ETHNICITY

Debates on Ethnicity

ETHNICITY 2015/13
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NATIONAL STATE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
IN POSTNATIONAL WORLD

The problem of national identity and consolidation of the society in the conditions of Latvia couldn't become nonactual. The latest significant publications in the humanities are also dealing with this question. The most thorough analysis of the basic issues of Latvian Studies could be found in the collective research "How much integrated is the society of Latvia?", in the four volumes of the collection of articles "Latvia and Latvians", in the materials of the 5th Congress of Latvian Studies (Letonika), etc.

Key words: national identity, liberal multiculturalism, integration process, national minorities, inclusive civic society

Maija Kūle, taking critically the politics of the science in Latvia, emphasizes that the state cannot exist without self-awareness. And the humanities are exactly creating reflective, thinking society ensuring self-respect of the state (Kūle 2013, p. 278). The situation in the research nuances of national identity was well highlighted in the conference "The collective identities of ethnic minorities in the national states of Eastern and Central Europe after 1991" taking place in Riga in October 2014. The researchers from different countries (Hungary, Belgium, the Ukraine, Estonia) took part and in their reports showed that integration patterns in different states are different.

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Despite different experience (Germany and France have experienced failures as well), nobody in Europe intends to give up from the fundamental concept of multiculturalism, only see its transformation in the 21st century. In the respect of Latvia issues Vladislav Volkov, Denis Hanov, Maija Kūle reported in the conference. V. Volkov stated with satisfaction that in Latvia a strong course in the social sciences has silhouetted, standing up for liberal multiculturalism: E. Kļave, S. Kruk, B. Zepa,

I. Brands-Kehre, R. Rungule, I. Šūpule. D. Hanov talked about the developing of the Preamble for the Constitution and about different views on its text. He judged critically the positions of Egils Levits, in which the minorities are shown a rather modest place in the future of Latvia – to cultivate their own ethnic culture, different from Latvian. Thereby open and unanswered would remain the most important question of the integration process of Latvian society – the role and place of minorities in the political life.

The concept of the modern liberal multiculturalism we can find in the book of the famous German philosopher Jürgen Habermas "Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy" recently translated into Latvian. J. Habermas stands up for a universal approach to all the citizens regardless of their cultural and ethnic identity. The collective rights of ethnic minorities in the sphere of education and language politics must be strengthened by the law (Hābermāss 2012, p. 10–11). In some other publication, defending the conjunction of tolerance and multiculturalism, J. Habermas also wrote, how important it is to apply pluralism in education system and in world outlook (Hābermāss, 2006, p. 53).

The polemics in the circles of scientists about the prospects of multiculturalism in Europe, in which politicians also take part, is never ending. It broke out in 2007–2008 when in the cities of France Muslim youth started to burn cars and to vandalize suburb shops. Scepsis against multiculturalism and integration possibilities arose, as well as attempts to write off the concept as unrealistic. For example, the book written by Tilo Saracina in 2010 turned against, as he called it, "unlimited multiculturalism" which can endanger the German culture.

The process didn't pass by Latvia as well. The document "The guidelines of integration politics of the society 2008–2018" prepared in the Ministry of Integration (IUMSIL) contained justification of inclusive civic society prospects. Multiculturalism was mentioned as farther prospects in Latvia. The project gained influential opponents (the Minister of Culture at that time Helēna Demakova). A point of view appeared also in the press that multiculturalism is "in sharp contradiction to the idea of national state"

(Muižnieks 2010, p. 58), that global government can replace national state, but Latvia can become the Tower of Babel.

Totally unjustified is the comparison of Latvia with Germany. In the last 20 years in Germany about 4 million immigrants from the Arabian countries have arrived – with low level of education, without profession, but with disproportional social demands. They continued to live in segregated Islamic environment also in Germany, opposing themselves to European democracy. Latvia has nothing in common with such situation: there are no Islamic masses with totally foreign traditions and tendency to segregation. Neither of the communities in Latvia endangers the foundation of value system of the other (Upleja 2011). It is also dangerous to use such disputable problems in selfish political intentions. But in Latvia it happened in such a way. The prepared Integration programme remained unapproved, but the Ministry of Integration was liquidated in 2009 (Muižnieks 2010, p. 58).

The conflict with the Islamic world causes justified concern in Europe, but it is not a reason to doubt the idea of national state. Already mentioned German philosopher Jürgen Habermas in his book "Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy" convincingly proves the role and the place of national state in the 21st century. Globalization is really happening, and it concerns the commercial sphere. Therefore the sovereignty of national states is shared with international organizations: SVF, PB etc. The European Union exists already 22 years – it is a formation of postnational democracy (Hābermāss 2012, p. 71). But no global government results for that reason. Nations still are developing in their national forms. A territorial state with its specific cultural substratum exists (Hābermāss 2012, p. 36).

Why multiculturalism should be regarded as a challenge to national state? There is no such challenge, if the society accepts incorporation, openness and if civic society and common political culture forms (Hābermāss 2012, p. 49). Accepting increasing pluralism European nations are on their way to one or another version of multiculturalism. Still natural contradictions between national and cosmopolitic, ethnic and European, countrified and industrial exist. Mankind has learned to solve these contradictions in a democratic way.

It is well demonstrated by the experience of the history of Latvia. At the time when Riga was preparing for its 800 year anniversary, academician Jānis Stradiņš wrote a paper about the ancient contrast between Riga and the rest of Latvia. J. Stradiņš reminded of the contrasts coming from history: Latvia developed as a national state with Latvian, countrified sub-

stratum, whilst Riga – as a trade and industrial centre with non-Latvian substratum (Stradiņš 2001, p. 14). Latvian peasants regarded Riga as foreign for a long time. It remained predominantly German till 1918 and only in independent Latvian state began to become really Latvian. But in Soviet times with the industrial hypertrophy it again became strongly russified. Nevertheless J. Stradiņš also mentioned in this connection that it was not quite a new phenomenon in the history of Riga and that "in Riga however always have lived generations of different nations taking over the traditions of Riga" (Stradiņš 2001, p. 20).

Worthy of attention is the role and the place of Riga in the formation of the multiethnic composition of Latvia. The cosmopolitic face of Riga, diversity of its cultural elements frequently caused special interest in Europe. So in 2007 in Hamburg Dr. Ulrike von Hirschhausen wrote a book "Borders of Community" about the relationship between Latvians, Germans, Russians and Hebrews in the second half of 19th century. "Riga is the greatest value of Latvia, which can bring up all the state not only in the terms of economics ... get attention with its particular charm, Europeanism, extraordinarity, splendid architecture." (Stradiņš 2001, p. 21) Riga, as well as Latgale, is a promoter of multicultural development in Latvia (Apine 2007, p. 24–25). The relations with East and West mostly are promoted by Riga. At the same time it should be acknowledged that Riga and Latvia differ in the terms of interests. Therefore these interests must be studied and persistently coordinated.

Present-day incidents in Europe expose the points of contradictions as well. In 2015 the chain of conflicts broke out anew after the terror acts carried out by the persons of Islamic belief in Paris, Copenhagen. As it is known, millions of Muslims live in France and Germany. European politicians grew concerned that a strong Islamophobia will develop among the French and Germans (as the movement PEGIDA in Germany) and rightwing political forces will get greater support. Leading politicians in Europe, as Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel and others, try to turn against Islamophobia and stop it (Ķezbers 2015, p. 10).

Globalization and political tensions don't cancel development strategy and principles of democracy of European states. They don't cancel also integration politics. The Ambassador of France in Latvia Stephane Visconti in the conversation with Latvian journalist Juris Paiders admitted that France has encountered the challenge brought up by immigrant millions with cultural trouble, but they don't refuse integration. He said that integration works in France. The Frenchmen of foreign origin in their majority respect the laws and values of France (Paiders 2015, p. 6). Also Germany remains

a national state with German culture substratum and with the aim to build a stable civic society with a membership of Muslim people. Latvia wants to stay a national state as well with a specific culture substratum which in its fundaments and roots is Latvian.

There are no millions of persons of Islamic belief in Latvia. But ethnic relationship in Latvia has its own history and peculiarities. The urgent problem is the situation of minority groups. In the restored independent Latvia several versions of Integration programme have existed: in 2001, in 2007 (it was not approved) and in 2011. It is only normally that such programmes are subjected to monitoring, they are revised and updated, because the life is more dynamic than written documents and it is bringing forward new demands. May be it is time to revalue the programme elaborated in 2011, the author of which was Sarmīte Ēlerte?

The version of the integration programme elaborated by the Ministry of Integration (IUMSIL) remained unapproved. But it was highly evaluated in the collective research "How much integrated is the society of Latvia?" In the chapter of the book, the author of which is Juris Rozenvalds, it was concluded that in its conceptual part the guideline project was an essential step forward in comparison with the previous, that it corresponds to the political guidelines of the European Union and cognitions of modern social sciences (Muižnieks 2010, p. 59). The offered model of integration wasn't a "radical liberalism", as it was named by the critics, but it corresponded to the ideas of modern liberal multiculturalism.

The six year work of the Ministry of Integration after its liquidation remained undiscussed, unestimated. A gap appeared in many spheres of integration – in the relationship with the most active members of cultural societies of minorities, in the cooperation with integration process researchers, whose recommendations were no more taken into consideration. Cross-cultural dialogue between cultural societies of minorities was broken (Apine 2014, p. 147).

There is no conformity of opinions about the integration model of the society in Latvia. Basically a permanent discussion between supporters of ethnonationalism and defenders of cultural pluralism, liberal multiculturalism is going on. The discussion became actual in 2011, when the version of the integration programme elaborated by S. Ēlerte was directed to debate (Bojārs, Lūsiņa 2010, p. 6).

The diversity of views became visible in the discussions in connection with the enclosing of Preamble to the text of the State Constitution of Latvia. Egils Levits, justice of European Union Court, in his article in the third volume of collection "Latvia and Latvians" sees the future of Latvian society

in such way: Latvians are the state nation in their own state, political nation – incorporating and assimilating (Levits 2014, p. 13). More clearly E. Levits expressed his opinion about the future fate of non-Latvians in the conversation with journalist Egīls Zirnis. The persons having arrived in Latvia in the years of soviet occupation, if they acknowledge the ideas of 1918, voluntarily incorporate in Latvian nation, in Latvian language and culture (Levits 2013, p. 16). Although E. Levits calls this process integration, in fact it is assimilation. E. Levits in his publications avoids to call the persons who have arrived after the war – minorities. The point of view of E. Levits is supported by many representatives of Latvian intelligence: M. Zālīte, I. Vaidere, J. Bordāns etc.

However the view of E. Levits has many critics: Aivars Endziņš, Andrejs Elksniņš, Brigita Zepa, Deniss Hanovs etc. I guess that the opinion of academician Jānis Stradiņš, which he came forward with in the beginning of discussion in the 5th Congress of Latvian Studies (Letonika) in October 2013, had a great role. J. Stradiņš agreed with the thought of E. Levits that the Constitution should be supplemented with a formulation of permanent principles about the roots and lasting values of Latvia, but still he considered that Preamble project offered by E. Levits must be defined more precisely and must be edited. J. Stradiņš didn't agree with some pretentious terms, among them "Latvian sense of life" reminding opuses of Ernests Brastiņš, representative of neopagan religious movement "dievturi". The term "state nation" referring only to Latvians is sounding pompous. The key thing stressed by J. Stradiņš is the idea of society unity, in order that Latvia would be "united and modern, not split and weak". Latvia is a multicultural country, and the people of Latvia are not only Latvians, but all the citizens. Academician J. Stradiņš criticized former state politics didn't promoting consciousness in the population that the minorities are welcome and necessary people for Latvia (Stradiņš 2013, p. 2).

The Law in the Saeima about the amendments in the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia was voted through on June 19, 2014, and the president of the State A. Bērziņš approved it. As it is seen in the text of Preamble of the Constitution, the ideas of Egils Levits have not been fully supported. There is no formulation about the Latvians as the only state nation, no opposition Latvians and immigrants, nor the idea of assimilation in the text of Preamble. While the designation the people of Latvia was mentioned three times(as in Constitution of 1922) and there is told that the national state of Latvia as democratic, legal and socially responsible respects the minorities.

Integration process in Latvia hasn't stopped. It couldn't be stopped either in the situation, if it hasn't any institutional security. In 2015 such nev-

ertheless exists. The Society Integration Foundation continues to work all the time, there is the Department of Society Integration and Civic Society Development in the Ministry of Culture. In the beginning of 2015 a new department was set up – the Department of Media Supervision, the task of which is to overpower the influence of Russian media. The multiethnic structure of the society in Latvia has developed historically, and it is beyond our powers to change it. In many studies and publications about the ethnic history in Latvia it is stated that there are no ancient conflict nests in the past of Latvia (as it is, for example, in Balkans), traditions of getting along have formed, the proof of which is also great proportion of mixed marriage. The traditions rooted in history are confirmed also by sociological studies.

A direct dialogue with the representatives of minorities is missing. As Viktors Avotiņš recognizes, the media reflect politic culture of elite, but the Russian-speaking audience is not seriously addressed (Avotiņš 2015, p. 6). The split Latvian society now and then causes a possibility of conflict. In 15 years two such jam situations have been experienced. One of them in 2003–2004 was connected with the launching of the reform elaborated by the Ministry of Education of Latvia. It provoked wide protests among the Russian-speaking population, mainly pupils and teachers, who defended their rights to learn in their native tongue. After the compromise version of the Education reform was adopted, the conflict faded away. The model of bilingual education (60% of the learning process in secondary schools is realized in the state language, but 40% – in native language) is still being carried out in the minority schools.

Nor less sharpness and outbursts of impatience arose in both parts of the society in connection with the Referendum of Language in February 2012. As in their preface to the book of Jürgen Habermas write Denis Hanov and Vladislav Volkov, Latvians and Russian-speaking population – both sides inwardly amalgamate around themselves and their truth, but the rhetoric of the discussions stimulated competition and danger (Hābermāss 2012, 16–18). As it is stated by D. Hanov in his publication, two years later, in 2014, despite the recent split, in everyday life it is not noticed, there are no disorders on the streets and mixed marriage continues to exist (Hanovs 2014, 3). As modern experience shows, despite the possibility of conflicts, the society of Latvia comparatively quickly returns to traditional, deeply rooted forms of getting along.

It is confirmed also by the previous historical experience. Russian community (similar behaviour is characteristic to all the Russian-speaking persons) in its evolution process during three centuries always was in the middle: both strengthened its ties with Latvia and Latvians and felt the

pressure and influence of its ethnic motherland Russia. Therefore in the process of identity formation there are both gaps and the strengthening of succession. The study devoted to Russian identity underlies the conclusions of its authors that the traditional model of behaviour is primary in the behaviour of Russians: "The local interests of Russian community rooted in Latvia always have been predominant over the role enforced by the empire, ethnic motherland." (Apine, Volkovs 2007, p. 214). The mentioned considerations about the peculiarities of ethnic relationship in Latvia enables one to think that they will stimulate the strengthening of national, state identity in Latvia.

We would like to discuss another edge of national identity – its connection with the historical memory. In the 90s of the 20th century the activation of historical memory was observed in all of Europe. For example, in Spain, the dictatorship of Franco lasting almost 40 years left a visible impression on the content of the national history of Spain. The lecture of historical memory in Spain was given on March 11th 2015 by Dr. Miguel Vazquez Linan in the National Library of Latvia (Diena 2015, p. 16). Of course, this process mainly concerns Eastern Europe.

The time of memories, commemoration set in. The regained historical past demanded to use another name of "heroes" and another name of "villains". The social memory research group from Latvia (Vita Zelča, Laura Uzule, Kaspars Zellis etc.) stated that "the cult of repression and sufferings" have become a characteristic phase for Latvia. Indeed, all the memories of oral history publications filled up with commemorating and describing one's own sorrow. It was linked with the denial, discrediting of the soviet past. But there were not only sufferings and repressions, there were also successful things – the history of several decades enabling the people to live their life with dignity. Is a balance between these two historical memories possible?

Jānis Stradiņš in his review about the four volume collection "Latvia and Latvians" acknowledges that not always is the balance obtained. Highly estimating the result of the research work, calling it an unprecedented, unique and fundamental edition, J. Stradiņš at the same time admits that the period of 50 years (1940–1990) sounds niggardly and one-sidedly, therefore there isn't built a complete scene of this period in the collection. Life hadn't stopped at that period, the modernization was going on (Stradiņš 2014, p. 2).

The hidden point of the matter is well shown in the classical work of Anthony Smith "National Identity". The true key of the identity is the process of self-awareness. The identity of the person is formed by the func-

tional role he is playing, functional identity (Smits 1997, p. 12). The collective memory hides social roles played in the past, about which may be one doesn't want to remember. But the functional roles forced by soviet regime (soviet collective farmer, pioneer – follower of Leninist ideas, excellent worker etc.) however one had to play. How the people today treat their former identities? In Latvia this balance is still being searched, professional researchers and artists in their memories and judgement about the past try to regain harmony with the previous period of their lives.

We have a significant source in our hands – a collection of memories of 69 scientists emeritus of Latvia "Science and my Life" published by the publishing house of Latvian University in 2009. It is the collective memory of the first post-war scientist generation. This generation (mainly from the Latvian countryside) came into science in the 50s of the 20th century, and they made a surprising career. This generation came into vacuum left in the science and institutions of higher education by mass emigration of Latvians to the West during the war. Forced by the conditions the newcomers filled the vacancies and became the leaders of departments and laboratories, as well as deans. In this period science received means also from the resources of the soviet military industrial complex. Therefore science centres, buildings with all the equipment, laboratory blocks quickly developed. Natural sciences (chemistry, medicine, biology, physics etc.) experienced their time of triumph. The aforementioned generation of scientists was in the front lines of all the achievements, discoveries. How could they not value positively all their life lived in science? It was also a personal success for them (Apine 2012, p. 28–30).

In the humanities the time of soviet regime couldn't be a success story, because the ideological restriction and censorship didn't allow the researchers to expand. Still I would like to mention the conversation of cultural historian Saulvedis Cimmermanis with Līvija Dūmiņa, in which he, evaluating the past of himself and his generation, emphasizes that one shouldn't remember the system he had to get along, but the people. He remembers with gratefulness those who had supported him in his life of scientist (among them Jānis Zutis, Aleksandrs Drīzulis, Līna Zaļkalne etc.), and he is convinced that the research of soviet time must not be thrown away, but should be continued (Dūmiņa 2014, p. 10).

The composer Arturs Maskats looking back to his work at the music for the opera "Valentīna" didn't agree with the director of the opera Viesturs Kairišs who said that the 50s of the last century were "grey, colourless years in the Soviet Union". Arturs Maskats in his turn remembers: "In our youth they were full of colours. There were many things not connected with the

leading ideology [..]. So were also the lectures of Valentīna Freimane, her craving for culture, and a panorama of enormous knowledge." Interesting is also the fact that A. Maskats who himself was born in the 50s, but was composing the music also about the 30s in Europe (this is also told in the book of Valentīna Freimane "Good-bye, Atlantis"), has felt the belonging to these 30s and became fond of them. A process of heritage is going on. The identity is continuing and accumulating (Lūsiņa 2014, p. 6).

Where are the elements of earlier former identity in modern art? The new trends could be seen in visual arts, for example, in the photography series of Arnis Balčus, which is given a significant title "Amnesia" – the loss of memory. It is the reconstruction of past – soviet time – events. Now it is included in the collection of *ABLV Bank*, which is meant for the Museum of Contemporary art. Till now in visual art the identity of the soviet Latvia has been represented surprisingly little and rather negatively to show the negative experience in demand at that moment. A. Balčus wrote in the catalogue: "Collective amnesia – forced or voluntary suppression of particular memories, which had been practised after Latvia regained independence – both for to deny Latvian soviet identity and to overcome recurrent political and economic failures." (Lindenbauma 2014, p. 16)

But from where will become those sides of system, which were successful, as already mentioned the prosperity of natural sciences? And how can we perceive the simple fact that the people have lived in any conditions, maybe they have lived the best years of their life at that time? They have deserved to be visible. What does A. Balčus show? Twelve large-sized pictures contain scenes from the soviet times. It is daily life, the reflection of the time with all the forgotten details. Seemingly occasional events, rituals of that time: girls spending their leisure time, civil defence training, obligatory glass of milk at school or bored militiaman at the roadside. There is no discreditation in these pictures, you will not feel also nostalgia in them. But there is perceptible significance of the past events in our consciousness and memory. A. Balčus himself writes: "… I don't try to depict the soviet regime or to praise positivism of socialism, but to tell how we and our parents were living not such a long time ago." (Lindenbauma 2014, p. 17) It is a link between the past and today, it is a continuity of identity.

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CAN NON-DOMINANT GROUPS BE HAPPY WITH MULTICUL-TURALIST SOLUTIONS?

During the 'Third Wave' democratisation, many observers of the global swing toward pluralist political regimes suggested the triumph of democracy over other forms of government. At the same time, many others continued to be sceptical, especially of the post-communist publics' aptness to embrace democratic virtues in full. This reservation is particularly important for societies undergoing state-building following the painstaking experience of socialism and, in part, traumatised by repression of ethnic distinctness. Comparative analyses of public attitudes towards political performance and political institutions in place continue to suggest that, today more than ever, the greatest portion of the post-communist publics are increasingly sceptical of democratic nature of political processes. In part the scepticism of post-socialist public is explained by limited account of ethnonational claims in political structures of the democratising states.

Key words: ethnic pluralism, multiculturalisms, democratising states, non-dominant groups, post-communist publics

Indeed there is an agreement that the outcome of transition from socialism should end in some kind of democratic political regime, accountable to the people it governs and by no means oppressive of their identities. At the same time, much less attention was granted to the way former socialist societies framed different identities, ethnic among others. The lack of

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public debate on the mechanisms of institutional accountability to agency claims during the transition from socialism has been made responsible for limiting the successful accommodation of complex sets of identities across the CEE region. In particular, the members of post-communist public who found themselves to be in the position of losers from democratic transition have sought to connect their social and political grievances to their 'inborn' identities, such as cultural, linguistic or ethnic. On the other side, the members of the public who emerged as winners of the post-communist transition have continuously claimed that (ethno-) political regimes installed were democratic and accommodating of diversity.

This is not a mean feat in societies with a long history of interethnic tension, communal animosities and experience of structural disadvantages based upon ethnonational agendas. For this reason, I suggest to look at the way how present-day CEE polities deal with their culturally diverse, multilingual and multiethnic societies they govern from a theoretical perspective. Although across Europe, East and West, state level politics are envisaged as decisions on national issues, all governments make considerable steps towards securing the multicultural diversity in their countries. In the process, multiculturalism has emerged as a quasi universal solution to guaranteeing equal representation of diverse interests put forward by ethnic communities residing at the territory of nation-state.

Most of the EU-member states recognise that they govern multicultural societies and in doing so, they also recognise ethnic pluralism on their territories, and to a degree support sustainable relations between the dominant and non-dominant groups on their territories. However, the policies on ethnic pluralism and diversity tend to be void if they do not recognise the equality of groups affected. This is why, I believe, it is essential to discuss *how* and *for what reason* political theory had been claiming the importance of ethnic diversity, producing scholarship broadly known under the catchy label of multiculturalism.

The debate on multiculturalism has grown broader over the past decade, while some off-stream theories of multiculturalism have also added depth to our understanding of why cultural diversity should not be taken for granted. While discussing some of the aspects of 'practical multiculturalism', I address whether policies aimed at recognition of diversity stand to what is at the core of liberal democracy, namely the autonomy of decision-making and equal treatment. In the first section of my paper I discuss how the relations between political institutions and the societies they govern is envisaged in multiculturalist debates. The second section of my paper addresses the place of agency in the relations between state

institutions and the diverse communities they affect. And finally, I look into the process of agenda-setting from the vantage point of multiculturalism. By drawing on the agency/structure tension in multiculturalism debates, I argue that there is little space for what is generally held to be pluralistic about multiculturalism.

Emerging from the background of liberal democratic understanding of interpersonal, as well as the individual's relations with political institutions, multiculturalism presumes the dominance of one group in the public sphere and assigns all other groups auxiliary functions. In doing so, multiculturalism underlines the importance of diversity only in so far as it affirms the leading role of the dominant group and recognises ethnic pluralism in order to perpetuate the relations of dominance between the majority and minority communities. Needless to say, there is little to no space left in the public arena for non-dominant groups' identities that can not be instrumentalised by the dominant groups to reaffirm the dominant group's superiority. The focus on the CEE states and societies allows me to show when multiculturalism went awry.

Multiculturalist Institution Building: An Oxymoron?

Democratisation of the CEE states has been welcomed by those members of society who perceived previous regimes to provide little accountability to social dynamics and to guarantee limited opportunities for state/society dialogue. Indeed, increasing political and social pluralism allowed diverse interests within societies to be expressed. Numerous cultural groups saw their claims accommodated, while political institutions updated embedded understandings of equal individual participation. More to the point, providing structural options for accommodating diverse claims allowed the elaboration of novel forms of intercultural communication, which democratising political structures saw as being conducive to societal integration.

Following emancipation from the socialist regimes all the CEE countries sought to plug into the global discourse of equality in diversity and gradually came to address the democratic deficit in their relation with non-dominant groups, residing on their territories. Under the pressure of European organisations all of the CEE states implemented liberal policies that could be seen as a starting point in democratisation of political processes, allowing for diversity of opinions to be expressed in public unprecedented for decades earlier. Although some overoptimistic observers have celebrated political shifts in the CEE as a proverbial return to the 'West', befitting the logic of the civilisational 'clash', it appears that while some

structural changes were made, many procedural issues remained much the same, utterly undemocratic (Huntington 1991, 2002).

No doubt, some of the liberal democratic principles were established across the region, but the policy-making is hardly guided by the principles ensuring democratic equality of all individuals affected. Particularly, individual rights of the members of minority groups were particularly badly reconciled with cultural bias of post-communist political institutions designed primarily, if not exclusively to serve the members of the majority ethnic group. This fact is increasingly leading political theorists to doubt whether liberal connotations of personal identity are not inherently at odds with group-focused policies, pursued by the states thus far while recognising ethnic pluralism (Habermas 2001, 2003). A Liberal approach to recognition, most argue, presumes and guarantees individual autonomy in agenda setting and presumes an agenda-driven relation between members of society, however ethnically diverse, and political institutions. Individual freedom of choice to join any group thus seems to be undermined by the very notion of primordially defined individual membership in ethnic community. Furthermore, by recognising ethnic pluralism of their societies, polities followed the previous tradition of essentializing groups and hampering individual choice to opt out and not be treated as group member.

As had been assessed in various studies of the CEE societies, both democratisation and accommodation of multicultural diversity appeared to be no different from early-day conformism to dominant culture. which many observers interpret as being an inherent goal of the current rise of citizenship and language policies by the CEE states. Even Will Kymlicka – the vocal proponent of multicultural solutions to social and cultural diversity – has recently pointed out that multiculturalism has unlikely successes in practice (Kymlicka 2002, 2007; Kymlicka and Opalski 2001). In this, the liberal democratic approach to multiculturalism appears to bear an inherent contradiction in terms: It is unclear whether accommodation essentializes identities, and to what extent recognition of differences between the communities (cultural among others) governed by state structures is at odds with the social cohesion these very structures exercise upon social groups. Some of the states, Kymlicka observes in his studies over the years, have recalled the policies of accommodating diversity at the expense of more stringent social cohesion, such as most of his Western European case studies. In other societies, mainly located in the CEE, Kymlicka observes the discourse on societal communities comprising diverse citizens, reshaping the politically accepted notions of diversity acceptable for the members of dominant communities, but failing to tap into the dominant understand-

ing of multiculturalism. Ultimately, a range of political theorists have concluded that some tensions within multicultural policies is irreversible and makes coherent multiculturalist policy making impossible (Benhabib et al. 2006; Fraser and Honneth 2003).

Various public policy approaches were devised to the management of cultural diversity in CEE societies, among which multiculturalism stands out for its immanent popularity. Multiculturalism came to put additional stress on respect and tolerance for differences among ethnic and linguistic groups through emphasis on the uniqueness of cultures. However, while originally multiculturalism was devised to emphasise differences between the dominant and non-dominant groups, across the CEE it is used to legitimise the existing status quo between the titular and other communities. It seems that across the CEE, the institutional framing of state/minority relations in terms of multiculturalism constitutes an integral part of a far-from-complete state-building process. My own previous research on the attitudes of the Baltic minorities does not find any evidence of these groups' inherent opposition to the emergent unitary state structures (Agarin 2006, p. 67; Agarin 2007, p. 187).

Most contributors to multiculturalism debate in the CEE argue that the state communities would have been much better off, if they treated non-dominant groups as partners rather than unreliable migrants during the process of state-building (Delgado-Moreira 2000; Kuzio 2005; Lauristin and Heidmets 2002; Parekh 2000; Silova 2006; Soutphommasane 2005). This seems to make particularly urgent call for accommodation of cultural differences as state institutions across the region are in dire need of consolidating their approach to nation-cum-state building. The fact that the majority of voters throughout the region refrain from questioning the institutional design of the new state structures should not overshadow the concerns of non-dominant groups, who are usually excluded from the deliberations on the design of political institutions. Doubtlessly, this leaves little leeway to renegotiate state/society relations writ large, and majority/minority relations in particular and calls into question the very nature of democratic decision making in the region.

Whatever the outcome, the policies aim at state-cum-nation building and at first create only the provisions for the development of multicultural societies. In this situation, plenty of room is left for improving the relations between the majorities and minorities across the CEE region. Multiculturalism takes on to guarantee equality in the relations between the dominant and non-dominant groups, but also to find a way out of the groups' concern for the future existence of their cultures. In this sense, multiculturalism can

do nothing more than to essentialize group features, which is probably the worst solution for *de facto* multicultural societies, because it identifies, if any, only the mainstream cultural groups as a legitimate representative of all potentially different in- and out-groups.

In theory multiculturalism can avoid the trap of groupism, however in practice policies need to identify collectivities about to profit from affirmative action, positive discrimination or the like and inevitably essentialize differences. In doing so, multiculturalist policies tend to undermine both the individual agency able to determine their own identity on the one hand, as well as social structures that predispose individuals and not the groups as the agenda-setters. Individual capacity to make choices and in so doing establish societal structures guiding other agents in their choices, are the core issues for debates on outcomes of multiculturalist social processes.

In what follows I demonstrate that the focus on the agency allows one to determine how deeply multiculturalism relies on the notion of individual liberty. In the following section I make clear that the analyses of institution-building across the CEE had rightfully drawn attention to the shortcomings in implementing democratic principles during state-cum-nation building. What they did not however, was to point out that the difficulties of accommodating minority communities in this region are in no way different from attempts of accommodation elsewhere in the EU. The situation, as I argue, results largely from the lack of agreement among the political elites, how state institutions should be designed to perform best, and how the members of society should interact with these institutions, and who should be seen as a primary beneficiary of state institutions.

Two Faces of Multiculturalism: Communitarian versus Pluralist

Multiculturalism has many faces and many more conceptual formulations. Two currents can be distilled out of the large array of approaches, with "communitarian multiculturalism" dominating the scene and "pluralist multiculturalism" sidelining with debates on the design of democratic processes (Rawls 1993; Taylor 1992, 2003). The communitarian version of multiculturalism, naturally, distinguishes the groups as objects of rights, estimates the policies' effectiveness with respect to cultural communities and treats them as homogeneous. The pluralist version on the other hand sees groups to be the bearers of specific rights and obligations, but underlines that each group is different and requires special consideration. In doing so, pluralist multiculturalism defends non-dominant cultural groups and suggests different forms of political representation of group interests, such as self-government, cultural autonomy, or the like (Benhabib et al. 2006;

Kymlicka 1995, 2007).

Both versions of multiculturalism however, fail to address the bias in policies, naturally resulting from the guiding principle of liberal democracies, namely that the majority rules. The dominant group is therefore always empowered more than all other minority groups affected by the decision, and as such has a greater impact on policy-making and sees other groups as contenders of power-resources already allocated to the dominant group. Decisively, because multiculturalism does not address individuals, but the groups as bearers of distinct rights and freedoms, it can only marginally contribute to debates on interpersonal interaction and thus intergroup negotiations. Whatever is at stake in debates on multiculturalism, groups – however defined – hardly engage in any interaction measures. Instead, - and this is consistent with the premise of liberal democracy, - groups' claims are expressed as nothing more than a sum of individual interests, favouring more resourceful members of groups over the ones with less resources. The paradox of the outcome is the following: it is the individual of the non-dominant group who is affected by incentives and policies agreed upon by the more resourceful members. However, she has limited space in determining both the direction and the pace of multicultural interactions, because these are already predetermined by the members of the dominant group. Hence, by looking at non-dominant groups and not at individual members of these groups, multiculturalism flaws its very basic assumption: individual freedom to choose among the options available.

Individual differences and cultural particularity are central to all liberal thinking, no matter how communitarian it is. What communitarian multiculturalism underlines however is that individual differences play an insignificant role in the public space and therefore can be easily suspended in order to ensure best institutional performance, ideal outcomes for social cohesion and, ultimately, to guarantee a single moral bottom line for social interactions. In his *Theory of Justice,* John Rawls conveys the idea of principles of justice that are fair and non-discriminatory, as long as individuals are treated as inherently equal and unaware of their position in society (Rawls 1971). The bottom-line of equality, in the Rawlsean sense is embedded in the principle of individual liberty to make use of the resources available to all members of society, even when ending up in a position of disadvantage for oneself. Thus, due to a fair selection, in the public sphere individuals are perceived as equals from an onset, with political structures treating them equally regardless of their group-specific particularities and differences.

However, communitarian multiculturalism fails to address the crucial

question: where do the groups come from, as a prerequisite for dismantling the claims of majority groups that their dominance is natural and inborn. Failing to discern the question of group origins, communitarian multiculturalists cannot effectively deconstruct the relations between the individuals and groups, groups and identities these require, and ultimately between political groups (such as nations) and institutions framing these (e.g. state institutions, border, citizenship). For example, Charles Taylor argues that members of the dominant group are inescapably privileged in the process of nation-building, as it is their culture and their language that shape state institutions and are empowered by the established political institutions. With no society being entirely homogenous, the communitarian multiculturalism thus advocates for focus to be put on the equality between cultural communities and not solely the equality of individuals. It urges for cultural sensitivity when dealing with issues of equality of persons, opportunities and equality before the law, as any other approach would imply assimilationist treatment of non-dominant groups by state institutions (Parekh 2000).

In this sense, recognizing differences between the cultural communities is a prerequisite of the different groups' participation in the same political processes on equal terms. Constitutional accommodation of cultural diversity, following Parekh, would allow guarantee of fundamental rights for minorities and therefore ensure the minorities' claims for equality. Cultural rights would allow non-dominant communities to develop an increasing sense of security and hence also facilitate integration into the wider society (Parekh 1999, p. 449-453). However, when he advocates incorporation of cultural rights into the list of human rights to be protected, the notion of equality between the cultures becomes highly problematic, protecting cultural right in the same manner as individual /human rights. Although potentially a useful tool for guaranteeing the rights of non-dominant groups vis-à-vis the state, communitarian, or group-rights' multiculturalism is designed to promote different cultures within a framework where one culture is already accepted as dominant. As such, communitarian multiculturalism is addressing the inherent cultural bias of political institutions, without aiming at redressing it, or even providing for equalities in access of non-dominant cultures to already established institutions.

The communitarian logic can additionally be reinterpreted in such a way, that the rights of non-dominant *groups* are put before the rights of *individual*s from the dominant group. Naturally, in a twist of a logic, one could also argue that potentially disadvantaged in the face of competition with the numerous non-dominant groups, the state-bearing community

are prior to the rights of all other groups and needs greater protection than all other groups. However, precisely this is what multiculturalism is trying to avoid, it seeks to recognise the equality of all groups, dominant or not, and place them on the equal footing and hence secure their positions for the future.

This is not an easy dilemma to crack: how can be individual rights be balanced by rights that are owned by collectivities? How can one establish a principle of equality between various collectivities already so different in their access to structural resources? Maybe pluralist multiculturalism provides a way out of the impasse?

Indeed, communitarian multiculturalists are frequently accused of favouring the collectivities as transmitters of human rights to individuals. Should this agenda be pursued, liberal multiculturalists argue, the result will be the restriction of individual freedom to choose a community, beliefs or practices independently and will bind individuals to their inborn identities making constructs primordial. On the other hand, putting individual freedoms in a disadvantaged position over the group rights, communitarian liberalism is said to avoid the recognition of differences available at the subgroup level. Thus, in order to attain an equal status the members of different groups would thus need to strive for recognition of equality of groups at the expense of intragroup differences. In doing so, communitarian multiculturalism is bound to treat groups as homogeneous entities, lacking contingency within their boundaries.

According to the pluralist models of multiculturalism on the other side, one would need to emphasise rights of the individual members of groups, actively undermine discrimination of the members of non-dominant communities, and aspire to modify (political, social etc) institutions in order to make them more accommodating to cultural differences. At the same time, while the communitarian models of multiculturalism advocate separation between the cultural communities in the public sphere in order to allow for culture-blindness of the political institutions, pluralist multiculturalism seeks another way. With the policies implemented seen by the pluralism multiculturalist as being likely outcomes of interest convergence (even if not of integration) between the dominant and non-dominant communities, pluralists treat ethnocultural communities as coexisting in separate social spaces. Where respective cultures dominate and have little opportunity for interaction and recognition of differences as being constituent to individual identities, providing for the basic interactions of individuals and guiding groups negotiations. This is impossible for pluralist multiculturalists because there are no salient groups to be observed, what we see are

individuals with divergent and situatively defined interests.

Whichever interpretation of social reality we pick to understand processes under way in the multicultural societies, it seems that its policies need to remedy the inequalities first. However, the policies being guided by the ideologies of equality were unable to develop a coherent set of policies to take the increasingly multicultural character of today's societies into account. What both attempts of multicultural solutions advocate is the increase in the individual/group participation in the common public processes, while at the same time reducing social interaction between the members of different cultural groups to a minimum in the private. Will Kymlicka is particularly vocal in this respect: 'Integration into common institutions operating in a common language should still leave maximal room for the expression of individual and collective differences, both in public and private, and public institutions should be adapted to accommodate the identity and practices of ethnocultural minorities. Put another way, the conception of national identity, and national integration, should be a pluralist and tolerant one' (Kymlicka 2001, p. 48).

As we observe across the democratising states of the CEE the culture of the dominant groups takes prevalence in the public sphere, basic differences between the cultural communities and support of the bottom-line equality for all individuals are predicated upon the cooptation of non-dominant groups into political projects of the dominant groups and those determining the way political institutions work. Across the CEE region, state institutions provide only a limited set of prerequisites to guarantee cultural pluralism in the public sphere in so far as they are designed to serve primarily the interests of titular groups.

Most of the states in the CEE (with the exception of those experiencing ethnic strife during the transition from socialism) are defined and acknowledged to be ethnonational states. In such ethnically divided societies, even if in private there is a degree of cooperation among individuals of different ethnocultural communities, in public and especially in the political sphere acknowledged differences between the individuals will be unlikely to lead to the revision of the institutional design and opening up of the public space for diverging, even if not challenging opinions. In other words, cultural pluralism does not stand a chance of producing a more democratic public space within political institutions designed to favour the members of one ethnic group over all other citizens (Anderson 2001; Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Jubulis 2001; May 2001; Mihas 1997; Tishkov 1997; Tismaneanu 1998).

Whether the right balance will be found between the state policies of

social cohesion on the one hand, and the contestation of political processes by non-dominant groups largely depends on the effective implementation of guarantees of liberal democratic principles. Differences in starting point for redistribution of potential for democratic participation across much of the democratising states needs to take into account the difference in the nature of the liberal rights vis-à-vis rights in non-liberal regimes. Reinterpretation of what individual rights entail, and actively demoting the common perceptions that individuals have rights only in so far as the groups to which they belong bestow these very same rights, is central for implementation of even the minimal principles of multiculturalist governance.

In many cases the members of non-dominant groups lack formal rights to participate in political decision making, in other cases, social and economic constraints disallow the minorities' equal engagement. Always however, the dilemma of democratisation brings similar challenges to all members of society: Whether Russian-speakers in Estonia or Latvia, Poles in Lithuania or Ukraine, Hungarians in Slovakia or Romania – all these cases represent the so-called 'imperial minorities' whose 'worse off' status today is implicitly linked to their 'better off' in the earlier days. In many cases, the guarantee of these groups' equality with the dominant communities (de facto state-bearing nations) would be in contradiction of the current state-cum-nation building logic extended by the dominant groups. This brings the question of power relations and power redistribution to the fore: how states manage their multicultural societies is dependent on the already dominant groups' preparedness to cede some of its privileges to other groups.

Multiculturalism's Take on Individual Choice and Agenda Setting

In the light of the tension within the multiculturalist debate itself, both communitarian and pluralist multiculturalisms tend to avoid the internal disagreement on the signposted policy objective: accommodation of interests of diverse societies multicultural policies affect. Arguably, multiculturalism cannot deliver adequate policy propositions to diversity regulation because it fails to account for a potential domino effect that results from providing recognition of non-dominant groups (Fraser 2006; Phillips and Benhabib 1997; Young 1997). As a result thereof, the internal debate on multiculturalism produced a finer distinction of the interface between the cultural diversity and policy-making on the issues. Specifically, the focus on the migrants and illegal residents, differential treatment of the new and old minorities caused multiculturalist debate to reconsider the foundations

of the liberal claims of democratic principles. Claims for recognition of the special status of the atomised minority groups, such as homosexuals, religious communities, individuals with disabilities and sectarian social groups brought the legitimacy of claims to the centre of the multiculturalism debate.

Whose claims are legitimate, and whose are just mimicking the dominant narratives to arrive at their own piece of the pie? Is it legitimate to distinguish between the objects of legislation, resident aliens, and foreigners, who potentially have similar rights and obligations but are excluded from active participation in the decision making process, affecting the local, dominant, original society? Today – and this appears to be an accepted notion in debates on multiculturalism – there is no non-discriminatory way to distinguish between any groups without explicit reference to the vaguely defined notions of group identity and individual reflexivity on the group dynamics. Ultimately, since 'identity' has lost prominence in the multiculturalist debate, individual autonomy and capacity for independent decision making has been increasingly important for the foundational liberal democratic notion of personal liberty.

The two lessons to learn from the internal debate on multiculturalism provide for a point of departure here. Firstly, individual autonomy for decision making is to be taken seriously, while secondly, the intention of agency should be addressed from the perspective of agency equality. These two notions, discussed above find themselves in constant tension over potential implications for decision making affective collectivities, political institutions regulating diverse societal communities, and for the individuals constantly updating their subjective positions in the relational field of others' identities.

Equality between the individuals of different cultural backgrounds can hardly be guaranteed as long as it is the group that is in focus of non-discrimination and equality protections. This makes individual autonomy central for implementing real equality in practice. In this sense, individual choice of identity undermines the consistency of the group, infringes on group-centred rights and freedoms, and limits the scope of group protection by political structures, such as states or international organisations. This is what we see in cases, where society integration is claimed to be successful, as witnessed across the EU during the 1990s. If the numbers of minority individuals proficient in the state language, acquainted with the dominant cultural practices and ultimately engaging in political participation are on the rise, states tend to withdraw attention from non-dominant communities and support individual initiatives on the basis of personal-

ity principle (Hagendoorn, Veenman, Vollebergh 2003, Kastoryano and Harshav 2002; Grillo and Pratt 2002; Delgado-Moreira 2000).

At the same time, individual freedom to choose loyalties, cultural and linguistic among others, opens the way for an interpersonal dialogue, limits opportunities for group-exclusion and makes groupist/culturalist discrimination more difficult. Along the lines advocated by communitarian multiculturalists, differential treatment of groups would undermine exclusion based on group membership, as in cases of intergroup competition on the same political stage, for example in territorially defined ethnic enclaves South Tyrol – Alto Adige, Western Finland, Catalunia and the Balearic Islands. The guarantee of individual choice of identity – as is proposed by the multicultural pluralists – on the basis of which the person could opt for an 'ethnicised' treatment by state institutions, would extend the options for greater *formal* equality between individuals affected, but can do so only in addition to groupist approach to individual choices. This principle is at work in the cases of state interaction with their endogenous, non-dominant residents, such as Sámi in Nordic states and First Nations in Canada. In all cases however, when the members of the non-dominant community prefer not to present themselves as the members of group different from the dominant community, they are likely to gain greater acceptance with the dominant public, as both schools of multiculturalism agree.

However, the models fail because it is always that the members of the non-dominant groups are in focus. Unlike the members of the dominant community, the members of non-dominant groups are presumed to possess features that distinguish them from mainstream (dominant) society. In so doing, the inherent difference of non-dominant groups is thought to provide clear criteria for non-dominant groups' claims for special protection, but these claims can only operate on the basis of institutionally driven groupism.

The way out, as appears to be, is to address what is at stake for *all* members of the political community, irrespective of their minority or majority status. Retarding perceptions of group identity as a centre-piece of institutions governing societies, underlying sovereignty, legitimising access to political membership and panning out the basis for political participation would be an option. Multiculturalists claim that groups identities need to be emptied of cultural content to provide for the minimal group-blind interaction capacities. Ideally, the space for interpersonal interactions will be determined by the culture-unspecific social accords, functional enough to bind both members and non-members of the societal community, and thus decouple interactions from any constructed categories, seen as primordial.

Among these 'primordialised identities' (Anderson 1991), multicultural-isms suggest national, ethnic and linguistic identities would be the first to loose salience in the situations where other identities, such as professions, skills, place of residence are more important.

Needless to say, non-dominant group would also have it easier to grasp the perceptions of equality in individual choice, if their minoritised identity would not be perceived as a potential reason for discrimination (Phillips 2003; Phillips and Dustin 2004). Thus defined, membership in any pri-mordial community would positively inform the members of collectivities about their individual options for personalised choice. Preference forma-tion on the basis of individual, and not unquestionable group identities, multiculturalisms say, can effectively create a base for a consolidated multi-cultural society. Side-stepping ethnocultural understanding of nationhood and unquestionable linguistic loyalties would automatically allow individ-ual choice in favour of the civic or constitutional community identity over cohesive ties of ethnic or linguistic kinship.

This would question how we think of successful or failed communi-cation across the cultural boundaries. Institutions ensuring intercultural communication are usually attested success by far and large because they do not impose any obligations on the dominant community to participate in the process. As a result, the members of the non-dominant group have to comply with the idea that the state, political institutions and political pro-cesses can be ran by the majority group with little consultation on the agen-da of the non-dominants. Hence, collective identities seem to be increas-ingly perceived as markers of groups' distinctness, legitimise the structural rigidity of the institutions serving the group's interests and identity. While on the side of the non-dominant group this logic is more often than not interpreted in terms of unwillingness to cooperate with the existing institu-tions of the dominant society, the members of the dominant group can be fully exempt from taking any note of non-dominant groups' specific expec-tations and demands.

The group-bias of multiculturalism leads most of the theories to suggest that the collectivities are necessary base-line for equality of non-dominant and dominant groups. However, because dominant and non-dominant groups have unequal access to structural resources, preferences and beliefs to be negotiated in the public sphere, the group-based take of multicul-turalism does not alleviate the existing inequalities. What multiculturalist approaches to integration do, is promote self-interested identification of all individuals with the dominant group in order to gain access to resourc-es already available in greater numbers to that group. Especially, where

non-dominant communities struggle to access to scarce (and, at times, highly contested) resources, central positions and benefits controlled by the dominant group, shifting group affiliation seems to be the quickest way upward. Despite the differences in minority members' motivation to integrate into dominant society as minor partners of dominant communities, the process is only a one-way adaptation of non-dominant groups to the structural constraints imposed by the dominant one. The process taking place requires only non-dominant groups to adapt to the rules, set out by a dominant community; the dominant group however does not need to adapt any new patterns of behaviour.

This points to yet another difficulty of reconciling multiculturalist rhetoric with the socio-political realities of the day. Opposed to a commonly held view, multiculturalism does not emerge as a result of intellectual construction, neither is it an attempt to address potential conflict of multiethnic societies. Instead it holds foot in the problems of the real world politics and is driven by growing awareness of inequality between different segments of society. Increasing heterogeneity of political communities across the globe links various questions of concern for multiculturalism debate: from international relations between the states to intergroup relations within state borders, from choices individuals of non-dominant groups to states' approaches to integrating their citizenry. Disregarding these differences between the groups at the cost of pushing for societal and political homogeneity would be light-headed at best, counterproductive at worst.

In this light, social integration is a means to an end in the multiculturalism debate. Offering solutions to agents on the ground, the makers of policy-framework and monitoring international community debates on social integration are always about the real-world society and on the limits of political and social theories. At all times however understanding what is the base-line for integration and what is the drive behind the respective policies is central to estimation of the envisaged outcomes.

How Multiculturalist are the CEE societies?

Discussing the agenda of multiculturalism one should be attentive to its main fraud: It is attentive to cultural projects of those groups already in the key position and in doing so multiculturalism is unable to challenge the existing division of resources, subjective positioning or intergroup power-relations. This is a particularly salient issue in societies undergoing the consolidation of their political institutions, or finding themselves in the process of nation- and state-building. This is where the problems lie with the CEE multiculturalisms.

The treatment of cultural communities by multiculturalists decisively subordinates individual choices to culturally determined action patterns and assumes cultural luggage to be important background for intercultural communication. At the same time, any judgement on cultural patterns is dismissed as being immoral and discriminatory, bluntly discouraging any negotiation on the differences and similarities between the members of different cultures. This puts off the evaluation of similarities between the cultures not only on impediments for collaboration, but also on the possible ways of mutual enrichment. Issues such as the value of human life, ethics and perceptions of individual freedoms all need to disappear from multicultural discourse. What you see, is what you get: Institutions assume that cultures are fully homogeneous within, and the subjects belonging to cultural community mutually share not only the language and values, but also interests and resources. However, with no multiculturalisms being built on the social ground zero, all versions of multicultural institutions accommodate dominant perceptions of politics, society and culture. The vicious circle is often thus reinforced by political institutions and social structures designed and driven by majorities' concern for preservation of existing *status quo*. Clearly, institutional determinism is embodied in the approaches to minority integration in the CEE states; however, married with multiculturalist rhetoric it is also embedding a biased cultural determinism into social relations.

The Western European societies seek to integrate the members of minority who either moved into these states following the demise of the imperial structures, or arrived in search of better economic and political opportunities. Opposed to them, most of the CEE societies face the challenge of devising policies to integrate minorities who previously were the majorities in former colonial states, or have found themselves on the wrong side of the border drawn as a result of international conflicts. These non-dominant groups did not come to accept the dominance of the state-bearing nations as pack and package of rights inherent to liberal democracy, as happened to the minorities in Western Europe. The CEE minorities were mostly marginalised in the process of decision making, which undoubtedly was democratic for the dominant groups in the region, but in no way sought to reflect the opinions of non-dominant communities on their status, contribution or terms of inclusion into a new policy. Across the CEE the members of minority groups had little say as to in which state they would like to live and as to how their state of residence should relate to them. This particular aspect of debating multicultural policies emphasises the inherent results of reducing individual preference formation to group action-patterns, cultural or otherwise.

The trouble with multiculturalism across the CEE is not that groups do not interact with each other to a degree necessary to declare the success of multiculturalism in any one country. Rather, the affected communities see multiculturalist solutions to their conflicts over resources as a way of inter-action among each other, as if they were homogeneous, self-sustained and largely independent units within nation-state borders. There is no debate on the fact that multiculturalism is reality across the CEE states and soci-eties. However, policies of social cohesion focus on collectivities with hard boundaries: group rights depend on freedoms of their individual members, where affirmative action and special consideration standards are highly de-sired criteria for re-allocation and distribution of resources made available. By far and large, CEE multiculturalisms affirm group rights, but do so by essentialising cultures and homogenizing them for policy purposes; it thus neglecting differences within and similarities between cultures.

On the one hand, political institutions across the CEE are said to be too stiff to be able to address the real grievances of the non-dominant members of any of the affected societies. The fact that the state is perceived to be a bulwark of national identity is not always unproblematic, as is reflected in the Western European debate on integration. The examples of the CEE countries suggest that the understanding of whose interests the state insti-tutions should serve and how differences – cultural, ethnic, linguistic being only the tip of the iceberg – should be addressed is highly problematic. The statehood became deeply ethnicised in the process of political com-petition, perpetuating inequalities between the majority and the minority communities by making the state home to only one, ethnocultural com-munity. In most cases, the political elites in the CEE states have anticipated the minorities' discontent with their disadvantaged position, but still have established regulations favouring the titular groups over those of non-dom-inant communities. National legislation and programmes fostering social integration to fulfil the criteria required/set by the international institu-tions focus on minorities, but do so half heartedly and more often than not, redistribute the funds available to the members of majority working with minorities, rather then channelling these directly into the non-dominant communities. By means of example, neither the approaches to Roma across the CEE, nor to Magyars in Slovakia or Romania, nor to Russian speakers in the Baltic States sought to increase multicultural accountability of the state institutions to these groups. Instead, they provided minority groups a margin option to cooperate within the existing (majority dominated) insti-tutions toward accommodation of their interests.

On the other hand, there is a limited edge for action of non-dominant

groups in the public sphere across the CEE. Common identities are reinforced and created by recurring expression of allegiance and mass attachment on the side of majority, prompting minority groups to engage in the same processes defining their group borders. Framed and reframed in the national political rhetoric, common parlance and self-understanding, these ethnic/cultural/linguistic identities are sticky and provide a set of clear action patterns expected from individuals as the members of one specific group. If anything, political institutions playing the role of "service station" further undermine the options for equal access of various cultural groups, even from among the well-resourced and connected citizenry. Much more, institutions framed as guarantors of majorities' cultural identity and dominant groups' tools reversing previous discrimination undermine the very idea of culturally diverse society. Independently of the limitation imposed on the non-dominant groups, the cultural favouritism of political institutions across the CEE, infringes on both pillars of the European minority rights instruments: non-discrimination and equality (Agarin and Brosig 2009).

To address multicultural nature of societies in the CEE, liberal equality and autonomy need to be assessed consistently and thoroughly. In turn, only via individual equality and autonomy can the balanced development of culture and identity of non-dominant groups can be guaranteed, where checks on political institutions' performance are still difficult. Further contestation and debate on the framework and recognition of multicultural nature of CEE societies is hence a necessary step to move beyond groups and address the ways where group interests converge.

Conclusion: Are Multicultural Solutions Possible?

My paper makes clear that both, the advocacy for and opposition to multiculturalism were fanned on exactly the same grounds. Multiculturalism assumes that cultural memberships are primordial and involuntary, and hence constrain their members' options for interaction with representatives of other cultural groups. This allows multiculturalists to call for accommodation of individuals who (allegedly) lack autonomy within political institutions that are (allegedly) culture blind. At the same time, these institutions are streamlined on the majority culture, and allow only for its members a degree of freedom and equality, which the members of non-majority cultures can never enjoy. The purpose of political institutions is thus to liberate the members of non-dominant communities from their cultural ballast and make them autonomous agents, in the sense of political institutions. And although the two claims are central to multiculturalism,

they are also inherently contradicting each other. Hence, the adherents to multicultural communitarism are able to claim primordial nature of cultural features, while at the same time favouring assimilation of minorities of a less sophisticated culture into a dominant one. At the same time, multicultural pluralists are vocal defenders of cultural equality, while at the same time underline the impossibility of communication across cultural divide.

This is where my discussion on the contribution of minority to cultural diversity of the CEE societies has a clear fit with the multiculturalism debate: Cultural claims of minority individuals are more often than not agent-driven and thus provide sufficient incentives for political institutions to respond accordingly. However, the claims of minority groups for their greater institutional accountability are misperceived by dominant groups as being agenda-driven, in the sense reflecting majorities' own experiences with political institutions. In all cases, agenda-driven claims of the dominant groups seek to further redistribute available resources and gain greater structural disadvantages for their dominant groups. If political institutions were to consider the stakes of minority integration carefully, they would need to address the disparities embedded in treatment of groups as the bearers of rights and duties. In the process however, individuals with dissenting opinions are bound to be the losers of liberal democratic turn, undermining the very project of institutional consolidation in the long run.

The bottom line is that whether groupism and individualism of current liberal democratic state will lead to further accommodation of minority cultures in the common state framework, largely depends on the willingness of majority groups to redistribute the resources rightfully or unrightfully belonging to their group.

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Natalia Kukarenko

BILINGUAL CHILDREN IN RUSSIAN-NORWEGIAN FAMILIES IN NORWAY: DILEMMAS WITH MOTHER-TONGUE

At the beginning of 2015, according to Statistics Norway, 15 percent of the population in Norway had an immigrant background and every fifth child was born in Norway with two immigrant parents. Immigration has led to a more diverse Norwegian society. Today people from 222 different countries live in Norway, and immigrants find themselves in all municipalities of the country. This means that Norway is a multilingual country and more than 200 different languages are spoken here (Egge-Hoveid & Sandnes 2015). However, maintaining language diversity in practice is a question of political intentions and the economic limitations of the welfare system as well as interpersonal, family and social attitudes and relations (Lanza 1998, Okita 2002, Ratikainen 2006, King & Fogle 2006).

Given increased cooperation between Norway and Russia in the High North, the Norwegian authorities express political demands about increasing the knowledge of Russian language and culture among young Norwegians (e.g. Muligheter og utfordringer i nord 2005, The Norwegian Government's High North Strategy 2006, New Building Blocks in the North – **The next step in the Government's High North Strategy** 2009). However, while a current political idea is that Norwegian-born youngsters should

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learn more Russian [1], our hypothesis is that Norwegian-Russian children represent a potential resource if they are given the opportunity to develop their linguistic competence. Children in linguistically-mixed marriages potentially have the opportunity to acquire the native languages of both parents, but a number of studies show that this potential is realized by individuals to a varying degree (Varro 1998, Okita 2002, Ratikainen 2006). In this article we will focus on dilemmas and choices parents of potentially bilingual in Norwegian and Russian languages children face in Norway.

Key words: Norwegian and Russian languages children, bilingual, immigrant, linguistic competence, diverse society

Bilingual children in Russian-Norwegian families in Norway: dilemmas with mother-tongue [2].

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Russian [3], our hypothesis is that Norwegian-Russian children represent a potential resource if they are given the opportunity to develop their linguistic competence. Children in cross-linguistic marriages potentially have the opportunity to acquire the native languages of both parents, but research shows that this potential is realized to a varying degree (Varro 1998, Okita 2002, Ratikainen 2006). In this article we will focus on dilemmas and choices parents of potentially bilingual in Norwegian and Russian languages children face in Norway.

Language situation in Norway

Norway as a multilingual country has two official languages, Sami and Norwegian, and Norwegian language has two official written forms, Bokmål and Nynorsk. Both of them are recognized as official languages, in that they are both used in public administration, in schools, churches, and media, but Bokmål is used by the vast majority, about 85–90%. Around 95% of the population speaks Norwegian as their native language, although many speak dialects that may differ significantly from the written language. The Sami language is equated with the Norwegian language.

Also there are three national minority languages in Norway, Romanes, Romani and Kven which are under protection of the Council of Europe Convention for regional and minority languages. Norway signed the Convention in 1992 and ratified it in 1993.

The national minority languages have a lower status than the Sami which belongs to indigenous languages.

At the end of the 1960s Norwegian government has changed their Norwegianisation policy towards the Sami people, they also introduced a more pluralistic ideology towards immigrants, promoting inclusion through integration as an overarching goal of Norwegian immigration policy (Engen and Kulbrandstad 2004). From the latter half of the 20th century, immigration has brought new ethnic groups in Norway. With it came new languages such as Urdu, Arabic, Turkish, Somali, and many others. Immigrant languages have no official status in Norway.

The main foreign language taught in Norwegian elementary school is English. The majority of the population are fluent in English, especially those born after World War II. German, French and Spanish are also com-

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3   See e.g. radio interview with politicians Elisabeth Aspaker (H), Kristin Halvorsen (SV) and Arne Eidsmo (NHO), NRK 02.02.2011: www.nrk.no/nyheter/distrikt/troms_og_finnmark/1.7489204

monly taught as a second or, more often, third language. Russian, Japanese, Italian, Latin and rarely Chinese (Mandarin) are available in some schools, mostly in the cities.

At the same time Norwegian policy on children is based on a doctrine "in the best interest of the child". This doctrine rests on the basis that children are not resilient and that almost any change in their living conditions would be detrimental to their well-being. In terms of this doctrine, both society and parents are interested in children's development. All children shall be ensured with excellent and safe childhood and learning conditions.

It is a fundamental principle of the law on primary and secondary education (adopted June 1998) that all children and young people in Norway should have equal rights to education and training adapted to their abilities and aptitudes. Students from linguistic minorities shall have the same opportunities, rights and obligations of pupils with Norwegian as their mother tongue.

Immigrants in Norway have a legal right to keep their mother tongue [4]. Immigrant children with both foreign parents have the right to education for four years in their native language. Bilingual education occurs in other subjects where the mother tongue is used as an auxiliary language. Special education in Norwegian can continue as long as the child can adequately speak Norwegian. Thus children of immigrant parents are encouraged to learn the Norwegian language. The traditional language training is granted only as long as the child does not have "sufficient skills in Norwegian", and only through the first four years (ie, a bilingual transition model), and not throughout the school. In practice this means that the municipalities are obliged to provide education in immigrant languages only so long that the child has acquired sufficient knowledge of Norwegian that he/she is able to communicate and participate in typical Norwegian-language teaching (Norman 2009, p. 38-42.)

It seems, in other words, that the skills in certain languages for certain students, and to a certain age, are considered a resource, while two-or multi-lingual skills in other languages is considered something just to be

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4   The Norwegian government offers language instructional courses for immigrants wishing to obtain Norwegian citizenship. From 1 September 2008 an applicant for Norwegian citizenship is obliged to provide evidence of proficiency in either the Norwegian or Sami language or give proof of having attended classes in Norwegian for 300 hours, or meet the language requirements for university studies in Norway (which is met by being proficient in one of the Scandinavian languages).

in possession of a transition period. Different languages have different status and there seems to be a disparity between the state language education policy for immigrant minorities and the general cultural processes towards greater pluralism with elite bilingualism being encouraged.

Some background data and research methods

The pilot project was carried out in the area of Tromsø in North Norway in 2011.

People with a Russian background represent a considerable proportion of the population in North Norway: 30% of the Russian population in Norway lives in the north, whereas only 10% of the total population resides in this area (Flemmen & Lotherington 2009). In 2011 the Russian-speaking group was the largest immigrant group in the two northernmost counties, Troms and Finnmark. In Tromsø, which is the largest city and the largest urban area in North Norway with a population of 69,116, Russians constitute the largest labor immigrant group (514 individuals in 2011).

Importantly, a large proportion (approximately 20%) of the Russian immigrant population in this area are children. However, the number of Norwegian-Russian children must be considerably higher: The children included in this category in the statistics are those that were either born in Russia or in Norway to two Russian parents. This means that children with one Russian and one Norwegian parent are not included, since they get Norwegian citizenship at birth. This must be a considerable group, as 66,7% of Russian immigrants are women, and most of them marry Norwegian citizens (Henriksen et al. 2010). What is more, the Norwegian-Russian Association in Tromsø (NRAT) from year to year increases the number of children's club groups. In 2010 there were 5 groups with 40 kids, in 2011 there are already 6 children's groups with about 70 kids (Norsk-Russisk forening 2011).

We have used semi-structured interviews with parents to explore the complexities that families and individual family members face in dealing with bilingual upbringing. Alongside observations of natural interaction between parents and children, mainly focusing on language mixing, were also made as some research shows that there may be substantial differences between what parents claim and what they actually do when interacting with their children (Ratikainen 2006).

For the pilot project 27 interviews have been carried out, of them 13 with Russian mothers, 7 with Norwegian fathers, 5 with Russian fathers and 2 – with Russian club teachers. Most of interviews were taken in home setting which allowed observing an interaction with kids and language

switching, while some interviews were done at working place of the respondents and in a café.

Parents were recruited through the NRAT. The NRAT initiated Russian club where children learn about Russian culture and language. Classes are arranged on Sundays, parents – members of the NRAT pay fee to the association which employs a teacher of Russian and pays salary. Apart from Russian club the NRAT arranges different events to promote Russian culture and traditions as well as to inform on Norwegian society and traditions. Both Norwegian and Russian members meet for celebrating Christmas, Victory Day, Easter, National Day, and the association arranges public lectures on important issues and seminars.

Russian language as a value

As mentioned above children in cross-linguistic families supposedly have better opportunities to become bilinguals. Nevertheless, having two parents with different mother-tongues does not guarantee bilingual competences of their children. Parents with an immigrant background may be interested in their child learning the majority language in order to succeed in the new country. They may also want the children to maintain competence in the minority language, either as a matter of identity and cultural recognition or as a social asset, or both. But even though some parents might be highly motivated and persistent in transmitting their native language to their children, they may encounter obstacles that make it difficult to raise the children as active bilinguals. Childrearing dynamics within families are typically complex and parents may encounter dilemmas in choosing between different considerations. Research done on the roles of mothers in raising bilingual children shows that this may affect not only the child but also have effects on minority mothers in particular, who might lose their linguistic identity (Harding & Riley 1986, Pavlenko 2001). This makes the gender dimension highly relevant within the context of this article.

All apart from one women-respondent claimed that Russian language has a high value. Still several of them were not quite certain about the effects of bilingualism. In fact NRAT, apart from running Russian club, arranges meetings and seminars devoted to the issues of bilingualism where they invite experts to talk about bi- and multilingualism and its effects on cognition. Nevertheless some mothers expressed concerns about workload of children especially the small ones who only started kindergarten and did not speak at all (kids start kindergarten in Norway at the age of one year old). All Russian fathers had no doubts about the value of a Russian

language and the need for their children to be able to speak Russian fluently while Norwegian fathers considered knowledge of Russian as an extra competence which might or might not be useful to their children in the future. None of the parents expressed any doubts about the necessity for their children to be fluent in Norwegian and English.

If to systematize responses on motivations of parents why their children should learn Russian, then mothers named following reasons:

1. a desire to use their native language in order to have a close emotional relationship with the child. All mothers find it difficult to speak tenderly with own baby in a foreign language. Also women told that they feel unnatural to express emotions in a foreign language.

2. an advantage of an extra language. In fact this reason was repeated by almost all women with an emphasis on the need to educate children in diverse things, like languages, sports, arts, etc. Many respondents mentioned that it is essential to detect and develop children's abilities as early as possible.

3. an aspiration to use the native language in order to be respected by the child. Some women told that the need to express themselves in a foreign language made them feel "child-like" as their level of Norwegian did not allow them to be as eloquent as they are in Russian. One woman respondent told of an episode when she was talking to a neighbour and her child later laughed at her accent.

4. a desire to cultivate a familiar bond in the foreign country. Communication in Russian with their children in mother-tongue and presence of a Russian-speaking community helps many women to overcome isolation and get culturally adapted and integrated in social life. At the same time mothers tend to be consequent in maintaining communication in Russian with their children, especially if these children were born in Russia and came to Norway following their mothers.

5. an aspiration to have close ties to the Russian family, relatives and friends. Absolutely all Russian respondents mentioned how important for them it was that their children were able to communicate with Russian grandparents and other relatives in Russian.

Russian fathers, first of all, mentioned identity issue, that their children should know their "roots". Another important reason for them was communication with relatives in Russia which all the Russian fathers-respondents referred to as an important source for identity support and language development. Also one father mentioned that he deliberately spoke only Russian with his two sons and was strongly against using Norwegian in the

home setting with kids because he wanted to be respected by them and did not want to be corrected for speaking wrongly in Norwegian.

When it comes to Norwegian fathers, they positively looked on development of Russian language skills and their general reaction was that their children amazed them. At the same time all Norwegian fathers expressed concerns about the workload of their children because of the Russian club and extra homework; some mothers also mentioned that they use a lot of efforts to motivate their children to go to club on Sundays and claimed that partners' support played an important role.

At the same time it is worth mentioning that a set of questions in the interviews was on family dynamics and language use at home. The numbers of Russian – Russian couples, where the issue of language choice is not problematic, are relatively small in Norway. The situation is more complex in mixed families where couples negotiate in different ways what languages to use in family settings. Similar issues were raised by Elisabeth Bjugn in her study of Russian and Filipino women in Kirkenes, Norway. She claims that ethnicity of a partner has a great impact on language choice at home (Bjugn 2001). In her study she found that the minority language was used if the partner could and was willing to speak it. In our case Norwegian men speak Norwegian with their children even though they can speak Russian and might practice Russian with their wives. Actually all of the Norwegian fathers-respondents meant that their children had enough input of Russian mentioning as sources mothers who read Russian books, watched with children Russian-language cartoons and movies, communication in Russian club and with other Russians in Norway and in Russia (relatives).

Anastasiya Rogova has also done a research on Russian women and children in Kirkenes, Finmark county (Rogova 2008). She pointed to the tendency of some Russian women and children to distance themselves from Russian language and culture. It is worth mentioning that Kirkenes area in 1990's had a particular history of Russian-Norwegian relations. Kirkenes is very close to the Russian border. After the fall of the iron curtain Finnmark experienced huge numbers of Russian people coming in search of incomes to the rich neighbouring Norway. The image of Russian prostitutes for a while was the predominant picture of Russian women. In fact in Tromsø several women mentioned that period as the times when they were reluctant to show that they were Russians and tried to avoid communication in Russian in public places.

Also Rogova pointed to the negative attitude of some Norwegian partners to the use of Russian with children in their presence. Several wom-

en-respondents in her study reported that their partners felt uncomfortable being unable to understand mother-child discussion.

In our case only two Russian women –respondents reported that they switched to Norwegian as a family language because of their partners who did not feel comfortable on being excluded from communication. Some women have also encountered difficulties in motivating their children to master Russian as their partners were opposed to their family visits to Russia for economic reasons. In fact these two women told that they stopped to be a part of the NRAT and their children ceased to go to the Russian club. At the same time absolutely all of the respondents mentioned the positive impact of visits to Russia and the input of Russian language on their children.

Similarly, Ratikainen analyzed motivation influencing a mother's decision to raise children bilingually and major factors influencing the process of establishing Russian language use in the mother-child communication (Ratikainen 2006). The general conclusion that Ratikainen makes, supported by other studies as well (e.g. Lanza 1997), is that in the situation where the input in Russian language is restricted only to the mother in the child's environment, and she in turn is very inconsistent in her language choice, it is unlikely that the child will use this language actively when addressing her. If the mother is able to speak Russian consistently with the child, the chances that the child will use the language in communication with her are considerably improved.

In our case several mothers told about situations when their children were highly surprised on hearing their mothers speaking Norwegian to people for the first time. That means that these Russian women managed to be consistent in their language strategy with their children despite the doubts of usefulness of bilingualism in Russian and Norwegian and bilingualism in general. At the same time the observations of everyday use of language and communication of Russian respondents allowed to witness that Russian immigrants were frequently mixing languages when communicating with each other, inserting many Norwegian words into Russian speech.

It is also interesting to mention here that because of the doubts about bilingualism and its effects, active Russian women-mothers from the NRAT initiated a series of meetings and seminars on bilingualism, invited experts from academic environment to discuss myths and truths about the phenomenon. What is more, the language acquisition group from the CASTL linguistic excellence centre at the University of Tromsø has started an advice and information service called *Flere språk til flere* (FSF) [Bilingualism Matters] for bilingual families and the general public, based on their research. Since the start in June 2011, they have given a number of presentations. As

part of their outreach activities, the group has also published a special CAS-TL issue of the magazine Ottar in 2012, with several contributions by the CASTL researchers [5]. The NRAT members have been active participants in the CASTL events on bilingualism and two of the researchers from the CASTL participated in the pilot project presented in this article.

At the same time the minority language use within the mother-child unit strongly depends on the family context and particularly on the father's competence in Russian and on emotional relationship between the parents. The father's attitude towards the Russian language reflects his attitude to Russia and culture and also depends on childrearing arrangements (Ratikainen 2006). On the one hand, Russian women claimed how impressed they were by Norwegian equality policy which made fathers take paternity leave to care for babies. On the other hand, this increased father's participation in the early childcare provided the children with additional input in Norwegian at the expense of Russian. One of the major concerns expressed by Russian mothers in our pilot was the small input of Russian and too few occasions for their children to be exposed to communication in Russian. Several parents-respondents told that they observed situations when their children visiting the Russian club outside the class setting would immediately switch to Norwegian as a language of play and small-talk.

In our study women constantly related to situations where they felt responsible for the atmosphere at home and emotional environment. Our study has also shown that partners in mixed families come across different traditions in childrearing and both Russian and Norwegian partners acknowledge a bigger workload on women in families. Yet there is also tacit expectation that children are to succeed in Russian language and it is mothers' responsibility. Women have reported that they have a feeling of responsibility both for motivating children to master Russian and the actual success of their children. Similarly to Okita's findings our research shows that there is a lot of "invisible" care work being done by minority women without proper appreciation accompanied by feelings of frustration and uncertainty.

Conclusions

Recent research on bilingual language and cognition shows that bilingualism gives children many advantages beyond the mastery of two languages (Costa et al. 2008). Bilingual children have higher language

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5   https://castl.uit.no/index.php/acquisition

awareness in general; they show spontaneous understanding of language structure and therefore often have enhanced learning abilities for further languages. They also show advantages in some key components of literacy, such as reading, and they tend to be better at 'multitasking' and focusing attention (Bialystok & Martin 2004, Sorace 2007, Bialystok 2009). These benefits of bilingualism persist throughout life: they are found not only in bilingual children but also in adults who were raised bilingually and may even protect against dementia and Alzheimer in old age. What is more, bilingualism gives many advantages not only to bilingual speakers but also to the society where they live and work (Bialystok et al. 2009, Pavlenko 2001). Linguistic competence and communication skills are some of the major challenges of globalization.

Results of the study presented in the article confirmed some of the previous ones mentioned above and show that Norwegian-Russian children represent a potential resource if they are given the opportunity to develop their linguistic competence. At the same time analysis of the arrangements on a political level (integration immigration policy documents) and level of practice (education in languages) show a contradiction between maintaining language diversity and promotion of elite bilingualism (e.g. Norwegian – English) as wanted and desired.

Apart from these external factors there are other dilemmas and obstacles that parents face on individual and interpersonal levels. The results also allow claiming that there is a clear gender dimension in the division of labor when raising bilingual children especially in cases when the native language of mother is a minority language.

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Elena Filippova, Vassily Filippov

NATIONAL-CULTURAL AUTONOMY IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA OVER TWO DECADES: CONCEPT AND INSTITUTION

The paper examines the evolution and the current status of the NCA and its role in the Russian Federation's social and political landscape. This work was supported by Russian Science Foundation. (Grant Nr. 15-18-00099 "Enhancing Social Cohesion and Civic Participation in Multiethnic States. Russian and International Experiences").

Key words: post-soviet Russia, national-cultural autonomy, ethnicity, minorities, democratization, stabilization, nationalities' policies.

Russia has inherited from the Soviet Union a complicated institutional and policy approach to ethnocultural diversity. From the very beginning the Bolshevik leaders opted for a principle of national self-determination rather than one of national-cultural autonomy (NCA) as defined by the Austro-Marxists. This choice consequently engendered the territorialization of ethnicity, in which a limited number of officially recognized ethnic groups is granted its "own" territorial unit. At the same time, many other groups are deprived of this benefit.

Given the presence of more than 100 different groups officially recog-

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nized in Soviet times as 'nationalities' and in some cases as eponymous of a territorial autonomy, post-Soviet Russia is officially defined as a multinational state.

Meanwhile, as it emerged in 1992, Russian multinational federalism left about 17 million of the 27 million ethnically non-Russian individuals without any form of autonomy and therefore without any protection for their ethno-cultural identity and interests (Codagnone, Filippov 2000, p. 263-288).

The process of democratization of public life in the late 80s - early 90s, to some extent, favored the arising ethnic claims. The emergence of public associations formed along ethnic lines provoked an understandable anxiety among the authorities at all levels. These disparate groups had to be standardized and placed under control. At the same time, it occurred to some politicians that the existing approach to ethno-cultural diversity had to be modified. In particular, these politicians came to question the causal relationship between ethnicity and territorial autonomy as a potential threat to Russia's national unity. In this very context the well-known but forgotten concept of NCA re-emerged on the political scene.

Russian and Western scholars have already provided an analysis of the law on the NCA adopted in 1996 and modified in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2009 (Filippov, Filippova 1998 and 2000; Bowring 2002, Khabrieva 2002; Ossipov 1997, 2004, and 2012; Ilarionova 2010; Smith 2013, etc.), so it is not necessary to discuss the legal aspect of this policy in detail. Rather, we will examine in this paper the evolution and the current status of the NCA and its role in the Russian Federation's social and political landscape.

What is NCA in contemporary Russia?

Osipov points out that "there is no uniform definition and no commonly accepted understanding of what NTA (non-territorial autonomy) may actually mean" (Osipov 2013, p. 3). As far as post-soviet Russia is concerned, as it has already been shown (Codagnone, Filippov 2000, p. 263-288), one can distinguish three basic approaches to NCA in post-Soviet Russia:

The use of NCA alongside the abolition of 'national' territorial autonomy (*an assimilationist approach*);

The introduction of NCA as a principle of the same importance as that of 'national' territorial autonomy, and as an instrument for keeping an eye on the latter (*a pragmatic centrist approach*). Thus, in the 1992 draft of the first version of Russia's Conception of Nationalities policy, Valery Tishkov proposed giving NCA equal value as 'national' territorial autonomy and

integrating it with institutions of 'local self-government' (Tishkov 1996).

The introduction of NCA, just as a general principle of policy rather than as a new institution, simply complementary to (and implicitly less important than) 'national' territorial autonomy (*a conservative state-sponsored approach*).

In fact, the NCA is defined by law neither as a mere principle of policy offering a path to cultural self-organization for citizens identifying with an ethnic community, nor as an entirely novel political institution, but "rather as something in between, something we could probably define as a 'social institute' based on ethnic belonging" (Codagnone, Filippov 2000, p. 263-288). In any case, one should not be mistaken: NCA communities as they exist in contemporary Russia have little in common with what Renner and Bauer originally meant by this term. Renner's model of NCA, Bauböck summarizes, "rests on four pillars: cultural nationalism, personal declaration, non-territorial jurisdictions and symmetrical relations between nationalities" (Bauböck 2005, p. 97-111). Three of them, we will further demonstrate, are not in effect in Russia's case.

First of all, the separation of the principle of cultural nationality from that of territorial location, proposed by Austro-Marxists, could be attractive to marginalized groups under the imperial order of the former Austro-Hungary, but not to the territorially endowed national minorities inherited from the Soviet system by post-Soviet Russia. Quite understandably, the large majority of experts and decision-makers adhered to the conservative position "not *instead of* but *together with*" (Pain 2004), fearing that the abolition of territorial autonomy could provoke rancor and mistrust among the so-called "titular nationalities". Moreover, the institutional structure of NCA hierarchy follows territorial lines, with only one NCA of each ethnic group per territorial level (local, regional, and federal), so its jurisdiction is not strictly "non-territorial".

Second point: the law does not require personal declaration, or personal membership in the NCA. This fact raises several questions, namely those of the real public demand for such association, as well as of its representativeness. As Kemp (2002) formulates it: "How far can representative sovereignty go based on the nationality principle? What will the constituency be? Who speaks for the nation (or national group) and who pays for its upkeep?" These questions are related to the even more complicated problem of defining and institutionalizing community boundaries and belonging: "whether it is desirable or defensible for individual citizens to publicly register their ethnic affiliation" (Smith 2013, p. 35). Arel calls for a "fundamental distinction … between the privacy of individual identities and the

public salience of collective identities", arguing: "The right of an individual to affirm his cultural (national) identity, within a certain setting, is not the same as the obligation by an individual to have an identity (not necessarily of his choice) registered by the state and which must be divulged in official documents" (Arel 2006, p. 2). It is worth noting that since 1997 passports and other personal documents in Russia no longer contain an entry for "nationality", and Art. 26 of the Constitution emphasizes that "no one can be forced to determine and indicate his national affiliation".

In the absence of personal membership, NCA is "a strictly individualist and associationist concept", defined by the law as a "form of the national-cultural self-determination which is the social association of citizens of the Russian Federation who consider themselves to belong to certain ethnic communities on the basis of their voluntary self-organization". In this regard, it is intended more likely for the "financing of the activities of a small minority of activists concerned with ethno-cultural problems" than of the "overwhelming majority of tax-payers" (Bowring 2002, p. 229-250).

Ossipov (2004) shows, that such an associationist approach fits neither with an ideal model of NCA, nor with the authorities' expectations. When there was no legal limit to the number of NCAs, leaders of rival groups formed more and more organizations, representing the same ethnic group. It is hardly surprising: a homogeneous ethno-cultural group is nothing but a myth, and it would be simplistic to assume that members of such a group should share the same views and interests. This situation led to a proliferation of NCA, and soon the government found itself in the awkward position of trying to deal with the leaders of several institutionalized associations, often in conflict with one another.

This issue was addressed by the 2004 amendment authorizing only one NCA per nationality per territory. The aim was to create a hierarchical structure based on ethnicity, integrated into the state governmental system and consolidating, as far as possible, all individuals belonging to corresponding ethnic groups – with the aim of maintaining the state's control of ethnic identity and establishing one singular association as a representative of any given ethnic group.

In so doing, lawmakers embraced the assumption dominant at the turn-of-the-20th-century and backed by Austro-Marxists that nations are stable and mutually exclusive communities of character, rather than the modern liberal vision that "one should not impose or assume cultural homogeneity for the sake of convenience. Nor should one assume that national identity is the main defining feature in people's lives" (Kemp 2002).

Always in contradiction with Renner and Bauer's model, NCA does not

ensure "symmetrical relations between nationalities", where both majority and minority groups would enjoy cultural autonomy on the same basis of personal declaration and ex-territoriality. Instead, some ethnic communities are still endowed with territorial autonomy while others lack this privilege. But one crucial point remains: nowadays Russian NCAs aim to protect ethno-cultural differences and the interests of individuals belonging to non-titular nationalities or residing outside their 'national' territory. This principle is clearly expressed in amendments, which came into effect in 2003. Henceforth Article 1 defines the national-cultural autonomy as "a form of the national-cultural self-determination... of citizens of the Russian Federation, who relate themselves to a defined ethnic community *being in the condition of national minority within a corresponding territorial unit*" (emphasis added – EF, VF). Nevertheless, some non-corresponding with these criteria NCAs have yet to be seen in the registration list (for example: Russian NCAs in the Kaliningrad, Kurgan, and Sverdlovsk regions; two local Buryat NCAs in the Republic of Buryatia; a Jewish NCA is the only one existing in the Jewish Autonomous Region). One must recognize, either that a territorial autonomy does not guarantee the protection of the so-called ethno-cultural interests of its titular nationality, or that NCA serves other purposes.

What place for NCA in Russian administrative structure and social life?

By now, according to the Federal Ministry of Justice, there have been 1125 NCAs (16 federal[1], 266 regional and about 830 local) established in Russia (http://unro.minjust.ru/NKAs.aspx). Among the most active, in the NCA-building, ethnic communities one should mention are Tatars with 165 NCAs in 37 territorial units, Germans (131/49), and Jews (129/50). Hence almost a half of all existing local and regional NCAs fall to into one of these three ethnic groups. They also were in the first ranks to establish federal NCAs. It should be emphasized that, if the Tatar population (more than 5 300 000 persons), is the most numerous, after the Russians, then the two other ethnic groups are much smaller in size. According to the

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1   Created in chronological order: German, Jewish (1996), Ukrainian, Tatar (1998); Byelorussian, Lezgine (1999); Kurdish, Romany (2000); Armenian (2001); Azerbaijan, Chuvash (2002); Polish (2003); Lithuanian (2004); Assyrian (2005), Kazakh (2007), Greek (2011). In November 2010, the High Court of Russia cancelled registration of the "Federal nation-cultural autonomy of the Ukrainians in Russia". A new organization under the same name was created later in 2012.

2010 census, there were about 394,000 (597,000 in 2002) Germans and only 157,000 (230,000 in 2002) Jews in the Russian Federation.

The local NCAs are spread very unequally over the country's territory. More then a hundred of them are concentrated in Moscow and the Moscow region; they are numerous in such regions as Samara (46 NCAs), Krasnoyarsk (31), Rostov (29), Krasnodar (26) and Stavropol (26), while there are few or none of them in many others. This disproportion can be explained by the fact that some regions developed a particularly active "nationalities" policy, including government programs and budgeting lines assigned for ethno-cultural purposes. Regional administrative bodies such as ministries, departments or committees responsible for the implementation of theses policies and programs encourage the NCA by providing them with some financial assistance.

It is worth mentioning that 51 local and 6 regional NCAs have been registered in Crimea since July 2014; surprisingly enough, only one of them (a local) was created on behalf of the Crimean Tatars, which are the most rapidly growing and the most active minority on the peninsula (about 12% of population, according to the latest Ukrainian census in 2001). Actually, Russian authorities supposed that the NCA could be a plausible response to the Crimean Tatar population's demand for recognition. Thus, on the eve of the March 2014 referendum in Crimea, the speaker of the Federation Council upper house of Russian parliament, Valentina Matviyenko, said in an interview with Rossiya 24 TV channel: "If the Crimean people decide on accession to Russia, the republic will have all the rights and opportunities of a constituent entity of the Federation and *Crimean Tatars will have the right to create a national cultural autonomy*" (emphasis added – EF, VF). Among possible explanations of such indifference of Crimean Tatars towards the NCA, one can mention the rivalry between existing Tatar voluntary organizations (not less than 20 on the peninsula) with divergent claims. Many of them are influenced by The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, an auto-proclaimed "single supreme plenipotentiary representative and executive body of the Crimean Tatar people", fighting for "free national self-determination in its national territory", - the official site of the Mejlis states (http://qtmm.org/en/general-information-about-mejlis). The non-territorial autonomy, which is NCA, is not fit for this purpose. On the other hand, there are some Tatar organizations that are pro-Russian and loyal to the Crimean government. So it is highly problematic to have one Tatar NCA per territorial unit, as the amendment to the law adopted in 2004 postulates it. Another reason is certainly the weakness of the NCA as an institution, notably due to the fact that the law does not allow them any

political engagement. And in the given situation in Crimea, the main concerns of the Tatar population are the housing and land property issues, but also the recognition of the status of indigenous people of Crimea, which is difficult to achieve without political mobilization.

Generally speaking, the NCA turns out to be a kind of public association hardly distinguishable from other forms of associations based on ethnic criteria, both in legal status and in sphere of action. According to a large majority of ethnic leaders, including those of the NCAs themselves, this kind of institution, "a top down initiative in which the interests of minorities were subordinated to those of the state and its dominant ethnic group" (Smith 2013, p. 33), does not provide any advantage in comparison with other forms of public associations, emerged "from below".

Thus, the Federal Jewish NCA (FJNCA) is undoubtedly of less influence in comparison with by far the more solid, both in terms of financial and social capital, Russian Jewish Congress (RJC) or Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia (FJCR), consolidating 200 communities of Orthodox Judaism in 178 cities all over the country. The Union of Russian Armenians, from the very beginning of Armenian militancy in Russia in the late 1980ˢ, enjoys public support and state recognition that the Federal Armenian NCA failed to gain because it is systematically compromised by scandals and disputes between rival leaders. The federal Korean NKA was dissolved soon after the death of its first president and never re-emerged.

At the local level, things are going in much the same way. The NCA occupies a modest place among other public associations formed along ethnic lines. Administrations at all levels usually do not distinguish between NCAs and "NCOs", national-cultural organizations, as they are generally named. On equal terms, they enjoy state support, including financial aid.

Unsurprisingly, the NCA doesn't meet the expectations of ethnic elites and leaders. First, dissatisfaction is due to the fact that it is prohibited from any political engagement. Secondly, the application of the law is insufficient, namely in the matter of the right of NCA "to apply to the legislative and executive powers and local authorities, so as to put forward their national and cultural interests". At the federal level, Consultative Council on the NCAs' affairs has been at long last created under the Ministry of Regional and Nationalities Policies in 2006. It is not clear yet if it has been maintained after the Ministry was dissolved in the fall of 2014 and the implementation of nationalities policies was assigned to the Ministry of Culture. Leaders of Federal NCAs are members of the Presidential Council for Interethnic Relations, while advisory bodies under the organs of executive power of the territorial units are still absent

in more than a half of the regions, and NCA representatives are seldom invited to participate in these bodies.

The amendments to the law introduced in 2004 and 2005 have considerably reduced financing of the NCA's activities from federal and local budgets. The law provides no budgetary financing. Only specific short-term programs can be supported, under the condition that they meet with the authorities' approval. Thus, the NCA activities rely on the good will of regional and local authorities, or on the sponsors' money. Not surprisingly, it makes the NCA vulnerable. Hence, the NCA as it has been realized in post-soviet Russia is everything but autonomous and is far from gaining "the same importance as 'national' territorial autonomy", as expected (Tishkov 1996).

20 years of the NCA history in Russian Federation: a provisional assessment

Smith (2013) proposes to analyze the merits of non-territorial autonomy through the double lenses of democratization and stabilization.

"From the 'liberal-democratic' perspective, - reminds Kymlicka, - political institutions should be judged by their impact on the lives of individuals, as measured by the basic liberal criteria of personal freedom and security, democratic rights, and economic security and prosperity" (Kymlicka 2002). In the case of the NCA, it means their ability "to affect intergroup relations, intragroup relations and group-state relations; to provide external protection for minorities against the pressure of dominant majorities, to protect internal minorities within autonomous communities and to support common overarching citizenship for everybody in the larger polity" (Bauböck 2005).

From this democratic perspective, we argue that today in Russia the so-called "ethnic" or "nationalities" policy doesn't help fight the daily discrimination that minorities can face. Rather then being a legal mechanism for the protection of ethno-cultural rights of individuals belonging to non-territorialized ethnic communities, it focuses on the patronage of ethno-cultural associations such as NCA. Therefore, the Government negotiates with only a limited, select circle of ethnic leaders, able to pose as minority representatives, but who are most often led by their personal power ambitions and economic interests, in some cases simply looking for access to public office and the entitlements that flow from this. NCAs and other ethnic associations have to vie for always-insufficient financial resources. This competition entails inevitable tensions and mutually weakens participants (Smith 2013, p. 34; see also Ilarionova 2010).

Various groups exploit the concept of NCA for rhetorical purposes aimed at the symbolic construction of multi-ethnicity and at public advertising of some official and non-governmental structures.

As Osipov arguably shows, the NCA has served to divert attention away from issues of equality and non-discrimination, allowing the authorities to define exclusion and conflicts in terms of cultural differences rather than institutional deficiencies and social deprivation (Osipov 2010, p. 54).

At the same time, an assimilationist approach obviously prevails in today's Russia. Ethnic difference seems to have been completely overlooked in the administrative reforms, namely in the fusion of territorial units. The so-called ethno-regional education component that had been offering mother-tongue teaching was abolished in 2007, and the number of pupils still learning it decreases. Christian Orthodoxy becomes progressively an official state ideology, and ethnic xenophobia affects a large part of the population. According to the *Levada center* annual surveys, more than half of respondents repeatedly say they are favorable or rather favorable to the idea of "Russia for Russians"; more then 40% agree that "minorities have too much power in Russia"; from 70 to 80% express negative attitudes towards migrants and claim the restriction of their influx; about 40% feel "annoyance, dislike or fear" towards so-called "individuals of Caucasian nationalities"; about 30% report feeling interethnic tensions in the city or region they live in and only as little as 11% reject any possibility of violent ethnic conflict in Russia (twice more often [around 20%] when asked about their own city or community). Between 2002 and 2012 surveys, a part of those who never happened to feel hostility from (or towards) people of another ethnic origin decreased from 60 to 44% (Levada Center 2013). Foreigners, Jews, and migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia have all come increasingly under attack during the past several years. The bloodiest clashes between ethnic Russians and so-called individuals of Caucasian nationalities have become a common event.

In this context, the NCA, which is devoid of any independence, is doomed to play a completely decorative role.

If one considers that "cultural nationalists are willing to settle for the national autonomy within multinational states, whereas statist nationalists are more likely to fight for changing the borders of states" (Bauböck 2005), then the option of national-cultural autonomy seems to be of less danger for political stability and state integrity than an eventuality of national self-determination. Russian law goes so far as to assimilate the NCA with "the form of the national-cultural self-determination" (Art. 1). Besides, by organizing the NCA in a centralized hierarchical structure ("regional na-

tional-cultural autonomies are established at the conferences (congresses) by the delegates of local national-cultural autonomies; federal national-cultural autonomies … are established at the congresses by the delegates of regional national-cultural autonomies" - Art. 6), the power institutions hoped to reduce the number of "ethnic" organizations in order to efficiently control them, to enhance their loyalty to state officials and policies in return to financial support, and also to prevent their radicalization.

However, this goal has never been achieved because the NCA failed to absorb or to displace other forms of 'ethnic' associations. Moreover, the attempt of the unification of all organizations of a given ethnic group under an umbrella of a regional NCA provided a side effect. Daucé shows, referring to the example of the Moscow Tatar organizations, that this "strengthened an essentialist representation of the Tatar community, leading ultimately to ethno-cultural criticism of state nationality policy [that] even led to conflicts in the Tatar community at the beginning of 2010s" (Daucé 2015, p. 82).

A recent (November 2014) amendment accentuates the stabilizing dimension of the NCA. Art. 1 of the law, defining the main goals of the NCA and initially mentioning only "the independent solution of the issues related to preservation of identity, development of language, education, and national culture" now entrusts the NCA with more state-oriented tasks, namely the "strengthening of the Russian national unity, harmonization of the interethnic relations, promotion of the interfaith dialogue and also of the activities aiming at social and cultural integration of migrants". However, we doubt that the NCA could cope with such complicated missions, given a lack of human and financial resources and a very limited influence on the respective ethnic communities.

Let us use an example of immigrant integration. It is obvious that its social dimension involves access to housing, welfare, education, employment and services, which can only be provided by the state, or business, or some wealthy and powerful charitable organizations, and not by the associations that are seeking financial aid. As for cultural integration, it seems at least contradictory to expect that an institution created in order to preserve an ethnic identity and to develop a particular language and culture would favor a language and cultural shift. The example of The Netherlands, where ethnic communities were entrusted with the integration of co-ethnic newcomers, proves that such an approach "contributed to social exclusion and did not provide incentives for the Dutch institutions to become more accommodating of [migrants]". It was abandoned since 1998 in favor of civic integration based on individual rights and adaptation into the host society

(Geddes 2003, p. 113). There is no reason in following this dead-end direction two decades later.

So we can conclude that the NCA as it is implemented in contemporary Russia aims for stabilization rather than democratization. It can be seen as "an attempt to enhance the loyalty of those numerous groups that lack territorial recognition of their nationality, while reining in the power of ethnocratic elites at the level of the sub-state national-territorial republics" (Smith 2013, p. 45). From this point of view, however, one has to recognize that the NCA does not prevent ethnic conflicts and in some cases (such as that of Russian Germans) does not eliminate the claims for territorial autonomy from the political agenda.

In the context of democratization, the NCA as it is realized in post-soviet Russia, can be understood, to some extent, as a sign of public recognition of cultural diversity, but it neither promotes tolerance towards minorities, nor protects their rights. It certainly doesn't provide the necessary tools which would "enable [minority] groups to exercise powers of control over matters deemed crucial to their flourishing, including education" (Leìger 2014, p. 420), in so far that non-territorial minority communities are not established as public law corporations ... [and] are not entrusted with ... legislative or taxation powers (Leìger 2014, p. 422).

The NCA in post-soviet Russia should rather be considered through the lenses of *institutional completeness*, presuming the presence of formal organizations of ethnic communities such as schools, churches, socio-economic organizations, newspapers, and community centers, which provide opportunities for individuals to meet and interact.

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Alexey Malinov

ON THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHNOSOPHY

The paper discusses about the new, developing synthetic academic discipline – *ethnosophy*, which emerges in the field of studies shared by ethnography, sociology, social and cultural anthropology, philosophy and cultural studies.[1] The purpose of the paper – to specify the scope of ethnosophy, its theoretical and practical perspectives. The Ethnosophy project was formulated in the late twentieth century. But its methods and subject field are actually debatable. Ethnosophy involves both theoretical and applied parts. Social, cultural and political transformation of modern society of the last two decades put it into a multidimensional change of strategies and tactics of cultural, social and national identity, changing the traditional forms of rhetoric and reflection of public expression. The author gives an account of the different conceptions of ethnosophy in contemporary philosophy and ethnography and describes the subject matter of this discipline in the example of the native population's of Mountain Altai mentality. Ethnosophy is the type of mythic mentality which provides basis for the formation of the new forms of national and cultural identity. Ethnosophy implies the

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archaization of mentality and falling back upon the age-old folk wisdom which seems to be a source of veritable knowledge. Ethnosophy includes ethnopedagogics, rather peculiar attitude to nature (proceeding from the assumption that all the natural phenomena are animate) and its own model of history (which is in fact a kind of folk-history).

Key words: Ethnosophy, regional philosophy, myth, axiology, sense, ontology, art, deontology.

Introduction

There is no ethnosophy in the list of contemporary academic disciplines, and that is not surprising: nowadays a trend towards subdivision, isolation and fragmentation of scientific knowledge is predominant. On the contrary, ethnosophy has arisen as a synthetic and, moreover, "artificial" academic discipline, which is emerging in the field of studies shared by ethnography, historical and cultural anthropology, philosophy and cultural studies. The project of ethnosophy was initiated in the end of the XX century, though its methods and subject matter are still in need of accurate definition.

Ethnosophy arose in the context of criticism received by the modern civilization, so it is not a coincidence that we should look for its sources in the history of attempts to reconsider the development of the Western civilization and in the interest to archaic cultures dating back to the beginning of the XX century. The majority of the works which can be defined as ethnosophic are full of resentment at the present state of affairs and pessimistic views of current events, usually perceived as the further "decline" and degradation of humanity. The disapproval of modern world-view strengthens (though to a different extent) religious feelings, makes people resort to religious teachings and urges them to participate in religious reformism. The advocates of ethnosophy believe that to overcome the "crisis" of the modern civilization humanity should fall back upon mythic origins of religion, which results in the archaization of mentality and the development of theories combining "ancient" knowledge with the data of modern science.

It is especially evident in the case of national forms of ethnosophy, which share the common motif of loss and then finding of some "initial" knowledge. New ideas here are perceived as largely forgotten old ones, and renovation is understood as return.

The grievances against predominant forms of modern civilization (and especially its social and normative practices) are also extended to the stronghold of this civilization, namely the science and rational thinking in

general. The increasing specialization of scientific knowledge and its grow-
ing withdrawal from trivial common sense truths create the impression of
fragmentariness of modern science and imperfection of scientific knowl-
edge about the world, which thus should be supplemented with coherent
world-view (previously provided by religion and philosophy) and practical
actions, implying the creative transformation of the world. This, inciden-
tally, explains pedagogical trends in ethnosophy and its tendency towards
dogmatism. Then we speak of some world-view, this need for coherence
often takes the shape of new pantheism.

Professional philosophers tend to look down upon ethnosophic spec-
ulations, seeing them as a product of dilettantism. It is true. All the eth-
nosophic studies should be defined as belonging to unofficial, non-ac-
ademic and even amateur philosophy. Though the history of philosophy
makes it obvious that the majority of philosophical "breakthroughs" has
been accomplished exactly by "non-professionals". However professional
competence here doesn't presuppose the high culture of thought, never
mind intellectual audacity. From the academic point of view the majority
of contemporary ethnosophic works are of course very naïve, but ethnos-
ophy doesn't duplicate philosophy or substitute for it. Ethnosophy should
be seen not as another philosophical system, but as an essential stage in the
development of national mentality. Ethnosophy deals not with philosoph-
ical ideas or abstract concepts, but with myths. All the things described by
the advocates of ethnosophy seem real for them and constitute the part of
their life-world.

The ideology of anti-globalization with its critical attitude to the west-
ern (and westernized) consumer societies is also the fertile ground for the
distribution of ethnosophy, which makes anti-globalist world view a part
of national mentality opposing mass-culture and thus obtaining the status
of some new "cultural universal". It is possible to say that ethnosophy is the
implementation of a trend toward transition from the attempts to substan-
tiate metaphilosophy to the construction of regional philosophies.

At the origins ethnosophy

The term "ethnosophy" has already had its own history dating back to
the beginning of the XX century. It is believed to be coined in 1926 by
the founder of Eurasianism, Nikolai S. Trubezkoy, in one of his letters ad-
dressed to Roman O. Jakobson. Nikolai Trubezkoy assumed, that different
aspects of a culture are not only interconnected, but are also developing
simultaneously; in a manner of speaking, they are moving in one direction.
The new academic discipline, which he has called *ethnosophy*, aimed to de-

scribe this affinity in the development of the different aspects of culture. Nikolai Trubezkoy wrote: "…we need some special discipline, which won't belong to the field of literature or politics etc., and engaged only in the synthetic studies of parallelism in the evolution of the specific aspects of life. <…> this question should be answered not by linguistics, but by some other discipline, e. g. 'ethnosophy'" (*Jakobson R. O. N. S. Trubetzkoy's Letters and Notes* 1975, p. 98). However ethnosophy was able to find its place in the theory of Eurasianism neither as an independent academic discipline nor as a term. About this time in the Soviet Russia several conceptions emerged, which also dealt with aims and methods of modern ethnosophy (though the term wasn't used in that moment). Here we first of all should list Alexey F. Losev's works on the philosophy of myth and Dmitry K. Zelenin's works on Siberian ethnography, especially Siberian shamanism. One of Zelenin's works was even initially entitled "The Philosophy of Siberian Shamanism".

The term "ethnosophy" can also be found in the "Cultural Anthropology" by American anthropologist M. Herskovits: this book summarizes the results of his research work (Herskovits 1955). It is noteworthy, that Herskovits has introduced this term while criticizing ethnocentric and Europocentric (or USA- and Europocentric) point of view in the social anthropology and cultural studies. According to the American anthropologist, every nation has its own system of values, describing the people's ideas of due and desired phenomena. At the same time every culture fully manifests itself in one aspect or "cultural focus", the feature which is the most characteristic for it (a culture is usually associated with this very phenomena). To adopt these desired values means to enter the culture or go through the process of "inculturation", which later allows not only to reproduce these values and certain cultural norms, but also to change them.

Over recent years the term "ethnosophy" has been actively used by the philosopher Vasily V. Vanchugov. In his monograph "Russian Philosophy in the end of the XIX and the beginning of the XX century and American thinkers of the 'Golden Age': the main areas of theoretical interaction" (Ванчугов 2000), the course of lectures entitled "Ethnosophy: the images of nations in the Russian philosophical thought" and the series of papers (Ванчугов 2009, p. 514–515; Ванчугов 2010, p. 131–143) he defines ethnosophy as "folk-philosophy", based on the ideas about the "essence of the nation". The goal of such debates is to assess advantages and disadvantages of the nation in the intellectual sphere, to draw up its collective psychological portrait and to define the nation's role in the history of the world. Vasily Vanchugov believes that ethnosophy is n attempt to explore the "essence of a nation" and to reveal the philosophical aspect of national mentality. That

is why he uses the phrase "ethnosophic portraits". Though according to him ethnosophy can be an example of paraphilosophy, sometimes its conclusions can be assessed higher than the results of trivial rational deduction. Here we can observe both the work of conscience in its pure forms and the figurative manifestations of the unconscious in the situation of confrontation with another rational being (nation, ethnos). In spite of the eccentricity of some philosophers' opinions about other peoples, they nevertheless comprise a valuable source and empirical basis for a certain form of knowledge, which can be called not only ethnosophy but also "philosophical area or regional studies".

According to Mikhail Epstein, ethnosophy belongs to the "sophy-disciplines" and is opposed to ethnography as a "logy-discipline". He assumes that while ethnography describes ethnoses, their genesis, history and culture, and ethnology studies the structure of their customs, traditions and rituals, ethnosophy explores relations between all the elements of this structure and the mistrial and sacral center or the pathos of national life. Ethnosophy usually studies highly developed societies, where the religious contents of culture exist in rudimentary or potential form, while ethnology aims at the investigation of rituals practised by primitive societies, where religious aspects of culture are explicit. One of the goals of ethnosophy is to explore the manifestations of unconscious and sacral structures in everyday, secular, professional and cultural life as well as to define the place of every ethnos in the evolution of human culture. Mikhail Epstein claims that Johann Gottfried Herder and Oswald Spengler were the fathers of ethnosophy; among the Russian founders of this discipline he lists Nikolai Ja. Danilevsky, Lev N. Gumilev and George V. Gachev (Эпштейн 2001, p. 73; Эпштейн 2004, p. 783–785).

A famous Africanist, Vladimir R. Arsenyev (1949–2010), wrote a series of basic works in the field of ethnosophy (Арсеньев 1996; Арсеньев 2006, p. 36–44; Арсеньев 2006a; Арсеньев 2008, p. 100–116). He defined ethnosophy as a specific branch of ethnography and other humanitarian disciplines, which has emerged to overcome conceptual crisis associated with the Post-modern phase in the development of the contemporary civilization, which causes the loss of the coherent world view and the rise of many distinct academic disciplines about society, based on the heuristically exhausted methods. According to him, strive for the synthesis of philosophy as a science about methods and the common foundations of the world and ethnography as a science about culture and society presents "ethnosophy" with its methodological guidelines. Vladimir Arsenyev noted that ethnosophy is a discipline belonging to the transitional period, the period

of crisis, which has made integral world view impossible. At the same time ethnosophy should overcome the Europocentric world view and the scientific guidelines laid by it. He believed the field studies of specific national and regional cultures to be the necessary element of this ethnosophic approach. Drawing his conclusions, he relied on his long-term studies of the African people Bambara (Арсеньев 1997; Арсеньев 2011).

The book "Philosophy of the North" written by Yuri V. Popkov and Eugeny A. Tugashev can also be labeled as a study utilizing ethnosophic approach (Попков, Тюгашев 2006).

Ethnosophy as the national philosophy

It is not a random fact, that ethnosophic conscience and searches for a certain scientific and methodological alternative have recently become so manifested. Social, political and cultural changes in the contemporary Russian society have far more serious consequence than it might seem at first sight. The rise of new ideological and mythological forms of national mentality (with ethnosophy as its reflexive manifestation) is among these consequences. As a kind of national philosophy ethnosophy finds itself in opposition both to the traditional forms of European philosophical thought and to the type of conscience evoked by the mass-culture. It draws support from the historical roots of the people, the traditional forms of religious world view and the reconstructions of archaic world outlook, esoteric practices and so on. To comprehend the complete picture it is not sufficient to analyze these phenomena from the position of political science or even ethnography, as they are significantly broader than their possible political and ethnographical contexts. This ethnosophic picture seems to be the most impressive and available for analysis in the cases when some attempts to express it in the form of that or another national philosophy are undertaken.

We can safely claim that the main idea of ethnosophy can be formulated as "Everything is meaning". Ethnosophic approach actualizes the meaningful foundation of the world and creates the hierarchical topography of meanings; it reproduces the archaic and mythological models of meaning making, thus opposing the machinery of the contemporary civilization, which makes everything senseless. Everything which has its meaning for a human being (his or her vital interests and the ways to endow different phenomena with meaning) can be somehow sorted and perceived as a series of loci able to create meanings. The status of each of the levels of hierarchy defines the system as a whole. The highest level of the hierarchy defines the contents of conscience and the structure of world view, which affects the type of mentality, the perception of the world and even actions. Ethnoso-

phy makes this system of meanings, including the type of conscience, the perception of the world and actions. It doesn't appear out of thin air, as a result of individual effort or subjective decision, but it is caused by the long-term and mutually determined development of natural, anthropological, social, historical and intellectual processes. Ethnosophy is the consistent and coherent hierarchy of meaningful determinants, which shouldn't necessarily be expressed in a discursive form.

Ethnosophy of Altai

It is more convenient to analyze the structure and subject-matter of ethnosophy on the example of some specific forms of mythological mentality and sense of justice, artistic conscience, ethnoecological practices and attempts to comprehend the past and present from the positions of philosophy. One of such examples is given by the system of ethnosophic conceptions of the population of Mountain Altai. This system includes traditional models of mythological world view, contemporary forms of juridical awareness inherent both in indigenous and Russian population of the region (which defends its rights utilizing historical and sometimes even mythological arguments), origination of the new forms of cultural and national identity, attempts to revive or imitate epic and shamanic traditions, artistic axiology of the contemporary Altai arts, ethnoecological practices, reanimation of the ideology of Siberian oblastnichestvo, formation of new sacral places and places of religious worship and some efforts to create "Altai philosophy".

It is no coincidence that Mountain Altai is so suitable for the research. It is unique thanks to the processes taking place in this region. From the one hand, this territory and population exist far from major cultural and political centers, which allow seeing all the ideological phenomena as autogenous. On the other hand the new — Altaic — ethnos is on the rise; it is willing to make itself known, it looks for the ways to express its national mentality, it declares its rights over historical and cultural legacy of the region. It is obvious, that this process is painful and tends to run to extremes. But the situation becomes even more complicated due to the multiculturalism and polyethnicity of the region, there Russian (dating from the Soviet period), Slavic, Turkic and Old Belivers' cultures are combined with mass-culture and interact with each other. Besides the multitude of the autochthonic and indigenous ethnic groups (Altai-Kizhi, Kumandin, Chelkans, Tubalar, Teleut, Telengit, Russian Starozhily and Kazakhs of the Chuya Steppe) and the significant quantity of mixed population there are a lot of Diasporas in the region. The clash of the world religions (Christianity,

Buddhism and Islam) and their local varieties (Old Belief, Burkhanism) is going against a background of the revival of shamanism and dissemination of the set of miscellaneous sects. National, religious and cultural syncretism along with the characteristic features of "regional development" provides fertile ground not only for new ethnogenesis, but also for the genesis of culture. Noospheric thought, Rerikhism, the different esoteric practices of contactees are widespread and rather outspoken in their philosophical claims.

That is the context in which Altai philosophy has made itself known. Among its active creators we can list A. S. Surazakov (archeologist and culturologist), such historians and ethnographers as V. A. Muytueva, V. A. Kleshev, V. P. Ojnoshev, an expert on Altai antiquities and museum employee N. A. Shodoev, journalists B. Ja. Bedurov and I. S. Tengerekov, an actor and director A. V. Yudanov, community leaders S. Kynyev and D. I. Mamyev etc. The genres of ethnosophic works are very diverse: from serious researches imbued with the certain ethnosophic ideology (V. A. Muytueva, V. A. Kleshev, V. P. Ojnoshev, A. S. Surazakov) to essays (A. S. Surazakov, B. Ja. Bedurov) and folk history (N. A. Shodoev, I. S. Tengerekov). These writings aim to reconstruct the traditional religious and mythological world view of Altaians (V. A. Muytueva, V. A. Kleshev, V. P. Ojnoshev), to formulate "Mountain Altai philosophy", "regional mentality", "municipal philosophy", "folk philosophy" (in A. S. Surazakov's words), to set forth the principles of "Altai bilik (folk wisdom)" (N. A. Shodoev). Such "natural and spiritual objects" of Mountain Altai as Belukha Mountain and the Katun River may become a theme for ethnosophic analysis. People and animals, plants, arzhans (healing springs) and mountains with their master-spirits are "equal and alive subjects". It is psychologically important for people to obtain recognition of master-spirits. Ethnosophy is characterized by the itch for the expression of the semantic constants of Altai culture and the world view of the people of Mountain Altai. But these culture and world views are taken not in a narrow sense of the culture and world view of Kan-Karakol ethnic group: they also include heritage of other historical periods and ethnic cultures associated with Mountain Altai (from the age of Scythians or even the people who left numerous petroglyphs in the mountains of Altai). Ethnosophy uses the specific historical and cultural material and makes attempts to reconstruct the hierarchy of life-building meanings, which are not always discursively defined, but obligatorily manifested through mythology, practical actions or the systems of norms and values. When in the result of ethnosophic research these senses become articulated and explored, they occur to be universal and reach the level of philosophical generalizations.

The modern art is another source of Altai ethnosophy. The historical peculiarity of Mountain Altai culture (at least in the last century) is that visual arts take priority over any other forms of creative activity. Starting from the first Altaian artist Grigory I. Choros-Gurkin (1870–1937) visual arts have been giving new creative impulses to local culture. For the national mentality of the contemporary Altaian people the figure of G. I. Choros-Gurkin is full of mythological and symbolical meaning. In the last years a peculiar state cult of the artist has emerged in the Altai Republic. There is a monument to Choros-Gurkin in the capital of the Republic (near the building of Kurultai, i. e. local parliament); his studio in the village Anos has been reconstructed. The artist's political activity, which laid the foundation for the contemporary Altai nationhood, is especially emphasized. This situation seems to be rather ironic, as in 1937 Choros-Gurkin was subjected to repression for the negative attitude towards the Soviet authorities, while nowadays his admirers are headed by the last representatives of the Soviet high-ranking party-and-Komsomol functionaries remaining in power. G. I. Choros-Gurkin belonged to the first generation of national Altaian intelligentsia, which had been brought up in missionary schools and apprehended the national program proposed by Siberian regionalists. Strictly speaking, G. I. Choros-Gurkin wasn't one of the indigenous inhabitants of Altai (Altai-Kizhi). By his father's side he was a Teleut, while maternally he descended from Kumandins and so belonged to an ethnic group which nowadays is called "Northern Altaians" and which is different linguistically and anthropologically from Southern Altaians. However his legacy has been vigorously "privatized" by the titular ethnic group. Visual arts undoubtedly interpret national culture not conceptually, but through images; however even using different means of expression they nevertheless explore the same semantic foundations of Altaian world view and culture, which philosophy tries to explore conceptually. In their best masterpieces Altaian visual arts achieve the effect of eidetic vision, which is also the aim of philosophical meditation. Thus, the late canvases of Vladimir D. Zaprudaev manifest the pantheistic sensation of the world. The whole ontological, axiological and semantic system is constructed by the symbolic and mythological movement of S. V. Dykov, V. Chromov and V. G. Tebekov (who is drawn towards Decorativism). Remarkable not only for the artistic mastery but also for the keen knowledge of the national psychology gallery of the national portraits is created by V. S. Torbokov. E. M. Chebotareva's works are meditative and esoteric: her pictures can be called "intuitive" or "visionistic". Graphic tales by N. A. Chepokov give the examples of genuine epic narratives. Peculiar spiritual tradition which only partly can be traced

back to the local culture is recreated in the works by A. A. Dmitriev and
L. V. Sofronov. Contemporary Altaian visual arts allow reconstructing the
artistic axiology of national mentality, being at the same time not so much
a reflection as rather a mould: they set images and visualize values, which
will lately be ascribed to the local culture.

However, ethnosophic analysis has not only spiritual or even phil-
osophical aspects, but also a sphere of perfectly practical application. It
makes it possible to re-assess the level of protection of indigenous peoples'
(including small ethnic communities) rights as well as political and juridi-
cal conflicts relating to the discussions about the restitution of the so-called
"Princess of Ukok", a ban on excavations conducted by archeologists from
Novosibirsk and Barnaul on the territory of the Altai Republic, the con-
struction of the gas pipeline to China, callings of Kurultais, elections of
el'bashi, the revival of zaisans etc. In particular the local lawmaking should
be assessed, as it imposes bans, controls the functioning of "sacral plac-
es" and so on. The existence of conceptual ambiguity accompanied by the
need for the legal regulation of certain spiritual guidelines make it neces-
sary to reconcile two types of mentality: juridical (formal) and ethnosophic
(mythological).

Conclusion

The universal concepts of national culture and characteristics of the
contemporary national and cultural identity of the inhabitants of the whole
region are manifested in the specific forms of Altai ethnosophic thought.
The investigation and assessment of these forms should be especially "deli-
cate", as ethnosophy is characterized by the more "flexible" criteria of ratio-
nality. In general, we can say, that the majority of ethnosophic works are the
products of prereflective, mythological mentality. In ethnosophy modern
(historical, national) myth, which in many respects defines the conscience
and motivation of the people sharing this mentality, is revived and lived
through. According to the Max Weber classification it, perhaps, can be de-
scribed as an example of axiological rationality. The principle of integrity
and interconnection of a man and his environment prevails in Altai ethno-
sophy, making it consonant with the main ideas of Russian philosophy. At
the same time ethnosophy as a kind of mythological mentality is cosmo-
centric and aims at the exploration and explanation of the interrelations
between man and cosmic processes and correlation between cultural, ideo-
logical and mental processes and the semantic structure of the Universe.
The reality of this structure is demonstrated through the myth. One of the
consequences of this attempt to formulate the ontology of sense in modern

ethnosophy is the ontological basis for deontology and thus the confrontation with the contemporary ethic relativism.

The main subjects of ethnosophy are modern forms of national consciousness, various manifestations of that consciousness (national philosophy, ethno pedagogy, historiography, art, etc.). Ethnosophy reveals a mythological model of the modern national consciousness, archaic trends in modern life, orientation of the social utopia, idealization of the past.

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THE EMIGRANT COMMUNITIES OF LATVIA: NATIONAL IDENTITY, TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIASPORA POLITICS

The recent economic crisis dramatically accelerated the already significant emigration flows from Latvia; in 2009-2010 the annual net emigration rates from Latvia more than doubled (EU-LFS data, Hazans 2013). In 2012 the total number of Latvians who have emigrated to other EU or OECD countries exceeded the 2008 level by 77 per cent (Hazans 2015). Although the intensity of emigration has since decreased, emigration from Latvia in 2012 – both net and gross, total and in percentages – exceeded the pre-crisis levels, and it decreased only slightly in 2013. In 13 years (2000-2012) the number of the inhabitants of Latvia decreased by 16 per cent, and emigration accounted for 10 per cent decrease (Hazans 2015). The vast majority of migrants are 15-34 years of age, and a growing number of people emigrate with their whole family, planning to stay abroad permanently (Hazans 2011; Hazans 2013). Considering the aforementioned tendencies, in the long run emigration threatens the future economic and demographic prospects of Latvia (Hazans 2015). Unsurprisingly, the problem has increasingly caught the attention of policy-makers (Šūpule et al. 2015). Yet, reliable data for planning, development and evaluation of the diaspora and return migration policies was lacking (Koroļeva & Mieriņa 2015).

In the summer of 2013 a group of researchers at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, the University of Latvia with the support of the European Social Fund grant began a research project: "The Emigrant Communities of Latvia: National Identity, Transnational Relations and Diaspora Politics". The aim of the project was not only to provide reliable statistics on

the Latvian diaspora, but to offer an in-depth assessment of the situation from the perspective of emigrants and return migrants themselves, linking the results of the study to policy initiatives. As part of the project, during a 20- month period eleven migration researchers and five experts developed a methodology and conducted the so far largest survey on Latvians and Latvian nationals abroad.

The fieldwork took place from 04/08/2014 until 31/10/2014 and the total number of interviews was 14,068[1], which makes it the largest survey on emigrants from one country to others ever conducted in Europe. Based on estimates of the size of the Latvian diaspora, more than 5% of Latvian diaspora members abroad participated in the survey. Among the topics included in the survey are:

1. the migration experience, motivation for emigration/return migration;
2. identity, sense of belonging, historical memory, celebration of festivities;
3. family, children, parents, social networks and maintenance of social contacts in emigration and after returning to Latvia; social networking online, using social media;
4. education in Latvia and abroad;
5. employment, professional mobility, acquisition of information on employment opportunities;
6. re-emigration plan: evaluation and impact on personal decisions on whether to return or not.

The *survey was conducted as a Web-survey, using different methods of recruiting respondents:*

- *social networking sites facebook.com, draugiem.lv, vkontakte.com, odnoklassniki.ru, latviesi.com,*
- *the three largest news portals in Latvia delfi.lv, apollo.lv, inbox.lv in Latvian and Russian for almost the entire period of fieldwork,*
- *diaspora organisations, diaspora media, On-line diaspora groups,*
- *Latvian embassies and the Latvian school network abroad (with the help of the State Language agency)*
- *websites frequented by Latvians abroad: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, the State Employment Agency, the Latvian Association of Local and Regional Governments and several municipality websites.*

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1   9,284 respondents (66% of the total number) filled in the questionnaire to the end and 4,784 filled it partially.

Google AdWords.

In order to inform more people about the project and the possibility of taking part in the survey, interviews were given to both Latvian and Russian media and press releases and articles were prepared and distributed, informing potential respondents about the survey. The link for the questionnaire together with an invitation to participate in the survey was placed on the project website www.migracija.lv.

The survey did not impose any limitations as to geographic location, aiming at all countries in the world. The distribution of respondents by country is reflected in Table 1.

Table 1. Countries of residence of the respondents (%)

No.	Country	Respondents		Latvian nationals in the world		Those who emigrated since 2000	
		Skaits	%	Skaits	%	Skaits	%
	The UK	4 954	35.2	70 502	33.3	67 359	43.8
	Germany	1 476	10.5	20 820	9.8	19 565	12.7
	Ireland	1 223	8.7	16 557	7.8	15 557	10.1
	Norway	838	6.0	7 071	3.3	7 352	4.8
	USA	810	5.8	28 272	13.4	3 270	2.1
	Sweden	569	4.0	3 679	1.7	4 587	3.0
	Denmark	471	3.3	3 621	1.7	3 702	2.4
	The Netherlands	399	2.8	2 699	1.3	2 859	1.9
	Russia	370	2.6	8 851	4.2	3 180	2.1
	Belgium	270	1.9	1 374	0.6	1 504	1.0
	Canada	233	1.7	8 287	3.9	1 377	0.9
	Finland	225	1.6	1 093	0.5	1 205	0.8
	France	208	1.5	3 550	1.7	3 051	2.0
	Austria	203	1.4	847	0.4	742	0.5
	Spain	173	1.2	3 993	1.9	3 859	2.5
	Italy	162	1.2	2 074	1.0	2 092	1.4
	Australia	160	1.1	9 984	4.7	222	0.1
	Switzerland	133	0.9	1 421	0.7	1 629	1.1
	Estonia	107	0.8	2 436	1.2	2 144	1.4
	Iceland	92	0.7	556	0.3	612	0.4
	Cyprus	76	0.5	951	0.4	978	0.6
	Luxembourg	70	0.5	436	0.2	394	0.3
	Lithuania	60	0.4	941	0.4	508	0.3
	Greece	58	0.4	351	0.2	420	0.3
	Czech Republic	52	0.4	270	0.1	332	0.2

UAE	48	0.3	96	<0.1	96	0.1
Turkey	42	0.3	147	0.1	156	0.1
Ukraine	41	0.3	1 433	0.7	330	0.2
Portugal	40	0.3	328	0.2	526	0.3
Belarus	39	0.3	1 215	0.6	279	0.2
Israel	36	0.3	4 111	1.9	1 243	0.8
Brasil	35	0.2	482	0.2	333	0.2
Poland	34	0.2	334	0.2	1 207	0.8
China	28	0.2	36	<0.1	35	<0.1
New Zealand	26	0.2	367	0.2	86	0.1
Other	298	2.0	2 292	1.1	1 156	0.8
NA	9	0.1				
Total	14 068	100.0	211 477	100,0	153 947	100,0

Note: Only countries with more than 50 respondents are presented in the table. All numbers include only those 15 years of age or older. Information about the Latvian nationals abroad and those who have emigrated since 2000 is based on the calculations of Maris Goldmanis (2015) using the available statistics from the official sources such as OECD, Eurostat, national statistical offices, etc. [2]

'*The emigrant communities of Latvia*' is most inclusive in terms of the target audience. All '*Latvians and Latvian nationals abroad*' were invited to participate in the survey, thus applying the broad and open definition of '*Latvian diaspora*', based on identification with the Latvian nation and/or citizenship. 903 respondents (6.4% of the total) belong to the 'old diaspora', i.e, those who left Latvia before 1991, whereas the majority are members of the 'new diaspora'.

In order to avoid the bias associated with some representatives of the target group not being able to speak the language of the survey, the questionnaire was offered in Latvian, Russian and English and there are very few Latvian emigrants not able to speak any of these languages. This survey also takes into account the liquid nature and diverse patterns of migration. An increasing number of emigrants do not settle permanently in one country alone, but alternate between countries or have a home in both. According to our survey, the proportion of such people among emigrants is 17%, and they were also included in the survey. *The lower age limit of the survey is 15 years old. Sometimes a bias in the sample might occur due to people who have*

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2   It is important to note that due to different reasons the official statistical data underestimate the real number of emigrants (Hazans 2013). According to Hazans' (2015) calculations, since 2000 Latvia has lost 260 000 people to emigration.

more free time being more likely to participate than, for example, those who are very busy at work. This survey applied an innovative approach, offering respondents an opportunity to fill in a shorter version of the questionnaire (20 minutes) or the full version of the questionnaire (30 minutes). 66% of our respondents chose to fill in the full version. The average length of the interview was 35 minutes.

The data was statistically weighted using the most recent data from OECD, Eurostat, the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs of Latvia, and the Office for National Statistics (ONS) in the UK, in order to represent correctly the different country/ age/ gender/ ethnicity/ education proportions of Latvian emigrants. The design of statistical weights is described in a separate document. A more detailed description of the research methodology and the design of statistical weights is available on the www.migracija.lv *website as well as, in Latvian, in the "Latvijas emigrantu kopienas: cerību diaspora" book (Mieriņa & Koroļeva, 2015; Goldmanis 2015).*

In addition to the quantitative survey, 159 partly structured in-depth interviews were conducted in the UK, the US, Sweden, Germany and Norway with emigrants representing the 'new diaspora', i.e., those who left Latvia after 1991, 18 interviews with return migrants, and 16 interviews with experts of diaspora and return migration policy. They were supplemented by other types of research (observations, focus group discussions, etc.) as well as analysis of 2008 to 2014 policy documents (development and policy planning documents, legislation and projects, information reports). Most researchers worked in the tradition of the grounded theory (Strauss/Corbin 1990) where an important aspect in recruiting respondents is to achieve as precisely as possible 'theoretical sampling' and 'data saturation'. Hence, ensuring the diversity of respondents of the in-depth interviews in terms of age, gender, social class/employment status, time spent abroad, and family status (e.g. children/no children) was one of the priorities of researchers. Most of the topics of in-depth interviews mirror the topics of the quantitative survey, allowing in-depth interviews to provide a deeper understanding of the quantitative data.

The "Emigrant communities of Latvia" project treats the confidentiality of data and protection of respondents' identities with the utmost care. In order to protect the identity of respondents the interviews were anonymised by deleting any information that could potentially identify the respondent (such as e-mail address if the respondent wrote it in the questionnaire), IP address, token information, etc.) before being placed on the safe server accessible only to a restricted group of researchers. In addition, all researchers signed a confidentiality declaration, committing to non-disclosure of any

information that could potentially identify respondents.

    "The emigrant communities of Latvia" project has made an important theoretical and methodological contribution to the field of migration studies, and laid foundations for future research on emigrants, specifically from the perspective of sending countries. The methodology of the study can serve as an example to future studies of other East-European emigrant communities. Results of the study challenge the current view of emigration, calling into question the notion of what it means to "emigrate", breaking a number of emigrants widespread myths and providing answers to questions important in the context of diaspora and return migration policy. They have so far been reflected in more than 20 scientific publications and presented in more than 20 international conferences.

    More and more experts in Latvia acknowledge the importance of evidence-based policy-making, and context surveys like this one play a crucial role. The huge response from the partners of the project has been truly encouraging, proving that the Latvian diaspora has not lost touch with their homeland, and that there is a large potential for future cooperation both in the area of research and beyond.

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