčininkai district (89.5 percent non-Lithuanians), the Vilnius district (77.6 percent non-Lithuanians), and some other areas. The most diverse city is Vilnius, while the second most diverse is Klaipėda; Visaginas, the town next to the atomic power plant, is 85 percent non-Lithuanian (Russians make up 52.4 percent of its population). Ethnic diversity was a criterion in choosing the locations for our survey (see Methodological note at the end of the paper).

A short look through the types of ethnic groups enables one to realize that there are indeed differing ethnic segments in Lithuania. The flows of migration during the Soviet period are important factors that account not only for ethnic diversity, but also for diversity within ethnic groups. Russians consist of people who came to the country at different times and because of various circumstances, with differing flows, to different places – yet often related to labor migration. Although processes of migration in Lithuania were part of flows throughout the entire Soviet Union, the position of the Russians in this country had some specific features. In comparison to the other Soviet republics, Lithuanian Russians had almost the smallest percentage of intelligentsia. Broadly speaking, Lithuanian nationalism in Soviet times was in a way successful in keeping the dominant social roles for ethnic Lithuanians. Russians, on the other hand, appear to have been less likely to be expected to have good preconditions for adaptation and self-organization at a time of transformations than could be inferred from their generally dominant role in the Soviet system.

Ethnic groups included in the adaptation survey have some specific typological peculiarities that become apparent when considering ethnic composition and

classification schemes. Russians and Russian-speakers are mainly postcolonial and labour migrants. The Polish community has a clear regional dimension, they have the legacy of being the border minority, and they are challenged by the processes of elite formation. Tatars are an old territorial minority that have integrated many varying elements in their identity (the dominant language has changed several times over the years). An interesting relationship is connected with the so called 'Kazan' Tatars that are largely Soviet migrants and are usually considered to be 'another type' of Tatars than 'Lithuanian Tatars'. Jews are the group that has undergone various aspects of diaspora existence. However, the Holocaust destroyed the evolution and the existence of Lithuanian Jewry; a large part of contemporary Lithuanian Jews are migrants from the territory of the former USSR. Roma (not included in the survey) exhibit one of the most typical characteristics of a diaspora: due to deep social exclusion, the social mobility of an individual depends on the mobility of the entire group.

Although one ethnic group may often fall into a few categories, may consist of differing parts etc., even a schematic account of social or migratory segments allows one to better grasp the preconditions and context of adaptation. The adaptation challenges intensively emerged in the milieu of the changing political regime and social structure in the early 1990s.

II.2. Measuring adaptation (research findings)

The main empirical findings come from survey data and interview materials collected in 2001-2[1] from Lithuanians, Russians, Poles, Jews, and Tatars.

Identification tendencies

The strongest identification in all the aforementioned ethnic groups is with the social categories such as co-workers or people of the same profession. Yet differences appear when the respondents evaluate the ethnic categories. When asked to mention the single most important category from the suggested list, Lithuanians, Poles, and Russians indicated one of the social categories while the Jews and Tatars more often mentioned an ethnic one (such as coethnics in Lithuania, diaspora members, or people who speak the same language). The historical diasporas have also declared a more intensive activity in NGOs.

The largest non-dominant ethnic groups, Poles and Russians, exhibit quite different tendencies of territorial identification. Poles, as well as Tatars, are more strongly attached to various dimensions of Lithuanian territory, and in this way are quite similar to the majority ethnic group. In contrast, Russians and Jews have lesser attachments to the territory of the country. However, as far as Russians are concerned, the low importance of territory cannot be immediately thought to mean the diasporization of the Russians, since identification with co-ethnics living abroad is quite low (a little higher in Visaginas).

Additional data on how ethnicity is currently verbalized comes from interview materials. Often ethnicity is perceived in banal and schematic terms, which proves that it is a clear and usual part of everyday life. In some cases it is verbalized clearly and extensively – and we call it 'a mobilized ethnicity', and in some cases – vaguely and as-if-unwillingly, and we call it a declining ethnicity.

Ethnic toleration and social distance

Lithuanians proved to be more "selective" in their relationships with others than Russians or Poles did. There is a higher rate of Lithuanians who say that they can always recognize a person of different ethnicity, while a large portion of Russians and Poles declare they do not notice a person's ethnicity. Other surveys, such as the European Value Survey (EVS), have also revealed that Lithuanians exhibit higher ethnic closure by declaring (43 percent) that ethnicity of spouses matters for the happiness of marital life (51 percent think it is not important), while 70-74 percent of Russians and Poles think it does not matter (Leončikas 2000). On the one hand, we notice certain differences in the levels of closure or tolerance, but the hierarchy of disliked groups is very similar for all of the ethnic groups. Selective intolerance "unifies" all the groups against the most disliked categories such as Gypsies, Muslims, and Jews.

According to the EVS, the categories of identity that were disliked remained stable during the last decade (data from 1990 and 1999). The negative reaction to other disliked categories such as drug-addicts or former criminals has changed, but the items of disliked identity remained on the same level and in the same order. We link the high level of intolerance for the identity categories to the high prevalence of recognizing ethnicity that exists on a regular basis. In this instance, one can recall an essay on anti-Semitism by J.P. Sartre where he aptly grasped the consequences of recognizing ethnicity. Sartre described the situation during the Nazi-period, when strangers would encounter Jews who were already marked with a yellow star. Willingly or not, with compassion or with despise, the passers-by were looking at the victims, and their looks were inevitably reminding the others that they were Jews – without any choice.

Ethnic insularity or exclusion?

A look at the data on social ties reveals the ethnic isolation of certain social segments. In spite of the present preconditions for structural assimilation (i.e. equal rights), there are groups in the sphere of employment that are ethnically isolated (separated). Although this is primarily a feature of small scale business that is organized along family ties, almost one half of the surveyed Poles and Russians work in a monoethnic environment. A certain portion of respondents (13 percent of Poles and Russians, 17 percent of Tatars, and 21 percent of Jews) have also indicated that they do not have Lithuanians among their personal friends.

Social participation is one of the key factors in adaptation of minority groups on a broad scale. Russians exhibit a striking difference with regard to participation in public life and are the most passive group. Lack of participation may result in marginalization of a considerable portion of the population. The satisfactory economic situation of a number of individuals does not tell everything about their perception of social life: their perception may be greatly influenced by symbolic interaction and by lack of recognition, which results in withdrawal from public life.

It is interesting to note that one fifth of the respondents indicate that it is important to be Lithuanian if one wishes to get a good job. Moreover, those who mentioned that they have encountered some kind of violation of their rights as minority members, tend to indicate that it happened in the sphere of employment. It all raises concerns about unequal chances for minorities during the process of adaptation.

Changes in social status

The central piece of data to assess adaptation success is a clear difference in the perception of how one's social status has changed. Regardless of equal rights for all Lithuanian citizens, one's own perception of change in status is not the same in different ethnic groups (Graph 1). The largest share of Lithuanians thinks their personal situation has improved. Russians have the opposite opinion: in fact, Russians and Tatars exhibit the most negative evaluations, which at the same time are the most different from the evaluations of the majority group (Lithuanians). This opinion among Russians is noticeable in all of the towns and allows us to conclude that social status and the issue of recognition rather than formal political rights is a barrier to the successful adaptation of the Russians. Moreover, there is a noticeable opinion among Russians and Poles that there is a constant danger for some of their family members to lose their jobs. The prevailing sense of social insecurity may be one of the basic indicators of the stumbling integration of minorities.

However, the negative evaluations are not exhibited in the place where they might be mostly expected. People in Visaginas have not indicated that their situation has worsened more often than respondents elsewhere have. This means that Russians see their situation as problematic in broad contexts, not only in the area of forthcoming industrial restructuring due to the closure of the atomic power plant.



***Graph 1.** Evaluation of the change in social status.*

Question: Have you personally gone up or gone down on the ladder of social hierarchy during the last 10 years?

Nonetheless, more recent statistics (from 2002 and 2003) complement the subjective evaluation of own's situation with objective data: in fact, unemployment amongst national minorities is higher than the national average. For instance, in 2003, while unemployment amongst Lithuanians stood at 11.7%, unemployment levels amongst the Russian and Polish minorities were 18.7 and 13.9 respectively. Unemployment amongst other minorities (Belarussians, Ukrainians, etc.) was also higher than average, at 15.3% (Department of Statistics 2003; 2004). While caution should be exercised in making speculative assertions with respect to these disparities between the Lithuanian majority and national minorities, this may be indirect evidence

of adaptation problems faced by minorities in the labour market. Multifaceted factors such as structural economic change, regional differences and differences in age structure somewhat help to explain variance, yet higher unemployment levels of the Russians still stand in contrast to generally higher educational attainment rates of the Russian minority. This issue has never been the focus of governmental policy and has only recently been the subject of research (see CSES and PPMI 2004).

Moreover, according to Kasatkina and Beresnevičiūtė (2004), individuals with a presumed minority background tend to occupy lower and low-qualification positions in the public sector (namely, amongst ministry personnel, i.e., technical staff). Some exceptions – i.e. instances of greater ethnic variety of the staff such as in the Ministry of the Interior – may in fact be partially inherited from the Soviet period.

Ethnicity may become a status element in subtle ways. The outcomes of adaptation are complicated when the statuses in minority and majority groups do not correspond or contradict each other; the mismatching statuses may result in certain marginality of such an individual. However, keeping both statuses can be a conscious decision by an individual, e.g. a local ethnic community leader who otherwise is known as an average schoolteacher. The contradiction of statuses becomes a problem if an individual wishes to overcome it, but cannot do so. The social environment may strengthen certain status contradictions, e.g. when an ethnic party leader (say, charismatic leader of the minority community) is not allowed to take certain public roles (that are considered important by the majority). A minority can also punish a coethnic individual for a perceived venality or lack of support. Can statuses within minority and majority correspond? The exemplary case of status match are Lithuanian Karaits. Leaders of their tiny community are well known and respected by the majority. An example is H. Kobeckaitė, who has led the Minority Department, has been a representative to the Council of Europe, and who currently works as an ambassador. However, the Karaits are more an exception than an illustration of minority roles in Lithuanian society.

II.3. Contents of ethnicity: 'group portraits'

The data on identification, perceptions of social distance and change of social status reveal that ethnicity has different contents in different groups. We combine various pieces of data to produce the brief sketches of what could be a 'portrait' of each of the surveyed groups.

Lithuanians. Given the various data that reflect the results of adaptation directly or indirectly, the higher rate of Lithuanians (in comparison to non-dominant ethnic groups) who acknowledge an improvement in their social status seems understandable. Also, there is a higher share of Lithuanians (and, by the way, Poles) that ascribe positive personal characteristics to themselves. As a majority, Lithuanians do not encounter ethnic obstacles in the process of adaptation to the social environment.

When comparing the data on self-evaluation and perceived change in status between Lithuanians and other ethnic groups (where the samples have similar social characteristics), we can make initial assumptions about the ethnic dimension of adaptation problems. These assumptions are strengthened by data that show the higher ethnic closeness of Lithuanians both in the field of primary relationships and in the groups of higher social status. Moreover, Lithuanians are more aware of ethnic stratification (admit that they recognize persons of another ethnicity).

Russians. Russians exhibit the conventional features of an ethnic group less than others: They identify less strongly with categories such as territory, coethnics in the country, and co-believers. Confessional or religious identity barely appears among the self-declared identities and is rarely given any importance on the list of suggested identity categories. At the beginning of the last decade there was a wave of religious revival, and it was anticipated that the Orthodoxy could become the unifying factor for the Russian community. However, this expectation did not come true, unlike in pre-war Lithuania.

The opinion about worsened social status and the overall civic passivity among Russians suggest that there are more general problems of adaptation rather than a mere identity crisis. More specifically, there are great differences of opinion in the segments of differing social status. The greatest contrasts (of all the surveyed groups) in comparison to the majority opinions are noticeable in the Russian groups of low status and low education. This means that the integration of the Russians (social similarity to the majority) in Lithuania is related to their social status.

Poles. Poles experience smaller obstacles in their adaptation and/or feel certain about the backing of their ethnic group. Strong identification with one's town or region testifies to the firm consolidation of this ethnic group. In some of the answers of the Poles, one can even see the signs of a traditional community. Apart from their relatively strong religious identity, Poles give a smaller significance to education and rather emphasize social background and ties with coethnics (in finding a good job). It was among the Poles that we saw the highest rate of ethnic Lithuanians among the relatives. This clearly contradicts a popular opinion about the prevailing separation of the Poles. On the other hand, the Poles who considered themselves typical did express an attitude of separation, yet their share in the overall sample is negligible.

Tatars. Tatars have the highest rate of individuals who are certain that they are typical representatives of their ethnic group. Generally Tatars (as well as Jews) are relatively more active in their ethnic organizations, however, their attitudes are not always the same: for instance, there is a difference between respondents from Visaginas and those from Alytus and Vilnius. Respondents from the latter towns, who are more often the descendants of a historical diaspora, exhibit a higher rate of accommodation (assimilationist attitude) to Lithuanians.

Jews. Among the major categories of self-identification, the Jews surveyed did not mention religious identity. Also, identification with the territorial aspects of the country is relatively weak. These features, at least at first glance, make the answers of the Jews and the Russians similar. It is possible that the similarity relates to the experience of both Russians and Jews as migrants of the Soviet period (which is a common trait among a share of Russians and a great portion of contemporary Lithuanian Jews). There is also a high prevalence of professional identity among the Jews that may have to do with a higher level of education in their sample.

To sum up, the major differences among larger ethnic groups such as Lithuanians, Russians, and Poles versus historical diasporas are noticeable mainly in the strength of ethnic ties with other group members. Apart from that, data confirm that Russians still experience an identity crisis and are likely to become a minority in a sociological sense. Among the surprising findings is that on many issues Poles tend to have the most similar opinions to those of Lithuanians. In the background of our study, we

are led to conclude that Poles are likely to become the most successfully integrated group (in contrast to popular opinions).

Identification: ethnic dimensions (mean)
0 – "dont't feel any attachment"; 1 – "feel somewhat attached"; 2 – strongly attached"



***Graph 2.** Identification: ethnic dimensions.*

Roma. Lithuanian Roma, in comparison to other ethnic groups, stand out due to especially deep deprivation on a number of dimensions. Certain segments of Roma suffer exclusion from public life and the labour market and experience particular housing and health problems. However, although Roma had not been a part of the survey quoted above, evidence on the attitudes of Roma contradicts the popular opinion that Roma themselves do not want integration or that the poverty of Roma should not be singled out in the background of overall poverty in a country. Data suggest that isolationist attitudes clearly do not prevail, but there are clear risks for the deprivation of Roma to increase because of their marginalization.

The dividing line between ethnic groups, such as in case of Roma and the rest of society, is especially problematic if it precludes social mobility. The measurement of both mobility and separation is always complicated, but it is reasonable to assume that intolerance, such as it is with regard to Roma, complicates the way out of the social margins. In such cases it is quite obvious that the efforts of one ethnic group may not be enough.

III. Successes and failures of social adaptation

The focus on adaptation helps one to understand the social meaning of ethnic processes in a contemporary society such as Lithuania nowadays, as we have tried to demonstrate. Although this society is relatively calm and free of ethnic conflicts, ethnicity has not disappeared and is effectively present when an individual solves problems regarding his/her status, social aspirations, and identity. The empirical data and considerations presented lead to a conclusion about the importance of the social (rather than political and legal) dimension in the contemporary adaptation of differing ethnic groups. In the beginning of the 1990s, the majority had great uncertainty about the political loyalty of the minorities and was concerned about potential claims of

separatism. Lithuania's decision to grant citizenship to all permanent residents of the country truly brought political revenues at an early stage of independence, however, the adaptation of ethnic groups remains a social challenge for a democratic society.

Obviously, processes of integration, assimilation, separation, or marginalization are multidimensional. Nonetheless, the types are distinguishable even though – sometimes surprisingly, sometimes not – all of them exist next to each other: sometimes in one family. In case of a particular individual, it may be complicated to unambiguously 'assign' a person to one type of adaptation. It confirms, though, that the choice of one or another type of adaptation is very conditional. It is dependent on the peculiarities of an individual's status and social ties. To reiterate, the type of adaptation is less a well-planned strategy of behavior than it is an outcome of how an individual combines his/her social status and ethnic identity.

An analysis of the content of types of adaptation leads one to a critical assessment of the stereotypical evaluations attached to notions of "integration", "assimilation", "separation", or "marginalization".

Precisely because adaptation is not always a pre-planned and consequential strategy and significantly depends on the social milieu, there cannot be a simple recipe for adaptation – be it adaptation of an individual or a group. Neither is there a universal solution for the minority-related policies. Even an option of integration has to be viewed critically and should not be fetishized. Of course, integration, when an individual can achieve a desired status and still sustain his/her identity, is an optimal social scenario for a democratic society. Yet what also has to be taken into account is the price paid for integration, i.e. the individual efforts. As a rule, the majority expects loyalty and active performance of civic duties by members of the minority. Also, the majority often controls how minorities internalize its culture. In this context, it is important to see that minorities are not always able to easily comply with the expectations of the majority. Therefore, there should be means by which the majority recognizes, appreciates, or supports the efforts of minorities to adapt.

Moreover, integration is not always an expression of social success and is not necessarily an outcome of free choice. It does not by itself help to escape the social niche prescribed for a diaspora. The historical diasporas of Lithuania, such as Tatars, are in a way deemed to 'integrate': Their members are often recognized and asked or reminded about their ethnicity; therefore they could not so easily opt, for instance, to assimilate.

For assessing the success of adaptation in minority groups on the broad scale, it is important not to overlook the problem of social participation. Lack of participation may result in the marginalization of a considerable part of the population. Marginality is apparently widely spread in times of intensive social change; however, marginalization has more expressions than merely social exclusion in its economic sense. The satisfactory economic situation of a number of individuals does not tell everything about their perception of social life: Their perception may be greatly influenced by symbolic interaction and lack of recognition, which can be a cause of withdrawal from public life. Fragmented identity, dissatisfaction with lowered social status, and limited social networks may happen to be characteristic not only of particular social layers, but of entire ethnic groups. In such a case, we encounter not only many personal problems of various individuals, but also a social entity whose behaviour is hard to predict.

Those who do not take part in societal processes and who do not identify with the surrounding society can not be considered 'integrated'. Spreading marginality among minority members may strengthen the process of an ethnic group becoming a minority. Minorities that are passive, indifferent, and infantile in public life are first of all vulnerable. However, marginality creates preconditions for deviant behaviour; marginal groups can be not only vulnerable but also become an object of political manipulation.

Marginality can turn into assimilation or separation. Assimilation, however, is not an easy solution for a minority member even if it is sometimes assumed to be. Individuals who lose their identity and the support of one group do not always acquire recognition and identity in another group. Again, marginality is never far away. Therefore we emphasize that participation rather than assimilation should be a focus of the state's integrative policies. On the other hand, assimilation should always remain an open option for individuals, and all the ethnic communities should nurture toleration for individual choice.

Nonetheless, assimilation is not always as dramatic as minority members often imagine it. On an individual level it may go smoothly and unnoticed – as long as both groups recognize the conversion and recognize the right of an individual to change groups and decide one's identity individually. Thus, the right to assimilate can also be considered an expression of democracy. In theoretical discussion though, we should be aware of the difference between cultural and ethnic assimilation. Cultural approximation does not necessarily have to result in the loss of ethnic identity. But again, it has to be seen whether identity is preserved because one wishes to do so or because one is forced to. When ethnic boundaries are emphasized, it may result in separatism. Recognizing ethnicity is a major form of reproducing ethnic boundaries in everyday life.

Among the crucial findings is the ethnic isolation of certain social segments. In spite of the present preconditions for structural assimilation (i.e. equal rights), there are groups in the sphere of employment that are ethnically isolated (separated). Although this is primarily a feature of small-scale businesses that are organized along family ties, almost a half of the surveyed Poles and Russians work in a monoethnic environment. Apparently, partnerships across ethnic lines do not emerge easily.

Ethnic separation may sometimes appear as a regrettable state of affairs, because it limits the social choices of an individual to a minority group. However, research has revealed that separation can be a well-calculated strategy for a social career. From an individual's point of view, it could be a rational and satisfactory way to live. That is probably why we see it present among larger minority groups regardless of the fact that there is no tangible ghetto. Separation can provide an individual full satisfaction with himself and his social environment. An ethnically mixed circle of clients was considered by some service-providers as proof that 'things are going right' without assuming for a moment that people of differing ethnicities can be partners rather than clients to each other. Separation provides comfort; that is why it remains a challenge for a society that wishes to have its ethnic groups interrelated on equal grounds. Low civic activism precludes counter-separatist mechanisms from emerging. Surprisingly, even NGOs sometimes have a dubious role: rather than providing links with the state and among various citizens, they function as a shelter for minority members both from the state and from other citizens.

The successes and failures of adaptation is one of the ways to develop ethnicity studies. It is significant to realize that ethnic processes remain a part of contemporary life in a democratic society. In Lithuania, the challenge is to optimize ethnic relationships: quite often minorities are not involved in the consideration of issues of common concern. They are not encouraged to take the role of active and responsible citizens. Unequal participation in civic life can result in marginality and separation, which in turn can lead to ethnic mobilization. Moreover, ignoring passive citizens, such as minority members often are, raises the risk that they will not only lose civic participatory skills but also the channels for inclusion. This could cause the old problems of ethnic mobilization and undefined loyalty to reappear.

Methodological note

A specific sampling approach was worked out in order to achieve a reliable cross-group comparison of five ethnic samples (Lithuanian, Russian, Polish, Jewish, and Tatar).

Sampling was one of the major challenges for the empirical part of this project, and we hope to have found a successful model for this research that enabled a valid comparison of the ethnic groups. A model of disproportional stratified sample was applied (non-probability sampling); the stratification criterion was ethnicity (as self-declared). Five ethnic groups were pre-selected, and approximately the same number of respondents was chosen for each of them. This model allowed the assessment of how the same variables (adaptation aspects) differed in different samples (in our case, in different ethnic groups). Sampling took sex, age, and concentration in particular towns of a given community into account, but the central emphasis in the logical model of this research was on the status groups. Expert groups were used for foreseeing and assigning particular individuals to a particular status group; in some cases, locations rather than individuals were specified (e.g. for finding the unemployed).

Sampling phases. For territorial sampling, sites of different ethnic composition were selected (Vilnius as the centre and a case of ethnic variety; Visaginas, Alytus, Šalčininkai, and Klaipėda as locations with higher concentration of Russians, Tatars, Poles, and Jews; Kaunas as a case where the ethnic majority prevails. Next there was a selection of individuals from the *status groups*. We concentrated on the social positions which have a cultural-symbolic meaning in society and are considered to mean different social success (or success of adaptation) in the current social situation. We constructed the following status categories that bear 'coded' names:

1) "Tuxedos": extraordinary social advancement and income level; the establishment;
2) "Mobile phones": middle range managers mainly in the private sector;
3) "Conference participants": people of science and culture (as a likely case of clear and strong cultural-ethnic identity);
4) "Uniforms": policemen and military;
5) "Hairdresser's": personnel of small enterprises (up to 10-15) that often tend to be monoethnic; the case of adaptation in the local social environment – hairdressing salon, car-repair, kiosk, etc.
6) "Marketplace": self-employed, relying on active individual effort, non-adapted to the institutionalized labour market;

7) "Unemployed": socially critical layer, especially in a time of transition;
8) "Dormitory": residents of the dormitories that used to be built next to the great industrial plants for the migrant labour force; these building settings still remain ethnic and social enclaves;
9) "Pensioners": pensioners as a category of people who are at the end of their trajectory of social mobility and do not have another (stronger) social identity.

Table 2

The size and structure of the actual sample

	Place of residence							Total
	Vilnius	Kaunas	Visaginas	Šalčininkai	Alytus	Klaipeda	oTher	
Lithuanians	38	35	36	19			1	129
Russians	32	36	36	1				105
Poles	39	8		34			1	82
Jews	34	34	1			31		100
Tatars	31	1	33		32			97
Others	11		34				1	46
Total	185	114	140	54	32	31	3	559

The samples are not representative of the entire ethnic groups they come from. Instead, everything possible was done to make all of the five samples similar in terms of social characteristics such as status, income, and education. This model permits the assessment of how the same variables (various indicators of adaptation) contrast in different samples (in our case, in different ethnic groups). In other words, when social differences are controlled, it is more likely that the differences between the samples are due to the ethnicity factor (i.e. the effect of ethnicity is maximized). Whether and how the ethnic groups differ in their adaptation has been the main issue of this research project.

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NOTES

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Kopsavilkums

Rakstā ir analizētas adaptācijas stratēģijas starp dažādām etniskām grupām Lietuvā. Četri varianti – asimilācija, integrācija, nodalīšanās un marginalizācija tiek aplūkoti kā specifisks statusa, sociālo attiecību un etniskās identitātes rezultāts. Četru stratēģiju konteksts apskatīts piesaistē diskusijai par etniskiem faktoriem, statusa grupu nozīmīgumu un pielāgošanās izaicinājumiem. Stratēģiju īpašais saturs ir analizēts, balstoties uz aptauju un interviju materiāliem, kuros tiek skartas identifikācijas, sociālās distances, sociālo tīklojumu noslēgšanās un pilsonisko aktivitāšu tēmas. Pēc īpaši izstrādātas atlases metodes sniegts kvalitatīvs starpgrupu salīdzinājums starp piecām etniskajām parauggrupām (lietuviešiem, krieviem, poļiem, ebrejiem un tatāriem). Šis raksts pamatojas uz plašāku pētījumu, un tā mērķis ir parādīt, kā adaptācijai pievērstā uzmanība palīdz izprast tās specifiskās situācijas, kurās etniskās atšķirības šķiet acīmredzamas. Ar to tiek mēģināts pārvarēt tendenci aplūkot minoritāšu integrāciju kā jautājumu, kas var tikt risināts politiski, kā arī atklāt etnisko attiecību un citu sociālo izaicinājumu saturu ar socioloģiskas analīzes palīdzību.

"Latvians" and "Latvia's residents": Representation of National Identity in Public and Private Discourse

"Latvieši" un "Latvijas iedzīvotāji": nacionālās identitātes veidošana publiskajā un privātajā diskursā

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In post-soviet years the discourse of the ethnocultural nation dominated Latvian public political discourse. Discursive construction of the Latvian nation in ethnocultural terms inhibited inclusion of *others*. However, in commonplace private settings individuals have to deal with the situation where ethnic categorisation is irrelevant to the purpose of social encounter here and now. Ethnic Latvians have to co-operate with neighbours of non-Latvian ethnic origin, although the private discourse lacks discursive tools permitting the social categorisation across ethnic boundaries. Analysis of banal conversation about Olympic Games in Internet forums demonstrates that individuals do not perceive the relevance of non-Latvian ethnicity of Latvia's medal-winners. Nevertheless ordinary citizens themselves have to invent inclusive social categories and to define such criteria of the nation that would surpass restricted ethnocultural identification.

Key words: identity discourse, ethnocultural nation, political nation, social categorisation, Internet conversation.

Analysis of identity is analysis of language use. French linguist Oswald Ducrot contends that language includes the catalogue of all human interrelations, all roles, that the speaker can choose for himself and to impose on the addressee (Ducrot 1972). We define our identities as we speak about ourselves choosing verbal formulas offered by public discourse, which helps us to describe individuals in shared group terms. In different social circumstances we formulate different identities, highlighting those characteristics which we judge being relevant in the context of a certain social encounter with others. In this article I analyse how individuals define Latvian nationality in a banal social context talking about the Olympic Games in Internet forums.

Public discourse on Latvian national identity, according to sociologist Pēteris Laķis (1998), is entrapped into a dilemma of 'ethnonational romanticism' vs. 'universalism'. Hans Kohn (1945) defined these opposites as Eastern ethnocultural romantic and Western legal and rational concepts of citizenship. Renewal of independent statehood in 1991 required that Latvians define themselves as the nation-bearing collectivity, which had to differentiate itself from the surrounding cultural environment and to provide a description of difference. The popular Latvian poet Imants Ziedonis (1991) appealed to make an 'inventory' of Latvian culture in order to set up a list of 'true' signs of collective identity. Possession of a distinctive culture is conceived as the *raison d'être* of a distinctive political entity, while the collective identity is defined

in terms of ethnocultural tradition. Minister of Culture Helēna Demakova (2004) recently declared: "The substantiation of Latvia's existence as a nation-state is the Latvian language, history and culture". A student of ethnic relations historian Leo Dribins (2004) put:

There is no doubt that every nation ... has to defend and develop its own identity. The state must guarantee this possibility. However, the most powerful guarantor of the identity is the ethnic community's care about its own cultural life and multiplication of its cultural values.

In 2000 a group of Latvian scientists declared in the strategic development programme: "Culture and language are carriers of national identity. ... The state must support the highest cultural values and ensure inheritance of the Latvian culture by future generations" (*Latvija* 2000). For traditionalists the ethnocultural bond is a natural protection from dysfunctional effects of the initial phase of Latvian capitalism (see Dribins 1994, Zariņš 1996), and the western mass culture (Čakare 1998). Integrity and solidarity of the ethnic in-group is secured by particular experience of the shared past, which is the main component of national identity (Putniņš 1997). Traditionalists contend that only folk culture generates social representations fostering social cohesion. This view influences the dominant political discourse. For example, the National Programme for the Integration of Society in Latvia – the government document on minority policy – in its section on public communication states that the main task of mass media is the provision of information about ethnic cultures (*Valsts* 2001).

Sociologists Tālis Tisenkopfs (1997a, 1997b) and Aivars Tabuns (1998) advanced arguments against the essentialist ethnocultural identity, stressing that collective identity represents the perception of changing time and therefore it could not remain unchanged. Tabuns *et al.* (2001) concluded that ethnic values failed to consolidate the nation despite the fact that the majority of Latvians perceived them as the only guarantee of statehood.

Mass communication research demonstrates that Latvian and Russian-language media construct different representations of social reality (Šulmane 2002). The Latvian press misrepresents the Russian-speaking population, while the local Russian-language press creates a negative image of the independent Latvian state (Šulmane, Kruks 2002). Despite the apparent bias of media representations, a recent survey by the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences indicated that Latvians and non-Latvians evaluated interethnic relations in positive terms (Zepa *et al.* 2004a). Talking privately about their personal experience, individuals apply their own discursive strategies, which differ from the public media discourse. Results of in-depth interviews allowed sociologists to argue that sustained relations with other ethnic groups living in Latvia have created a margin of tolerance which functions as an invisible guarantee of social cohabitation. "However, on the level of intergroup communcation individuals construct ethnic relations through the prism of historical and political conditions" (Zepa *et al.* 2004b).

Private discourse on sport exemplifies the discrepancy with public discourse. Mediated sport is generally accessible due to the proliferation of communication channels. Being open to interpretation by people of different backgrounds – ethnic, cultural, political, etc. – mediated sport is a resource of shared experience and social representations. Televised sport events function as a ritual strengthening the national identity (Dayan, Katz 1992).

In the Olympic Games 2004, Latvia's team won four silver medals – all by ethnic non-Latvians. I have analysed eight discussions in Latvian and Russian-language Internet forum *Delfi* evoked by the news about these sportive victories.[1]

No	medal-winner	lang.	news posted	end of discussion	posts	censored
1	Sapronenko	LV	Mo 23 August 20:31	24August 23:39	459	NA
2	Sapronenko	RU	Mo 23 August 20:46	25 August 21:49	113	NA
3	Scherbatykh	LV	We 25 August 20:28	NA	NA	NA
4	Scherbatykh	RU	Th 26 August 08:52	NA	365	NA
5	Rublevskaya	LV	Fr 27 August 13:29	28 August 17:31	1070	61
6	Rublevskaya	RU	Fr 27 August 18:47	28 August 15:56	64	NA
7	Vasilevskii	LV	Sa 28 August 10:52	30 August 17:00	486	31
8	Vasilevskii	RU	Su 29 August 11:12	30 August 11:05	79	NA

(NA data is not available. Texts of the 3rd and 4th discussions were lost on-line due to technical problems.)

Delfi is the most popular news webpage. The weekly audience of Latvian *Delfi* is 12 percent of Latvians and 5 percent of non-Latvians; 2 percent of Latvians and 6 percent of non-Latvians aged 15-74 visit the Russian-language portal.

All available censored posts are included into discourse analysis of two discussions. Since the censored comments are posted during some minutes and several hours (especially during late evenings and week-ends) the voices had an opportunity to react on it.

Marks of otherness. Even the athletes' names make evident their otherness: Viktor Shcherbatykh, Yelena Rublevskaya, Yevgeniy Sapronenko, and Vadim Vasilevskii. Nevertheless it was the Latvian flag which was raised in Athens and seen by millions TV viewers worldwide. Finally, abroad nobody cares about the ethnicity of the athletes, neither names nor surnames are evident markers of otherness for the foreigners. Commentators of the Russian-language *Eurosport* TV channel used to pronounce these names as they are spelled in Latvian, and they did not care about the 'Russianness' of Latvia's athletes.

Things in Latvia went the other way around. Absence of discursive tools of classification hindered the discussion. Latvians needed these medals in order to draw profit from international fame and boast their self-identity *vis-à-vis*, for instance, Lithuanians who send numerous congratulations to 'brothers Latvians'. Or, on the contrary, Latvians had to protect their honour against bold Lithuanians who boasted their sport achievements. Ethnicity of the athletes had to be downplayed in the discourse, as the honour of the state was at stake. Participants of all discussions actively posted arguments on ethnicity and nationality. The scenario and threads developed in Latvian-language discussions are summarised below.

- Jubilation of 'our' medal, no references to the ethnic origins of the athlete.
- A Russian provocateur posts a comment underlining that the athlete is an ethnic Russian.
- A Latvian provocateur posts a comment in favour of Latvian ethnicity, denying the medal was won by a Russian athlete.
- Some posts silence provocateurs (disqualifying personal assault, irony, appeal to the web-master to censor their posts).

- Voices recategorise the Latvian nationality and include the athlete in the 'Latvian' in-group by means of:

  o territorial definition of nationality,
  o deconstruction of the concept of 'pure' ethnicity,
  o creation of the non-ethnocultural nomenclature of 'Latvianness': language proficiency, citizenship, patriotism.

- Posts insist that the athlete should be judged by his/her individual achievements rather than ascriptive factors:

  o stressing the personal effort of the athlete, he/she is isolated from the 'Russian' out-group,
  o private acquaintance of a Latvian voice with the athlete (training together) allows his/her inclusion in the 'Latvian' in-group.

- Russian voices point out that Latvians judge ethnic others inconsistently.
- Latvian and Russian posts create a 'community of destiny' underlying common social grievances (individuals vs. 'bad government'; 'bad state' vs. 'good country').
- Latvian and Russian posts create a global inclusive identity:

  o common religious background (opposed to a Muslim rival in weightlifting),
  o common racial background ("Oliyar finished fourth, but he was the first white athlete").

Denomination. Joy of the Latvian forum was discouraged by the bureaucratic nomenclature of categorisations underlining difference: 'alien', 'new-citizen', 'non-citizen', 'non-Latvian', 'Russian-speaking', 'one of an other nation' (*cittautietis*). The Latvian language does not provide ready-made and shared definitions of the nation that would include individuals with different ethnocultural backgrounds. The Latvian word *latvietis* – 'Latvian' – connotes ethnic belonging. The Russian language disposes two words that perfectly distinguish between ethnic – *latysh* – and territorial belonging – *latviyets* (resident of Latvia). In order to differentiate the two concepts in English I will use accordingly 'Latvian' and the possessive form 'Latvia's'.

Latvian has no adequate word equal to the English term 'nationality'. Usually people are categorised by *tautība* (analogous to the German *Volk*), which blends ethnicity and nationality. Only recently linguists borrowed two English words to differentiate ethnicity (*etnicitāte*) from nationality (*nacionalitāte*). These new Latvian words are not yet in consistent use.

Voices in *Delfi* had to create a new procedure of categorisation and fix it verbally: the 'alien' (*cittautietis*) medal winners were to be included in 'our' group (*tautietis*). It is loudly that Latvians do not use the word *latvietis* in discussions. However, in response to provocateurs, those who denied the medal, togetherness was strengthened by usage of this word. Participants consciously attempted to make of it an inclusive definition of the nation: "In Latvia's team all are Latvians" [7].[2]

Whereas Latvians tend to disregard ethnocultural nationality, non-Latvians capture the dominant Latvian political discourse and increasingly express, sometimes ironically, their awareness of ethnocultural difference. Russian voices use the ethnic identification 'Latvian' (*latish*) ironically in inverted commas. They point at ethnic diversity and boast their ethnic identity: "A Russian has helped you" [3], "Without

Russians you are 0 (zero)!!!" [3]. A voice "mono" with a symbolically significant address "moscow@russia.lv" ironically concluded in Latvian: "So well, Latvia has just a usual kind of "Latvian" Olympian?" [3]. Russian posts stressed athletes' Slavic names and underlined that they were 'OURS': "Again Russian names save Latvia's honour!! Hurrah!!!" [6]; "OUR people have won 4 silvers for Latvia!" [8].

Both forums encountered limitation of the ethnicity-based categorization. The winner of the fourth silver medal, javelin thrower Vadim Vasilevskii, is the most interesting case of failed ethnocultural categorization [7 and 8]. This athlete possesses multiple identities: he is an ethnic Pole, born in a Russophone family, and attended Latvian-language school. However, the ethnocultural discourse cannot cope with cross-identities. Both forums advanced the most important criteria of categorisation in order to include the athlete in their ethnic group. Some posts mentioned his perfect Latvian and offered, as proof, to listen to his interview in the evening newscast: "Vasilevskii speaks Russian with an accent and only with a dictionary", "He is not a Russian!!! He poorly yaps Russian". A voice in Russian *Delfi* reported that Vasilevskii graduated from Latvian-language secondary school. Several posts mentioned he was Polish by origin. "If Vadim is a Russian, than I'm a ballet dancer… His grandfather is Pole. That is why his surname". No agreement on Vasilevskii's ethnic background was reached, however.

Redefinition of the nationality concept. Latvian voices do not share a common approach to the nationality concept. Supporters of the inclusive definition actively defended their opinion and redefined nomenclature of nationality in order to include ethnic others. Three main arguments were outlined:

- political definition of the nation (they are Latvia's, not Russia's athletes);
- citizenship as a criterion of nationhood (they have acquired citizenship through naturalization);
- language proficiency (athletes speak Latvian).

Latvian nationalists were overtly isolated. As an example I offer this nationality thread developed in the fifth discussion in response to Latvian provocateur A and Russian provocateur Semen.

A: Look at names – who wins medals for Estonians and Lithuanians. Only Estonians and Lithuanians. I envy them.

Gacha, to A: Nationality is not important... Important is attitude towards the state. I respect those who represent Latvia in the international arena, because they are loyal to OUR STATE!

Shakis, 2 A: Shut up........

AdatuGalva: Of course! Especially Zadneprovskii [Lithuania's athlete of Russian origin]! Name does not matter?! Some Ivanov [a common Russian surname] is a bigger Latvian patriot then a typical Bērziņš [a common Latvian surname]!

Zirgs, A: Nationality is not important! Ours have not come from other national teams… Ours usually were ours. May be Andrijus Zadneprovskis sounds Lithuanian? Forget these stupid discussions on nationality!

AdatuGalva: Hey, idiots! Have you heard what Zhenya [Sapronenko] said on his return back home?! Like this - happy to come back ... to Fatherland!

brother: Let's stop heating the nationality problem. We know that Shcherbatykh, Sapronenko, Rublevskaya are not Latvians by national origin, but they represent the Latvian state in the Olympic games. if asked Who are you, you would hear a proud

answer, that we are Latvians!!! We must be proud of such people who have done much more for Latvia than some criers!

Pecis: ... Viva Latvian Olympians!...

[censored] Semen: they are not Latvian olympians!!! They are Russian!!! olympians from Latvia!

Nu nu, to Semen: They all have Latvia's citizenship, therefore they are Latvian Olympians...

mikus: Latvia's athletes are Latvia's citizens. Such honour and proud!!!

The fourth medal in a row won by a non-Latvian activated nationalists, they intensively participated in the seventh discussion.

[censored] Daina: Again a Russian????????????????????????? Shame!

Fuj, atkal [Pshaw, again]: What a disgust! No wonder abroad they think that only Russians live in Latvia. "Thanks" for advertising :(....

Pretīga Latvijas reklāma [Abhorrent advertising for Latvia]: I agree. Russian muzzles shouldn't advertise Latvia.

blja: Well, folks, enough?????????!!!!!!! Stop this babyish talking!! Rejoice the big time, don't mix up with politics!!! Disgust!

idiotiem un atpalikušajiem [to idiots and slowcoaches]: I explain to you: only citizens may represent Latvia in the Olympics. These winners themselves wanted to represent Latvia.

vikings: I repeat again... Olympians are Latvia's patriots and ALL speak the Latvian language despite their names and surnames, and they are proud of their state...

dusma [ire]: Oh, God, how long we can continue this. I am sick of all those, who still agonize in inferiority complexes, unable to find their identity. Ethnicity is insignificant, after all athletes are citizens of Latvia and they represent Latvia with honour! End of story. Congratulations!!!

latviete [Latvian]: Well, stop this quarrel, compatriots!!! These our (yes, yes OUR!) medalists are even more Latvians that many of you, because while you "true Latvians" wag your tongues they carefully work at the stadium... Yes, they speak Latvian with minor accent, but they SPEAK GOOD! One shouldn't colour life either black or white, then life will be more colourful!!! These Latvia's citizens of Russian ethnicity make me feel proud as a Latvian! I am grateful to them for this!!!!!

Tauta [Nation]: RUSSIANS – FOREVER!!!

Nu nu [Well well]: This is an article on Latvians, who have won four medals already, but you are fan of Russians, Americans or somebody else... Haven't you confused the forums?

Tauta: Here we are talking about Latvia's not Latvian Olympians. You shouldn't mix up SUCH things.

Nu nu: Latvia's and Latvian Olympians are the same. All Latvia's citizens are Latvians. All citizens of USA are Americans. All citizens of France are French. CLEAR???

Neither Russians in their forum shared the same opinion on ethnicity and Latvia's nationality, many posts demanded to stop discussing this topic and isolate Russian nationalist voices.

[6] Matrio: You are f.... dead asses. Everywhere you tuck politics in. I am a Russian, but psychology of some compatriots surprises me. You folks are crazy with ethnicity. There are some cretin Latvians, but you are not better. We all live in the same country, so let us rejoice success of our athletes, regardless their ethnicity. If somebody dislikes something, nobody holds you here!!! Sorry for rudeness, I am enraged.

[8] fishbox: Are you cretin? He is citizen of Latvia and therefore he represents Latvia. In the world NOWHERE except Latvia there is such a notion as ethnicity. There is citizenship... :/ I HATE NATIONALISM.

The discourse downplays the role of ascriptive factors (like belonging to the alien ethnocultural tradition) in favour of individual achievements (acquisition of full-fledged political rights through naturalisation). Latvians argue that Russians have no ground to boast their collective ethnic identity – individuals should be evaluated according to their personal achievements. In response to this thesis Russian-speaking non-citizens have to invent arguments justifying their passive political behaviour. They say they feel offended by the politics of independent Latvia and betrayed by Latvians: during *perestroika* they supported Latvia's independence, nevertheless they were deprived of citizenship rights in 1991.

> [8] **www:** Haven't you heard about naturalisation… I think it's an easy way to get rid of inferiority complexes!
>
> **the tiger to www:** don't mix the doctor with the patient. I was born here and I have lived here all my life. Why somebody was given citizenship. somebody not? Why should I go through naturalisation, but others not?

Language proficiency is very important for Latvians as they represent it as the visible marker of in-group identity. Language use is one of the basic conflicts between Latvians and non-Latvians (Zepa *et al.* 2004a: 15). it is true for the Internet discussions also.

> [3] Unikis: …May be Vadims has a fraction of Slavic blood. but he speaks perfect Latvian **and** he was born and grew up here.
>
> **[3] Putras Daukis**: there is a big difference between a Russian who speaks Latvian and respects this state (like Scherbatikh or my neighbour Victor) and a Russian who doesn't speak or doesn't want to speak Latvian. …
>
> **[8] mr.Cepels**: Medals to those who speak Latvian !!!!! You should learn language!!!! then you'll be champions....

'Localism' and personal acquaintance – 'already being-among-Latvians' – is another criteria of inclusion.

> **[3] Yole:** He is not a Russian. Born in Dobele [a provincial town in Latvia]. Grown up in Latvia. He has Latvia's citizenship.
>
> **[3] Unikis:** Scherbatikh speaks good Latvian, I perceive him as a chum from Dobele.
>
> [6] Megafox: BTW I'm familiar with Lena Rublevskaya – she even speaks Latvian perfectly.

Russians use to ridicule such criteria. pointing out that Latvians celebrate the athlete's language proficiency, rather then sportive achievement. They point that Latvians apply universal criteria inconsistently. "Radja" [3] noted that voices of Latvian *Delfi* underlined ethnicity of others discussing deviant behaviour and criminal news. "Spec" [censored in 5], probably himself a Latvian, put:

> After the Olympics again every discussion in this forum inevitably will turn to interethnic relations and 2 of 3 voices will blame "occupants" and their descendants for all possible and impossible Latvia's problems. Damned duplicity of Latvians :(

Opinion poll manifests shared racial and religious prejudices among Latvians and Russians (Zepa *et al.* 2004a). Internet discussions constructed the inclusive group opposing 'our' Christian background to the Iranian gold-medal winner in weightlifting [3]. A racial boundary was drawn in posts on the fourth place of Stanislav Oliyar in 110 m hurdling: "From Latvia comes the only one white athlete who reached the finals of the second most important Olympic discipline" [5].

Another binary opposition that overcomes ethnic division is the social one. 'Us' the ordinary people (both citizens and non-citizens) are opposed to 'bad government'. Internet voices construct a community of destiny stressing common social grievances.

Conclusion. The two language discourses in Internet forums share some common concerns. Both tend to highlight personal experience of interethnic encounters and express readiness to hear out the partner. Still Latvians and Russians lack a symbolic definition of togetherness. The dominant ethnocultural public discourse failed to provide verbal formulas of social categorisation fitting the trivial positive experience of individuals. Athletic contests – as pragmatic common goals – have the potential to provide discursive tools for construction of self-assertive national identity across ethnocultural boundaries.

NOTES

[1] "Jevgēņijs Sapronenko izcīna olimpisko spēļu sudraba godalgu vingrošanā atbalsta lēcienā", August 23, 2004. See http://www.delfi.lv/archive/article.php?id=8891589&ndate=1093208400&categoryID=8552400;

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Kopsavilkums

Latvijas publiskajā diskursā dominējošā nācijas kā etnokultūras veidojuma definīcija ir kavējusi iekļaujošos kolektīvo identitāšu veidošanu. Tradicionālisti uzskata, ka, būdama dabiska, etniskā kultūra nodrošina stingru pamatu sociālai saliedētībai. Taču ikdienas dzīvē dažādu etnisko grupu pārstāvji ir spiesti mijiedarboties, un viņiem pašiem ir jāveido citas kopības identitātes. Diskusijā par 2004. gada Olimpiskajām spēlēm interneta portālā *Delfi* tās dalībnieki meklēja universālo Latvijas nacionālo identitāti, lai iekļautu "savējo" vidū etniskos nelatviešus. Oficiālā identitāšu nomenklatūra iesaka šādus atšķirības un izslēgšanas definējumus: "cittautieši", "nelatvieši", "krieviski runājošie", "jaunpilsoņi". Komentētāji interneta forumā apzināti lietoja etnisko apzīmējumu "latvietis" kā nacionalitātes apzīmējumu un pat pastiprināja šādu lietojumu, lai izolētu provokatoru balsu nacionālistiskos ziņojumus.

Delfu krievu foruma dalībnieki ir pārņēmuši dominējošā latviešu publiskā diskursa rūpes par etnokultūras identitāti. Forumā bija izteikta tendence akcentēt sportistu piederību savai etniskajai un/vai lingvistiskajai grupai.

Definējot nacionalitātes koncepciju, latvieši kā iekļaušanas kritērijus izvirzīja Latvijas pilsonību un latviešu valodas prasmi. Latviešu foruma dalībnieki mazināja askriptīvo faktoru nozīmi (piederība kultūras tradīcijai) par labu individuāliem

sasniegumiem. Savukārt krievu forumā tika aizrādīts, ka latvieši nekonsekventi piemēro citus vērtēšanas kritērijus: ignorē etnisko izcelsmi tad, kad ir runa par "vajadzīgiem" indivīdiem, taču pasvītro to, runājot par nevēlamiem.

Abi forumi veido iekļaujošo identitāti uz kopīgas reliģiskās un rases piederības pamata. Tāpat interneta forumu balsis veido "mēs" identitāti, pretstatot "vienkāršos cilvēkus" un "slikto valdību".

Interneta diskusijās par ikdienišķiem notikumiem, kas skar kopīguma mērķus, centieni veidot iekļaujošo nacionālo identitāti ir daudz aktīvāki nekā publiskajā politiskajā un mediju diskursā.

The Concept of Collective Identity and Liberal Theory
Kolektīvās identitātes jēdziens

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This article investigates the topic of collective identity in liberal theory and society in light of the challenge posed by the history of ideas of hatred in Leonidas Donskis's book *Forms of Hatred, The Troubled Imagination in Modern Philosophy and Literature* (2003). More precisely, the challenge is whether it is possible today for modernist individualism to create identity, which is strong enough to serve as a basis for societal existence and is not built on hatred. Liberal tradition has seen no need for a notion of collective identity, resulting in problems in explaining collective authority, rationality, and responsibility. In contemporary liberal theory there are attempts to develop a workable notion of collective agents with characteristic rights, duties and responsibilities. Such a theory by Philip Pettit is discussed briefly.

Key words: Leonidas Donskis, Philip Pettit, collective identity, hatred, liberal theory, individualism, modernism.

> Odi ergo sum. I hate therefore I am. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries may well be described as the era of organized collective hatred.[1]

These are the opening words of Leonidas Donskis' wonderful book *Forms of Hatred, The Troubled Imagination in Modern Philosophy and Literature*, published last year. Donskis is a Lithuanian philosopher from Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas, and it was actually this book that provoked me to investigate the topic of collective identity in liberal theory and society. Donskis's book concentrates on the history of ideas of hatred during the past two centuries, in particular in areas we do not usually associate with narrow, dogmatist nationalism:

> [Hatred] proliferates its forms in the modern troubled imagination assuming such sophisticated forms of interpretation of the human world and of self-comprehension as the philosophies of history and culture, the comparative study of civilizations, literary scholarship, and fiction. Hatred of the modern world is manifest in myriad abuses of religion, spirituality, scholarship, and humanity".

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries may well have been the era of organized collective hatred, but at the same time they have also been the era of the triumph of liberal democratic societies. Yet it seems that increasingly often these societies, boasting of open-mindedness and tolerance, impartial and egalitarian institutions, stressing that rights belong to individuals, not groups, nevertheless consent, allow or even approve of national identities which are racist, sexist or degrading, and involve bigotry, inequality and oppression. This same point is noted by Donskis: "It is assumed that hatred can be successfully generated only in isolation or in what we call "closed societies"—which is true as far as religious and modern secular ideocracies are concerned—but it can flourish in a liberal democracy as well."[2]

This is the challenge that interests me in Donskis' book; those instances where apparently enlightened and educated people purposefully, on their own initiative, categorise others on bases that seem unfair and degrading and who end up treating others unequally and degradingly. Such behaviour is apparently justified by what and who they are; they may see it as their duty or obligation as representatives of the collective identity in question. It may even be that such attitudes are an essential component of the substance of the collective identity. In such cases hating becomes the basis for identity, without which the collective identity does not exist. How then are we to react to such behaviour, because of its importance to collective identity? If we do not tolerate such behaviour from individuals, how would things be different or justified if a group or a collective opted to act that way?

Collective identity, as long as it is somehow seen as "authentic", [3] is now often theorised as safe, reliable and positive. It indicates a group of people who are thought to be reliable, trustworthy and dependable, but who may just as well be quite the contrary, particularly towards outsiders. Often such trustworthiness is achieved at the high price of isolation, as history has shown us. Collective identities may then become narrow, dehumanising and dangerous. All this has then the potential to become the culture of hatred, as Donskis describes it:

> Ultimately, hatred implies that human individuality has no value, since good and evil are once and for all attached to some groups. It creates a kind of point-of-no-return situation: once we cross the line separating 'us' from 'them' or once we happen to belong to a group target, we cannot escape hatred. Neither our personality nor our individual history matters. Our moral choices, dreams and passions, remembrances and little secrets, confessions and discoveries, victories and failures – the whole content of our personality – can be instantly reduced to a single code word which designates our group or background. And that single word can be warrant for hatred.[4]

Donskis's claim seems to be precisely that collective identities are increasingly often built on the foundation of hating the other. Since the question here is why and how could free and rational people allow their collective identity to be built on such a basis, my purpose here is to evaluate the challenges collective identities in general and identities of hatred in particular pose to the liberal theory and society.

For these reasons, theories about personal as well as collective identity seem to have a bearing firstly on what it means to be a rational agent, and secondly on the way we treat other people and behave towards them; that is, moral issues. Needless to say, these are bound to have effects on society as well.

Of the concept and the research

There is no unanimously agreed definition of "collective identity". The concept, however, goes back to sociologically oriented thinkers such as Marx and Durkheim, and Erik Erickson and Erving Goffman. It is grounded in classic sociological constructs such as Durkheim's "collective conscience," Marx's "class consciousness," Max Weber's "Verstehen", and Ferdinand Tonnies' "Gemeinschaft". More general interest in the concept, however, only arose during the last couple of decades of the 20th century, with rapidly expanding literature on the topic and references made "indirectly through the linkage of various collectivities and their identity interests via such concepts as identity politics, identity projects, contested identities, insurgent

identities, nationalism, imagined communities, identity movements and even social movements more generally".[5] Since then, extensive, mainly sociological studies have been conducted in these areas.

In the construction of collective identities, self-reference or self-image, "oneness" and "we-ness" is based on some "origin" or basis which is common to all its members. It may for instance be a common competence or task – the same language, similar work, a particular education or a specific insight – or holding certain values. Thus the notion addresses the "we-ness" of a group, stressing similarities or shared attributes of its members. People are seen as committed by social and historical circumstances to particular people in a network of relationships, expectations, requirements and affections, but also to a particular range and ordering of values.

These shared attributes were traditionally characterised as "natural" or "essential", as something which permanent features of the collective discussed. They were thought to be persistently associated with the physiological traits, psychological predispositions, regional features, or the like of the collective. When the romantic seekers of the national identity of Finns at the end of the nineteenth century were travelling through the countryside observing peasants and their habits, collecting poems, songs and ancestral stories, it was such traits they were looking for: "the collective's members were believed to internalize these qualities, suggesting a unified, singular social experience, a single canvas against which social actors constructed a sense of self."[6]

This essentialist and naturalist character of collective attributes has since been contested by a number of approaches. The main alternative contemporary account depicts collective identity as being socially constructed;[7] other approaches listed include structuralist, postmodernist, primordialist and relativist postulations.

Theoretical or conceptual work is of vital importance here, since it is bound to affect the validity and quality of studies of collective identity. As said, the concept of collective identity is far from clear or settled, and the analytical implications of the various characterisations used in research should be considered carefully.[8] In this paper I will concentrate on the kinds of difficulties that emerge in persisting with particular methodological, ontological or epistemological as well as normative presuppositions in analytical moral and political philosophy. It is necessary for the researcher to recognise their underlying assumptions and postulations, which make a world of difference in evaluating the plausibility of the implications and conclusions drawn from the theories. Sociologists used to making subtle distinctions, such as "social", "cultural", and "personal" identity, in particular for empirical use, yet one should also clearly understand what the bases and criteria for these distinctions are.[9] Particularly social ontology is of great importance here; that is, what are these entities we refer to as collectives like; do they really exist and, if they do, what follows from their existence? To what extent are they "constructed" or created as artefacts for political purposes; is collective identity imposed on groups or does it evolve within the group; why do people join in collectives, to further their own interests or for some other reason; how far and how strongly do they motivate people; are collective identities ideologies; and, most importantly, what consequences does internalising collective identity have on individual rationality and morality? I believe the need for analytical philosophising in this field lies in the clarification of such questions.

Liberal theory and identity

The challenge of Donskis is, to reiterate, whether it is possible for modernist individualism to create identity which is strong enough and not built on hatred. He writes that individualism is too weak and problematic to serve as a basis for societal existence. Liberal-democratic societies run into trouble because they ignore the fact that the societies are fundamentally holistic or hierarchic by nature. As a result, modern individualism makes our present Western condition and consequently identity extremely vulnerable and fragile. It devalues old certainties, forces people into a state of rootlessness and uncertainty, and has created "a ready market" for any movement, religious or any other, "to provide or to renew certainty".[10]

In order to evaluate this claim, we need to go deeper into the potential liberal theory creates for meeting this challenge. The fact that complicates this examination is that liberal theory is basically a normative theory of the way individuals should be treated, but which contains empirical elements. In liberalism descriptions – the way of the world – intermingle with judgments – the way the world should be. It is ideology in practice, ideals embedded in a limited number of empirical generalisations.

Personal identity is based on the self-image of the individual. Collective identity is similarly based on the self-image of the members of a collectivity as its members. They are both based on observations and reflections of the world around us, constantly comparing ourselves with others, our society. In doing this we evaluate, interpret and try to understand what we see, feel and experience and how it fits our conceptual frameworks and world visions. It would be wrong to think that we first observe and investigate what the facts of this situation are, and only then deliberately and freely choose how we are to work with them. Quite the contrary, we perceive the world not only through our own beliefs and hopes, but also through the habits and customs we have learned throughout our lives.

All this means that our identity – be it personal or collective – is a curious mixture of real circumstances and high hopes; of what we are and what we wish to be in our own circumstances. And it is here that we find the link to ideologies[11]. They are similarly curious mixtures of facts and ideals: first of all, they contain some sort of empirical-scientific explanation of what man is like; of the society we live in as well as what the laws or principles that make us tick are; and of the empirical circumstances and necessities that constrain us. However, they also include normative judgements of the very same things: what is good or bad in human nature, what actions or states of affairs are praiseworthy or blameworthy; what the worthwhile goals of human life are, what a good society is like or how we should raise our children. The central problem is that we have no simple method of distinguishing between what the facts of the world are in the sense that there is nothing we can do about them, and what the moral judgments or normative constraints and human goals are which may vary and which we may shape or choose. Very often normative goals become facts where they are believed to be facts. For human beings, as social scientists well know, there are very few things that count as hard facts in this sense.

This lies at the heart of Donskis' challenge: by believing that the world is the way liberal theory claims it should be, and acting accordingly, we have also made the world a liberal one in practice. This is the way ideals, principles and norms become

facts and are transformed into actual reasons for or constraints on individual action. But does this then lead us to a dead end in regard to the question of this essay? Is there no way out; do we have to resort to the idea that hatred has become the lynchpin of modernist collective identity? If we have started to believe that the world and its people are moved to think, feel and act the way liberal theory describes, what can we do to change this?

Liberalism differs from most other ideologies in that it avoids making substantial recommendations concerning man and society. This is the essence of the individualism of liberalism: it aspires to leave choice to the individual. Individual goals are a matter of private taste and deliberation as long other individuals are not harmed, which is why liberalism advocates neutrality. Herein also lie the roots for the weakness of individualism in providing social roots.

But how are we to deal with ideological issues? To start with, the liberal postulations concerning human nature, action, sociability and the like ("facts") that are constructed somehow incorrectly surely need to be corrected. Unfortunately, however, we have never really agreed on any of these questions. The major philosophical debates since Socrates have been about what the true nature of being human is like. Part of the liberal reluctance to define what is universally human good arises, those substantial recommendations for man and society, arises from such failures.

Normative principles also need to be justified and one way of doing so is with a coherence method called "reflective equilibrium". The theoretical exposition of this method is that we are to start by reflecting on our "considered moral judgments"; that is, judgments that we have thoroughly and conscientiously examined and approved as our basic convictions, such as "religious intolerance and racial discrimination are unjust". From these judgments we are to construct moral principles. Then, conjoined with our beliefs about the circumstances we find ourselves in, these principles should entail our judgments. This is a process of working back and forth until we reach the equilibrium at which our principles and judgments cohere. This is the point of reflective equilibrium.[12]

In this vein, I am comparing normative liberal principles to the moral judgments of people against the empirical background of history and literature. Donskis has provided us with an interpretation of the latter part, and the prior part is to be provided by liberal theorists. It is the interplay between normative prescriptions and facts of human life that are at play here.

Let us then move on to see how the political theory of analytical philosophy has dealt with the concept of identity. Liberal society with its entities and actors is usually conceptualised in this framework, which has dominated this theorising for the past four decades. It seems that even communitarianism, its central critical opponent, is really only a part of liberal theorising.[13]

Analytical methodology and the notion of identity

The analytical method means assessing complex ideas and thoughts such as identity by analysing them and reducing them into simpler elements whose relationships are then scrutinised. This method has been one of the central elements of contemporary social sciences, as Jon Elster puts it in his *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*[14]:

- The basic unit of research in social sciences is **individual human action** (this also includes corporate or collective actors, such as groups, companies and states).
- To explain social institutions and social change means showing how they arise as results of individual action and interaction.

This general tendency has resulted in various sorts of individualism, particularly in analytic political and social theory. This I believe has resulted in analytical political theory not really having a plausible notion of collective identity[15].

Ontological and/or methodological individualism is a central element of analytical political theorising, and as such a source of a number of problems in research. The ontological question of this paper is whether collective subjects such as groups, networks, and nations really exist and, if they do, what they are like; that is, whether we can properly ascribe judgements, intentions, goals and the like to them. An ontological individualist claims that only people act and choose and can have such mental properties or that collectives constitute subjects only in a summative summary and metaphorical sense.[16] A number of liberals are also methodological individualists, and claim that the only genuinely scientific propositions are reducible to individual actions, dispositions or wills. We may articulate meaningful propositions concerning collectives; it is only that they are supposed to be logical or mental reconstructions of individual action.

When such stances are further translated into terms of moral responsibility, the result is moral or political individualism, according to which collectives like groups, institutions and states have no rights that their individual members do not already have. As Robert Nozick famously put it: "Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights)."[17] Since the individual takes priority over the collective at the ontological as well as moral and political levels, it is no wonder that the question of identity in analytical political theory has focused exclusively on individual identity.

In liberal political theory, individual identity is further linked to civil liberty and political liberalism, which include religious toleration, the rule of law, and individualism. According to Donskis, the keywords here are reason, conscience, justice, and tolerance, which juxtapose historical phenomena such as hereditary monarchy, papacy, spirituality, and social order.[18] It is true that the liberal tradition has always stressed the importance of removing obstacles from individual choice and action, such as oppressive institutions and traditions and the arbitrary power of the state. Its purpose has been to emancipate the individual from the bonds of the collectives with which she has not voluntarily complied. As free individuals, we have the right to choose our bonds and commitments and those collectives we wish to join or resign from.

All this obviously results in people having a multiple repertoire of freely chosen identities. To put it bluntly, for a liberal individualist, identity is primarily a matter of choosing the most pleasing. The market of identities is all set out: just pick the one most appropriate for your present purposes.

But the logic and dynamics of action behind the emergence of identity in real life is of course far more complicated than merely choosing where one wants to belong and who one wants to be. It is not at all clear how far we can even make such choices.

We are born and tied to particular families, communities and social environments, and in many cases it is not even possible to raise the question of whether they have been voluntarily complied with. This rather self-evident fact has often been advanced by the various critics of liberalism, particularly the communitarians.

It is also true that a number of crucial questions remain unanswered: what would "collective identity" mean under such circumstances? Which of these identities becomes dominant and why? How does a "contextually driven activation of one of the elements in the repertoire [become] dominant", to borrow from David Laitin's opening speech at this conference. In addition to these questions, a number of others can be answered properly only by appealing to concepts such as collective action, collective identity, or collective responsibility.

But how far do these facts affect liberal theory? Which parts of it are in need of redefining or correcting? We need to be careful here in what the liberals actually assert and believe; what they think are facts and what the goals they maintain are. The crucial point is that their theory of the individual and her identity is a characteristically a **normative** theory; that is, a justificatory theory which tries to give the individual a normative status[19] instead of describing what she is like, and how and according to what motives she acts in real life. In particular, liberal theory considers how she may or may not be treated, what she is at liberty or has a right to do, and what she may or may not do to others. That fact that she may not be like that in real life, or is not treated or does not treat others as the liberal theory dictates, will not refute the theory. Quite the contrary, it simply proves that we have even more reason to demand these things, since they are clearly missing from her life.

Liberals are in fact committed to a belief in the fundamental moral equality of the individual, and are universalists in the sense that liberal ideals apply to all human beings and can be shared by all. Thus the object of liberal identification, our primary collective identity, is that of the human race. What liberalism in fact says is be whatever you like as long as you are liberals. Paradoxically, however, such an identity seems empty, a negative description of a human being, dictating only common rules of conduct, limiting actions which cause harm to other people, but say nothing about the content of life or of human goals. The common liberal identity seems indeed to be, as Donskis says, weak and vague.

Such considerations produce tension when the question of what it is to possess a human identity is today increasingly often asked from another perspective. It is suggested that individuals should define themselves in terms proper to the people or community to which they belong. In fact it seems that 'belonging' has become the precondition of full human adulthood, the primary relationship of human beings. It is only when we acknowledge what group we belong to that we can discover who we are and what being human truly means. There is no universal human identity then, or if there is, it is transcended by local identity.

Contrary to this notion of particularistic human identity concentrating on "belonging", liberals have always stressed voluntary undertaking, free joining and resigning. The paradigmatic notion of collectives is free association, which is the ideal of social action in liberal theory. Nothing, however, is said about the substance of the associations.

These are then some of the central tensions inherent in the concept of identity – one between the individual and the collective, and others between the particular and

the universal.[20] But are stronger and more substantial collective identities then a threat to liberal society?

A liberal notion of collective identity?

It seems to me that the central problems of liberal theory in this context are that without a workable notion of collective identity, it is unable to explain problems of collective authority (who has power over a group of people and how it can be justified; the extent to which an individual may voluntarily relinquish his freedom of choice and action); collective rationality (as failures of individual reason, such as in the paradigmatic case of the Prisoner's dilemma), and collective responsibility (who are we to blame for genocide; who bears the responsibility for corporate wrongdoing; who are we to praise when society survives a ferocious war?). These deficiencies have, however, been recognised in contemporary liberal theory with attempts to develop a feasible notion of collective agents with characteristic rights, duties and responsibilities. It is worth noting, for instance, that a "liberal-nationalist" trend has appeared, in which it is believed that a shared national identity is necessary to protect liberal values.[21]

Towards the end of this essay, I will briefly deal with one liberal writer who does indeed pay serious attention to collectives, and their identities and responsibilities. This is the Australian philosopher Philip Pettit, who explicitly distances himself from the reductionism of analytical philosophy in his *A Theory of Freedom. From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency* (2001).

A central assumption of Pettit's theory is his ontological stance, which departs from the usual liberal individualistic ontology. For Pettit, collectives are genuine subjects or agents and display intellectual properties in their own right. These properties are not mere projections of those of their members. In our social realm there are individual as well as proper collective subjects.[22] Collective subjects are capable of being held responsible, and of holding others responsible in turn. Collective subjects are, however, *fit to be held responsible so far and only so far as they enjoy discursive control.*

The discursive dilemma

Pettit argues for the existence of collectives on the basis of the so-called *discursive dilemma* (in jurisprudence known as the 'doctrinal paradox'). This is a dilemma collectives often face where the responses involve either individualising reason or collectivising it. Only collectives that collectivise reason are true collective subjects. The discursive problem arises because it "is not tied to the acceptance of common doctrine, only to the enterprise of making group judgments on the basis of reason".[23]

Pettit's central claim is that every group that embraces *a common purpose* will face this sort of dilemma. He summarises this argument in three steps:

1. Since the pursuit of a common goal requires reasoning and judgment, any group will generate *a history of judgments* (a 'track record').
2. These *past judgments constrain present judgments*; only one current judgment in each case will be consistent or coherent with the past judgments.

3. The group will thus be confronted with the discursive dilemma, *whether to individualise or collectivise reason.*

Pettit argues further that such a collectivity will *inevitably be forced to collectivise reason* (again involving three steps):

4. The group cannot efficiently or credibly promote its common goal if it tolerates inconsistency or incoherence in its judgments over time.
5. If it cannot do this, it will lose any hold over its members and any respect among outsiders.
6. Every purposive group *is* thus *bound to try to collectivise reason,* achieving and acting on collective judgments that pass reason-related tests like consistency.

The group will be disposed to collectivise reason using a premise-driven procedure:

7. In order to be an efficient promoter of the common good the group cannot renounce its past judgment on a regular basis, otherwise one cannot take such an inconsistent entity seriously.
8. The group must avoid automatic recourse to the revision of past judgments and must generally make those judgments that are required in consistency or coherence by the past judgments.

These are the requirements that collectives need to satisfy in order to be genuine agents or subjects for Pettit:

> Groups or groupings that collectivize reason may be usefully described as integrations of people, or integrated collectives, or perhaps social integrates. This way of speaking emphasizes the fact that the collectivity involved integrates members into collective patterns of judgment and decision that respect the demands of reason at the collective level. It sounds a contrast with those groups and groupings that do not reason at all or that individualize the use of reason. These we naturally describe as aggregations of people, or as aggregated collectivity, or just aggregates.[24]

Let me summarise Pettit's position: groups often face the hard choice of whether to individualise or collectivise reason; and integrated collectives are prone to choose the latter. More specifically, they will usually opt for the sort of collectivisation by which they treat existing commitments as premises from which conclusions on some new issue will be derived.

As a result, genuine (that is, integrated) collectives display intellectual properties that are not merely projections of the properties of their individual members. The intentions and judgments of such groups may differ radically from those of their members. They may make judgments that none of the individual members endorse, and they may form intentions to act that no member intends.

The personhood of collectives

According to Pettit, a free agent is simply an agent fit to be held responsible. More specifically, a free agent is so because of the way her actions materialise, her self or psychology operates, and her person relates to other people.[25] In other words, an agent will be a candidate for freedom if she is a centre of personhood, selfhood and action. But how do collective agents satisfy these requirements?

As Pettit quite rightly notes, there is a long tradition in history of ascribing personality to certain collectives, and that this is the proper way to address genuine (that is, 'integrated') groups. Integrated groups are 'conversable interlocutors' just like individuals: they can speak for themselves and think of themselves as 'I', 'me' and 'mine'; they have beliefs, intentions and desires, and are able to express these states in signs or words.

Moreover, if persons are acting sincerely, they can be "expected to live up to the words in the things they believe and desire and do". The same goes for collectives:

> To the extent that integrated collectives bind themselves to the discipline of reason at the collective level – to the extent that they endorse a norm of living up to reason – they must be expected to live up to the words they authorize, and the deeds they perform, in the other things that they say and do. They must count as conversable interlocutors, and as subjects who can be held responsible for the things they accept and bring about.[26]

For these reasons integrated collectives also have a personal point of view. Previous commitments are of vital importance to the members of the collective, "the words defended in the past... will stand out from any words emanating elsewhere as words that bind and commit them"[27]. It is these words that stand out for the members of the collective as "our voice". The collective is a plural subject – the attitudes of groups are their attitudes.

Integrated collectives are persons in their own right since they have a first-person point of view which we normally associate with personhood; they are subjects which can enter into a dialogue with other people and other collectives; they can be held responsible for their commitments; and finally, their members think of them in the first person plural, as we who judge, intend and act.

From personal to collective identity

According to Pettit, "anyone who enjoys discursive control must count as a person and a self" and "will deserve to be regarded as the same person and the same self over various stretches of time... No person without personal identity, we might say, and no self without self-identity."[28]

Instead of building identity into the traditional natural psychological or physiological connection over time, Pettit builds it into discursive control, which

> ... involves being expected over time to be able to square what one does or claims or feels on any occasion with what one did or claimed or felt at earlier times. That is to say, being capable of discursive control involves being situated on an intertemporal trajectory such that one is expected to bring the doings and sayings and thoughts that occur earlier on that trajectory to every discursive tribunal. One's current claims can be questioned for their consistency with earlier claims on the trajectory, for example, in a way that they cannot be questioned for their consistency with any other claims: with anyone else's claims, as we will say. One's current actions can be questioned for their consistency with earlier intentions on the trajectory, in a way that they cannot be questioned for their consistency with any other intentions: that is, with anyone else's intentions. And so on. But if this is so, then we can say that someone at a later time is the same person as someone at an earlier, just so far as they are bound under discursive practice to answer for, or answer to, the earlier person in this distinctive fashion. The later agent is the same person as the earlier just so far as they are related in the manner – whatever this is – that makes such inter-temporal answerability possible.[29]

The thing that makes one a person with a personal identity is 'inter-temporal answerability', or to put it more soberly, 'responsibility over time'. What makes two people the same person at different times is that "under existing discursive practice the later [person] can be held responsible for and to the earlier"[30]. Responsibility over time means here that the claims or intentions I have already expressed must be consistent with my current dispositions, or that their inconsistency must force me to change these dispositions.

The two central notions of personhood for Pettit are **(1) personal identity:** "someone at a later time is the same person as someone at an earlier time if and only if they relate across time in such a way that the later can be called upon, under discursive practice, to answer for or to the earlier" and **(2) self-identity:** "a person at a later time can be regarded as the same **self** as that person at an earlier to the degree to which the later does not disown the attitudes and actions of the earlier".[31] These notions apply to collective agents just as they apply to individual agents.

A collectivity at one time will be the same institutional person as a collectivity at an earlier stage as far as the later collectivity can be held answerable for the judgments, intentions and actions of the earlier collectivity under discursive practice. Concerning self-identity, a collectivity will be the same institutional self as that collectivity at an earlier time to the degree that it owns or endorses the judgments, intentions and actions of the earlier one.

Pettit lists a number of characteristics in which collective agents differ from human agents. Collective agents have no perceptions or memory or sentience the way humans have; they form collective minds and intentions only on those matters they are organised to advance. Since they are artificial creations, their responses may be governed by reason, although "only in a painstaking fashion," since it is extremely complicated.

Collectives are "are persons and selves of a bloodless, bounded and crudely robotic variety", and therefore we should think of them "as agents to which individuals give life by suspending their own projects, now on this occasion, now on that, in order to serve the collective point of view".[32] As such they represent only an artificial form of life and remain dependent on whether the individual members (voluntarily) comply with them.

Conclusion: what is collective responsibility?

Towards the end of his account of collective identity Pettit also discusses the question of collective responsibility,[33] the question which is of prime importance when discussing collective identity. This discussion, however leaves very little to talk about.

He starts by stating that we may now distinguish between the actions of individuals in group roles (when they represent the group or cast a vote in group deliberations), and the actions of the collective itself. This means in terms of responsibility that

> ... it will often be appropriate to hold a group responsible for what is done by the agency of an individual or individuals, and yet not appropriate to hold those individuals themselves responsible; they will be fit to be held responsible only for their individual contributions.

Pettit goes on to say that

> … in exploring matters of responsibility…we need to allow for a possible bifurcation between individual and collective responsibility. We need to be ready to admit that there are two streams of action along which to trace lines of responsibility, one at the collective level, and the other at the individual. The group may be fit to be held responsible for a given action, the individuals fit to be held responsible for their particular contributions, and yet it may make no sense to parcel out responsibility for the group action among those individuals

As a matter of fact Pettit is saying nothing here that we would not know already from our ordinary language. This is probably a reflection of the individualistic methodology dominating this academic field, and which on occasions like these clashes with everyday moral thinking.

I fully appreciate the difficulties involved in determining responsibilities of collective institutions and members of collectives; it has been notoriously difficult even to designate legally responsible persons in enterprises and newspapers. Moral responsibility is even more difficult to determine.

What does it mean to "hold a group responsible for what is done"? Who is held responsible? It is here that the basic individualistic nature of our moral thinking and theorizing becomes apparent. We would think it unjust and unfair to blame all members of a collective for a particular decision, such as making all Russians guilty of what the communists did; or all Muslims of what al Qaeda does. But as we have witnessed full well in the course of human history, this also leaves the guilty the opportunity to evade their real responsibility by blaming it on social pressure, collective demands or obeying orders. But who then are we to blame or praise?

What is curious in Pettit's exposition of collective identity, freedom and responsibility is that he never even deals with the possibility of a collective identity becoming one of hatred (oppressive, degrading, racist, etc,). It seems to me that, in a typically liberal fashion, he postulates human nature to be if not outright good, at least not bad, and merely self-interested. Since Pettit does not think it necessary to impose any restraints on what people may contemplate doing in "integrated collectives", he evidently does not see it as possible that a free and rational person would want to harm others for any reason; the existence of pure evil is apparently out of the question. In liberal theory the individual acts only for self-interested reasons; and if someone harms someone else, we simply need to make such behaviour dysfunctional or too expensive for her self-interest through the use of police and the law. Suicide bombers, patriots, religious believers as well as saints and beneficiaries are all just irregular deviations from normal human behaviour.

But the remaining question is whether identities of hatred are a contingent or inherent feature of liberal societies; whether there is something about liberal individualism that would entail the emergence of such identities. In the end, the issue is the extent to which humans really need strong communities, and whether "societies are fundamentally holistic or hierarchic by nature", as Donskis claims. This is the challenge liberal theory and liberal democratic societies must face, as some liberal nationalists have realised. Pettit's account of collective responsibility is a much-needed initial analysis, but we remain in dire need of understanding and articulating what collectives and their responsibilities are really about.

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NOTES

[1] Donskis 2003, p. 1.

[2] Op cit. 2.

[3] The obverse of this notion is collective political identities built on propaganda, demagoguery, one-sided information or the like. "Authentic" identity, in contrast, is something seen to

evolve voluntarily, peacefully, and most importantly, "naturally". Needless to say, whatever these notions refer to would need to be thoroughly and carefully analysed.

[4] Ibid.

[5] See for instance Snow 2001.

[6] Ibid. See also Loukola & Mustala 1997.

[7] See Cerulo 1997 and Snow 2001.

[8] As Snow puts it in "Dimensions, Layers, and Types of Collective Identity" 2001: "Although there is an extensive literature on collective identity, with considerable discussion regarding its conceptualization and sources, this literature has been relatively mute regarding variation in its form. The concept most often is invoked as if it is an invariant, uniform collective phenomenon. This is not the case, however, as collective identities can be multidimensional and be multi-layered within a specific locus, and they may also vary by type. The multidimensionality of collective identity is indicated by reference to its cognitive, emotional, and moral dimensions... The relative importance of each of these dimensions to the vitality and motivational force of a collective identity has not been elaborated, however. Presumably the presence of each of these dimensions yields a more robust and vital collective identity."

[9] See also Polletta & Jasper 2001.

[10] Donskis 2003, p. 7.

[11] This account of ideologies owes much to Gauthier 1977.

[12] The method was originally presented in John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice*, 1972. See also Haslet 1987, pp. 305-6.

[13] See for instance Walzer 1990, p. 6, where he writes that "no communitarian critique [of liberalism] ... will ever be anything more than an inconstant feature of liberalism".

[14] Elster 1989.

[15] See also Welch 1989.

[16] Pettit 2001, p. 105.

[17] Nozick 1975, p. ix.

[18] Donskis 2003, p. 1.

[19] See for instance Carse 1994, pp. 187-8.

[20] The idea behind modernism is that Western philosophy is somehow foundational to what it means to be human. Rationality is the key factor here: the task of science is to provide us the facts on the framework within which we are to aim for our goals, purposes and further our plans of life. Behind this notion we find the universal human nature, 'universal humanity', which includes man's personal quest for truth and goodness, development of human virtue and characteristic human functions such as understanding, benevolence, compassion, and mercy. See also Trainor 1998.

[21] See for instance Mason 1999, and Cronin 2003.

[22] Pettit 2001, p. 105.

[23] Op cit. 106.

[24] Op. cit. 113.

[25] See also op. cit. 82-7.

[26] Op. cit. 96-7. Aggregate collectives will "not be answerable in the same way to words previously authorized or deeds previously performed. It will always be possible for such an aggregate to vote in favour of a judgment or an intention that is out of kilter with earlier commitments, and to do so without recognising any embarrassment."

[27] Ibid.

[28] Op. cit. 82.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Op. cit. 83.

[31] Op. cit. 118.
[32] Op. cit. 118-9.
[33] Op. cit. 121-3.

Kopsavilkums

Rakstā ir aplūkota kolektīvās identitātes tēma liberālajā teorijā un sabiedrībā tā izaicinājuma perspektīvā, kuru savā grāmatā *Forms of Hatred, The Troubled Imagination in Modern Philosophy and Literature* (2003) analizē Leonīds Donskis. Precīzāk, šis izaicinājums slēpjas jautājumā, vai šodien modernistiskais individuālisms spēj veidot identitāti, kas būtu pietiekami spēcīga, lai balstītu sabiedrisko eksistenci, naidu. Liberālajai tradīcijai nav bijusi nepieciešamība pēc kolektīvās identitātes jēdziena, un tādējādi ir radušās problēmas, skaidrojot kolektīvo autoritāti, racionālismu un atbildību. Mūsdienu liberālajā teorijā ir veikti mēģinājumi radīt izmantojamu priekšstatu par kolektīvajiem aģentiem ar attiecīgām tiesībām, pienākumiem un atbildību. Šai sakarā tiek aplūkota Filipa Petita teorija.

II

Political identities

The Same Civil Society? Moral Identity and Perception of Politics Before and After 1991

Tā pati pilsoniskā sabiedrība? Morālā identitāte un politikas uztvere pirms 1991. gada un pēc tā

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The concept of civil society has a double role in the democratic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe: the rebirth of the concept in political theory is mainly due to citizens' movements and anti-authoritarian activities in this region. On the other hand, the weak or absent civil society is regarded today also as one of the main problems of democratic consolidation there. In this paper I argue that certain continuities between these processes can be identified by referring to a specific kind of moral identity of civil actors. For this purpose I (1) analyze the main elements of the moral self-understanding of civil actors during the 'singing revolution' of 1988-1991, and (2) make a few suggestions about its lasting impact on today's civil society of Latvia and its perception of democratic political life.

Key words: civil society, moral identity, post-communism, democratization.

The rebirth of the concept of civil society in political theory and democratic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe seem to have many common points in their origins. Besides the New social movements in Western countries, the democratization movements and their anti-totalitarian political activities in this region in the 1980s have contributed to the present actuality of this ostensibly old-fashioned concept. However at the same time development of civil society has commonly been regarded also as one of the main problems of the democratic consolidation in the last fifteen years – also in Latvia civil society is seen as notoriously weak. So the question arises, whether the term 'civil society' in both periods, that of transition and that of consolidation, means the same thing, whether there are any continuities, and how are the conceptual differences to be explained. In this paper I am going to argue that these differences are partly explainable by referring to the specific kind of moral self-understanding of actors of civil society, as well as to their perception of themselves as political actors. For this purpose I am going (I) to sort out a few most important elements of this moral self-understanding of Latvian democratization movements in the years before the regaining of national independence, and (II) to connect them to a particular perception of politics, as well as to make a few suggestions about relations between this "golden age" of Latvian civil society and its present weakness.

I

The status of 'civil society' in Central and East – European democratic transformations has been eagerly discussed recently. The range of opinions is wide: there are

authors who suggest that the usage of the term in democratic developments of Central and Eastern Europe have been seminal for its later interpretations in contemporary political thought. There are also more skeptical voices saying that the usage of this concept in the transformation processes was mainly due to the fact that the concept of democracy was already inflicted with Marxist – Leninist connotations and therefore unusable[1], or that to talk about the rebirth of political society in the Tocquevillean sense rather than that of civil society would be far more appropriate in this context[2]. These controversies are mainly due to the unclear boundaries and many dimensions of the concept. In most cases it is clear that civil society involves non-state, self-organized and autonomous activities of citizens in modern societies, but there is no consensus about its relations to economic activities and associations, about its role in the political life, as well as about its normative underpinning. This diffusion also creates difficulties in making explicit relations between Latvian civil society before and after 1991, which commonly lead to oversimplifications – e.g., by regarding the civil activities of the eighties as some 'primitive' and underdeveloped form of civil society, which will later develop by itself, or by connecting them closely to economic liberalization. The need for civil society is often seen as the task to follow some 'standard' Western version of it, without any relation to the recent civil experience and its legacy. These simplifications can be at least partly avoided by referring to moral self-understanding of civil society, which also helps to interpret the democratic life of present-day Latvia in the light of the symbolic constitution of its new political identity during the 'singing revolution'.

By moral self-understanding of civil society I mean *all these motives and orientations, which organize the life of civil society on the basis of mutual solidarity and non-instrumentally grounded assumptions, and which can be at least analytically separated from equally important dimensions of economic liberation and national self-determination.* These motives can be sought out in the publications of this period – in political manifestos and speeches, in journalism, polemical articles and memoirs – which can serve as a mirror of the civil society of this time, of its conception of itself, as well as of its perception of good and bad politics.

The moral dimension of civil society in Central and Eastern – European democratic transformations has not been homogenous throughout all the countries of this region. For example, as Ansgar Klein shows, in Central European states the moral dimension of civil society has been especially accentuated in Czechoslovakia (According to Klein, in Poland its political self–determination has played a central role, in Hungary – economic liberalization[3]). Nevertheless, the moral dimension to a different extent has been present in all the democratic movements in Soviet–dominated Europe. As such it also demands exploration in the context of Latvia.

It should be noted that due to Latvia's specific situation there has been no systematic and elaborated reflection on the role and goals of the civil activities in the post-totalitarian communist state from the participant's perspective, as represented by Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia, Adam Michnik in Poland and others. The incorporation into the Soviet Union seems to have extinguished not only possibilities of organized political resistance, but also those of literary and theoretical self-reflection of would-be civil agents. Nevertheless, in the second half of the 1980's, due to the Communist party's loosening control of the public sphere, there has been a vast

amount of attempts made by different authors to expose the identity of the new civil society, which in non-systematic way show many similar motives to the countries with more profound dissident and theoretical traditions. Of course, economic, national, moral and other motives in these accounts are closely intertwined there, and motives of national self-determination for obvious reasons are in Latvia more prominent than in European countries not incorporated into the Soviet Union. However, exactly the moral dimension of this self-understanding can highlight some important moments in the perception of political activity, which have influenced important aspects of civic life in today's Latvia. Here I will concentrate on three constantly recurring aspects of this discourse, which could to some extent illustrate this moral identity. These are: (1) '*authenticity*' as the need for 'existentially true' politics; (2) '*spirituality* (garīgums) and *vertical integration*' – intertwinement of transcendent (religious, mystic) motives and communicative search for identity in civil life of this period; and (3) '*conscience and substantiality of evil*' – moral oppositions perceived in a binary and fundamental way, as well as specific 'inwardness' of socio-moral intuitions.

'Authenticity' or existentially true politics. It has been often remarked that democratic movements in Central and Eastern Europe have not perceived themselves only as the means of political and social liberation. The strong personal dimension has always been present. On the level with other countries, also in the Latvian context the main signifier for this tendency has been 'truth', which constantly occurs in the publications of this period:

> "Official ideology and your own conscience. Violent ideology and apparatus that realizes it as an unchangeable divine force opposed to your freedom, to your creative spirit, to the sum of your personal experience. [..] Truth is a crime."[4]

Thus states writer Gundega Repše in the year 1989. Another example: the people of Jēkabpils district Zasa village remembering their activities in the time of awakening. The author retells her dialogue with the local communist authorities:

> "- Do you live badly in Zasa? You have food and security enough [..]. We will soon abolish this Popular Front of yours!
>
> - Man doesn't live from bread alone. [..] What we need is truth, freedom of conscience and justice!"[5]

What is meant by truth in these quotations is by no means pure correspondence with states of affairs past or present. Truth is regarded as the main existential value, as the only possibility for the individual to challenge the elaborated system of lies and manipulation, and to regain her own deeply personal identity. It always involves the dimension of revelation, which can completely change the lives of those who live and act truthfully. It is a metaphor of authentic humanity and ethical responsibility. Vaclav Havel has convincingly elaborated this concept of truth and its role in the mentality of post-totalitarian society. His 'anti-political politics' refer to the form of social activity which involves opposition to the manipulative system by breaking the rules of the hypocritical game of loyalty. This is a revolution, which takes place "not on the level of real, institutionalized, quantifiable power which relies on the various instruments of power, but on a different level altogether: the level of human consciousness and conscience, the existential level."[6]

Havel's reflections on authenticity as a political virtue and those of the authors of the third Latvian reawakening, besides many obvious parallels, also show one important

difference. In Havel's account individual 'authenticity' and 'truth' are directed to all systems of what he calls 'blind automatism'[7] – not only to repressive systems of really existing socialism, but also to the systems of Western consumerist society which are similarly manipulated by the systems of market economy and professional, elite politics. No such motive can be found in the discourse of Latvian civil society of the 1980's – probably because of the lack of experience with Western societies, which was more accessible to Polish, Czechoslovak and other Central European intellectuals than they were to those of the Baltic countries. Nevertheless, Havel's reflections help us to clear the conceptual background of this dimension of 'truth' and 'authenticity' of the Latvian national reawakening. This dimension is more complicated than a simple demand for free speech and accessible information. As a link between public activity and private normative intuitions, it represents an important segment of civil society's moral identity. It also locates this dimension in the broader context of the history of European moral thought – here Havel and his commentators refer to the conception of truth of German philosopher Martin Heidegger and other sources. It allows seeing that these motives are not some backward form of 'socialist' morality or a purely strategic slogan, demanding freely accessible information. 'Truth' and 'authenticity' refer here to specific normative intuitions, which have been present in society at the beginning of its democratization process.

'Spirituality' and vertical integration. The hard translatable Latvian word 'garīgums' (*Spirituality*) has been widely used throughout the civil activities from the mid-1980's and is also still in use in some political contexts. Commonly it refers to cultural activities in the broad sense, with strong connotations of various kinds of collective religious or mystic experience:

> "If we should identify the main force of this Renewal, the only possible answer would be: the idea is becoming more evident in all of society, that we will be able to improve our life only by retrieving our lost spirituality."[8]

The popular term 'singing revolution' designates not only that the democratic transition mostly was not violent. It also says that in this period free and public collective cultural activities were perceived as a political force, which unite and emancipate people as active actors of civil society. It seems that this concept has two equally important dimensions in this context – communicative and transcendent. The communicative dimension of free and public cultural activity has been closely connected with the explosive interest in religious, philosophical and literary matters that can be observed as parallel to growing political engagement. This growing interest cannot be regarded as divine revelation or natural entity – it has its roots in social activities, and can be regarded as a sphere of identity building for individuals as well as for groups. In this context 'transcendent' elements of spirituality have been important exactly as a newly opened field for free and equal communication about intellectual or existential problems, which previously was systematically distorted by ideological suspicions.

One of the few authors who have made a systematic attempt to analyze the 'spirituality' of the Latvian third awakening is philosopher Pēteris Laķis[9]. Although many of his observations are very interesting, his explanation of this 'spiritual renewal' as an expression of the long-preserved Latvian cultural identity cannot be regarded as fully adequate. Laķis seems to ignore the specific role this 'spirituality' has played in the mobilization of civil associations and groups. In this sense spirituality has in no

way been a purely 'spiritual' phenomenon – it has been a politically effective aspect of the civil society's search for its new identity. It has been conceived widely enough to incorporate very different identities, which have not been Latvian in the narrow sense. Today it seems somewhat strange that in pictures of this period, in the forefront of manifestations of the Latvian People's Front, there are two banners – the present national flag and the flag of Nikolai Rerih's society, which represents the specific kind of Oriental mysticism and actually has nothing to do with strictly Latvian identity. Then it was not perceived as something strange, as it is now – all these manifestations of 'spirituality' have been accepted as far as they could help to activate people. This need for communicative spirituality has been similarly perceived in other branches of the 'spiritual' community. Artists also began to perceive their work as socially important: poets discuss the perspectives of political poetry[10], the Union of Composers contemplates its own mission by saying that "Music must unite people"[11].

On the other hand, the link to transcendence is not less constitutive for the self-understanding of Latvian civil movements of this period – not only in the explicit sense of traditional Christian motives but also as other, pantheistic or pagan themes. One can recall the speech given by Dainis Īvāns in Mežaparks 7 October 1988, where he asked for forgiveness to 'mother Latvia' as to some personified deity. It is important to see that both these dimensions – communicative and transcendent – can be seen as essentially interwoven. It is relation to transcendence which enables authentic communication and mutual responsibility among the members of civil society. Martin J. Matuštik makes an interesting contribution here by showing how close this mentality, as represented by Havel, is to the ethical thought of Lithuania born Jewish thinker Emmanuel Levinas[12]. The identity of a civil actor is constituted not by some self-sufficient, rational *ego,* but by her primary responsibility to the Other. The ethical relation to the Other is seen at the same time as the relation to transcendence, so the de-centred ethical individual is capable of communication only if she recognizes that her own identity needs some 'vertical' dimension of her original responsibility.

Conscience and 'substantiality of evil'. Both elements of the self-understanding of Latvian civil society during the democratic transition described above have found their expression in the perception of the nature of political activity. At first, a constantly recurring element here is the traditional Protestant notion of individual conscience in political life. One of most popular 'spiritual' ideologues of this period, Lutheran priest Modris Plāte, says:

> "We are seeking the way out of the total crisis of society; for this purpose we are returning to morality and ethics, to universal values. We begin to admit that the key to resolving economic and other problems is to be found in the human being itself, in her inner harmony, enlightenment and strength."[13]

What is interesting and telling in this quotation is the strong conviction that all social problems are to be solved by means of following one's own conscience, so the good political activity depends primarily on perceiving of what one's own conscience says. Also, as seen from this quotation, the source of universal values and orientations is this specific inwardness – and the real experience of other people is seen as only secondary. These motives are very important for the reawakening political consciousness of Latvian civil society: morality in politics is seen as coming from individual and inward relation to some universal source, not from the political

community itself. There is no trace of the idea that people's own moral intuitions could change by experiencing other people.

This inwardness of moral intuitions also leads to a dualistic perception of political actors and to an implicit assumption of 'substantiality of evil'. It can be illustrated by biblical metaphors constantly used to expose the self-understanding of Latvian democratization movements. The Last Judgment and the way of the Israelites to the Promised Land are constantly reappearing themes. Austris Ozols writes:

> "This is the time for reevaluation of all values. Gold is gold, seeds are seeds, and chaff is chaff. [..] Everything will find its own place. It will not be possible anymore to hide behind euphonic words an empty, hypocritical soul."[14]

Or Dainis Īvāns about his feelings being the leader of Latvian People's Front:

> "The way of the Israelites from Egyptian serfdom to the Promised Land has been also the Latvian way of suffering. [We were] followed by pursuers, in front of us was raised the sea of torture, which opened itself in the eclipse of pain, saving us from burning in the darkly glowing hell of nations."[15]

What can be seen in these apocalyptic expressions is the extent to which democratization movements have perceived themselves as a kind of moral crusade. Agents perceive themselves as the only representatives of light in a fully dark world, and the evil is clearly identifiable and 'substantial'. The reason why people are supposed to represent it is not that they avoid following certain norms or commonly accepted principles. They represent the 'dark forces' according to some metaphysical division of the world, which does not come from the political struggle, but only finds its expression in it.

II

Of course, it is hard to avoid the temptation to interpret these orientations as revolutionary ideals, which have helped to mobilize people in the transition period but have little relevance after the establishment of national sovereignty and liberal democratic institutions. Nevertheless, such an approach would be misleading not only because this mentality in some aspects is still quite present in Latvian society and its perception of politics. These aspects can also show why it is so difficult to mobilize people for civic activities now, although they very often perceive themselves as no less manipulated and humiliated as they did in the Soviet period.

Processes of societal modernization – liberalization of economy, professionalization of politics, commercialization of culture and the public sphere – in many cases have led to the atomization of society, to instrumental conception of politics and to specific civil resentment – especially because of the political elite's unwillingness to provide the amortization for these inevitable problems of modernization. Everyday social praxis and intuitions of civil solidarity have become separated by ostensibly impersonal and automatic societal transformations. At the same time, during the processes of democratic consolidation, the need for active and politically engaged civil society is perceived with increasing strength. This need would also require redefinition of the moral dimension of civil society – from negative terms of anticommunist denial to positive terms of autonomous self-assertion. In this context the civil experience of the 1980's can still be instructive.

The symbolic dimension of *authenticity and truth* undoubtedly has played a very important role in the mobilization of civil society in the period of democratic transition. At the same time it is not hard to see why this accentuated authenticity could also lead to political indifference and resentment in civil society after the establishment of liberal democratic institutions. During the transition phase truth in politics has been perceived as something clearly visible for every rational person who lives in accordance with her own conscience. The political elite formed itself in the beginning of the 1990's, the 'truth' as immediate and authentic transparence of political decisions when was lost from public perception. For civil actors it has been really hard to accept the fact that decision-making in politics is no more based on 'the Truth', but predominantly on the balance of powers and on conflicting interests. Therefore politics has to a great extent been perceived as 'inauthentic' and 'untrue' as they were in Soviet times. At the same time the popular belief that what we need to harmonize processes in our society is the redeeming force of "the Truth" is still obviously dominant. The broad and unconditional support for opening of the secret files of the KGB can be a good example of that.

The role of truth in modern democracies has been widely discussed. Is it necessary to assume some substantial truth as a ground for good politics, or maybe there is nothing more in truth than true or false linguistic statements, which can be subjected to democratic dialogue, as Richard Rorty sees it[16]? Whatever the right answer was, there is a strong need for transition from a metaphysically to a communicatively grounded perception of truth in Latvian politics. 'Truth' in the latter sense would be the expression of the idea that symmetric dialogue among different civil actors is more important for society than our strong convictions about what the ultimate truth is. Such transformation could also lead to a new 'authenticity' of civil society – as its moral autonomy. The element of Havelian 'living in truth' – opposition to any kind of manipulative system, also to economic and political systems of modern liberal democracies – could be revived here as a self-assertion of civil society by preserving its right to the private and cultural self-determination.

Non-communicative, transcendent dimensions of '*spirituality*', as well as emphasized importance of individual conscience also show traditionalistic political intuitions, which inevitably lead to disappointment in civil life after the democratic transition. With increasing commercialization and 'Westernization' of the cultural sphere, 'spirituality' loses its ties with the communicative praxis of civil society, gets almost exclusively religious connotations and becomes a slogan for short-lived political parties. 'Spirituality' is no more the place for the search of individual and group identity in the recently opened public sphere – now it simply designates conservative, traditionalistic political orientation. Common cultural activities still have their integrative force, but they are no more perceived as politically significant by their participants as they were during the 'singing revolution'. This also clearly correlates with the understanding of civil society observable among members of the political elite. In this understanding, civil society and minority groups are a good thing only so far as they are occupied with the 'cultural' matters in the narrow, apolitical sense and do not try to influence political decisions.

The role of *morality* in Western democracies has been discussed very widely in political theory. There are authors, like Niklas Luhmann, who argue that in modern,

functionally differentiated societies, morality mainly creates conflicts, not unanimity, therefore democratic politics must proceed on the level "of higher amorality"[17]. If extreme, nevertheless this approach shows one important dimension of modern politics. The excessive moralization of political controversies creates a distorted image of modern political communication, which is rather based on the code 'powerful/ powerless', than on 'moral/immoral' or 'good/evil'. By calling somebody an evil or a corrupt scoundrel one renders this person or party principally incommunicable and unelectable – which cannot be regarded as a democratic approach to political process. In this context one could recall the many attempts to present one's political opponents as morally evil persons – as the representatives of "dark forces", as agents of some Stalinist conspiracy, or as malicious egoists, who let children and old people starve on the street. This *overmoralizing of political rhetoric*, clearly having its roots in the period of democratic transition, could be potentially dangerous for Latvian politics, which is still influenced by intuitions of pre-1991 political mentality. It distorts the perception of political life and creates the illusion that making political decisions is a dualistic struggle between good and evil individuals, which is hardly the case. Besides this overmoralizing provides great opportunities to create new *ad-hoc* political actors – all they need to do is to position themselves as the new, morally impeccable messiahs against previously ruling evil bastards. Previous experience and sober evaluation can be only secondary. This perception of substantially moral politics has found its expression in the startling statistics about the trust in public institutions – people trust mass media, but do not trust politicians and political parties. This could be at least partly explainable by some kind of moral self-understanding. Mass media reproduces public morality and constantly works with the images of the good and the evil, the honest and the dishonest etc. Real politicians, on the contrary, usually seem to correspond to the intuitions of popular morality only once – when they have just appeared on the political stage.

On the other hand, it would be too easy to deny the popular moral intuitions of any role in political life. At least from the age of Machiavelli, political theory has been haunted by visions of morality-free and purely technological politics. Nevertheless, morality has always come back - as questioning for justice, for liberation and equality. But with the emerging of the modern world where there is no last moral instance as some supernatural authority; this moral dimension has transformed itself. Moral questions are no more thinkable in transcendent and traditional terms – morality is created here on Earth, among human beings. In this sense, the moral competence of a citizen cannot be evaluated according to her individual conscience as to some divine voice speaking in her – as it was generally perceived during the 'singing revolution'. Rather, the new civil morality would demand her ability to relativize her own conception of good life versus those of other people.

In this context, the problem of common identity is closely connected to moral self-perception. What kind of community we want to be – this question is closely linked with another: what are the common norms we want to follow? In this context interesting suggestions have been made by Jürgen Habermas, who defend the view that only the dialogue on normative questions can preserve the rational group and individual identity in the fragmentary, post-traditional society, which is increasingly

regulated by money and power. If Habermas is right, moral intuitions of Latvian civil society, inherited from democratic transformation, should not be eliminated. They have to be transformed accordingly to Latvia's strategic orientation to becoming a modern democratic society. This would include the restriction of traditionalistic moral rhetoric about 'dark forces' and 'bright forces', 'corrupt bandits' and 'unselfish patriots' being abused by the political elite. Also a symmetric and state-supported dialogue about normative problems in civil society is needed, whereby civil society could once more perceive itself as being a subject, and not only an object of Latvian politics.

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Kopsavilkums

Šajā rakstā, balstoties uz literāru un publicistisku avotu analīzi, tiek aplūkota Latvijas "dziesmotās revolūcijas" dalībnieku politiskā pašizpratne, kā arī tās ietekme uz vēlākajiem politikas procesiem atjaunotās demokrātijas apstākļos. Raksta pirmajā daļā tiek apskatīti trīs nozīmīgi elementi, kas raksturo šo pilsoniskās sabiedrības "zelta periodu": autentiskums jeb nepieciešamība pēc "eksistenciāli patiesas" politikas, garīgums kā kopsaucējs indivīdu un grupu identitātes meklējumiem un "ļaunuma substancialitāte" jeb politisko pretrunu bināra, maniheistiska moralizācija. Raksta otrajā daļā tiek izvirzīta tēze: lai gan minētajām orientācijām bija liela nozīme Latvijas demokrātiskās pārejas apstākļos, to ietekme uz politiski ieinteresētas pilsoniskās sabiedrības veidošanos liberāli demokrātiskas iekārtas apstākļos nepavisam nav tikai pozitīva. Pilsoniskā pasivitāte, kas lielā mērā ir raksturojusi atjaunotās demokrātijas politisko dzīvi, būtu pārvarama ar pakāpenisku atbrīvošanos no tradicionālajām morālajām orientācijām par labu pilsoņu komunikatīvai iesaistei politisko lēmumu izvērtēšanā.

Identity, Ideology and Political Parties in Latvia: Liberalism and *Latvia's Way*
Identitāte, ideoloģija un politiskās partijas Latvijā: liberālisms un "Latvijas ceļš"

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As an independent Latvia emerged from a fast collapsing Soviet Union in August 1991, the Latvian Peoples Front (*Latvijas Tautas Fronte*), the political umbrella organization uniting nationalists, reform communists, dissidents, greens and numerous other political groups in the battle for independence, began to fragment, and new political parties formed in preparation for the first free post-communist elections. Since then, around a hundred parties and electoral coalitions have competed in four parliamentary elections, although only eighteen have actually succeeded in winning parliamentary seats.

Key words: political party, political identity, ideology, Latvia, liberalism.

In these thirteen years of democratic activity, a clear model of Latvian party organization has emerged. Essentially, parties can be described as 'thick' and 'thin'. 'Thick' in terms of party finances, benefiting from generous political party financing regulations coupled with lax regulation:[1] 'thin' in terms of organization, with small memberships, strong charismatic party leaders and centralized, professional management. In terms of party models, they resemble 'catch-all' parties that have abandoned 'attempts at the intellectual and moral encadrement of the masses' in exchange for seeking 'a wider audience and more immediate electoral success'[2]; or the 'electoral-professional' party that mobilizes only for elections and relies on a 'charismatic leader' to attract voters.[3] Both models reject ideology as a form of political identification, holding it to be outmoded, irrelevant, and constraining the ability of a party to appeal to the largest possible part of the electorate. As a result, Latvian parties could be expected to have neglected the ideological construction aspect of party. However, this has not been the case.

Latvian parties have developed political identities based on established political ideologies. Parties proclaiming a social-democratic or conservative ideology have been elected to every parliament. Greens and agrarians are in the current government coalition. Indeed, all the major democratic political ideologies have been represented in the parliament. At the same time, it should be recognized that these ideologies operate in a party system where the pervasive dividing factor is ethnicity. Put simply, ethnic Latvians overwhelmingly vote for 'Latvian' parties, while Russian-speakers overwhelmingly vote for 'Russian' parties.[4] Parties with similar programs

and ideologies do not openly cooperate in the Latvian parliament if they represent different ethnic communities. Perhaps it is best to visualize two party systems in Latvia – one Russian-speaking, and one Latvian. While the Russian-speaking system contains parties clustered around the centre and left wing of the political spectrum, the Latvian system contains a full spectrum of ideologically left to right parties. However, how far does ideology actually shape policy-making, and how far is it simply used for external identification or as a faēade of 'respectability'?

This paper seeks to partly answer this question by looking at the most successful party in modern Latvian political history, Latvia's Way (*Latvijas Ceļš – LC*). This is done for two reasons.[5] First, being in every coalition government between 1993-2002 (see annex 1), LC had the opportunity to at least partly execute its policies. Second, it has been argued that the long-term success of LC led to other Latvian parties, whether consciously or unconsciously, modeling themselves after LC.[6]

The paper is structured in the following way. First, it will briefly consider how parties use political ideology. It will then turn to look at Latvia's Way and the liberal ideology it adopted in more detail before moving on to look at three policy areas (minorities, economics and foreign affairs) in which LC has played a key role. Finally, the paper will consider how LC has used liberalism in forging its political identity, and argue that ideology plays a more important role in party identity than is commonly accepted.

Political Ideology and Liberalism

Political ideology is a set of constantly evolving political ideas that make general assumptions about the way in which human beings act, and form specific, cohesive policy proposals. Political parties have traditionally used ideology for three main reasons: First, to provide a comprehensible framework for programs of political action. Second, as a vote-catching device, particularly when a particular ideology has wide support at a specific period of time (as with social democracy in twentieth century Sweden). Third, it provides both internal and external sources of identity by locating a party in the political spectrum – occasionally even as a faēade of respectability e.g. the 'Liberal Democratic Party' in present day Russia or the 'National Socialist German Workers Party' in inter-war Germany.

Political ideology was largely discredited in post-1991 Latvia. As one LC parliamentarian explained in 2002: 'The term ideology in Latvia has a very dark meaning, because in the previous regime political parties were actually very repressive. So we are still scared to use this term – ideology'.[7] Nevertheless, by the 1993 parliamentary election, political parties were identifying themselves with concrete political ideologies in their pre-electoral programs. For some parties this ideological identification came automatically, as the leading parties of the inter-war era were 'restored' – the Latvian Social Democrat Workers Party, the Latvian Farmers Union, the Democratic Center and so on. In contrast, LC was one of the 'new' parties that had no previous ideological baggage, yet still chose to identify itself on the ideological scale – as a liberal party.

Before discussing why LC chose a liberal identity, the paper will turn to briefly define liberalism. However, liberalism, as one of the oldest political ideologies,

tracing its origins back to the seventeenth century, does not naturally lend itself to a pithy definition.[8] It has been constantly evolving for almost four hundred years, meaning different things at different times, in different parts of the world, the only constant being that it is traditionally associated with moderate reform or progress, and the political center ground. In order to avoid a diversion into a lengthy debate on liberalism, perhaps the most appropriate definition can be taken from the 'Liberal Manifesto' of the Liberal International, the organization uniting global liberal parties, and of which LC has been a member since 1993. This defines liberalism as 'freedom, responsibility, tolerance, social justice and equality of opportunity… these principles require a careful balance of strong civil societies, democratic government, free markets, and international cooperation'.[9] This also identifies three policy areas with a distinct liberal agenda: (i) minority policy (the most challenging aspect of developing 'civil society' and 'democratic government' in modern Latvia); (ii) economic policy ('free market'); and (iii) foreign policy ('international cooperation'). But before the paper turns to look at the extent to which LC has followed ideologically liberal policies in these areas, the following section will look at LC in rather more detail.

Latvia's Way – A Political 'Bouillabaisse'

'Latvia's Way' was the dominant party of Latvian politics from 1993-2002. It was the only party represented in each of the eight government coalitions in this period and it also provided four of the eight Prime Ministers and significantly more ministerial portfolios than any other party (see annex 1). A tired and lackluster campaign saw it finish below the 5% threshold in the 2002 parliamentary election. Nevertheless, following a change of leadership and cadre turnover, it successfully came back in the 2004 European Parliamentary elections, picking up one of the eight Latvian mandates. Its single Member of European Parliament sits in the liberal bloc (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe – ALDE).

Table 1

LC's Performance in Parliamentary Elections: 1993-2002

Year of Election	1993	1995	1998	**2002**
% of votes	32.41%	14.65%	18.05%	4.9%
# of seats (/100)	36	17	21	0

Source: www.cvk.lv (Latvian central election commission)

LC was founded on 13th February 1993 by members of the elite 'Club 21'[10] and émigré Latvians representing the World Federation of Free Latvians (WFFL).[11] They decided to invite a number of leading ex-communists to join the party because some, especially former speaker of the Supreme Council, Anatolijs Gorbunovs, were riding high in contemporary opinion polls. Thus, from its very beginning LC served as an umbrella organization for three diverse groups (i) émigré Latvians (largely politically conservative and nationalist); (ii) Soviet era nomenclature and (iii) Club 21 (representing the new political and economic nomenclature). It differed quite radically from the other parties of the early 1990's, which contained small, homogenous groups of like-minded individuals. In contrast, LC was a diverse political 'bouillabaisse' from its very beginning.[12]

This diversity allowed LC to draw on a greater pool of human resources than other parties and LC came be known to as the 'dream team' of Latvian politics. Indeed, right up until its electoral demise in 2002, it continued to have a seemingly bottomless pool of politicians from which to dredge Prime Ministers, ministers, parliamentarians, local authority leaders, and patronage representatives in a whole host of state institutions. At the same time, this diversity could also have led to difficulties in developing a cohesive political identity. This problem was tackled by the rapid adoption of a liberal ideology. Indeed, at its first party Congress in 1994, the LC leadership announced that it had filed for membership in the Liberal International.[13] But how did LC define liberalism? Interviews with party elite made it clear that liberalism was interpreted as individualism: 'no-one can actually call LC and order the party to do something', because there was no central unified idea or plan of action.[14] Thus liberalism was used to explain away conflicts and differences that arose from the diversity of its members. Indeed, 'the rational reason for the formation of LC was not liberalism but power... ideology was not important – liberalism was the same as communism or fascism'.[15] Indeed, some members of the party did not hide their lack of support for liberal values. When one founding member was asked in 1995 whether he identified himself as liberal or conservative, he answered: 'conservative. I believe in tested, traditional values.'[16]

Thus LC chose liberalism specifically because of its flexibility and potentially many different interpretations: 'from the very beginning the LC ideology has been to adopt the best features of these [UK, Canada and the USA] different systems.'[17] Also, LC was formed at a time that Francis Fukuyama captured as the 'End of History' (the ideological victory of liberal democracy and capitalism over communism and other –isms), when it was believed that liberalism was popular with the electorate.[18] Finally, the ascendancy of liberal ideology meant that it attracted young cadres to the party. One senior long-term party functionary described how she 'was a 4th or 5th year student of philosophy in 1993, and in ideological terms I had become a liberal. LC claimed to be liberals, so I decided to go and see what liberals look like close up.'[19]

Thus LC initially adopted liberalism as a vote-catching, recruitment and identity device, but not specifically for policy framing purposes. So have LC policies been liberal? The paper will now turn to look at the role of LC in three key policy areas.

Minority Policy

Minority policy has been the most contentious policy area for Latvian governments since the renewal of independence in 1991. It has centered around two major issues: citizenship and language. In terms of citizenship, the issue initially polarized between the 'zero option' of granting citizenship to the entire population of the Latvian territory, or a more limited interpretation based on Latvian 'ethnicity' and the legal continuity of the pre-1940 Latvian state. Language policy, on the other hand, has been divided around the extent to which the Russian language should be used in the public sector.[20]

A classical liberal position on minority policy would emphasize the equality of all people before the law, the duty of the democratic majority to care for the interests of the minority, as well as individual freedoms supporting mass participation in the democratic process, the eradication of barriers to employment and full participation

in the civic life of the country. At first glance, it appears that Latvia followed a very different track.

The citizenship law adopted in 1994 was very different from that adopted during the first independence era. While the principle behind the 1919 law was one of *jus solis* where citizenship was based on the *place* of birth, the 1994 law was based on the principle of *jus sanguine* where nationality is acquired through descent from the parents. Citizenship was automatically granted only to those individuals who were citizens before the Soviet occupation of 17th July 1940, and their direct descendants. Those people who moved to Latvia in the Soviet era (overwhelmingly Russian-speakers) were denied automatic citizenship. The law on the renewal of Latvian citizenship was passed in October 1991,[21] but it was a government coalition led by LC that adopted the citizenship law laying out the steps to naturalization in July 1994. It was deeply controversial, dividing potential citizens into quota groups based on age and length of residency in Latvia, rather than viewing potential citizens as individuals. The law was only liberalized, putting the emphasis on individuals rather than groups, in October 1998 after a national referendum on the issue.

The two key pieces of language legislation actually came before LC was formed as a political unit. The 1989 language law declared Latvian as the joint national language of the Latvian Republic (with Russian), but the 1992 law, and a series of additional laws and regulations in the same year, essentially made Latvian the sole state language. As a result, civil servants and other state employees must speak Latvian at a certain graded level, and a language test is part of the process of gaining citizenship. At the same time, however, the state has continued to fund schools teaching in Russian and other minority languages, minority cultural organizations, and there are no restrictions on the use of Russian in commerce. The aim of language policy appears to have been integration of the population through the Latvian language – motivating Russian speakers to become bilingual. It could be argued that a more liberal course would have been to maintain Russian as a state language after 1992. However, in the long-term this would have probably exacerbated ethnic relations by maintaining a cultural division between Russian speakers and Latvians (which still exists, to a large extent, through parallel newspapers, electronic media etc.). Moreover, Latvian politicians feared that Russian would eventually swamp the Latvian language, the key identity point of the Latvian nation.

Both the cabinet governments of Valdis Birkavs and Maris Gailis, LC Prime Ministers between 1993 and 1995, were 100% ethnic-Latvian, and LC has primarily appealed to ethnic Latvian voters. Indeed, LC is a party made up almost wholly of ethnic Latvians.[22] Nevertheless, LC initially adopted a moderate tone. LCs first electoral program in 1993 proposed granting citizenship to Russian speakers gradually, based upon individual merit e.g. Latvian language fluency.[23] Mark Jubulis has argued that this makes LC radically different from other parties because 'Latvia's Way followed a cultural form of nationalism, which made citizenship primarily contingent upon integration into Latvian society through the acquisition of language skills, and has also been more pragmatic and willing to reach compromises... in short, Latvia's Way viewed non-citizens as *potential* citizens, capable of being integrated, while the radical right viewed the non-citizens as "occupiers" who should be barred from *ever* acquiring Latvian citizenship'.[24]

Certainly, LC adopted a liberal policy in the Latvian context – holding the political middle ground between the 'zero option' and denying Russian-speakers the opportunity to become citizens. Moreover, LCs support of individual, rather than collective rights in terms of acquiring citizenship, is a classically liberal position. Essentially, LC has acted as a restraining influence on the more nationalist forces found in government coalition parties.

Economic Policy

Latvia's accession to the European Union, as well as membership in the World Trade Organization and a host of other international organizations, has proven that the Latvian economy has been reconstructed from the centralized Soviet-type to an open market economy. Economic growth in recent years has been among the highest in Europe (GDP growth of 6.1% in 2002 and 7.4% in 2003[25]). At the same time, Latvia is the poorest member state of the European Union and has occupied 50th position in the United Nations Development Program Human Development Index for four years, well behind the other two Baltic States (Lithuania was 41st and Estonia 36th in the 2004 rankings). Moreover, Latvia has consistently been ranked well behind its Baltic neighbors in the Transparency International rankings on perceptions of corruption. Indeed, a 2001 World Bank report on 'Anticorruption in Transition' argued that Latvia suffered from a particularly high degree of 'state capture' corruption (5th among the 20 post-communist countries surveyed, and the highest among those countries that have since joined the European Union) – defined as individuals, groups or firms from the public sector illicitly influencing state institutions to make favorable decisions on their behalf.[26] Corruption has a negative impact on the national economy, by frightening (or confusing) potential foreign investors and denying the state taxation or other income through the misallocation of resources. Moreover, corruption eats away at support for the democratic system – public support for political parties and politicians in Latvia is the lowest among the new EU member states.[27]

Table 2

Latvia and the UNDP HDI

Year	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
HDI Ranking	55	92	92	74	63	50	50	50	50

Source: www.undp.org

Economic policy is one of the defining features of liberalism. Classic liberal economic theory emphasizes limited government and laissez-faire economics guided by the invisible hand of the market. Liberals in the twentieth century have, however, advocated stronger government intervention in the economy, although the last fifteen years have seen a renewed debate on the extent of government influence. Nevertheless, it is clear that a liberal approach to economics would support a radical overhaul of the Latvian economy from the Soviet command-driven system to a more market oriented model. This would entail economic liberalization, privatization and so on. At the same time, modern liberalism would also advocate socio-economic policies defending the disadvantaged.

The first economic policy statements from LC were blatantly populist, promising that, if elected to government, LC would double the income of every family in Latvia every twelve months.[28] LC's 1993 pre-election manifesto continued this theme, calling for pensions to be radically raised and the provision of universal health-care through the introduction of obligatory health insurance, as well as rapid liberalization and privatization.[29] LC had a comprehensive economics program based around the 'Latvia-2000' paper elaborated in 1992 by a group of Latvian economists who had studied economics at Georgetown university under the guidance of the Latvian-American economics professor, Juris Viksnins. 'Latvia 2000' called for the creation of a market economy with a strong social safety net, cuts in subsidies to Latvian industry, and the eradication of protectionist import measures. Marju Nissinen has compared it to the German *soziale Marktwirtschaft* economic model.[30] Latvia-2000 also called for a rapid program of privatization, setting the target of privatizing 75% of state-owned enterprises by 1996. LC certainly had the opportunity of realizing these aims, controlling the Ministry of Finance portfolio from 1993-1995, the years when the framework for privatization and liberalization was put in place. Of course, Latvian policy-makers were also constrained by the Washington consensus policies of the IMF and World Bank that played a key role in reforming economic policies all across the east-central European region. However, the details of, for instance, *how* to privatize were left in the hands of national policy makers, and LC can claim at least part of the plaudits for the macroeconomic reforms. The success of the other side of economic reform – socioeconomic policies – is open to interpretation.

The most controversial aspect of LCs role in economic reform has been in terms of corruption. Party wallets are 'thick' because of the generosity of party benefactors. Interviewees did not hide that over the course of its history, LC had been sponsored by a number of economic groupings (or 'oligarchs') that in turn gained some economic good from government policies. Specifically, LC controlled the Privatization Agency from its inception, and through its most productive years. While accusations of political corruption have been difficult to prove, the lack of transparency in the privatization of huge chunks of Latvian real-estate and profitable state-owned businesses are difficult to explain in a liberal context. Moreover, the disillusionment of the population with the state of economic reform and the political establishment continues to play a key role in the instability of the Latvian party system.

Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of Latvia has been strongly oriented towards the west. Integration with the European Union and NATO as well as other international organizations, has been the priority of all Latvian governments since 1991, and was achieved by the middle of 2004. At the same time, Latvia has had a difficult relationship with Russia largely because of the citizenship and language policy issues. For example, there is still no Latvia-Russia border treaty.

A liberal foreign policy is traditionally internationalist, supporting international institutions (from the inter-war League of Nations to the great number of post-second world war institutions) and active engagement with the international community. In the modern era, there has been an emphasis on respect for international law and international institutions, and for national foreign policies that encourage international development.

There can be little doubt that LC has pursued just such an agenda. Moreover, LCs role in this process is quite clear because it monopolized the Foreign Minister's portfolio from 1993 to 2002, as well as a number of other important foreign policy posts.[31] LC has consistently reoriented Latvian foreign policy from the east to the west. As a former Prime Minister rather colorfully said: 'Russia is like a big vacuum cleaner and we must always run forward to be rooted in western society. If we stop running, we will be sucked in.'[32]

Pursuing a western-oriented foreign policy has also had a knock-on effect in a number of other foreign policy areas. The deregulation of the Latvian economy, the lowering of tariffs and opening the national economy to increased competition, as well as the increased personal freedom to work and travel in the European Union are certainly liberal policies. Moreover, the 'conditionality' of accession to the EU, whereby Latvia had to fulfill certain human rights, democracy, and economic criteria, were important in shaping domestic policy. Indeed, an orientation away from Russia and the other post-Soviet states, with their rather dubious human rights and democratic records, could also be construed as a liberal step.

Conclusion

What does this brief survey of three key LC policy areas reveal? Certainly, LC has held consistent policy positions in minority, economic and foreign policy areas. Moreover, economic liberalization and integration with international organizations can certainly be seen as promoting liberal values. However, LCs stance on minority policy is less clear cut, although in the polarized context of Latvian politics, it can be said to have played a moderating role.

LC has clearly used liberalism to attract votes, members and build an identity and place in the Latvian political spectrum. It has also adopted largely liberal policies, at least in the three areas reviewed. While not all interviewees agree ('the party program is an ideologically eclectic cocktail. If you look at the party's political behavior, or its program in office, then you can see that it has not really been very liberal.'[33]) it does appear that LC followed a liberal manifesto. Of course, this was also the advantage of adopting liberalism –it can be difficult to pin down.

Thus political identity has played an important role for LC. Moreover, in the post-communist era, when there were few solid social bases on which to structure parties, and society was fluid, political ideology was an anchor to which the party could attach itself, and even give voters some clarity in the party system. Perhaps it is no coincidence that the longest surviving parties in post-communist Latvia – LC, the Latvian Social Democratic Workers Party, For Fatherland and Freedom / Latvian National Independence Movement, Latvian Farmers Union and the Green Party, all claim a strong ideological linkage. No doubt, these parties have accentuated their charismatic leaders as much as their political ideology. Nevertheless, it seems that ideology has played an important role in defining party identity both inwardly and outwardly.

But was this deliberate? After all, liberalism was initially adopted by LC largely because it was the ascendant ideology in 1993. It seems that as time went by LC became constrained by its ideology. From being a source of outward identity, it also

became a source of internal identity and cohesion. More comparative research must be undertaken in order to consider the wid er use of ideology by parties in Latvia and elsewhere in the east-central European states. But in the case of LC, it seems that the importance of ideological identity has been underestimated.

Annex 1: Composition of Latvian Governments 1993-2002. List of Latvia's Way Ministers and Prime Ministers

1993-1994:

1. Valdis Birkavs – Prime Minister
2. Georgs Andrejevs – Foreign Minister
3. Ojārs Kehris – Economics Minister
4. Uldis Osis – Finance Minister
5. Andris Gūtmanis – Transport Minister
6. Jānis Vaivads – Education, Science and Culture Minister
7. Egils Levits – Justice Minister
8. Māris Gailis – State Reform Minister
9. Valdis Pavlovskis – Defence Minister
10. Ģirts Kristovskis – Interior Minister
11. Edvīns Inkēns – Special Tasks Minister
12. Jānis Platais – Budget Minister
13. Oļģerts Pavlovskis European Union and External Trade Minister
14. Gunārs Meierovics – Baltic and Nordic States Affairs Minister
15. Andris Bērziņš Labour Minister
16. Druvis Skulte – Privatization Minister
17. Vilis Krištopāns – State Income Minister
18. Normunds Zemvaldis Health Minister

1994-1995 (September 1994 – December 1995):

1. Māris Gailis Prime Minister
2. Valdis Birkavs – Foreign Minister
3. Andris Piebalgs (later Indra Sāmīte) · Finance Minister
4. Ģirts Kristovskis (later Jānis Ādamsons) – Interior Minister
5. Jānis Vaivads (later Jānis Gaigals) Education and Science Minister
6. Andris Gūtmanis – Transport Minister
7. Andris Bērziņš – Social Security Minister
8. Romāns Apsītis – Justice Minister
9. Vita Tērauda – State Reform Minister (until 30.06.95.)
10. Oļģerts Pavlovskis European Union and International Trade Minister
11. Aija Poča – State Income Minister
12. Raimonds Jonītis – Industry and Privatization Minister
13. Druvis Skulte – Privatization Minister (until 20.03.95.)
14. Pēteris Apinis – Health Minister
15. Jānis Bunkšs – Local Authority Minister

1995-1997 (December to January 1997, then February 1997 to July 1997)

Prime Minister Andris Skele (independent)

1. Valdis Birkavs – Foreign Minister
2. Vilis Krištopāns – Transport Minister

3. Māris Gailis (later Anatolijs Gorbunovs) – Environment and Regional Development Minister
4. Jānis Gaigals – Education and Science Minister
5. Aija Poča – State Income Minister
6. Andris Bērziņš – Employment Minister

1997 (August) -1998 (October)

Prime Minister Guntars Krasts (TB/LNNK)

1. Valdis Birkavs – Foreign Minister
2. Vilis Krištopāns – Transport Minister
3. Anatolijs Gorbunovs – Environment and Regional Development Minister
4. Jānis Bunkss – Local Authority Minister
5. Aija Poča – State Reform Minister

1998-1999

1. Vilis Krištopāns Prime Minister
2. Anatolijs Gorbunovs – Transport Minister
3. Valdis Birkavs - Foreign Minister
4. Jānis Gaigals – Education and Science Minister
5. Kārina Pētersone -- Culture Minister
6. Aija Poča – State Income Minister

1999-2000

Prime Minister Andris Skele (People's Party)

1. Anatolijs Gorbunovs - Transport Minister
2. Indulis Bērziņš · Foreign Minister
3. Valdis Birkavs Justice Minister
4. Kārina Pētersone – Culture Minister
5. Jānis Bunkšs – Special Tasks in Local Authority and Public Administration Refrom Minister

2000-2001

1. Andris Bērzins · Prime Minister
2. Indulis Bērziņš – Foreign Minister
3. Anatolijs Gorbunovs – Transport Minister
4. Kārina Pētersone – Culture Minister

NOTES

[1] See Cigane (2003).

[2] Kircheimer (1966): p. 184.

[3] Pannebianco (1988).

[4] Baltic Social Sciences Institute (2001 and 2002).

[5] The paper is based on ten interviews leading Latvia's Way, party members, including two former Prime Ministers and party Chairmen, as well as a number of parliamentary deputies and Ministers. Other primary sources include newspaper interviews with leading political actors, political memoirs, as well as party programs. Basic information such as party

programmes and statutes are available from the LC web site: http://www.lc.lv (accessed 15th July 2003).

[6] Li Bennich Bjorkman (2003).

[7] Interview with LC parliamentary deputy: 10th March 2002.

[8] From the classical liberalism of John Locke's *Two Treatises of Government* (1689) and Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) to the modern liberal debate on state intervention discussed by the economists John Maynard Keynes and von Hayek's *The Constitution of Liberty* (1960) and latterly the political scientists Nozick in *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (1974) and Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* (1971).

[9] Oxford Manifesto (1997).

[10] Club 21 was an organization founded in late 1991 by 21 leading members of the Latvian business and political communities, with the stated aim of bringing together the Latvian elite in an informal forum where various economic, social and political issues could be discussed.

[11] Founded in 1956, this organization representing all Latvian organizations based outside of Latvia. The representatives in Jurmala were thus the émigré political elite. http://www.pbla.lv

[12] Lieven (1994): p. 301.

[13] The Liberal International is based in London, uniting political parties with liberal ideologies. It defines liberal parties as being those that accept its basic documents – the Liberal Manifesto of Oxford (1947); the Declaration of Oxford (1967); the Liberal Appeal of Rome (1981). http://www.liberal-international.org/

[14] Interview with ex-LC Minister: 8th April 2002.

[15] Interview with LC Parliamentary Deputy: 8th April 2002.

[16] *Klubs*, May 1995, p. 4.

[17] Interview with ex-LC Minister: 21st August 2003.

[18] Fukuyama (1992).

[19] Interview with LC Member and Central Office Employee: 11th April 2003.

[20] As of July 2004, in a total Latvian population of 2,309,339, 58.7% was ethnic Latvian, 28.8% Russian, 3.9% Belarussian, 2.6% Ukrainian and 6% other. 470,220 people (around 20% of the population) were non-citizens. www.np.gov.lv (Naturalization Board).

[21] 'On the Renewal of the Republic of Latvia's Citizens' Rights and Fundamental Principles of Naturalization' passed by the Latvian Supreme Council on October 15th, 1991.

[22] In the 2002 national election 85.6% (48) of candidates on the LC list were ethnic Latvians. Only 2 were Russian, 1 Polish, 1 Lithuanian, 1 Lib (a Latvian tribe) and 3 did not identify their nationality. (Latvian Central Election Commission – www.cvk.lv accessed 23rd December 2002).

[23] *Latvijas Vēstnesis*, 13th May 1993, p. 7.

[24] Jubulis (2001): pp. 8–9.

[25] World Bank (2004).

[26] World Bank (2001), p. 3.

[27] See 'Baltic Barometers' I to V by Richard Rose et al www.balticvoices.org

[28] *Diena*, 2nd March 1993, p. 1.

[29] *Latvijas Vēstnesis*, 13th May 1993, p. 7.

[30] Nissinen (1999): p. 133.

[31] Interview with ex-LC Minister: the interviewee claimed that 'LC has realistically and substantively supported EU integration, not just as a political slogan... if you look at people working actively for EU integration – Kesteris [Deputy State Secretary at the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1993-2003) and Chief Negotiator for the Latvian Delegation

on EU accession (1999-2002)]. Daudiss [LC parliamentary deputy 1993-1997, member of the parliaments foreign affairs committee, Latvian Ambassador to the UK from 2001 to his untimely death in 2002], Piebalgs [Latvian Ambassador to the European Union 1998-2002, Assistant State Secretary for EU Affairs at the Latvian Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2002-present] – they are all from LC. Indeed, leading Ambassadors and functionaries from the Foreign Ministry are all from LC'.

[32] Huang (1999).

[33] Interview with LC Member and Central Office Employee: 11th April 2003.

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Kopsavilkums

Šajā rakstā tiek aplūkota ideoloģijas nozīme Latvijas veiksmīgākās postkomunistiskā perioda partijas "Latvijas ceļa" darbībā. "Latvijas ceļš" tika izveidots 1993. gadā, gatavojoties pirmajām postkomunistiskā perioda Saeimas vēlēšanām. To veidoja trīs dažādi grupējumi – "Kluba-21" dalībnieki, Latvijas Tautas Frontes liberālā spārna pārstāvji un emigrācijas latvieši. "Latvijas ceļš" bija iesaistīts visās astoņās valdības koalīcijās no 1993. līdz 2002. gadam, un tā biedri trīs reizes ieņēma premjerministra amatu. Tas pasludināja sevi par 'liberālu' partiju. Tomēr būtu jāvaicā: vai tas bija priekšvēlēšanu manevrs vai nozīmīga politiskā filosofija? Šajā rakstā tiek aplūkots jautājums, cik lielā mērā "Latvijas ceļš" īstenoja "liberālu" politiku svarīgās trīs jomās: mazākumtautību jautājumā, ekonomiskajā politikā un ārpolitikā. Lai gan liberālisms sākotnēji tika izmantots kā balsu piesaistīšanas instruments un partijas iekšējās un ārējās identitātes forma (iesaistot savā kodolā dažādas nošķirtas indivīdu grupas), tas galu galā "iefiltrējās" arī partijas formulētajā politikā.

FHRUL Bloc: Leftist Parties or Parties of Russian-speaking People?
PCTVL bloks: krievvalodīgo partijas vai kreisās partijas?

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The public discourse remains ambiguous about labeling a group of parties currently referred to as the bloc of "For Human Rights in United Latvia" (FHRUL). Terms "left-wing parties" and "parties of Russian-speaking minorities" are used interchangeably. This paper explores social base of voter support for these parties in an attempt to identify a more appropriate term and finds that ethnic factors play far more important role, hence, "parties of Eastern Slavic minorities" emerges as a suitable label for the mentioned political organizations.
Key words: Political parties, voting behavior, identities, cleavage theory

Although more than ten years have passed since the first competitive multi-party elections were held in the post-Soviet Latvia, the public discourse remains ambiguous about labeling a group of parties currently referred to as the bloc of "For Human Rights in United Latvia" (FHRUL). This term came into being after the disintegration of the "For Human Rights in United Latvia" union in 2003.

On the one hand, these political organizations are called leftist parties to stress their political platforms. Indeed, programs of the National Harmony Party, the Socialist Party of Latvia, and "For Human Rights in United Latvia" often contain references to standard leftist solutions such as increased government regulation, stronger involvement of the government into solving social and welfare issues etc. On the other hand, these organizations are often referred to as parties of the Russian-speaking population, and rightly so – they advocate interests of Slavic ethnic minorities, support further liberalization of legislation regulating language use and the education system in Latvia.

However, this ambiguity does not attest merely to a confusion of terminology. One can also distinguish between different identities of the mentioned parties that are linked to a particular label. Moreover, those identities may affect the electoral prospects of parties.

One of the ways to approach the issue of party identities is to analyze social and demographic characteristics of supporters of the respective parties and their voting motivations. This paper seeks to explore what factors – economic or ethnic – played a more important role in giving support to the FHRUL bloc and what are the implications of those findings for the issue of identities of parties. The paper is based on data from a survey of 1196 citizens of the Republic of Latvia between 18 and 74 years of age conducted in February 2004.

Theoretical background and hypotheses

One of the oldest and still influential traditions in research on voting behavior is related to exploring the influence of social demographic factors upon the voters' choice. This tradition is based on an empirical discovery in the mid-20th century that certain social groups were more prone to support certain political parties (Berelson et al. 1954, Lipset 1961). It was asserted that various social demographic variables define group interests that profoundly affect both activities of parties and public notions about what parties advocate what interests. Later, this way of thinking about European polities led to the formulation of cleavage theory (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967).

Although subsequent research showed that class voting may have weakened (Clark et.al. 1993) or that voters' behavior was affected by psychological factors such as party identification (Campbell 1960) or rational calculations of personal benefit (Downs 1957), the importance of social factors remains notable (Heath 1990) in spite of a number of social and political processes related to the growing levels of education and welfare, changes in value orientations etc. (Manza et al. 1995).

Views about the impact of social factors upon voters' behavior in Eastern Europe are quite diverse. It was believed soon after the collapse of the communist regimes that East European party systems would largely be structured around the same cleavages that were found in Western Europe (Kitschelt 1994). Electoral performance of parties under recognizable labels (Social Democrats, Liberals, Conservatives etc.) may have prompted such predictions. On the other hand, radical social economic reforms in the region and the resultant social mobility of individuals questioned prospects for West European regularities to be soon observed in Eastern Europe. (Mateju and Rehakova 1997).

The theoretical disagreements have led to a number of empirical studies to explore the role of social factors in shaping voters' choice. A few of them fall within the category of studies of economic voting, i.e. whether and how changes in the economic situation of an individual or his/her perceptions about the likely change in the future have influenced his/her voting decision (Kiewiet 1983; Šumskas 2003). Other authors have paid attention to how an individual assesses the overall state of the economy in the past and the likely change in the future, and how those assessments have impacted support for position and opposition parties (Lewis-Beck 1988; Harper 2000).

Given the rapid social and economic changes and oscillation of political sympathies in Eastern Europe, this approach seems to be appropriate both theoretically and empirically. However, it fails to explain why parties that have ruled either alone or as part of a coalition have managed to retain sizeable parliamentary presence despite the profound reforms. Also, this approach does little to clarify whether there are any durable political cleavages, or whether political sympathies are formed ad hoc and without any long-term prospects for stabilization. At the same time, a number of studies on Eastern Europe suggest that structural factors possess more explanatory power for voting behavior than factors associated with economic voting theory do (Bielasiak and Blunck 2002).

Cleavage theory emphasizing the importance of politicized, deeper and more stable social divisions for understanding the structure of political sympathies (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) constitutes the theoretical basis for this paper. Earlier research

has identified two important cleavages – the social economic one and the ethnic one – (Evans and Whitefield 1993; Norgard et al 1999), and major parties tend to position themselves vis-à-vis both of them. Therefore, it is assumed that different identities of parties of the FHRUL bloc are related to these cleavages. If those parties result from the social economic cleavage, they can be considered leftist parties. If, however, they are more related to the ethnic dimension, they should be regarded as parties of the Russian-speaking population.

In order to explore the relationship of the mentioned parties with one or another cleavage, a number of hypotheses will be formulated and verified on the basis on theories of voting behavior.

If we assume that parties of the FHRUL bloc mobilize support on the basis of their views on social economic issues, we can formulate a number of hypotheses in line with this assumption. One of the basic conclusions of class voting theory relates support for leftist parties with lower employment status (manual worker etc.). One can also expect that voters with lower income and a lower level of formal education will be more enthusiastic about efforts of redistribution advocated by the leftist parties. However, support to left-wing parties in transition societies can also be characteristic of people who have an income or education level above average but who consider themselves to be losers from the post-Communist reform process (Mateju 1999).

If we regard the FHRUL bloc as a function of the ethnic cleavage, then other assumptions could be formulated. In this case, the ethnic identity of voters would become particularly important, and the FHRUL bloc would be supported first and foremost by ethnic Russians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians. Given the social and demographic structure of Latvia's society, parties of the FHRUL bloc are likely to receive more support in the largest cities of the country where some 80% of the mentioned minorities reside. Regionally, support for the FHRUL bloc is also likely to be found primarily in Rīga and Latgale.

Thus, it is possible to formulate a number of working hypotheses:

1.1. the lower the income level of citizens, the higher their likelihood to vote for parties of the FHRUL bloc.

1.2. the lower the level of formal education of citizens, the higher their likelihood to vote for parties of the FHRUL bloc.

1.3. the lower the employment status of citizens, the higher their likelihood to vote for parties of the FHRUL bloc.

1.4. the stronger citizens regard themselves as losers from the post-Communist transition, the higher their likelihood to vote for parties of the FHRUL bloc.

2.1. citizens who identify themselves as Russians, Belorussians, or Ukrainians are more likely to vote for parties of the FHRUL bloc.

2.2. citizens who use Russian as the prime language of communication in the family are more likely to vote for parties of the FHRUL bloc.

2.3. citizens who reside in Rīga or Latgale are more likely to vote for parties of the FHRUL bloc.

2.4. citizens who reside in the seven largest cities (Rīga, Liepāja, Daugavpils, Rēzekne, Jelgava, Jūrmala, Ventspils) are more likely to vote for parties of the FHRUL bloc.

Data and variables

Data from a survey conducted in February 2004 will be analyzed to verify the above hypotheses. In total, 1196 citizens of the Republic of Latvia between 18 and 74 years of age were polled. The sample is representative of the general population of citizenry.

To identify supporters of parties of the FHRUL bloc, answers to questions "What party would you vote for, if the Saeima elections would be held today?" will be used. Respondents that had chosen to support the National Harmony Party, the Socialist Party of Latvia, the "Equal Rights" party and the FHRUL will be classified together for the purposes of this paper.

The level of income will be established on the basis of answers to the following question: "What was the net income of your family per household member last month?". In a similar vein, all respondents were requested to indicate the highest level of their formal education using the following scale – primary education; incomplete secondary education; secondary education; vocational secondary education; higher education. The level of education was coded from 1 (primary education) through 5 (higher education). Employed persons were ranked in accordance with the relative status of employment, adapting a methodology used in other studies – self-employed persons (also entrepreneurs); senior managers; civil servants and specialists; lower-skilled employees in the service sector; manual workers. Employment status is coded using a scale from 1 (self-employed) through 5 (manual worker).

The concept of winner/loser from transition is difficult to operationalize. First, post-Communist reforms affected many vital spheres of social life – economy, politics, inter-personal relations etc. Secondly, each individual could have gained from transition in one sphere but turn out to be a loser in others. Thirdly, both gains and losses may be intangible and non-quantifiable and, thus, nearly impossible to compare. Given these considerations and the need to establish a quantitative variable, a self-assessment of winner/loser status from transition provided by each respondent will be used in this paper. Those respondents who fully or rather agree with the statement that life in the Soviet period was generally better than nowadays will be classified as losers from transition while those who fully or rather disagree with this statement will be regarded as winners from the post-Communist reform process.

The verification of the second model requires information about respondents' ethnic belonging to be established on the basis of their self-identification. Ethnicity will be coded dichotomously: Latvian (1) and Eastern Slavic (2). Taking in to account that self identification may not be a perfect tool to establish one's ethnic belonging, an additional question was introduced – "What is the language used most frequently for everyday communication in your family?" – to distinguish between Latvian (1) and Russian (2). Voter support in specific regions and urban settings will be established on the basis of information about the place of residence provided by each respondent.

Analysis

As the dependent variable – support to parties of the FHRUL bloc – is dichotomous, the method of logistic regression will be employed for statistical analysis of independent variables.

Model 1 is related to establishing the significance of economic cleavage for support to parties of the FHRUL bloc. The model first considers four hypotheses outlined above. This model incorporates the following independent variables: employment status; income; education; winner/loser from transition. Model 2 is related to establishing the significance of the ethnic cleavage. It verifies another four hypotheses (2.1. to 2.4.) making use of the following independent variables: ethnicity; language used in family; type of the place of residency; region. Finally, independent variables from both models will be merged to establish the statistical significance of each variable and, potentially, changes thereof.

Results

Results of Model 1 (see Appendix 1) demonstrate that the status of winner/loser from transition is the best predictor of support for parties of the FHRUL bloc – losers are more likely to vote for these parties. Such a result is somewhat surprising if one interprets winning/losing in economic terms. It means that support for the FHRUL bloc is more dependent on assessments of long-term retrospective changes in an individual's economic well-being rather than on the current economic situation of each respondent.

The level of formal education is also related with support for the FHRUL bloc – people with a higher education tend to be more supportive of the bloc parties. This observation runs contrary to theories contending that leftist parties are more supported by people with a lower level of education. Other variables did not yield statistically significant results. The overall explanatory power of Model 1 was very poor.

Results of Model 2 (see Appendix 2) attest to a huge importance of language of communication used in family and the ethnic identification of each respondent for explaining the support to FHRUL parties. In other words – respondents who regard themselves as representatives of an Eastern Slavic ethnic minority or who use Russian as their primary language of communication in their family are more likely to vote for parties of the FHRUL bloc. The regional aspect also seems to play a role, but it lacks statistical significance. It is important to note the strong explanatory power of Model 2 – it explains 81% of variation in support for parties of the FHRUL bloc. Therefore, Model 2 lends support for theoretical assumptions about the role of ethnic factors in voting for FHRUL parties.

When independent variables of both models are merged into a single model to make their significance more exact, variables of Model 1 rapidly lose their statistical significance (see Model 3 in Appendix 1). Ethnic identification and language in family, in turn, retain their explanatory potential. However, the overall explanatory power of Model 3 decreases by 3.5 percentage points. Therefore, one can conclude that economic factors such as low income, lower level of formal education and a lower status of employment are nearly insignificant for explaining the support for parties of the FHRUL bloc. Thus, mobilization of supporters of these parties can hardly be facilitated by emphasizing economic issues. Further, a sizeable segment of voters, whose social demographic background matches theoretical descriptions of left-wing party supporters, choose to vote for parties that are not part of the FHRUL bloc and, moreover, can hardly be considered leftist.

The results of this analysis show that support for the FHRUL bloc is mobilized on the basis of ethnic factors. However, a traditional understanding of how ethnic belonging is defined needs to be expanded by adding the use of language in the family to the usual indicator of ethnic self-identification. Data show that, in the context of the current regression model, ethnic self-identification has a somewhat smaller statistical significance than the language used at home. It implies that belonging to a specific linguistic space in Latvia carries a more profound political significance than ethnic self-identification does. One of the possible explanations for this observation lies in the patterns of consumption of media products by different linguistic groups.

Conclusions

This paper explored social factors affecting support for parties of the FHRUL bloc on the basis of the cleavage theory. Given this theoretical framework and empirical evidence from other countries, two theoretical models were formulated. One of them included economic factors while the other emphasized ethnic factors.

Logistic regression analysis was applied to data from a survey of 1196 citizens of the Republic of Latvia conducted in February 2004. Results of statistical analysis demonstrated that ethnic factors were far better predictors of support to FHRUL parties, with use of the Russian language in the family and Eastern Slavic ethnic self-identification being the strongest statistically significant predictors. Therefore, it would be correct to conclude that the identity of parties of the FHRUL bloc is closely related with ethnic matters and that "parties of Eastern Slavic minorities" would be a more accurate label for these parties than "leftist parties" would.

On the other hand, one has to note methodological difficulties with operationalization of the theoretically salient term of winners/losers from transition in the context of this paper. This term deserves more attention and better operationalization in surveys, as scholars have somewhat neglected this phenomenon in Latvia.

This paper contributes to the discussion of the Latvian party system, its character and development. It also provides additional evidence of the high salience of ethnic cleavage in Latvia's polity. Simultaneously, conclusions reached in this paper question the positive assessment of initial results of the societal integration policy pursued in Latvia over the last years or, at least, provide a point of departure for long-term evaluation of this policy.

Although results of this study lend strong support to cleavage theory, it must be noted that parliamentary representation of parties of the FHRUL bloc has gradually grown since the mid-1990s. This could be seen as a consequence of the ongoing naturalization process, as a result of which more than 80 000 residents (mainly Russians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians) have obtained Latvian citizenship. On the other hand, FHRUL parties have been in parliamentary opposition since 1993. This peculiarity underlines the necessity to verify a number of hypotheses derived from the theory of economic voting, as it could provide alternative or complimentary explanations of voter support to parties of the FHRUL bloc.

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Kopsavilkums

Vairāk nekā 10 gadus pēc pirmajām brīvajām Saeimas vēlēšanām, kuras norisinājās daudzpartiju sistēmas apstākļos, publiskajā diskursā joprojām ir vērojama divējāda nostāja attiecībā pret noteiktu partiju grupu, ko pašlaik ir pieņemts apzīmēt šādi: PCTVL bloka partijas. No vienas puses, šīs partijas tiek dēvētas par kreisajām partijām, uzsverot to politiskās platformas. No otras puses, tās bieži tiek dēvētas arī par krievvalodīgo iedzīvotāju partijām, un arī tas nav bez pamata.

Šāda divējāda nostāja vedina domāt, ka ir iespējams runāt arī par atšķirīgām partiju identitātēm, kas ir saistītas ar vienu vai otru nosaukumu. Viens no veidiem, kā ir iespējams tuvoties precīzākai izpratnei par minēto partiju identitāti, ir aplūkot šo partiju vēlētājus un analizēt viņu motivāciju atbalstīt šīs partijas. Pētot partiju atbalstītājus un viņu motivāciju, netieši tiek pētīti šo cilvēku priekšstati par aplūkojamajām partijām, to politisko platformu un nozīmīgākajiem to identitātes komponentiem. Šajā rakstā ir meklēta atbilde uz jautājumu: kādi sociālie faktori – ekonomiskie vai etniskie – ir bijuši nozīmīgāki PCTVL bloka atbalstam, un ko tas liecina par šo partiju identitāti?

Analizējot 2004. gada februārī veiktās sabiedriskās domas aptaujas rezultātus un izmantojot regresijas analīzi, noskaidrots, ka divi galvenie PCTVL bloka partiju atbalstu ģenerējošie faktori ir piederība kādai no austrumslāvu etniskajām grupām un krievu valodas lietojums ģimenē. Tādējādi var secināt, ka šo partiju atbalstītāju primārā motivācija ir saistīta ar etniskās piederības jautājumiem – pretstatā labklājības pārdales problemātikai. No tā izriet secinājums, ka šī bloka partiju identitāte ir cieši saistīta ar etniskajiem aspektiem un ka precīzāks šo partiju apzīmējums būtu "(austrum)slāvu minoritāšu partijas", nevis "kreisās partijas".

APPENDIX 1

Table 1

Regression models of support to parties of FHRUL block

	Model 2					Model 1					Model 3				
	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp (B)	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp (B)	B	S.E.	Wald	Sig.	Exp (B)
ETN						1,304	0,370	12,424	0,000	3,683	1,948	0,531	13,483	0,000	7,017
VAL_GIM						3,532	0,511	47,731	0,000	34,180	3,569	0,839	18,098	0,000	35,495
REGION						0,626	0,336	3,475	0,062	1,870	1,034	0,555	3,471	0,062	2,813
PILS						-0,070	0,327	0,045	0,831	,933	-0,586	0,574	1,044	0,307	0,556
IENAK	0,187	0,147	1,608	0,205	1,205						0,016	0,239	0,004	0,948	1,016
NODARB	0,112	0,117	0,918	0,338	1,118						0,063	0,180	0,122	0,727	1,065
PAGATNE	-0,636	0,133	22,762	0,000	0,530						-0,074	0,201	0,138	0,711	0,928
IZGL	0,421	0,192	4,832	0,028	1,524						0,052	0,291	0,032	0,858	1,053
Konstante	-2,811	1,066	6,955	0,008	0,060	-8,257	0,822	100,777	0,000	0,000	-9,056	2,265	15,980	0,000	0,000
% KOP_SK	86,1					90,8					92,5				
% PCTVL_SK	0,0					81,3					77,8				

Table 2

Legend of variables

Label of variable	Variable	Scale
ETN	Ethnic self-identification of respondent.	1 – Latvian 2 - Eastern Slav (Russian, Belorussian, Ukrainian)
VAL_GIM	Language that is most frequently used for communication in respondent's family.	1 – Latvian language 2 – Russian language
REGION	Region of residence.	1 – Vidzeme, Kurzeme, Zemgale 2 – Rīga, Latgale
PILS	Type of the place of residence.	1 – other places 2 – Rīga, Daugavpils, Liepāja, Rēzekne, Jelgava, Ventspils, Jūrmala
IENAK	Net income of respondent's family per household member last month.	1 – 40 Lats per month and less 2 – 41-80 Lats per month 3 - 81-140 Lats per month 4 – 141-250 Lats per month 5 – 251 Lats per month and more
NODARB	Employment status of an employed respondent.	1 – self-employed, entrepreneur 2 – senior manager 3 – specialist, civil servant 4 – lower-skilled employee in service sector 5 - manual worker
PAGATNE	Attitude towards life in the Soviet period	1 – fully agrees that life in the Soviet period was better 2 – rather agrees that life in the Soviet period was better 3 – rather disagrees that life in the Soviet period was better 4 – fully disagrees that life in the Soviet period was better
IZGL	Respondent's education	1 – basic or incomplete primary education 2 – primary or incomplete secondary education 3 – secondary education 4 – vocational education 5 – higher education
KOP_SK	Overall percentage of correctly predicted cases	
PCTVL_SK	Percentage of FHRUL support cases correctly predicted by each model	

Impact of Europeanization on Involvement of Society in Decision Making Process in Latvia
Eiropeizācijas ietekme uz sabiedrības iesaisti lēmumu pieņemšanas procesā Latvijā

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The article deals with cognitive and normative structures of Europeanization related to the impact of Europeanization on involvement of Latvian society in the decision-making process. The author aims to show that deepening of the European integration process in Latvia, after accession to the EU, leads to more coherent Europeanized dialogue between state and society in the decision-making process, development of closer interaction of society with other interest groups on the national and international level, and contributes to European political identity formation.

The organization of individuals in the nongovernmental sector with the task to protect their interests is an effective way of better understanding the political process, and the possible costs and benefits from participation in the Europeanization process. Analyses of the interaction process between society and state allows to conclude that despite fragmentation of Latvian nongovernmental organizations in different sectors, preconditions are created for further strengthening the dialogue between society and state in the further Europeanization process. Europeanization positively influences the role of the nongovernmental sector in communication with the state and the international community, leading to consolidation and development of the sector and the creation of new values and European political identity.

Key words: Europeanization. European Union, decision-making process, non-governmental sector, identity formation, interaction.

Introduction

Accession to the European Union (EU) puts a new dimension and psychological change on the Europeanization process in Latvia. Discussion is no longer only about the application of EU directives, but also about the participation of states and society in creating them. New changes put an additional burden on society in comprehension of the various new aspects of the Europeanization process with respect to the EU dimension – timely receipt of essential information and active intervention in the decision-making process, enlargement of the national networks also with nongovernmental institutions on the European level for definition of the relevant national positions.

The author aims to prove that Latvia's accession to the EU adds a new wider and deeper dimension to the quality of state – society interaction in the decision – making process, requiring an active "bottom – top" approach, which also facilitates the formation of European political identity in society.

The article deals with state – society relations as one of many domains of Europeanization. Europeanization is mainly used in the narrowest meaning of the concept – with respect to the EU political process.

1. Theoretical background

The process of European integration has started a very complex process determined as "Europeanization", the process of structural change, variously affecting actors and institutions, ideas and interests and response to EU polices.

Europeanization initially was defined as "Incremental process re-orientating the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of organizational logic of national politics and policy making".[1 2] However, the most common definition is given to Europeanization as a process consisting of "processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, "ways of doing things", and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political structure, and public policies."[3 4 5]

As the EU developed and deepened, the effects of Europeanization were increasingly experienced in the domains of national policies, politics, and more broadly, in the domestic policies of the new member states like Latvia. Political scientists in the framework of Europeanization have mostly concentrated on the aspects of comparative politics, international political economics, theoretical policy analysis and systemic change. There are possibilities to analyse Europeanization through – 1) adaptation of institutional settings in the broadest sense through rules, procedures, norms, practices at different political levels in response to the dynamics of integration; 2) the role of the pre-accession process in the continued democratization and "marketization" of Central Europe; 3) the emergence of new, cross – national policy networks and communities; 4) restructuring of the strategic opportunities available to domestic actors and finally 5) shifts in cognitive and normative dimensions – discourse affecting policy in response to European developments, norms and values, political legitimacy, identities, state traditions – understanding of governance, policy paradigms, frames, and narratives.[6] The last dimension should be kept distinct from the others as being the most appropriate for analyses of society involvement in the decision-making process as well as European identity formation.

When speaking of "European identity" it needs to be stated what exactly is meant, as each of these words taken individually may be very ambiguous. The "European" identity in the context of this article is that of the EU which is part of Europe, the word "Identity" being understood to mean the spirit of the community and the very source of its cohesion. EU as an organization and its policies and achievements are expression of that identity which aims to ensure that its citizens and peoples not only understand but also espouse the spirit of the Union if they are ultimately to identify with it. Indeed, the Union's very ability to survive, grow, act and succeed in its work depends on it.

2. Participation of society in the decision-making process

Europeanization is not simply only about less tangible aspects, such as beliefs, values and identities, but mutually closely interacts also with formal policy rules. Europeanization has had a deep impact upon the public policy functions of the member states, as it can develop from different stages and forms of the policy process, e.g. policy formulation and putting policy into practice. The concept of Europeanization is about the impact of European policy within the member state, leading to close interaction between state and society in the policy process. It thus entails two steps: adoption at the EU level and then incorporation at the domestic level. The former step alone would be complete only in the EU pre-accession phase and could be regarded to pertain to Latvia prior to accession.[7] Coordinated decision – making process and active society involvement after accession to the EU must ensure coherence in Latvia's overall European policy – defining the policy and national interests in the EU context and beyond in order to benefit society.

Practice shows that effective decision-making can be achieved by –

- Establishment of effectively functioning working methods (detailed rules, procedures and guidelines for all related processes, concrete responsibilities between involved parties and the best practices) to ensure high quality from the beginning – also when decisions have to be prepared and taken in a very short time;
- Development of an operational network and active informal communication through personal contacts across institutions and working together using similar and well established working methods, being aware of problems, issues and details to be considered and addressed;
- Building substantial knowledge and understanding of EU matters in order to open ground for discussions. In later stages of decision making this makes it possible to comprehensively deal with the issues of their competence and to quickly formulate coherent and well-argued positions in communications with the EU.

With deepening of EU membership – both in terms of time of membership and the gradual expansion of EU competencies – Latvia, similar to the tendency in other member states, has started to regard EU more as internal rather than foreign affairs. Therefore there are highly necessary "normal" national decision-making procedures with a "European" dimension.

For the society of Latvia accession to the EU should be regarded first of all as the psychological impact on perception of the process. That should definitely influence the way of participation of society in the decision-making process. It means that before accession, all the policy initiatives with respect to the EU were much treated as the ones where "we do not have many possibilities to influence, but only to adopt". It was a good time to learn and build capacity, therefore good practices of interrelation in the decision-making process were created in some sectors, e.g. agriculture, fisheries, protection of consumers' rights. However, there was also large pressure to transpose and implement a large number of different EC directives, but after accession, the situation has changed. Perceptions and values should be and are more and more developing in a way that decisions on policies are not settled by "somebody" far away in Brussels but actually vice versa – the society has rights, even more obligations, to influence the process, proposing better solutions.

To better illustrate the idea, Table 1 indicates the policy process cycle where a broken line separates the dimensions (circles marked in gray color) where involvement of society at the early stage of preparation of proposals for national positions is highly desirable in order to influence the goal of policy that is going to be later decided on the EU level. Therefore a "bottom – up" approach is pushing society more to build knowledge, evaluate needs and values and propose positions in a way that is most beneficial to it through adopted EU policy or national law at the later stage of implementation.

Table 1

EU dimension in the policy preparation cycle



For public administration and society of a new member state like Latvia, it is even harder at the beginning to change psychology and realize that it is now possible to participate in the process from the beginning of preparation of EU level regulation, and not just only to undertake the implementation obligations of the member states. At the same time there are changes in the national co-ordination and decision-making system itself, and a great number of skilled people are withdrawing from the administration in order to move to the private sector or to work in Brussels.

For the active society groups involved in the process, like the non-governmental[8] sector, accession to the EU opens new dimensions – the number of possibilities, contacts and impact channels to the process mainly through partners on the international level. So the state is expected to facilitate building of relevant knowledge and to provide relevant new information on a systematic basis for better involvement in the process.

The situation should be made opposite to that which prevailed during the pre-accession process, when public information work with society on EU issues was very fragmented due to limited financial resources. The pre-referendum period, when a

large amount of money was invested in intensive knowledge/attitude building at the very final stage of accession, should not be taken into account as ordinary activity, (as well as the results from opinion polls) because it was used more to prepare society for the particular decision, but not for the process itself. However, during the period after the referendum and since the accession, the intensity level of knowledge building and attitudes, particulary towards new EU policies, have slowed back down nearly to the same level as during the pre-accession period.[9]

One of the typical tangible results of Europeanization in society is a high attraction to available EU structural funds in Latvia and active involvement of members of society in the process of acquiring finance, if such an opportunity is seen. That leads to Europeanization of interests and the promotion of particular values (e.g. values and interests similar to those of the farmers or entrepreneurs in Germany or other member states). At the same time, a positive new trend that appears is more active participation of society in decision-making on policies and future values like the one related to EU Financial perspective 2007 –2013, or the Lisbon process determining competitiveness of the EU in the global market, where one can observe involvement of the major business associations and NGO partners in the definition of initial positions that should later result in new practices and values both nationally and on the European level.

Interaction between State and society

In order to better understand the changes and challenges brought forward by the impact of the Europeanization process, first of all there should be outlined a number of important findings during the EU pre-accession period in Latvia. For instance, often the very limited capabilities of sector partners (NGOs, enterpreneurs and their association, social groups) during interaction with the state in a particular sector readily eliminated the possibility of developing any further consultation practice between the two, even causing disbelief in it:

- In all the sectors of the economy there were very few organizations with modern strategic planning, a broad view and an analytic approach. Managers did not think long-term, fight with survival problems and operational management. When organizations cannot plan their own future, they are not able to co-operate on future needs.
- Representatives of the sectors were not well educated in the market economy and public administration, so they did not understand basic principles, and disagreed with them. Understandably it takes much time and education to change perception. Sometimes people approached officials who were not dealing with their particular problem and blamed them for everything, only because they were a part of the bureaucracy. Entrepreneurs and nongovernmental organizations are slowly starting to realize that consultations in the European integration context would assist them in developing lobby practices on the national and international level, therefore also building a more European type of identity and good practice.
- A significant problem was communicating information within represented non-government groups. Many people were representing their professional view, which many times did not conform to the opinion of their organisations' leaders or that of other members. Both sides of consultations lack abilities to conduct successful consultations – bad previous experiences, misperception, lack of

negotiation skills. other interpersonal problems. Associations were not able to recruit good specialists. pay appropriate salaries to their managers and spend a lot of time on legislation, because they performed some other services to make money etc.

- Because of financial and managerial problems. organisations often were not representative - organisations were comprised of. only those enterprises. which were active or felt a need for co-operation. Those were represented in two, three and even more associations, where they were trying to solve their own particular problems.
- The formal or non-obligatory character approach to the consultations from the part of the government, and therefore also a lack of competence, should be considered as a problem.

Usually it was possible to observe a lack of understanding of the non-governmental sector regarding the impact of EU legislation on a particular policy. NGOs not always fully comprehend a particular field, its interrelation with the EU and the impact of the EU. One part of organizations has lacked overall comprehension about issues that, in relation to a particular field already touch other inter-related fields at the same time. Therefore, important is the question about the capacity of the nongovernmental sector to attract personnel that could be able to develop within organizations such systematic understanding and to prepare a well – argued position. Non-governmental structures have the possibility in such kind of co-operation to get to know more about the EU, its structure, the basic principles of operation, and about the principles of legal drafting.

There were also a number of NGOs that tended more toward themselves, internal problems, short-term targets and quick results. Nevertheless, parallel to the increasing number of NGOs, there is increasing professionalism of the members in managing NGOs, fundraising and legal comprehension. Not always is it possible to estimate where is the exact merit of Europeanization or the development of the political process itself.

The role of NGOs in particular is growing with Latvia's accession to theEU in respect to policy formation, as it is relevant to ensure a clear understanding about EU policies and long-term interests. EU policy determination should take place on the highest level with quality input from the NGOs sector. This additional layer is now already obvious in decision making with respect to the EU dimension, where particularly important is timely public discussion concerning particular national EU policy. There is a need for developed dialogue in order to formulate national interests and their justification.

Ministries have submitted to the government of Latvia for decision making 85 draft positions for the EU Council of Ministers during the first four months of EU membership (May – September 2004). Table 2 indicates the information on results of the dialogue between the government and the non-governmental sector in the framework of preparing these draft decisions.[10]

Government institutions consider that activity from the side of social partners has not been substantial. The most common reasons have been indicated as a lack of knowledge and language skills.[11] The results prove the trend that from one point of view, the government irregularly organizes the consultation process, however the situation

varies from sector to sector. If some sectors are less active in interrelation with the government, then others are oppositely active, e.g. agriculture, environment, social.

Table 2

Interaction between government and society in decision making process (85 draft positions to Council of Minister)



The present situation indicates existing fragmentation in a number of sectors and the need for strengthening common practice of cooperation work between state and nongovernmental sectors, so the Europeanization process has a good base for facilitating that. Analyses of the information included in the national positions indicate a trend that for society, more significant are such sector policy issues as agriculture, social issues, standards. General up-level issues, such as political and institutional – foreign affairs or European Constitution Treaty, are less understood and significant for people in general, even if there exist small NGOs like the Institute of Foreign Affairs which can provide opinions on external affairs; nevertheless, in many cases it has been indicated that they are not even requested or necessary.

Interaction between state and nongovernmental sectors is developing a political participation culture and creates a feeling of ownership in society that the EU is not only the government's business. As far as there are possibilities to participate in the process, this also facilitates developing European identity to a large extent through interaction with partners in other member states, therefore affording opportunities to gain new experiences, active dialogue organization practices with the government, and lobby techniques.

One of the substantial effects of Europeanization after the accession of Latvia to the EU are the rights of NGOs in EU institutions to be treated as similar co-operation partners – they have not only rights but also possibilities to participate in the preparation of directives and laws. There is also the possibility to be heard in Brussels. For this purpose it is worth combining forces with international partners in order to be listened to both on the national and international level. In this respect it should be realized that the practice in member states that the EU and national governments support NGOs and provide finances for active interaction is the case where European values should be developed and traditions be continued. This should be developed also in Latvia.

3. Role of society discourse in Europeanization process

Europeanization characterizes challenges also to the legitimacy of discourse in society. The latest research has indicated evidence to the existence of diverse national discourse providing legitimacy to European related issues.[12]

The political process in Latvia, similar to other new member states, should be characterized by a "top-to-bottom" and not a "bottom-to-top" approach. Therefore there are limited possibilities to legitimize different policies as a result of wider discussion in society, existing values and interests. If in the case of the pre-accession period it is possible to speak about adjustment to the EU and the process driven by the political elite, in which society feels exempted from participation in the process, then after accession to the EU Europeanization would have to undertake a much wider and more particular interaction model of social and political process. Through reacting to external effects Europeanization should facilitate the formation of "bottom-to-top" driven discourse in society.

As result of Europeanization, there is an increase in the need for legitimizing discourse of the political process. That would allow ensuring popular support for change. Therefore also the future of European integration is dependent on further support by society of openness and the European integration process itself. Discourse therefore is one of the important domains for elements of democratic policy and cognitive – normative structures allowing to sustain democracy and to provide society with the feeling of common goals and interests, and putting them higher than narrow personal interests, as well as the supporting long-term interests, performance and culture of particular institutions.

Society should be convinced about the government and the political elite that their choice is not only necessary but is also the right one. Such legitimizing discourse is especially important because often pressure for change is not "bottom-to-up" but "top-to-bottom" directed, by trying to justify the intentions of the government and enterpreneurs for economic and institutional changes as solutions to economic and political problems on the national and European level.

As larger necessity appears for social and political interaction in order to legitimize decisions, the more changes impact national values and identity in relation to the traditional comprehension of economic development, social welfare, and political democracy. Therefore, responsible elites, in order to effect relevant changes, have to introduce in society discourse that would allow to redefine these basic values, comprehension and also political identity in close link with new challenges.

In addition, Latvia has and will have discourse that differs from the old and new member states. Each state has a different economic, institutional and value structure, therefore having a different reaction to European effects and creating different social and political discourse. For instance, such old member states as France have mainly created discourse which is closely related to economic and institutional changes, while Great Britain has been more concerned with globalization issues (European discourse in Latvia).

There is little research for the moment regarding how Europeanization facilitates the development of opinion in society and change in civil society. Notwithstanding that representatives of the government are trying to be the central creators of discourse, their place could also be taken by political analysts, researchers, interest and social groups. In this case, a particular role is placed on values that allow to influence social and political interaction and change further development. The driving force for such development in public and social life in Latvia might become skills to interact in the realization of national EU policy. The direction of policy should reflect national

interests and values in society similarly to the issues related to the improvement of economic conditions for entrepreneurs, strengthening of European identity in society by making Europe closer to people, etc. However, it will be possible to make judgments later, when it is possible to see how successfully one or another priority policy is operating, their mutual interaction and linkage to the processes in society.

Communication between society and the government is one important element in social and political interaction. Society might hesitate to provide support for a particular direction of the state if it has doubts or is not fully sure about its results (Vote in the referendum on accession of Latvia to EU). The goal of the communicative function is internal co-operation. It means that the political elite is not only telling society about particular political programs, but also willing to listen and change them by reacting to opinion in society. One of the mechanisms in this case are political forums. Before accession to the EU it was meetings of the National Convent, presently it might public discussion about national EU policy and interests or some other important issue in the EU context regarding society or a particular social group (not only the issue concerning the availability of finances from EU structural funds for implementation of particular ideas). The development of such discourse is considered a new challenge after accession to the EU, as before accession there was a stronger "top-to-bottom" stream rather than real interaction with the participation of society.

Europeanization on the national level is not limited only to structural and political changes. European values and political paradigms have been aligned to a particular extent also on the state level by changing discourse and identities.[13] Such issues as national identity might become important in society. As a result, there can occur a rebirth of identity based on national and ethnic principles, therefore becoming a potential source of resistance to Europeanization (In Latvia oppositely – faster integration of non-citizens after accession of the state to the EU). Even churches and spiritual societies have come under pressure to adjust their structures and relations between the state and the public according to the changing context of Europe. The churches are requested to assist in interpreting and providing explanation to "unification of Europe" (The role of the clergy during the preaccession campaign to the EU in Latvia and Lithuania).

4. European identity formation through interaction in decision – making process

The classic response to the question of European identity is: unity in diversity. Ethnic background, culture, religion and history are certainly important factors for European identity. Identity is subject to change. It is not something 'static', given for all time.[14]

As there is still a lot of discussion going on concerning this issue, it is however obvious that Europeanization and particularly accession to the EU extends the dimension of the decision-making process and society involvement. Through need to adopt favorable decisions, collaboration also extends to other countries more and more, therefore creating a synergy of opinions with society groups in other countries. The mixing of different national political identities for a common purpose actually leads closer to the formation of a common European political identity in the decision-

making process on the national level. The analyses of interaction illustrated that with accession to the EU good preconditions for the development of European identity were also established.

There has been an increase in the extent of the decision-making process in which society is involved, with much wider opportunities to influence the process through setting contacts with international organizations, therefore exerting more organized pressure on the issues of their concern. Enlarged participation possibilities in the process actually facilitate the mixing of national identity with European identity for the common goal to reach synergy and mutually favorable decisions.

Information and the role of business involvement are additional valuable critical factors and indicators of performance that might influence further Europeanization and provide answers if the decision-making transformation process and greater interaction develop. The first one is an important tool for increasing knowledge and intensifying effectiveness of communication. What concerns the other one – large players with particular interests in the process might influence the substance of the agenda.

Mainly it is a process that we can call the transformation of identity. Since Latvia is a newcomer to the EU, more empirical data should be accumulated before putting forward questions for further research like – whether the level of growing interaction between different national identities in the EU decision making process gives only pattern for change, more active and quality participation in the decision making process aiming to increase the quality of life or whether it also leads to the development of European identity as an additional layer to the national one? Further Europeanization of different areas of life and processes and some time after accession will allow to test the answer to the established question. A good basis for that is already laid with the accession of Latvia to the EU.

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Kopsavilkums

Rakstā tiek aplūkoti ar eiropeizāciju saistīti procesi, galveno uzmanību pievēršot eiropeizācijas ietekmei uz sabiedrības iesaisti lēmumu pieņemšanas procesā. Līdz ar pievienošanos Eiropas Savienībai padziļinās arī Eiropas integrācijas process Latvijā. Tas sekmē daudz ciešāka eiropeizācijas dialoga veidošanos starp valsti un sabiedrību lēmumu pieņemšanā, attīsta tuvāku sabiedrības mijiedarbību ar valsts pārvaldi un citām sabiedrības interešu grupām nacionālajā un starptautiskajā līmenī, tādējādi sniedzot arī savu ieguldījumu Eiropas politiskās identitātes veidošanās procesā.

Indivīdu organizēta darbība nevalstiskajā sektorā ar mērķi aizstāvēt savas intereses ir efektīvs veids, lai labāk izprastu politiskos procesus, kā arī iespējamos ieguvumus un zaudējumus no līdzdalības eiropeizācijas procesā. Analizējot sabiedrības un valsts mijiedarbības procesu var secināt, ka, neskatoties uz Latvijas nevalstisko organizāciju fragmentāciju dažādos sektoros, ir radīti priekšnoteikumi turpmākā dialoga stiprināšanai starp sabiedrību un valsti turpmākajā eiropeizācijas gaitā. Eiropeizācija pozitīvi ietekmē nevalstiskā sektora nozīmi sadarbībā ar valsti un starptautisko kopienu, tādējādi veicinot sabiedrības konsolidāciju, attīstību, jaunu vērtību un Eiropas politiskās identitātes veidošanos.

III

Discussion on David Laitin's book Identity in Formation. The Russian-speaking population in the Near Abroad

Participants in the discussion:

David Laitin, Stanford University, USA
Aivars Tabuns, University of Latvia
Victor Makarov, Baltic Forum, Latvia

DAVID LAITIN'S PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON THE BOOK

First, I would like to thank you for inviting me here and for putting together such a stimulating conference on such an important topic. I am very grateful and honored to be here and even more so to have a panel here discussing a book that I wrote and published in 1998. I am going to start with a small summary of the book, without any updating, to allow the commentators to react to the book, which they prepared for, and not react to my updating which they, of course, have not prepared for.

My research was made in 1993 and 1994. I did fieldwork living in Narva, Estonia. I had research assistants doing comparable fieldwork in Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Here in Latvia the fieldwork was conducted by Vello Pettai. The question I asked was: what would happen to this beached diaspora, to these 25m people, Russians, who were living in the countries of the near abroad. How would they react – politically, socially, and culturally – to the independence of the 14 non-Russian republics. That was the research question that I went into this project asking. The primary findings I will report now. But I should emphasize, that the book was not normative. It did not say what a good reaction would be, or the best policy, or the most democratic outcome. It did not make any normative claims; it was a positive book in the sense that it tried to pattern the different trends of the Russian speaking population in the four republics to see where it is going, not whether it is a good direction or a bad one.

The first of the three points I will make is that in all the non-Russian republics the Russians faced a double cataclysm. In 1988-89 there were the language laws in all of the four republics which essentially took away from the Russians their historic right to remain monolingual. This was a cataclysm for Russians, who thought of it as their right that they could go anywhere in the seven time zones and speak Russian and never have to learn another language. That was the first cataclysm. The second cataclysm was the independence in 1991, when they suddenly became minorities in the titular republics, rather than a part of a plurality or even a majority in the Soviet Union. Suddenly, they were minorities in these republics and had to deal with their minority status. This was a double cataclysm that faced the Russians in all four republics, and it created a new identity category – the Russian speaking population – which brought together Jews, Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, into one group that faced this cataclysm of linguistic minority status.

However, and this is my second point, in each of the republics there was a different strategy, a different political orientation of the Russian speaking population. They all did not act in the same way. In Kazakhstan, the Russian speaking population included both Russians and Kazakhs who were cosmopolitan Russian speakers, many of whom did not speak Kazakh. Their long-term strategy was to prepare for exit: "When the nationalists take over in Kazakhstan, we better have a place to live in Russia, Ukraine, or elsewhere, because when the nationalists take over and Kazakhs

become Kazakhized, there will be no place for Russians." So the Russian speaking population, both Russian and Kazakh, were making preparations for exit. In Ukraine, the Russian speaking population included ethnic Ukrainians as well as Russians, most of them from eastern regions of Ukraine. There the strategy was not of exit, but of voice. That meant that in the southeastern regions of Ukraine there would be a right to speak Russian as the language of the locality. So, there was more of the Belgian solution in Ukraine, while in Kazakhstan I said there would be an Algerian solution, that is, preparing for exit. In the Belgian solution there was a Flemish region, a Walloon region, and then Brussels as the place where both languages existed side by side. In Estonia and Latvia I made my most controversial claims. And those claims were that the strategy of the Russian speaking population was, in the long term, to assimilate. That is to adapt, over time, more and more to the cultural patterns of the titular populations. That meant learning Estonian or Latvian in the first generation, and maybe in the second and third generation actually becoming Estonian and Latvian through a process of assimilation. My model here was the Catalonian, in Spain, where the 40% of the Spanish speakers had become members of the Catalan society, learned Catalan, and started to become Catalan over time. So there were three different patterns: assimilation, voice, and exit.

In none of the cases, and that was my third point, was conflict absent. That is to say, assimilation was not more peaceful, in my judgment, than exit or voice. All of them had a potential for conflict between groups, and in different ways. In Kazakhstan, I felt the source of the conflict would be the cosmopolitan Kazakhs versus the nationalist Kazakhs who wanted to make Kazakhstan a country where Kazakh was the language of political rights, and this was a threat to the Russian speaking Kazakhs. I felt that nationalists versus cosmopolitans who are mostly titulars would be the major source of conflict. In Ukraine, I thought the major source of conflict would be in the border zones between East and West, over whether these areas will become Ukrainian speaking or Russian speaking, as the areas that could have gone either way, in terms of the dominant language. And Kyiv was the core place where the battle was going to be brought out between the Russian speakers and the Ukrainian speakers. In Estonia and Latvia I foresaw the conflict between the assimilators, that is the Russian speaking population that was learning Estonian and Latvian and trying to integrate into the society, and those political leaders in the Russian speaking population that wanted monopoly representation of their group. To the extent to which there would be assimilation, I argued, there would be a threat to the Russian speaking leadership, that they would loose their representative monopoly over the Russian speaking population. Therefore, I saw a conflict between the leadership of the Russian speaking population and the society itself, one seeking assimilation, one trying to stop it. I have not done research in these republics for ten years. I have done some follow-up in Estonia, but I would be very interested to see how this book looks to experts ten years later.

Aivars Tabun's comments on David Laitin's book

University of Latvia

For the first, I would like to point out that this book is a significant study. The quality of the book is best characterized by the awards which the author received for this book[1]. It will be useful to learn more about it for all researchers interested in ethnic relations. In good faith, the author has analyzed the data obtained by him and other researchers by not avoiding data which are inconvenient with his conclusions. He carefully and self-critically evaluated the methods used to obtain the data. This also made it easier for me to fulfill my own tasks. Taking into account the limited time for my presentation, I am going to pay more attention not to those numerous conclusions I agree with the author but to the theses and conclusions which, in my view, are disputable.

Therefore, I will devote my paper to: 1) The concept of assimilation; 2) Tipping game model; 3) The concept of Russian-speaking population. It is necessary retell briefly those aspects that the author studied systematically. However, I hope this will not distort perception of the main ideas of the author.

Assimilation

David Laitin defined assimilation as "the process of adaptation of the ever changing cultural practices of dominant society with the goal of crossing a fluid cultural boundary separating [minorities] from dominant society" (p. 30).

He wrote that "...there are clear signals of early assimilation ...– of Russian-speakers into Estonian and Latvian.... First, there is an environment within the Russian-speaking community of acquiescence, not rejection. Second, the adult generation is making a good faith effort to reach government-set standards of linguistic achievement, both sides knowing that these standards will of necessity be low. Third, the young generation, still in school, has some, albeit limited, opportunity to develop fluency in Estonian. I predict that in the next generation a significant majority of Russian residents in Estonia will be as fluent in Estonian as Estonian adults are in Russian today" (p. 152). As the author noted, in this book he treated language as a proxy for culture and linguistic assimilation as an indicator of cultural assimilation, ... and window on identity shift (p. 368).

The author has mentioned several times three stages of assimilation:

1. Unassimilated bilingualism – people learn enough of a second language to perform minor tasks; using it in limited domains, and with great difficulty;
2. Assimilated bilingualism – people develop full facility in second language, but maintaining some facilities in their ancestral tongue;
3. Assimilation – their children (or grandchildren) may speak only the state language, without developing any facility in their ancestral tongue (p. 308).

In this book, the author has basically analyzed the "development of fluency in the state language" considering it as an initial phase of linguistic assimilation. At the

same time, one can hardly find facts that would allow the author to make hypotheses about the third phase of assimilation. Therefore, the author's conclusions may be rather related to potentialities for assimilated bilingualism but not to assimilation as an irreversible process as it is often defined in the academic literature. The very latter form of assimilation is the one minorities are concerned with, especially those minorities which seek to preserve their own identity. On the contrary, minorities perceive bilingualism as an additional opportunity and least as threats.

Although it was pointed out that the author defined assimilation as the process of adaptation of the cultural practices, nevertheless, having read the book, it did not become clear to me which cultural practices are different for both groups – titulars and Russian-speaking population – and whether there is a cultural boundary separating minorities from dominant society. I think it would more useful to analyze not differences in cultures but differences in political values and goals, which are not one and the same. At the same time, in mass media and academic literature we can often see attempts to identify cultural and political conflicts.

The hypotheses about assimilation may look more questionable when we examine this process in the contexts of the definitions of collective identities. In the beginning, I will quote a definition of assimilation that is published in Oxford Concise Dictionary of Sociology: "A term assimilation …used to describe the process by which an outsider, immigrant, or subordinate group becomes indistinguishable (underlined by the author) integrated into dominant host society ... Assimilation implied that the subordinate group actually came to accept and internalize the values and culture (underlined by the author) of the dominant group" (p. 20).

If we would examine definitions of assimilation in the works of other sociologists and political scientists, we could find that behavioral assimilation occurs when a newcomer absorbs the cultural norms, values, beliefs, and behavioral patterns of the "host" society. Immigrants or other minority groups are "absorbed" into a host society. The policy of assimilation accelerates the downsizing of linguistic minority group(s) and these groups can not preserve their own cultural identity. Therefore, the European Council's "Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities Article 5 prescribes that "Parties shall refrain from policies or practices aimed at assimilation of persons belonging to national minorities against their will and shall protect these persons from any action aimed at such assimilation".

As the title of the book suggests, one of the author's central themes is formation of identities. Studies on collective identities indicate that collective identities are constituted through shared memories. These identities are established and maintained through a variety of mnemonic sites, practices, and forms; common myths and historical memories, shared experience (Pal Kolsto). As Barry Schwartz puts it, "collective memory[2] is both a mirror and a lamp – a model of and a model for society"[3].

Historical consciousness refers not only to a knowledge of the past but implies the use of that knowledge to understand the future. Many elements blur our perception of history as it regards current political action. History may be used as evidence in the support of particular political positions for the benefit of a group too. It may cripple us with the realization of the relative inability of individuals to effect change. In addition, our memories of the past tend to be selective and short. We may remember falsity rather

than truth. At the same time all of us are affected by the understanding of our historical traditions, and in its best form, this knowledge leads us from legend toward truth.

If we analyse the construction of national identities, we must devote serious attention to myths of ethnohistory and the politics of symbolic and cultural representation. "While an anxious readiness-to-receive the past exists as something of a generality in modern everyday life, closer historical attention will also reveal that very different versions and appropriations of the past continue to emerge from different classes and groups"[4]. For this reason social scientists must investigate why people are attached to the past; how widespread different historical myths are in popular perception (some myths have a broad popular resonance and impact on government policies, but others are marginalised); what impact they have on government policies; how the past is used as part of a political agenda and how the past is is mobilised in the formulation and composition of local identities and senses of belonging[5].

The next table shows the way in which Russians and Latvians interpret different events in Latvia's history. Of course, the interpretations which are shown in the table are not held by all members of the relevant ethnic communities, but they can nevertheless be seen as typical. The viewpoints were assembled from the Latvian and Russian press, focusing on articles in which judgments have been made about Latvian history. They represent those views which are expressed most commonly when discussing the country's history.

Table 1

Latvia's history as seen by Russians and Latvians[6]

Latvia's history as seen by Russians	Latvia's history as seen by Latvians
In 1940, the Baltic States, including Latvia, were annexed and incorporated into the USSR. This was a way in which the Soviet Union sought to protect itself, as well as the Baltic countries, from Fascism. Latvia's incorporation into the USSR can by no means be considered an occupation, and Russians are not to blame for it. Latvia was not occupied, because there was no armed opposition to the Soviet army when it arrived. The Latvian nation recognized Soviet authority, was loyal to it and worked with it. Latvians were proportionally represented in the power structures of the USSR and the Latvian SSR. Repressions were the work of Stalin's regime, and the repressions were carried out by representatives of various nations, including the Latvians.	The peaceful and successful development of the Latvian state was ended by the USSR, which concluded a secret pact with Hitler's Germany on the division of Eastern Europe. Latvia was occupied, annexed and incorporated into the USSR. This happened under conditions of open military pressure and threats and in violation of international treaties. Membership in the Soviet Union was supported by only a small share of the Latvian population; some residents of Latvia hoped that the country would be able to avoid entering World War II in that way. Latvians were not well informed about the true face of the Soviet regime and about the consequences of the occupation. Elections in the summer of 1940 were neither free nor democratic. The Constitution of Latvia did not allow Parliament to change the legal status of the state, which means that the incorporation of Latvia into the USSR was unlawful. Many countries in the world never recognised the occupation.
As the front lines of World War II approached the Latvian SSR, the Soviet authorities took a series of preventive steps against people who were not loyal to the Soviet Union.	1940 and 1941 are known in Latvia as "The Year of Horror". On June 13 and 14, 1941, more than 15 000 residents, including children and elderly people, were arrested and deported – a process which condemned many people to death from starvation and disease.

When the war with Germany began, Latvians celebrated the arrival of the German occupation forces. They supported and participated in the Fascist program of genocide against the Jews. That is why Hitler's Germany chose Latvia as the place where Jews from all over Eastern Europe were put to death. Many Latvians joined volunteer police battalions to fight against partisans and to implement the policies of genocide. In 1943 the German occupying forces established a voluntary Latvian legion in the Waffen SS. The Latvian Legion fought against the Red Army and, by extension, fought against the countries in the anti-Hitler coalition.	Some Latvians were sympathetic to the arrival of the German army in 1941, because they hoped that the Germans would get rid of the Soviet occupation once and for all. As the events of the "Year of Terror" came to light. Latvians became increasingly convinced that a new Soviet occupation must be opposed at all costs. Most of the Latvians in the Latvian Legion were forcibly drafted into the military and were not volunteers. This was a violation of international norms. The Latvian Legion was a military unit, and it did not participate in actions against civilians. Many Latvians were also mobilized by the Red Army. Latvians were forced to fight and die on behalf of other countries, and they had no choice but to yield to Hitler's or Stalin's regime.
Toward the end of the war, Nazi collaborators left Latvia.	Fearing Soviet repression, some 100 000 residents of Latvia fled to the West as the end of the war approached.
After Latvia was liberated from Fascism. people hostile to Soviet power continued to hide in the forests for several years. These were people who had participated in Nazi crimes during the war and did not accept Soviet authority. The authorities of the USSR and the Latvian SSR liquidated this opposition.	After World War II, some Latvians who hoped that the independence of the country would be restored. Western countries provided military assistance to partisans. The Soviet authorities were merciless in their treatment of the national partisans and their supporters.
On March 25. 1949, and later, the USSR and the Latvian SSR transferred non-loyal citizens and their family members to other regions of the USSR. The organisers of these repressions cannot be denounced, because they were simply obeying orders.	On March 25, 1949, 13 504 families (42 322 people in all) were put into cattle cars without any court judgments and deported to Siberia. More than 28.000 Communist Party and Soviet activists participated in this process. The goal was to break rural opposition to "collectivisation" the process during which the state took away everything that farmers owned. Collectivisation and the accompanying repressions seriously harmed Latvia's economic and cultural potential.
Because of population losses during and after the war. Latvia needed an inflow of workers from other parts of the USSR to repair its economy. Russians and other Eastern Slavs turned Latvia into an industrially developed country. and they made an important investment in the culture, sciences, athletics and other areas of activity of the Latvian SSR.	The number of Latvians in Latvia declined considerably as the result of Soviet oppression and war. In order to carry out more rapid Sovietisation and Russification, the USSR implemented a targeted program of migration into Latvia. The result of these policies was that the proportion of ethnic Latvians in Latvia declined to 52% in the late 1980s (from 77% in 1935). In 1989, there were more non-Latvians than Latvians in the country's eight largest cities. The building of many large factories in Latvia was an economically unjustified process, and there were social and ecological costs to pay.

Despite the fact that the proportion of non-Latvians in Latvia increased, Latvians were never prohibited from speaking in their own language and from developing their own culture. All of the necessary conditions were present in schools and in society to allow Latvians and other non-Russians to learn the Russian language. A truly bilingual situation emerged. Ethnic groups used their own languages in private, but the main language for communication was Russian.	The nationality policies of the Soviet Union were not in any sense aimed at encouraging migrants to learn the Latvian language and to adopt local cultural traditions. Opportunities for Latvians to speak their own language were gradually narrowed. The Soviet authorities wanted to create a unified "Soviet nation", which in truth meant the Russification of all non-Russians. The Latvian language, which is a small language, did not develop, and cultural development was hindered by censorship and ideological limitations.
A period of transformation, openness and democratisation began in the late 1980s throughout the USSR. Latvia's Russians, together with Latvians and other nations, participated in this process very actively. They supported the efforts of Latvians and other ethnic groups to preserve their cultures, languages and traditions.	Latvians perceived the process of restructuring as a chance to restore independence and to reinstate the sustainability of the Latvian nation. The Russian community was not united on this issue. Many people continued to support the Communists and their efforts to reinstate the Soviet regime. Sometimes this involved violence (e.g., the "Black Berets" in January 1991 and during the August putsch).

I suppose that assimilation may take place when groups have shared historical memories and shared future vision. As various studies and also the author's own observations indicate, titulars and non-titulars do not have a common perception of the past and nothing indicates they are coming closer to it. Therefore, in my view, potentialities for assimilation are illusory.

The Baltic states can facilitate bilingualism of non-titulars in the near future, although, as the author himself points out, "Mediators have an interest in keeping "their" own people monolingual, so that they can continue to profit from representing them to the political center" (p. 338). When analyzing potentialities for further assimilation, it is ignored that the Baltic countries have a border with Russia and Russian culture. Mass media and Russian state ideology have substantial influence on the Russian speaking population in the Baltic states. There are still many people as well as politicians in Russia who perceive the Baltic states as "near abroad", which, in their view, is still a synonym for the word "borderland" ("okraini") and where they do not want to give up their influence. If we take into account these circumstances, then, in my view, there is no ground for discussion of assimilation at all. Bilingulists were all national-titulars, however, they can hardly be classified as assimilated persons.

Tipping game

Relying on a model developed by Thomas Schelling, the author interpreted identity shift in terms of a "tip" or "cascade" (p. 21). Such cascades occur because people's choices about their actions are based on what they think others are going to do. If I think none of my neighbors will sell his house... I have no incentive to sell mine. But if I think many others will...then I have interest in selling my house before those others do......(p. 21). The author thinks that national identities, like social and neighborhood identities, have cascade qualities (p. 24). If all Russian-speakers feel that all others will remain monolingual in Russian, they will see little need to learn

Estonian. But if they fear that many others are already adjusting to the new language regime by learning Estonian, they will feel pressure to join the cascade (p. 25).

The author noted that adopting a new language does not automatically mean one has adopted a new identity, but he thinks that such "microactivities are moving... the Russian speaking community.... toward an identity tip" (p. 23).

On the whole, I think that the scenario can be quite possible. But I have doubts about other aspects of the tipping model. Therefore, I would like to draw your attention to Figure 1.2.. (p. 29).

As Figure 1.2. indicates, when the percentage of Russians who speak the titular language increases, their payoff decreases? The author thinks that the value of expected payoff depends on three separate calculations of benefits: first, the expected economic returns; second in-group scorn, third, out-group acceptance (p. 56).

First, I will turn to economic returns. I have no doubt that, when the percentage of Russians who speak the titular language is small, economic returns of bilingualism is higher in comparison with the situation when the number of bilingual persons increases. I also agree with the author's thesis that, when the number of bilinguals increase, there can be fewer bilinguals who get economic returns from asymmetric bilingualism. However, I cannot agree with the thesis that in a linguistically divided society economic returns of bilingualism will decrease. Already now such industry sectors in Latvia as trade, hotel and restaurants, transport, renting, public administration, education, health, social work, other community and personal services employ more than 60% of the work force. Bilingualism is a professional necessity in these sectors. Bilingual persons always have higher economic returns than monolinguals have. It is supported by European and US statistical data and I do not know anybody who might think otherwise.



Figure 1.2. Competitive assimilation game: Percentage of Russians who speak titular language.

Second, there is the value of in-group status. David Laitin points out: "Suppose Russian speakers who attempt to learn the titular language suffer ridicule, ostracism, or even bodily harms from members of their own community" (p. 250).

Learning the titular language does not imply that a person will not communicate with other representatives of minorities in the Russian language at all. I think that, when fluency in the titular language is rare, Russians will look at this with suspicion. When bilingualism of non-titulars spreads, in my view, ostracism against bilinguals from Russians should decrease.

Third, there is the value of out-group acceptance. David Laitin points out: "Suppose Russian-speakers who learn the titular language are easily identified by titulars and are barred from enjoying the fruits of assimilation. Titular clubs, social groups, and spouses remain out of bounds for assimilation, or nouveaux titulars" (p. 250).

"In Pettai's discussions with Russian-speaking youth in Riga, members of the disaffected group of *Russian Technical University* students told him that they had friends who had sufficient Latvian ability to matriculate in the *Latvian University*. But they were "treated as second rate there" anyway. From these reports, we begin to see that many Russians beginning to feel that Estonians and Latvians do not really want them to learn the local language". (p. 283)

"As the authors of SM-Segodniia wrote: "The popular (?- *my note*) phrase 'we don't need you to know Latvian, we just need you to know your place" crudely, but adequately explains to people who don't understand, what is demanded of them" (p. 128). Each time Russian-speakers open their mouths in front of Latvians, they now feel humiliated, a complete reversal of status since 1988 (p. 283)

I do not think that these situations are typical. Second, I see no ground for thinking that fluency in the titular language may provoke titular's negativism. I think that those Russians who have not learned the language of titulars will be rather more affected by stricter out-group ostracism. However, these are only my assumptions.

Something else seems to me more confusing in the aforementioned Figure 1.2. – why the percentage of Russians who speak titular language will increase when the level of pay-off decreases?

It seems to me that the spread of bilingualism (cascade) is more influenced not by the expectations of Russians how other Russians will act but rather by social pressure exerted by titulars and the state. But this is only my assumption.

"Russian-speaking population"

"This discourse analysis reveals that …a new category of identity, the "Russian-speaking population", has emerged (my emphasis) in all four republics" (p.x). "A major finding of this book is that the development (my emphasis) of a conglomerate identity (Russian-speaking population) …is the principal countertrend to assimilation " (p. 33).

I have doubts whether there is ground for discussions about development. Did representatives of linguistically assimilated groups really use their mother tongue at home or anywhere else before 1991 and, only after 1991, become Russian-speakers?

In my view, the so called conglomerate "Russian-speaking population" is a group that consists of Russians and the assimilated non-Russians. These assimilated non-Russians do not know their own mother tongue or do not use it at home; they are not willing to send their children to schools where instruction is in their native language. It is often common to so called Russian Jews. Organizations which represent "Russian speaking population" do not stand for protection of language, culture, identities of other ethnic groups. I think that the concept of Russian speaking population is used to disguise ethnic demands of Russians, the demands of the very group that has successfully managed to assimilate representatives of other ethnic groups. This is the already known old Soviet "internationalist" ideology. I also doubt whether "Russian nationalism in Russia itself should differ from the Russian nationalism of the near abroad" (p. 310). Russia actively supports the political demands of Russian non-titulars.

I agree with the author that many Russian-speakers have characteristic "empire-consciousness" (p. 306), they try to preserve the privileges of Russians, and a number of representatives of the group share many Soviet symbols. Thus it complicates attempts of ethnic compromises, because the largest part of titulars is more concerned not with cultural but political demands and values of non-titulars. It is another reason why I am quite skeptical about rapid assimilation and cascades of identities.

NOTES

[1] The Mattei Dogan Award from the Society for Comparative Research; Gregory M. Luebbert Memorial Award from the Comparative Politics Section of the American Political Science Association; David Easton Award from the Foundations of Political Theory Section of the American Political Science Association; Wayne Vucinich Book Prize from the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies – all for *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations of the Near Abroad.*

[2] Theodor Schieder wrote that the first explicit use of the term„collective memory" we could find in work of Hugo von Hofmannsthal // Shieder T. *The Role of Historical Consciousness in Political Action, History Theory*. 1902, December, 17:1-18.

[3] Schwartz. B. Memory as a Cultural System: Abraham Lincoln in World War II. American Sociological Review, 1996, 61(5) (Oct): 908-27.

[4] Wrights, P. *On Living in an Old Country*. London: Verso, 1985, p. 25.

[5] Jeanett, Edwards. The Need for a "Bit of History. In: *Locality and Belonging*. Ed. by Nadia Lovell. London and N.Y.: Routledge, 1998, p. 148.

[6] *National, State and Regime Identities in Latvia*. Ed. by Aivars Tabuns. Baltic Studies Centre, 2001, pp. 78-89.

Victor Makarov's comments on David Laitin's book

First of all, I would like to thank Professor Laitin for writing this book. Being one of those who might have been an observation object of your study in Latvia, it has been a rewarding experience to read your book. It is interesting, informative, it explores an important subject, and it is also permeated by a humanistic spirit that no academic book should be without.

I would like to touch upon three issues relating to your book. First, I will discuss some of the theoretical points that you build your book on. Second, I will look at how successful your forecasts for identity developments in Latvia have been. Lastly, I would like to discuss those questions which your book leaves unanswered, thus putting them on the agenda for future research and, hopefully, for a book that you might want to write in the future.

I will start with the theoretical issues, beginning with the main theoretical protagonist of the book, namely identity. At a seminar I attended last year, a sociologist was invited to act as a discussant on a paper on this subject. She started by saying: "I know nothing about this nonsense, and I do not think this identity discussion is really important. It is the real-world problems and social problems of integration we should be thinking about. The identity issue will disappear when people integrate." Some scholars believe that identity is no more than an outdated academic buzz-word. But I think that your book proves that it is not true, and that identity is, indeed, important, and also that it should be linked to other concepts in political science. My first point on the theoretical concept of the book is similar to that made by Professor Tabuns. The concept of assimilation that is used as a foundation of your theory is an interesting one, but it is also problematic. You understand assimilation as adoption of cultural practices of the dominant society. According to your definition, identity is labeling, either by in-group out-group, or by the individuals themselves. You rightly notice that assimilation does not amount to an identity shift. But it is not only because a change in the linguistic repertoire is not enough to change identity. It is also because cultural practices – and all social practices have a cultural content – can be similar in effect but still have completely different meanings. In other words, people can do the same things but interpret them differently. Therefore, the linguistic repertoire may or may not be relevant for the identity game. The European Jews provide a good example of this: under certain circumstances the language does not matter, but it is the general social role, the niche for scapegoating that creates a certain negative identity on the outside and a completely different, asymmetrical identity within the in-group.

Furthermore, the definitions of cultural meanings and identities change, and it is exactly this change that is interesting, as you noted yesterday: what practices are important to assimilate, and what practices are not? It would be good if the Latvian society established a clear set of rules about what the integrants and the assimilants should do in order to become part of the Latvian identity, but it has been proven impossible. Ironically, there is not even a singular and clearly defined titular cultural

practice to integrate into. The titular identity that is usually presented as something solid is not that at all. It is rather a continuum, a range of different identity combinations. These titular practices are not even impermeable to the cultural practices of the minorities. Consequently, we can expect various and multiple titular identities to change in the process of integration. Perhaps instead of only talking about the Russian identities, we should be considering the process of mutual reconfiguration of identities. (The Latvian case may be more obvious in this sense than the Estonian one.) We may yet see a society of cross-cutting cleavages that is based on cross-cutting identities.

My second point on your theory relates to the identity tipping, or identity cascade, which is at the core of your theory. I was not completely satisfied with the way you assumed the automatic bridge between the language repertoire cascade and the identity tip. The tipping game, as you explain it in terms of the rational choice theory, may not be the only possible explanation for this new linguistic trend. Other simple necessities might be the matter. Even more importantly, the main idea of rational choice is that people try to maximize the effectiveness of their actions for achieving their goals. This says nothing about what kind of goals people set. For example in the tipping game, the goals may be economical, but they may also be cultural. It would be very interesting to revisit the pragmatic hero of your book, Liuba Grigoriev and see what she now thinks of the way her Russian and Estonian identities mix, and what her priorities are nowadays. Especially the Latvian case demonstrates that the political discourse is invaded by cultural issues. This is perhaps one point to the effect that it is premature to discard identities as an important theoretical instrument. Identities are an important causal factor as well as a consequence of the political process. This is obvious in the Baltic states, and may be just as valid for other societies.

Now I would like to address your predictions. In your forecast for Latvia, you suggest that the Russian population could assimilate or move towards a more articulated conglomerate identity and perhaps even claim a distinct nationality. This also creates background for ethnic conflict. This forecast seems to have come true, and yet, at the same time, not entirely so. As has been mentioned so many times, we now see that Russians are too difficult to classify as one single identity. No "modal", or "typical" Russian exists; instead, there are many groups that are different and even socially distant from each other. It is hard for any political entrepreneur to make claims on all of these groups. Until now all such attempts have failed. Secondly, it is perfectly possible for individuals to engage in two processes simultaneously: on the one hand, assimilation of some cultural practices, and on the other hand, asserting distinctness in other ways. The core of your forecast is phrased in political terms: will the ethnic conflict escalate? And what kind of political system will emerge to accommodate these? As you present it, it is a choice between a pluralist model, a consociational model, and a kind of ethnically or culturally controlled democracy. It is relevant today to look at which of these models have been accepted, but this is still a very open question on which judgment is in abeyance. We can say, though, that the consociational and the pluralist models are the two main political ideologies among the Russian public, and these two models constitute the division line within the Russian public opinion.

Lastly, I would like to address the issues that are not raised in your book. The most interesting aspect of identities is expressed in the title of this conference: what

is the future of identities, now that the Baltic countries have become part of the European Union?

First, the EU is a very important external factor. It seems to have transformed Rogers Brubacker's triangle into a square. How does that relate to the future of the nation state? During the ten years that passed since you made your research, the nation states themselves have transformed. And the EU is constructing an identity of its own. We can expect more people to call themselves Europeans. Behind this trend lies a deeper issue. Identities are not interesting *per se*, but because collective identities are a source of compliance ideology, to use Wilson's term, and in this capacity they are a crucial base for the functioning of the political system. The Baltic societies are struggling to construct viable national identities that could rely on the trust and solidarity available from ethnic and cultural identities, in order to create more social cohesion. How will the EU affect these identity building projects? Neither political trust nor solidarity is in abundance in a country like Latvia. The European integration – which is a much broader notion than the EU proper – is changing the configuration of the political systems in the small nations, as their political power is leaking out towards the EU institutions and European and global networks. At the same time, the EU is not guarantee in and of itself, of an economically and politically successful society. Therefore the nation state has to remain an important actor to achieve a sustainable society. The question is then, whether we are getting into a vicious circle: the nation state retains the responsibilities, even as it is losing its powers to the supranational actors, and, through a demonstration of impotence, losing support.

Russia is the second important external influence on Latvian identities. Some Russian researchers have recently defined the national identity building project as the single most important challenge Russia is going to face in the future. The way it looks now, the Russian identity building project might spill over the boarders of the Russian Federation. This is already reflected in the Latvian political setup. Yet most interesting is not the attempt to construct a Russia-friendly political movement in Latvia, but the more general, and more culturally focused agenda that the Russian state might pursue in the future to create a stronger link between Russia and the diaspora. In accordance with the concept of "the Russian world", moderately phrased policies are now being developed in Russia. These policies do not mean direct interference in the countries with a Russian diaspora, but nevertheless, they seek to create a stronger link between the ethnic and cultural Russians and the Russian state. It is important because what we have seen in the last years has not been just one process of border building and separation between Latvia and Russia. There is also a process that makes it easy to maintain cultural identities beyond the borders of the nation state. The costs of cultural transactions are getting lower, because culture is symbolic, even immaterial. At the same time, the gains to be had from a large cultural identity remain, as does the importance of identities over the purely economic issues. If we apply the rational choice model to this situation, the gains from retaining access to big cultures can easily outweigh the gains from tipping into a different, titular identity.

On the other hand, national identities are less easily transferable outside the nation state, because they depend on consistent inculcation through the educational system. To take a fresh Latvian example, the Russian –language schools, there is no danger that these schools in Latvia will reproduce loyal Russian patriots. The problem is

that these schools have failed to create a sensible democratic identity of a Latvian citizen that would link the citizen and the state, as well as link together citizens and compatriots of different ethnicity. This brings me to the last but nevertheless important point. Perhaps the real problem that we should be studying is the lack of a democratic or civic identity. This problem is universal for the Baltic states as well as other countries. Many Russians have so far failed to establish a realistic political identity. Also, for a large part of the ethnic Latvian population, recognizing the actual composition of the polity is a difficult challenge. As professor Zepa's research demonstrates, about half of the Latvian population has difficulty acknowledging and accepting as compatriots the citizens and non-citizens with another historical and cultural background.

Perhaps in the future we should move away from discussing the identities of the Russian speaking minority, and move over to looking at the multiple and multilayered identities of the Latvian people. This would amount to the classical matter of studying political and cultural orientations. Then, democracy and not ethnicity would be the main protagonist of this discussion, and perhaps, of Professor Laitin's next book. Thank you!

David Laitin's response to the comments

First, I want to thank the two commentators for giving me the honour of reading my book. I am going to make three general points, barely touching on all the comments, but trying to pick out areas where I think I have something useful to say. First, on the criticism of my use of assimilation. As I looked at the definition that Professor Tabuns put on the board, I was very pleased. I thought I got it right. Assimilation is, indeed, adaptation of the ever changing practices of the dominant society. Victor asked me about Liuba and her family, with whom I lived. I visit them every year. Liuba's daughter married a Russian in Kohtla-Jarve three years ago, they moved to Tallinn, and they changed their name to an Estonian one. They would be coded, if you looked at their current name, as part of the Estonian population. They would not be coded as assimilated Russians, because their name looks Estonian, they speak perfect Estonian, and they only speak Russian in private themselves. Their first child speaks Estonian as the first language. So, when assimilation occurs, we tend not to see it. Again and again, the social scientists fail to see assimilation because of the bad practices of selection bias. If you look at the concrete aspects of daily life, you can better catch this process. The language of normal use is the one I picked up on for this book. As someone normally gets up and goes to a newspaper stand and speaks in Latvian, that is an observable adaptation of the cultural practices of the dominant society. Suppose, one listens to Latvian music or buys Latvian music as their preferred form of music, or buys Latvian books. Is it not the same thing as assimilation, becoming a Latvian? I would say, to the extent to which the cultural practices - to read a book, to listen to the music, to speak the language – become a normal part of someone's life, those are indicators that assimilation is a process that is taking place. Aivars correctly points out that in the book there are no examples of the third stage of assimilation. He says that it is only my assumption. That is not quite correct. That was my prediction of a trend that I thought would occur, not an assumption in any way. It is obvious, that if I were making a prediction of what would happen in ten years, my prediction has failed. But as I was making a prediction for an intergenerational process, the jury is still out.

Sergej Kruk told us today that common memories were already forming, and we can think of dates and events that are commonly thought of as important, like the Olympics of 2004 and the Latvian participation in it. The extent to which it becomes a common memory of an event in people's own history, it suggests another example of the assimilation process. I think I developed a way of empirically examining assimilation processes and I have incurred other researchers to look at practices as the key indicators of assimilatory practices.

On point number two I feel less confident. I have learned from the commentary today and from many of the talks, that I made two general points in the book that were in some way important or contradictory. The first point was that there would be increasing adaptation of Latvian cultural practices by Russian speakers. And on the

social level of everyday practice there would be an emerging assimilation process. I also said in the book that I foresee a conflict occurring between the self-proclaimed or elected leaders of the Russian population who would stand against policies that incurred assimilation, and indeed we see that this has appeared strongly in the past few days in Latvia, where the elites form two blocks of Russian speakers and the block of Latvians. And the former block is organized to challenge the assimilatory possibilities. What I did not see in the book was that the emergence of these blocks would work against the social process that I was detecting from below, and that the emergence of political blocks could consolidate separate cultural and political identities for much longer than I expected. So the elite level politics that was in a sense the consequence of the assimilatory practices was having an effect on those assimilatory practices. That was a causal mechanism I did not properly analyze in the book. Therefore there were several scholars at this conference that raised this criticism of my book. I accounted for processes of assimilation on the social level, but block politics on the elite level was missed in my analysis.

Let me say as a third point, about the international level. Victor and Nils Muiznieks the other day properly pointed out that I undervalued it in the book and looked at the processes primarily as domestic processes. I will look at the international level, as Victor asked me, from two different sides: the integration of Europe, and, two, the nation-building or rather nation-reconstruction process in the Russian Federation itself. In Europe, as I have written elsewhere and only summarize today, there is an emergent multilingual repertoire identity for a European citizen. A European citizen will speak the language of her or his state, he or she will speak English which will become the language of Europe, and, as a third language, they will speak the language of her or his local region. If he or she is a Catalan, and a member of Europe, they will become trilingual, and that will be a normal part of their cultural repertoire. Catalan in Catalonia, Spanish for the state level, and English for dealing with matters as a European. Why should these state languages remain important when everyone is going to learn English? I think the reason is as follows: the states in the European union will remain in control of the ministries of education. They will make a deal with their own populations. And the deal will look like this: we will teach you English and the state language for free, and we will give you an excellent education; you do not need to have a private education because we have an excellent educational system. When your children graduate from our schools, say, in Sweden or Amsterdam, they will be better English speakers than American high school graduates, as well as speaking the state language. What every citizen in the Netherlands will get is fluency in the state language and complete capability in the international language of Europe. I believe that Estonia and Latvia as well, will make the same deal: we will give you as citizens of Latvia an excellent kindergarten to secondary school education which will enable you to participate in Latvia as well as Europe. And this will be a part of what you pay taxes for: you will not need a private education. But you will become an Estonian or a Latvian as part of that process. The state languages and state histories will be taught in state schools. To give an example, when my daughter was a fourth grade student in Spain, every single day she came back with a map she had drawn of the country of Spain. It had become part of the experience of Spanish students that they were members of the Spanish state. And that was in Catalonia, by the way. I believe that the Russian students in the future in Latvia will be prepared to be

members of Europe, but also they will be acquainted with and will be part of their own history, Latvian literature, Latvian music etc. So I think that the joining of the European Union will consolidate the Latvianization of Russian speakers, who will also speak Russian. They will be trilingual, but they will be part of the Latvian national culture. Let me finally say something about Russia and the Russian Federation. I wrote the book in 1997 and 1998. I was living in Narva in 1993 and 1994. Russia was in political chaos when I lived in Narva and in economic chaos when I wrote the book. From the point of view of the Russians in Ida-Virumaa, in northeastern Estonia, Russia was a chaotic mess, and Estonia was an orderly society which many of them were lucky to live in. It did not occur to me, although it should have, that Russia would one day regain its stability economically and politically. The people who have been looking at Russia for the past two weeks may feel it has gone back to 1993. I think it may be too pessimistic. It is a gigantic country with tremendous resources. And it presents an opportunity for Russian speakers in Latvia and Estonia to identify not so much with the west, but to identify with the cultural, economic and political project in the east. The implications of re-emerging Russia are something I did not consider in the book and I have not thought that through yet myself, so Victor is quite correct to criticize me for it. Thank you so much for your time.