

Reliģiski – filozofiski raksti XXXIII

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Ilze Koroļeva

Latvijas Universitātes Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts

DAŽĀDIE VĒRTĪBU ASPEKTI MŪSDIENU KONTEKSTĀ

Žurnāla “Reliģiski-filozofiski raksti” XXXIII laidieni veltīts Latvijas sabiedrības vērtību analīzei salīdzinošā perspektīvā. Ņemot vērā vērtību jēdziena daudzdimensionālo raksturu, vērtību apraksts, analīze un klasifikācija visos laikos ir izraisījusi diskusijas, strīdus un pat konfliktus. Daudzo vērtības jēdziena aspektu apzināšanai, kā norāda Latvijas Universitātes profesore, akadēmiķe Maija Kūle, nepieciešamas gan kultūras vēstures un plaša spektra humanitārās zināšanas, gan dialogs sociālajā telpā, gan *sensus communis* – kopējais viedoklis. Filozofu vidē ir sastopama izpratne, ka vērtības ir ontoloģiski pastāvošas un nav tieši atkarīgas no novērtējuma, tās nevar nedz iznīcināt, nedz atcelt, lai gan ar audzināšanas un mediju palīdzību var ietekmēt vērtīborientāciju (Kūle 2016).

Sociālajās zinātnēs vērtības tiek definētas kā vispārīgi mērķi, ko indivīds uzskata par sev svarīgiem un kas nosaka viņa attieksmes un uzvedību (Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992). Tiek izšķirtas personiskās jeb individuālās vērtības un ar sociālo piederību saistītās vērtības. Pētnieki visā pasaulē ir pierādījuši, ka gan indivīdu personiskās vērtības, gan ar sociālo piederību saistītās vērtības ietekmē indivīdu politisko uzvedību, rīcību un izvēli vēlēšanās. Valdības lēmumus, likumu izstrādi, grupu attiecības un pilsonisko uzvedību nosaka vērtības, jo tās ietver vēlmes, uzskatus, morāles kodeksus, kas nosaka indivīda uzvedību sabiedrībā. Politikas dokumentos,

kā arī akadēmiskajā literatūrā pastāvīgi uzsvērtā vērtību loma ekonomiskās izaugsmes, demokrātijas funkcionēšanas un nacionālās drošības uzturēšanas veicināšanā. Latvijas valsts vērtību sistēmas pamatā ir deklarēta uzticība fundamentālajām Eiropas vērtībām. Bet cik vienota un saliedēta šobrīd ir pati Eiropa, cik vienota un saliedēta ir Latvijas sabiedrība brīdī, kad Ukraina nežēlīgā karā cīnās par visas Eiropas vērtībām – brīvību, demokrātiju, tiesiskumu, cilvēktiesībām? Šobrīd dzīvojam situācijā, kad Eiropas augstākās vērtības tiek liktas svaru kausos ar Eiropas sabiedrības un indivīda labklājības mazināšanos. Kara izraisītās ekonomiskās un enerģētiskās krīzes, dzīves kvalitātes mazināšanās un augstās inflācijas dēļ Eiropas valstu starpā notiek nemitīga kaulēšanās par ekonomiskajām interesēm. Daudzas problēmas, ar kurām šodien saskaras Eiropas sabiedrība, ir balstītas uz dažādo vērtību konfrontāciju, tādēļ sabiedrības noskaņojuma un vērtību izpratne ir ārkārtīgi svarīga.

Ideja veidot speciālu žurnāla numuru nolūkā veicināt teorētisko un empīrisko zināšanu attīstību par vērtībām Latvijā, aicinot sociālo un humanitāro zinātņu pētniekus dalīties ar jaunākajiem pētījumiem un atziņām šajā jomā, dzima projekta “Vērtību maiņa nestabilos apstākļos: sabiedrības saliedētība un neoliberālais ētoss”¹ īstenošanas laikā. Pētnieciskā projekta tiešais mērķis bija sniegt jaunu salīdzinošu šķērsriezuma analīzi par vērtībām Latvijā un to veidošanos imigrācijas procesu, socializācijas un vēsturiskās pieredzes kontekstā. Tā kā projekta īstenošana sakrita ar Covid-19 pandēmijas sarežģītāko posmu, kas izgaismoja sabiedrības šķelšanos un padziļināja sociālās nesaskaņas un sociālo spriedzi visās dzīves jomās, pieauga nepieciešamība padziļināt sabiedrības attieksmju un vērtību dažādu aspektu izpēti.

Cits motivējošais faktors, kas rosināja uzrunāt plašāku sociālo un humanitāro zinātņu pētnieku loku, aicinot piedalīties šī žurnāla veidošanā, bija iespēja pētniekiem izmantot pavisam jaunus, tobrīd tikko publiskotus starptautiskā salīdzinošā Eiropas Vērtību pētījuma (*European Values*

¹ LZP projekts «Vērtību maiņa nestabilos apstākļos: sabiedrības saliedētība un neoliberālais ētoss» (Nr. lzp-2020/2-0068) realizēts LU Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūtā, vadītāja Inese Šūpule, 2020.–2021. gads.

Study – EVS) aptaujas datus, kas kļuva pieejami 2021. gada novembrī. Eiropas Vērtību pētījums ir viens no ievērojamākajiem salīdzinošajiem pētījumiem, kas vērsts tieši uz vērtību izpēti Eiropā. EVS Latvija piedalās jau kopš 1990. gada, kas padara iespējamu sabiedrības morāles un vērtību analīzi teju trīsdesmit gadu garumā. Iepriekšējie pētījumi veikti 1990., 1999. un 2008. gadā, bet apkopotie dati pieejami GESIS Sociālo zinātņu datu katalogā (*EVS 2022*), kas sniedz iespēju Latvijas iedzīvotāju vērtības un attieksmes skatīt salīdzinošā perspektīvā.

Vēl viens nozīmīgs uz akadēmiskiem standartiem balstīts starptautiskais salīdzinošais pētījums, kas vērsts uz iedzīvotāju vērtību un attieksmju analīzi vairāk nekā 30 Eiropas valstīs, ir Eiropas Sociālais pētījums (*European Social Survey – ESS*)². Arī šī pētījuma datu analīze ir iekļauta vairākos krājuma rakstos un sniedz būtisku ieguldījumu salīdzinošai vērtību izpratnei. ESS pētnieciskā programma britu sociālā statistiķa, akadēmiķa sera Rodžera Džovela (*Roger Jowell*) vadībā tika uzsākta 2001. gadā. Latvija ir piedalījusies četros ESS pētījuma posmos: 2006. gadā (3. posms), 2008. gadā (4. posms), 2015. gadā (7. posms) un 2019. gadā (9. posms). Latvijā ESS zinātnisko vadību un īstenošanu no 2003. līdz 2014. gadam nodrošināja LU Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts, kopš 2018. gada – LU Sociālo zinātņu fakultātes Sociālo un politisko pētījumu institūts.

Salīdzinošo starptautisko pētījumu dati ļauj ne tikai izsekot izmaiņām vai stabilitātei Latvijas iedzīvotāju vērtībās un attieksmēs, bet arī salīdzināt tās ar citu Eiropas valstu iedzīvotāju vērtībām un attieksmēm. Vairāki no šajā izdevumā iekļautajiem rakstiem balstīti uz EVS (2021) un ESS (2019) aptaujas datu analīzes rezultātiem. Latvijas iedzīvotāju kultūras vērtības citu Eiropas valstu kontekstā savā rakstā aplūko LU vadošā pētniece Inese Šūpule un pētniece Rasa Šķērstiņa. Izmantojot Ronalda Ingleharta un viņa domubiedru izstrādāto teorētisko un metodoloģisko pieeju, iedzīvotāju vērtības tiek analizētas un salīdzinātas divās dimensijās: sekulāri racionālās vērtības pret tradicionālajām vērtībām un izdzīvošanas vērtības pret pašizteikšanās vērtībām.

² Eiropas Sociālā pētījuma mājaslapa (2021). Pieejams: <http://www.europeansocial-survey.org/> (skatīts 22.12.2021.).

ESS pētījumā izmantotais vērtību modelis ir balstīts uz Šaloma Švarca vērtību klasifikācijas modeļiem (Schwartz 1992; 2012; Sortheix & Schwartz 2017). Šajā vērtību teorijas modeli balstītie indikatori aplūkoti vairākos šī izdevuma autoru rakstos. Analizējot ESS 9. posma datus, LU Sociālo zinātņu fakultātes docents Jurijs Ņikišins un Latvijas Universitātes asociētais profesors Mareks Niklass pārbauda cilvēka attieksmju un pamatvērtību (saskaņā ar Š. Švarca vērtību teorijas modeli) ietekmi uz Latvijas iedzīvotāju pārlicību par to, ko nozīmē taisnīga sabiedrība un kādai jābūt “taisnīgai un godīgai” ienākumu un labklājības sadalei sabiedrībā.

Jautājumam par to, kā sabiedrības noteiktu grupu dzīve un socializācija postkomunistiskajās valstīs ietekmējusi vērtības un attieksmi pret sabiedriskā labuma radīšanu un iesaistīšanos kolektīvā rīcībā, pievērsusies Latvijas Universitātes asociētā profesore Inta Mieriņa. Balstoties uz 14 valstu salīdzinošu datu analīzi, autore secina, ka Centrāl- un Austrumeiropas valstīm raksturīgā spēcīgā nacionālā identitāte var palīdzēt atrisināt kolektīvās rīcības, kā arī sabiedriskā labuma un kopējo resursu dilemmas. Stipra pieķeršanās savai tautai un valstij var veicināt kolektīvu rīcību – iesaistīšanos dažādās grupās un biedrībās, ziedošanu un brīvprātīgo darbu, kā arī iesaistīšanos politiskās aktivitātēs.

LU vadošā pētniece Inese Šūpule, izmantojot Š. Švarca vērtību teorētiskā modeļa indikatorus, salīdzina Latvijas krievu un latviešu vērtības, meklējot līdzīgo un atšķirīgo šo grupu vērtējumos. Analīzē savstarpēji papildinoši izmantoti abu iepriekš aprakstīto pētījumu ESS (2019) un EVS (2021) dati.

Savukārt LU vadošais pētnieks Mārtiņš Kaprāns analizē abu Latvijā lielāko etnolingvistisko kopienu politiskās attieksmes, meklējot atbildes uz pētniecisko jautājumu, vai neolīberālās kārtības izraisītā nedrošība var aizstāt etnokulturālo identifikāciju kā Latvijas sabiedrības ideoloģisko avotu. Analīzē īpaša uzmanība ir pievērsta atbalstam alternatīvai politiskai sistēmai un tam, cik lielā mērā šādu atbalstu var izskaidrot ar nedrošību un simpātījām pret kreisi orientētām komunitārisma idejām. Autors secina, ka nedrošība var iespējot pāretnisku saliedētību, taču tas nenozīmē, ka etnolingvistiskais elements kļūst nenozīmīgs režīmu maiņas kontekstā.

Reliģijpētniece, projekta vadītāja Rīgas Stradiņa universitātē Agita Misāne kopā ar RSU vadošajiem pētniekiem Ritmu Runguli, Silvu Senkāni un Ivaru Neideru savā rakstā pēta saistību starp Latvijas iedzīvotāju reliģisko identitāti un attieksmi pret četrām morāli neviennozīmīgi vērtētām parādībām – abortu, eitanāziju, pašnāvību un nāvessoda piemērošanu. Senāk veiktā Pasaules vērtību pētījuma (1996) un EVS (2021) datu salīdzinošā analīze liecina, ka 25 gadu laikā Latvijas sabiedrībā kopumā ir mazinājusies abortu, eitanāzijas un pašnāvības attaisnošana. Nozīmīgākās atšķirības reliģiozo un nereliģiozo iedzīvotāju starpā vērojamas attieksmē pret abortu un eitanāziju, kamēr atšķirības attieksmē pret pašnāvību un nāvessodu ir mazāk izteiktas.

Atšķirībā no sociālo zinātņu pētniekiem, kas vērtības analizējuši, balstoties galvenokārt uz kvantitatīviem sabiedrības attieksmju un vērtību uzskatu mērījumiem, filozofisku analīzi par to, kā vērtības zaudē savu sakrālo vai aizsargājamo nozīmi, pārvēršoties par hobiju, piedāvā Latvijas Universitātes vadošais pētnieks Māris Kūlis. Viņa analīzes pētnieciskais jautājums ir: vai vērtības, rituāli, tradīcijas, kultūras prakses iemieso kādu “augstāku jēgu”, pat ja tās tiek praktizētas, vai arī tās ir tikai vaļasprieks jeb hobijs? Analizējot bagātīgu piemēru klāstu, to skaitā no islāma tradīcijas un sabiedriskās kustības *woke*, autors nonāk pie secinājumiem, ka arī Latvijā vērojama vērtību pārtapšana par ārējām vai hobija izpausmēm, ko raksturo, piemēram, dažādu pagānisko zīmju attēlošana uz apģērba u. tml. Ja nepastāv sakrālā mīta pamats, individuālās vērtības kļūst par privātu lietu un tām nav publiskas nozīmes. Tādā gadījumā sakrālās vērtības zaudē savu sakrālo nozīmi un to praktizēšana drīzāk ir tikai atdarinoša performance jeb, citiem vārdiem sakot, tās pārtop par hobiju.

Savukārt vēsturniece, LU pētniece Maija Krūmiņa, balstoties uz trimdas latviešu atmiņām, aplūko materiālo vērtību lomu bēgļu gaitu laikā 1944./1945. gadā, kā arī morālo vērtību izpausmes, kas atklājas, stāstot par bēgļu rīcību, izdarītajām izvēlēm un pieņemtajiem lēmumiem. Pētījuma pamatā ir Nacionālās mutvārdu vēstures krājumā iekļautās trimdas latviešu dzīvesstāstu intervijas. Atmiņas par bēgļu līdzpaņemtajiem materiālajiem

priekšmetiem bieži vien ir saistītas ar simbolisko vērtību, ko šie priekšmeti ieguvuši laika gaitā. Bēgļiem nozīmīgas garīgās vērtības (daba un dzīve, solidaritāte, taisnīgums, atbildība, labestība un brīvība) atklājas gan tajā, kā trimdas latvieši atspoguļo savu un citu cilvēku rīcību bēgļu gaitās, gan epizodēs, ko viņi izvēlējušies iekļaut savos dzīvesstāstos.

Cilvēka vērtībuzskatu veidošanās, uzskatu maiņa ir process, kas risinās visā dzīves garumā, tomēr priekšstati par vērtībām tiek ieaudzināti jau bērnībā un turpina veidoties pusaudža gados un jaunībā, augot noteiktā ģimenē, sociālajā vidē, gan vecāku, gan draugu, gan plašākas sabiedrības ietekmē. Vairākos rakstos analizēta vērtību veidošanās jauniešu mērķgrupā. Vērtību maiņa sabiedrībā kopumā notiek ļoti lēni, tādēļ visbiežāk tiek runāts par vērtību maiņu dažādu paaudžu salīdzinājumā. Daugavpils Universitātes vadošā pētniece Ilze Kačāne analizē vērtību nodošanu vairākpaaudžu ģimenēs un aplūko starppaaudžu komunikāciju kā līdzekli ētisko un morālo vērtību trūkuma mazināšanai ģimenē un sabiedrībā. Ģimenes locekļu mijiedarbību autore raksturo kā divvirzienu procesu, kas nodrošina ne tikai vērtību tālāknodošanu, bet arī ietekmē vērtību (t. sk. ģimenes kā vērtības) resemantizēšanu un reinterpretāciju.

Daugavpils Universitātes profesores Anitas Stašulānes un Jiveskiles Universitātes (Somija) profesores Terhi-Annas Vilskas (*Terhi-Anna Wilska*) kopīgajā rakstā tiek aplūkota svētku loma imigrantu jauniešu identitātes formēšanās procesā. Analīze balstīta uz krievu jauniešu Somijā pieredzes stāstiem par dažādu sekulāro un reliģisko svētku svinēšanu. Identitātes veidošanās procesā jauniešiem raksturīga sevis identificēšana ar abām – mītnes zemes un izcelsmes zemes kultūrām. Daudzslāņainajā svētku pieredzē paralēli vēsturiskās atmiņas un etnisko pamatvērtību pēctecībai iezīmējas integrācijas, globalizācijas, komercializācijas un masu kultūras nospieduma slānis.

Savukārt Daugavpils Universitātes vadošā pētniece Alīna Romanovska, balstoties uz pētījumu 14–18 gadus vecu jauniešu grupā, aplūkojusi jauniešu kultūras uztveri un viņu viedokļus par kultūras vērtībām, analizējot šīs uztveres atbilstību vai neatbilstību izglītības standartos noteiktajām prioritātēm kultūras vērtību apgūvē.

Pārlūkojot rakstu tematiku, var secināt, ka šis “Reliģiski-filozofisko rakstu” laidniens atšķiras no citiem ar ārkārtīgi bagātu un plašu empirisko materiālu un informāciju, kas paver lasītājam iespējas ne tikai iepazīties ar jaunāko pētījumu rezultātiem, bet pārdomāt un pozicionēt savus vērtībuzskatus plašākā Latvijas un Eiropas sabiedrības vērtību kontekstā.

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VARIOUS ASPECTS OF VALUES WITHIN THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT

The current issue of *Religious-Philosophical Articles* is devoted to the analysis of values of Latvian society from a comparative perspective. Given the multidimensional nature of the concept of 'values', the description, analysis and classification of values have at all times given rise to debates, controversies and even conflict. Identification of the many facets of the concept of values (as noted by Maija Kūle, professor at the University of Latvia) requires suitable competency within a broad spectrum of cultural history and knowledge of the humanities as well as dialogue in the social sphere and *sensus communis*. There is an understanding among philosophers that values have an ontological existence and are not evaluation-dependent and can neither be destroyed nor abolished, although education and media can influence value orientation (Kūle 2016).

In the social sciences, values are defined as general goals that an individual considers to be important and that determine their attitudes and behaviour (Rokeach 1973). A distinction is made between personal or individual values and values related to social affiliation. Scholars worldwide have shown that person values and social affiliation values influence the political behaviour, actions and electoral choices of individuals.

Values determine government decisions, law-making, group relations and civic behaviour because they include the desires, views, and moral

codes that determine an individual's behaviour in society. In political documents and academic literature, constant attention is focused on values that promote economic growth, the functioning of democracy and the maintaining of national security. Latvia's national value system is based on a declared commitment to fundamental European values. But how united and cohesive is Europe today, how united and cohesive is Latvian society at a time when Ukraine is fighting a brutal war for European values – freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights? We are currently living in a situation in which the highest European values are being weighed against the reduced wellbeing of European society and the individual. Due to the energy and economic crisis caused by the war, high inflation and decline in the quality of life, there is a constant bargaining among European states over economic interests. Many of the problems facing European society today are based on a confrontation of different values, so understanding public opinion and values is of paramount importance.

The idea to invite researchers in the social sciences and humanities to share their latest research and findings in their field, and publish a special issue of the journal to promote the development of theoretical and empirical knowledge on values in Latvia was born during the project “Value (trans)formation in uncertain times: social cohesion and neoliberal ethos in Latvia”¹. The immediate aim of the project was to provide a new comparative cross-sectional analysis of values in Latvia, and their development in the context of immigration processes, socialisation and historical experiences. As the project coincided with the most difficult phase of the Covid-19 pandemic, which highlighted the divisions in society and deepened social discord and social tensions in all spheres of life, there was a growing need to explore in more depth the different aspects of social attitudes and values.

Another motivating factor for reaching out to a wider range of social sciences and humanities researchers to contribute to this journal was the

¹ The project was funded by the Latvian Council of Science “Value (trans)formation in uncertain times: social cohesion and neoliberal ethos in Latvia” (Nr. lzp-2020/2-0068), Project lead: Dr.sc.soc. Inese Šūpule

opportunity of researchers to use new and just published survey data from the international comparative European Values Study (EVS), available in November 2021. The European Values Study is one of the most significant comparative studies focusing specifically on values in Europe. Latvia has been taking part in the EVS since 1990, which makes it possible to analyse morals and values over a period of 30 years. Previous studies were carried out in 1990, 1999 and 2008 but the data collected are available in the GESIS Social Sciences Data Catalogue (EVS 2022) which provides a comparative perspective on the values and attitudes of the Latvian population.

The European Social Survey – ESS² is another major international comparative study based on academic standards, analysing the values and attitudes of the population in more than 30 European countries. The data analysis from this source is also included in several articles in the current issue, offering a significant contribution to a comparative understanding of values. The ESS research programme was launched in 2001 under the leadership of Sir Roger Jowell, a British social statistician and academic. Latvia has participated in four ESS research phases: in 2006 (Phase 3), 2008 (Phase 4) and 2019 (Phase 9). In Latvia the scientific management and implementation of the ESS was provided by the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the University of Latvia, and since 2018 – by the Institute of Social and Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Latvia.

Not only does data from comparative international studies allow tracking of the dynamics or stability in the values and attitudes of the Latvian population but also to compare them with the values and attitudes of individuals in other European countries. Several articles in this issue are based on the results of the analysis of the EVS (2021) and ESS (2019) survey data. In their article Inese Šūpule, a senior researcher at the University of Latvia and researcher Rasa Šķērstiņa examine the cultural values of the Latvian population in the context of other European countries. Using the theoretical and methodological approach developed

² European Social Survey website (2021). Available: <http://www.europeansocial-survey.org/> (Accessed: 22.12.2021.)

by Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues, the values of the population are analysed and compared along two dimensions: secular-rational versus traditional values and survival values versus self-expression values.

The value model used in the ESS study is based on the values classification models of Shalom Schwartz (Schwartz 1992 2012; Sortheix & Schwartz 2017). Indicators based on this value theory model are discussed in several articles by the authors of this issue. Analysing the ESS Phase 9 data Jurijs Ņikišins, docent at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Latvia, and Mareks Niklass, Associate Professor at the University of Latvia examine the influence of people's attitudes and core values (according to Schwartz's value theory model) on the views of the Latvian population about what a just society means and what should be considered a 'just and fair' distribution of wealth and income in society.

Inta Mieriņa, Associate Professor of the University of Latvia, has addressed the question of how the life and socialisation of specific groups in post-communist countries has influenced values and attitudes towards the creation of public goods and engagement in collective action. Based on the analysis on comparative data from 14 countries, the author concludes that the strong national identities characteristic of Central and East European countries can help resolve dilemmas of collective action, and of public goods and common resources. Strong attachment to one's people and the nation can foster collective action – joining various groups and associations, volunteering, and engaging in political activities.

Inese Šūpule, a senior researcher at the University of Latvia, makes use of the indicators of S. Schwartz's theoretical model to compare the values of Russians and Latvians in Latvia, looking for similarities and differences in the evaluations of these two groups. The data from both studies – ESS (2019) and EVS (2021) is used in a complementary way in the analysis.

Mārtiņš Kaprāns, a senior researcher at the University of Latvia, analyses the political attitudes of the two largest ethnolinguistic communities in Latvia, seeking answers to the research question of whether insecurity caused by the neoliberal order can replace ethnocultural identification as

an ideological source of Latvian society. The analysis focuses in particular on support for an alternative political system and the extent to which such support can be explained by insecurity and sympathy for left-leaning communitarian ideas. The author concludes that the insecurity may allow for supra-ethnic cohesion, but this does not mean that the ethnolinguistic element becomes irrelevant in the context of a regime change.

In their article, Agita Misāne, religious researcher and project leader at Rīga Stradiņš University, together with RSU senior researchers Ritma Rungule, Silva Senkāne, and Ivars Neiders explore the relationship between the religious identity of the Latvian population and attitudes towards four morally ambiguous issues – abortion, euthanasia, suicide and the death penalty. A comparative analysis of data from the World Values study (1966) and the EVS (2021) shows that over the past 25 years, Latvian society as a whole has decreased its justification of abortion, euthanasia and suicide. The most significant differences between religious and non-religious populations are in attitudes towards abortion and euthanasia, while differences in attitudes towards suicide and the death penalty are less pronounced.

In contrast to social science researchers who have analysed values based on mainly quantitative measures of societal attitudes and value beliefs, Māris Kūlis, a senior researcher at the University of Latvia, offers a philosophical analysis of how values lose their sacred or protected meaning and turn into a hobby. The research question of his analysis is: do values, rituals, traditions, cultural practices embody a ‘higher meaning’, even if they are practised, or are they just a hobby? Analysing a wealth of examples, including from the Islamic tradition and the Woke social movement, the author concludes that in Latvia, too, there is a transformation of values into external or hobby manifestations, characterised, for example, by the depiction of various pagan symbols on clothing, etc. In the absence of a sacred myth, individual values become a private affair and have no public meaning. Thus, the sacred values lose their sacred significance and their practice becomes more an imitative performance, or in other words, they become a hobby.

Maija Krūmiņa, a historian and researcher at the University of Latvia, draws on memories of Latvian emigres to examine the role of material values during the refugee journey in 1944/1945, and also the manifestations of moral values revealed in the stories of the actions, choices and decisions made by refugees. The research is based on interviews with Latvian exiles included in the National Oral History Collection. Memories of material objects that refugees took with them are often linked to the symbolic value that these objects acquired over time. Spiritual values (nature and life, solidarity, justice, responsibility, goodness and freedom) that were important to the refugees were revealed both in the way exiled Latvians reflected on their own and others' actions during the refugee journey and in the episodes they chose to include in their life stories.

The formation and change of values and beliefs is a lifelong process but values are instilled in childhood and continue to be formed in adolescence and young adulthood, growing up in a particular family and social environment, influenced by parents, friends and wider society. Several articles have analysed the formation of values in the youth target groups. The change of values in society as a whole is very slow; which is why the most frequent discussion is about the change of values between different generations. Ilze Kačāne, a senior researcher at Daugavpils University, analyses the transmission of values in multigenerational families and looks at intergenerational communication as a means of reducing the lack of ethical and moral values in families and society. The author describes the interaction between family members as a two-way process but also influences the re-semanticisation and reinterpretation of values (including family as a value).

A joint article by Anita Stašulāne, professor at Daugavpils University (Latvia) and Terhi-Anna Wilska, professor at the University of Jyväskylä (Finland), analyses the role of festivities in the formation of immigrant youth identity. Their investigation is based on the experiences of young Russian people living in Finland celebrating various secular religious festivals. In the process of identity formation, young people are characterised by self-identification with both cultures –those of the country of their

origin and their home country. In the multi-layered experience of festivals, a layer of integration, globalisation, commercialisation and the imprint of mass culture emerges alongside the continuity of historical memory and core ethnic values.

Alina Romanovska, a senior researcher at Daugavpils University, based on a study of 14–18 year olds, has investigated young people's perception of culture and their views on cultural values, analysing whether or not these perceptions correspond to the priorities in learning cultural values set out in educational standards.

Looking through the topics of the articles, it can be concluded that this issue of *Religious-Philosophical Articles* differs from the others by the extremely rich and extensive empirical material and information, which opens up opportunities for the reader not only to get acquainted with the latest research results, but also to reflect and position their own value views in the wider context of values in Latvian and European society.

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WEST-EUROPEAN, EAST-EUROPEAN AND NORDIC COUNTRIES: WHERE DO LATVIAN VALUES STAND?

Social inequalities, cleavages caused by restrictions imposed by the government to reduce the Covid 19 pandemic, and the rise of political populism pose new questions regarding the values and value change in different societies. In this article the authors attempt to analyse cultural values, using the theoretical and methodological approach developed by R. Inglehart and colleagues, and locate the values of the Latvian people on two dimensions: secular-rational values vs. traditional values and survival values vs. self-expression values. The article provides a comparison of values in four countries: Latvia, Norway, Poland, and Great Britain. The analysis is based on the data from the fifth wave of the European Values Survey, which in Latvia, was carried out in 2021. The data analysis was performed within the project “Value (trans)formation in uncertain times: social cohesion and neoliberal ethos in Latvia” (Nr. lzp-2020/2-0068).

Keywords: Cultural values, Inglehart’s modernisation theory, insecurity and populism, Latvia

Introduction

Since the 1980s value studies have explored people’s values and beliefs, value changes and their social and political impact, and, based on these studies, different scholars worldwide have drawn very influential and controversial conclusions. Cultural change is gradually also occurring

in Latvia; however, the trajectory of change cannot be regarded as linear, and some trends are controversial. Social inequality and the rise of political populism are some of the trends which trigger an alarm and can pose risks to the sustainability of Latvia's democratic polity. A study by Kaprāns and Mieriņa (2019) informs that 38% of the Latvian population agree (16% are unsure) that "our country's traditional values are conflicting with those of the West". Studies to date have shown that there is a lack of social trust and mutual empathy in Latvia, and part of the Latvian population express political cynicism, apathy, and mistrust of the government (Mieriņa 2018). Researchers under the leadership of Professor Kruk have concluded that "low social trust and social passivity are the corollaries of pluralism anxiety" (Kruk 2018, 14). The previously mentioned beliefs weaken support for liberal democracy and require attention and monitoring by researchers. In this context, the scope of the article is twofold. First, the analysis attempts to highlight – theoretically and empirically – the value dimensions developed by Inglehart and colleagues (Inglehart 1997; 2018; Inglehart & Baker 2000; Norris & Inglehart 2019): these are secular-rational values vs. traditional values and survival values vs. self-expression values. Second, the article provides a comparison of cultural values in four countries: Latvia, Norway, Poland, and Great Britain. In this analysis, Poland represents Eastern European countries, Norway – the Nordic countries, and Great Britain has been chosen to represent West-European countries. The empirical base for the analysis is the fifth wave of the European Values Study (EVS 2020). The categories of analysis used for the comparative analysis of EVS survey data were chosen after the review of relevant literature. They illustrate the similarities and differences across countries regarding two value dimensions: secular-rational values versus traditional values and survival values versus self-expression values, based on Inglehart (2018).

The article is structured in the following way: first the theoretical considerations, and analytical framework are described, followed by outlining of the data, after which the empirical findings are presented. The analysis includes a comparison of the most important aspects of life, attitudes

towards different political systems and values perceived as important in the education of children, that is, for the next generations. The empirical findings and conclusions make a contribution by pointing out similarities and differences among people in four countries – Latvia, Norway, Poland, and Great Britain.

Theoretical considerations

The two most important value dimensions that have been found by R. Inglehart (1997) in value survey analysis reflect cross-national polarization between traditional versus secular-rational orientations toward authority, and survival versus self-expression values. Inglehart has located 43 countries on a global map of cross-cultural variation based on these two dimensions (Inglehart 1997, 81–98). He has found that the worldview of people in rich societies differs systematically from the worldview of people in low-income societies across a wide range of political, social, and religious norms and beliefs.

Although R. Inglehart acknowledges that traditional societies are very diverse, he defines what traditional values encompass. In his analysis, traditional values have been characterized by low levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, and homosexuality, by male dominance in economic and political life, deference to parental authority, the importance of family life. These societies emphasize social conformity rather than individualistic striving, they usually are relatively authoritarian, most of them place strong emphasis on religion, and they have high levels of national pride and a nationalistic outlook. Societies with secular-rational orientations, which mostly are advanced industrial societies, usually have the opposite characteristics.

The survival/ self-expression dimension is based on findings that post-industrial societies enjoy comparatively high levels of security, and this has impacted on their values and attitudes. Thus, for people in societies facing high levels of insecurity and low levels of well-being, economic and physical security are the most important values. Therefore, they

express intolerance to different outgroups more frequently and feel threatened by foreigners or homosexuals, favour traditional gender roles, and an authoritarian political view. These societies usually report relatively poor health, low interpersonal trust and show low levels of subjective well-being. A shift from materialist to postmaterialist values, described in Inglehart's earlier works (Inglehart 1977; 1990) is a part of a broader shift from survival values to self-expression values (Inglehart 2018). Most importantly, this cultural shift brought significant social and political changes, for example, an emphasis on stronger environmental protection policies, a support for democracy and human rights, the protection of people with disabilities and minorities, gender equality in government, business and academic life, and the spread of democracy. This shift is linked to the move away from participation in political processes, such as voting, joining political parties, trade unions, and associations, replacing it with participation in demonstrations and activism, especially among younger people. A greater support for the value of self-expression is conducive also to greater happiness and life satisfaction (Inglehart 2018, 4).

In a recent publication Kafka and Kostis (2021) have analysed the way in which the cultural background has changed during the past decades and whether this affects the growth rate of economies. They have used an unbalanced panel dataset comprising of 34 OECD countries from 1981 to 2019, and their conclusions are that the cultural background of the countries under analysis presents a shift from traditional/materialistic (from 1981 up to 1998) to post-materialist values (from 1999 up to 2019). These conclusions support Inglehart's updated modernisation theory (Inglehart 2018).

Recent studies by Inglehart (Norris & Inglehart 2019; Inglehart 2018) have been devoted to the problem of rising populism and support for a strong leader. According to his analysis, people who live in precarious conditions feel a higher need for group solidarity, rejection of outsiders and obedience to strong leaders. The opposite – high levels of existential security encourage openness to change, diversity and new ideas. While the prosperity and security of the post-war era brought cultural change in

Western countries, in recent decades, diminishing job security and rising inequality have led to an authoritarian reaction, support for a strong leader and xenophobia.

This theory has, however, been criticized for being materialistic, unilinear, and comparative-static (Haller 2002). It struggles to explain the difference between countries in the same region that have experienced similar historical, political and economic events and, most importantly, it is insensitive to cultural diversity within European societies. Different studies, including the latest studies by Inglehart (2018) show that value change is much more diversified and open-ended as initially suggested. What was seen as the developmental ideal, has proven to be elusive or even questionable, as illustrated by the cultural backlash identified by Norris & Inglehart (2019).

The location of Latvia on two dimensions of cross-cultural variation, based on an analysis of the World Values Surveys, 1990–1991 and 1995–1998 (Inglehart & Baker 2000), informs us that Latvia has a high score regarding secular-rational values and in this aspect, it is close to Protestant Europe (Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden). At the same time, Latvia differs considerably from Protestant Europe when looking from a survival/self-expression values dimension, because survival values dominate over self-expression values. The analysis of the results of the World Values Survey, 2010–2014 confirms previous findings (Rungule & Seņkāne 2018), and reveals that Latvians share secular-rational and survival values. Regarding Inglehart's materialism-post-materialism scale, the analysis by Mieriņa (2018) shows that materialism among Latvians increases significantly with age (especially in the age group 45 years and older), but it should be noted that those who support materialism values are also in the younger age group.

In other studies, Latvia is associated with a broader context of political culture and values that are characteristic of the Central and East European (CEE) region. Previous research on CEE countries has identified support for far right and populist ideology (Mudde 2007); a rising threat in Europe, which is more widespread in CEE countries than in Western

democracies (Mierīņa & Koroļeva 2015; Mudde 2005). Generalized trust that enables private transactions, the effectiveness of governance, and cooperation for the public good (Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995) is not widespread in the CEE region. Instead, CEE societies tend to form narrow, dense, and quite homogeneous networks and to have low trust in others (Rose 1999; Letki & Mierīņa 2014). An inherent predisposition to distrust (Sztompka 1996), and also social fragmentation have led people in CEE to think primarily in terms of narrow self-interest, rather than the public good (Howard 2003). Authoritarian appeal is linked with the past political culture, as well as prejudice towards minority groups, cultural conservatism, and right-wing self-positioning (Mudde 2005; Mierīņa & Koroļeva 2018). Norris and Inglehart (2019) claim that the insecurity and austerity experienced by individuals during the financial and economic crisis in 2008–2009 also had an impact on cultural values and have contributed to the rise of the populist wave. Sources of various values and attitudes are schematically provided in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Sources of various values and attitudes

Source: Developed by the “Value (trans)formation in uncertain times: social cohesion and neoliberal ethos in Latvia” (Nr. lzp-2020/2-0068) project team.

Based on the analysis of literature (Inglehart 1997; 2018; Inglehart & Baker 2000; Norris & Inglehart 2019; Rungtule & Senkāne 2018), we hypothesize that, first, most Latvian people hold secular-rational values which are expressed through a low level of importance attributed to religion; and second, survival values dominate over self-expression values among the Latvian people. Third, we hypothesize that due to insecurity and romanticizing of the regime of Kārlis Ulmanis (regarding the cult of the leader in Latvia see, for example, Hanovs & Tēraudkalns 2012) the Latvian people are rather open to the appeal of authoritarianism and support a political system with a strong leader who does not have to bother with a parliament and elections.

Methodology

The European Values survey (EVS) and the World Values Survey (WVS) are international comparative studies, which mostly rely on methodology developed by Inglehart and his colleagues. Therefore, the theoretical discussion when using the EVS and WVS data is often related to Inglehart's theory of value change and related insights, their critique and further research. In this article, the empirical base is the EVS data. Latvia has been participating in the European Values Survey since 1990, which allows for value analysis for more than thirty years. Previous surveys were conducted in 1990, 1999 and 2008, but the last wave of the survey was conducted in 2021. Implementation of the 5th round of EVS research in Latvia was ensured by the Institute of Social and Political Research of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Latvia. The target group of the survey consists of permanent residents of Latvia from the age of 18. These age limits are set in accordance with the standards developed by EVS, which have been unchanged since the implementation of the first stage of EVS in 1980 (EVS 2021).

The questionnaire included questions on (a) family values and marriage, (b) attitudes towards employment and work values, (c) political views and ideology of the population, (d) questions on tolerance, (e) views

on religion, (f) socio-economic problems. The sampling method of the study in Latvia envisaged the implementation of a multi-stage stratified random sample, ensuring an adequate representation of all regions and settlements in Latvia in the sample. In order to create a representative sample, anonymized information about the population was requested and received from the Population Register of the Republic of Latvia.

Given that the survey was conducted in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, two survey methods were used: a face-to-face structured computerized interview and a computerized self-completion questionnaire. The respondent in the household was selected using the principle of the nearest birthday (from all adult members of the household, the one who will have a birthday shortly was selected for the interview). To ensure a theoretical net sample size ($n = 1200$), the total gross sample size was 3061 addresses. This means that a total of 3061 addresses, selected from the Population Register of the Republic of Latvia where at least one person over the age of 18 has declared a place of residence, were included in the sample. All in all, 1335 questionnaires were considered valid for analysis. The overall response rate was 44%. To equalize the probability of including the respondents in the sample, data weights were prepared based on the respondents' region of residence, gender, and age.

The countries used for comparison with Latvia were Norway, Poland, and Great Britain. Very generally Norway is chosen to represent values in the Nordic countries, Poland represents Eastern European countries, and Great Britain is a West-European country. In Inglehart's map of cultural values (Figure 3.3. Locations of 94 societies on global cultural map, 2008–2014; Inglehart 2018), Norway represents a group from Protestant Europe, Great Britain – the group of English-speaking countries, Poland is close to the Catholic Europe group, and Latvia represents the Baltic group. According to Inglehart's research, all four countries represent different cultural clusters (Inglehart 2018). Table 1 summarizes the survey characteristics in all four countries: the fieldwork period, the mode of data collection and the sample size.

Table 1. The EVS survey characteristics in Latvia, Norway, Poland, and Great Britain

No.	Country	Fieldwork period	Mode of data collection	Sample size
1.	Latvia (LV)	01.05.2021. – 30.09.2021.	CAPI / CATI	1335
2.	Norway (NO)	22.08.2018. – 17.12.2018.	CAPI / CATI	1122
3.	Poland (PL)	17.11.2017. – 08.02.2018.	CAPI	1352
4.	Great Britain (GB)	12.02.2018. – 16.07.2018.	CAPI	1788

The analysis categories used for comparative analysis of the EVS survey data are summarised in Table 2. They include the analysis of answers on three questions. First, regarding the importance of different life aspects. Second, concerning the most desirable qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Third, the attitude towards a democratic political system and political system with a strong leader, who does not have to be concerned with a parliament and elections. Table 2 also provides the characterization of each value as a secular-rational value/ traditional value or survival/ self-expression value based on Inglehart (2018).

Table 2. The analysis categories used for comparative analysis

Cultural Value	Responses to the following question	Secular-rational values // traditional values Survival values// self-expression values
Work	How important it is in your life. Work	Different interpretations available
Family	How important it is in your life. Family	Traditional values

Cultural Value	Responses to the following question	Secular-rational values // traditional values Survival values// self-expression values
Friends and acquaintances	How important it is in your life. Friends and acquaintances	Self-expression values
Leisure time	How important it is in your life. Leisure time	Self-expression values
Politics	How important it is in your life. Politics	Different interpretations available
Religion	How important it is in your life. Religion	Secular-rational values versus traditional values
Good manners	Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which five would you say are the most desirable for a child to have? Please choose up to five! Good manners	Traditional values
Independence	Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which five would you say are the most desirable for a child to have? Please choose up to five! Independence	Self-expression values
Hard work	Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which five would you say are the most desirable for a child to have? Please choose up to five! Hard work	Traditional values, Survival values

Cultural Value	Responses to the following question	Secular-rational values // traditional values Survival values// self-expression values
Feeling of responsibility	Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which five would you say are the most desirable for a child to have? Please choose up to five! Feeling of responsibility	Different interpretations available
Imagination	Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which five would you say are the most desirable for a child to have? Please choose up to five! Imagination	Self-expression values
Tolerance and respect for other people	Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which five would you say are the most desirable for a child to have? Please choose up to five! Tolerance and respect for other people	Self-expression values
Thrift, saving money and things	Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which five would you say are the most desirable for a child to have? Please choose up to five! Thrift, saving money and things	Survival values

Cultural Value	Responses to the following question	Secular-rational values // traditional values Survival values// self-expression values
Determination, perseverance	Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which five would you say are the most desirable for a child to have? Please choose up to five! Determination, perseverance	Different interpretations available
Religious faith	Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which five would you say are the most desirable for a child to have? Please choose up to five! Religious faith	Secular-rational values versus traditional values
Unselfishness	Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which five would you say are the most desirable for a child to have? Please choose up to five! Unselfishness	Different interpretations available
Obedience	Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which five would you say are the most desirable for a child to have? Please choose up to five! Obedience	Traditional values
Strong leader	Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections	Traditional values, Survival values
Democracy	Having a democratic political system	Secular-rational values Self-expression values

Results

Looking at the general tendencies about the most important aspects of life in the assessment of the population of Latvia, Norway, Great Britain, and Poland, it is evident that at the level of the main trends, the opinion of the population of all the countries considered is similar (Figure 2, Table 3). In terms of importance, family is first in all countries, and it is followed by work, leisure and friends and acquaintances. Politics and religion occupy the last place in terms of importance.

Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life.




Figure 2. The importance of different aspects of life (%). The EVS data (EVS 2020)

Table 3. The importance of different life aspects (%). The EVS data (EVS 2020)

Work						
No.	Country	very important	quite important	not important	not at all important	Total
1.	LV	48	42	8	2	100
2.	GB	45	31	10	14	100
3.	NO	63	30	5	2	100
4.	PL	60	34	3	3	100
Family						
No.	Country	very important	quite important	not important	not at all important	Total
1.	LV	81	18	1	0	100
2.	GB	91	7	1	0	100
3.	NO	93	7	0	0	100
4.	PL	94	6	0	0	100
Friends and acquaintances						
No.	Country	very important	quite important	not important	not at all important	Total
1.	LV	30	58	11	1	100
2.	GB	55	40	5	0	100
3.	NO	62	36	2	0	100
4.	PL	40	55	4	1	100
Leisure time						
No.	Country	very important	quite important	not important	not at all important	Total
1.	LV	42	51	7	1	100
2.	GB	48	45	6	1	100
3.	NO	52	43	4	1	100
4.	PL	42	53	4	1	100

Politics						
No.	Country	very important	quite important	not important	not at all important	Total
1.	LV	4	27	41	28	100
2.	GB	13	44	28	15	100
3.	NO	14	57	24	5	100
4.	PL	8	39	32	21	100
Religion						
No.	Country	very important	quite important	not important	not at all important	Total
1.	LV	9	29	34	28	100
2.	GB	15	23	36	26	100
3.	NO	11	23	47	19	100
4.	PL	39	41	13	7	100

However, interesting observations emerge when national differences are scrutinised more closely. In comparison, the priorities of the Polish population are significantly different, as a significantly higher proportion of Poles consider religion to be an important aspect of life (80% consider it as important). For comparison, among the population of Latvia and Great Britain, only 38% think that religion is important in their life, but in Norway – only 34%. This shows that the people of Latvia, Great Britain and Norway are relatively more secular, but in Poland, religion is important – as it is in traditional societies. In general, this is in line with previous observations that Latvia, Great Britain, and Norway are similar in terms of the importance of religion, and they are united in the Protestant cluster of European countries (Inglehart & Baker 2000).

When analysing the significance of politics in the daily life of the population of the countries in question, it is evident that the opinion of the Latvian people on this issue is closer to that of the Polish people. Compared to other countries, Latvia has the lowest number of people who care about politics (31%, and only 4% say politics is very important). Among the Polish population, this indicator is 47% (very important 8%),

in the United Kingdom 57%, but in Norway, 71% say that politics is important in their lives. These answers reveal the apolitical nature of Latvians, which can be explained by the lack of trust in state institutions and the belief that they have no opportunity to influence political processes (Mierīņa, Šūpule & Kaprāns 2021).

The answers about the importance of work are interesting with regard to the inhabitants of Great Britain, where the biggest share of people say that work is not important in their life (24%). Regarding the importance of family and friends and acquaintances, it was evident that the importance of these aspects is not as strongly expressed among Latvians as it is in other countries, we can see that among Latvians there are more respondents who say: “quite important”, and less are convinced that these aspects are “very important”. This again is a signal of certain anomie and alienation.

The analysis of the most desirable qualities for a child – which children can be encouraged to learn at home – reveals a completely different picture in different countries (Figure 3, Table 4). For example, in Norway, the three most frequently mentioned answers are tolerance and respect for other people (91%), independence (86%), and a sense of responsibility (84%), while the least frequently mentioned are: religious faith (7%), thrift, saving money and things (11%), and obedience (14%). When putting these answers on a secular-rational values – traditional values and survival values – self-expression values matrix, the answers of people from Norway confirm that they are supporting secular and post-materialist values.

For Polish people, comparably, independence (29%) is not a desirable quality for a child, but the importance of hard work is highlighted (81%). Tolerance and respect for other people (80%) and a sense of responsibility (73%) are also among the most welcomed qualities for a child. Latvians differ from Poles regarding the importance of independence, which is a desirable quality for a child for 74% of Latvians, but similarly to Poles, Latvians also welcome hard work (74%). In Great Britain, the most desirable quality for a child is good manners (87%), in second place are tolerance and respect for other people (82%). Religious faith (10%) is the least desirable quality for a child according to the people in Great Britain.

Surprisingly, imagination is mentioned quite seldom among the desirable qualities for a child, although it is more often mentioned in Norway (44%) and Great Britain (33%) than in Latvia (18%) and Poland (16%). When reviewing these answers through the lens of a secular-rational values – traditional values and survival values – self-expression values matrix, the answers of the people in Norway and Great Britain correspond to self-expression and post-materialist values more than the answers of Latvians and Poles, who favour hard work and thrift, saving money and things (54% in Latvia and 35% in Poland).

Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which five would you say are the most desirable for a child to have? Please choose up to five!




Figure 3. The most desirable qualities for a child (%). The EVS data (EVS 2020)

Table 4. The most desirable qualities for a child (%). The EVS data (EVS 2020)

		LV	GB	NO	PL
1.	Good manners	68	87	75	60
2.	Independence	74	52	86	29
3.	Hard work	74	46	19	81
4.	Feeling of responsibility	85	45	84	73
5.	Imagination	18	33	44	16
6.	Tolerance and respect for other people	69	82	91	80
7.	Thrift, saving money and things	54	19	11	35
8.	Determination, perseverance	51	42	28	26
9.	Religious faith	11	10	7	33
10.	Unselfishness	16	47	22	17
11.	Obedience	18	21	14	20

The rise of political populism in Europe and persisting social inequality in Latvia require particular attention to the attitudes of people to various types of political systems. Data from the fifth EVS survey (EVS 2020) clearly show that having a democratic political system is the most welcomed option in all four countries (Figure 4, Table 5). However, the respondents from Norway are most convinced about that (84% say it is a very good and 15% say it is a fairly good way of governing this country). Latvians and Poles more often choose the option that it is a fairly good way of governing this country, still the overwhelming majority favour a democratic political system.

The alternative political system with a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections is definitely supported in all countries less often. However, some differences are evident. While people in Norway and Great Britain, and even in Poland are quite convinced that having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections is a fairly bad or a very bad political system, Latvian responses split into two parts: 53% think that it is a good political system, and 47% think that it is a bad political system.

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?




Figure 4. Attitude toward democracy and having a strong leader (%). The EVS data (EVS 2020)

Table 5. Attitude toward democracy and having a strong leader (%).
The EVS data (EVS 2020)

Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections						
No.	Country	very good	fairly good	fairly bad	very bad	Total
1.	LV	15	38	29	18	100
2.	GB	3	11	21	65	100
3.	NO	2	13	37	47	100
4.	PL	6	20	26	48	100
Having a democratic political system						
No.	Country	very good	fairly good	fairly bad	very bad	Total
1.	LV	45	47	7	1	100
2.	GB	65	29	5	1	100
3.	NO	84	15	1	0	100
4.	PL	47	44	6	3	100

Conclusions

The analysis of the fifth wave of the European Values Study (EVS 2020) aimed to compare value orientations in four countries: Latvia, Norway, Poland, and Great Britain. Schematically Poland was representing Eastern European countries, Norway – the Nordic countries, and Great Britain – West-European countries. Theoretically and methodologically this analysis has been inspired by studies carried out by Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues (Inglehart 1997; 2018; Inglehart & Baker 2000; Norris & Inglehart 2019). The main analysis categories were placed on secular-rational values – traditional values and survival values – self-expression values dimensions. In general, the analysis of the newest EVS data confirms previous findings that Latvian people hold secular-rational values, which are expressed through a low level of importance attributed to religion. This can be observed both regarding the most important aspects in life and regarding the most desirable qualities for a child to be encouraged to learn at home. Secondly, among the Latvian people, survival values still dominate over self-expression values. Most explicitly this can be seen in answers to the question about the most desirable qualities for a child, where hard work and thrift, saving money and things are often-mentioned answers among Latvians.

Analysis of the EVS data (2020) confirms that people in Norway support secular and self-expression values (among self-expression values also including post-materialist values). To a lesser extent, the same trend can be observed in Great Britain. Finally, Poland differs from all other countries in respect to the secular-rational values vs. traditional values dimension because Polish people place more importance on religion in their life.

In this analysis there are worrying trends found in Latvia in reference to two aspects: first, a low support for self-expression values, for example, the development of a child's imagination. This is worrying because it reduces children's openness to trying new things and processes, to innovations and creativity. Secondly, the split of the attitudes of Latvians to the

evaluation of a political system with a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections can be dangerous during times of various crises. For example, when people are dissatisfied with an increase in the cost of living and do not trust the government, populists can use this fragmentation and play a strong leader card. Therefore, these trends need to be analysed in future studies.

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Inese Šūpule, Rasa Šķērstiņa

Rietumeiropa, Austrumeiropa vai Ziemeļvalstis: kam tuvākas ir Latvijas iedzīvotāju vērtības?

Kopsavilkums

Sociālā nevienlīdzība, neapmierinātība un sabiedrības šķelšanās, ko izraisīja valdības noteiktie ierobežojumi Covid-19 pandēmijas mazināšanai, kā arī politiskā populisma pieaugums radīja jaunus jautājumus par vērtībām un vērtību maiņu dažādās sabiedrībās. Šajā rakstā autori mēģina analizēt kultūras vērtības, izmantojot R. Ingleharta un viņa kolēģu izstrādāto teorētisko un metodoloģisko pieeju, un lokalizēt Latvijas iedzīvotāju vērtības divās dimensijās: sekulāri racionālās vērtības pret tradicionālajām vērtībām un izdzīvošanas vērtības pret pašizteikšanās vērtībām. Lai izprastu Latvijas iedzīvotāju vērtības citu Eiropas valstu kontekstā, vērtību salīdzinājums veikts četrās valstīs: Latvijā, Norvēģijā, Polijā un Lielbritānijā. Analīzes pamatā ir Eiropas Vērtību pētījuma piektā viļņa dati, kas Latvijā tika veikti 2021. gadā. Datu analīze veikta projekta “Vērtību maiņa nestabilos apstākļos: sabiedrības saliedētība un neolibērālais ētoss” (Izp-2020/2-0068) ietvaros.

Atslēgvārdi: kultūras vērtības, Ingleharta modernizācijas teorija, nedrošība un populisms, Latvija

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CONTRIBUTING TO PUBLIC GOODS AND SAFEGUARDING COLLECTIVE RESOURCES IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL IDENTITY

Challenges related to the creation of public goods and engagement in collective action in post-communist countries have previously been associated with a lack of social trust, the fragmentation of society, weak civic culture, citizens vs. state mentality or even fuzzy morality. One of the factors in the existing literature – the potential of which has not been sufficiently explored – is the role of collectivism, e.g., attachment to, and identification with a particular group. This paper aims to fill this gap and explores whether a strong national identity, which is characteristic to many ECE countries, can help to solve the problem of collective action, as well as public goods and common-pool resource dilemmas. The paper is based on a large-scale comparative survey of 14 East-Central European countries. The analysis shows that a strong sense of attachment to one's nation and country can facilitate collective action – joining various groups and associations and their activities, donating and volunteering, and engaging in political activities. It also facilitates contributing to the public good by paying wages honestly, declaring and paying taxes and being environmentally conscious. The positive effect of these actions can be explained in different ways, but, as our analysis shows, it is likely based on empathy with one's group, as well as on rational considerations.

Keywords: public goods, East-Central Europe, national identity

Introduction

Public goods and common resources such as clean air, the preservation of biodiversity or prevention of climate change are at the heart of the well-being and future of any society, yet their creation and preservation requires a joint effort. Complex problems such as these require cooperation between countries, between various sectors of society, levels of government, various service providers and also professionals and experts from different fields, legislators, representatives from the executive sector and civil society. But first, in order to take action, people first need to become aware of the challenges, and then acquire the motivation to do something about it.

The essence of the problem of collective action (Olson 2008) is that from the perspective of a selfish individual it is irrational to vote, to take part in a strike or demonstration, to join a movement or engage in any mobilized collective activism. Participation in all of these activities requires time and effort, yet the difference that one person makes might seem negligible; activists themselves personally receive only a small part of the benefits that their actions provide for the public. The problem of collective action is similar to that of public goods, as those who do not participate are not excluded from reaping the benefits arising from the activity (Van Vugt et al. 2000; Biel 2000).

The creation of public goods includes multi-person social dilemmas (Kollock 1998) – it is hindered by a willingness to free-ride at the expense of others. There are several types of multi-person dilemmas: i) Public goods dilemmas (the individual bears the costs for benefits to the collective), including the collective action problem and ii) Common-pool resource dilemmas (the possibility to achieve immediate gain that creates costs for all). Multi-person dilemmas can lead to situations where individual rationality leads to collective irrationality (Kollock 1998; Van Vugt et al. 2000; Biel 2000) – or “the tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 2019).

Collective action problems are often modeled by the trust game (Kreps et al. 1996) or the prisoner’s dilemma game theory (White-

ley 1999). In the Prisoner's Dilemma, each participant gains an immediate benefit by exploiting the trust of others; the dilemma is that if all participants do this, trust is destroyed and social interaction becomes difficult. Everyone would be better off if everyone trusted each other, but when faced with the possibility of being taken advantage of, people rationally choose not to trust others from the start. In such a situation, the system will create an equilibrium where trust is difficult or impossible to build and social capital will be minimal. Since according to the theory there is an assumption that individuals are rational actors, it states that in order to obtain mutual solidarity, the long-term net benefits of staying in the group must be higher than the short-term net benefits of breaking away (Axelrod 1984). In addition, it is important for individuals to have a positive disposition towards cooperation for them to risk taking the first step towards such cooperation (Gambetta 2000). Individuals who trust others are more likely to be positively inclined to engage in collaboration, develop mutual bonds, and work toward common results (Gambetta 2000).

Creating the public good requires coordination and trust among people. However, as Hibbing and Alford (2004) argue, people are wary cooperators – they cooperate when others cooperate; invest if they expect others to invest as well. This is why trust and social cohesion are important in social dilemmas. Research has shown that they influence, for example, pro-environmental behaviour (Jones 2010) and investment in the common good (Anderson et al. 2004; Kocher et al. 2012). Close ties and trust may promote compliance with norms and reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour (Woolcock & Narayan 2000), increase involvement in associations and voluntary work (Herreros 2004; Putnam et al. 1994; Wilson & Musick 1997). Feld and Frey (2002) elaborate that obeying the law and contributing to the public good are determined by networks and embeddedness in these networks, the principle of reciprocity, social norms, the perception of other people's actions, trust in other people, commitment and cooperation, as well as collective efficacy. In the literature, these aspects, especially trust in fellow humans, are often called social capital

(Coleman 1994; Herreros 2004; Portes 1998; 2000), and its productive potential has been widely discussed.

One of the factors – the potential of which has not been sufficiently explored in the existing literature – is the role of collectivism, e.g. attachment to, and identification with a particular group. The literature suggests that group identity could serve as a source of trust and solidarity, contributing to pro-social behaviour both due to rational expectations, i.e., “I will be better off if my group is better off” and affective feelings, i.e. empathy and care about one’s “own people” (Figure 1). In other words, relations with the group – cooperation, trust, abiding by social norms or reputation – and emotional attachment to a certain social group might be the reason why individuals do not always act as *homo economicus* but are willing to contribute to public good even at a cost to themselves.




Figure 1. A theoretical scheme of group identity on contribution to public good

Commitment to act for the benefit of the group (rather than another person or oneself) has been termed in the literature as collectivism or, as Snyder and Omoto (2012) describe it, “community concern”. We speak of collectivism when the ultimate goal is not to increase one’s own welfare

or the welfare of specific others who benefit; the ultimate goal is to increase the welfare of the group (Batson et al. 2003). It has been argued that collectivism is a product of social identity (Turner et al. 1987; Tyler 2000), and collectivist motivation may be aroused by a concern for a group's welfare (Batson et al. 2002). However, although empathy towards a group may be driven by simple concern and compassion (Snyder & Omoto 2012), some sense of identity of a given person or their significant others with that group seems necessary to simply appreciate the saliency of issues concerning it. For example, in his work on social capital Portes talks about consummatory motivations facilitating cooperation for the sake of the collective good (Portes 1998). He refers to emotional ties with a specific group of people, often verging on a sense of solidarity and a common fate. Such "bonded solidarity" is not a reflection of internalised norms, but the product of a given situation; altruistic motivations are therefore not universal but bounded by the limits of the community (Portes 1998). Portes therefore believes that willingness to invest in public goods is amplified by an attachment to a given group/community. Portes' arguments are also mirrored in the paper by Brewer and Kramer (1986) who argue that stressing the common fate or identity between individual group members might help to solve collective action problems. In fact, the formation of a group identity is one of the possible explanations for the experimental findings that face-to-face communication about the problem before the experiment increases cooperation (Biel 2000). Collectivism is rarely measured directly, but it is assumed that group identity serves as a good proxy for it. Therefore, most research investigating the effect of pro-social motivations on cooperation in social dilemmas refers to social identity as a factor increasing inter-group solidarity and influencing the saliency of group-related issues in individual-level decision making. Such [group] identity – or solidarity – can be established and consequently enhance a cooperative response with the absence of any expectation of future reciprocity, current rewards or punishment, or even reputational consequences among other group members. Moreover, this identity operates independently of the dictates of conscience

(Dawes et al. 1990). The mechanism at play has been defined as “transposition of motivation”, where increased social identity results in increased motivation to achieve positive outcomes for the group rather than for oneself, and it has been confirmed by a series of experiments (De Cremer & Van Vugt 1999). Other experiments have shown that the willingness to cooperate increases with stronger feelings of collective concern (De Cremer & Barker 2003) or group identity (Tyler & Dawes 1993), and that individuals with stronger group identity show restraint in using a collective resource when it is endangered, although this effect gradually decreases when the group size increases (Brewer & Kramer 1986). Research on tax compliance has shown that social identity is relevant for explaining concerns for group-level justice and for compliant behaviour (Wenzel 2004) and that compliance is influenced by a sense of solidarity with the nation, which, in turn, reinforces collective identity (Rawlings 2004). Klandermans (2002) has shown empirically with three different examples (farmers, the elderly and ethnic groups) in three different countries that both emotional and cognitive identification with a certain group is a prerequisite for political action on behalf of that group. In fact, identity (group identification and collective identity in particular) has also been one of the core concepts in psychology of protest behaviour, and it has been shown empirically that commitment to a particular group makes it more likely that people will participate in collective action on behalf of that group (Klandermans 2002). Interestingly, studies also find that not only does commitment facilitate participation, but participation also strengthens commitment (Barling et al. 1992). Finally, an effect of social identity on cooperative behaviour has been noted, where a stronger identity resulted in perceptions of cooperation being more salient (Kerr 1992).

Collectivism, just like any other empathic attitude, may result from individual traits, reinforced in the process of socialisation (Kunyk & Olson 2001), but it can also be a social characteristic, as systematic differences in levels of cooperation in social dilemmas have been noticed across countries with different sets of dominant values (Parks & Vu 1994).

Due to various reasons, the post-communist context is especially ungrateful for the creation of public good (Rose-Ackerman 2005; Uslaner 2010). The obstacles can be found both at the administrative level (an inefficient, insufficiently transparent and distrusted public administration, a perception of corruption within the authorities, instability and unpredictability of laws, weak social protection), as well as at the individual and societal level. The rise of individualism, a breakdown of social ties, increasing inequality and ideological emphasis on entrepreneurial attitudes and competition has led people to primarily think in terms of individual benefit. The attempts of the state to coordinate the production of public goods and preservation of common resources are hindered by citizen vs. state mentality (Foley & Edwards 1996), “fuzzy morality” (Gerxhani 2004), and sometimes even forced disobedience – related to survival, regardless of moral beliefs on the issue. Participatory democracy requires a corresponding political culture (Almond & Verba 1989), but unfortunately in post-communist countries we can talk about a culture of mistrust (Uslaner 2003). Lack of trust is often seen as one of the factors responsible for the low involvement of citizens in political life and in voluntary groups and associations (Howard 2003). Finally, several researchers of post-communist countries have pointed to the fragmentation of society – social atomization or division among the population (Paldam & Svendsen 2000) which hinders any kind of cooperation.

We know from previous studies that post-communist countries also tend to have high levels of ethnic nationalism (Kaprāns & Mieriņa 2019) which pre-supposes strong group identity, yet its role in public goods related attitudes and behaviour in East-Central Europe has so far not been explored. The goal of the paper is to test empirically whether strong national identity, attachment to the country, and national chauvinism – all indicators of a strong sense of belonging to a certain ethnic, national or territorial unit – help to facilitate contribution to the public good and involvement in collective action, thus helping to overcome the “weakness of civil society” in East-Central Europe. This argument is far from self-evident, taking into account that national chauvinism and nationalism in

general are often associated with various negative side effects, such as divisions within society and hostility towards certain ethnic groups (Mierîna & Koroļeva 2015).

Based on the literature, we hypothesize that different expressions of national and territorial identity lead to stronger community attachment, empathy and trust, as well as a preference for cooperation and a sense of collective efficacy (Coleman 1990; Portes 1998). They encourage people to engage in collective action and contribute to the public good:

- 1) to join different groups and associations and their activities, and to donate;
- 2) vote, and engage in different mobilized activities, as well as to;
- 3) pay their fair share of taxes and;
- 4) behave in an ecologically conscious way.

The role of trust, reciprocity and empathy in creating and protecting the public good will also be tested in relation to national identity.

Data and methods

The analysis is based on data gathered as part of the “Public Goods through Private Eyes: Exploring Citizens’ Attitudes towards Public Goods and the State in East-Central Europe” project funded by the ERC. At the core of the project is a full-scale representative comparative public opinion survey in 14 East Central European (ECE) countries conducted in 2013-2014. It covers Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. Face-to-face interviews in respondents’ homes were conducted. Random sampling was implemented from pre-listed addresses. The sample was clustered within 75 sampling units with the target sample of 20 interviews in each sampling unit. The number of respondents – from 1420 in Ukraine to 1732 in Bulgaria. Respondents were people 18 years of age or older. Weighted data are used in the analysis. Regarding the

method of analysis, we initially planned to use structural equation modelling (SEM), however, due to the high complexity of the model it was decided to use two-step regressions instead.

The indicators of collective action include:

- 1) voluntary work for different groups and associations, e.g., political groups, organizations mobilising people to act for local community matters etc. (summary index 0–4; 0 – has not participated; 1– has participated in one activity; 2 – two activities, 3 – three activities; 4 – four or more activities);
- 2) donating to different groups and associations (summary index; 0–4);
- 3) political participation (voting in the last parliamentary elections and participation in mobilized activities, i.e., signing petitions, joining strikes, and participating in protest marches or demonstrations; summary index index 0–4);
- 4) tax behaviour and compliance (“Has it ever happened that you did not declare all of your income to the Tax Office?”; “..you claimed more tax deductions than you were entitled to?” “..you worked for cash in hand payment and DID NOT PAY tax on this income?). (index 0–3)
- 5) green behaviour (“How often do you ...buy environmentally friendly products even if they are more expensive?”, “..cut back on driving a car for environmental reasons?”, “..save electricity and water to protect the environment?” (index 0–4)

Based on the character of the dependent variables, in four of the five models we use ordinal regressions, and in the last one (green behaviour) – a simple linear regression.

Belonging to a certain group is conceptualized along several dimensions. In several cases, an average of two or more questions represented a single dimension. The reliability of such scales was tested using correlations and Cronbach’s alpha, and was found to be acceptable.

- 1) national identity (how close do you feel to your ethnic or national group; 1–5);
- 2) attachment to [country] (when someone criticizes [country], it feels like a personal insult, when someone praises the achievements of [country], it feels like a personal compliment; I feel a sense of responsibility for [country's] future – an index; 1–5);
- 3) community attachment (I see myself as part of a local community, I frequently talk about local matters with my neighbours, I feel a sense of belonging to a local community; 1–5);
- 4) national chauvinism (generally speaking, [country] is a better country than most other countries; the world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like [country nationals]; index; 1–5).

In order to get an insight into what might explain the impact of group belonging on contribution to public goods, we add in the next step of the analysis various indicators of solidarity and trust available in the survey data:

- 1) trust (if you are not always on your guard other people will take advantage of you, most people can be trusted; people cooperate with others only for their own benefit; index 1–5);
- 2) preference for cooperation (5 items, i.e., it is human nature to cooperate with others, people who help others will not be alone in a time of need; working together always brings more benefits than acting on your own, people should do favours for each other without keeping track of who owes whom, a person who has received help from someone should help others; index 1–5);
- 3) collective efficacy (it is not worth cooperating with others because it is easier to get things done on your own; 1–5);
- 4) empathy (I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me, I feel sorry for other people when they are

having problems, helping people in trouble is very important to me, people should help those who are less fortunate; index 1–5).

The regression models also include a number of relevant control variables: age; gender; education (university degree); employment status (employed, student, pensioner, etc.); sociability (how often do you meet socially with family and relatives; friends; neighbours); health problems (index); type of locality, and whether one has children.

Results

Contribution to the public good

The study Public Goods through Private Eyes is so far the only study that allows for a comprehensive comparison of the attitude of society towards the public good and collective action in the post-Soviet space. Therefore, it is first worth considering how the inhabitants of East-Central European countries perceive the public good and how actively or passively they try to preserve it.

In terms of tax behaviour, the study examines three different situations: not declaring all of one's declarable income to the State Revenue Service; requesting greater tax deductions than are due; or receiving cash in hand payments for work without paying the applicable taxes. Any of these actions leads to a reduction of the total tax revenue, which is used to ensure the public good, i.e. national defence, education, health care, the protection of citizens, etc. As we see in Figure 2, Latvia is the country with the most respondents (45%) than in any other country included in the study (sig. < 0.001) who admit that at least one of the following situations has happened to them. Other countries where a relatively high proportion of respondents admit tax evasion are Ukraine (30%), Estonia (24%), Moldova (22%) and Poland (21%).




Figure 2. Tax evasion: How many situations have happened during the last 12 months (%)

Speaking about environmental issues and excluding those who did not have an opinion on this issue, it must be concluded again that in Latvia, according to their own words, the behaviour of the population is significantly less environmentally conscious than in other Central and Eastern European countries. 45% say that they do not (or would not) use their car less often for environmental reasons, while 37% do not save electricity and water to protect the environment – more than any other country included in the study (Table 1). Only 10% often or always reduce the use of their car for environmental reasons, 20% are used to saving electricity and water to protect the environment, and 15% regularly buy environmentally friendly products, even if they are more expensive. It can be concluded that no more than every fifth resident of Latvia thinks carefully about the impact of their behaviour on the environment.

Table 1. Green behaviour (%)

	Bulgaria	Croatia	Czechia	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Moldova	Poland	Romania	Serbia	Slovakia	Slovenia	Ukraine	
How often do you ...buy environmentally friendly products even if they are more expensive?	Always	1.8	2.6	2.2	2.5	3.1	1.5	2.0	6.2	3.3	1.0	3.1	2.3	2.9	1.9
	Often	13.2	11.8	10.0	14.6	16.9	13.2	15.0	24.5	27.0	10.5	13.9	17.9	21.9	13.7
	Sometimes	24.1	31.2	25.7	32.4	31.3	30.9	34.5	28.0	38.4	29.6	34.3	35.0	39.8	33.6
	Seldom	32.5	27.8	35.5	34.4	32.6	33.0	25.4	25.0	21.4	34.6	28.2	29.0	19.3	26.9
	Never	28.4	26.6	26.6	16.1	16.1	21.4	23.1	16.3	10.0	24.3	20.5	15.8	16.2	23.9
How often do you...cut back on driving a car for environmental reasons?	Always	5.3	8.1	3.3	4.7	4.3	1.9	2.9	10.7	5.2	4.8	5.5	5.9	4.3	4.5
	Often	19.4	17.5	12.5	10.8	25.1	8.0	11.4	22.1	19.7	20.9	22.7	17.6	23.5	10.7
	Sometimes	26.9	21.3	21.6	25.4	30.6	19.4	23.4	23.7	26.8	34.7	28.7	32.2	32.5	27.7
	Seldom	23.8	22.1	26.7	28.0	26.0	25.3	28.6	23.9	24.3	18.7	21.4	22.4	22.7	17.9
	Never	24.7	31.0	36.0	31.1	13.9	45.4	33.7	19.6	24.0	20.8	21.7	21.9	16.9	39.2
How often do you...save electricity and water to protect the environment?	Always	12.8	19.7	23.0	21.0	30.2	5.8	25.6	23.6	22.8	7.0	9.8	31.8	23.3	10.6
	Often	25.1	21.7	30.0	24.5	33.2	13.8	26.3	22.7	42.7	28.8	23.9	27.9	44.1	24.8
	Sometimes	24.0	17.9	20.0	18.4	18.2	22.7	22.0	19.2	17.6	34.0	27.1	16.6	20.1	27.0
	Seldom	18.0	18.1	11.4	18.0	11.0	20.7	13.5	17.4	11.1	16.2	19.8	12.6	6.8	14.1
	Never	20.1	22.7	15.6	18.2	7.4	37.0	12.6	17.1	5.8	14.0	19.4	11.1	5.7	23.4

In terms of collective action, out of all countries surveyed, respondents in Czechia were the most active in ECE, followed by the Slovaks, Slovenians and Poles (Table 2). Hungarians and Serbians were some of the least active. Latvians and Estonians lagged behind in terms of political participation, however, were more active in other forms of collective action such as donating.

Table 2. Involvement in collective action

	Has participated	Mean	Has participated	Mean	Has participated	Mean
Croatia	13.3	.19	50.8	.80	78.0	1.02
Czechia	80.6	.92	83.4	1.05	74.9	1.00
Ukraine	12.0	.13	20.7	.22	81.2	1.00
Slovakia	24.2	.35	37.2	.61	76.0	.97
Bulgaria	11.1	.13	23.9	.33	79.7	.94
Slovenia	23.1	.33	54.0	.71	77.6	.93
Romania	11.4	.16	34.6	.48	83.6	.92
Poland	22.9	.33	54.1	.71	70.8	.90
Lithuania	17.5	.20	49.7	.80	73.4	.85
Moldova	17.8	.21	30.8	.34	73.8	.85
Serbia	5.7	.08	22.4	.32	73.1	.82
Hungary	15.9	.19	26.2	.31	69.2	.81
Estonia	21.8	.30	32.4	.43	66.3	.77
Latvia	14.2	.20	43.6	.60	65.7	.72

Note: Mean number of activities the respondent has been involved in are reflected in the table, i.e., on average, how many groups or organizations (out of 18 possible answers) the respondent has volunteered or donated to, and how many political activities (out of 5 possible answers) the respondent has been engaged in during the last 12 months.

As already mentioned, in this paper we will test the impact of ethnic and territorial identity on contribution to the public good and engagement in collective action. Compared to the population of other countries, there are relatively many people among the population of Latvia – 20% – who feel very little or rather little belonging to their ethnic group (Table 3). This attitude is often found in other countries (Estonia and Ukraine) with several large ethnic communities. The data show that in all of the Baltic States and also in Ukraine, respondents of Russian nationality expressed a lower sense of belonging to their ethnic community than the country's largest ethnic group. In contrast, people in Bulgaria, Romania, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary have expressed the strongest sense of national identity.

Table 3. Sense of ethnic or national belonging (%)

	Not close at all	Not very close	Close	Very close
Bulgaria	0.9	1.8	24.6	72.8
Slovakia	2.0	2.4	34.4	61.2
Czechia	1.1	4.6	39.1	55.2
Romania	0.2	4.4	41.4	54.0
Hungary	2.7	5.8	43.2	48.2
Lithuania	2.2	9.6	44.1	44.1
Latvia	6.2	14.3	36.8	42.8
Moldova	0.7	8.2	48.6	42.5
Croatia	0.8	4.0	55.2	39.9
Slovenia	0.4	3.2	57.5	38.9
Poland	2.3	12.8	51.0	34.0
Ukraine	8.2	16.3	42.7	32.8
Serbia	1.5	7.5	61.9	29.0
Estonia	2.6	13.5	57.6	26.3

Note: Answer to the question “How close do you feel to your ethnic or national group?”

The survey results lead to the conclusion that people in East Central Europe tend to have a strong sense of attachment to their country – particularly those in Moldova and Bulgaria, but also Poland, Romania, and Serbia (Table 4). Community attachment is also high in most countries, while national chauvinism is not characteristic of the citizens of ECE. It is interesting to note the relatively low country and community attachment among people in Czechia who otherwise have a strong sense of national identity. Community attachment is lowest in the Baltic states – a finding warranting its own separate investigation.

Table 4. Attachment to the country, community, and national chauvinism

	Attachment to [country]	National chauvinism	Community attachment
Moldova	3.9	0.8	3.7
Bulgaria	3.9	1.3	3.8
Poland	3.6	1.2	3.7
Romania	3.6	0.9	3.7
Serbia	3.6	0.7	3.8
Latvia	3.5	0.9	3.3
Ukraine	3.5	0.8	3.6
Estonia	3.4	0.9	3.2
Lithuania	3.3	1.0	3.3
Slovakia	3.2	1.0	3.6
Croatia	3.2	1.2	3.7
Czechia	3.2	1.0	3.3
Hungary	3.2	1.2	3.5
Slovenia	2.9	1.6	3.6

Note: mean index on a scale from 0 to 4

Importance of national identity and other social factors

We continue our analysis by examining the impact of national identity on engagement in collective action: voluntary work for or donating to various groups and associations, as well as political participation. All models had adequate Goodness-of-fit indicators, and Omnibus tests confirmed that the specified models were significantly better than the null model. The included variables were able to explain particularly well the variation in voluntary work (Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Square 0.2 in M1 and M2) and donating (0.17 in M3 and 0.18 in M4), yet somewhat less so – in political participation (0.12 in M5 and M6). It is interesting to note that adding trust and cooperation indicators did not notably increase the explained variation, which could indicate that most of the information is already absorbed by the variables in the previous specification of the model such as national identity and belonging.

The regression analysis (see M1, M3, M5 in tables 5-7) shows that national identity (feeling close to one's ethnic or national group), attachment to one's country and community all facilitate engagement in collective action (Sig.<0.001). National chauvinism can also play a positive role, except that in the case of voluntary work its effect is not statistically significant. Both the dependent and independent variables are coded to a five-point scale, thus it is easy to compare the size of effects. Particularly noticeable is the impact of national identity on political participation during the last 12 months. One can conclude that if the person feels part of the political community, they will also be more likely to experience a sense of duty and responsibility to participate in its political processes. Community attachment is particularly important for engaging in voluntary work, considering that most of it takes place locally, in a particular neighbourhood or city. If a person feels as part of the local community, they are more likely to support their friends and neighbours both due to emotional and practical reasons.

Table 5. Regression of voluntary work on belonging to a group

Parameter	Voluntary work					
	M1			M2		
	B	Std. Error	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Sig.
National identity	.167	.0317	<.001	.146	.0330	<.001
National chauvinism	.035	.0250	.155	.032	.0258	.214
Attachment to [country]	.186	.0271	<.001	.142	.0289	<.001
Community attachment	.183	.0254	<.001	.136	.0273	<.001
Trust				.043	.0295	.148
Preference for cooperation				.073	.0463	.116
Cooperation efficacy				.070	.0216	.001
Empathy				.143	.0388	<.001

Note: The control variables are not reflected in the table.

Adding trust and cooperation measures to the models (M2, M4, M6) changes little, except that the impact of community attachment on donating is explained away (Table 6). Preference for cooperation and a belief in the efficiency of cooperation, and most of all, empathy, seem to be the backbone of donating behaviour. It can be strengthened by community attachment, yet community attachment itself is not among the main reasons why people choose to donate.

Table 6. Regression of donating on belonging to a group

Parameter	Donating					
	M3			M4		
	B	Std. Error	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Sig.
National identity	.211	.0246	<.001	.191	.0257	<.001
National chauvinism	.063	.0193	.001	.061	.0200	.002
Attachment to [country]	.232	.0209	<.001	.169	.0223	<.001
Community attachment	.078	.0196	<.001	.012	.0212	.566
Trust				-.005	.0229	.838
Preference for cooperation				.107	.0360	.003
Cooperation efficacy				.084	.0167	<.001
Empathy				.297	.0305	<.001

Note: The control variables are not reflected in the table.

Empathy and belief in the efficiency of cooperation are important for volunteering, independently of group attachment (Table 5). Moreover, preference for cooperation and trust in its efficacy are also important drivers of political participation (Table 7). This confirms that in order to solve collective action problems it is important that people have confidence that engaging in the specific activities will bring the expected results, however, there is also a certain moral of value dimension that can facilitate political participation even in the absence of immediately visible benefits. It is interesting to note that according to our analysis, when accounting for other factors, generalized trust does not play a significant role in engagement in collective action.

Table 7. Regression of political participation on belonging to a group

Parameter	Political participation					
	M5			M6		
	B	Std. Error	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Sig.
National identity	.265	.0236	<.001	.253	.0246	<.001
National chauvinism	.064	.0190	.001	.052	.0198	.008
Attachment to [country]	.204	.0203	<.001	.171	.0218	<.001
Community attachment	.107	.0195	<.001	.078	.0212	<.001
Trust				-.006	.0226	.785
Preference for cooperation				.112	.0344	.001
Cooperation efficacy				.054	.0162	.001
Empathy				.041	.0291	.162

Note: The control variables are not reflected in the table.

Contribution to public goods such as education and science is often realized through the paying of taxes. According to our analysis, group belonging has a complex impact on tax compliance (Table 8). National chauvinism (a belief that one's country is better than others) can facilitate tax evasion, even though the effect is not large. It is possible that these answers are reflective of a chauvinistic, opportunistic personality who feels generally better, smarter and more deserving than others and, thus, will not hesitate to take advantage of a profitable situation when the opportunity arises. At the same time, those who feel attached to one's country and community are significantly more likely to honestly declare and pay their taxes (Sig.<0.01, M7). The effect of group attachment wanes when trust and cooperation indicators are taken into account (M8). Instead, generalized trust appears as a factor that facilitates tax compliance (or lack of trust – tax evasion). This result lends further support to experiment-based economic theories arguing that people need to have confi-

dence in the honesty and fair contribution of others in order to contribute accordingly themselves. If trust in others is low, people will be more likely to look for possibilities to reduce their own tax contributions, in order to avoid becoming “suckers” who pay for the benefits enjoyed by non-contributing others. Attachment to one’s country of community can facilitate trust (i.e., “my” people will not be dishonest) and, thus, indirectly reduce tax evasion. The specified model in this case explains 15% of the variation, and the Omnibus test confirms that it is significantly better than the null model.

Table 8. Regression of tax evasion on belonging to a group

Parameter	Tax evasion					
	M7			M8		
	B	Std. Error	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Sig.
National identity	.003	.0307	.919	-.034	.0319	.288
National chauvinism	.109	.0262	<.001	.105	.0271	<.001
Attachment to [country]	-.074	.0275	.007	-.056	.0294	.058
Community attachment	-.080	.0255	.002	-.031	.0277	.259
Trust				-.203	.0314	<.001
Preference for cooperation				.063	.0471	.178
Cooperation efficacy				.027	.0224	.232
Empathy				-.032	.0388	.404

Note: The control variables are not reflected in the table.

Finally, our analysis also confirms the importance of group attachment to green behaviour (Table 9). Of particular importance is attachment to one’s country, meaning that those who identify themselves with the country also tend to care about its future and behave in an environmentally conscious way. Feeling close to one’s ethnic group or nation matters too, as it probably translates to wanting to ensure a better and cleaner

living environment for one's own people as well. Those who do not feel embedded in their country and ethnic/national group are more likely to act carelessly and degrade natural resources. The effect of community attachment disappears after including trust and cooperation preferences in the model (M10, Table 9). Empathy and preference for cooperation appear as some of the important drivers of green behaviour, however, the independent effect of country attachment and national belonging remains. One can conclude that not just emotional factors, but probably also rational calculations related to embeddedness in a certain place and community play a role in ensuring that people act in an environmentally conscious way.

Table 9. Regression of green behaviour on belonging to a group

Parameter	Green behaviour					
	M9			M10		
	B	Std. Error	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Sig.
(Intercept)	3.735	.0652	<.001	3.731	.0945	<.001
National identity	.023	.0099	.020	.023	.0102	.024
National chauvinism	.004	.0080	.653	.007	.0082	.370
Attachment to [country]	.158	.0085	<.001	.120	.0090	<.001
Community attachment	.027	.0081	.001	-.014	.0087	.108
Trust				.016	.0093	.093
Preference for cooperation				.099	.0142	<.001
Cooperation efficacy				.003	.0067	.665
Empathy				.116	.0120	<.001

Note: The control variables are not reflected in the table.

Conclusions

Our analysis allows us to confirm the hypothesis that willingness to invest in public goods and involvement in collective action is influenced by the sense of attachment to a particular place and community. The fact that the majority of people have a strong sense of attachment to their nation and country can facilitate collective action – joining various groups and associations and their activities, donating and volunteering, and engaging in political activities. It also facilitates contribution to the public good by honestly declaring and paying their taxes and behaving in an environmentally conscious way.

The positive effect of a strong national identity on collective action and preservation of the public good can be explained in different ways, but, as our analysis shows, it is likely based on both empathy with one's group, as well as rational considerations. If one feels as a member of a group, what is good for the country can be seen as good for oneself.

For most behaviour related to collective action and public goods, national identity and country attachment matter more than local community attachment. One possible explanation is that regulations in East-Central European countries are mostly made, and public goods created and protected at the national level. It does not mean, however, that other, more de-centralised approaches are not possible which would then place more emphasis on local identities.

Noting the strong impact of national identity on political participation, we conclude that if a person feels a part of the political community, they will also be more likely to experience a sense of duty and responsibility to participate in its political processes. Thus, strengthening national identity and tying it to civic duty can help to alleviate the “weakness of civil society” (Howard 2003) in post-communist ECE countries.

Local identity – the attachment of an individual to his community – does matter for the public good and collective action, too, and engagement in voluntary work is already benefitting from local community ties established by activists. In the Baltic states and the Czech Republic community

attachment is, unfortunately, low for a significant part of the population. Urbanization processes are partly responsible for this, and partly – the diminishing role of the church in society, but other explanations are also possible, which are beyond the scope of this study, such as a general anomie and the atomization of society typical of the countries of the former Soviet bloc.

It is interesting to note that preference for cooperation and a belief in the efficiency of cooperation, and most of all empathy seem to be the backbone of donating behaviour, and also significantly influence engagement in voluntary work, over and above the effect of group identity. The lack of regard for and confidence in their fellow citizens in post-communist countries due to atomization and fragmentation of society, as argued by Paldam and Svendsen (2000), can hinder such contributions. Generalized trust, however, does not have an impact on collective action that would be independent from group belonging and the aforementioned social factors.

Another interesting finding is that the effect of group identity and attachment wanes when trust and cooperation indicators are taken into account. Instead, generalized trust appears as a factor that facilitates tax compliance (or lack of trust – tax evasion). This result lends further support to experiment-based economic theories arguing that people need to have confidence in the honesty and fair contribution of others in order to contribute accordingly themselves. This lack of trust in ECE countries (Uslaner 2010 and others) is likely among the reasons for high levels of tax evasion observed in this region (Gërzhani 2004). Attachment to one's country of community can facilitate trust in fellow citizens and, thus, indirectly reduce tax evasion.

The fact that empathy and preference for cooperation appear as some of the important drivers of green behaviour is not surprising, as people's actions in one part of the world may impact on other parts of the world even more. However, the independent effect of country attachment and national belonging remain, testifying to the separate role of group identity.

Our analysis also shows that ethnic divisions and detachment from one's ethnic group among some minority groups in ECE can hinder contribution to the common good. However, it is possible to compensate with a stronger national identity, which is no less important in the context of the public good.

Overall, our study provides clear evidence that measures to strengthen national and local identity could help solve the problem of collective action, as well as public goods and common-pool resource dilemmas in ECE. On the other hand, national chauvinism, while it can facilitate collective action in the form of political participation or donating, does not increase environmental consciousness and may even be associated with tax evasion.

In conclusion, the analysis performed as part of this paper indicates that it is important to preserve local and national identities, ideally without the element of national chauvinism as one of the sources of collective action and the creation of the public good.

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Inta Mieriņa

Ieguldījums sabiedrisko labumu nodrošināšanā un kolektīvo resursu saglabāšanā Centrālajā un Austrumeiropā: nacionālās un lokālās identitātes loma

Kopsavilkums

Izaicinājumi, kas saistīti ar sabiedriskā labuma radīšanu un iesaistīšanos kolektīvā rīcībā postkomunistiskajās valstīs, iepriekš bijuši saistīti ar uzticēšanās trūkumu, sabiedrības sadrumstalotību, vāju pilsonisko kultūru, “pilsoņi pret valsti” mentalitāti vai pat izplūdušu morāli. Viens no faktoriem, kura ietekme esošajā literatūrā nav pietiekami izpētīta, ir kolektīvisma loma, ko raksturo pieķeršanās noteiktai grupai un identificēšanās ar to. Šī raksta mērķis ir izpētīt, vai daudzām Centrāl- un Austrumeiropas valstīm raksturīgā spēcīgā nacionālā identitāte var palīdzēt atrisināt kolektīvās rīcības, kā arī sabiedriskā labuma un kopējo resursu dilemmas. Darba pamatā ir liela mēroga salīdzinošs pētījums par 14 Austrumeiropas un Centrāleiropas valstīm. Analīze atklāj, ka stipra pieķeršanās savai tautai un valstij var veicināt kolektīvu rīcību – iestāšanos dažādās grupās un biedrībās, ziedošanu un brīvprātīgo darbu, kā arī iesaistīšanos politiskās aktivitātēs. Tas arī veicina ieguldījumu sabiedriskajā labumā, godīgi deklarējot un maksājot nodokļus un rūpējoties par vidi. Pozitīvo efektu var izskaidrot dažādi, taču, kā liecina mūsu analīze, tas, visticamāk, ir balstīts gan uz empātiju pret savu grupu, gan uz racionāliem apsvērumiem.

Atslēgvārdi: sabiedriskais labums, kolektīvā rīcība, nacionālā identitāte, Centrālā un Austrumeiropa

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BASIC HUMAN VALUES AS DETERMINANTS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS INEQUALITY IN LATVIA: EVIDENCE FROM THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY

Various scholars have addressed the issue of so-called conditional justice, referring to the differing impacts of one's income and socioeconomic status on the belief regarding what should be the 'just and fair' distribution of income and welfare in a society. Up to now, research has focused mostly on individual-level factors like income and personal affluence, education, and gender, as well as country-level determinants like income inequality, welfare regime, GDP, and unemployment rate, but relatively seldom taking into account attitudinal factors like human basic values, extensively elaborated by Shalom Schwartz and his collaborators. The authors hypothesize that basic human values may have some explanatory potential. The goal of the current paper is, therefore, to explore the impact of values on the belief that Latvians have on what constitutes a fair society from Round 9 of the ESS Justice and Fairness module and also to reconsider the influence of other factors addressed in previous studies.

***Keywords:** justice and fairness, inequality, income and welfare distribution, basic human values, European Social Survey*

Introduction

In Round 9 of the European Social Survey (2018), a set of questionnaire items measuring people's attitudes towards justice and fairness was proposed by an international team of scholars led by Stefan Liebig, Professor of Sociology at Bielefeld University in Germany (European Social Survey 2018). The proposal was grounded in the observation that European societies had experienced hitherto unseen increases in various dimensions of social inequality in the last decade. It was argued that this increase was conditioned, above all, by the emergence of more flexible labour markets (and thus less secure jobs), the surging demand for technological skills in a wide range of occupations, and changes in the social structure of European countries. Socioeconomic instability, rising unemployment, and widening support for populist and radical political parties were largely brought about by the 2008 financial crisis and the failures of national and European institutions to respond to its negative impact on people and the politics of Europe. The introduction of severe austerity measures that were, often unwillingly, adopted by a number of countries under the pressure of international bodies, involving a radical reconsideration of national welfare policies as well as large-scale job losses in both the public and private sectors of the economy, instigated discussions on what constitutes a 'just' and 'fair' distribution of social goods and resources among academics, politicians, opinion leaders, as well as the general public.

The module proposed by Liebig's team aimed to fill the research gap, both in the literature and in social measurement instruments, on how people perceive and evaluate different aspects of inequality. While a large degree of inequality endangers the legitimacy of social and political institutions and puts core democratic values under question, major experiments undertaken in the last century with the aim to create an ideal and egalitarian society were associated with violence. These proved to be economically unsuccessful and determined the gap between east and west of the European continent that is still evident today, and even reinforced by

the outcomes of the 2008 recession. Thus, it can be anticipated that neither of these extremes can ensure optimal socioeconomic development and a high standard of living and that some sort of equilibrium should be maintained between the freedom of achievement and the redistribution of certain resources to those who are in need. This requires, in turn, a better and fuller understanding of what equality and inequality means to people, and by what kind of criteria they form their opinions of whether – and how much – inequality can be tolerated or justified. The perceptions of justice and fairness, then, are seen – both conceptually and empirically – as tightly bound with the level of inequality in a society, the notions of reward for efforts, support for the poor, and redistribution of social goods and values. Now we turn to a review of recent studies on this subject-matter.

Literature Review

A number of research papers in the past decade have focused on public attitudes towards justice and fairness with regard to the redistribution of socially important resources. For example, Azar et al. (2018) studied the relationship between income, egalitarian values and attitudes towards healthcare policy by analysing the data of 29 countries from the 2011 International Social Survey Programme dataset. They found the effect of income to be small and statistically insignificant for attitudes towards government involvement and public funding. On the other hand, the willingness to pay taxes to improve healthcare services demonstrated a positive correlation with people's earnings. An egalitarian attitude was found to be positively associated with support for government involvement in healthcare provision, and this effect was found to hold across different socio-demographic groups.

In an earlier study, somewhat narrower in scope but still thought-provoking and interesting, Burak (2013) focused on American attitudes towards extremely high incomes. The theoretical foundation of his study is built upon a clash of two different approaches to explaining the

differences in attitudes towards income. The first of the two, labelled the 'self-interest approach', is based upon the observation that those who are in an advantaged position in society tend to hold more positive or justifying views on inequality; Burak cites a number of other studies providing empirical evidence for this observation (Hasenfeld & Rafferty 1989; Kluegel & Smith 1986; Svallfors 1997). It is being contested by the 'moral economy approach' which stresses the importance of values as factors that influence policy preferences, and argues that these values can originate from motives other than mere self-interest, and even people who are well-off may support the welfare state on the grounds of moral conviction (cf. Mau 2003), although such views may not stem from egalitarianism.

The goal of Burak's study was to investigate whether Americans support the notion of what he referred to as social maximum – namely, whether a certain level of income exists which it is morally wrong to exceed, regardless of its linkage to individual talents, hard work, legitimacy of the earnings, or how beneficial the income earner's business is to the rest of society. The findings show that three-fifths of Americans are favourable of a cap on compensation; this support remains stable even when high earners are presented as very productive or hard-working. Support for the compensation cap was justified by a perceived scarcity of resources and a concern that high earnings are disproportional to their contribution; the general orientation towards equality was also of importance here. On the other hand, the commitment to free market values, the idea that one should own what he or she deserves, and seeing compensation caps as a restriction on individual freedom predicted the opposition to the idea of limiting one's extremely high earnings.

Drawing upon French, British, and German data from Round 4 of the European Social Survey, Likki and Staerkle (2014) developed a typology of attitudes towards social solidarity and social control. They see them as "two basic modes of regulation of social groups that aim at a stable, effective and morally justifiable group organization" (Likki & Staerkle 2014, 407). While social solidarity puts emphasis on providing support to

less advantageous groups in a society, such as the poor, the old, or the sick, and developing welfare programs aimed at the fulfillment of everyone's basic needs, the social control approach seeks to maintain social stability by means of developing and enforcing norms of acceptable behaviour and punishing those who attempt to deviate from them. The authors present the United States and Scandinavian countries at opposite poles of the control and solidarity spectrum; while the former exercises zero tolerance policy and relatively low levels of redistribution, the latter provide high standards of social security and offer a variety of welfare programmes. Likki and Staerke found the preference for social solidarity over social control to be positively correlated with higher income and education levels, thus contradicting the self-interest hypothesis reviewed in detail by Burak (2013). At the same time, the emphasis on control versus solidarity was found to be associated with lower levels of education, while the level of income showed no relation to preference for social control. In addition, the preference for both low solidarity and low control was predicted by a combination of higher income and lower subjective material vulnerability. Finally, those favouring both high solidarity and high control showed lower levels of both income and education and also demonstrated higher levels of subjective vulnerability (operationalized as feeling oneself to be physically and socially insecure).

Australian attitudes to inequality and redistribution were examined in a study by Saunders and Wong (2013). Bearing in mind the widespread perception of Australia being a fairly egalitarian country on the one hand, and the global increase in inequality since the 1980s on the other, they outlined puzzling evidence from surveys conducted in Australia where the perception that income differences are too large does not translate to higher support for redistribution policies. While agreement with the former statement may exceed 80 per cent, the proportion of those favouring governmental interventions to reduce the income gap draws support from less than half of the population. For operationalizing and measuring the relevant attitudes, they proposed and used a battery of four questions, each measured by a 5-rank agree-disagree scale:

- *The gap between rich and poor is too great and should be reduced*
- *Incomes at the top are too high and should be reduced*
- *Incomes at the bottom are too low and should be increased*
- *Large differences in income are necessary to maintain Australia's economic prosperity*

Somewhat contrary to implications from the study by Likki and Staerkle (2014), the Australian survey results suggest that people's attitudes towards inequality and redistribution are influenced, first and foremost, by their own perceived socioeconomic position and are not stable over time. People's demographics and value orientations seem to be of a secondary nature. As Saunders and Wong (2013, 73) conclude, "those with more economic resources are most opposed to redistribution because it threatens to change existing status hierarchies in ways that will adversely affect them".

Dallinger (2010) analysed the 1999 International Social Survey Programme data from 23 countries, most of them located in Europe but including also the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Her study focused on comparing citizens' responses to a set of two questions, '*Differences in income in [this country] are too large*' and '*It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high income and those with low income*' and comparing the impact of both individual-level and country-level factors that explain variations in people's attitudes towards income inequality and the role of the government in addressing this. In the course of the study, Dallinger found that the support for inequality-reduction policies is conditional upon the state of the economy in a given country. If it is stable and highly developed, people assign less importance to welfare measures and will largely rely on the market to satisfy their needs. On the contrary, turbulence and decline make people put more hope in the government's efforts to reduce the negative consequences thereof. On the whole, Dallinger's conclusions seem to echo those drawn from the Australian study by Saunders and Wong (2013) with the notable exception that the latter study put much more emphasis on country-level factors. It should be noted, however, that

Dallinger's study is based on data gathered more than 20 years ago and therefore could not take into account recent shifts in the state of the economy, welfare systems, and value orientations of the past decade.

Recent studies have foregrounded and examined the linkage between attitudes towards income inequality and meritocracy. For instance, Roex et al. (2019) studied the interplay and joint influence of the social position of individuals and perceived meritocratic attitudes towards income inequality. Drawing on the 2009 International Social Survey Programme survey in 39 countries and operationalizing the attitude to income inequality with a single five-rank question about the extent to which respondents believe that *'income differences [in country] are too large'*, they find that different social strata show more polarised attitudes towards inequality in societies where income is seen as evidence of individual effort and hard work. In particular, social strata with a low income and less education were more hostile towards income inequality in societies that were perceived to be meritocratic, i.e. linking achievement to personal effort and ability.

Ignacz (2018) has addressed international differences in attitudes to income inequality in Western and Eastern Europe in the light of political history and socialization. Criticising the focus on macro level differences that prevailed in inequality research until recent times, Ignacz argued for incorporating the socialization and upbringing effects in parts of Europe with a different political legacy (socialist versus non-socialist). Outlining her reasoning, Ignacz drew upon the observation that overall, individuals in post-socialist countries hold quite different beliefs about inequality than those living in countries that did not experience state socialism and a planned economy. She elaborated a set of hypotheses aimed at calculating the effect of socialism, measured as the duration of exposure of individuals in Eastern Europe to a socialist regime in their formative years, i.e. up to 16 years of age. Ignacz found that in general, people from post-socialist countries tend to view income inequality as more unfair than their Western counterparts, and those who have spent little or none of their formative years under socialism tend to show more acceptance of income inequality than those who grew up during the socialist era.

Langsæther and Evans (2020) explored the impact of social class membership on the desirability of income inequality – a challenging endeavour taking into account the abundance, variety, and often lack of comparability of approaches to measuring social class. They measured inequality preferences with a single European Values Study 10-point item asking people to choose their position between two extremes: “incomes should be made more equal” (1) and “there should be greater incentives for individual effort” (10) and assessed class membership using a complicated EGP class schema developed by Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992; Erikson, Goldthorpe & Portocarero 1979). They also included variables to measure class position of respondents’ parents to account for socialization in their formative years which was previously shown to have an impact on political values and attitudes. They also measured household income, unemployment experience, dependence on social security in the last five years, and autonomy (i.e. freedom to make decisions in one’s job) as potential predictors of attitudes to inequality. As for the results, Langsæther and Evans found the higher service class and the self-employed to justify income inequality, while workers and routine non-manual employees showed a similar degree of support for income redistribution. Gender differences are less pronounced although women tend to favour redistribution slightly more than men do. On the other hand, age, education, as well as the socialization effect showed to exert little to no influence on attitudes to inequality.

As could be seen above, some studies (e.g. Azar 2018; Burak 2013) stressed the importance of incorporating values as determinants of attitudes towards inequality rather than relying on self-interest as the principal explaining factor. According to the seminal definition given by Schwartz (1992), values should be understood as concepts or beliefs that refer to desirable goals that motivate action, transcend specific actions and situations, and serve as standards or criteria thus guiding the selection or evaluation of actions, policies, people, and events, and can be ordered by importance relative to one another. Their universal nature warrants the assumption that the importance of certain values and their prevalence over

opposing ones could explain variations in attitudes towards inequality. From the ten basic human values (Self-Direction; Stimulation; Hedonism; Achievement; Power; Security; Conformity; Tradition; Benevolence; Universalism) identified and repeatedly confirmed in international comparative social research (Schwartz 1992; Schwartz & Bardi 2001; Vecchione et al. 2014) the most interesting to explore is the impact of achievement, power, security, and universalism on attitudes towards inequality.

The selection of these four values for further analysis is justifiable by their content and hypothetical impact on the attitudes of interest (see Schwartz 1992). Achievement embodies the orientation towards personal success by demonstrating competence according to social standards, and thus is linked to meritocratic attitudes dealt with in the studies reviewed above with a more positive stance towards inequality. Similar to achievement, power prioritizes social status and prestige, as well as control or dominance over people and resources. On the other hand, security emphasizes safety, harmony, and the stability of society, of relationships, and of oneself, and one can expect a more positive attitude towards equality and redistribution from those holding onto this value. And last but not least, universalism promotes understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature and can be expected to correlate positively with equality and redistribution.

Research Hypotheses, Data, and Method

The main goal of the study is to discover the impact of the four basic human values selected (achievement, power, security, and universalism) on societal attitudes towards inequality and redistribution in Latvia, one of the Baltic countries that participated in Round 9 of the European Social Survey. Acknowledging that people's thoughts on inequality and redistribution cannot be measured with a single item (a shortage of some of the previous studies reviewed above), the authors utilize four questions from the Justice and Fairness module in Round 9 of the ESS that draw specific

images of what constitutes a fair society based on different scenarios of wealth distribution and acceptance of inequality (Table 1). It is noteworthy that items G26 and G27 echo the two poles of the European Values Study 10-point question on whether incomes should be made more equal and whether greater incentives for individual effort should be used to measure inequality preferences, as argued by Langsæther and Evans (2020).

Table 1. Measures of attitudes towards inequality and redistribution
(outcome variables)

Item number in ESS Round 9 questionnaire	Variable name in ESS Round 9 dataset	Item label	Response options (recorded)
G26	sofrdst	A society is fair when income and wealth are equally distributed among all people.	1 – Disagree strongly 2 – Disagree 3 – Neither agree nor disagree 4 – Agree 5 – Agree strongly
G27	sofrwrk	A society is fair when hard-working people earn more than others.	
G28	sofrpr	A society is fair when it takes care of those who are poor and in need regardless of what they give back to society.	
G29	sofrprv	A society is fair when people from families with high social status enjoy privileges in their lives.	

The basic human values of achievement, power, security, and universalism are seen as the main predictors of attitudes in the analytical model proposed by the authors. In line with the Schwartz value theory and the approach to measuring values practically, survey respondents are presented with a list of 21 fictitious people, each featuring a description containing two statements, for example:

- It's important to him (her) to show his abilities. He (she) wants people to admire what he (she) does

and asking the respondent to indicate how much the described person is similar to the respondent and offering six response options on a Likert-type scale (very much like me; like me; somewhat like me; a little like me; not like me; not like me at all). The 21 descriptions are then used to construct the respondents' scores on a total of 10 values; thus, every value is constructed using descriptions of two people, except for universalism that features descriptions of three made-up persons.

Table 2 presents the survey questions used to construct each of the four values selected as predictors of the attitudes of interest. The variables for the four selected values were constructed using guidelines written by Shalom Schwartz and available from the ESS website (Schwartz, n.d.).

Table 2. Schwartz's human values scale items contributing to each value

Human value	Survey items constituting the respective value
Achievement	It's important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does.
	Being very successful is important to him. He hopes people will recognise his achievements.
Power	It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.
	It is important to him to get respect from others. He wants people to do what he says

Human value	Survey items constituting the respective value
Security	It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety.
	It is important to him that the government ensures his safety against all threats. He wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.
Universalism	He thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life
	It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him. Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them.
	He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him.

The household total net monthly income is incorporated into the analysis as the control variable, measured as income deciles from the 1st (lowest) to 10th (highest). Another measure of inequality, the perceived sufficiency of income with four ordered response categories ‘*Living comfortably on present income*’, ‘*Coping on present income*’, ‘*Finding it difficult on present income*’, and ‘*Finding it very difficult on present income*’, is also included in the analysis. Following the insights from the studies by Burak (2013), Likki and Staerkle (2014), Roex (2019) and Langsæther and Evans (2020), presence/absence of higher education is also included as a control variable, as well as gender. In recognition of the multi-ethnic population composition of Latvia, we include a dummy variable denoting whether the respondent’s first mentioned ancestry is Latvian versus other. Finally, age and age squared (to account for possible non-linearity of the association) are included as control variables in the regression.

As the core differences in inequality attitudes are expected to be related to the basic human values, we formulate five research hypotheses on their anticipated impact on images of a fair society:

H1 A positive relationship is to be expected between the achievement value and the association of fairness with higher reward for hard-working people (Item G27).

H2 A positive relationship is to be expected between the power value and the justification of privileges for people of high social status (Item G29).

H3 A positive relationship is to be expected between the universalism value and the support for equal distribution of income and wealth (Item G26).

H4 A positive relationship is to be expected between the universalism value and the support for care of those who are poor and in need, regardless of what they give back to society (Item G28).

H5 A positive relationship is to be expected between the security value and the support for care of those who are poor and in need, regardless of what they give back to society (Item G28).

In order to account for the relative importance of values while checking the hypotheses, separate linear regressions for each of the Justice and Fairness items are conducted including all of the selected human values. Also, in order to confirm the findings by Saunders and Wong (2013) regarding the relationship between support for redistribution and economic well-being, we formulate an additional hypothesis on the association between G27 and the perception of the household's income:

H6 Those with a relatively worse perception of their household's well-being will demonstrate lower support for the image of fair society when hard-working people earn more than others.

Latvians' Perceptions of a Fair Society

Prior to establishing the relationship between basic human values and images of a fair society, it pays to explore and compare the levels of agreement with each of the four statements representing these images. This initial and basic step in the analysis can provide a general picture of what Latvians believe to be a fair society through the lens of attitudes towards

inequality and redistribution. Moreover, for items G26 and G27 of Round 9 of the ESS questionnaire, cross-tabulations can indicate whether equal distribution of income and wealth among all people and allowing hard-working people to earn more than others are seen by the respondents as ‘natural’ opposites that mutually exclude one another (as one would theoretically expect from their wording).




Figure 1. Attitudes towards inequality and redistribution in Latvia (%)

Source: ESS Round 9 Latvian data.

The picture that emerges from the frequency distributions is highly ambivalent. On the one hand, there is a clear demand for a just reward for hard work, as more than 85 per cent of respondents agree with the idea that in a fair society, hard-working people should earn more than others. At the same time, people are largely opposed (almost 59 per cent, with 16 per cent undecided) to the idea of privileges for those originating from high social status families. Moreover, despite the overwhelming majority supporting the principle of larger rewards for harder work, more than 45 per cent agree that an equal distribution of income and wealth among all people is an indicator of a fair society. As agreeing with statement G26 obviously implies rejecting G27, there seems to be a striking contradiction in the minds of many Latvian people regarding the elements of a fair society, something that warrants further exploration by cross-tabulating the responses to these questions (see Table 4).

Table 3. Cross-tabulation of Latvians' responses to ESS Round 9 questionnaire items G26 and G27

	<i>G27 (society is fair: hard-working people earn more than others)</i>					
<i>G26 (society is fair: income and wealth are equally distributed among all people)</i>	Disagree strongly	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Agree strongly	Total
Disagree strongly	5	5	1	18	32	61
Disagree	1	23	11	138	102	275
Neither	1	8	19	61	33	122
Agree	0	17	14	174	66	271
Agree strongly	3	3	2	17	98	123
Total	10	56	47	408	331	852

Pearson chi-square = 190.12, p < 0.001. Entries are numbers of respondents.

Table 3 confirms the ambivalence observed above in Figure 1. As seen from the cross-tabulation, quite a large proportion of the respondents (355 or 41.7 per cent out of 852 respondents, the cells highlighted in grey on the bottom right) agree simultaneously with both statements that appear mutually exclusive. Additionally, a small number disagreed with both G26 and G27 (34 or 4 per cent out of 852, cells highlighted in grey on the top left). This leads to the conclusion that for marginally less than one-half of the respondents, the criteria of a fair society do not appear as mutually exclusive, i.e. it was possible for them to agree or to disagree with both of them at the same time. Interestingly, quite a similar response pattern is observable in other countries that participated in Round 9 the ESS. For example, the proportion of people agreeing with both G26 and G27 is fairly large in the two neighbouring Baltic countries, namely, in Estonia (21.7 per cent) and Lithuania (27.7 per cent), but still considerably less

than in Latvia. In Poland, the respective proportion is close to that of Latvia (41.7 per cent), and some West European countries show even higher percentages of respondents agreeing with both G26 and G27 which is similar to Lithuania and Estonia (34.9 per cent in Germany and 33.9 per cent in the United Kingdom).

We now turn to a series of linear regression analyses to explore the possible effects of the pre-selected human values of achievement, power, security, and universalism on perceptions of a fair society as represented by items G26 to G29 in Round 9 of the ESS questionnaire while including also the control variables specified in the research hypotheses section.

The first item subject to analysis represents the highly egalitarian view of what makes a society fair, as it requires that income and wealth are equally distributed among all people in a society. Despite its obvious association with radical economic leftism (and its repercussions with the recent Soviet past in Latvia), the proportion of Latvians that strongly agree or agree with the statement is anything but marginal. Table 4 sets out the results of the analysis.

Table 4. Results of regression analysis for G26 – Society is fair when income and wealth are equally distributed

Factor	B	Std. Err.	p-value	Beta
Achievement	0.02	0.06	0.79	0.01
Power	0.01	0.06	0.89	0.01
Security	0.01	0.07	0.94	0.00
Universalism	0.17	0.09	0.07	0.09
Ancestry: Latvian	-0.35	0.10	0.00	-0.14
Higher education: yes	-0.25	0.12	0.03	-0.09
Gender: female	0.11	0.10	0.26	0.05
Age	-0.03	0.01	0.04	-0.48
Age squared	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.37

Factor	B	Std. Err.	p-value	Beta
Income: comfortable	<i>reference category</i>			
Income: coping	0.05	0.21	0.82	0.02
Income: difficult	0.26	0.24	0.27	0.10
Income: very difficult	0.22	0.29	0.45	0.05
Income decile	-0.01	0.02	0.80	-0.01
Constant	4.08	0.42	0.00	.
R-squared	0.06			
N	763			

Contrary to the anticipation formulated in Hypothesis 3, we do not see that any of the four basic human values has any statistically or even substantially significant effect on support for the equal redistribution of income and wealth. Only universalism shows a slightly stronger and positive relationship with G26, but the $\beta = 0.09$ is still to be considered weak and the p-value of 0.07 exceeds the conventional level of statistical significance. Still, this result can signal that a stronger (and more significant) relationship may be found in other ESS countries and thus warrants further research on this issue. Substantially and statistically significant associations include negative coefficients for ancestry (ethnic Latvian respondents are less likely to support equal distribution of income and wealth than minorities) and education (as respondents with a higher education record find such a redistribution less attractive than those who do not hold a tertiary degree). All that being said, Hypothesis 3, as formulated in our study, should be rejected. We now turn to the opposite statement, G27 – society is fair when hard-working people earn more than others.

Table 5. Results of regression analysis for G27 – Society is fair when hard-working people earn more than others

Factor	B	Std. Err.	p-value	Beta
Achievement	0.01	0.05	0.78	0.01
Power	-0.12	0.05	0.01	-0.11
Security	0.08	0.05	0.08	0.07
Universalism	0.08	0.09	0.37	0.05
Ancestry: Latvian	-0.18	0.07	0.01	-0.09
Higher education: yes	-0.12	0.10	0.22	-0.06
Gender: female	-0.12	0.08	0.16	-0.06
Age	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.70
Age squared	0.00	0.00	0.03	-0.53
Income: comfortable	<i>reference category</i>			
Income: coping	-0.46	0.16	0.01	-0.25
Income: difficult	-0.47	0.20	0.02	-0.23
Income: very difficult	-0.48	0.23	0.04	-0.14
Income decile	-0.02	0.02	0.34	-0.06
Constant	3.69	0.33	0.00	.
R-squared	0.12			
N	792			

The immediate conclusion from the data in Table 5 is that Hypothesis 1 (the only one pertaining to G27) should be rejected. The achievement value does not show any significant relationship with rewarding hard-working people. However unexpectedly, this is where power comes into play, showing a negative association with support for G27. The larger the importance of power, the less likely it is that respondents would support higher rewards for hard-working people. This is a puzzle indeed as the wording of items making up the power value emphasizes wealth

(importance of being rich) and respect from others (that is usually expected, inter alia, in response for hard work and the fruits of one’s labour). Just as with G26, ethnic Latvians are less inclined to support higher rewards for harder work than non-Latvians, while age presents a significant but substantially minor positive effect. The strongest of the reviewed factors affecting people’s attitudes towards the image of a fair society as depicted in G27, however, appears to be their subjective assessment of the financial situation of their household. Respondents who describe their ability to live on the current household income as ‘coping’, as well as ‘difficult’ and ‘very difficult’, are more likely to disagree with the image of a fair society in which harder-working people receive higher rewards. This confirms Hypothesis 6.

The next fair society item, G28, promotes help to those who are poor or in need, regardless of whether they give something back. Thus, in contrast to G26, it does not call for a radical egalitarian overhaul of society but rather suggests providing help to those who find themselves in a disadvantageous situation. This image enjoys widespread support among Latvians (almost 75 per cent), being second only to higher rewards for hard-working people (item G27 with more than 85 per cent supporting it).

Table 6. Results of regression analysis for G28 – A society is fair when it takes care of those who are poor and in need, regardless of what they give back to society

Factor	B	Std. Err.	p-value	Beta
Achievement	-0.04	0.04	0.37	-0.04
Power	-0.03	0.05	0.58	-0.03
<i>Security</i>	<i>0.10</i>	<i>0.05</i>	<i>0.06</i>	<i>0.08</i>
<i>Universalism</i>	<i>0.13</i>	<i>0.07</i>	<i>0.08</i>	<i>0.09</i>
Ancestry: Latvian	-0.22	0.08	0.01	-0.11
Higher education: yes	-0.03	0.09	0.73	-0.01

Factor	B	Std. Err.	p-value	Beta
Gender: female	0.02	0.08	0.81	0.01
Age	0.01	0.01	0.55	0.17
Age squared	0.00	0.00	0.61	-0.13
Income: comfortable	<i>reference category</i>			
Income: coping	-0.18	0.16	0.28	-0.09
Income: difficult	-0.31	0.18	0.09	-0.15
Income: very difficult	-0.35	0.22	0.10	-0.09
Income decile	-0.01	0.02	0.59	-0.03
Constant	3.85	0.40	0.00	.
R-squared	0.05			
N	772			

Hypotheses 4 and 5 were specifically designed to test the relationship between G28 and the values of security and universalism. The evidence presented in Table 7 provides a somewhat inconsistent answer to the question. The hypothesized relationships are clearly there and they are positive, but their significance level minimally exceeds the conventional level of 0.05. Again, ancestry appears as the strongest factor of all included in the regression, with ethnic Latvians being less likely to agree that a fair society should be judged by the way it cares for those who are poor and in need. None of the control variables (gender, age, education, and income) substantially and significantly affect the (dis)agreement with G28. From a substantial perspective, Hypotheses 4 and 5 can be deemed to be confirmed, however, the lack of statistical significance of these results does not warrant the generalization of this finding to the Latvian society at large.

Hypothesis 2 expects those prioritizing power to agree more with item G29 (a society is fair when people from families with high social status enjoy privileges in their lives). The proportion of Latvians who agree with this is the least among all four items of a fair society, i.e. less than

25 per cent. As follows from a negligible, statistically insignificant regression coefficient for power (Table 7), this factor does not affect agreement with G29. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is to be rejected. Interestingly, it is the security factor that shows an almost significant association ($p = 0.06$) with G29, although it is negative, implying that a higher degree of stratification in society is undesirable for those respondents who prioritise security with its motivational goals of safety, harmony, and stability of society (Schwartz 1992).

Table 7. Results of regression analysis for G29 – A society is fair when people from families with high social status enjoy privileges in their lives

Factor	B	Std. Err.	p-value	Beta
Achievement	0.06	0.06	0.31	0.05
Power	-0.01	0.06	0.92	-0.01
Security	-0.11	0.06	0.06	-0.09
Universalism	-0.15	0.09	0.08	-0.09
Ancestry: Latvian	0.13	0.10	0.18	0.06
Higher education: yes	0.06	0.09	0.49	0.03
Gender: female	-0.05	0.09	0.61	-0.02
Age	-0.01	0.01	0.40	-0.21
Age squared	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.28
Income: comfortable	<i>reference category</i>			
Income: coping	0.30	0.18	0.08	0.14
Income: difficult	0.34	0.19	0.08	0.14
Income: very difficult	0.23	0.25	0.36	0.06
Income decile	0.03	0.02	0.13	0.08
Constant	2.34	0.38	0.00	.
R-squared	0.04			
N	766			

Discussion

All in all, the four basic human values selected did not show strong positive relationships with images of a fair society set forth in Round 9 of the ESS questionnaire. Their power to predict support for certain images of a fair society based on demand for equal distribution (G26), award for hard work (G27), care for the deprived (G28) and acceptance of privileges for high-status individuals (G29) should be seen as relatively weak. That said, the present study is limited to Latvia only, and the conclusions outlined here might not hold in societies with a traditionally greater support for equality, such as Scandinavian countries, or societies emphasizing individual responsibility and respect for achievements stemming from hard work, like the USA (cf. Likki & Staerke 2014).

Achievement and power, both being self-enhancement values, were not found to exert any substantial influence on items G27 and G29 in Round 9 of the ESS questionnaire that represent a favourable stance towards inequality. This leads to the conclusion that Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 are to be rejected. On the other hand, security and universalism revealed a relationship with equality and redistribution-oriented statements G26 and G28 that is positive, although weak and marginally above the conventional border of statistical significance, so Hypotheses 4 and 5 can be confirmed if only one refrains from further generalization. Finally, Hypothesis 6 is the only one that appears confirmed and generalizable: those who are worse off are less likely to consider a society fair if hard-working people earn more than others.

Analysing the regression results for item G26, the conclusion is drawn that equal distribution of income and wealth are more likely to be seen as a feature of a fair society by ethnic non-Latvians and younger people. Those having a higher education degree also are more in favour of income equality, echoing the findings by Saunders and Wong (2013). At the same time, neither of the four values of achievement, power, security and universalism shows a statistically significant impact on selecting the equal income distribution as the criterion of a fair society; moreover, the regres-

sion coefficient signs for security and universalism are negative, suggesting that they could have shown a negative association with support for income and wealth equality. This runs contrary to what could be expected from the orientation of the security value toward harmony and stability and that of universalism to appreciation and protection of all people.

The selection of higher rewards for hard-working people (item G27) shows a significant association with power only, but the association is negative – a finding just as counterintuitive as the findings on the absence of significant impact of the selected human values on support for equal distribution. The puzzle why those prioritising power (represented by richness and respect in the Schwartz value scale) are more likely to reject the meritocratic attitude represented by item G27 warrants deeper inquiry in future research. For the present, our supposition is that the image Latvians have of what makes a fair society is contradictory *ab initio*, as was shown by the cross-tabulation analysis presented in Table 3. Indeed, with more than 45 per cent of respondents agreeing with statements G26 and G27 that are, in essence, mutually exclusive, the negative association between the power value and support for meritocracy can be just yet another finding grounded in the deep inconsistency of people's perceptions of a fair society. What does appear consistent is the relationship between subjective well-being and the support for power. People who indicate that they are coping with their present income, or find it difficult or very difficult to cope, are less likely to support a meritocratic image of a fair society than those who claim that they live comfortably on their present income. Also, ethnic Latvian ancestry was found to be negatively associated with support for item G27.

Item G28 emphasized that in order to consider society fair, it needs to care for those who are poor and in need. Here, we do not see any significant relationship between any of the four selected values and the statement of interest, although security and universalism values show positive associations, the statistical significance of which only slightly exceeds the conventional threshold of 0.05. Yet again, ethnic Latvian ancestry is negatively related to item G28, suggesting that ethnic minorities are more

supportive of caring for those in need. Gender, age, and perception of income do not seem to contribute much to variation of support for this image. Finally, none of the factors in the regression model are significantly related to support for item G29 (*A society is fair when people from families with high social status enjoy privileges in their lives*). In general, the very wording of this item does not seem to be suited to societies with a lack of long-standing, traditional class divisions as those previously unique to the United Kingdom and some other West European societies.

We find ethnic Latvian ancestry to be negatively associated with items G26 and G28, emphasizing equal distribution of income and wealth and the importance of care for those who are in need. Thus, ethnic minorities appear to be more egalitarian and inclusive in their image of a fair society which might be ascribed to their own less advantageous position. However, this assumption fails to explain why ethnic Latvians seem to be less supportive of item G27 which promotes meritocracy, quite contrary to popular stereotypes portraying ethnic Latvians as cherishing private initiative and individual achievements more than predominantly Russian-speaking minorities of this country. Again, this might be linked to an inconsistent combination of the vision of a fair society, held by slightly less than half of the sample (see Table 3).

We also find that it is not uncommon for people to agree simultaneously with substantially opposing images of a fair society, as illustrated by items G26 (support for equal distribution of income and wealth) and G27 (support for meritocracy and harder-working people earning more). A further look into the distribution of responses in the UK, Germany, Poland, Estonia, and Lithuania shows that holding contradictory views is not uncommon for other European countries with long-standing differences in their economic, political and societal development. The research problem regarding people who hold contradictory beliefs has been extensively studied simultaneously in psychology where it is sometimes referred to as cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957), i.e., a mental state in which contradictory cognitions or behaviours cause psychological discomfort; it should be noted, however, that determining whether people do

indeed feel such a discomfort goes beyond the scope of the European Social Survey and the data it provides. Alternatively, one can explain contradictory beliefs with cognitive polyphasia, a term coined by Moscovici 1961/1976/2008 and defined by Jovchelovitch (2002) as the “state in which different kinds of knowledge, possessing different rationalities, live side by side in the same individual or collective”. As argued by Martinez (2018, 3.2), its essence is in “individuals maintain[ing] varying modes of thinking, which are contextually activated based on [the] social setting”. For example, survey participants may show support for equal distribution of income and wealth in a society in general and believe at the same time that persons deserve to be individually rewarded for hard work more than those who are less sedulous or productive. Thus, egalitarianism on the societal level can get along with meritocratic attitudes when thinking about the most desirable image of fairness at the individual level.

Cognitive polyphasia theory can successfully explain but does not solve definitively the contradiction discussed above. We believe that this warrants further research into how well the ESS Justice and Fairness items setting forth apparently different and contradictory images of a fair society are able to differentiate between their supporters. Thus, another promising approach would involve survey experiments to compare the distribution of responses in two variants of the questionnaire, the first one presenting G26 and G27 one after another and the other one presenting a forced-choice question in which respondents would need to select the equal distribution or the meritocracy scenario. In a similar way, Ronald Inglehart measured people’s materialist versus postmaterialist value orientations (e.g. Inglehart 1977; Inglehart & Abramson 1999).

And last but not least, the stable presence of ancestry as a statistically significant predictor of opinions on what kind of society can be viewed as fair suggests that it should be considered in more depth in further analysis in Latvia as well as in other societies marked by ethnic, linguistic, or political divisions.

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Cilvēku pamatvērtības kā determinantes attieksmēm pret nevienlīdzību Latvijā: liecības no Eiropas Sociālā pētījuma

Kopsavilkums

Dažādi pētnieki ir pievērsušies tā sauktā nosacītā taisnīguma jautājumam, ar to domājot ienākumu un sociālekonomiskā statusa ietekmi uz pārliecību par to, kādai jābūt “taisnīgai un godīgai” ienākumu un labklājības sadalei sabiedrībā. Līdz šim pētījumi tika vērsti galvenokārt uz indivīda līmeņa faktoriem, piemēram, ienākumiem un personīgo labklājību, izglītību un dzimumu, kā arī uz valsts līmeņa noteicošajiem faktoriem, piemēram, ienākumu nevienlīdzību, labklājības režīmu, IKP un bezdarba līmeni, taču salīdzinoši reti tika ņemti vērā attieksmes faktori, piemēram, cilvēka pamatvērtības, kuru izpētei pievērsās Šaloms Švarcs un viņa līdzstrādnieki. Raksta autori pieņem, ka cilvēka pamatvērtībām var būt nozīmīgs skaidrojošs potenciāls. Tāpēc šī darba mērķis ir izpētīt vērtību ietekmi uz Latvijas iedzīvotāju pārliecību par to, ko nozīmē taisnīga sabiedrība, izmantojot ESS 9. kārtas Taisnīguma un godīguma moduļa jautājumus.

Atslēgvārdi: taisnīgums un godīgums, nevienlīdzība, ienākumu un labklājības sadalījums, cilvēka pamatvērtības, Eiropas Sociālais pētījums

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CROSSING SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES: CAN PRECARIITY MOBILIZE THE POLITICAL DISAFFECTION OF LATVIANS AND RUSSOPHONES?

Ethnic tensions have a long history in Latvia. Ever since the restoration of independence in 1991 Latvian society has experienced the symbolic confrontation between the ethnic Latvian majority and Russophone minority. Militant ethnopolitics and societal cleavages have overshadowed a persistent socioeconomic inequality. This paper seeks to explore whether the precarity induced by a neoliberal order can replace ethnocultural identification as an ideological source of tensions in Latvian society. In particular, the paper focuses on support for an alternative political system and to what extent such support can be explained by precarity and sympathies towards left-wing communitarian ideas. These findings suggest that precarity may enable trans-ethnic cohesion. Yet, this should not automatically imply that an ethno-linguistic element becomes irrelevant in terms of regime change.

Keywords: *precarity, political system, autocracy, technocracy, Russophones*

The past decade in Latvia was marked by militant ethnopolitics. Being predated by the ethnopolitics of previous decades, the temperature of ethnic issues remained high. The so-called language referendum in 2012 enabled constitutional reforms that introduced explicitly ethnonational foundations of the Latvian state (Ijabs 2016). Conversely, the annexation

of Crimea and subsequent proxy war of Russia in eastern Ukraine made Latvian politicians more concerned with Russia's influence and information operations in Latvia. The education reform adopted in 2018 was yet another ethnopolitical landmark that was set to make Latvian language as the only language of instruction in all schools. At the same time, the consequences of the economic recession (2008–2010) have exacerbated the issues of social inequality. By affecting both the ethnic Latvian majority and Russophone minority, this has empowered the discourse of failed state and precarity (Kaprāns 2019). A swift stratification and social tensions have, arguably, incited a trans-ethnic political resentment. Taking into account these somewhat diverse processes, my paper seeks to find out to what extent precarity can challenge the existing ethno-cultural boundaries and form an ideological basis of alternative solidarity, thus mobilizing Latvian people for political change.

This paper follows rather recent attempts to look for alternative conceptual perspectives and empirical contexts that would help avoid the dichotomization of inter-ethnic relations and shed light on the potential of emerging conviviality between ethnic Latvians and Russophones. Regardless of militant ethnopolitics, scholars have observed a persistent and strong identification with Latvia among Russian-speakers (Kaprāns & Mieriņa 2019; Duvold et al. 2020, 30–37). It has been argued that Latvians and Russophones maintain a relatively small social distance (Kaprāns et al. 2021) and are prone to mix with each other on an everyday level through the practices of “banal integration” (Ekmanis 2017) and “horizontal citizenship” (Jašina-Schäfer & Cheskin 2020). Media scholars also suggest that Latvian and Russian-speaking audiences are not isolated entities as they may share media repertoires (Kaprāns & Kudors 2017; Vihalemm & Juzefovičs 2022). On the other hand, studies focusing on generational dynamics have pointed to the fragmentation of Russophone identity that enhances more convivial culture and mutual inclusion (Laizāne et al. 2015; Cheskin 2016). Meanwhile, Agarín and Nakai (2021) insist that many Latvians, regardless of their ethnicity are united by disaffection with the Latvian state and political system. Bringing

forward ethnonational rather than socioeconomic issues, they argue, translates into political objection or dejection during national elections. However, studies so far have not sought to understand to what extent the precarity of Latvian citizens serves as yet another unifying context that may enable political attitudes towards the existing political system in Latvia.

Precarity and political disaffection

Precarity as a social phenomenon has become a research field within which different political subjectivities and political identities emerge. This field is particularly pertinent to the criticism of neoliberal capitalism. Standing (2011) has argued that labor relations in the neoliberal economies form a new dangerous class – the precariat – which includes a very wide spectrum of social categories, from flexible and fixed-term workers to immigrants. This emerging class “consists of people who have minimal trust relationships with capital or the state” (Standing 2011, 8). Meanwhile, Savage et al. (2013) have significantly narrowed the definition of the precariat to include only people with low economic, social and cultural capital. Political analysts tend to refer to the precariat as a culturally embedded class category to explain the phenomenon of “left behind” people who voted for Brexit in the UK or Donald Trump in the US (Mattoni 2012; Norris & Inglehart 2019). Precarious people have also formed an ambiguous, but handy category to describe social changes in the Baltic states and Central Europe, where demographic trends have caused a fear of nation-killing depopulation and fueled a political hatred of Western liberalism (Krastev & Holmes 2020).

The concept of the precariat, however, imposes an essentialized view on the insecure segments of society. In this respect, “precarity” demonstrates a greater analytical value as it helps to define socio-economic conditions in which uncertainty and vulnerability become a permanent and differentiating social fact. Regional disparities, low status, low wages, corporate insecurity of employees in front of the administration of organiza-

tions and institutions are social phenomena that can be associated with insecurity (Volchik et al. 2018). Precarity as a relational category is not only rooted in labor relations, as Standing believes, but it is understood “as a mode for rethinking heterogeneous identities and group formations under neoliberal capitalism” (Jørgensen 2016, 960). Thus, the threat to ethnic identity can also be considered as a likely source of precarity that affects the political behavior of society.

Socioeconomic insecurity and vulnerability can create new political subjectivities that challenge the structural conditions shaped by conflicting ethnic identities. Such precarity has the ability “to form a common social space for struggle” (Jørgensen 2016, 966) that manifests itself in a demand for regime change or significant reforms of the political system. Latvia is one of the most unequal EU countries in terms of income, where during the economic recession a distinctly neoliberal strategy was implemented to overcome the crisis, placing the greatest responsibility on the shoulders of its citizens (Ozoliņa 2019). Massive emigration embodied this individualistic ethos. Neoliberalism and nationalism as Dace Dzenovska has put it, were not able to provide “everyday ethics that makes life livable” (Dzenovska 2012, 181). This has exacerbated the failed state discourse in the past decade, thereby overshadowing the discourse of ethno-politics. The discursive shifts towards neoliberal consequences prompts the first research question (RQ1): Can socioeconomic precarity and a communitarian ethos mobilize shared support for changes in the political system among Latvians and ethnic minorities?

In a broader sense, precarity refers to any way of being characterized by existence without predictability or security, affecting one’s material or psychological welfare. Immigrants are often cited as a prototype of a precarious group. However, during the Soviet occupation, Russophone immigrants in Latvia themselves caused precarity among Latvians. After the restoration of Latvia’s independence, anxiety about the uncontrolled influx of Soviet immigrants transformed into concerns about the claims of Russian-speakers regarding identity. This has effectively established ethnic relations as a permanent element of precarity. The attitude

towards language and history has remained as a symbolic fault line that divides the “Latvian” and “Russophone” political actors. This, among other things, has constrained the spread of political liberalism (Dzenovska 2018).

Since the collapse of the USSR, Russia’s compatriot policy and the “culturalist program” of Latvia’s ruling parties (Laitin 1999) have laid the foundation for the “regime divide” that Duvold et al. (2020, 42–45) define through different attitudes towards market economy, political regime and international politics. Therefore, economic conflicts in Latvia are subordinated to cultural conflicts (Eihmanis 2019). Meanwhile, a considerable income inequality has been observed among Latvians and Russian-speakers in the previous decade that has perhaps encouraged Russian-speakers to emigrate more than Latvians (Vilerts & Krasnojorovs 2017; Hazans 2019). Regime divide, marginalization of Russophone political actors and income inequality create a state of precarity that also may enable the demand for fundamental changes in Latvia’s political system. At the same time, the theory of diversionary nationalism claims that across the countries and over time, where economic inequality is greater, nationalist sentiments are substantially more widespread and that nationalism then works to divert attention from inequality, so many citizens neither realize the extent of inequality nor demand redistributive policies (Solt 2011).

Ethnocultural nationalism can indeed be seen as an anesthetic. It helps ethnic Latvians to reduce the social pain caused by an unequal society. However, persistently low trust in state institutions shows that the contradiction between ethnocultural nationalism and low state legitimacy may also mobilize support for changes in the political system. Alternatively, Latvian nationalism does the opposite to the Russian-speaking part – it may exacerbate precarity and a sense of inequality that also manifests itself in higher political disaffection. The second and third research question of this paper are embedded in these different considerations of precarity that arise from the problems of nationalism and state performance: (RQ2) Can socioeconomic precarity and weak nationalism

mobilize support for regime change among ethnic Latvians? (RQ3) Can socioeconomic precarity and weak nationalism of Latvia's ethnic minorities mobilize support for regime change?

Methodology

In order to find answers to the research questions, I use data from the European Values Survey (EVS). This is a cross-national survey that provides time series data on the basis of a standardized methodology (see European Values Study). In the paper, I explore the data obtained in the summer of 2021 (May–September). The nationally representative sample size for this survey was 1,335 respondents.

The EVS data are analyzed by multinomial logistic regression. This regression type allows the evaluation of the influence of multiple independent variables on the dependent variable that consists of more than two unordered categories. I have included groups of independent variables in the regression models that can help me to answer the research questions (Appendix 1). The first group of independent variables are standard demographic indicators. It should be noted that EVS provides data only about the nationality of respondents that do not allow to distinguish the Russian-speaking category, as is the case in other surveys. For this reason, I use the category of ethnic minorities that is mostly made up of Slavic respondents (93%) and can be reasonably considered as a proxy variable representing the Russophone segment of Latvian society.

The second set of variables includes indicators related to socioeconomic precarity. In order to reduce similar variables, a factor of socially responsible democracy was created combining respondents' sympathies with left-wing communitarian ideas. The third group of independent variables consists of the identity indicators that allow the effect of national ties on political attitudes to be measured. Three factors of weak national attachment were created from these indicators: (1) weak national belonging, (2) irrelevance of inherited/primordial identity, and (3) irrelevance of

acquired identity. These factors help to distinguish the impact of ethnocultural and civic elements in regression models.¹ The fourth set of variables is made up of political attitude indicators by which another factor was created – a negative attitude towards Latvia's political system. I included this factor in the research design to test the persistence of the explanatory power of socioeconomic and identity factors. In the regression analysis, the support of Latvians for three alternative political systems (henceforth also called political alternatives) is used as the dependent variable. The first alternative focuses on a strong leader who does not depend on parliament and elections. This alternative represents support for a rather autocratic political system. The second alternative offers a technocratic political system in which experts, not the government, make decisions about the country's development. Support for both political systems was defined as a third category of dependent variable and is called the technocratic autocracy alternative. Abstaining from any of these alternatives was defined as the reference category in multinomial regression models.

In the last decade, support for the autocratic alternative has significantly decreased in Latvian public opinion, while support for the technocratic alternative has remained high (Figure 1). Over time, public opinion in Latvia has demonstrated moderate but sustained support for a strong leader (Kalniņa 2018, 112–113). However, support for a tough leader is currently more polarizing than trust in experts. On the other hand, support for the hybrid alternative, or technocratic autocracy, demonstrates more inconsistent dynamics.

¹ Agarin & Nakai (2021, 26) have used the same identity variables in their study to construct the Antipathy to Latvia Nationalizing Policies factor. The EVS identity variables reveal how respondents perceive national identity and polity rather than their attitude towards Latvia's nationalizing policies. Thus, Agarin & Nakai have interpreted identity variables too broadly and have not distinguished the obvious differences between the dimensions of acquired and inherited identity.




Figure 1. Support to alternative political systems in Latvia (%)

Note: these results are calculated relative to the total number of respondents who expressed a specific opinion, i.e. did not choose the answer “Don’t know”. The share of respondents who did not know what to answer to both questions is 6%.

The baseline model of the regression analysis accounts for aggregate data that provide an answer to the first research question (RQ1). In the second model, I have distinguished only the answers of Latvian respondents, and in the third model those who identify with one of the ethnic minorities. By comparing regression results in two subpopulations, it is possible to answer RQ2 and RQ3. In the following, I use multinomial logistic regression to test the effects of various factors on three different political alternatives (Appendix 2). I have calculated the odds ratio, whereby reference above 1.0 reflects a positive impact and values below 1.0 show a negative impact on the dependent variable. I compare the odds ratio to state that a larger (or smaller) odds ratio has a larger (or smaller) impact over other parameters. All models reported in this paper meet the Likelihood-ratio-test and Goodness-of-fit criteria.

Results

The first multinomial regression model reveals an aggregate effect. According to these results a preference for technocratic autocracy is the least affected by various factors (Figure 2). Essentially, indifference towards the acquired identity is the only factor that increases support for technocratic autocracy. More diverse effects are illuminated by other political alternatives. Sympathy for a socially responsible democracy and communitarian ideas, as well as dissatisfaction with the current political order in Latvia, increases support for technocratic governance. However, the irrelevance of acquired identity prompts even stronger support. That is, excluding national identity from one's positioning strategy may increase the attraction of a technocratic alternative. At the same time, the irrelevance of inherited identity reduces support for the technocratic alternative. Hence even weak primordialism on aggregate level favors the maintenance of political status quo in Latvia. Finally, Model 1 reveals that the significance of a socially responsible state also increases support for the autocratic alternative, but weak national attachment and dissatisfaction with the current political system reduce the likelihood of choosing this political alternative.

Model 1 demonstrates that ethnic Latvians are less likely to support the technocratic alternative, whereas other alternatives do not show significant inter-ethnic differences. The data also indicate that support for technocratic autocracy and autocracy increases among a less formally educated part of society. It is precisely these two alternatives that are most supported in Latgale, the most Russophone, but also the most socio-economically deprived Latvian region. Model 1 suggests that households with low or medium incomes enhance support for technocratic autocracy. Age groups also exert a significant effect: support for autocracy increases within the second oldest cohort (49–64), while support for the technocratic alternative significantly decreases within the second youngest cohort (35–48).




Figure 2. Impact of different factors on support for political alternatives (Model 1)

Note: Odds ratios of multinominal regression analysis are reported. Reference above 1.0 reflects a positive impact and values below 1.0 show a negative impact on the dependent variable.

Model 2 demonstrates how support for regime changes is conditioned among ethnic Latvians (Figure 3). The importance of a socially responsible democracy reinforces the support of Latvians for technocratic and autocratic alternatives by 15% and 25% respectively. Support for technocracy increases significantly (2.1 times) if the irrelevance of acquired identity is taken into account. Simultaneously, indifference towards inherited identity reduces the support of Latvians for this alternative. Thus, there is a certain tension between civic-oriented and primordial-oriented conceptions of national identity when it comes to the technocratic alternative. Yet, if a weak nationalism factor is replaced by a strong nationalism factor, then, keeping other variables constant, the support of Latvians for all political alternatives increases significantly, whereas the impact of socially responsible democracy disappears.²

Model 3 shows that the demand of ethnic minorities for a socially responsible state also increases support for the technocratic alternative by 53% (Figure 4). Indifference towards acquired identity increases support

² These regression results are available upon request.

for this alternative by 10,8 times, while support for the autocratic alternative increases by 7,4 times. However, weak nationalism reduces affinity towards autocracy, thereby suggesting that a strong leader might evoke ethno-national associations among Latvian Russophones.




Figure 3. Impact of different factors on support for political alternatives (Model 2)




Figure 4. Impact of different factors on support for political alternatives (Model 3)

Model 2 and Model 3 demonstrate that lower education and living in a socioeconomically more deprived region (Latgale) pushes ethnic Latvians towards technocratic autocracy or autocracy. Among Latvians, support for the technocratic alternative is also increasing among salaried

workers, those living in Riga and those in their fifties. But the lower education of ethnic minorities sheds light on a small but statistically significant opposite effect by reducing support for technocratic or autocratic alternatives.

I have checked the robustness of these findings by inputting into Model 4 the individual parameters used to construct five factors.³ This regression analysis upholds interethnic differences with respect to support for technocracy. It also shows that belief that the state makes people's incomes equal particularly increases support for the technocratic alternative. This is also enhanced by the irrelevance of Latvian language as a defining quality of Latvian identity. Meanwhile the role of Latgale retains its impact on increasing support for technocratic autocracy and autocracy.

Discussion

The attitude towards the desired form of political system has highly divided Latvian public opinion. This study shows that precarity and sympathy for left-leaning communitarian ideas can enable indifference towards ethno-cultural identity and increase support for regime change. This is most evident in support for the autocratic model where a strong leader does not depend on election cycles. Simultaneously, the socio-demographic sources of precarity (lower education, economically deprived place of residence, pre-retirement age) also pave the way for autocracy.

Precarity also increases support for a hybrid technocratic autocracy. This, however, does not depend so much on the demand for a state to perform in a socially responsible manner. Moreover, support for "expert governance" or technocracy reveals ethnic differences as ethnic minorities are more likely to sympathize with such an alternative. This study suggests that along with communitarian ideas, Russophones are more attracted by

³ These results are available upon request.

the de-ethnicized image of technocracy. Perhaps the rule of experts is seen as an alternative to the nationalizing political regime of Latvia. Thus, the aggregated data provide an affirmative answer to the first research question of this article (RQ1). Namely, precarity and the ethos of communitarianism can indeed mobilize ethnic Latvians and minorities for regime change, particularly if autocracy or technocratic autocracy is considered as a political alternative.

In light of the second research question (RQ2), it can be argued that socio-economic precarity and the discourse of insecurity in conjunction with weak nationalism are able to mobilize ethnic Latvians to uphold an alternative political system. In particular, the idea of equality and a socially responsible state can encourage Latvians to support autocratic and technocratic alternatives. The sources of precarity – lower incomes and living in areas of potentially higher relative deprivation – may reinforce this support. The irrelevance of ethnic boundaries and weaker nationalism also foster Latvians' opting for regime change. Yet, a strong national attachment and ethno-cultural identity claims may become a more decisive ideological trigger for regime change than communitarian ideas. Specifically, a strong authoritarian leader may resonate with the political imagination of nationally-minded Latvians. This, to some extent, speaks in favor of the diversionary nationalism theory, as identity-based insecurity exerts stronger mobilizing power than socio-economic insecurity.

The idea of a socially responsible state is also able to mobilize Latvia's ethnic minorities for regime change, but that can only be observed in terms of the technocratic alternative. Hence, the third research question (RQ3) receives a positive answer. This mobilization effect is much stronger than one can observe among ethnic Latvians. Here again indifference towards national identity reinforces benevolence towards regime change. Arguably, such a political attitude is directed by the Russophones' desire to distance from Latvia's ethno-cultural reality rather than by socioeconomic precarity.

On a more general level, this study suggests that ethnic issues remain a crucial political resource making it less likely that Latvians and Russo-

phones could treat socioeconomic precarity as a shared and distinctive ideological position. The varying salience of ethno-cultural background and ethnocentrism in these different sections of Latvian society is an ultimate tipping point that may increase or reduce support for an alternative political system. Socioeconomic precarity can certainly expand a unifying political agenda, but it largely cannot erase ethno-cultural boundaries and habitus that define “left behind” people and that shape their revolutionary spirit.

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The data analysis has been performed within the project “Value (trans)formation in uncertain times: social cohesion and neoliberal ethos in Latvia” (Nr. lzp-2020/2-0068).

Appendix 1

Factors	Variables
Support for socially responsible democracy (F1) <i>N=1146</i> <i>Eigenvalue: 1,73</i> <i>Cronbach's Alpha: 0,63</i>	In democracy governments should tax the rich and subsidize the poor (0-10) In democracy people should receive state support in case of unemployment (0-10) In democracy the state should make people's incomes equal (0-10)
Indifference towards inherited identity (F2) <i>N=1310</i> <i>Eigenvalue: 1,61</i> <i>Cronbach's Alpha: 0,75</i>	To be born in Latvia is not important for being considered truly Latvian (1-4) To have Latvia's ancestry is not important for being considered truly Latvian (1-4)
Indifference towards acquired identity (F3) <i>N=1305</i> <i>Eigenvalue: 1,89</i> <i>Cronbach's Alpha: 0,7</i>	To respect Latvia's political institutions and laws is not important for being considered truly Latvian (1-4) To be able to speak Latvian is not important for being considered truly Latvian (1-4) To be able to become a part of Latvian culture is not important for being considered truly Latvian (1-4)
Weak nationalism (F4) <i>N=1218</i> <i>Eigenvalue: 1,37</i> <i>Cronbach's Alpha: 0,54</i>	I do not feel closely connected to Latvia (1-4) I do not feel proud to be a citizen of Latvia (1-4)
Dissatisfaction with political system (F5) <i>N=1267</i> <i>Eigenvalue: 1,68</i> <i>Cronbach's Alpha: 0,81</i>	Latvia is not democratic at all (1-10) Latvia's political system is not satisfactory at all (1-10)

Appendix 2
Results of multinomial regression

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)
Intercept	-1.236	.249		-.220	.865		-6.671	.068	
F1 Socially responsible state	.046	.390	1.047	.048	.415	1.050	.171	.419	1.186
F2 Irrelevance of inherited ID	.009	.955	1.009	.061	.743	1.062	-1.430	.035	.239
F3 Irrelevance of acquired ID	.382	.140	1.465	-.055	.857	.947	4.025	.000	55.984
F4 Week nationalism	-.317	.161	.728	-.134	.598	.875	-2.021	.027	.132
F8 Dissatisfaction with politsyst.	.000	.995	1.000	-.037	.521	.963	.385	.160	1.470
Age = 65+	-.018	.961	.982	-.088	.827	.916	-1.660	.363	.190
Age = 49-64	-.327	.292	.721	-.117	.725	.890	-3.468	.023	.031
Age = 35-48	-.077	.808	.926	.004	.990	1.004	-1.257	.426	.284
Age = 18-34	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.
Education = Lower than secondary	.027	.942	1.027	.161	.699	1.174	-.268	.885	.765
Education = Secondary/ professional	.621	.034	1.861	.702	.025	2.018	1.004	.482	2.729

Technocratic autocracy alternative

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)
Technocratic autocracy alternative									
Education = BA degree	.346	.307	1.414	.391	.279	1.478	.183	.910	1.201
Education = Master/Doctor	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.
Nationality = Latvian	-.044	.888	.957	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.
Nationality = Other	0 ^b	.	.						
Employment = Paid work	.064	.821	1.066	.116	.717	1.123	-1.438	.207	.237
Employment = Other	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.
Income = Up to 500 EUR	.872	.067	2.392	.845	.094	2.328	1.238	.482	3.448
Income = 501-900 EUR	.618	.154	1.855	.682	.135	1.977	.103	.950	1.109
Income = 901-1100 EUR	1.224	.006	3.401	1.359	.004	3.890	-1.117	.946	.890
Income = 1101-2000 EUR	.870	.060	2.388	.928	.061	2.528	1.545	.437	4.686
Income = 2001 and more EUR	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.
Gender = Male	-.050	.814	.951	-.193	.406	.825	2.075	.032	7.962

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			
	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	
Technocratic autocracy alternative	Gender = Female	0 ^b	.	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.	
	LV region = Pierīga	-1.78	.549	.837	-5.07	.124	.602	3.547	.009	34.707
	LV Region = Vidzeme	.761	.032	2.140	.642	.080	1.901	.067	.	1.069
	LV region = Kurzeme	.377	.329	1.459	.419	.333	1.520	-.582	.731	.559
	LV region = Zemgale	.234	.498	1.264	-.129	.727	.879	3.707	.056	40.717
	LV region = Latgale	3.172	.000	23.850	2.258	.001	9.560	24.909	.996	65768563766.230
	LV region = Rīga	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.
	Intercept	-1.770	.109	-1.543	.269	-6.624	.031			
	F1 Socially responsible state	.191	.001	1.211	.146	.021	1.158	.431	.015	1.539
Technocratic alternative	F2 Irrelevance of inherited ID	-.415	.015	.660	-.445	.021	.641	-.935	.094	.393
	F3 Irrelevance of acquired ID	.904	.001	2.470	.742	.028	2.100	2.382	.006	10.825
	F4 Week nationalism	-.056	.813	.945	-.182	.509	.833	.418	.483	1.519
	F8 Dissatisfaction with politsyst.	.065	.268	1.067	.058	.384	1.059	.324	.190	1.383
	Age = 65+	.189	.632	1.208	.416	.347	1.516	-1.778	.300	.169
	Age = 49-64	-.863	.010	.422	-.863	.021	.422	-2.492	.063	.083
	Age = 35-48	-.086	.793	.918	.022	.950	1.023	-.783	.593	.457

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)
Age = 18-34	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.
Education = Lower than secondary	-.904	.037	.405	-.209	.672	.812	-5.015	.003	.007
Education = Secondary/professional	.179	.540	1.196	.471	.152	1.602	-1.377	.197	.252
Education = BA degree	.138	.674	1.148	.364	.320	1.439	-1.340	.304	.262
Education = Master/Doctor	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.
Nationality = Latvian	-.732	.019	.481	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.
Nationality = Other	0 ^b	.	.						
Employment = Paid work	.516	.104	1.676	.746	.048	2.109	-1.024	.309	.359
Employment = Other	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.
Income = Up to 500 EUR	.547	.236	1.727	.416	.425	1.516	2.028	.146	7.601
Income = 501-900 EUR	.198	.620	1.219	.358	.423	1.431	.107	.935	1.113
Income = 901-1100 EUR	.700	.089	2.014	.925	.048	2.521	-.362	.791	.696

Technocratic alternative

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3			
	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)
F8 Dissatisfaction with politicsyst.	-.188	.017	.829	-.155	.087	.857	-.151	.594	.859			
Age = 65+	.362	.504	1.436	.197	.742	1.218	.360	.856	1.434			
Age = 49-64	-.296	.549	.743	-.183	.736	.833	-2.058	.247	.128			
Age = 35-48	.940	.044	2.560	.916	.080	2.499	.457	.794	1.579			
Age = 18-34	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.			
Education = Lower than secondary	-.426	.442	.653	.389	.540	1.476	-5.308	.007	.005			
Education = Secondary/professional	.716	.090	2.046	1.053	.033	2.866	-1.286	.326	.276			
Education = BA degree	-.244	.638	.784	.202	.738	1.224	-2.571	.113	.076			
Education = Master/Doctor	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.			
Nationality = Latvian	-.569	.161	.566	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.			
Nationality = Other	0 ^b	.	.									
Employment = Paid work	-.002	.996	.998	.026	.957	1.027	-1.175	.887	.839			
Employment = Other	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.			

Autocratic alternative

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)	B	Sig.	Exp(B)
Income = Up to 500 EUR	.172	.799	1.188	.362	.639	1.436	1.274	.501	3.577
Income = 501-900 EUR	.004	.995	1.004	.084	.908	1.087	.572	.744	1.772
Income = 901-1100 EUR	-.318	.643	.728	-.591	.487	.554	.414	.822	1.513
Income = 1101-2000 EUR	.053	.937	1.055	-.065	.936	.937	2.468	.223	11.798
Income= 2001 and more EUR	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.
Gender = Male	-.440	.142	.644	-.980	.005	.375	2.111	.044	8.260
Gender = Female	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.
LV region = Pierīga	-.030	.947	.970	.124	.831	1.132	1.757	.180	5.792
LV Region = Vidzeme	1.215	.020	3.369	1.300	.030	3.668	21.620	.999	2451412775.494
LV region = Kurzeme	.533	.374	1.705	.960	.189	2.612	-.841	.643	.431
LV region = Zemgale	.845	.071	2.329	1.112	.047	3.042	2.029	.356	7.608
LV region = Latgale	2.647	.001	14.106	2.806	.001	16.545	20.916	.997	1212296455.333
LV region = Rīga	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.	0 ^b	.	.

Autocratic alternative

Mārtiņš Kaprāns

Šķērsojot simboliskās robežas: Vai nedrošība var mobilizēt latviešu un krievvalodīgo politisko neapmierinātību?

Kopsavilkums

Starpternisko attiecību saspilējumiem ir gara vēsture Latvijā. Kopš neatkarības atjaunošanas 1991. gadā sabiedrība ir pieredzējusi simbolisku konfrontāciju starp etniskajiem latviešiem un rusofono minoritāti. Kaujinieciska etnopolitika un etnolingvistisko kopienu konfliktēšana ir aizēnojusi socioekonomisko nevienlīdzību. Šajā rakstā tiek meklētas atbildes, vai neoliberalās kārtības izraisītā nedrošība var aizstāt etnokulturālo identifikāciju kā Latvijas sabiedrības ideoloģisko avotu. Rakstā īpaša uzmanība ir pievērsta atbalstam alternatīvai politiskai sistēmai un tam, cik lielā mērā šādu atbalstu var izskaidrot ar nedrošību un simpātijām pret kreisi orientētām komunitārisma idejām. Pētījuma rezultāti liecina, ka nedrošība var iespējot pāretnisku saliedētību. Taču tas automātiski nenozīmē, ka etnolingvistiskais elements kļūst nenozīmīgs režīmu maiņas kontekstā.

Atslēgvārdi: nedrošība, politiskā sistēma, autokrātija, tehnokrātija, krievvalodīgie

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VALUE CONSENSUS AND DISCREPANCY AMONG THE MAJOR ETHNOLINGUISTIC COMMUNITIES IN LATVIA: SURVEY DATA ANALYSIS

In this article, values are explored through the lens of differences and similarities in values and attitudes of the two major ethnolinguistic communities in Latvia. The paper examines the existence of a set of core values that is shared by (or at least equally widespread among) the Latvian and Russian-speaking communities in Latvia, as well as other values and attitudes that are still rooted primarily in people's ethnic and/or linguistic self-identification. The value model used in the study is based on the model of Shalom Schwartz's value theory (Schwartz 2012). The analysis is based on data from the European Social Survey (2019) and European Values Survey (2021). The data analysis has been performed within the project "Value (trans)formation in uncertain times: social cohesion and neoliberal ethos in Latvia" (Nr. Izp-2020/2-0068).

Keywords: Schwartz's value theory, ethnolinguistic communities, Latvia

Introduction

Any cross-national analysis provides a general picture of value support in different countries, but it often overlooks the fact that a country may consist of a variety of ethnolinguistic groups each holding different sets of values. Considering that values are generally seen as a part of culture, and are fundamental for one's cultural identity (Smolicz 1981; Phinney, Ong & Madden 2000), a country-level analysis of an ethnically diverse

society, such as Latvia, might provide important additional insight. Arguably, everyday exposure to the majority culture can shape the minority values and attitudes, reducing the inter-ethnic differences (Phinney, Ong & Madden 2000). Yet, it is suggested that value acculturation occurs less rapidly than behavioural acculturation (e.g., LaFromboise, Coleman & Gerton 1993). In Latvia, 63% of the population are ethnic Latvians, 24% – Russians, and 13% – members of other ethnic groups (CSB Latvia 2021). Persons with Russian language as a native language comprise about 36% of the Latvian population (CSB Latvia 2017). As noted in the theory of reactive ethnicities, members of the minority group in a volatile political climate can choose to revitalize their ethnic cultural habits or homeland-oriented identifications (Diehl & Schnell 2006) and can reproduce the regime divide (Duvold, Berglund & Ekman 2020). Studies on media consumption in Latvia have shown that the media audience is largely divided by language (mass media in Latvian and mass media in Russian), and many studies emphasize that the media, especially in Russian, has been used for many years to disseminate biased information about Latvia created in Russia or initiated by Russia (Kudors 2015; Pelns 2010; Spakovska, Jemberga, Krūtaine & Sprinģe 2014). A proportion of Russian speakers in Latvia consume mass media provided by the government of the Russian Federation, where the state has monopolised almost all media assets to produce information products, using money from the state budget (Hanley & Kuzichkin 2021).

The last publication focused on value differences between the two biggest ethnolinguistic groups in Latvia was published in 2018, and it was based on data gathered in 2014 and 2015 (Rungule & Senkāne 2018). New data collected within the European Social Survey (2019) and European Values Survey (2021) provides an opportunity to analyse if the trends discovered in the previous studies are stable. Hence, the research question scrutinized in this article is: to what extent can we talk about shared values in Latvia, or is Latvia a multi-values society split along ethnic lines? The author examines the existence of a set of core values that is shared by (or at least equally widespread among) the Latvian and Russian-speaking

communities in Latvia, as well as other values and attitudes that are still rooted primarily in people's ethnic and/or linguistic self-identification. The value model used in the study is based on the model of Shalom Schwartz's value theory (Schwartz 2012). To understand the differences between the two biggest ethnolinguistic groups, the article also looks at the cleavages and tensions in attitudes identified in previous studies (Kaprāns & Mieriņa 2019; Šūpule, Krastiņa, Peņķe & Krišāne 2004).

This article is organized as follows. First, it provides the theoretical considerations important for analysis of the values and attitudes among the two biggest ethnolinguistic groups in Latvia. This includes both relevant theoretical arguments and existing empirical research. The third section reports on the survey data used for the analysis. After presenting results of the analysis, the final section offers conclusions and discusses the study's limitations.

Theoretical considerations

One of the most influential and highly cited scholars in the sociological study of values is the Israeli psychologist, Professor Shalom Schwartz. The European Social Survey questionnaire includes a measurement of the "Human Values Scale", which is designed to classify respondents according to their basic value orientations.

The model of Schwartz's theory of values is summarized in Figure 1. The ten main motivating values of individuals according to the model of Schwarz's theory of values (Schwartz 2012; Sortheix & Schwartz 2017) are interpreted in the following way: (1) Security is understood as safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships and of self; (2) Conformity is interpreted as restraint of actions likely to upset others and violate social expectations or norms; (3) Tradition is respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self; (4) Benevolence is perceived as preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact; (5) Universalism is understanding, and protection for the welfare

of all and the environment; (6) Self-direction refers to independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring; (7) Stimulation is about excitement, novelty and challenge in life; (8) Hedonism is understood as pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself; (9) Achievement is interpreted as personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards; and finally (10) Power here is a social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources. In Figure 1, a categorization of ten basic values is provided in the structure of a circle, because according to Schwartz's theory, values next to each other are closer on a theoretical continuum, whereas values across from each other are contradictory. All of the most important personal values can be reduced to two value dimensions: self-enhancement versus self-transcendence and conservatism versus openness to change.



Figure 1. Shalom Schwartz's value theory model (Schwartz 2012)
Source: Based on Shalom Schwartz's value theory model (Schwartz 2012)

A study by Rungule and Seņkāne (2018) on cross-comparative comparison of values has provided an in-depth study on different value aspects and theories across different socio-economic groups in Latvia. The

empirical base of their analysis is data gathered in 2014 and in 2015. Their general conclusions about value preferences reveal that, according to the World Values Survey and the European Social Survey, in the Latvian population, secular-rational values dominate over traditional values (WVS), conservation values dominate over openness to change values (ESS), survival values dominate over self-expression values (WVS), and self-transcendence values dominate over self-enhancement values (ESS) (Rungule & Seņkāne 2018, 101). In their work, they have also included an analysis of value preferences between Latvian and Russian linguistic groups. Their main conclusion is that the difference between people speaking Latvian and Russian is not expressed as much as that between age groups. However, those who speak Latvian more often identify themselves with benevolence towards in-group members, while the Russian-speakers tend to espouse universalism supporting welfare for all. At the same time, tradition as a motivational value is more important for Russians; hedonism and stimulation are the characteristics of individuals speaking Latvian in the family (Rungule & Seņkāne 2018, 100). In this article, the author continues the approach of Rungule and Seņkāne (2018) and compares the values of ethnic Russians in Latvia and ethnic Latvians, which leads to examining the extent to which Russians in Latvia have assimilated into mainstream society. Thus, the article examines the existence of a set of core values (based on Shalom Schwartz's value theory model) that is shared by ethnic Latvians and ethnic Russians in Latvia, also looking for differences between the two groups. Differences in various values and attitudes have been identified in several previous studies (Kaprāns & Mieriņa 2019; Šūpule, Krastiņa, Peņķe & Krišāne 2004). Based on what has been identified in these studies, the following main indicators were selected to understand ethnic differences and similarities among Latvians and Russians: 1) Emotional ties with Latvia and Europe; 2) Social distance in different ethnic groups; 3) Attitudes towards gays and lesbians as an indicator of conservatism in different ethnic groups.

Data and methods

The analysis is based on data from the European Social Survey (2019) and the European Values Survey (2021). In this section, the author provides a short description of these international comparative studies, and more particularly – survey rounds, used in the data analysis, and the items analysed.

European Social Survey (ESS)

The ESS is an international comparative sociological study on values and attitudes of the population in more than 30 European countries. This research program was launched in 2002 under the leadership of Roger Mark Jowell and Max Kaase (Jowell, Roberts, Fitzgerald & Eva 2007). In Latvia, the scientific management and implementation of the ESS was provided by the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the University of Latvia from 2003 to 2014. Since 2018, the scientific management and implementation of the ESS is organised by the Institute of Social and Political Studies of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Latvia. Latvia has participated in four phases of the ESS study: in 2006 (Round 3), in 2008 (Round 4), in 2015 (Round 7) and in 2019 (Round 9). The ESS questionnaire consists of two sections (modules), each of which includes approximately 120 measurements. The basic module is kept relatively constant, while two to three rotating modules are included in the questionnaire at regular intervals (different modules are included at different rounds of the study).

The core module covers the following groups of issues: trust in institutions, national, ethnic, religious identity, political participation, prosperity, health and safety, socio-political values, moral and social values, social exclusion, living conditions, education and occupation, financial situation, and demographic indicators.

The rotating modules cover topics such as immigration, civic participation and democracy, the family, work and well-being, the moral aspects of the economy, health and access to help, personal and social well-being,

experiences and manifestations of age discrimination, Europeans' perceptions and assessments of democracy, and more (ESS, 2021).

The data of the ESS-2019 (Round 9) includes a 21-item version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire, developed by Professor Shalom Schwartz. The method of data acquisition for Round 9 in Latvia was a random sample representing the population of Latvia, using the register of addresses. Target group: Latvian residents aged 15 and over. Sample size: 918 respondents. Survey time: 10.10.2019 to 21.01.2020.

The Portrait Values Questionnaire is designed to analyse 10 motivating values which were measured in the questionnaire by 21 indicators. Each of the values is measured by two indicators, while the value of universalism is measured by three. The questions are formulated as a description of 21 people, and the participants of the survey evaluate the similarity of each characteristic to themselves using a 6-point scale (possible answers: Very much like me, Like me, Somewhat like me, A little like me, Not like me, Not like me at all, (Refusal) (Don't know)). The analysis of the data is based on a comparison of the attitudes and values of the two largest linguistic groups in Latvia. The question used to create categories is: What language or languages do you speak most often at home? First answer. This question allowed to create two analysis categories: 72% or 664 respondents who mostly speak Latvian at home, and 26% or 235 respondents who mostly speak Russian at home. 2% mostly speak in another language at home, and this group was not included in the analysis.

The ESS survey data has been used not only in the analysis of value models, but also to understand the sense of belonging to Latvia and Europe of both ethnolinguistic groups and attitudes towards gays and lesbians as an indicator of conservatism. The wording of the questions to understand the sense of belonging to Latvia and Europe is: 1) How emotionally attached do you feel to Latvia? Please choose a number from 0 to 10, where 0 means not at all emotionally attached and 10 means very emotionally attached. 2) And how emotionally attached do you feel to Europe?

To understand the attitudes towards gays and lesbians, agreement with the following two statements has been analysed: (1) “If a close family member was a gay man or a lesbian, I would feel ashamed”; (2) “Gays and lesbians are free to live life as they wish”.

IBM SPSS Statistics 22 software was used in the analysis and a Chi-Square test was used for categorical data analysis. For a Chi-square test in this analysis, a p-value that is less than 0.00 ($p = .00$) indicates there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the observed distribution is not the same as the expected distribution, and a relationship exists between the categorical variables.

European Values Survey (EVS)

The European Values Survey (EVS) is one of the most significant international comparative studies in Europe, focusing specifically on value research. Latvia has been participating in the European Values Survey since 1990, which allows for value analysis for more than thirty years. Previous surveys were conducted in 1990, 1999 and 2008, but the last wave of the survey was conducted in 2021. The implementation of the 5th round of the EVS research in Latvia was ensured by the Institute of Social and Political Research of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Latvia. The target group of the survey consists of permanent residents of Latvia from the age of 18. These age limits are set in accordance with the standards developed by EVS, which have been unchanged since the implementation of the first stage of EVS in 1980 (EVS, 2021). The questionnaire includes questions on (a) family values and marriage, (b) attitudes towards employment and work values, (c) political views and ideology of the population, (d) questions on tolerance, (e) views on religion, (f) socio-economic problems. The sampling method of the study in Latvia envisaged the implementation of a multi-stage stratified random sample, which ensures an adequate representation of all regions and settlements in Latvia in the sample. In order to create a representative sample, anonymized information about the population was requested and received from the Population Register of the Republic

of Latvia. Given that the survey was conducted in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, two survey methods were used: a face-to-face structured computerized interview and a computerized self-completion questionnaire. The respondent in the household was selected using the principle of the nearest birthday (from all adult members of the household, the one who will have a birthday shortly was selected for the interview). To ensure a theoretical net sample size ($n = 1200$), the total gross sample size was 3061 addresses. This means that a total of 3061 addresses selected from the Population Register of the Republic of Latvia, where at least one person over the age of 18 has declared a place of residence, were included in the sample. All in all, 1335 questionnaires were considered valid for analysis. The overall response rate was 44%. To equalize the probability of including the respondents in the sample, data weights were prepared based on the respondents' region of residence, gender and age.

The analysis categories used to analyse the values of ethnic groups in Latvia is based on the question: "What is your ethnicity?". Taking into account the distribution of answers and the purpose of the analysis, three categories of analysis were created: Latvians, Russians and other ethnicities. All in all, there were 75% Latvians, 19% Russians and 6% other ethnicities included in the sample of the EVS in 2021.

The main indicators of the EVS survey selected to understand ethnic differences and similarities were: 1) Social distance in different ethnic groups; 2) Attitudes towards gays and lesbians as an indicator of conservatism in different ethnic groups. To measure social distance, the EVS survey uses an adapted Bogardus scale (Emory S. Bogardus), which is considered a classic tool for measuring attitudes towards different ethnic groups (Babbie 2004). According to Hagendoorn and Kleinpenning (1991), the social distance scale is suitable for assessing negative attitudes that contribute to people's lack of openness and tolerance to other ethnic or social groups. The wording of the question in the EVS questionnaire is: On this list are various groups of people. Could you identify any that you would not like to have as neighbours?

Regarding the attitudes towards gays and lesbians, agreement with the following statement has been analysed: "Homosexual couples are just as good as parents as other couples". The attitude towards gays and lesbians has been viewed as an indicator of the spread of conservatism values in both ethnolinguistic groups.

In the case of data analysis of the EVS survey, IBM SPSS Statistics 22 software was also used, and a Chi-Square test was performed for categorical data analysis.

Results

The main motivating values of individuals according to Schwartz's theory of values

The analysis of indicators based on the model of Shalom Schwarz's theory of values (Schwartz 1992; 2012; Sortheix & Schwartz 2017) reveals that security, benevolence and universalism are the most important values in both Latvian and Russian socio-linguistic groups. However, there are differences in the assessment of those aspects that are not the most significant (not with the highest rating) (Table 1).

The largest number of respondents in both groups of analysis feel similarities with such statements: (1) He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him; (2) It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote himself to people close to him; (3) It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free and not depend on others. (4) It is important to him that the government ensures his safety against all threats; he wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.

Table 1. Schwartz's 21-item measure of human values. Summarized answers: Very much like me, like me, somewhat like me (%)

Statement / Like me	Latvian	Russian	Chi-Square Test Result
Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his own original way.	70%	56%	$X^2(1, N = 888) = 13.0$, $p = .00$
It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.	22%	20%	$X^2(1, N = 893) = 0.5$, $p = .50$
He thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.	82%	77%	$X^2(1, N = 884) = 2.6$, $p = .11$
It's important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does.	47%	51%	$X^2(1, N = 890) = 0.8$, $p = .36$
It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety.	87%	83%	$X^2(1, N = 894) = 1.9$, $p = .16$
He likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life.	69%	56%	$X^2(1, N = 894) = 11.2$, $p = .00$
He believes that people should do what they're told. He thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.	55%	48%	$X^2(1, N = 888) = 2.8$, $p = .09$
It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him. Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them.	85%	81%	$X^2(1, N = 892) = 2.2$, $p = .14$

Statement / Like me	Latvian	Russian	Chi-Square Test Result
It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries not to draw attention to himself.	74%	78%	$X^2(1, N = 895) = 1.3, p = .26$
Having a good time is important to him. He likes to "spoil" himself.	72%	52%	$X^2(1, N = 895) = 27.4, p = .00$
It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free and not depend on others.	91%	88%	$X^2(1, N = 898) = 2.4, p = .12$
It's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for their well-being.	86%	78%	$X^2(1, N = 895) = 7.2, p = .01$
Being very successful is important to him. He hopes people will recognise his achievements.	52%	53%	$X^2(1, N = 891) = 0.0, p = .88$
It is important to him that the government ensures his safety against all threats. He wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.	90%	91%	$X^2(1, N = 891) = 0.2, p = .62$
He looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an exciting life.	36%	27%	$X^2(1, N = 895) = 6.2, p = .01$
It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.	62%	73%	$X^2(1, N = 883) = 7.3, p = .01$
It is important to him to get respect from others. He wants people to do what he says.	55%	58%	$X^2(1, N = 889) = 0.6, p = .43$

Statement / Like me	Latvian	Russian	Chi-Square Test Result
It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote himself to people close to him.	94%	85%	$X^2 (1, N = 895) = 17.4, p = .00$
He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him.	94%	93%	$X^2 (1, N = 900) = 0.4, p = .51$
Tradition is important to him. He tries to follow the customs handed down by his religion or his family.	81%	73%	$X^2 (1, N = 898) = 5.9, p = .01$
He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that give him pleasure.	59%	43%	$X^2 (1, N = 897) = 15.4, p = .00$

At the same time, there are significant differences in attitudes towards such statements: 1) Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his own original way. 2) He likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life. 3) Having a good time is important to him. He likes to “spoil” himself. 4) He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that give him pleasure.

This leads to the conclusion that hedonism and stimulation are more characteristic of the Latvian linguistic group.

Emotional ties with Latvia and Europe

The answers to the question about emotional ties with Latvia reveal that there are differences between Latvian and Russian socio-linguistic groups regarding emotional ties with Latvia ($X^2 (10, N = 913) = 37.7, p = .00$). At the same time, it should be noted that in the Russian linguistic group also a fairly large part of the respondents (68%) feel closely connected with Latvia (compared to 83% in the Latvian linguistic group) (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Emotional ties with Latvia (%). The ESS data. N=916.

In comparison, a significantly smaller number of both Latvian (43%) and Russian (28%) linguistic groups have close emotional ties with Europe. At the same time, it should be noted that the differences between the two groups are statistically significant ($X^2(10, N = 881) = 36.2, p = .00$), and this means that Latvians more frequently have close emotional ties with Europe (Figure 3).

Looking at the answers to the question “Imagine there were a referendum in Latvia tomorrow about membership of the European Union. Would you vote for Latvia to remain a member of the European Union or to leave the European Union?”, it is important to note that 11% of the respondents in the Russian linguistic group did not answer this question because they do not have the right to vote. It is significant that in both Latvian (84%) and Russian (62%) linguistic groups, most respondents positively assess Latvia’s membership in the EU, although the differences are statistically significant ($X^2(5, N = 868) = 92.9, p = .00$), and Latvians are more in favour of Latvia remaining a member of the European Union.




Figure 3. Emotional ties with Europe (%). ESS data. N=884.

Social distance to different groups

The EVS survey data reveal that Latvians and Russians have different social distances and prejudices in certain aspects. For example, regarding homosexuals, it can be seen that 34% of Latvians and 50% of Russians indicate that they do not like to have homosexuals as neighbours, and these are statistically significant differences. At the same time, there are groups against which similar prejudices are directed, for example, Muslims or immigrants. Overall, 36% of Latvians and 34% of Russians say they do not want to live with Muslims as neighbours. However, the most negative attitudes among all ethnic groups are towards living in a neighbourhood with drug addicts and heavy drinkers (Figure 4).




Figure 4. Social distance to different groups (%). EVS data. N=1297.

On this list are various groups of people. Could you identify any that you would not like to have as neighbours?

Attitude towards gays and lesbians

Indicators of conservatism or traditional values in the ESS survey are questions about attitudes towards gays and lesbians. In the questionnaire, they were formulated as statements that respondents either agree or disagree with. The survey data show that in the Latvian linguistic group 41% of respondents agree with the statement “If a close family member was a gay man or a lesbian, I would feel ashamed”, in the Russian linguistic group, 60% agree, and these differences are significant ($X^2(4, N = 801) = 43.4, p = .00$).

Tolerance towards gays and lesbians is measured by attitudes towards expression “Gays and lesbians are free to live life as they wish”. 66% of respondents in the Latvian linguistic group agree with this statement, in the Russian linguistic group – 50% agree with it, and these differences are also significant ($X^2(4, N = 847) = 21.8, p = .00$) (Figure 5).




Figure 5. Attitude towards the statement: Gays and lesbians are free to live life as they wish (%). ESS data. N=850.

In the EVS survey (2021), the statement “Homosexual couples are just as good as parents as other couples” is less often supported among Russians (9%) than among Latvians (18%), and there are significantly more of those who disagree with such a statement (79% among Russians and 62% among Latvians) (Figure 6). These data reveal again that there is a more conservative view of homosexuality among Russians than among Latvians.




Figure 6. Attitude towards statement: Homosexual couples are just as good as parents as other couples (%). The EVS data. N=1215.

In general, the analysis of the survey data shows that the main differences between the Latvian and Russian linguistic groups are related to conservatism and intolerance towards gays and lesbians.

Conclusions

In this article differences and similarities in values and attitudes of the two major ethnolinguistic communities in Latvia were explored through the methodological approach and theory of Shalom Schwartz, which allowed to compare personal values of the Latvian and Russian-speaking communities in Latvia. The comparative analysis of the ESS data revealed that security, benevolence, and universalism are the most important values in both Latvian and Russian linguistic groups. At the same time, among other values, hedonism and stimulation are more characteristic to the Latvian linguistic group. This confirms what has been observed in previous studies (Rungule & Seņkāne 2018).

The study of personal values was supplemented by the analysis of different other issues, previously identified as relevant when looking for value differences. Using an adapted Bogardus scale, the article also looked at the social distance between different groups of people in society. The comparative analysis of the EVS survey data showed that Latvians and Russians have different social distances and prejudices in certain aspects. For example, Russians more often than Latvians do not want to live next door to homosexuals. Importantly, Russians or Russian speakers more often express negative attitudes towards different statements on gays and lesbians. At the same time, it should be stated that homophobia is widespread among Latvians, too, although it is more pronounced among Russians in Latvia. All in all, the study leads to the conclusion that when looking at values and attitudes of the two major ethnolinguistic communities in Latvia, there are differences in feelings of belonging, attitudes towards the EU, and attitudes towards gays and lesbians, but very small in terms of Schwartz's values. The main conclusion of the article is that there are fewer differences between Latvian and Russian socio-linguistic groups

in the context of the values and attitudes considered than it is constructed in different groups in society.

From a methodological point of view, it should be noted that this article used EVS (2021) data and ESS (2019) data, and regarding the last dataset there were some limitations to explore values at the level of ethnic groups. Due to the lack of a question about the ethnicity of respondents, in the case of the ESS survey, the analysis was focused on similarities and differences between linguistic groups, not ethnic groups (those who mostly speak Latvian and those who mostly speak Russian at home). Hence, in the case of the EVS survey, the analysis is focused on similarities and differences between ethnic groups (Latvians and Russians). As a limitation of this study, it should be noticed that ethnic groups and linguistic groups only partly coincide in Latvia. Although the Latvian ethnic group and the group of Latvian language users overlaps by 97% (Šūpule 2012), because only 3% of those who say that they are ethnic Latvians do not have the Latvian language as a native language. The situation is significantly different among the Russian linguistic group in Latvia, where not only Russians, but also Belarusians, Ukrainians, Poles, and others say that their native language is Russian and the language mostly spoken at home is Russian.

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Inese Šūpule

Līdzīgais un atšķirīgais vērtību atbalstā divu lielāko Latvijas etnolingvistisko kopienu vidū: aptaujas datu analīze

Kopsavilkums

Šajā rakstā vērtības ir pētītas caur divu lielāko Latvijas etnolingvistisko kopienu vērtību un attieksmju atšķirību un līdzību analīzi. Galvenais šeit aplūkotais pētnieciskais jautājums ir divu Latvijā lielāko lingvistisko grupu attieksmju un vērtību salīdzinājums: kas ir kopīgs un kas ir atšķirīgs? Pētījumā izmantotā vērtību izpētes pieeja ir Šaloma Švarca vērtību teorijas modelis (Schwartz 2012). Analīzes pamatā ir Eiropas Sociālā pētījuma (2019) un Eiropas Vērtību pētījuma (2021) dati. Datu analīze veikta projekta “Vērtību maiņa nestabilos apstākļos: sabiedrības saliedētība un neo-liberālais ētoss” (Izp-2020/2-0068) ietvaros.

Atslēgvārdi: Švarca vērtību teorija, etnolingvistiskās kopienas, Latvija

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THOU SHALT NOT KILL EXCEPT... ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, SUICIDE AND THE DEATH PENALTY – JUSTIFICATION IN RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR POPULATIONS OF LATVIA

United Nations and Council of Europe documents recognize human life as a universal value. However, there are differences in the application of this principle in practice, since exceptions are allowed by the laws of different countries allowing medical abortion, assisted suicide, euthanasia, and the death penalty. In addition, citizens are not unanimous on the question of when the ending of one's own life or that of another is justified.

The aim of the article is to find out the relationship between the religious identity of the Latvian population and attitudes towards four morally controversial phenomena such as abortion, euthanasia, suicide, and the use of the death penalty, using data from the European/World Values Studies of 1996 and 2021. The article uses cluster analysis and linear regression.

This study finds that in 2021, society has demonstrated less justifiability of abortion, euthanasia and suicide compared to 1996. Statistically significant differences between religious and non-religious populations are observed in attitudes towards abortion and euthanasia, while differences in attitudes towards suicide and the death penalty are less pronounced.

Keywords: European/World Values studies, morally debatable behavior, right to life, death, abortion, euthanasia, suicide, death penalty

Introduction

The *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, adopted by the United Nations in 1948, states that “everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person” (Article 3). Further and broader reference to the right to life is found in the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966: “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life” (Article 6). Similarly, Paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the *European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms* adopted by the Council of Europe in 1950, declares: “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No-one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.”

These texts imply that the right to life is universal, i.e., it is a fundamental right pertaining to every single human being, and that the legal obligation of protecting the above right lies with the member states of the United Nations and the Council of Europe respectively. In practice, matters are considerably more complicated, and the universality of the right to life can sometimes be questioned. One exception may be the death penalty – the *European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms* makes reference to this. None of the documents cited above mention abortion, euthanasia or assisted suicide. Legal approaches to these issues vary from country to country and so do debates within societies. It is reasonable to assume that the religious perspective features prominently in these debates since questions concerning life and death are central to any religious culture, even if faith doctrines and the attitudes of their followers to end-of-life issues vary in specific cases. The matters are complicated by a lack of agreement on when life starts and when it ends. In Europe, religious attitudes are generally more restrictive than legal systems. In brief, “the problem of the right to life is the stretchable interpretation of this right and the difficulty of clearly defining what

the negative and positive responsibility and obligation of the state is” (Zieberts & Zaccaria 2019, 2).

Historically, the European religious landscape is dominated by Abrahamic monotheistic religious traditions. Christianity, Islam, and Judaism do not envisage individual life as sacred and valuable in itself, but rather as a precious gift from the Creator who remains the sole authority in control of it. European societies may have become more secular but has this changed the approach to how they view the value of human life?

In this article, we do not intend to join the discussion on the secularization of Europe. The causes, spread, features and dimensions, the meaning of the term itself – all lie beyond the scope of this study. Generally, we would agree that “modernization undermines the power, popularity, and prestige of religious beliefs, behavior and institutions” (Bruce 2011, 21). The question is to what extent? Adherents to the “privatization of religion thesis” would argue that modernization does not put an end to religions. Rather, and particularly in Europe, religious beliefs and practices become more individualized while church membership and attendance have declined in most European countries (Davie 2003; Hervieu-Léger 2003). Some sociologists argue that religions are also moving back into the realm of public debate. Jose Casanova dated this move back to the 1980s (Casanova 1994), the period that coincided with *Perestroika* in the USSR (from 1985 onwards) and, at the end of that decade, with the movement for restoration of national independence of the Republic of Latvia. The re-emergence of the public presence of religion in Latvia also dates back to that time.

Where are we now? Earlier studies (Misāne 2014; Misāne & Niklass 2016; Niklass & Misāne 2019, Krūmiņa-Koņkova & Misāne 2018) have described the contemporary religious milieu of Latvia as a space where the majority of the population value religious organizations highly but only a small minority tend to participate actively in religious life. Religious beliefs are individualized, and orthodoxy levels are low. Latvian society demonstrates high religious diversity. Three of the largest denominations are Evangelical Lutheran, Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox while

other Christian groups (Baptists, Adventists, Old-Believers, etc.) and non-Christian religions are represented in smaller numbers. About one third of the Latvian population do not identify with any religion and a few percent identify as atheists.

Since the national awakening in the late 1980s, religious dignitaries have not hesitated to express their views on a wide array of issues, especially where morals are concerned, and they often refer to the fact that the majority of Latvian residents self-identify as Christians. However, the beliefs of the Latvian population remain insufficiently studied.

In this article, we attempt to uncover one aspect of the attitudes of the Latvian population towards end-of-life issues. We will use data from the latest wave of the European Values Study/World Values Survey (EVS/WVS). EVS/WVS is a cross-national survey of human values, first carried out in Europe in 1981 and later extended worldwide. It was designed by the European Value Systems Study Group (EVS. History 2022). Latvia has participated in only a few surveys conducted according to a similar methodology. EVS/WVS data archives contain separate arrays of Latvian data for 1996, 1999, 2008 and 2021. In this article the latest data of 2021 will be analyzed (EVS 2021), but for comparison we will also use the oldest available data – 1996 data (EVS 2022). The twenty-five years that have passed between these two waves seems a sufficient timespan to exhibit any significant changes in moral developments.

The EVS and WVS contain questions concerning the justification of a number of morally ambiguous and/or illegal behaviors. Respondents are asked whether each of these behaviors is justified, on a 10-point scale from ‘never justified’ to ‘always justified’.

This article focuses on the attitude to four exceptions: where the universality of the right to life may be questioned. The principal research question is about the relationship between the religious identification of Latvians and their justification of abortion, euthanasia, suicide, and the death penalty (capital punishment).

The article will present results solely for Latvia and at this stage of our research we will not offer broader international contextualization.

Methodology

To identify relatively homogeneous groups of respondents based on selected characteristics of religious identity, we used a k-means cluster analysis algorithm. The cluster membership variable was used for analysis of the association with dependent variables as well as for linear regression. We used an eight-cluster solution based on religious participation, importance of religion, religious beliefs, religious self-identification, trust in the church and level of indoctrination.




Figure 1. Conceptual model

Final cluster center analysis description was used for interpretation of clusters (see Annex 1).

As background variables, we used respondents' age, gender, ethnicity, level of education, region of residence and household income.

Concerning attitudes to abortion, euthanasia, suicide, and the death penalty, in the EVS/WVS survey questionnaire the following items are relevant: "Please, tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in

between”. Respondents had to indicate their answers on a rating scale from 1 (never justified) to 10 (always justified).

We used multiple hierarchical regression to predict the dependent variables of justifiability of abortion, the death penalty, euthanasia, and suicide. Hierarchical multiple regression provides the option to enter the independent variables into the regression equation in the order of our choice, to achieve control for the effects of covariates on our results and to consider possible causal effects of independent variables when predicting dependent variables.

A Chi-square test of independence was applied to determine the relationship between justification and adherence to religious faith (denomination).

To determine the overall fit (variance explained) of each model, statistically significant changes of adjusted R^2 can show how much extra variation in the dependent variable can be explained by addition of religiosity clusters as independent variables. To determine the relative contribution of each of the predictors to the total variance explained, we use statistically significant B and beta coefficients (see Annex 2 and Annex 3).

There are six groups of religious indicators in the data: participation in public or private religious practices (prayer, church attendance), denominational affiliation/religious self-identity (i.e., how respondents think of themselves), importance of religion, indicators of religious belief in particular entities like God, the afterlife and reincarnation, Heaven/Paradise and Hell, and the level of indoctrination – i.e., how close individual beliefs are to the teachings of their religion. By applying cluster center analysis, we were able to identify eight religious identity clusters among 807 respondents in the sample (see Annex 1). “Unbelievers” form the largest cluster (N=257, 32%) – close to one third of respondents do not identify with any religion but do not consider themselves atheists either. Religion does not matter much in their lives and neither does the church nor religious practices. Max Weber might have called them “religiously unmusical”.¹

¹ “Religiously unmusical” is an expression commonly attributed to Max Weber – this is how the classic characterized his own attitude to religion, reportedly in a 1909 letter (Svatos 1998, 548).

A substantial group (N= 125, 15%) could be called “believers without belonging”. These individuals self-identify as believers in an Ultimate Reality, an impersonal spirit rather than God in the Christian sense, and in the existence of Heaven, Hell and the afterlife but they do not belong to any specific religious organization. Catholic (N=108, 13%), Orthodox (N=97, 12%) and Lutheran (N=88, 11%) constitutes those respondents who identify with the three larger denominations. They generally have moderate levels of indoctrination and involvement in religious practices compared to smaller clusters of Protestant minorities (N=21, 3%) and a cluster which we have called *virtuosos* (N=9, 5%). A *virtuoso*, when applied to religion, is a term suggested by Max Weber (Weber 1961, 267-301), denoting a person of intense religious belief and practice who attempts to fulfill religious tenets to perfection. *Virtuosos* can identify with any Christian denomination; what sets them apart is high awareness of their own religious identity, belief in God as a personified being and other symbols of the Christian creed, active prayer, and church attendance. Finally, there is a cluster of atheists (N=72, 9%).

Justification of morally debatable behaviors in Latvian society in 1996 and 2021

We could observe a decrease of means of justifiability of all morally debatable behaviors except homosexuality – it was justified by a larger part of the population in 2021 than it was in 1996. In 2021, Latvian society was least likely to justify politically motivated violence and bribery. This was followed by offences like light drug use, tax fraud and claiming unwarranted state benefits.

Statistically significant differences were observed in attitudes to abortion, euthanasia, and suicide in 2021 (the question about the death penalty was not asked in 1996). Of all the behaviors discussed in this article, suicide is least justifiable. The justifiability of abortion and euthanasia is comparatively higher but tends to decrease over time.




Figure 2. Justifiability of morally debatable behaviors in 1996 and 2021 (mean)

This may indicate that Latvian society has become less permissive. Referring to Marco Marozzi's research (Marozzi 2021), it can be argued that in the 1990s Latvian society was in line with other post-Soviet countries in its tolerance of dishonest-illegal behaviors but in 2021 it does not yet correspond to the tolerance of Western European countries regarding personal-sexual behaviors. We will further discuss how attitudes to abortion, euthanasia, suicide and the death penalty correlate with religious identity.

Abortion

In Latvia, the termination of pregnancy upon a woman's request is available up to the 12th week of pregnancy but medical specialists are obliged to inform the woman of the nature of the termination of pregnancy, possible complications, and of the possibility to preserve the life of the unborn child (Law on Sexual and Reproductive Health. Ch.VI, Section 25). The Sexual and Reproductive Health Law that allows elective abortions was adopted by the Parliament in 2002 and, notably, the process of adoption took six years. The draft law was submitted to the Parliament as far back as in 1996. Previously, the termination of pregnancy was regulated by a government document issued by the Council of Ministers in

1991 (Council of Ministers Ruling No 72, 1991). Adoption of the law took so long largely because of protests from religious organizations and some pro-life NGOs (Ābele 1996).

In theory, the justifiability of abortion is the issue where faith differences are most profound. The Christian doctrine generally opposes abortion and so should its followers. Teachings of various Christian churches, denominational groups, and individual theologians may only differ when specific extenuating circumstances could allow for an exception, such as a pregnancy resulting from rape or incest or if it presents danger to the life of the mother or fetus.

In practice, attitudes are more complex. Overall, the number of respondents who chose answers 1-5 on the scale is considerably higher than those who tend to find abortion justifiable to some degree. Answer 5 is more common among respondents who do not adhere to a religious faith; in fact, it is the most common position in the secular part of Latvian society.²

When we compare believers and non-believers, the Chi-square test of independence shows that statistically significant differences ($\chi^2(9) = 60.221$; $p < 0.001$) are found in all positions on the 1-5 spectrum, while part of the scale (6-9) that can be attributed to a more permissive attitude demonstrates no statistically significant differences between believers and non-believers. At the end of the scale (10), denoting complete justifiability of abortion, we again find that the opinions of believers and non-believers are significantly different.

² One might suppose that participants aimed at the middle of the scale which, strictly speaking, it is not – 5 and 6 are equidistant from both ends of the scale. However, the fact that 6 was chosen by a considerably smaller number of participants might indicate that although this is mathematically incorrect, participants assumed that 5 is the middle point of the scale. It might mean at least three things – the participants who chose 5 either (1) wanted to indicate that they don't know what their attitude is (the option "don't know" was not offered in the questionnaire), or (2) they thought that abortion is equally justifiable and unjustifiable or (3) they thought that abortion is sometimes justified. The last interpretation is the closest to the literal meaning of the text in the questionnaire. A similar pattern is observed in the case of euthanasia.

Participants belonging to a religious denomination are more likely to indicate that abortion is never justifiable (20.4%, AdjRes = 4.4) than those who don't adhere to any religious faith (11.2%; AdjRes = -4.4; total = 15.6%). At the other end of the scale, respondents who do not belong to a religious faith are more likely to admit that abortion is always justifiable (9.4%; AdjRes = 2.7) than religious individuals (5.4%; AdjRes = -2.7; total = 7.5%). Thus far, we can say that faith really makes a difference.




Figure 3. Justifiability of abortion by religious belonging (%)

When we look at specific religious identity clusters, we find that the majority (56.93%) of Protestant minorities and more than one third of *virtuosos* (35.14%) find abortion to be never justifiable. Notably, atheists may form a small cluster of all respondents, but the proportion of atheists who deny abortion completely is also considerable (21.54%). At the same time, atheists and unbelievers clearly dominate among those who find abortion always acceptable. Answer 5 is found in all religious identity clusters, including Catholic, Lutheran and Orthodox.

Hierarchical linear regression analysis shows that male respondents are less permissive compared to females ($B = -0.55$; $p = 0.006$). Age is also statistically significant ($B = -0.03$; $p < 0.001$). The unjustifiability of

abortion also tends to increase with age. Some of the religious identity clusters demonstrate less tolerance of abortion in comparison to unbelievers, namely, other Protestants ($B = -2.39$; $p < 0.001$), *virtuosos* ($B = -2.17$; $p < 0.001$) and believers without belonging ($B = 0.089$; $p = 0.003$). Demographic variables explain 12.7 % of variance of justifiability of abortion, taken together with religiosity clusters, they explain 16.6 % of variance, the change of adjusted R^2 is 4.7% (statistically significant).




Figure 4. Justifiability of abortion by religious identity clusters (%)

Suicide

Suicide is death “deliberately initiated and performed by a person in full knowledge and expectation of its fatal outcome” (OECD 2022). Suicide is a notable global public health issue. It is one of the leading causes of death worldwide, with more deaths due to suicide than to diseases like malaria, HIV/AIDS, breast cancer, or war and homicide. Globally, about 703 000 individuals die by suicide every year. The global age-standardized suicide rate was 9.0 per 100 000 population for 2019. Suicide was the fourth leading cause of death in young people aged 15–29 years for both sexes, after road injury, tuberculosis, and violence (WHO 2021).

According to OECD data from 2020, Latvia had the fifth highest suicide rate in the world: 14.9 per 100 000 persons (OECD 2022). In 1996, Latvia was in fourth place with a much higher indicator: 38.9 per

100 000 persons. The suicide rate for men and women differs – in 2020, it was 28.5 for men, and 4.4 suicides per 100,000 persons for women (OECD 2022). Over the past three years (2019–21) intentional self-harm was the cause of an average of 279 deaths by suicide per year and 23 deaths per month.³

Section 124 of the Criminal Law of Latvia stipulates punishment for leading someone to suicide or attempting to do so by treating the victim cruelly or systematically humiliating their personal dignity. The punishment is more severe if the person has been financially or otherwise dependent upon the culprit.

Christian doctrine is very strict about suicide, considering it to be both a grave sin and an act contrary to human nature (Clemons 1990). According to the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (Articles 2280–2283), suicide is prohibited by the fifth commandment: “Thou shalt not kill”. The reason for this is the sanctity of human life as it was created by God and entrusted to human beings: “God alone is the Lord of life from its beginning until its end: no one can under any circumstances claim for himself the right directly to destroy an innocent human being” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2258).

Similarly, according to the Orthodox catechism, life is protected by God’s commandment. It states that suicide is the greatest offense among all types of murder since killing oneself is even more against the laws of nature than killing another person. Individuals who commit suicide can no longer repent, so they are denied the salvation of their souls. It is also emphasized that life belongs to God who gave it to us.⁴

The Book of Concord, the principal collection of Lutheran doctrinal documents, does not specifically address suicide. Rather, it is implied in a broader rejection of any intentional killing of a human being – self-murder is still murder, prohibited by the fifth commandment. Since Lutheran

³ Calculated from: Veselibas statistikas datubāze. Iedzīvotāju nāves cēloņi mēnesī. (Available at https://statistika.spkc.gov.lv/pxweb/lv/Health/Health__Mirstiba/MOR10_)

⁴ Available in Russian at: the official site of the Latvian Orthodox Church (pravoslavie.lv).

doctrine is less explicit, one may expect that Lutherans might be more accepting of suicide compared to Catholics and Orthodox believers.

It can also be assumed that people whose moral norms are influenced by Christianity are less likely to justify suicide than non-believers. Is this so?

Indeed, most believers in Latvia do not justify suicide and their position is strict. The answer “never justifiable” (position 10 on the scale) was chosen by 63.9% of believers and 44.4% of non-believers. There are statistically significant differences according to the chi-square test ($\chi^2 (9) = 51.13; p < 0.001$).




Figure 5. Justifiability of suicide by religious belonging (%)

We also found a statistically significant association of justification of suicide with religious identity clusters (Fisher-Freeman-Halton Exact test; $p < 0.001$).

If we rank the religious identity clusters according to the justification of suicide, then the strictest stance is found among *virtuosos* – nearly all admit that suicide is never justifiable. As for other religious identity clusters, the Orthodox have the strictest position – 89% do not justify suicide. There is a similar distribution of answers for Catholics and believers without belonging – 80% state that suicide is not justified.

Notably, non-believers have a stronger attitude towards suicide than Lutherans and other Protestants: suicide is considered unjustifiable by 74.8% of non-believers and about 70% of Lutherans and other Protestants. Compared to other clusters, Lutherans and other Protestants more often (25–30%) take a middle position – they neither justify nor do not justify. More than half of atheists also believe that suicide is not justifiable, a third of them take a moderate position, while about one tenth believe that suicide is justifiable.

Suicide is considered inexcusable by a larger proportion of Orthodox and Catholics than by Lutherans and other Protestants. The position of believers without belonging is similar to that of Catholics, while the position of Lutherans and other Protestants is more moderate and similar to that of unbelievers.




Figure 6. Justifiability of suicide by religious identity clusters (%)

As the hierarchical linear regression analysis shows, the position of males is less affirming than that of females ($B = -0.55$; $p = 0.002$). Age is also a statistically significant factor ($B = -0.02$; $p = 0.005$) – justifiability of suicide decreases with age. Some of the religious identity clusters also

demonstrate more non-justifiability in comparison to ‘unbelievers’ – *virtuosos* ($B = -1.15$; $p=0.006$) and believers without belonging ($B = -0.65$; $p=0.013$).

Demographic variables only explain 6.9% of variance of justifiability of suicide, together with religious identity clusters they explain 8.5% of variance, the change of adjusted R^2 is 2.5%, which is statistically significant.

One can conclude that religious identity is not the sole explanatory factor for differences in attitude to suicide, it must be considered together with other factors like age and gender.

Euthanasia

Euthanasia is illegal in Latvia. Since regaining independence in 1991 there have been several public discussions on legalizing euthanasia and in all cases, they were sparked by a precedent. One of the most prominent is the case of Viesturs Bundža – a man in his mid-forties who was diagnosed with an aggressive form of throat cancer in 2014. In 2016, when he realized that his condition was terminal, he decided to end his life with the help of *Dignitas* in Switzerland and launched a campaign asking people to donate money for the purpose. This sparked an active debate not only in the media but in religious circles as well, since Budža was a member of a Lutheran parish.

Another noteworthy precedent took place in 2021 when a petition on the *Manabalss.lv* public initiative website was signed by more than 10 000 people – the number that is necessary for the initiative to be reviewed by the Saeima (Parliament). This forced politicians to address the issue head-on. To make a decision about the initiative, the committee in the Saeima responsible for the issue – the Mandate, Ethics and Submissions Committee – organized a hearing. They invited two healthcare experts – a palliative care doctor who has previously been vocal about his opposition to euthanasia and an anesthesiologist, and ministers of four Christian organizations from Catholic, Lutheran, Baptist, and Orthodox

churches. All invited experts voiced their objections against the legalization of euthanasia and after that, the committee voted to reject the initiative. Janīna Kursīte-Pakule, head of the Saeima Mandate, Ethics and Submission Committee expressed her doubts that neither physicians nor people are ready to accept the practice of euthanasia: “How many doctors will take on this death procedure? But above all, are the people, the public prepared to accept this cardinal change?” she said to journalists after the vote.⁵ A few days later, after a long debate, the initiative was also rejected by the Saeima. In the debate before the vote, several MPs expressed similar views to Kursīte-Pakule, i.e., that the legalization of euthanasia is premature, and some members echoed the argument already expressed by the palliative care specialist in the committee meeting, i.e., that before discussing the legalization of euthanasia the country should substantially improve the availability of palliative care to patients who need it.⁶ Religious authorities publicly state their opposition to the legalization of euthanasia whenever such an opportunity arises.

The EVS questionnaire includes one item on euthanasia: “Please, tell me whether you think euthanasia (terminating the life of the incurably sick) can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between?” Respondents had to indicate their answers on a rating scale from 1 (never justified) to 10 (always justified). 1199 participants gave their answers, 137 (10.27%) did not. The mean result of the answers is 5.12 (SD = 3.10).

Three items in the results stand out. 21.1% of participants indicated that euthanasia is never justified, 12.7% – that it is always justified, and 16.4% chose 5. As in the case of abortion, it is not clear how to interpret the relatively high number of people who choose 5. One might suppose

⁵ See: “Saeima committee rejects initiative on euthanasia legalization.” <https://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/saeima/saeima-committee-rejects-initiative-on-euthanasia-legalization.a396239/>

⁶ See: “Saeima rejects initiative on euthanasia legalization.” https://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/saeima/saeima-rejects-initiative-on-euthanasia-legalization.a398145/?utm_source=ls&utm_medium=article-bottom&utm_campaign=article

that participants aimed at the middle of the scale but that is not mathematically correct, as 5 and 6 are equidistant from the ends of the scale. However, the fact that 6 was chosen by only 7.6% of participants might indicate that although this is mathematically incorrect, participants assumed that 5 is indeed the middle point of the scale. As in the previous case of abortion, it is not entirely clear how to interpret that choice. It seems that the safest thing that can be said about these participants is that they think that euthanasia is in some cases justified, but they don't have a strong opinion under what conditions. To say anything more in-depth on this, a more detailed survey would have to be conducted on the topic.




Figure 7. Distribution of answers on the justifiability of euthanasia (%)

Is there any correlation between participants' religious identity and their attitudes towards euthanasia? In the questionnaire, the participants were asked to indicate whether they "belong to a religious faith (denomination)"? Membership in a religious denomination affects participants' attitudes towards euthanasia.




Figure 8. Justification of euthanasia by religious belonging (%)

The participants who belong to a religious faith tend to think that euthanasia is less justifiable than those who don't indicate membership of a religious faith. ("Yes", mean = 4.73, SD = 3.09; "No", mean = 5.46, SD = 3.06). The Chi-square test of independence shows that there is a statistically significant difference between participants who belong to a religious faith (denomination) and those who do not in their attitudes towards the justifiability of euthanasia ($\chi^2(9) = 36.760$; $p < 0.001$). The participants belonging to a religious denomination are statistically more likely to indicate that euthanasia is never justifiable (26.9%, AdjRes = 4.5) than those who don't belong to religious faith (16.3%; AdjRes = -4.5; total = 21.3%) and the other way round, participants who say that they don't belong to a religious faith are statistically more likely to say that euthanasia is always justifiable (15.4%; AdjRes = 3.1) than those who indicate belonging to a religious faith (9.4%; AdjRes = -3.1; total = 12.6%). However, in the rest of the cases, there are no differences in answers about the justifiability of euthanasia, with one exception: the participants who don't belong to a religious faith are statistically more likely to choose 3 on the justifiability of euthanasia scale (9.3%; AdjRes = 2.6) than the participants who belong to a religious faith (5.3%, AdjRes = -2.6).

Interesting correlations show up in the comparison of different religious clusters. The Chi-square test of independence ($\chi^2(9) = 136.555$; $p < 0.001$) indicates that Orthodox (35.2%; AdjRes = 3.0) and *virtuoso* respondents (48.4%; AdjRes = 3.5) are more likely than others to say that euthanasia is never justifiable (total = 22.7). Interestingly, Lutherans (12.8%; AdjRes = -2.3), believers without belonging (14.7%; AdjRes = -2.2) and unbelievers (17.2%; AdjRes = -2.5) are less likely than others to say that euthanasia is never justifiable. Looking at the other end of the scale, atheists (27.1%; AdjRes = 3.8) are statistically more likely than others (total = 12.7%) to say that euthanasia is always justifiable and *virtuoso* participants (0.0%; AdjRes -2.2) are statistically less likely to choose this answer.

Multiple hierarchical regression analysis shows that the following independent variables have a statistically significant association with attitudes towards the justifiability of euthanasia – gender, age, education, region, *virtuosos*, and other Protestants. Male participants justify euthanasia to a lesser degree than women ($B = -0.589$). Participants who have either a Master's or Doctoral degree justify euthanasia to a higher degree than others ($B = 0.740$). Participants from Pierīga ($B = -1.583$), Vidzeme ($B = -1.262$), Zemgale ($B = -1.180$) and Latgale ($B = -2.198$) regions justify euthanasia to a lesser degree than participants living in Riga. As for the religious clusters, *virtuosos* ($B = -2.763$) and participants who belong to other Protestant denominations ($B = -2.130$) justify euthanasia to a lesser degree than unbelievers.

Demographic variables only explain 17.2% of variance in justifiability of euthanasia, together with religious identity clusters they explain 20.5% of variance, the change of adjusted R^2 is 4.1 % which is statistically significant.

The death penalty

Latvia abolished capital punishment in 1996 through an amendment to the Criminal Law, a year after it had joined the Council of Europe and the country was preparing to join the EU. The mid-1990s witnessed some

debates concerning the abolition but there is little reason to assume that religion played a significant polarizing role in the positions taken by various social groups. The EVS/WVS survey in 1996 did not contain a question about the death penalty and there are no reliable and comparable data concerning the public opinion on justification of the death penalty at that time. Dainis Turlajs, then Minister of the Interior, himself in favor of abolition, publicly affirmed that 87.5 % of the Latvian population support the death penalty and 10.4% are against it (*Par nāvessoda moratoriju Latvijā* 1996), but it is unclear how this data was obtained. When consulted by the President's Pardon Council, two members of the clergy generally supported the abolition, only occasionally pointing out that the same principle should be applied to the legislation pertaining to abortion (Ibid.).

The official Roman Catholic teaching on the death penalty has changed over time and the church openly recognizes it. The *Catechism of the Catholic Church* admits (Article 2267): "Death penalty on the part of legitimate authority, following a fair trial, was long considered an appropriate response to the gravity of certain crimes"

(Catechism of the Catholic Church, 546). However, for several reasons, now the church teaches that the death penalty is inadmissible and advocates for its global abolition (Article 2268 Ibid.). The positions of Lutheran churches vary worldwide. Luther's Large Catechism, when discussing the fifth commandment,⁷ implies that the right to punish lies with the government and that includes the right to sentence to death, but it does not say that governments have no right to abolish it.

Currently, most of the Latvian population do not find the death penalty justifiable. "Never justifiable" is the most common answer and very few find it "always justifiable". Of those who do not find the death penalty justifiable, statistically significant differences are found, clearly, at the end of the spectrum between the opinions of those who identify with a religious denomination (40.34%, AdjRes=3.2) and the non-religious part of the population (31.25%, AdjRes= -3.2). ($\chi^2(9) = 16.845$; $p=0.051$).

⁷ The Large Catechism is part of the Book of Concord. See: *The Large Catechism*. <https://bookofconcord.org/large-catechism/>.




Figure 9. Justification of the death penalty by religious belonging (%)




Figure 10. Justifiability of the death penalty by religious identity clusters (%)

Hierarchical linear regression analysis shows that the only statistically significant demographic factor is ethnicity. Russians are less supportive of the death penalty than Latvians ($B = -0.77$; $p = 0.007$). Demographic variables explain only 7.9% of variance of justifiability of the death penalty. Demography, together with religiosity clusters explain the same 7.9% of variance in justifiability of the death penalty, the change of adjusted R^2 is 0.8% which is not statistically significant. We can conclude that religion has no significant impact on individuals' support or denial of the death penalty.

Religious determinants of justification of morally debatable behaviors – discussion and conclusions

Attitudes to abortion, euthanasia, suicide, and the death penalty vary, and religious identity is a factor of different weight in each case. The Chi-square test shows that statistically significant differences between religious and non-religious populations can be observed in attitudes towards abortion and euthanasia, while differences in attitudes towards suicide and the death penalty are less pronounced.

Applying adjusted R^2 , we can determine what percentage of justification total variation is determined by demographic and what percentage by religious characteristics. Religion has the greatest influence on the attitude to abortion – clusters of religious identity explain 4.7% of the variation in the justification of abortion, 4.1% of the justification for euthanasia, 2.5% of the justification for suicide, which is statistically significant more than just looking at demographics. The change in the death penalty is 0.8%, which is not statistically significant.

Several studies have found a strong association between religiosity and attitude to abortion, generally predicting lower acceptance of abortion among religious individuals compared to their secular counterparts (Emerson 1996; Adamczyk 2013; Petersen 2001), hence our findings are not surprising.

Religiosity is also typically linked both to a lower risk of suicidal behavior and to a negative attitude towards suicide (Boyd & Chung 2012; Cook 2014; Gearing & Lizardi 2009; Lawrence et al. 2016). In the case of the latter, we do find a link, but it is considerably weaker than in the case of the justification of abortion.

There is a substantial proportion of participants (26.9%) who think that euthanasia is never justifiable. However, a considerable proportion of people think that at least in some cases euthanasia is justifiable. Religiosity has some effect on people's views on euthanasia, however, the effect is not substantial. This seems to be in line with findings from other European countries:

A person's position towards euthanasia, whether Catholic, Protestant, or not religious, thus seems to be much more determined by the dominant culture within a country than by doctrinal religious stances of the denomination one associates with. People, religious or not, living in countries in which other people's right to self-determination is generally accepted, e.g. with regard to personal choices regarding sexuality, life and death, are for instance usually also more accepting of euthanasia as an option for incurably ill people. Particular historical factors (e.g. national socialist experiences with euthanasia) will also have an influence (Cohen et al. 2014, 151).

The first thing to notice about the attitude to the death penalty is the very low support for this type of punishment. A clear majority of the Latvian population do not find it justifiable in any circumstance. This is especially true of the religious sector of society. Abandonment of the death penalty is a significant feature of a shared European identity. Certain tensions between "Old" or Western Europe and former members of the Eastern Communist block did exist (for discussion see: Fijalkowski 2011) and can be explained by the history of the penal systems of societies. The Soviet Union, which Latvia was a part of for several decades, was a highly punitive society, but it is worth remembering that the Penal Code (1933) from the pre-war independence period stipulated not to use the death penalty in peacetime. So, the tendency to put restraints on the most violent and severe form of punishment was present in Latvian society long before the death penalty was abolished in some Western European countries. We would argue that in the case of attitudes to euthanasia, suicide and the death penalty, the general social climate is probably more important than religious belonging.

We can conclude that in 2021, society has demonstrated less justifiability of abortion, euthanasia and suicide compared to 1996. Compared to the non-religious population, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide are less often justified by the *virtuoso* group, Protestant minorities, and believers who do not adhere to a specific denomination. There are no significant differences in attitudes towards the death penalty between religious groups.

Annex 1. Religious identity clusters

		Final cluster center								
	Indicators of Religiosity	4	6	1	5	3	7	8	2	
	<i>"How often do you pray?"</i>	-0.5	-0.7	-0.5	-0.9	-1.3	-0.2	0.8	0.9	R
Participation/ practice	<i>"How often do you attend church services"</i>	-0.6	-0.7	-0.5	-1.9	-1.5	0.1	0.6	0.9	R
	<i>How often did you attend religious services when you were 12 years old</i>	-0.6	-0.6	-0.3	-0.5	-0.6	0.0	0.5	0.6	R
Importance of ...	<i>religion</i>	-0.5	-0.7	-0.5	-1.7	-1.4	-0.1	0.6	1.0	R
Belief	<i>In God_</i>	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.6	-1.1	-1.4	
	<i>In the Afterlife</i>	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.7	1.1	0.3	-0.6	-0.6	
	<i>In Paradise</i>	0.4	0.4	0.3	1.2	1.5	0.2	-0.6	-0.6	
	<i>In Reincarnation</i>	0.4	0.2	0.4	-0.3	0.1	0.4	-0.4	-0.6	
	<i>In Hell</i>	0.4	0.3	0.1	1.0	1.5	0.2	-0.6	-0.6	
	<i>Belong to a religious organization</i>	0.1	-0.2	0.7	2.4	1.2	-0.3	-0.3	-0.1	
Self-identification	<i>Belong to a denomination</i>	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.8	-0.9	-0.6	-0.9	
	<i>A person of faith</i>	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.6	-1.2	-1.2	
	<i>An unbelieving person</i>	-0.7	-0.6	-0.5	-0.6	-0.7	-0.5	1.4	-0.7	

	Indicators of Religiosity	4	6	1	5	3	7	8	2	
	<i>Convinced atheist</i>	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	3.6	
	<i>Catholic</i>	2.2	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	0.5	-0.4	-0.3	-0.4	
	<i>Lutheran</i>	-0.4	-0.4	2.3	-0.4	0.5	-0.4	-0.2	-0.4	
	<i>Orthodox</i>	-0.4	2.6	-0.4	-0.4	0.2	-0.4	-0.3	-0.4	
	<i>Other Protestant (Bapt., Meth., etc)</i>	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	6.1	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	
Trust...	<i>in the Church</i>	-0.6	-0.7	-0.3	-1.3	-1.3	0.1	0.7	1.2	R
	<i>"God is a personified being"</i>	-0.2	0.0	-0.3	1.3	3.0	-0.3	-0.2	-0.3	
Indoctrination – agreement with	<i>"There is some kind of higher power, spirit"</i>	0.6	0.4	0.7	-0.3	-1.2	0.7	-0.5	-1.0	
	<i>"I really don't know what to think"</i>	-0.3	-0.2	-0.4	-0.3	-0.5	-0.3	0.4	0.0	
	<i>"I don't think there is a higher power, God or spirit"</i>	-0.4	-0.3	-0.3	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	0.5	1.8	
	<i>N</i>	108	97	88	21	39	125	257	72	807
	<i>Cluster Name</i>	Catholics	Orthodox	Lutherans	Other Protestants	Virtuosos	Believers without belonging	Unbelievers	Atheists	

Note: R – reverse scale.

Annex 2. Regression models for justification of Abortion, the Death Penalty, Euthanasia, and Suicide Standardized Regression Coefficients (beta) and explained variance R²

	Dependent variable: Justifiability of...			
	Abortion	Death penalty	Euthanasia	Suicide
Gender Female				
Male	-0.10		-0.09	-0.12
Age in years	-0.18		-0.16	-0.12
Ethnicity Latvian				
Ethnicity Russian		-0.12		
Ethnicity Other				
Secondary education				
Less than secondary education				
1st level higher or Bachelor's degree				
Master's or Doctoral degree			0.09	
Riga region				
Pieriga region	-0.14		-0.19	-0.09
Vidzeme region	-0.09	-0.11	-0.13	
Kurzeme region	-0.10	0.10		-0.13
Zemgale region		-0.13	-0.12	
Latgale region	-0.23	-0.14	-0.22	-0.15
Income		0.10		
Cluster Unbeliever				
Cluster Catholics				
Cluster Orthodox				
Cluster Lutheran				
Cluster Other Protestants	-0.14		-0.11	

Note: Bold – reference category.

	Dependent variable: Justifiability of...			
	Abortion	Death penalty	Euthanasia	Suicide
Cluster Virtuoso	-0.18		-0.18	-0.11
Cluster Believer without belonging	-0.12			-0.11
Cluster Atheistic				
Adjusted R ² total	0.166	0.079	0.205	0.085

Annex 3. Regression models for justification of Abortion, Death Penalty, Euthanasia, and Suicide (Unstandardized Regression Coefficients (b) and explained variance R²)

	Dependent variable: Justifiability of...			
	Abortion	Death penalty	Euthanasia	Suicide
Male	-0.56		-0.59	-0.55
Age in years	-0.03		-0.03	-0.02
Ethnicity Latvian				
Ethnicity Russian		-0.77		
Ethnicity Other				
Secondary education				
Less than secondary education				
1st level higher or Bachelor's degree				
Master's or Doctoral degree			0.74	
Riga region				
Pieriga region	-0.95		-1.58	-0.55
Vidzeme region	-0.74	-0.85	-1.26	
Kurzeme region	-0.94	0.87		-0.95

	Dependent variable: Justifiability of...			
	Abortion	Death penalty	Euthanasia	Suicide
Zemgale region		-1.03	-1.18	
Latgale region	-1.86	-1.08	-2.20	-1.00
Income		0.00		
Cluster Unbeliever				
Cluster Catholics				
Cluster Orthodox				
Cluster Lutheran				
Cluster Protestant	-2.39		-2.13	
Cluster Virtuoso	-2.17		-2.75	-1.14
Cluster Believer without belonging	-0.89			-0.65
Cluster Atheistic				
Adjusted R ² model 1	0.127	0.079	0.172	0.069
Adjusted R ² model 2	0.166	0.079	0.205	0.085
Adjusted R ² Change	0.047	0.008	0.041	0.025
Regression Unstandardized Coefficients (b) are significant p<0.05 * p<0.001 **				

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Tev nebūs nokaut, izņemot... Aborta, eitanāzijas, pašnāvības un nāvessoda attaisnošana Latvijas religiozo un nereligiozo iedzīvotāju vidē

Kopsavilkums

Apvienoto Nāciju un Eiropas Padomes dokumenti atzīst cilvēka dzīvību par universālu vērtību. Tomēr pastāv atšķirības šī principa piemērošanā praksē, jo izņēmumus pieļauj, piemēram, dažādu valstu likumdošana, atļaujot medicīniskus abortus, asistētas pašnāvības, retāk eitanāziju un nāvessodu. Arī iedzīvotāji nav vienprātīgi jautājumā par to, kādos gadījumos savas vai citas dzīvības atņemšana ir attaisnojama. Raksta mērķis ir noskaidrot saistību starp Latvijas iedzīvotāju reliģisko identitāti un attieksmi pret četrām morāli neviennozīmīgi vērtētām parādībām – abortu, eitanāziju, pašnāvību un nāvessoda piemērošanu, izmantojot Eiropas/Pasaules vērtību pētījumu trešā (1996) un septītā viļņa (2021) datus. Rakstā izmantotas klāsteru analīze un lineārā regresija.

Secināts, ka 2021. gadā sabiedrībā kopumā ir samazinājusies abortu, eitanāzijas un pašnāvības attaisnošana salīdzinājumā ar 1996. gadu. Statistiski nozīmīgas atšķirības religiozo un nereligiozo iedzīvotāju starpā vērojamas attieksmē pret abortu un eitanāziju, kamēr atšķirības attieksmē pret pašnāvību un nāvessodu ir mazāk izteiktas.

Atslēgvārdi: Eiropas/Pasaules vērtību pētījumi, morāli neviennozīmīga uzvedība, tiesības uz dzīvību, nāve, aborts, eitanāzija, pašnāvība, nāvessods

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VALUES AS A HOBBY: THE TRANSFORMATION AND SURVIVAL OF CULTURAL RITUAL VALUES IN THE PROCESS OF DESACRALIZATION

The paper examines how values lose their sacred or protected significance and turn into values as a hobby. Using an excerpt from Arundhati Roy's novel "The God of Small Things", a trend of transformation of values is outlined, raising questions about the importance of different values – both sacred and secular – for the representatives of these values. In short, the question is related to the value of values: is their practice (affirmation) meaningful in the basic sense of these values, or is this practice mere imitation as a hobby? The article gives several examples that show the versatility of this topic. The case of Qutb's Islamism highlights the importance of the distinction between private and public: the exclusion of the Islamic religion from the public sphere would result in the religion and its values losing their prominent role. A contrasting direction of change is evident in the woke movement, in which secular ideas transform into quasi-religious beliefs (re-sacralization of values). Finally, an explanation of this contemporary cultural picture of values becoming a hobby (in the dynamics of private-public relations) is sought in Andreas Reckwitz's observation that the "general" is being replaced by a "singular" logic. Since the sacred and general meaning of values is abolished, this is where the shift in the understanding of values is most apparent. Because there is no longer a foundation of a sacred myth, individual values become a private matter and have no public meaning.

Keywords: values, sacred, protected, hobby, leisure activity, desacralization

Chapter 12 in Arundhati Roy's novel "The God of Small Things" paints a spectacular picture (Roy 1998). The novel is set in Aymanam, Kerala, India, around the second half of the 20th century, a time when modernity has more or less reached the outskirts of India. The scene describes a dancer, or rather a performer of sacred ritual dances, who now earns his living by performing shortened versions of these dances for the pleasure of tourists, but who assuages his resentment at night, finding satisfaction in doing the whole dance properly.

*"In Ayemenem they danced to jettison their humiliation in the Heart of Darkness. Their truncated swimming-pool performances. Their turning to tourism..."*¹

The Heart of Darkness (a reference to Joseph Conrad's story), also called the House of History by Rahel, is an old house that once belonged to a British colonialist, but after his death became part of an expensive hotel. The embodiment of history, the house where India's different destinies – colonialism and traditions, different times and cultures – meet, is now "the toy histories that rich tourists came to play with".

Performing for tourists is undoubtedly a source of income, providing a livelihood "to stave off hunger", but it is also a powerful humiliation that defiles both the performer and the ritual, and therefore the gods. After performing in the Heart of Darkness, the dancer may "collect his fee" and "get drunk", but this fails to assuage the offence to sacred feelings. In the story, the dancer, called the Kathakali Dancer, stops at a temple on his way back from a performance "to ask pardon of their gods. To apologize for corrupting their stories. For encashing their identities. Misappropriating their lives". The lives and stories of the gods, as it turns out, are no longer real, they are not even fake, because they have been rendered useless.

The sacred significance is taken away from the Dancer as well, who "from the age of three ... has been planed and polished, pared down, harnessed wholly to the task of storytelling". The cultivation of his craft has

¹ All extracts quoted from the e-book: Roy 1998.

required the utmost effort and dedication, which could only be justified by the recognition of a transcendence that no longer really exists in a desacralized and demystified world. The correct performance of a ritual is not simple, but requires long preparation and knowledge, even if it may not appear so from the outside, because the viewer is unable to see all the layers of meaning conveyed in a complex system of symbols and gestures. In the modern world, the role of the Dancer has changed radically, he has gone from being “the most beautiful man”, from being a storyteller of divine tales to “condemned goods” and his children shun him – they “become clerks and bus conductors”. Children, be they bodily children or metaphors of cultural transmission, pursue their futures in the administration and infrastructure of the modern state. But at the same time, the Dancer is also “a prince raised in poverty”, whose spiritual nobility is but a title that has lost its exchange value.

Salvation can only be found under the cover of darkness, at night, when the modern world is asleep and the old temple is a place to dance for the gods, not for tourists. The dancer’s salvation is in the old stories, but the stories that are believed. “This story is the safety net above which he swoops”, but at the same time one has to be aware that he is “like a brilliant clown in a bankrupt circus”. To escape, to wash away the shame, humiliation and disappointment, it is necessary to return to the gods, but – and this is important – this can only be done in hiding.

“Perhaps that evening had been a particularly bad one in the Heart of Darkness. In Ayemenem the men danced as though they couldn’t stop. Like children in a warm house sheltering from a storm. Refusing to emerge and acknowledge the weather. The wind and thunder. The rats racing across the ruined landscape with dollar signs in their eyes. The world crashing around them.”

The dancer’s world really does seem to have collapsed, with only rats running around “with dollar signs in their eyes”, for whom nothing is sacred and therefore nothing at all is sacred. In the end, the Dancer

becomes a performer, a sustainer of cultural performances, or “he becomes a Regional Flavor”. The transformation of a cultural element characterised by an extremely strong symbolic saturation into a “Regional Flavor” is a very apt description if one pays attention to the layers of meaning: the sacred has become secondary, while in the foreground is a tag given by the modern world.

Sacred, protected and secular values

The picture presented in the story can be broadened and applied to the analysis of the contemporary cultural scene. The dancer who has lost his sacred connection illustrates a well-known process, namely desacralization and demystification, a task already set by Enlightenment philosophy. The dancer’s reaction – to collect the money and get drunk in disgust – is also not surprising. But we need to look at the subject from a different angle, putting aside the resistance described by Roy (resentment, the experience of losing the history that is directly present), in order to ask about the nature of the various forms of cultural practices that seem to have been revived: do values, rituals, traditions, cultural practices embody a “higher meaning”, even if they are practised, or are they just a leisure activity, a hobby? One might ask: do the various values that are supposedly affirmed through rituals and artefacts lose their meaning, but only in this way can they survive and even flourish, because they become a hobby that does not require sacrifices inappropriate to the contemporary situation? In this sense, values and sacred practices become something radically different, and it would no longer be adequate to speak of mere change. An approach that recognises various values as existing by establishing their existence in a declarative form may, however, be misleading, because, having lost their sacred meaning, the values found no longer resemble their original form – they are different values altogether. In short, the question is one of the value of values: is their practice (affirmation) meaningful in the basic sense of these values, or is this practice mere imitation as a hobby?

In this article, the terms ‘hobby’ or ‘leisure activities’ are used in a narrow meaning in the restricted context of an issue regarding values. The further elaboration of these concepts are interwoven in the following text, but some main points should be emphasised already: a hobby is private, it is primarily of a personal nature, but sacred or protected values are public; hence, values as a hobby do not have the normative aspect. While some hobbies can have an impact on public life, there is a significant difference in the presence of normativity: indeed, private leisure activities sometimes have consequence in public life (e.g. soccer ball through a window), but they are not an argument in decision-making in political life (in contrast, when being a soccer fan becomes ‘like a religion’, outsiders can bring up the topic of sacralization).

Different answers to the questions outlined above about value transformations make a significant difference to the resolving of a number of contemporary issues, among them, above all, the search for identity and value studies. Values are sometimes spoken of as Platonic transcendent entities that can be identified and have at least some persistence; cultural and artistic values that can be found, described and celebrated. In some cases, the same values are understood as social constructions at a particular point in time and space (Freiberger 2016, 295). Baiba Bela writes that the social sciences study values as basic cultural ideas that perform certain functions in society. Values are linked to cultural norms, but are seen as more abstract and general than norms. Whereas norms regulate behaviour in certain situations, values determine what is judged as good or bad. According to Emile Durkheim, values and norms provide the social integration that allows individuals to function as a society and offer coherence, reliability and stability. Michel Foucault began to look at values as part of the social power system and argued that values offer an ideological frame (Bela 2011, 147).

Given the continuous discussion regarding the relationship between culture and religion (e.g.: Darginaviciene & Sliogeriene 2019), additional notes are required concerning the variety of values. First of all, the distinction between religious and sacral values can be problematic because

“so-called secular beliefs and practices concern the same things as those counted as religious; it is not their content that distinguishes one lot from the other” (Charlton 2016, 332). A preliminary distinction could be based on genealogy, arguing that sacred values have their source in the transcendent, but secular values originate from the human domain. However, it is possible to speak of so-called sacred or protected values. A sacred value can be defined, for example, by Tetlock et al. as:

“any value that a moral community implicitly or explicitly treats as possessing infinite or transcendental significance that precludes comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or secular values” (Tetlock et al. 2000, 853).

This definition underlines the existence of certain values and moral principles that are seen as non-negotiable. While, indeed, this is more often the case with religious beliefs and ideas, one must agree with the observation that there is such a thing as the “secularized sacred”. Anthropologist Scott Atran, in a study of the unconditional commitment of devoted actors, stresses that sacred values can “refer to any preferences regarding objects, beliefs, or practices that people treat as both incompatible or nonfungible with profane issues or economic goods, as when land or law becomes holy or hallowed” (Atran 2016). The presence of the sacred element can then also be identified in political concepts and attitudes towards, for example, human rights or, as Atran rightly points out, in the broader sweep of political history marked by the Enlightenment-inspired ambitions to save humanity from misery through various revolutions (liberalism, socialism, anarchism, communism, fascism, etc.) and to raise it not only to the heights of economic prosperity but also to make the world more right and better in a moral sense (Atran 2016).

This article, however, emphasises another transformative movement of the concept of value. Not a shift from the religious to the secular and further secularisation, but a change in the various kinds of secular or protected values that alters the significance of value while retaining its performative form. Agita Misāne, investigating whether Christian values are

socially constructed or ontologically given, observes that the appeal to so-called “Christian values” is more likely a way for modern people to avoid a profession of faith. Values are separated from ontological truth. For example, rather than believing in the truth of the biblical message, modernity seeks in it an idea of the social order of the world (Misāne 2005, 77).

Sayyid Qutb’s Islamism and division of the public and private sphere

This sentiment, in which values lose their sacred significance, has been well captured by the ideologues of Islamism, who have pinpointed the fragile points of European thinking. The secularization and desecularization process have affected not only the West, the Islamic cultural sphere, but also Hinduism, Buddhism. This is most strikingly (if mostly indirectly) manifested in the development of the topic of identity, when cultures try to preserve their own identity by fighting Western rationality (Stančienė 2019, 17–18). When addressing the question of personal identity, the question is whether it is a stable, ingrained or rather a socially conditioned construction? Is a person born an Arab, Latvian or Portuguese, or does nationality develop over time?² While at a theoretical level the indeterminacy of identity is a legitimate idea, it has many opponents who find unacceptable the idea that, for example, being Latvian or Islamic or having a relationship with a god is a blatant coincidence. In other words, a person’s identity must not be a hobby to which one feels attachment and yet which can be changed at will.

Bringing to the fore the question of the importance of religious dogma in the persistence of identity, the sprouts of this tendency were noticed as early as the mid-20th century from a specific perspective by Sayyid Qutb,

² Research on the issue of identity as a fluid phenomenon is conducted more thoroughly in the case of, for instance, Latvian migration. The socio-cultural integration of Latvian migrants in various host countries and the impact of becoming and being Latvian are examined in further detail by scholars in the in-depth study “The Emigrant Communities of Latvia” (Kaša & Mieriņa 2019).

one of the leading adepts of radical Islamism. He argued that the most serious threat to Muslim societies was not the military threat, but the cultural invasion that tended to make the religion of Islam irrelevant or, to put it in more modern terms, a private affair. He observed that modern Western societies (or at least progressive cultural elites) tend to separate private identity and public behaviour as two very different spheres. Whether ethnic, cultural, sexual – any private preference is of no concern to others, i.e., it is not a public matter. Qutb, consistently following the tenets of the Islamic religion, denies such a distinction. On the contrary, he advocates a monolithic unity of public and private life. So, Islam is and can only be public — there is no such thing as private Islam. He strictly states that any Islamic state is obliged to implement Sharia, and Sharia, according to Qutb, is “everything legislated by Allah Almighty for ordering man’s life; it includes the principles of belief, principles of administration and justice, principles of morality and human relationships, and principles of knowledge” (Qutb 2006, 120). Sharia is thus understood as a comprehensive set of rules for all aspects of life. He condemns Western science and philosophy, which are pursuing “a well thought out scheme” with the aim “to shake the foundations of Islamic beliefs and then gradually to demolish the structure of Muslim society” (Qutb 2006, 128). He well understood that the separation of the Islamic religion from power or its exclusion from the public sphere would only result in the religion losing its leading role.

Modern Western society is characterised by increasingly blurred boundaries between private and public, and it is no longer surprising to see rapid shifts from one to the other. But this is not only a consequence, but a co-existing precondition. One could say that this is only possible if sacred or protected values are softened in their steadfastness. To borrow Zygmund Bauman’s terms, for a fluid society to flow easily, it must avoid elements that are too rigid, which are absolute and non-negotiable values. If Islam (or any other religion) maintains its dogmatic categoricity, it also needs public relevance – and vice versa. What is publicly relevant claims to be universally relevant as well. If, on the other hand, religion

withdraws from public life and becomes “everyone’s own business”, it ceases to be a universally relevant principle in its own right, whereas if ritual practices are maintained, it should rather be called a hobby, a leisure activity.

Qutb developed the central concept of Islamic political theory, *hakimiyya* (God is the sole and undisputed sovereign of the state), which dictates that no one can directly represent God and thus usurp God’s authority. It also means that the highest values come from God alone, not from secular authority, let alone from each individual person. That is why, not without reason, the Palestinian cleric, activist, teacher and preacher Abdullah Azzam, the spiritual father of modern jihad, reminded the faithful to turn away from those who reinterpret religion: “And leave those who take this faith as mere play and amusement and are deluded by their worldly life” (Quran 6:70; Azzam). The directness of the Islamic scriptures in forbidding “a mere play” with the Most High makes it clear that submission to the will of God cannot be partial, so to speak, only when there is spare time and means to be found. If faith is real, it must be categorical.

In this context, the possibility of a so-called Euro-Islam needs to be reconsidered (see: Kūlis 2019). Tariq Ramadan, in his book “Being a European Muslim”, called for a new European Muslim identity, seeking to fuse European culture and Muslim ethics, and to disassociate itself from Saudi Arabia and Islamic terrorism (Ramadan 1999). However, if the “Muslim ethic” remains categorical, there are only two possible paths: either Euro-Islam fails or Islam loses its meaning. If Islam is made a private affair, and diluted with controversial interpretations, it is likely to turn into a hobby which outwardly imitates certain practices but does not confirm their original meaning just like yoga in gyms.

Here we can reflect on the view of terrorism research theorist Charlotte Heath-Kelly that the restriction of religious practice to the private sphere is at the heart of contemporary understandings of what constitutes acceptable or unacceptable social practice (Salvatore 1997; Asad 1993). Heath-Kelly points out that this historically developed understanding,

which is presented as universal when it is not, leads terrorism studies to the notion of a “new terrorism”, i.e. that contemporary “religious” terrorism is more lethal, less focused on utility and ontologically distinct from leftist and nationalist forms of terrorism (Heath-Kelly 2010, 235–254). However, this picture is the fruit of a distorted view, since it assumes that the sacred element has been abolished everywhere, as if the project of Enlightenment had been completed to the full.

American Civil religion, BLM and woke as cases of resacralization

Qutb’s reflections are applied to a specific historical situation in time and place, but philosophically reworked (distanced and abstracted), they can be applied to many other cases. An example of secularized sacred values can be seen in the case of the role of religion on civic ideals in the United States, famously described by Robert N. Bellah: “Although matters of personal religious belief, worship, and association are considered to be strictly private affairs, there are, at the same time, certain common elements of religious orientation that the great majority of Americans share. These have played a crucial role in the development of American institutions and still provide a religious dimension for the whole fabric of American life, including the political sphere” (Bellah 1967, 3–4). Bellah’s analysis shows the same theme that Qutb addresses, but from the opposite direction: the sacralization of secular values or, in other words, the turning of a set of secular values into a divine law. In the USA, there are currently two social movements on the same vector, in which the (re)sacralization of values is prominent: although the so-called *Woke* and *BLM* (Black Lives Matter) are mostly spoken of as political movements, there are strong features of quasi-religious movements. Racism scholar John McWhorter writes that it is in the area of anti-racism in the US that religious elements are coming to the fore: superstition, clergy, original sin, evangelicalism, apocalypticism, persecution of heretics, replacement of old beliefs (McWhorter 2021, Chapter 2).

The very name of the movement, *woke*, and the concepts of vigilance and waking suggest associations with a religious cult. In the context of the movement, they have a special nobility, an exaltation, a belonging to a community blessed with a special knowledge of diabolical “structures”. In other words, in the case of *woke*, there is a sacralization of postmodern technical terms and, in the opposite direction, the introduction of religiously imbued terms into philosophical discourse. Some examples: *woke* as rebirth or resurrection, privilege as depravity, original sin, cancellation and excommunication, the status quo as the post-Fall world, responsibility to the future as divine judgement, etc. (Lindsay 2020).

The *Woke* movement has a special role for rituals that address the role of white people in creating and maintaining structural injustice.³ Redemption is achieved through public expressions of repentance (from pledge statements to foot washing) that lead to a state of rebirth or *woke*.⁴ In this worldview, the subject of responsibility becomes problematic, as the “system” is elevated to the heights of transcendence. The victim is like a saint whose complicity in his own grief must not be questioned, because to do so would be to question the whole system, both its existence and its interpretation, but that would be blasphemy.

In the context of the analysis of values as a hobby, the examples of *Woke* and BLM are interesting as they highlight the misleading appearance of a hierarchy of values. Although often different values (e.g. in the 2018 Eurobarometer survey: peace 45%, human rights 42%, respect for human life 37%, democracy 27%, personal freedom 24%, equality 21%, the rule of law 18%, tolerance 16%) are named as particularly important, but it could be hypothesised that these are just labels, in other words, values

³ Indeed, today’s US universities have been the scene of religious, sectarian ritual-like performances that demand loud, blatant and non-negotiable expressions of one’s position. A striking example is the Diversity Commission event at Evergreen University in Washington, where participants were invited to board an imaginary canoe and paddle to new shores of social justice. See: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IHM7SUFIE8w>

⁴ For example, in the US, the public washing of black people’s feet as atonement: <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8397065/White-police-officers-community-members-wash-feet-black-faith-leaders-protest.html>

are identified but treated as a hobby.⁵ This is more evident against the backdrop of, for example, the *woke* movement, in which secular ideas (e.g. social justice) become the object of unreflected, dogmatic adoration: they are no longer “merely” the subject of academic research or political decisions (values as a hobby), but are transformed into quasi-religious beliefs (resacralization of values).

In a broader sense, the question of identity outlined above is revealed here. Namely, are traditional practices, ideas or rituals just a private hobby, a leisure activity, a pastime, or do they have a public, social role? Is my religion, the foundations of my faith, socially significant, public, or is it just a private activity? But here we have to understand that private pursuits are not socially significant and influential or, to put it very simply, the private is not public because it does not concern others.⁶ This feeling is also recognisable here in Latvia: are the Latvian language, customs, traditions, as well as the national costume at festivals and beer at Jāņi just a matter of hobby, a pastime, or do they represent something deeper, unquestionable and befitting of all “real” people?

The examples given above – Islamism and American exceptionalism (one could add Russian exceptionalism, Jewish exceptionalism, etc.) – are extreme, they show blatantly zealous pursuers of values. In other words, the subject is usually seen in terms of religions. However, by continuing the reference to Latvia, the theme can also be extended to the cultural sphere. Just as there is a distinction between the conventional understanding of religion and so-called civil religion, a distinction could be made between culture and culture as a hobby or consumer culture.

⁵ More research on values in Latvia in relation to Europe, see: Kūle 2016a, 2016b.

⁶ This may be different in specific cases. Krūmiņa-Koņkova (2021) looks at how Eastern spiritual ideas emerged and were adapted in Soviet Latvia between the 1960s and 1980s; in particular, she examines how people actively pursued their spirituality (e.g. Yoga movement) in their private sphere while navigating legal boundaries or finding ways to get around them. See also Pazuhina's (2021) paper where she explores the concept of ‘everyday religiosity’ of the Orthodox Old Believers religious tradition, which defines the central place of religious practices within the private scope of family life.

In the Latvian context, there could be numerous examples.⁷ The Song and Dance Festival is often cited as the most prominent event of Latvian culture, “uniting the nation” and confirming its “values”. However, it must be admitted that at the same time, this event is not a re-enactment of pagan rituals mentioned in folk songs, but a relatively modern performance, borrowed from the alien German culture⁸. The Midsummer celebration has already become an anecdotal example, in which the focus is not on the multiplication and growth of life, the cyclical nature of time or similar intentions, but on the collective drinking of beer and the “traditional” eating of Caucasian shashlik. In the last decade, it has become increasingly popular to decorate clothes with “folk signs” and patterns, even to wear folk costumes during festivals, but one may wonder whether, for example, the sign of Mara on a t-shirt protects against evil or simply looks pretty. Sometimes defenders of Latvia’s ancient culture speak of the Latvian virtue of work, traditions and a peculiar pantheism, but the reality of the Latvian countryside today raises doubts about the virtue of work in a significant part of society, while urbanisation makes one question the validity of invoking pantheism. Yes, values are invoked, but one can reasonably doubt whether they have anything to do with their in-vokers.⁹

⁷ An interesting study of visual signs about Latvian values: the Latvian values of my generation (implemented by the Department of Sociology, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, University of Latvia); <https://latvijasvertibas.wordpress.com/>

⁸ When discussing the subject of inherited values and practices from the German community, it is crucial to bring up historical movements like the 19th-century Baltic German Evangelical Lutheran community. Numerous songs with Latvian lyrics were written using works by German composers (See Karnes 2005).

⁹ Philosopher Elga Freiberga speculates on the causes of it: “The heterogeneity of Latvia’s social life, social alienation prevents our being able to speak of cherishing common values in Latvian society. The causes and reasons for this alienation are clear, they are of a historical nature. They come from the socialist past, in which all the values keeping up man’s life and self-esteem were deliberately and systematically denigrated, starting from religious values and ending with political and individual ones” (Freiberga 2016, 297).

Andreas Reckwitz's analysis of society of singularities

One way to explain this contemporary cultural picture of values becoming a hobby in the dynamics of private-public relations is to look at the German philosophical sociologist Andreas Reckwitz's observation that the "general" is being replaced by a "singular" logic, with its consequences in all forms of social life — economic, cultural and political. Reckwitz argues that a structural transformation has taken place in late modern society, in which the dominance of the social logic of the general has been overtaken by the dominance of the social logic of the particular. The core of classical modernity, which had taken root in Western Europe since the 18th century, was expressed by a social logic that promoted standardisation, formalisation and generalisation, as well as the replacement of traditional customs by large-scale sets of predictable rules. The singular social logic that has been prevalent since the 1970s or 1980s, on the other hand, is completely at odds with what has formed the core of modern society for more than 200 years.¹⁰

The reason for this shift is that, since the second half of the 20th century, the forces that drove industrial standardisation have become drivers of social singularisation. Reckwitz explains that the first structural break occurred in the transition from the old industrial economy to cultural capitalism, and also in the transition to an economy centred on the creative industries. The second turning point is the digital revolution, which has made it possible to track individual users, but has also paved the way for customised products and advertising.

The rise of singular logic has also led to a profound change in attitudes towards culture. Unlike industrial society, which sought to marginalise it, the society of the singular logic of particular placed culture at the centre.

¹⁰ Philosopher Maija Kūle describes the state of this era in culture, art, science, politics – in all spheres of life – with life form "on the surface". In contrast to the life form "upwards", expressed by hierarchy and the aspiration to the absolute, or later "forward", expressed by coexistence and the idea of progress, the primordiality of place replaced by being in time, and the present defined by an ever-changing accumulated past, the life form "on the surface" is characterised by dissolution and diffusion (Kūle 2006).

However, this shift is not self-evident: for Reckwitz, the rise of singularisation and culturalization can be explained as the convergence of three mutually reinforcing structural moments: the emergence of cultural capitalism, the triumph of digital media technologies, and the post-Romantic, revolutionary hunger for authenticity of the new middle class (Reckwitz 2020, 10). Culture is indeed coming to the centre, but with a new and peculiar meaning: “In late modernity, moreover, the sphere of culture has adopted a specific form: no longer a clearly delineated subsystem, it has rather transformed into a global hyperculture in which potentially everything – from Zen meditation to industrial footstools, from Montessori schools to YouTube videos – can be regarded as culture and can become elements of the highly mobile markets of valorization, which entice the participation of subjects with the promise of self-actualization.” (Reckwitz 2020, 8–9). If a new hyperculture is emerging, it is to be expected that it will not be content with its status as steward of the old system but will reassess its values. This is what happens in a globalized world, where what is locally significant loses its value at the international level because it is not attractive to outsiders who look at values from a pragmatic point of view or as tourists who explore them as examples of “Regional Flavor”.

In Reckwitz’s analysis, the social logic of the singular is closely linked to the concept of culture, but it requires a shift from the traditional understanding of culture that might be found in the concept of value. Reckwitz writes that in the course of singularization, social entities acquire characteristics that allow them to become cultural subjects: a culturalization takes place. In this process, according to Reckwitz, valorisation plays a leading role, which is a fundamental process of assigning or denying value (Reckwitz 2020, 54).

The concept of value must be reviewed in light of the analysis of singular logic. Reckwitz underlines that value cannot be viewed in a neo-Kantian spirit, but rather must be seen as a practice of valuing individual objects, in other words, values must be seen as part of the dynamics of social circulation. In this interpretation, values are not something stable

and enduring, something essential, but something open and even contradictory. Reckwitz emphasises the valorisation processes in which values are singularised and desingularised; they are given or denied an intrinsic complexity. If one joins Reckwitz's analysis and understands cultural practices as practices of valorisation and devalorisation, it becomes clear that it is possible to break away from an earlier understanding of the concept of culture in favour of one that takes into account the effects of singular logics (Reckwitz 2020, 56). One can only speculate whether this process of valorisation is the same as the one referred to in Arundhati Roy's story as a world where only rats run around "with dollar signs in their eyes".

The transformation of values into a hobby is probably partly explained by the changes in social order described by Reckwitz, and in particular by the process of singularisation, which, although not self-evident – singularisation leads to authenticity – it is not yet clear what kind of authenticity is at stake. On the one hand, the logic of generality claims universality, but the emphasis on the particular degrades it. In such a context, various traditional values might even seem to gain ground, because they need a higher force: generality and universality. However, it is important to note here that the logic of universality is a derivative of industrialization, a product of Weberian rationalization, and that is why it has become alienated from the "sacred" nature of values. In other words, the values of modernity can be universal without the burden of a sacred background. Singularisation breaks the link with the universal and thus, on the one hand, really distances from the dimension of universality, which in turn distances from the sacred significance that usually claims at least some universality. On the other hand, however, the emphasis on the particular is more important. If values are separate, they may have something like an "aura of significance", but they cannot be recognised: they become a private activity, a "separate hobby", just as private language is impossible (Wittgenstein's argument). Individual, private value is like a means of payment without the management of the financial system: a banknote is real, it can be kept in a purse, carried around, admired, but it is useless as a medium of exchange.

In the social order expressed by the singular logic, private values are not impossible; on the contrary, they become just that: they become unique, their value is constantly changing, and the course of these changes is unpredictable. It is here that the change in the understanding of values is most clearly seen, as the sacred meaning of values is abolished: values are still important, but they are not universal. Values are “my” values, not “common” values. Values become a sign of recognition, a “regional flavour” as in the story of Roy. Individual values become a private affair, they no longer have any public significance because they no longer have the background of sacred myth that made them so powerful. An analysis of the contemporary situation must take this into account, because a superficial view can present a false picture in which values are found to be not only present but also authentic and alive. However, such a picture is misleading, since the values in question are only “alive” in the foreground, on the façade, but do not possess the essence encoded in the original understanding of these values, which requires values-appropriate behaviour *in their entirety* within a given system of values, beliefs and practices that derive from them. Values as a hobby, on the other hand, give freedom to a completely different pattern of behaviour: it can be seen as theatricality or performance, the basic aim of which is entertaining imitation. Values as a hobby move from the sacred sphere into the realm of play.

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Vērtības kā vaļasprieks: kultūras rituālo vērtību transformācija un izdzīvošana desakralizācijā

Kopsavilkums

Rakstā aplūkots, kā vērtības zaudē savu sakrālo vai aizsargājamo nozīmi un pārvēršas par hobiju. Izmantojot fragmentu no Arundhati Rojas romāna “Mazo lietu dievs”, tiek ieskicēta vērtību transformācijas tendence, kas ļauj jautāt par dažādu vērtību – gan sakrālo, gan laicīgo – nozīmi šo vērtību pārstāvjiem. Rojas stāstā parādītā aina tiek attiecināta uz mūsdienu kultūras ainas analīzi, ko starp citu raksturo desakralizācija un demistifikācija. Īsāk sakot, rakstā tiek jautāts par dažādu kultūras prakšu šķietami atdzīvināto formu būtību: vai vērtības, rituāli, tradīcijas, kultūras prakses iemieso kādu “augstāku jēgu”, pat ja tās tiek praktizētas vai arī tās ir tikai gluži kā vaļasprieks? Rakstā minēti vairāki piemēri, kas parāda šīs tēmas daudzpusību. Islāmists Saijids Kutbs islāmisma interpretācijā izceļ privātā un publiskā nošķiruma nozīmi: islāma reliģijas izslēgšana no publiskās sfēras novestu pie tā, ka reliģija un tās vērtības zaudētu savu nozīmīgo lomu: ja ticība ir īsta, tai esot jābūt kategoriskai, bet, ja islāms tiek padarīts par privātu padarīšanu, tas pārvēršas par vaļasprieku, kas ārēji atdarina noteiktas prakses, taču neapliecina to sākotnējo jēgu. Ja islāms (vai jebkura cita reliģija) saglabā savu dogmatisko kategoriskumu, tā paģēr arī publisku relevanci – un otrādi. Publiski relevantais pretendē uz vispārnozīmīgumu.

Savukārt, ja reliģija aiziet no sabiedriskās dzīves un kļūst par “katra paša darišanu”, tā savā būtībā vairs nav uzskatāma par vispārnozīmīgu principu, taču, ja rituālās prakses tiek uzturētas, to drīzāk būtu jādēvē par vaļasprieku. Pretējs pārmaiņu virziens vērojams sabiedriskajās kustībās *woke* un *BLM*, kurās saskatāma sekulāro pārliecību transformācija kvazireliģiskos uzskatos (notiek vērtību resakralizācija). Jau agrāk ir bijis iespējams runāt par t. s. amerikāņu pilsoniskās reliģijas tapšanu, ko raksturo dažādu valstisku un sekulāru jēdzienu (brīvība, demokrātija u. tml.) padarišana par kvazireliģiskiem mērķiem. Tas notiek arī rasisma apkarošanas jomā ASV, kur ir vērojama reliģisko elementu iznākšana priekšplānā. *Woke* gadījumā ir vērojama postmodernisma tehnisku jēdzienu *sakralizācija* un pretējā virzienā – reliģiski piesātinātu terminu ienešana filosofiskajā diskursā, piemēram, *woke* jeb mošanās un modrība kā atdzimšanas metafora, privileģētība kā samaitātība, kā iedzimtais grēks, atcelšana (*cancellation*) un ekskomunikācija, pastāvošā situācija kā pasaule pēc grēkā krišanas, atbildība nākotnes priekšā kā dievišķā tiesa utt. Minētie piemēri virza pie jautājuma, vai vērtību pārtapšana par hobija izpausmēm nav vērojama arī Latvijā, piemēram, dažādu pagānisko zīmju attēlošana uz apģērba u. tml. Visbeidzot – skaidrojums šai mūsdienu kultūras ainai, kad vērtības kļūst par hobiju (privāto un publisko attiecību dinamikā), meklējams Andreasa Rekvica novērojumā, ka “vispārīgo” aizstāj “singulārā” loģika. Tā kā vērtību sakrālā un vispārīgā nozīme ir atcelta, tieši šeit visuzskatāmāk izpaužas vērtību izpratnes maiņa. Ja tiek konstatēts, ka nepastāv sakrālā mīta pamats, individuālās vērtības kļūst par privātu lietu un tām nav publiskas nozīmes. Tādā gadījumā sakrālās vērtības, pat ja tās tiek praktizētas, zaudē savu sakrālo nozīmi un tādējādi to praktizēšana drīzāk ir tikai atdarinoša performance – tās pārtop par hobiju.

Atslēgvārdi: vērtības, sakrālais, brīvā laika pavadīšana, desakralizācija

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MATERIAL AND MORAL VALUES IN EXILE LATVIAN DISPLACEMENT NARRATIVES

The article explores the memories of exile Latvians by analysing the role of material values in the process of their displacement from Latvia in 1944/1945, as well as the manifestations of moral values revealed in the narratives of the actions, choices and decisions of refugees. The study is based on life story interviews gathered in the National Oral History Archive which convey the displacement experience in an intense way by vividly depicting the psychological and emotional circumstances and also the material issues that people faced in the particular historical situation. The sources confirmed that refugees tried to think practically and take only the most necessary things with them, but quite often it turned out that they were not prepared for how far and long their refugee journey would turn out to be. Moreover, it turned out that memories of material items taken along by the refugees were often directly related to the symbolic value that these objects acquired over time. The sources also identified common values relevant to the refugees (nature and life, solidarity, justice, responsibility, goodness, and freedom) which were revealed both in the way how exile Latvians reflected on their own and other people's actions and in the episodes chosen to be included in their life story.

Keywords: memories, refugees, Second World War, values

As the Red Army advanced on the Baltic states at the beginning of 1944, the German occupying forces elaborated plans to evacuate the majority of the Estonian and Latvian populations. However, when the time

came (in the summer of 1944), the advancement of the Red Army was so rapid and unexpected that evacuation plans were carried out chaotically and to a very limited extent. Therefore, it is not possible to strictly allege that German evacuation policy was the only and most crucial factor in the process of Latvians fleeing as some of the refugees left their homes on German orders, but many more decided to flee, fearing wartime activity and a repetition of the Soviet terror of 1940-41.

Refugee flows initially headed to central parts of Latvia, especially the capital city Riga, but later they were redirected to Kurzeme (the westernmost region of Latvia). The first ship organized by the Germans for the transportation of the refugees departed from Riga on August 4, but after the fall of Riga on October 13, 1944, these ships departed on a daily basis from the ports of Ventspils and Liepāja (in Kurzeme) and took refugees south to East Prussia or southwest into Germany. An alternate, although illegal, destination was Sweden, which was geographically close and unscathed by the war. Notably, most of the refugees were only hoping to temporarily avoid danger and were convinced of a rapid return after the Soviet forces were driven out of Latvia.

During the last months of the war those Latvian refugees who had arrived in Germany tried to move further westwards to escape the advancing Red Army. In their attempts, they sometimes walked hundreds of kilometers on foot before reaching British or American (sometimes French) occupation zones. Even then, there were no guarantees that the borders would not suddenly change or that they would not be immediately transferred to the Soviets who regarded them as their own citizens, subject to immediate repatriation. It is not possible to determine exactly how many Latvian refugees perished during the turmoil of the war (harsh winter conditions in 1945, Soviet attacks on transport vessels, air raids on German cities etc.), as well as the number of those who remained in territories overtaken by the Soviets and were forced to return to Latvia. Most recent studies show that approximately 178,000 Latvians had reached the western occupation zones in Germany, while another five thousand found refuge in Sweden (Kangeris 2016, 111).

After the war, the majority of Latvian refugees were concentrated in displaced persons (DP) camps, where they spent several years before emigrating to their new host countries. This period was relatively calm and allowed for reflection upon and narrativization of the recent experience through dialogues with oneself and others. Furthermore, the cultural discourse generated within the DP camps provided to the camp administration and also the Latvian refugee community itself explanations for the reasons why the decision was made not to return to Soviet Latvia (Sebre 1992). As stated by folklorist Inta Gale-Carpenter, at this time an exile ideology was formed, which became evident when Latvian refugees departed to their new host countries: at that moment, they no longer considered themselves as emigrants or refugees, but as self-proclaimed exiles (*trimdinieki*) with a common goal of fighting communism, working for the restoration of an independent Latvia, preserving Latvian culture abroad, and transmitting this culture to future generations (Gale-Carpenter 1989). Along with this common goal, Latvians in exile were united by memories of life in pre-war Latvia, leaving home and settling in their new host countries. These aspects allow them to be defined as a certain community of memories; namely, a group of people whose members feel connected to each other because they are united by a common direct experience (Irwin-Zarecka 1994).

The flight from Latvia was an essential turning point in the life of every exile, and as such it can reveal both individual and societal values and beliefs. As noted by sociologist Baiba Bela, values are important when making the decision to become a refugee, as well as during the flight and being an exile: they have an impact on the decision-making process, in the evaluation of one's own and others' actions, and in building relationships (Bela 2011). In addition, becoming displaced by definition also changes one's relationships with the material world, including the world of things (material values) (Dudley 2010). Within this context, the main research objective of this article is to study the role of material values during the flight, as well as the manifestations of moral values revealed in displacement narratives of exile Latvians.

The study is based on life story interviews gathered at the National Oral History (NOH) Archive. The Latvian diaspora became one of the first targets of life story research expeditions of Latvian oral history researchers, and the NOH Archive also contains numerous interviews recorded by diaspora Latvians themselves. Thus, the NOH Archive has several collections devoted to the experience of exile/diaspora Latvians, four of which were selected for this particular study: 1) “Latvians in Norway”: 20 interviews recorded in 1993 and 1996; 2) “Latvians in Sweden”: 27 interviews recorded in 1996; 3) “Latvians in Great Britain”: 49 interviews recorded during fieldwork in Great Britain in 2009 and 2011; 4) “The American Latvian Association’s Oral History Project ‘Life-Story in Exile’”: 70 interviews recorded in the United States¹. Of these 166 interviews, 75 contained more or less detailed displacement narratives² which were analysed in-depth.

When analyzing the life stories of exile Latvians, it is acknowledged that biographical memory refers not only to the images and events of the past stored in one’s mind, but also to the versions of the past that are determined by the life course of an individual, as well as the broader social and cultural context (Kaźmierska 2012). This is consistent with the classical works of Maurice Halbwachs, who argues that individuals bear not only their own autobiographical memory but also a collective memory. Thus, the individual (autobiographical) memory is always rooted in the collective meanings, culture, and imagination of a society and also in the acts of representation and communication. Multiple social and cultural

¹ This collection contains several hundred interviews, but for this study the first seventy entries (recorded in 1997–1999) were used.

² Some narrators left Latvia not as refugees, but while serving in the German military forces; others were born after the war. In addition, in several cases, even if the authors of the interviews left Latvia as refugees, they do not talk about this experience in their life stories: some narrators were too young to remember and be able to describe the flight; in other interviews, especially those recorded in 1990 and 1992, the interviewing took place about specific life experiences, without touching on the issue of displacement. There are also cases when narrators consciously or unconsciously chose not to talk about the displacement experience.

codes of remembering are performed and reconciled, resisted, or rejected in a constant process of locating and relocating the subject in time, space, and meaning (Keightley 2010). In addition to the effects of collective memory, individuals always interpret their experiences to create a coherent whole out of them. From this point of view, what matters in a biography is not events or actions themselves, but their interpretation, aimed at validating biographical experience so that one could perceive it as both constant and processual (Każmierska 2012).

Material Values

Similar to people, objects also fall victim to armed conflict and displacement: they change owners voluntarily or forcefully, are exchanged for food and shelter, hidden away, or entrusted to friends or neighbours (Dziuban & Stańczyk 2020, 1). In the event of fleeing one's home, objects are of particular importance, as leaving in a state of urgency and war means being vulnerable, both existentially and materially, as the skills and objects one may take can greatly determine one's future (Parkin 1999, 305). Therefore, it is important to look at what objects were taken by refugees when they left their homes and for what reasons; what role the belongings of the individuals took during the flight; as well as to analyze the significance of surviving objects from the homeland in the memories and identity of exile Latvians.

As many researchers have pointed out, for many refugees keeping their house keys is a symbolic way of keeping alive their connection with the lost home and is often a commitment to the project of return (Taylor 2009). Therefore, in the context of both material and symbolic objects brought along by the refugees, the question of house keys arises as one of the most topical. In Latvian literature, for example, in Agate Nesaule's novel "Woman in Amber", two contrasting models of action are highlighted. The first – the keys were left in the door so that it would not be broken; the second – the door was locked and the key was taken along (Nesaule 1997, 46–48). Although only three life story authors analyzed in

this research mention what was done with the keys, they also reflect both models of behavior described by Nesaule: in two cases the key was left to either relatives or neighbors; in the third case, the key is still kept in the author's family (obviously the door was locked and the key was taken along). In general, the authors of the life stories rarely talk about this aspect, which in itself suggests that the keys were not taken along. Otherwise, as indicated above, they would probably have acquired a symbolic meaning and would therefore be highlighted not only in the narrative of the flight but also when speaking about maintaining a connection with Latvia and passing this heritage on to future generations.

A lot more information is revealed by the life story authors about the fate of those material valuables that either could not be taken along because of their size and/or limited possibilities. Most often, such things, especially the most valuable ones, were buried in the ground or otherwise hidden as described by one of the authors: "We knew it could all be destroyed, so we buried all our clothes, belongings and equipment in the ground. We dug holes and buried them in the ground. We buried valuables, documents and even grain in the ground. Actually, you can't dig it up, it rots, but at least there will be seed for the next year." (NOH-813) In a group interview, where participants were asked specifically about the things taken and left behind, the same author clarifies that valuable books (for example, her grandparents' Bible) and milk jugs with honey and butter were also buried in the ground while her mother's loom and weaving equipment were hidden in the bushes nearby, believing that they would not be stolen, but would at least be saved from destruction if the house were set on fire (NOH-2710).

The aforementioned group interview provides the most valuable information about the hidden objects because in life story interviews such matters are only discussed if there are vivid memories associated with these events. For example, Arta Svenne's father buried part of his valuables in the ground, and she remembers this because for her, still a child, her father's actions seemed very exciting and she buried her celluloid fish next to his valuables (NOH-3401). Another example is Zigrīda Daškevica,

whose family hid some of their photographs under the floorboards of the apartment. This fact is mentioned by her in the life story interview when talking about returning home after Latvia regained its independence and her unfulfilled hopes of recovering these photographs (NOH-3417).

Valuable books and documents that were either hidden in attics or buried in the ground (ensuring that moisture does not reach them) are most often mentioned among the hidden possessions as well as raw food materials (honey, butter, sugar, alcohol, etc.) and tableware (glass sets, porcelain dishes). However, one of the authors also mentions a buried piano: “About those buried things, I remember being told that the piano and all the dishes were buried, and, of course, all the books. But we haven’t found anything. The piano was wrapped up in blankets; it was a brand-new piano. We really didn’t want to lose it as we hoped to be back in two weeks.” (NOH-2710) As in the previously mentioned case of hiding the weaving loom, the greatest concern of the refugees was that the houses they left behind would be burned down, along with all their belongings. Accordingly, they hid things that were of value to them, but their size determined that it was impossible to take them along. It is worth noting that in other cases valuable things, which were suitable for travel, because of their size were still hidden (“My mother was a dentist, and she buried those big bottles with alcohol, because at that time alcohol was very valuable.” (NOH-2710)) Similarly to the question of the house keys, there are two completely opposite trends: the hiding of alcohol bottles mentioned by Ints Dzelzgalvis (apparently, the family wanted to save them for the time after return) and the action of Ginters Brunovskis, who took several such bottles with him (he was well aware of their value and the possibility of using them as a means of exchange³) (NOH-190).

Such contrasting patterns of behaviour can most likely be related to the all-pervasive belief in an imminent return which was shared by most Latvian refugees, which in turn affected their choice of the things to take

³ During the German occupation, especially in its final phase with the deficit of goods increasing and the course of the Ostmark falling, alcohol often served as a means of exchange for obtaining various goods (Zellis 2007, 74).

along. As a result, some people, believing in the ephemerality of their refugee journey, but at the same time fearing the destructive consequences of warfare, chose to take with them belongings that had no practical value but which could otherwise be destroyed. Such actions are marked vividly in the memories of Zigrīda Daškevica: “We had no clothes, but we had books. /../ We were fully confident that we will be back in a couple of months. /../ I took my Latin book so that I can memorise from it and be able to resume my studies when I will come back after Christmas. Photographs. We were not sure what will happen to them if they are left behind. So they were taken out of albums. And those beloved books, and the folk costume! Because we didn’t know what would happen to that house, whether it would be broken into or who would be there. So we took only such things. But we didn’t think in a practical sense.” (NOH-3417)

Several other sources also indicate that, as people were hoping to return in a short time, they felt that there was no need to take anything extra with them: “You know, when my mother said that Saturday morning that we have to leave in the afternoon, I took photos out of the albums. She said: “But we will be back in two weeks! Why are you ruining those albums?”” (NOH-3420); “My mother somehow chose worn-out clothes, not the newest ones, so that they wouldn’t get damaged on the way or something, because she always thought we’d be back soon.” (NOH-193); “Everyone thought that the war will be over soon and we will go back. We only took what was most necessary. Not warm clothes and things like that.” (NOH-203)

In general, people tried to think practically and take only the most necessary things with them, but quite often it turned out that they were not prepared for how far and long their refugee journey would turn out to be, because they hoped for a favorable outcome of the war. In this context, the memories of Mirdza Andersone offer an interesting example of a situation in which opposing views collide: the mother hopes to return soon and does not want to take anything of value along, while the 14-year-old daughter is much more aware of the possible outcome of the refugee journey: “I packed everything that we brought to Germany. I packed our

silver, I packed my poetry album, I ripped the photos out of the album. /../ Mom said: “We are only leaving for a short time. When the war will be over, we will come back.” But somehow (I don’t know how) I knew that we would not return to Latvia. And I thought – oh, photos – we will never get them again, we will need silver... Mom said: “We don’t need new clothes! Only the old ones!”” (NOH-192)

Although this case marks a situation where the decision to take photographs and books along was determined because of the author’s belief that it will not be possible to return, most often such things were taken along by people who, like the author’s mother, believed in a return in a short time, but, as mentioned above, they tried to protect valuable but fragile things from wartime destruction. It should also be taken into account that the circumstances were generally dramatic, people were confused and there was little time to consider what would and would not be useful on the way. Therefore certain things could be taken along by pure chance, as described in an excerpt from Jana Hale’s memoirs: “The day we left Riga, my mother went through the apartment and packed various things with her. She took out photos from the albums and took one vase. She took one ashtray and two summer dresses.” (NOH-3428)

Similarly, Erita Dzilna describes the situation when her mother walked around the apartment, collecting things to take along, and among other things she put an alarm clock in her bag, because “she said that it was like the soul of the house” (NOH-2809). This, and other examples⁴ illustrate the fact that in the rush and confusion, all kinds of things (vase, ashtray, alarm clock) could be taken along by the refugees, the practical use of which was questionable (it was not even possible to use them as exchange for food or other basic necessities). However, such behaviour

⁴ “We were told that there is a train going to Kurzeme at Riga Preču Station. Well, we quickly grabbed something, something that came to mind. In such a moment one does not properly think about what would be the most valuable, what to take or what not to take. You take something worthless, just put it in.” (NOH-465); “It happened very unexpectedly, so we had to pack our suitcases during the night. The departure was too sudden, so we forgot to take many valuable and necessary things with us. Our possessions were relatively small – mostly clothes.” (NOH-812)

is entirely consistent with the observation by social anthropologist David Parkin, that even in the midst of great haste, people tend to take with them, if possible, even the smallest reminders of who they are and where they came from. Thus, alongside the items that can be used for exchange or defence *en route*, and the food, bedding, medicines, etc., items that have little or no utilitarian or market value are also taken along (Parkin 1999, 313).

In general, the information provided by the sources about the material objects taken along by refugees can be divided into three groups. Firstly, people often mention foodstuffs, clothing and other practical things. Obviously, food products were of great importance during the refugee journey, because, on the one hand, they significantly supplemented meagre food rations that people received. On the other hand, it was possible to exchange some of these products for other things needed by refugees or offer them as remuneration for various services⁵. Among other practical things, various kinds of tableware and dishes are mentioned, as well as larger material values: a sewing machine, typewriter, photo camera and radio. It should be noted that the transportation of such devices, both due to their size and value (threat of being stolen and expropriated), was certainly cumbersome, however, they were of great importance (sewing machines provided an opportunity to earn a living, typewriters were widely used in the Displaced Person camps after the war, while a radio made it possible to follow the progress of the war).

The second group of material values taken along consists of jewellery and other items that were not necessarily practical but were considered valuable enough to be used for exchange of goods (silverware, wrist-watches, tobacco products, alcohol, medicines, etc.) One of the most vivid examples that shows how important such valuables could be in deciding the fate of refugees is the episode in Krišs Ligers' memories of how his

⁵ For example, when Melita Martinova's family tried to find a way to get out of the city which was being advanced on by the Red Army, they managed to persuade a German family they met on the road to take them in their car with the help of some butter taken from Latvia (NOH-208).

family managed to escape the Soviet occupation zone: “The moon was full; we were walking near some bushes and suddenly a guard appeared – a Red Army soldier with a machine gun. Okay, so where are we going? We are going home to Latvia. He smiles and says: “Latvia is not in that direction.” He understood. Ok, good. Mom found her ring and gave it to him. Yes, but he was still kind of thoughtful. My father could not stand it, he pulled out a gold ruble. He looks carefully at it, and the coin falls into the grass. He drops his machine gun, falls on his knees, my parents are also on their knees, and I am also looking for that ruble in the grass. And mom finds it. She holds it in her hand and thinks – should I give it to him or not. Because it was the last thing we had. And she gave it to him. The Russian took it, he said: “Okay, you wait. I will go check out the other posts. When I come back, you can go.” Well, and he disappears (father told me that those five minutes were the longest of his life), then came back and said: “Come on, go!”” (NOH-3423)

The detailed and expressive recounting of this episode leads to believe that it has been often discussed in the author’s family as the decisive moment that allowed them to reach safety and determined their future. Moreover, this episode marks several aspects – both about what was taken along by the refugees and the difficult decisions they had to make regarding these items (either to give up the last thing of value in a situation where there is a high probability of betrayal). At the same time, it marks both active action (taking the risky path) and also how dependent refugees were on the decisions made by others, as well as successful or less fortunate coincidences.

The third group of material values taken by refugees consists of things that had purely emotional or symbolic value: mainly books, photographs, paintings, as well as national costumes, a national flag, a handful of sand, etc. As for books, they appear very often in refugees’ memories – in most cases authors indicate that refugees had two to three books with them, although in some cases the number was higher. Jānis Konstantīns Čakste has clearly stated in his memories how important this matter was for the refugees: “We took what we could carry for ourselves, but there had to be at

least two books.” In response to a question about why it was so important, he answers laconically: “In order to save Latvian culture.” (NOH-455) Most likely, this kind of sentiment was characteristic of representatives of the Latvian intelligentsia (the author mentioned here is a family member of the first President of Latvia), however, the sources indicate that the books were of great value among refugees of various ages and origins.

The family photographs that many refugees took with them also had a sentimental value, the greatest of which was revealed when the refugees became exiles and these items became the only way to recall the places and people left behind. One of the most vivid descriptions of the role of photographs in the lives of exiles is given by Vija Straumane: “Mommy had torn all the pictures out of the albums and thrown them in a box somewhere. The most significant thing about these pictures was that we didn’t have any children’s books, so we, the small children, looked at them and studied them carefully. I didn’t realize it at first, but those pictures had become so sweet and so close to us because we grew up with them. And every time we studied those faces from our parents’ wedding pictures and baptisms, and grandparents’ portraits – they all grew up with us, they were standing by our side.” (NOH-2710)

This narrative is consistent with the researchers’ observation that photographs depicting distant and unattainable people and places are particularly powerful emotional and mnemonic tools (Svasek 2012). In addition, in the context of migration, people who do not have access to such photographs of the past can feel the loss of family and identity more profoundly (getting to know the faces of one’s ancestors enriches one’s personality) (Attan 2006, 182). Therefore, in cases where refugees had taken photographs with them, they played an important role in the process of transferring memories between generations of exiles, allowing children and grandchildren to get to know and keep in touch with relatives who had remained in Latvia. In other words, they allowed the family’s heritage to be preserved in places far from its place of origin.

It should be noted that such a connection with the lost home during the long years of exile was also facilitated by other surviving items of the

refugee journey (e.g., a wooden cutting board, alarm clock, etc.). Anthropologist Ilana Feldman emphasizes that this happens because with increasing distance, the balance between the material and the narrative in people's relationships to their homes shift, and the narrated prevails over the tangible (Feldman 2006, 17). It also confirms once again that, apart from food, clothing and other valuables, refugees often took along quite ordinary things whose intrinsic value was limited, but the symbolic meaning increased, absorbing the owner's biography and socio-cultural markers (Tolia-Kelly 2004).

Moral Values

In order to analyse moral values reflected in the refugee narratives, the study uses value theory developed by ethics professor Augusts Milts. This theory is adapted to life story research and distinguishes four main categories of values: Nature and Basic life, Social life, Culture, Higher values (see Table 1).

Table 1. Hierarchy of values as distinguished by Augusts Milts
(Milts 1996, 145)

Nature, Basic life	Life, vitality, health, quality of the environment
Social life	Prosperity, order, solidarity, social security, justice, responsibility
Culture	Unity, individuality, qualitative action, humane way of life, care for higher values
Higher values	Goodness, virtue, truth, beauty, freedom, meaning of life, faith, hope, love

Concerning the value of nature and life, refugee narratives often include one episode that marks the boundary between life at home/homeland and going into the unknown future, and recurrently this episode is related to Latvian nature/the landscape or some natural phenomenon.

Examples of such episodes can be found in the memories of both Valda Danenbergā and Ilona Birzgale: “All the fields were blooming, those of our neighbours and ours. It was harvest time when we left our home. It was the time for harvesting rye, and all the fields were yellow. And as far as you could see, the fields of the neighbours were also wonderful. There was a good harvest. We left in July. And then my heart hurt terribly.” (NOH-56); “It was a Sunday morning and the road was all muddy. And behind the wall there was a white church on a kind of hill, and trees in such beautiful autumn colours. And those Suiti women in their gorgeous national costumes were going to the service. And you know, that view has remained with me as the last beautiful view from my homeland.” (NOH-3420)

In both cases the natural landscape and its beauty gave an additional emotional significance to the beginning of the refugees’ journey and caused a deep rooting of these moments in the authors’ memories by symbolizing the breaking point (or the biographical break)⁶ in their life stories. In turn, in the memories of Vera Ozers-Puķīte – “The clouds were terribly threatening, and the wind was quite strong. And there was a kind of reflection of light somewhere. It was all so terrible... it left such a terrible impression. You are sailing towards an unknown fate, aren’t you,” (NOH-443) – the natural phenomenon seems to reflect the inner emotional state of the refugees when leaving the port of Riga by ship. Overall, all these cases recount natural landscapes turning into geographical-emotional landscapes, i.e., landscapes that have the power to stir up strong feelings or agitations of the mind (Rosbrook & Schweitzer 2010).

Alongside nature and life, one of the most frequently mentioned values in life stories is solidarity, which was of extreme significance during the flight. Baiba Bela has pointed out that the behaviour during the flight shows people’s deepest values, because when faced with situations critical to survival, superficially appropriated values become irrelevant, instead

⁶ The concept of a biographical break describes the impact of significant, sudden events on an individual’s life course, which radically changes its direction and intentions (Pranka 2015).

showing people's true values. Thus, for some people, the survival instinct prevails, while others follow their ideals of justice, including the principles of solidarity and helpfulness (Bela 2011, 151).

The refugees were forced to rely on the solidarity and help of fellow citizens even when they had not yet left the territory of Latvia, but sought refuge in Kurzeme for a shorter or longer period of time. In general, most of the refugees' memories of this time highlight the help and support they received, which in some cases was particularly vivid: "Yes, people were very kind to us. I have one particular case in mind. Early in the morning, we walked through a forest and suddenly stumbled out into a field. /../ We saw a small house, a farmer's house. And a man with long hair and grey beard was chopping firewood and looking at us. We could no longer walk, so we went to him and asked for bread. And then an elderly woman came out of the house. I can still imagine her today, holding her hands under her apron and saying, "Dear God, why isn't the mistress at home! She was waiting for you so much!" As it turned out, the owner of that little house had been waiting for an opportunity to help people like us, of course, knowing nothing about us personally. And there we got bread, we got honey, a piece of pork." (NOH-445)

Another author, Valda Danenberg, also recalls a similar positive experience (the owners of the house where her family stayed before going to Germany provided clothes for their children), however, she also mentions a negative experience, when instead of solidarity and help she received rejection: "In some cases, we weren't allowed to sleep even in the barns. Many nights my husband and our three boys slept under a tree." (NOH-56)⁷

During their journey abroad, Latvian refugees who were united by their place of origin and nationality often showed mutual solidarity and

⁷ Such manifestations of anti-values are also evidenced by the fact that the newspaper "Tevija" often published repeated calls for everyone to lend a helping hand to the refugees: these articles appealed to the solidarity of all Latvians and strongly condemned those residents of Kurzeme who did not want to share their homes and food with refugees.

help, both by sharing the food they had taken with them, by providing help to mothers with small children, and by fleeing together from the approaching Red Army. In this context, it is possible to speak about one of the cultural values – unity, which manifested itself when Latvians tried to maintain mutual contacts, as evidenced by the memories of Ilze Ziverte: “You are in total despair, when you come to a foreign land. And if you hear the Latvian language somewhere, you immediately run to the one speaking it and hug him. It doesn’t matter at all if you know him or not.” (NOH-465)

However, outside Latvia, the lives and well-being of refugees often depended considerably more on the help and solidarity of the local residents. Even though it was not infrequent to encounter a negative attitude, many life story authors highlight positive episodes which, even many decades later, lead them to feel tender emotions. One such episode is recalled by Dzidra Ādamsons: “A woman came out of the bakery and gave me a bun of bread. Small, grey wartime bread. And it was definitely the tastiest bread I have ever eaten in my life. /../ I really don’t know, our memories very often deceive us, we remember what we idealize. But that woman has remained for my whole life as a symbol of goodness and perfection. I remember her so well! A chubby, rosy German woman who gave it to me. I really don’t know if she was like that, but she has remained like that in my memory.” (NOH-2434A) Obviously, to the author, the bread and the vividly described German woman embodied not only the values of social life (solidarity), but also the highest values (the goodness).

It is worth noticing that when talking about the experienced solidarity and mutual assistance, authors frequently emphasize that such value-oriented behaviour later paid off both directly and indirectly. Thus, for example, Elza Reinberga in her narrative directly links solidarity with her safe escape from death: “There was a situation when they [German soldiers] decided to accept me and my girls [daughters] in that truck, but not my relatives – a man, his wife and their boy. And I thought – they have always helped me so much, I can’t leave them now. /../ And I refused. Then again, you never know how fate plays out. It turned out that there had

been a bombing somewhere on the road, and everyone on that truck was killed.” (NOH-790)

Stories of lucky escapes are often found in refugee narratives, and also in other cases they are largely associated with various moral values – faith in higher powers (destiny, God), solidarity, unity and empathy. In addition, people in their memories highlight that, at times, actions of the enemy also disclosed similar values. Such an example is reflected in another episode by the same author, when she talks about her and her two daughters’ encounter with Red Army soldiers, being well aware of what fate could await females in such a situation: “I was left with my two girls, those Russians, and some other women who were screaming and moaning, and were shot at and... And I started to say to that Russian – okay, I see what’s going on here. Shoot the small one [youngest daughter] first! And then whatever you do to us two, but shoot her first! But that Russian asked me – where do you have that little one? And I showed him the carts. He approached, pulled the blanket from my daughter’s nose. The moon was still shining. Then he suddenly begun to caress her head – little *gulobchik*. He probably had small children at home himself. And he started to persuade the others to let us go. And he managed to do that!” (NOH-790)

The dramatic episode evidences both the empathy and compassion shown by the Red Army soldier and the fact that life loses its value in such a situation. It should be noted that expressions of a fatalistic attitude can be found in other life stories as well – most often in situations when refugees had to face constant airstrikes, as described by Juris Viksniņš: “My mother adopted a very fatalistic approach to that matter. ././ She took her family, sat in the middle of the meadow and said: “Well, if God has decided for us to go, then we don’t want to die like rats in these caves [bomb shelters], let’s die right here in the open field.”” (NOH-904) The described actions of the author’s mother show both a trust in higher forces and a certain element of freedom as she wants to decide for herself the way to die. However, there were also cases when people surrounded by the tragedy of the war and the flight lost some of the highest values, namely, freedom and even the meaning of life. Lūcija Kazeniece describes such

feelings as follows: “Well, what could we feel. Nothing. All the events unfolded so unexpectedly, so terribly that we turned into machines who moved where we were sent; sat where we were told to sit; got up when we were told to get up.” (NOH-107) Nevertheless, an attitude of this kind is not often encountered in life stories, which suggests that even in the most difficult and complicated situations, such values as faith, hope and life did not lose their importance in people’s lives.

In people’s memories of this time, expressions of such values as justice and a sense of duty can also be found. Justice, which manifested itself as standing up for the life and health of another person (in this case, a compatriot), is described by Valida Danenbergā: “When we got out [of the ship], we stood in a long line, showing our documents. [And] then one old man was kicked because he did not know how to answer in German what he was asked there. And I got worried, I spoke German, I went to argue with that German officer. I was ready for anything! I had decided that if I had to hit him, I would!” (NOH-56)

Encounters with anti-values which manifested both in the actions of military personnel in the occupied areas, local residents and even refugees themselves are often recalled by the authors of life stories, as illustrated by the memories of Ilga Āakste and Gunārs Brunovskis: “Then I experienced something that I remember terribly. /./ When Americans were approaching, many people started looting.. /./ And how those people behaved there! /./ I never thought that people are so useless, but they are. /./ It was disgusting.” (NOH-456); “And unfortunately, I have to say that those refugees acted quite shamelessly when taking away those [stolen] clothes. /./ They showed their real face, and it shouldn’t have happened like that – even if we are saved and got through safely, we shouldn’t act in such a way.” (NOH-190)

Most often, when talking about these kinds of situations, the authors simultaneously express their assessment, which ranges from condemnation to disgust, thereby consciously or unconsciously emphasizing that such a model of behaviour does not correspond to their value orientation. In addition, as emphasized by Baiba Bela, the inclusion of such episodes in

the life story shows the values of the authors *per se*, because “just like memory, life stories are always selective, and the principles of this selection are often based on deep emotions and collective ideas about good and bad, worth remembering and the worthless” (Bela 2011, 152).

In this context, it is significant that several authors have also included in their life stories descriptions of situations in which they themselves have violated their values by stealing food and other products from local residents. However, in all these cases, the authors emphasize that they did it for the first (and last) time in their life and that they consider it a reprehensible act that could only happen due to extraordinary circumstances (“We stole those potatoes; we did such a sinful deed because we had nothing to eat.” (NOH-813)). Thus, even when talking about manifestations of anti-values, these authors actually confirm their value orientation.

At the same time, other authors highlight the fact that even in cases of haste and danger, they were not able to act against their values. For example, when recalling the moment when he had to go to the refugee transport, Ansis Mitrevics describes his actions as following: “I won’t go into details, but I will tell you one nuance that shows how we were brought up and what an instinct for honesty we had at that time. I was performing in a costume play for which I had borrowed fabulous swords from the city’s history museum /../ So [when I had to leave] I ran to the museum to return it, but it was closed at the time. I knocked until I got the guard. I told him that I had borrowed those swords and want to give them back. I was acting stupidly. The Russians are coming, but I have to settle things of honour! What you have promised, you should fulfil.” (NOH-768)

If in this case the author managed to stick to his sense of duty, which he, in retrospect, connects with the values of society in interwar Latvia, then the opposite situation is vividly imprinted in Nora Pīpkalēja’s memories: “One day my mother calls me, she says – drive home quickly, papa has got a car and we are driving away. And I still have a bit of a bad conscience, because one of my colleagues came in and asked me to make song sheets for her tenants’ burial. And I didn’t manage to do that because I just couldn’t sit there [voice breaks] and do anything.” (NOH-784) Both the

author's narrative, as well as her emotional reaction during the interview (voice breaking) show how much regret this situation caused her as she did not fulfil her "duty" due to anxiety.

Conclusion

Although the analysed life stories of exile Latvians were recorded more than 50 years after the events, they nevertheless convey the displacement experience in an intense way by vividly depicting the psychological and emotional circumstances as well as material issues that people faced in the particular historical situation. The analyses show that narratives of the flight reveal the value-orientation not only of the narrators themselves, but of their contemporaries as well. Common values relevant to refugees emerged: nature and life, solidarity, justice, responsibility, goodness, freedom, and others. In addition, it was observed that the value-orientation of the narrators was revealed both in the way the authors reflected on their own and other people's actions and in the episodes they choose to include in their life story. Moreover, the memories of material values taken along by the refugees were often directly related to the symbolic value that these objects acquired over time.

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Maija Krūmiņa

Materiālās un morālās vērtības trimdas latviešu bēgšanas naratīvos

Kopsavilkums

Rakstā pētītas trimdas latviešu atmiņas, analizējot materiālo vērtību lomu bēgļu gaitu laikā 1944./1945. gadā, kā arī morālo vērtību izpausmes, kas atklājas, stāstot par bēgļu rīcību, izdarītajām izvēlēm un pieņemtajiem lēmumiem. Pētījuma pamatā ir Nacionālā mutvārdu vēstures krājumā iekļautās trimdas latviešu dzīvesstāstu intervijas, kas atspoguļo bēgšanas pieredzi, spilgti atainojot psiholoģiskos un emocionālos apstākļus, kā arī materiālās problēmas, ar kurām cilvēki saskārās konkrētajā vēsturiskajā situācijā. Avoti apliecina, ka bēgļi centās domāt praktiski un ņemt līdzi tikai pašas nepieciešamākās lietas, taču bieži izrādījies, ka viņi nebija gatavi tam, ka tik tāls un garš būs viņu bēgļu ceļš. Turklāt atklājās, ka atmiņas par bēgļu līdzpaņemtajiem materiālajiem priekšmetiem bieži vien ir tieši saistītas ar to simbolisko vērtību, ko šie priekšmeti laika gaitā bija ieguvuši. Tika identificētas arī bēgļiem nozīmīgas garīgās vērtības (daba un dzīve, solidaritāte, taisnīgums, atbildība, labestība un brīvība), kas atklājās gan tajā, kā trimdas latvieši atspoguļo savu un citu cilvēku rīcību bēgļu gaitu laikā, gan epizodēs, ko viņi izvēlējušies iekļaut savos dzīvesstāstos.

Atslēgvārdi: atmiņas, bēgļi, Otrais pasaules karš, vērtības

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INTERGENERATIONAL COMMUNICATION OF VALUES IN LATVIA: QUALITATIVE RESEARCH RESULTS

The article analyzes value transmission within multi-generational families and considers inter-generational communication as a means for minimizing the exclusion of ethical and moral values both within the family and society. Value sharing has been approached in the frame of such social relationships as “the self” – “the family” and “the family” – “others”.

The study on intergenerational relationships in families was conducted in the Latgale region – the south-eastern part of Latvia – by applying qualitative research tools and collecting the data from semi-structured in-depth interviews. Subjective experiences shared by 34 individual family members in ten families revealed that family members’ bi-directional interactions ensure not only the transmission of values but, depending on family lifestyles, impact the processes of value (including family as a value) re-semanticization and re-interpretation. By performing essential family functions (upbringing, recreational, regulatory, communicative, etc.), as well as by sharing the inherited wisdom and accumulated knowledge across generations, the communicative procedures that result in dynamic functionalism among multiple systems may occur, in the frame of which diverse and contradictory value systems get connected and either undergo transformations or co-exist. Such factors as a strong bond between generations and mutual family practices result in the system of established values, norms, and goals that contribute to the quality of life of families, both socially and economically, and ensure the future of the country.

Keywords: family lifestyle, family values, socialization, ethics, perceptions of morality

Introduction

In our globalized and fragmented world characterized by integration, interdependence, and openness on the one hand and disintegration, heterogeneity, and separation on the other, modern families are facing disconcerting problems and challenges in the transmittal of family values. Such issues as work/ life and home imbalance, unemployment, financial problems, domestic violence, addictions, and the effects of poor parenting affect family members' physical strength, mental well-being, and intergenerational communication. With material values increasingly becoming more prominent than spiritual values influence the lifestyle of a contemporary family and testify to a shift in value orientation. Nevertheless, for young people associations with a good life include critical concepts related to socialization and the relationships between different contexts and macrosystems (family, peers, school, community) rather than the family's socio-economic status and material living conditions (OECD 2019; Suldo et al. 2014). Thus, relationships with parents and social connections with other family members that ensure transmission of values are crucial for ensuring positive health outcomes, determining self-satisfaction (Edwards, Lopez 2006; Suldo et al. 2014), and contributing to universally human, cultural, and personal value formation and development.

In addition, empirical studies on the aspects of young people's well-being and satisfaction in the family and general family processes have constituted greater validity than global life satisfaction results, especially when discussing values and their transfer. Technological innovations and the use of ICT devices have crucially affected the social institution of the family and transformed extended family systems into nuclear ones (Carvalho et al. 2015; Saleem et al. 2015). The dynamics of intergenerational relationships and socialization practices have also been challenged by active migration trends, demographic transitions, and fundamental transformations in family structure (Kaša & Mieriņa 2019). The decrease in

face-to-face interactions among family members poses the threat that non-material and family values will degenerate and provokes further changes in value orientation and value relations; thus, the increasing lack of intergenerational communication and value exchange may affect not only the children and young people of today but also the future of Europe. However, since the construction of placial, spatial, collective, cultural, and national identities is directly linked to the individual's socialization and the discursively organized learning experiences, intergenerational exchange of knowledge (through family activities during major (usually cultural-cum-religious) festivals or family gatherings, by communicating values and passing down valuable skills, or memories, i.e., equipping youngsters with vital information to remember from the past) may alter the past and future (Deák & Kačāne 2021). Therefore, it is of crucial importance for interactions and socialization patterns to be based on universal human values and being a 'Cultured Man', i.e. being respectful to people within and outside the family, being open to diverse cultural expressions, as well as to possess cultural capital for the preservation of historical and cultural heritage (Kacane 2020, 1151).

The article aims to analyze value transmission within multi-generational families in Latvia and the role played by the family in forming an individual's value system, specifically the value of the family and its heritage, and the values of responsibility, loyalty, and respect. The postmodern and cosmopolitan view of values is based on "conventional wisdom" – that universal values across cultures are non-existent until the point of political instability, during which universal value claims are widely circulated to defend extreme political views and win ideological fights, such as political campaigns, elections, and wars (McMurtry 2011). In this context, different parties involved in a conflict may debate on, e.g., "Western values", "Eastern values", "Soviet values", "Islamic values", "family values", "universal values", etc., to build persuasive politics and reframe arguments. To avoid such global issues as political manipulation, authoritarian populism, terrorism, violence, and a general lack of universally accepted social and ethical standards requires both identification and confrontation of the

crisis of values. This can be done by delving into the moral dimension and socio-emotional needs of each individual or family as a system, impacted by the individual and collective past.

Theoretical and conceptual framework

The family is the smallest social structure and a socio-cultural environment with numerous socialization agents; it is the foundation of a societal organization and a setting for the human's first social development. Based on Family systems theory, families are "continuous entities", with rules, beliefs, traditions, and values "that shape members over time" (Pfeiffer & In-Albon 2022). Family dynamics impact communication patterns and intergenerational transmissions, however, families' experiences are not isolated and are shaped by historical, political, social, economic, and cultural contexts, thus in order to approach the processes of intergenerational communication of values it is of vital importance to focus on both interactions between family members and between the family and the contexts by which the family has been shaped and in which the family has been embedded (Watson 2012).

The family performs various social functions: upbringing, regulatory, communicative, and security. Family functions relate to several interrelated activities (affection, self-esteem, spirituality and religion, regular care, socialization, education, leisure, etc.), which in the family system framework are grouped based on the triangle of such general components as economics, daily care, and recreation, some of which may be individually prioritized depending on the family's socio-economic status and the needs of its members (Turnbull et al. 2015; Gargiulo & Kilgo 2018). The family lifestyle, a multi-dimensional category subject to transformations and changes, includes several aspects: primarily the structure of activities by which family members satisfy their needs, a system of relationships throughout one's lifetime, and a hierarchy of values. (Kraus et al. 2020) Being "the nucleus of a culture universally" (Saleem et al. 2015, 29), family is the core institution responsible for the transmission of fundamental

values, collectivist and individualist values, work-related values, personal values, patterns of behavior, and ethical norms.

In the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia (1922), family is seen as one of the foundations of a cohesive society and a group of persons which constitutes a priority for the Latvian state and which, irrespective of its model, has to be protected. Family as a value is mentioned alongside such values as loyalty to the country and its future generations, freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, honesty, a work ethic and contextualized within the processes of the identity-formation of Latvia in the European cultural space through intergenerational exchange, i.e., passing down knowledge, experiences, and beliefs to the younger generations, and universal human and Christian values (Constitutional Assembly 1922). According to Latvian legislation, a family, in the narrow sense of its definition, “consists of the spouses and their children while they are still part of a common household” (Cabinet of Ministers 1937/1993), thus a general perception of family is based on the structure of the nuclear or elementary family. The definition of an extended family in Latvian Civil Law is not provided, however, the relations between two or more persons are determined based on kinship lines, and degrees. Grandparents may take full care of children if the parents are not able to support them and, vice versa, the duty to support parents and, in cases of necessity, grandparents, lies upon all of the children (Ibid.).

Methodology

Procedure

The article presents the results obtained in the framework of research on intergenerational dynamics of cultural socialisation within an international project “Cultural Heritage and Identities of Europe’s Future – CHIEF” (2018–2021), funded by the European Commission Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation programme. Twenty-six semi-structured in-depth interviews with 34 participants from 10 families were conducted in the south-eastern part of the country – the historical and cultural

region of Latgale¹ – between September 2019 and January 2020.² The interviews were conducted both in the Latvian and Russian languages in urban, rural, and semi-urban settings: in the city of Daugavpils, in several parishes of Augšdaugava Municipality, and in the town of Preiļi in the Preiļi Municipality. The interviews followed CHIEF's Fieldwork Manual, designed with the aim to unpack the role of intergenerational communication and family in shaping young people's cultural identities, their practices of cultural participation, and the meaning of cultural heritage by indicating that family settings are one of the most important sites of informal cultural socialisation and participation for young people. Among others, the Manual offered thematic blocks that centred around such topics as family history, family lifestyle and cultural participation, intergenerational communication of values, knowledge and memory, future expectations. The paper presents the findings that deal with conceptions of the family and intergenerational communication of values.

Sampling

Families were accessed and purposely sampled via the participants who had been approached in earlier stages of the project at formal education establishments and who had reflected different forms of cultural

¹ Pursuant to the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia (1922), the territory of the Latvian state, within the borders established by international treaties, consists of four distinct regions, including Latgale. The Resolution on Latgale's Secession from Vitebsk Province (a part of tsarist Russia) and Reunification with other Latvia's Territories was adopted at the Latgale Congress in Rēzekne (1917), on one of the most significant occasions on the way to the proclamation of independent Latvia (1918), and later implemented after the Latvian War of Independence (1918–1920), the Polish-Soviet war (1919–1920) and after signing the peace treaty between Latvia and Russia (1920).

² The region is a crosscultural, mainly Christian (Roman Catholic), territory where due to the historical presence of a considerable number of representatives of ethnic (Russians, Poles, Lithuanians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Jews etc.) and denominational minorities (members of the Russian Orthodox Church, Old Believers etc.), a space of cultural fusion and merging of traditions has been created. According to the Central Statistical Bureau of the Republic of Latvia, the region's permanent residents currently include ethnic Latvians (46%) which constitute the minority, and representatives of other ethnic groups (54%) – constituting the majority.

literacy. The younger generation was represented by 12 young people in the age range 14-25. The middle generation, representing parents and others (e.g. uncle), included 11 people whereas the older generation, representing grandparents and others (e.g. godmother) included 11 people. Informed consent was signed by each interviewee confirming that their participation was voluntary; in the case of minors the consent form was signed by one of the parents. The research conforms to EU Directives on data protection (95/46/EC and 2006/24/EC). The average length of each interview was one hour; it was followed by taking detailed participant notes on the context of the interview, non-linguistic communication, and reflections on the data provided outside the interview recording. All audio-recorded interviews were transcribed and anonymised.

Data analysis

Qualitative content analysis – a widely used qualitative research technique that is applied “to interpret the meaning from the content of text data” (Hsieh & Shannon 2005) was made to determine the presence of certain words, themes, and concepts within the qualitative data obtained during the interviews. The interviews were coded manually by identifying the main categories (codes) that were divided into subcategories (subcodes), and later analysed as a meaningful text considering cultural-historical context.

Influences of socio-political context

Understanding the historical and cultural contexts of family upbringing is the core principle for analyzing socializing experiences, differences in values, and intergenerational communication of values (Dyk Hyjer 2014). For contextualizing the inter-generational research data it is important to provide a frame of the changing contextual environment that overlaps with the interview participants' lifespan.

Conflicts of values and their formation traditionally take place at historical breaking points; thus, by reflecting on generations and the events they had lived through in specific periods of the country's history, including the time when the territory of Latvia was a part of other political

formations located on their periphery, reveals how the value crises of the past impact the value system of today. Furthermore, considering differences between the social and cultural contexts in which grandparents, parents, and their children were socialized is essential as differences in their value systems are likely to be observed. In addition, considering that the interviews included questions on family history, family traditions, beliefs, opinions, and experiences related to cultural participation and socialization in modern-day Latvia, intergenerational communication of values may be discovered.

Interviewees from the older generation, represented in the study by eight females and three males, were born shortly before Latvia's Soviet occupation (1940), during the years of WW2 under Nazi occupation (1941–1944) and the Soviet reoccupation (1944), and in the first post-war decade. It was a time of brutal power change and adoption of a new paradigm, during which national, cultural, religious, and family values were devalued, denigrated, and re-defined to meet the needs of the communist ideology for building a new sociopolitical reality of Soviet Latvia and adopting “the values” of Marxism-Leninism (proletarianism, collectivism, anti-individualism, putting social and public interest first, unquestioned loyalty, sacrificing oneself for the Communist party, obedience, etc.) seen as necessary to ensure the continuity of the totalitarian regime (Kristberga 2021). For the authorities of the new political power, “the primary goal was a vital integration of Soviet values into the general ideological system, based on fundamental ideological issues” (Sister Euphrosyne 2017, 161). This was implemented by applying different techniques primarily in the sphere of education and culture. In its fear of Christian values, the Communist regime, perceived as the representation of metaphysical evil, was in direct conflict with the Church that was striving to protect the “divine values” (truth, honesty, love), the nation's moral and religious life, and the fundamental right for man's freedom (Kalme 2017). Thus, the values imbed in a part of the interviewed older generation during early childhood contradicted the hierarchy of values declared by the totalitarian regime in their youth and maturity. Contact with this regime turned out to be

traumatic for both the youngsters of that time and the older generations within their families as turning into “Soviet man” required not only cultivating unusual qualities (for that time period) and the recognition of new values, but also a kind of betrayal – refusal of values instilled before (Bleiere et al. 2021, 61). In an attempt to build a prosperous future for the young people of the 1950s–1960s, families were forced to suppress their true beliefs and comply with double standards. i.e., some kept following former family rituals, including religious ones, and observing family and the Church’s values privately, without revealing or dwelling on them publicly. In addition, these secretive attempts to preserve traditional and Christian values in the situation of destruction and moral decay, when aggressive attacks by the regime were made to forcibly erode and substitute these values with anti-values, manifested themselves as a patriotic struggle for not only the independence of Latvian statehood but also for the values of Western civilization (Strods 1999, 559). Moreover, “[o]wing to the Church’s separation from the State, the latter’s russification policies, penetrating nearly all spheres of society, did not affect the Church. By sustaining the people’s Christian faith, the Church preserved an essential dimension of the national identity as well” (Kalme 2017, 247). Eventually, the interviewees from the older generation, especially those who spoke Latvian, participated in the political post-Soviet national restoration discourse and, on the individual and family level, attempted to reconstruct normality, including the national and ethnic values of interwar Latvia (1918–1940), in the post-communism situation (Stukuls Eglitis 2002). The restoration of temporal normality for the older generation was based on the accentuation of tradition (conservatism).

The middle generation represented in the study by nine females and two males were born after Khrushchev’s Thaw³ in the second half of the

³ The era in Soviet history that followed USSR leader Joseph Stalin’s brutal rule and death in 1953 and lasted till the early years of the 1960s under his successor Nikita Khrushchev’s rule; a crucial shift in policies and behaviors marked by exploring and postulating a set of universal values by Soviet intellectuals (See: Kozlov & Gilburd 2013; Yurchak 2005).

1960s and 1970s, the period of ongoing geopolitical tensions and the Cold War between the “Soviet-” and “Western-bloc” countries, on the one hand, and the continuous struggle between conservative pro-Stalinists and liberals, on the other. During that time, the processes of secularization and Russification of society under the circumstances of a totalitarian regime and anti-religious propaganda continued; in addition, a reformulation of a new Soviet model of values, behavior patterns, and norms occurred. Due to a complex system of atheist, ethical, and aesthetic upbringing, developed by the Soviet regime for building patriotism of a “Soviet man”, sustaining the Latvian people’s identity along with its moral and cultural values was largely restricted locally and continued on the western side of the Iron Curtain – in exile. The period of scientific and atheistic propaganda, substituted by a period of scientific and atheistic education had taken its toll, thus, the middle generation’s life experience up till *perestroika*⁴ and *glasnost*⁵ was largely gained in the cultural and political context of accepting Soviet social standards as a norm. However, to compensate for the lack of freedom and remain immune to the indoctrination of Soviet values, strategies of escapism were sought through expressions of art and a creative approach to life, especially among intellectual *Homo Sovieticus* (Kristberga 2021). For the middle generation, self-identification processes largely coincided with the culminating change of the European political landscape, the shift of the 1980s regime, and the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) eliminating the Cold War division of Europe; therefore the restoration of normality in post-communist Latvia for them implied both an expression of the traditional, national and religious values to preserve their continuity and a transition to a stronger identification with Europe and reliance on European liberal values – democracy,

⁴ From Russian, the “restructuring” of multiple aspects and spheres of ideological work; a part of the reform launched and instituted in the USSR by Mikhail Gorbachev in the middle of the 1980s, a programme that led to new thinking and the re-emergence of nationalist tendencies (See: McNair 2006).

⁵ From Russian, “openness”; the Soviet policy of open discussion and transparency in media, a campaign leading to new freedoms (Ibid.).

freedom, inclusivity, openness –, which ensured greater opportunities for personal growth and cultural exchange and also for future generations.

The representatives of the younger generation, five females and seven males, were born in the middle of the 1990s after the disintegration of the USSR and the restoration of Latvia's independence (1990) and at the beginning of a new millennium marked by Latvia's integration within the European Union (2004). The new era and a shift from collectivism to individual and consumerist values, as well as mass media and the Internet, increasingly contributed to the processes of re-traditionalization (Lane 2002; Arts & Halman 2004) and striving to abandon socialist values, which the majority of the older generations had largely devalued but were incapable of refusing from fully. Thus, some of them stayed “in-between the past and the present”, a testimony to how historical events of the past influence an individual's self-perception and group memberships today. In general, though, for the majority of present day families of the former USSR Republics, values are associated with the conventional European family (Arts & Halman 2004), however, adherence to a religion, Christian values, has been transforming into the platform of universal human values. The youngsters of the new era have been more inclined to perceive freedom as a natural and integral value of Latvian and European democracy; in the frame of socio-economic development, they tend to orient towards strengthening the “global citizen's” materialist and post-materialist values (Inglehart 1977).

Results

Sharing values and beliefs in families

In the current debate regarding the transmission of family values, intergenerational interviews about family history, lifestyle, future expectations, and world perceptions shaped under the impact of historical, political, economic, and social conditions reveal family attitudes to morality and ethics. Depending on the family background, orientation towards

or association with belonging to local (regional), national (Latvian), European, Soviet, and global cultural spaces, one can distinguish a plurality and variations of values within and across families or “microcultures”. These values either compete within an individual or between/ among individuals and collectives, manifesting themselves as polarization – a conflict of values (“culture wars”) (Chapman 2015) or clashes (Beck et al. 1994) – or co-exist in their inclusive multi-layered form. In addition, they fall within the frame of fundamental social relationships: the self – family, family – others (community/ society/ state (nation)/ world), man (family) – nature⁶; the first two of the three aspects will further be discussed in detail.

The self and family

The Soviet policy implemented for half a century had a negative effect on the value of the self and family as one of the foundations of traditional values since, for decades, the focus had been laid on the interests of the collective rather than the individual and family: “[f]amily life was juxtaposed with public life, but young people were persuaded that family ties were old-fashioned and not necessary for the new system” (Runce 2016, 160–161). This applies to all generations and in many ways explains the values (not) instilled in the younger generation, i.e. values that are not properly instilled become absent ones. According to the data obtained, instilling family values often takes place by verbally communicating them to the younger generation, however, a mindful perception of oneself and family as an entity with its past, as well as an acknowledgment of family (including ancestors) as a value in general, also requires non-verbal means of communication. It is the actions, including participation and socialisation, that verify the alignment of one’s stated values and more productively teach everyday life behaviours and annual traditions.

⁶ On family as a site of consocial learning and interactions while being situated between culture, nature, experience, and belonging, see Deák & Kačāne 2021.

Family and its heritage as a value: the younger generation's perspective

Although all the interviewees acknowledge family as a value and family as the first gateway into cultural socialization that includes the transmission of values, the younger generation's knowledge of family heritage and customs rarely reaches beyond the nuclear family. The majority of youngsters show very limited awareness of both grandparents' lives, their attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions, and, in the case of single-parent families, – the divorced/ deceased parent's paths in life. One of the examples is a student who had agreed to participate in the joint interview with her grandmother in her rural home, however, her behavior during the interview and replies revealed disconnectedness and separateness in the relationship between the two and other relatives due to physical and eventually emotional distance between them:

If honestly, I don't know much about the history of our family, except for one or two generations, since nobody has told me anything. My parents have not told me much about their childhood or their relationships in their families either. Sometimes I happen to meet a relative whom I know nothing about. We are four in the family – my mother, my father, my sister, and me. All the rest are almost strangers to me (Ance Daugaviņa, 20, F8, urban).⁷

For some youngsters, being with the family has provided a fake feeling of belonging with no display of genuine emotions and no interest in togetherness, which testifies to the gradual transformations of a value system and the creation of “unwilling families” (and “unwilling nation”⁸):

⁷ In-text references after interviewees' quotes include a participant's self-chosen name and surname pseudonym (the surname pseudonym in all but one case is identical for all generations of one family), age, family number, and geographical location. For detailed participants' socio-demographic information, see Kacane 2020, 210–214.

⁸ Such a phenomenon as stepping onto the “path of passive existence” and the formation of the “unwilling nation” is gradually developing; this signals the appearance of “unwilling families” (Simba Magone, 22, F9, rural; Biruta Liepa, 75, F10, rural; Marija Murāne, 83, F6, semi-urban).

I am not really interested in it [going somewhere with parents]. My dad doesn't really like it either. Mom rarely goes out with dad. She usually goes somewhere with her girlfriends (K2 Kafe, 16, F3, rural).

The greatest value of the family, as seen by the youngster from a socially vulnerable family is in being together with family. Having a family is perceived as a value in itself and as a means for sharing knowledge. Among the things he missed the most while away during studies in Germany is the time spent with the family (picnics in summertime and evenings in wintertime), at the same time the information shared on family history reveals a clear intergenerational gap:

We are six people [in the family] now – five brothers and my mother. I know very little about my grandparents. I know only about mom's mom because we lived together for a while. She worked in [...] a chemical factory. That's about all I know. I know very little about what was in my family before mom (Ārzemnieks Felikss, 18, F5, rural).

Such a tendency of providing only fragmented memories and distorted facts while reproducing family history raises the alarm about family disintegration and a partial collapse of the notion that family is a value in itself and the recognition of traditional family values.

The youngsters do not always appreciate or accept the family's lifestyle and may make extreme decisions to avoid loneliness, e.g. a pupil of a local secondary school, still a minor, reports on having moved out to start – as he notes – building a self-made man and to undertake “conscious” self-development:

I have a different kind of attitude towards people, others, and myself. [...] I moved closer to my friends [...] to be more sociable, more talkative (Antons Felikss, 17, F5, rural).

Changes in family structure⁹ testify to a notable shift in family configuration and thereby also – insufficient transmission channels. The need of the complete and extended family in the transmission of values is further testified by dwelling upon the importance of intergenerational exchange, which is especially emphasized by the young interviewees from single-parent families:

The older generation passes on this knowledge to their children and grandchildren [...]. If one of these links in the chain is missing, knowledge is not transferred in such amount and detail. That's why the involvement of all generations in the transmission [of values] is very important (Juris Liepa, 25, F10, urban).

The significant role of the multi-generational family in passing down the family history that allows the recognition of family as a value and family values, in general, is also supported by those coming from large and complete families. Values are equated with a complex multi-layered “culture house” within an individual; the whole multi-generational collective consistently and patiently participate in “building” it:

It is the family that starts building this small ‘house’, this small ‘culture house’ in you, ‘brick by brick’. Something is added by grandma, telling about her life and showing something that you may be interested in [...]. Grandpa puts in something of his own. Mom and dad add something of their own. By growing up based on the fact that you have this foundation that your family has laid for you, you can already build your ‘own house’, which you can then pass on to your children and share with your friends. The family is the key to starting the culture right inside you” (Simba Magone, 22, F9, rural).

⁹ In 2021, there were 11 228 marriages and 4 643 divorces registered in Latvia, the total population of which is 1 893 223 (cf., in 2019, there were 12 861 registered marriages and 5 971 divorces). According to Official Statistics of Latvia and Eurostat, the number of divorced marriages per 1 000 inhabitants in Latvia in 2019 was 3.1. – the highest among the EU countries and identical to its neighbor Lithuania (<https://stat.gov.lv/lv>, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>).

In a few cases, though, young people's interest in their ancestors' lives and values of the era they have lived in is boosted by their decision to get involved in exploring family genealogy or participate in school-recommended research competitions. The methodological approach (historical method, biographical method, qualitative research methods, etc.) applied in working on such a task provides them with the opportunity to increase the range of their knowledge; e.g., on their ancestors' participation in World War I, the Latvian War of Independence and other significant events in the history of the nation or the effect of the Soviet/ German occupation, deportations, exile on the family (Migle Migla, 14, F7, urban; Ance Daugaviņa, 20, F8, urban; Simba Magone, 22, F9, rural, Juris Liepa, 25, F10, urban). The learned family history has provoked reflections and re-examinations of the past in the family circle and evoked participation in joint activities for contextualization of the information obtained, such as family evenings out or going to the cinema to watch the Latvian historical drama "Dvēseļu putenis" [The Blizzard of Souls]¹⁰ or the biographical drama "Melānijas hronika" [The Chronicles of Melanie]¹¹ (Simba Magone, 22, F9, rural; Agnese Liepa, 53, F10, rural).

The data analysis testifies to the fact that youngsters interested in the family's past and family as a value are commonly those representing the families that are actively engaged in the multi-generational transmission of values and are dynamic civic participants. Accounts of the time spent together with extended family members in joint activities, such as celebrating family, religious, national, and ethnic festivities, sharing the same hobbies, going to concerts, embarking on domestic travel and international

¹⁰ The most watched movie in Latvia's centenary, also known by the English title "Riflemen" (dir. Dzintars Dreiberģis, 2019), and based on Latvian writer and army officer Aleksandrs Grīns' (1895–1941) patriotic novel of the same title, depicts the time in Latvia from 1915 to 1920 (<https://www.dveseluputenis.lv/en/>)

¹¹ The movie (dir. Viesturs Kairiģis, 2016), based on Latvian writer Melānija Vanaga's (1905–1997) autobiographical work "Veļupes krastā. 1941–1957" [Suddenly, a Criminal: Sixteen Years in Siberia], portrays the deportation of Latvians to Siberia and their struggle for survival under Soviet rule. It is a representation of collective history that documents Soviet crimes against humanity. See Vanaga 2015.

trips, or doing home chores and duties jointly, attest to a mindful transfer of recreational, moral, social, religious and political values, e.g., taking family time, respect, responsibility, kindness, empathy, trust, honesty, faith, tolerance, etc.

When we have family nights together, he [grandfather] loves to pick up the accordion and play something for us. He also sings sometimes. I've also heard that the two of them, granddad and grandma, used to dance folk dances a lot [...] (Raičuks Zaraija5, 19, F1, rural).

A different tendency is observed among youngsters from vulnerable and low-income families. Impacted by economically pressing issues, the value of money is mentioned as one of their primary needs, which is confirmed by their choice of the self-identification marker “human who needs money” (Antons Felikss, 17, F5, rural). In addition, they acknowledge that the family lifestyle of meticulous financial planning has taught them more about “how money works at home” than what family and its heritage are and that education is critical “because with a good education you can get a good job” (Ārzemnieks Felikss, 18, F5, rural).

The connection between children, parents and grandparents after starting to live in separate households is determined by the quality of connectedness and largely depends on the family's previous lifestyle and success in having communicated the perception of family as a value and such human values as loyalty to their children:

Friendship and loyalty are the main things in our family because without loyalty and friendship we would have nothing. We hate telling lies to one another because this provokes conflicts, which is the most painful and unpleasant thing for our family (Anna Smiltepi, 16, F2, rural).

Family and its heritage as a value: the middle generation's perspective

The decades-long impact of political terror on family life and neglect of family as a value in the Soviet social system has left a psychological

trauma across generations¹²; in addition, it was followed by repetitive periods of economic instability, work-life imbalance, economic emigration, and a significant number of family breakdowns that have been diverting the family members from spending time with their descendants or ancestors. Under the impact of diverse outside influences, family as a structure and value has undergone many changes and is being constantly challenged. To overcome these challenges, the middle generation mainly see the value of family through the lens of work and education, which provides better career opportunities for young people and equips them with solutions for balancing work and private life. According to representatives of the middle generations, virtue education within family upbringing implies acquiring “work culture” – the habits of diligence, aim-orientation, order, industriousness, as well as the skills that determine the inner quality of life and provide a more secure future for the younger generation. Teaching virtues – including a work ethic and skills – is, in particular, emphasized by families in rural environments. They follow a patriarchal family model, which was most common until 1940 and was supported during the period of the authoritarian regime of Kārlis Ulmanis (1934–1940), and simultaneously respect contemporary family values, thus prioritizing such values as obedience, support, and cooperation:

This summer I helped [my grandparents] and milked the cows. Not only me but my cousins too because grandma really needed help (Anna Smilteņi, 16, F2, rural).

Since our childhood, we have been taught to work, to love work [...], and to take care of each other. If something goes wrong with someone, everyone comes to help each other. [...] We also harvest potatoes. All the little ones take buckets and dig them up. We do everything together, teach them to work and live (Rudzupuķe Smilteņi, 40, F2, rural).

We work together, we celebrate together. [...] If we need firewood, we go [to a forest] – both the big ones and the little ones. Everyone (Deds Smilteņi, 65, F2, rural).

¹² On intergenerational transmission and effects of communal trauma on the family environment and parenting, see Lehrner & Yehuda 2018.

However, many representatives of the middle generation report constant work an impossibility to find time for their children, which contributes to a decrease not only in the frequency of communication but also its intensity and quality. As a result of this, young people get used to being alone and gradually become unwilling to communicate with their family. Although a widowed mother of five children (who at one point when feeling low, was ready to give her children up in the hope they would receive proper food and a warm place in an orphanage) justifies the situation by the openness of modern society to changing traditions, she is simultaneously fearful of transformations of values and neglect of the family as a value in the future:

We were taught, when I was a child [that] [w]e had to visit our grandmother, grandfather and drop in at our great-grandmother's on holidays, for us it was compulsory (Ludviga Felikss, 42, F5, rural).

An impossibility to escape from financial burdens and a fear of losing work largely contribute to disengagement and emotional detachment, e.g., having received education in the Soviet period led her to claim that this partially preserved her Soviet identity and values. The mother also acknowledges that long working hours have left a negative impact on the home environment, which resulted in parenting difficulties, thereby leaving the channels less open to value transmission: "Mostly I come home from work, they [the children] are already asleep. And I go to work, they are still sleeping" (Ludviga Felikss, 42, F5, rural). Thus, joint activities for absorbing family values is not the priority and/ or possibility of all the families interviewed.

The middle generation are striving to shift the focus from hard work to better education and from the collective – to the individual. They encourage their children to pursue higher education and teach them house chores, which being considered as values, may ensure a more successful future and provide greater possibilities for keeping work and family balance.

Although the middle generation see the impossibility to overcome their own work and private life imbalance as one of the main hindrances to spending a sufficient amount of time with the family, similarly to young people, they acknowledge the importance of loyalty and cooperation as a contributing factor for the value of the family:

[..] we must be able to cooperate within the circle of our family. A single person cannot cope with this task. Consequently, there is that responsibility – if I do something, I do it. Who else, if not we ourselves, will help each other? (Priēde Daugaviņa, F8, 44, rural).

Family and its heritage as a value: the older generation's perspective

The older generation provide detailed, heartfelt memories, full of admiration for their ancestors; they see the value of the family as crucial for its members and society. It can be exemplified by a respected father and grandfather who, in spite of many tragedies in his life (e.g. loss of his own father in his early childhood), has managed to build a strong family following traditions and a code of ethics from the ancestors and a belief that family itself is a family value. While looking back, he tearfully cherished his grandfather who had played a crucial role in his upbringing and that of his three siblings:

We are very proud of grandfather because he was a man of faith. At that time, there was radio but no television. He was reading “Katōļu Dzeive”¹³ to us, old Latvian periodicals. He was such an interesting person. He was uneducated [..] He was born in 1903, and when it was time to go to school, it was World War I. He missed school. He didn't go to school for a single day, but he learned to write in the Latvian language and Russian by self-learning because his brother had gone with the Latvian riflemen to Russia. [...] He always had agricultural magazines and calendars at

¹³ I.e., “Katōļu Dzeive” [Catholic Life] – a religious monthly in Latgalian that was issued from 1926 until 1940 when its publication was banned by the Soviet power; its publication was resumed in 1989 and lasted until 2014. It covered the topics such as the Church, religion, culture, history, and language of the Latgale region.

home. My brother still has a small library from him. All magazines – whether they were from the time of independent Latvia or the Soviet epoch – were stitched by him in winter and put in hard covers. They looked like books then. He was very curious. [...] He liked to read aloud. We, the little ones, in his warm room, were sitting on a sheepskin coat on the floor, and grandfather was reading [...] he could read and fall asleep. We woke [him] up to continue reading. [...] and then I said [to our grandson]: “We had a grandfather. We were very proud of him! I would like you to be proud of your grandfather someday!” But he says: “[..] I am proud of you already now!” (Hugo Migla, 60, F7, rural).

For the older generation, family as a value is acknowledged via family time, when members of the household or extended families regularly meet and spend time together making memories and indirectly ensuring transmission of family values. In cases when physical meetings are not possible, the exchange of values may require the use of various digital tools, however, this has been noted more as an exception than a regularity between the younger and the older generations:

Ēriks Hānbergs¹⁴ once used the word *sajūgsme*¹⁵. We have *sajūgsme* with children. We are constantly in touch. Cool! They call us regularly, and I call them (Hugo Migla, 60, F7, rural).

A full-bodied intergenerational exchange and transfer of values cannot be evenly distributed among all three generations not only due to the older generation mostly living in separate households or irregularity of meetings, but mainly because of alienation, reluctance, and fear to intervene, justifying it by respecting others' boundaries, and accepting freedom as “everything is acceptable for youth nowadays” and “youngsters should be allowed to live a modern life” (Vika Daugaviņa, 74, F8, rural). According to two interviewed farmers representing the older generation, the consequences of different generations living separately may be manifestations of reserved or “surface” relationships among generations, i.e. contrary to

¹⁴ Latvian writer, publicist, and journalist (b. 1933).

¹⁵ Emotional attachment, strong bond, and powerful connection.

the older generation's childhood experiences, their own grandchildren have less experience in interacting with grandparents during both mundane and festive activities. The value transfer often takes place within the process of observing family traditions, which is vividly expressed in families in rural households that provide prerequisites and facilities for keeping these family traditions, such as a regular gathering of the extended family for recreational purposes (e.g., sauna (*pirts*¹⁶) days, local trips at weekends, festive holidays – Christmas, Easter, summer solstice celebrations¹⁷, Cemetery festivals¹⁸, etc.).

The value of the family is also confirmed by describing family memorabilia – inherited tokens (a sacred cross, a religious painting, embroidery) or memories in their tangible (pictures, photo albums, etc.) and intangible (memories) form. However, based on the older generation, value misalignment has been observed because the younger generation spends less time together with extended family members, they are less involved in work for the good of the family alongside the older generations or due to the fact they are not sufficiently appreciated and rewarded for their involvement, both emotionally and financially (Deds Smilteņi, 65, F2, rural; Hugo Migla, 60, F7, rural). However, the generational gap is described by the younger generation as a conflict of categories such as visions, expectations, perceptions, and reality, as a result of which discrepancies emerge between “how things are done [...] and how they are supposed to be done” (Juris Liepa, 25, F10, urban), which again testifies to the lack of communication.

The older generation's belief that family is both the foundation and a value is further revealed by their markers of self-identification. In most cases, the interviewed grandparents directly and consciously associate

¹⁶ Latvian *pirts* has been the spatial microcosm of a family for mundane work and recreation rituals for centuries; as a part of the individual farmstead system it has been included in the Latvian Cultural Canon section “Architecture and design” (Latvijas kultūras kanons. <https://kulturaskanons.lv/en/>)

¹⁷ The Midsummer festival, known as *Līgo* or *Jāņi*, is a Latvian public holiday celebrated on the night of 23 June to 24 June.

¹⁸ On the Latvian Cemetery Festival tradition, see: Uzule & Zelča 2014; Stašulāne 2021.

themselves with the social role they perform in the family, i.e., such categories as “vectēvs” [from Latvian – grandfather], “gēds/ deds” [familiar name of grandfather in Latgalian; from Russian *dedushka*, *ded*], “opis/ ūpis” [individualized variations of the familiar names of grandfather; from German – *opa/ opi*], “oma/ ome/ omi” [variations of the familiar names of grandmother; from German *oma/ omi*], “baba” [familiar name of grandmother in Latgalian; from Russian *babushka*, *baba*], have been chosen to claim their identity beyond the private family space. In many cases, it has become a public name used respectfully by the local rural community when addressing a person. These forms of self-identification symbolize and circulate both traditional and self-adopted values – the highest level of responsibility taken by the oldest member of the family for all generations in the family:

This [tradition] is from my grandfather’s times. He was the senior in the family, and he distributed [oblates]. Then follows the next male who is the oldest in the family. This is his duty of honor (Hugo Migla, 60, F7, rural).

In such a way, pride is expressed for both the family and the duty of communicating values, including virtue education to the next generations.

To sum up, both of these – the amount of time, which provides a child with security, and the quality of the time, which gives one’s offspring a sense of importance and acceptance, – “matter for developing the ‘channels of affection’ which facilitate transmission of values” (Schluter 2017). The lack of attention and a failure to establish “channels of affection” distort intergenerational dynamics and interfere with valuing the opinion of the older generation as their first scale of value, as well as prevent transmission of the family heritage to the younger generation. Teaching, disciplining in a healthy manner, and training a child are the means by which a strong family can impart its values and inculcate good habits; to ensure that what is learned is also retained (Aatsinki et al. 2019). According to the interviewees, alongside the values of education, work, and ethics,

placing value on the family can determine future success. Overall, keeping the balance of intergenerational exchange is crucial for the transmission of values and perception of family and its heritage as these values form the backbone of the individual and ensure positive interaction with broader society. The need to rebalance material values and spiritual values (support, cooperation etc.) is indicative of their different perception among the generations. It also testifies to shifts of these values not only at different turning points in the development of society as a whole but also influenced by subjective reasons that stem from within the family.

Family and others

The family reflects the character and social effects of the changes that emerge, exist and develop in society as a whole. Likewise weakening of the ethical value of family and its heritage poses a risk that broader self-identification processes will be eroded and also the forming of a sense of belonging to a community, society, the state (nation), and the world as a whole.

According to the theory of Morality-as-Cooperation (Curry 2016), there are seven well-established types of cooperation (helping family, helping a group, exchange, resolving conflicts through hawkish and dovish displays, dividing disputed resources, and respecting prior possession) and, accordingly, seven types of morality (obligations to family, group loyalty, reciprocity, bravery, respect, fairness, and property rights) – a phenomenon, which presents “a collection of biological and cultural solutions to the problems of cooperation recurrent in human social life” (Bentahila et al. 2021). As young people learn about cooperation and the acceptance of diversity within the family, they also make connections between cooperation with other groups and diversity in others. Thus, the value of diversity initially foregrounded within the family circle shifts beyond the family space.

Searching for self-identification and the defining of one's own and collective identity are related to the current interest in reflection on the past within today's context, as well as to identifying alternative developmental

variants for the future. Since values shape individual and group identities, an unstable value system may result in a weak identity, which again testifies to the fact that values that are not properly instilled in the family become absent ones. Thus, the lack of a strong identity and sense of belonging blocks the pathways to a successful individual and collective future.

The value of belonging

While most of the families interviewed have very similar opinions about the value of family, the feeling of inclusion within one's family, and the sense of family belonging, varying values emerge even within one family when the focus is on questions of belonging to a community, society, the state (nation), and the world. The interview data revealed that Latgale's multi-ethnic and multi-religious composition determines the existence of several explicit collective forms of belonging. When approaching their own family's history, interviewees adopt a collective perspective that is linked to the national past or to the past of the ethnic/religious group either within or outside the national discourse. Placing the family heritage outside the national discourse largely interferes with the sense of belonging of non-Latvians of the middle and older generations to the state and to Europe. Youngsters, however, irrespective of their ethnicity, tend to avoid the historical determinant and approach their heritage in a wider context of universal human and modern European democratic values:

In the future, there won't be significant differences between the cultures of different nations. Conflicts, too, will be fewer since all that is related to the past will be forgotten. People will be more united (Andrejs Petrovs, 20, F6, urban).

I have this transitional period between how much my opinion was influenced by my parents and how I formed my own idea of the world and how it should be. That's why I have such a situation of conflict at the moment – on the one hand, I also have conservative values, that Latvia belongs to Latvians and the like. However, on the other hand, I think that it is inevitable that cultures and traditions will mix (Ance Daugaviņa, 20, F8, rural).

Although both the representatives of the Soviet and post-Soviet generations and Latvian and Russian speakers are all united in appreciation of the value of peace and human life, the value of inclusion, the value of social justice, the value of education and one's occupation, the value of partnership, collaboration and teamwork, opinions differ on perceptions of the value of diversity, co-existence, (non) acceptance of foreign values and (non) avoidance of exposure to "alien" values (including the "unburied (Soviet) past" (Etkind 2009) and the Soviet value system):

It seemed to me that I was the only person who was afraid to admit my being a Jew; however, we appeared to be some three persons in my class who feared the same. [...] Why was I afraid then? [...] In those times, nobody claimed that the Jews were different. If not loved, the alien is always avoided. [...]. I don't say that in Soviet times open antisemitism existed, that I had been beaten or something like that, but fear to admit it existed (Marusja Petrova, 49, F6, urban).

The imbalance and discrepancy of opinions that are influenced by diverse individual experiences and multiple historical and social factors emerge due to a lack of intergenerational communication or, as in the case of the interviewed students, finding oneself at the crossroads of influences and one's own opinion. A split between the multiple world views regarding the Soviet occupation and WW2 events signal the division of society and the presence of different value systems. The value of integrity, including the negotiation of differences of opinion, conflict resolution, tolerance, forgiveness, generosity, and hospitality, are learned through the modelling of relational skills by family members and also values related to achievement are based on their positive perception in the family. Yet for many young people, social media appears to be among the most "reliable" sources of information, as parents "don't speak much about that in the family" (Ārzemnieks Felikss, 18, F5, rural).

The poor knowledge that young people have of their family's past, as discussed previously, reveals also their blurred or twisted conception of the nation's history (especially among non-Latvian speakers) and testifies to

the complex processes of the social construction of identities and forms of collective belonging that determine the value of patriotism, which is always initially transmitted within the family. Although the younger generation's identities are constantly being challenged by globalization, the older generations (especially Latvian speakers) are striving to instill regional and national values in the younger generation, following their belief that being European and being a citizen of the world implies being Latvian and Latgalian. To overcome the most pressing issues and challenges regarding the future of the nation (depopulation, migration, escalation of political conflicts, violence, possible wars, etc.), parents and grandparents, in the manner of their own understanding, educate their children to love the country of their ancestors and the land and natural environment they have inherited, as well as to honor and respect the national symbols and traditions that have united the nation and kept them together through hardships.

The value of loyalty

Loyalty to the country (and family) as a value in many cases becomes marginal when one dwells on building the individual futures of one's children/ grandchildren, i.e., the collective perspective is immediately substituted by the individualistic perspective when referring to the future well-being of the younger generation. Families reflected societal values about opportunities for the development and education of the younger generation, however, often this is achieved outside the native country:

There is nothing for her to do here. There is huge emptiness here. There is no work, and very few people are left here. Everyone has gone away. People [follow] the work now (Vika Daugaviņa, 74, F8, rural).

Thus, families that, in essence, are expected to contribute to the sustainability of the country, having become disillusioned in the country's economic and social policy, prioritize personal (individual) values. Nevertheless, the focus on the common good manifested itself through the emphasis of human qualities which might help to defend personal, family, national and supra-national values:

There is a saying that no such profession as being a good person exists. I would like to add – if a person is not good, if he basically is not a human, no profession would help then (Jānis Zaraija, 54, F1, rural).

The value of religion and respect

According to Dyk Hyjer, “[p]roscriptions for moral behaviour as well as the dependence on a higher power as a source of values, meaning, and strength may underpin the parents’ desire to have their children participate in communal religious activities whether or not they are endorsed or permitted by the broader societal context” (Dyk Hyjer 2014, 152). Despite half a century of secularization and the change of socio-cultural contexts, values based on the fundamental nature of religiousness have not been lost; however, family religious practices and participation have decreased significantly, as has the perception of religious education as a means for guiding the spiritual growth of youngsters and also their moral reasoning and judgment. Although the older generations attempt to pass down these values, they are often greatly striving themselves:

Previously there were *kārklū vācieši*¹⁹ [the false Germans]. Well, perhaps I am slightly a kind of a *kārklū katolis* [false Catholic], but all the same, we attend church at Christmas, Easter, and Whitsunday (Hugo Migla, 60, F7, rural).

They [family] also say that you have to go to church and participate in the Way of the Cross in Aglona²⁰ [...], but, to be honest, I don’t believe in God. That’s why I don’t like it. [...] It was like this; they

¹⁹ The expression was used from the end of the nineteenth century as a pejorative concerning the Latvians who were attempting to become non-Latvians in order to receive some benefits.

²⁰ Roman Catholic Basilica of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Aglona is a significant centre of Catholicism, a holy site, and an element of intangible cultural heritage of Latvia (Juško-Štekele 2016). The interviewee refers to the tradition of pilgrimage and People’s Via Crucis that traditionally takes place on 14 August in the framework of the feast of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary into Heaven celebrated by Roman Catholics on 15 August.

told me not to talk nonsense because there might be a time when I would desperately need to believe in God... (Migle Migla, 14, F7, urban).

The perceptions of Christian and religious values have primarily been included in the binary opposition of “one’s own” and “others” and have manifested themselves as fundamental in the (non)acceptance of the “others”, i.e., immigrants and refugees, rather than in the formation of the younger generation’s inner world and value system:

Frankly speaking, I would like [my son-in-law/ daughter-in-law] to be Christian. Perhaps, what is said about Muslims is a stereotype, however, things that are happening now in the world leave a negative impression (Ritamigla Migla, 34, F7, urban).

To sum up, although the role and the value of the family in present day Latvia have been acknowledged and the lifestyles of contemporary families have become more differentiated, families are facing many challenges in the intergenerational communication of ethical and moral values. A social value system in the multi-valued society of Latvia implies the cohesion of fundamental, common universal human values (family, support, cooperation, work ethic, respect, honesty, justice, etc.), national and European values (democracy, freedom, solidarity, human rights, equality, etc.), however, the disintegration of socio-political values has been observed, which may deepen the negative effect on the value of belonging and loyalty with respect to both the family and the state.

Conclusion

The research revealed that the younger generation tend to internalize the older generations’ value systems, which testifies to the fact that values function as guiding principles for intergenerational relationships, however, economic, political, and social issues have a negative impact on the intergenerational polylogue and the space of informal cultural socialization. Both family communication patterns (conversations, joint recrea-

tional and work activities) and quality of communication determine the value system and orientation of young people. Effective communication of values depends on the family structure, family environment, processes, and relational dynamics within it. As values are absorbed unconsciously and learned from deliberate teaching in both nuclear and extended family settings, a shift of the focus from dyadic relationships to group (inter-generational) communication significantly contributes to the formation of collaborative family networks, their sustainable development, and, eventually, a more successful transmission of values. Value transfer is a systematic, multi-dimensional, and selective phenomenon, and outcomes of this process are endangered in the cases of “zero-history” (families with forgotten/ unspoken family heritage) and “task-oriented” families. Although there are diverse pathways for transmitting values, including formal, informal, and non-formal cultural and educational settings, effective transmission of values in a family depends on its collaborative model, its strength and solidarity – factors that allow the bridging of inter-generational communication and ensure the transmission of such values. Thus, the primary means of the transmission of values are coordinated by affectionate relationships that ensure bidirectional exchange and personal influence. The quality of emotional relationships (attachment, closeness, belonging, loyalty, togetherness, kindness, mutual respect, reliance on each other, etc.) among multi-generational family members guarantees higher value perception and value continuity; in its turn, alienation, emotional distance, division, uncertainty, and non-belonging testify to lower value awareness and observation of values. Value transmission outcomes in the family illustrate that the more beneficial strategies used for preservation of values and communication provoke both intergenerational similarities and change, as well as provide family members with an “existential code” or “matrix that gives people a placement in the world” (Amadini 2015, 36). Restoration of the ethical depth of parenting may improve not only the transmission of family and ethical heritage, and bidirectional exchange of the value system, but also contribute to the values and norms of the society.

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Starppaaudžu vērtību komunikācija Latvijā: kvalitatīvā pētījuma rezultāti

Kopsavilkums

Rakstā analizēta vērtību nodošana vairākpaudžu ģimenēs un aplūkota starppaaudžu komunikācija kā līdzeklis ētisko un morālo vērtību trūkuma mazināšanai ģimenē un sabiedrībā. Ģimenes vērtību nodošana ir pētīta sociālo attiecību “es” – “ģimene” un “ģimene” – “citi” ietvaros.

Latgales reģionā veiktajā pētījumā par starppaaudžu attiecībām ģimenēs izmantota kvalitatīvo pētījumu metode un datu vākšanas instruments – daļēji strukturētas padziļinātas intervijas, kurās piedalījās 34 dalībnieki no desmit ģimenēm. Subjektīvās pieredzes analīze atklāj, ka ģimenes locekļu mijiedarbība kā divvirzienu process nodrošina ne tikai vērtību tālāknošanu, bet arī atkarībā no ģimenes dzīvesveida ietekmē vērtību (t. sk. ģimenes kā vērtības) resemantizēšanu un reinterpretāciju. Veicot būtiskas ģimenes funkcijas (audzināšanas, atpūtas, regulējošo, komunikatīvo u. c.), kā arī nododot no paaudzes paaudzē mantotās un uzkrātās zināšanas, veidojas tādas komunikatīvās situācijas, kas rada dinamisku funkcionālistu starp sistēmām, kuru ietvaros saskaras daudzveidīgas un pretrunīgas vērtību sistēmas, kas vai nu tiek pakļautas transformācijām, vai pastāv līdzās viena otrai. Tādi faktori kā stipra saikne starp paaudzēm un kopīgi ģimenes pasākumi veido iedibinātu vērtīborientieru un normu kopumu, kas veicina ģimenes dzīves kvalitāti un nodrošina valsts nākotni.

Atslēgvārdi: ģimenes dzīvesveids, ģimenes vērtības, socializācija, ētika, morāles uztvere

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SVĒTKU SOCIĀLĀS UN KULTŪRAS VĒRTĪBAS KRIEVU JAUNIEŠU SKATĪJUMĀ SOMIJĀ

Uzsverot, ka svētki kā kultūras indentitātes indikators var palīdzēt izprast imigrantu identitātes veidošanos, rakstā ir analizēts Somijā dzīvojošo krievu izcelsmes jauniešu skatījums uz svētku svinēšanu. Pirmajā raksta daļā ir skaidrotas datu vākšanas metodes un raksturota pētījuma metodoloģija. Otrā daļa ietver kvalitatīvo interviju (N 16) datu analīzi, kas atklāj jauniešu pieredzi dažādu sekulāro un reliģisko svētku svinēšanā. Rakstu noslēdz secinājumi, kādas sociālās un kultūras vērtības jaunieši saskata svētku svinēšanā. Somijā dzīvojošie krievu jaunieši svētku vērtību saskata to sociālās integrācijas, tradīciju pārneses un audzinošajā funkcijā. Imigrantu kultūras identitātes veidošanās parasti tiek traktēta kā bināra izvēle: iecelotāji sevi identificē vai nu ar mītnes zemes kultūru, vai arī ar savas etniskās izcelsmes kultūru. Somijā krievu imigrantu jauniešu vidē veiktais pētījums liecina, ka identitātes veidošanās process ir daudz sarežģītāks. Intervijās iegūtie dati ļauj secināt, ka Somijā dzīvojošie krievu jaunieši piedzīvo integrācijas procesu, kam ir raksturīga sevis identifikācija ar abām, t. i., ar mītnes zemes kultūru un izcelsmes zemes kultūru. Somijā dzīvojošo krievu jauniešu piemērs ilustrē daudzslāņainu svētku pieredzi, kurā paralēli vēsturiskās atmiņas un etnisko pamatvērtību pēctecībai iezīmējas integrācijas, globalizācijas, komercializācijas un masu kultūras slānis.

Atslēgvārdi: svētki, svētku svinēšana, sociālās un kultūras vērtības, identitāte, identitātes veidošanās

Ievads

Vērtību koncepts ir integrāla dzīves sastāvdaļa, jo pastāvīgi tiek vērtēta, piemēram, pārtikas uzturvērtība, uzvedības ētiskā vērtība, zinātniskā atklājuma teorētiskā vērtība, jaunrades mākslinieciskā vērtība utt. Jēdziena *vērtība* morfoloģija liek domāt par kaut ko empīrisku un stabilu, kas ir izsvērts un izvērtēts, tātad kaut kā vērts. Izdarot slēdzienu par vērtību, kāds fenomens vai lieta tiek atzīta par lietderīgu vai labu. Individuālā līmenī par vērtīgu tiek atzīts tas, pēc kā cilvēks tiecas, ilgojas un alkst. Toties, raugoties pāri atsevišķa indivīda subjektīvajām vajadzībām, attieksmēm un vēlmēm, izkristalizējas vērtību kopums, kas ir svarīgs noteiktai cilvēku grupai un visai sabiedrībai. Tomēr reālajā dzīvē atsevišķu indivīdu tieksmes, ilgas un alkas ir dažādas, t. i., sabiedrības locekļi nav orientēti vienu un to pašu vērtību virzienā, jo cilvēki vērtības izprot dažādi un dod priekšroku atšķirīgām vērtībām. Tādējādi veidojas atšķirīgas vērtību hierarhijas, ko nosaka, piemēram, sociālais statuss, etniskā piederība, vecumposma īpatnības u. c. faktori. Dzīves laikā cilvēki mēdz mainīt savu vērtību hierarhiju, to piešķaņojot mainīgajiem sociāli vēsturiskajiem apstākļiem. Kā norāda Ludvigs Grīnbergs, cilvēks ir ne tikai dabas daļa, kura ir apveltīta ar kognitīvām spējām, kas ļauj atrisināt vissarežģītākos uzdevumus, bet arī būtne, kas spēj veidot attieksmes pret realitāti, tās izkārtējot hierarhiski, atkarībā no interesēm, ko nosaka “sociālā prakse” (Grünberg 2000, 14).

Vispārīgi runājot, ar vērtībām saprot īpašības, ko cilvēks piešķir objektīvi pastāvošajam, lai apmierinātu savas vajadzības (Grünberg 2000, 15). Tas nozīmē, ka vērtība ir saikne starp kāda fenomena objektīvo kvalitāti un cilvēka apziņu, t. i., ja objektīvā kvalitāte ir neatņemama fenomena eksistences daļa, tad vērtība izriet no cilvēka subjektīvajām vajadzībām. Šajā rakstā, aplūkojot svētku vērtību, ar jēdzienu “vērtība” ir apzīmēta starp indivīdu un sabiedrību pastāvošā psihosociālā saikne (Schwartz 2008), kas orientē uz jēgpilniem mērķiem un sociāli pieņemamiem līdzekļiem šo mērķu sasniegšanā gan atsevišķus indivīdus, gan sociālās grupas.

Analizējot jauniešu piešķirto vērtību svētkiem, to svinēšanas nepieciešamību un jēgu, svētki ir traktēti, pirmkārt, sociālo vērtību aspektā (kādas

sociālās vajadzības apmierina svētki), otrkārt, kultūras vērtību aspektā (kādi kultūras elementi ir pārmantošanas vērti). Svētki kā sabiedrisks pasākums, kas notiek konkrētā laikā un telpā, akcentē noteiktas materiālās un nemateriālās kultūras vērtības. Mūsdienās antropologi pievērš īpašu uzmanību svētkiem kā sociāliem vai reliģiskiem rituāliem, kas stiprina grupas sociālās saites (Cavalcanti 2001; Roemer 2007). Imigrantu kopienu pētniecībā svētku kultūras izpēte ļauj identificēt sociālo saišu tīklojumu, kas atspoguļo iecerotāju piesaisti gan mītnes zemes, gan izcelsmes zemes kultūrai. Šajā rakstā analizētā jauniešu attieksme pret svētkiem, to svinēšanas tradīciju pārmantošanu un jauninājumiem palīdz izprast Somijā dzīvojošās krievu kopienas jaunās paaudzes sociālo realitāti.

Svētki ir nozīmīgs pētniecības objekts, jo, izzinot svinēšanas uzvedības modeļus, kas balstās kādai sociālajai grupai vitāli svarīgās vērtībās, var noskaidrot sabiedrības vērtīborientāciju dažādu kultūru kontekstā. Tā kā svētki ir kultūru dažādības un indentitātes indikators, to svinēšana palīdz izprast arī migrācijas izraisītos sociālos procesus. Imigrantu kultūras integrācijas modeļu (Algan et al. 2012) būtiska sastāvdaļa ir svinēšanas ieradumi, tradīcijas un jauninājumi. Šī raksta mērķis ir aplūkot svētkiem piešķirtās sociālās un kultūras vērtības, analizējot Somijā dzīvojošās krievu imigrantu jaunās paaudzes pieredzi svētku svinēšanā. Vērtības ir nevis subjektīvs iztēles auglis, bet reālās eksistences aspekts, jo tās tiek “izdzīvotas”. Dzīvā pieredze nosaka to, ka dažas lietas cilvēks atzīst par skaistām vai neglītām, labām vai sliktām, derīgām vai nederīgām. Estētiskā, ētiskā un utilitārā vērtībā atbalsojas cilvēka izjustās vajadzības un vēlmes, kas neļauj palikt vienaldzīgam pret kādām lietām vai norisēm. Tālab vērtības netiek izskaitļotas loģiskā veidā, bet gan “izdzīvotas”.

Somijā dzīvojošo krievu jauniešu vidē pētījums tika veikts no 2021. gada 1. oktobra līdz 31. decembrim. Par pētījuma vietu bija izraudzīta Somijas centrālās daļas pilsēta, kurā mīt 144 tūkstoši iedzīvotāju, no kuriem somu valodu ikdienā ģimenē lieto 136 tūkstoši, zviedru valodu – 293, sāmu valodu – 16, bet citu valodu lieto 8052 iedzīvotāji. Intervētie uzskata, ka šajā Somijas pilsētā dzīvo apmēram 2000 krievi (Olga, siev., 52 gadi, grupas līdere, 26.10.2021.). Lai gan Somijā veikta pētījuma tiešais

mērķis nebija padziļināti izprast krievu imigrantu svētku kultūru, lauka darbā veiktās intervijas jauniešu vidē sniedz ieskatu, kādi svētki un kādā veidā tiek svinēti viņu ģimenēs, kā krievu jaunieši uztver Somijas kultūrvidei raksturīgās svētku tradīcijas, kā krievu kopiena saglabā savas svētku svinēšanas tradīcijas un kādas ir krievu un somu svētku kultūras mijiedarbības izpausmes krievu diasporā Somijā. Atbildes uz šiem jautājumiem palīdz identificēt, kādu vērtību jaunieši piešķir dažādu svētku svinēšanai.

1. Ieskats datu vākšanā un pētījuma metodoloģijā

Izlasī veidoja ģimenēs krieviski runājoši jaunieši, kas darbojas grupās, kurās komunikācijas un kultūras tradīciju pārmantošanas instruments ir krievu valoda: reliģiskā kopienā, krievu valodas apguves grupā un divās kultūras tradīciju saglabāšanas grupās. Izlases veidošanā šīs grupas kalpoja par izejas punktu potenciālo intervējamo vervēšanai. Lauka darbā galvenie pētnieciskie instrumenti bija novērošana un intervēšana. Iepazīšanās ar intervējamajiem noritēja pakāpeniski, sākot ar grupu līderiem un aktīvākajiem to dalībniekiem. Piedaloties grupu aktivitātēs un lietojot “sniega pikas” metodi, pētniecei radās iespēja iepazīties arī ar mazāk aktīviem grupu locekļiem. Grupu aktivitāšu laikā veiktie novērojumi tika dokumentēti pētnieka dienasgrāmatā. Lauka darba laikā tika veiktas 16 individuālas kvalitatīvās intervijas: tika intervēti trīs grupu līderi (vecumā no 46 līdz 51 gadam) un 13 jaunieši, no kuriem vairums bija 19–23 gadu vecumā, bet diviem vecākajiem respondentiem bija 34–35 gadi. Tika intervētas 12 sievietes un 4 vīrieši, jo vairums grupu locekļu ir sievietes, ko raksturo arī lielāka atsaucība.

Intervējamo vervēšanā palīdzīgu roku sniedza grupu līderi, kuri bija iepazīstināti ar pētījuma mērķi un ļāva pētniecei piedalīties grupas pasākumos. Lai gan grupu līderi atbalstīja pētnieci un izsūtīja informētās piekrišanas veidlapas ar pētnieces kontaktinformāciju visiem savu grupu locekļiem, atsaucās tikai tie jaunieši, ko pētniece uzrunāja personiski pasākumu laikā. Vervēšanas procesā nācās saskarties ar potenciālo intervējamo aizņemtību (darbs, studijas, sociālās, kultūras un sporta aktivitātes).

Lai gan jaunieši izrādīja interesi piedalīties pētījumā, viņiem bija ierobežotas iespējas izbrīvēt laiku intervijai. Lauka darba laikā Somijā nepastāvēja pulcēšanās ierobežojumi Covid-19 pandēmijas dēļ un grupas drīkstēja darboties, ievērojot epidemioloģiskos drošības noteikumus, tomēr bija jāņem vērā, ka epidemioloģiskā situācija varētu strauji mainīties. Jauniešu aizņemtības un mainīgās epidemioloģiskās situācijas dēļ tikai viena intervija notika klātienē, pārējās intervijas tika ielānotas labu laiku iepriekš un tika veiktas, izmantojot Zoom platformas tehnoloģiskās iespējas. Visi intervējamie, izņemot vienu, intervijas laikā ieslēdza videokameras un kontaktējās ar pētnieci aci pret aci. Lai gan tas ļāva novērot intervējamā emocijas, tomēr iespēja identificēt ķermeņa valodu bija ierobežota. Atsaucība bija augstā līmenī, jo no visiem potenciālajiem intervējamajiem tikai viens vēlāk mainīja savu lēmumu piedalīties intervijā un vairs neizrādīja vēlmi kontaktēties ar pētnieci.

Kvalitatīvās intervijas ar grupu līderiem noritēja nestrukturētā formā, t. i., nevis ierobežojot intervējamo ar iepriekš izstrādātu aptaujas shēmu, bet ļaujot "izstāstīt stāstu". Tas sniedza iespēju grupu līderiem paust savu viedokli un izvērst skaidrojumus par viņiem aktuālām tēmām un problēmām. Šīs intervijas ietver datus par grupas izveidošanās vēsturi, darbības virzieniem un vērtību sistēmu, kas nododama jaunajai paaudzei. Darbā ar jauniešiem tika lietotas daļēji strukturētas intervijas, t. i., tās tika veiktas, sekojot iepriekš izstrādāto jautājumu sadaļām, nereti mainot to secību un uzdodot padziļinātus jautājumus (Brinkmann 2014). Intervējamie sniedza izvērstas atbildes, it īpaši plaši tika stāstīts par personīgo pieredzi, kas piedzīvota bērnībā, no krievu kultūras vides nonākot somu kultūras vidē (pārceļoties uz dzīvi Somijā kopā ar savu ģimeni, uzsākot skolasgaitas ar nepietiekamām somu valodas zināšanām utt.). Intervēšana notika pozitīvā gaisotnē, līdzsvarojot intervijas vadīšanu ar cieņpilnu klausīšanos atbildēs.

Intervijas noritēja jauniešu ģimenēs runātajā valodā, t. i., krieviski, un to vidējais ilgums bija viena stunda. Tās tika ierakstītas audioformātā un vēlāk transkribētas krievu valodā, atzīmējot tekstā emocijas, garākas pauzes un ievērojot pētniecībā pieņemtos transkripcijas normas (Dresing et al. 2015). Lai novērstu kļūdas, pēc transkribēšanas intervijas bija jānoklausās

vēlreiz, vienlaikus veicot interviju datu anonimizēšanu. Rakstā citētos interviju fragmentus latviešu valodā tulkoja viena no raksta autorēm, vietumis kvadrātiekvās norādot vārdu vai vārdu savienojumu krievu valodā, kas precizē vārda nozīmes nokrāsu.

Veicot lauka darbu, bija stingri ievērota pētnieciskā darba ētika. Pirms lauka darba uzsākšanas pētniece lūdza atļauju veikt novērojumus un intervijas, ierakstīt sarunu audio formātā un uzņemt fotogrāfijas. Visiem dalībniekiem bija izsniegta piekrišanas veidlapas, kurās bija skaidri izklāstīti pētījuma mērķi, kā arī skaidrotas pētījuma dalībnieku tiesības, tai skaitā tiesības neatbildēt uz kādu jautājumu vai pārtraukt savu dalību pētījumā bez jebkādam sekām intervētajam. Potenciālajiem pētījuma dalībniekiem tika atvēlēts pietiekams laiks, lai iepazītos ar veidlapas saturu. Pēc tās izlasīšanas interesenti apliecināja savu piekrišanu dalībai pētījumā, tomēr katras intervijas sākumā pētniece vēlreiz atgādināja piekrišanas veidlapā izklāstīto. Pētījumā piedalījās tikai pilngadību sasnieguši jaunieši, tāpēc vecāku piekrišana nebija nepieciešama. Lai nodrošinātu anonimitāti, pētniece lūdza intervētajiem pašiem izvēlēties sev pseidonīmu, kas tiktu lietots datu apstrādē un atsaucēs uz intervijām. Transkribējot intervijas, tika anonimizēti visi dati, kas tieši vai netieši varētu atklāt pētījuma dalībnieku identitāti (personvārdi, grupu nosaukumi, iestāžu nosaukumi, vietvārdi u. c.).

Kā pētniecības instruments ir izmantota kvalitatīvā kontentanalīze, kas nav stingri reglamentēta (Hsieh & Shannon 2005) un sniedz iespēju pētniekam būt fleksiblām (Schreier 2012; Schreier 2014). Uzsākot kontentanalīzi, tika skaidri definēts analīzes objekts – svētki un kā analīzes vienība tika izmantots vārds, teikums vai vairāki teikumi, kas veido vienotu domu (Schreier 2014). Tā kā interviju skaits nav liels, tās tika kodētas manuāli: vispirms tika identificētas galvenās kategorijas jeb kodi, tad tās tika sadalītas apakškategorijās jeb apakškodos. Tādējādi analīze tika veikta, sekojot tekstam (Krippendorff 2013). Kodi tika veidoti, balstoties uz interviju datiem, savukārt, pārskatot izveidotos kodus, tie tika izvērtēti pēc atbilstības konceptuālajam ietvaram, pētījuma mērķim un pētniecības jautājumiem, tādējādi datu analīzē tika lietota deduktīvā un induktīvā metode (Hsieh & Shannon 2005).

2. Jauniešu gūtā svētku pieredze

2.1. Ziemassvētki

Svētku svinēšana ir jauniešu dzīves integrāla sastāvdaļa, tāpēc intervētie labprāt skaidroja, kādus svētkus un kādā veidā ir paraduši svinēt. Jāuzsver, ka savās atbildēs jaunieši nenosšķīra sekulāros un sakrālos svētkus, bet uzskaitīja, piemēram: “Jaunais gads, Ziemassvētki, Lieldienas, Uzvaras diena, Vecais jaunais gads un citi” (Anna, siev., 20 gadi, studente, 17.11.2021.). Šādā uzskaitījumā viegli pamanīt krievu kultūrai raksturīgo svētku kalendāru. Tā kā intervijas notika gada pēdējos mēnešos, kad valdīja pirmssvētku atmosfēra, intervētie īpaši akcentēja Ziemassvētkus un Jaungadu. Jauniete skaidroja, ka viņas ģimenē Ziemassvētki un dzimšanas dienas ir “vienīgie svētki, pārējos mēs kaut kā ne visai svinam” (Marija, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 10.12.2021.). Intervētā vēlējās precizēt savu atbildi, atkārtojot, ka viņai “paši lielākie svētki ir Ziemassvētki, Jaunais gads, dzimšanas dienas, bet citi svētki nav nozīmīgi nezin kāpēc” (Marija, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 10.12.2021.).

Jauniešu stāstījumi par Ziemassvētku svinēšanu liecina, ka Somijā dzīvojošie krievu jaunieši saskata atšķirības starp Gregora kalendāru un Juliāna kalendāru: “Somijā Ziemassvētki ir 25. datumā, ne tā kā [Krievijas] pareizticībā” (Veronika, siev., 19 gadi, skolniece, 14.10.2021.). Atbildēs par Ziemassvētkiem iezīmējās intervēto piederība Somijas Pareizticīgajai baznīcai, kas savā liturģiskajā kalendārā seko pāvesta Gregora XIII ieviestajai laika skaitīšanai:

Jautājums: Kādus svētkus svinat ģimenē?

Atbilde: Ziemassvētkus.

J.: Kad tos svinat?

A.: 24. datumā.

J.: Kopā ar pareizticīgajiem vai luterāņiem?

A.: Pareizticībā (Lola, siev., 21 gads, studente, 14.12.2021.).

Jaunieši ir novērojuši, ka dažādās kultūrās vieni un tie paši svētki tiek svinēti ne vien citādāk, bet arī atšķirīgā intensitātē, tāpēc izskanēja

spriedums, ka “Krievijā Ziemassvētku nav, tur [ir] tikai Jaunais gads” (Marija, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 10.12.2021.). Intervēto skatījumā “Ziemassvētki ir paši populārākie somu svētki” (Veronika, siev., 19 gadi, skolniece, 14.10.2021.).

Kultūru saskares rezultātā intervēto jauniešu ģimenēs svin “gan somu, gan krievu svētkus” (Anna, siev., 20 gadi, studente, 17.11.2021.), tomēr intervijās tika skaidri iezīmēta tradīciju robeža starp krievu un Rietumu kultūru:

J.: Kādus svētkus jūs svinat ģimenē?

A.: Mēs svinam tieši krievu svētkus, svinam arī rietumu svētkus.

(Aleksandrs, vīr., 20 gadi, students, 13.11.2021.)

Šādā nostājā atspoguļojas krievu kultūras nošķiršana no Eiropas kultūras. Somijā krievu kopienas grupu darbībā ir skaidri nodalītas abu kultūru tradīcijas, piem., intervijās tika skaidrots, ka grupa dodas “uz viņu [somu] Ziemassvētkiem” (Valentīna, siev., 55 gadi, grupas līdere, 11.10.2021.) un tika pausta attieksme, ka 25. decembrī ir “viņu [somu] Ziemassvētki, viņu *Joulu*” (Alise, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 01.12.2021.). Turklāt Ziemassvētku tradīciju nošķiršana iezīmējās arī jauktajās ģimenēs:

J.: Kādus svētkus svinat mājās?

A.: Mēs svinam “somiski” Ziemassvētkus. Parasti kopā ar tēta vecākiem, tas ir, kopā ar vecmāmiņu un vectētiņu no tās puses (Ļermontovs, siev., 23 gadi, 19.11.2021.).

Intervēto sniegtajās atbildēs Ziemassvētku svinēšana 25. decembrī iezīmējās kā apzināta izvēle. Intervētā skaidroja: “Kā mēs atbraucām uz Somiju, tā nezin kāpēc nolēmām, ka svinēsim Ziemassvētkus, lai gan daudzas krievu ģimenes, kas ir iebraukušas Somijā vai jau dzimušas šeit, viņas tomēr vairāk svin Jaungadu. Bet mēs [svinam] tieši Ziemassvētkus” (Marija, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 10.12.2021.). Arī atteikšanās svinēt Ziemassvētkus 25. decembrī ir apzināta izvēle, kas intervijā tika pamatota šādi: “Manai mammai dzimšanas diena ir 25. decembrī, tāpēc mēs nekādīgi nevaram svinēt divus svētkus vienā dienā. Tik un tā visu uzmanību

paņem dzimšanas diena” (Veronika, siev., 19 gadi, skolniece, 14.10.2021.). Runājot par “somu” Ziemassvētku svinēšanu, vienā gadījumā tika uzsvērts, ka tieši tie ir ģimenes “mīļākie svētki” (Marija, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 10.12.2021.), bet citā gadījumā skanēja piebilde, ka “[“somu”] Ziemassvētki ir mums svarīgi, bet mēs tos nesvinam katru gadu” (Karla, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 19.11.2021.).

Skaidrojot, kā Ziemassvētki tiek svinēti, jaunieši norādīja, ka “tie ir ģimenes svētki, kad dāvinām dāvanas” (Marija, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 10.12.2021.). Jaunieši apzinās ģimeniskuma vērtību un mēģina rast tā sajūtu arī vecāku šķiršanās gadījumā: “[Svinu] ģimenē. Sākumā parasti pusi dienas pavadu kopā ar tēvu, ja sanāk, bet uz vakarpusi braucu tad pie mammas un svinu kopā ar viņas ģimeni” (Lola, siev., 21 gads, studente, 14.12.2021.). Kultūru saskares rezultātā krievu ģimenes ir pārņēmušas somu kultūrai raksturīgos Ziemassvētku svinēšanas elementus: ģimeniskumu un dāvināšanu. Arī krievu kopienas rīkote grupu Ziemassvētku pasākumi tiek papildināti ar šiem elementiem:

J.: Ko vakar svinējāt?

A.: Mums bija Ziemassvētki, atzīmējām. Mēs sagatavojām programmu, mums tur bija biezputra un dažādas tortes, un tēja, kafija bija. Mēs tur vienkārši sēdējām kopā, ēdām un dzērām, tad mums bija viktorīna, viena [grupas dalībniece] pat padziedāja mums. Tad visi pirka dāvanas viens otram un tās izdalīja.

J.: Kādas dziesmas viņa dziedāja?

A.: Tās bija kaut kādas somu Ziemassvētku dziesmas (Karla, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 19.11.2021.).

Lai gan somu kultūrai raksturīgās Ziemassvētku tradīcijas tiek apgūtas, to praktizēšana ne vienmēr ir jauniešiem saistoša: “Parasti somu Ziemassvētki. Parastais somu ēdiens, dāvinām dāvanas – katru gadu viens un tas pats. Atbrauc visi radnieki, pavadām laiku kopā, ejam uz pirti, ēdam vienu un to pašu [no gada gadā]” (Lola, siev., 21 gads, studente, 14.12.2021.). Tomēr, runājot par Ziemassvētku tradīcijām, iezīmējās vēlme arī tās pārmantot: “Bērnībā pie mums parasti nāca Salavecis un dalīja dāvanas bērniem. Tā kā mums pagaidām bērnu nav, mums ar sievu Salavecis

nav vajadzīgs. Vēlāk, kad būs bērni, tad dabiski būs jāuztur šī kultūra, jo runā, ka Salavecis ir nācis tieši no Somijas, no Lapzemes. Somijā viņš ir *Joulupukki*, tas Santa” (Bils, vīr., 34 gadi, IT speciālists, 12.12.2021.). Runājot par saviem nākotnes plāniem, – kādus svētkus gribētu svinēt savā ģimenē, kad tā būs izveidota, – tika akcentēta piederība Somijai: “Es ļoti gribētu turpināt Ziemassvētku [tradīciju], jo uzskatu, ka, ja jau mēs dzīvojam Somijā, tas ir svarīgi svinēt somu svētkus. Citi bērni stāstīs, ka viņiem ir Ziemassvētki, bet, ja mums nebūs [Ziemassvētku], tas, šķiet, būs ļoti bēdīgi. Tāpēc manā ģimenē Ziemassvētki noteikti būs kā ģimenes svētki ar dāvanām” (Marija, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 10.12.2021.).

Somijā dzīvojošo krievu jauniešu apziņā Ziemassvētkiem nav reliģiskās vērtības. Jaunieši intervijās neatsaucās uz šo svētku reliģiskajiem atribūtiem, netika pieminēts arī baznīcas apmeklējums. Intervētajai, kuras “ģimenei saknes ir Izraēlā”, ir izveidojies priekšstats, ka “galu galā Ziemassvētki un Jaunais gads ir ļoti vienādi [svētki], tas ir, Salavecis, dāvanas, viss kaut kas tāds...” (Alise, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 01.12.2021.). Apgalvojusi: “Es nesvinu Ziemassvētkus”, intervētā piebilda: “Ja godīgi, man ļoti gribētos pamēģināt atzīmēt Ziemassvētkus, vienkārši tāpēc, ka man patīk Ziemassvētku sajūta, man vienmēr ir patikuši Ziemassvētki” (Alise, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 01.12.2021.).

2.2. Jaungads

Krievu kultūrā īpaša nozīme ir piešķirta Jaungadam, tāpēc jaunieši par šiem svētkiem runāja izteikti emocionāli: “Es milu Jauno gadu, bet vienmēr jūtu, ka Jauno gadu varētu padarīt vēl vairāk krāšņu [*prazdnīčnym*]. Domāju, ka mani draugi vai to ģimenes parasti tos neuzskata par dikti svarīgiem svētkiem, bet man ir jautri rīkot lielus svētkus Jaunajā gadā” (Ļermontovs, siev., 23 gadi, 19.11.2021.). Intervētajiem Jaungada svinēšanas atmosfēru rada izrotāta eglīte: “Jaunajā gadā mums parasti ir bijusi eglīte. Mēs likām istu eglī, lai gan mums ir daudz kaķu. Katram ģimenē ir savs kaķis, tāpēc, kad mēs visi sanākam kopā vienā mājā, tur ir kādi seši kaķi, bet viņi neaiztiek eglīti. Tik un tā mēs gribam likt istu eglīti, kas nav no plastmasas, pēc kuras nav jākrāmējas ar skujām, kas sabirst uz paklāja.

[..] Tad mēs karam rotājumu virtenes, tas ir ļoti atmosfērīgi, un zvaigzne galotnē ļoti skaisti [izskatās]” (Alise, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 01.12.2021.).

Apgalvojot, ka tiek svinēti “abi, gan somu, gan krievu” Jaungadi (Aleksandrs, vīr., 20 gadi, students, 13.11.2021.), izskanēja apliecinājums pieturēties pie krievu kultūrai raksturīgajiem svētku svinēšanas paradumiem: “Mēs mēģinām kaut pavisam nedaudz Jaungadu svinēt krieviski” (Ļermontovs, siev., 23 gadi, 19.11.2021.). Intervētie ir novērojuši ievērojamu atšķirību, kā šos svētkus svin somu un krievu kultūrā: “Krievu Jaunais gads – tie ir tādi lieli, krāšņāki svētki [*boļše prazdničnij*]. Tajā ir vairāk *fejerverka*, visa kā vairāk. Bet somu [Jaungads] ir daudz mierīgāks, vienkārši pasēž nedaudz un iet tālāk darboties ar savām lietām vai kopā ar draugiem kaut ko darīt” (Aleksandrs, vīr., 20 gadi, students, 13.11.2021.).

Apzinoties kultūru atšķirības, intervētie norādīja vairākus krievu kultūrai raksturīgos Jaungada svinēšanas diferencējošos elementus. Pirmkārt, tika minēts jaunā gada iestāšanās atskaites laiks:

J.: Ko nozīmē “krievu Jaunais gads”?

A.: Krievu Jaunais gads ir nedaudz agrāk ... vai nedaudz vēlāk... es vairs neatceros. Jā, tas atnāk nedaudz agrāk nekā somu (Aleksandrs, vīr., 20 gadi, students, 13.11.2021.).

Somija un Krievija atrodas dažādās laika joslās, tāpēc ģimenēs svinētais Jaungads tiek sagaidīts divreiz, t. i., pēc Maskavas laika ģimenes lokā un tad pēc Helsinku laika ārpus ģimenes:

J.: Pēc kāda laika jūs svinat Jauno gadu?

A.: Sākumā pēc Maskavas laika, manuprāt, stundu agrāk, bet pēc tam pēc Somijas [laika].

J.: Cikos ejat šaut petardes uz ielas?

A.: Lūk, uzreiz kā pulkstens [ir] divpadsmit, mēs paceļam glāzes, un tad uz pusstundu ejam ārā uz ielas, skatāmies salūtu, šaujām [petardes]. Pēc Somijas laika.

Savukārt, ja Jaunais gads tiek sagaidīts ārpus ģimenes, krievu jaunieši pieskaņojas vietējai sabiedrībai:

J.: Kā svinat Jauno gadu?

A.: Jauno gadu parasti sagaidu kopā ar draugiem.

J.: Ko jūs darāt?

A.: Kā kuru reizi, kā sanāk. Dažreiz klubā, reizumis pie kāda. Šogad kopā ar draudzeni Spānijā sagaidīsim.

J.: Pēc kāda laika parasti sagaidāt Jauno gadu?

A.: Pēc somu (Lola, siev., 21 gads, studente, 14.12.2021.).

Otrkārt, kā krievu kultūrai raksturīgs Jaungada svētku elements tika minēta Maskavas TV skatīšanās, no kuras Somijā dzīvojošie krievu jaunieši pamazām distancējas: “Vienkārši vecākiem ir tāda tradīcija klausīties [Krievijas] prezidenta runu vienmēr Jaunajā gadā” (Aleksandrs, vīr., 20 gadi, students, 13.11.2021.). Attieksmē pret Maskavas TV skatīšanos iezīmējās slēpts paaudžu vērtību konflikts.

J.: Jūs skatāties Krievijas TV, kad sagaidāt Jauno gadu?

A.: Pagājušajā gadā mamma ieslēdza, bet tas tur vienkārši griezās [*krutīsa*], un mēs paši par sevi kaut ko... Gribējās mūziku paklausīties vai ko tādu. To visu mamma vairāk izlemj, viņa ieminas, lūk, ieslēgsim, paskatīsimies, kā viņi Maskavā sagaida Jauno gadu (Ļermontovs, siev., 23 gadi, 19.11.2021.).

Treškārt, pretstatā politiskajam Jaungada sagaidīšanas aspektam, kas jauniešus maz saista, krievu kinoindustrijas radīto “kulta” filmu patērīnš, sagaidot gadu miju, tiek labprāt pārmanots: “Mēs ar mammu skatījāmies “Likteņa ironiju”” (Ļermontovs, siev., 23 gadi, 19.11.2021.).

Ceturtkārt, gadījumos, ja Ziemassvētki netiek svinēti 25. decembrī, Jaungada svinībās izteiktāk iezīmējas ģimeniskuma aspekts:

J.: Vai Jaungadā pie jums nāk ciemiņi?

A.: Nē, tie parasti mums vienmēr ir bijuši tikai ģimenes svētki (Alise, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 01.12.2021.).

Zīmīgi, ka intervētie apliecina prieku sagaidīt jauno gadu ģimenē: “Es ļoti mīlu svinēt Jaungadu kopā ar ģimeni, vismaz daļēji, bet lai ģimene būtu kopā. Protams, bieži vien tas vienkārši nav iespējams, jo katram jau ir sava ģimene un visus kopā nekādīgi nesavākt. Bet ar tiem, ko varam

savākt, mēs labprāt svinam Jauno gadu” (Alise, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 01.12.2021.). Tomēr ģimene nav vienīgā jaunā gada sagaidīšanas vide, jo tiek pieļauts, ka “Jaunajā gadā mēs ar draugiem varam izklaidēties vai kaut ko vēl... Piemēram, var kaut kur aizbraukt” (Marija, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 10.12.2021.). Tomēr ģimenes vide ir tieši tas, pēc kā jaunieši ilgojas, tāpēc ieskanējās nostalgiskas atmiņas: “Kādreiz svinējām Jauno gadu ar vectētiņu un vecmāmiņu Pēterburgā. Tad pie mums kāds ienāca, bet ne uz ilgu laiku – tikai apsveikt un doties tālāk savās gaitās. Ja godīgi, es ilgojos pēc tiem laikiem, kad bijām kopā visa ģimene: vecmāmiņa un vectētiņš, un kaut kādi ciemiņi, kas nāca un gāja. Tas bija ļoti atmosfērīgi” (Alise, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 01.12.2021.).

Piektkārt, kā krievu svētku kultūru diferencējošs elements iezīmējās Jaungada sagaidīšana pēc “vecā stila”. Lai gan Krievijā un krievu diasporā nereti atzīmē jaunā gada iestāšanos arī pēc Jūlija kalendāra, interviju dati ļauj noprast, ka krievu ģimenēs Somijā šis paradums izzūd:

J.: Vai esat dzirdējusi par “vecu jauno gadu”?

A.: Nu, esmu dzirdējusi, bet mēs nekad to nesvinam. Pēc “vecā jaunā gada” novācam rotājumus, eglīti. Tie ir vēl vieni svētki, kad var vēlreiz iedzert, pasvinēt. Krieviem tie ir svētki, bet mēs Somijā kaut kā tos nesvinam nekad (Marija, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 10.12.2021.).

Runājot par svētku tradīciju pārmantošanu, intervētie pauda viedokli, ka Jaungada svinēšanā iesaistīs arī savus pēcnācējus: “Jaunais gads kļūst daudz interesantāks, kad ģimenē ienāk bērni, jo vecāki Jaunajā gadā cenšas radīt pasaku tieši bērniem, un paši sāk ticēt pasakai” (Katrīna, siev., 23 gadi, skolotāja, 28.11.2021.).

2.3. Uzvaras diena

Starp vēstures atceres dienām ar izteiktu politiski ideoloģisku nokrāsu izceļas 9. maijs. Attieksmē pret 1965. gadā PSRS ieviesto Uzvaras dienas svinēšanu 9. maijā un šīs tradīcijas turpināšanu krievu diasporā Somijā skaidri iezīmējās izteikti atšķirīgas divu grupu līderu pozīcijas. Vienas

grupas līdere īpaši uzsvēra, ka 9. maijs tiek “atzīmēts” (Valentīna, siev., 55 gadi, grupas līdere, 11.10.2021.), turpretim otras grupas līderes attieksmē pret Uzvaras dienu iezīmējās nostāja pret tās mērķtiecīgu izmantošanu Krievijas ideoloģijā mūsdienās. Viņa uzskata, ka Uzvaras dienas svinēšana Somijā ir “tieši saistīta ar to, ka šeit dzīvojošie krievi skatās Krievijas TV un ka propagandas, gan labas, gan ne pārāk, apjoms pārsniedz robežas [*zaškaļivajet*]. Un vecāki, dabiski, nodod savus priekšstatus tālāk bērniem. Un bērni nāk pie mums, ienes mūsu lokā savus priekšstatus. Mums ir kaut kādā veidā tas viss jāizskaidro” (Olga, siev., 52 gadi, grupas līdere, 26.10.2021.). Tādējādi otrās grupas gadījumā iezīmējās īpaša misija, ko īstenot ir visai sarežģīti, jo Krievijā vēstures politizēšanas rezultātā 9. maijs ir sasniedzis sekulārās reliģijas līmeni (Gerlach 2014). Apzinoties šo problēmu, grupas līdere skaidroja, ka pret Uzvaras dienu izturas ar “cieņu un bijību [*s počtenijem, s trepetom*]” (Olga, siev., 52 gadi, grupas līdere, 26.10.2021.), lai gan viņai nav pieņemams “pārspilējums, kad bērnus ietērpj karavīru formastērpos un liek darīt pieaugušo lietas, ko viņi [bērni] īstenībā nesaprot” (Olga, siev., 52 gadi, grupas līdere, 26.10.2021.). Apzinoties, ka iebildumi pret Uzvaras dienas svinēšanas veidu var radīt sakāpinātas emocijas Somijā dzīvojošo krievu kopienā, grupas līdere izvēlējās no grupas pozīcijas aktīvas paušanas: “Mēs izvēlējamies savu pozīciju, mēs it kā apejam šo tēmu. Tas ir, kad esam spiesti, mēs, protams, tomēr nedaudz pieskaramies šai tēmai, runājam par to. To, drīzāk, mēs tā darām nevis tāpēc, ka it kā šaubāmies, bet vienkārši nevēlamies saspilējumu, mēs nevēlamies spriedzi. Tas ir svarīgi, lai cilvēki, kas nāk pie mums, gan pieaugušie, gan bērni, justos brīvi, tas ir, mēs it kā apejam to, līdzīgi kā kovida tēmu tagad, tas ir apmēram tāpat. Kaut kādus asus momentus, kas ne pārāk labi savienojas kultūrās, mēs vienkārši apejam” (Olga, siev., 52 gadi, grupas līdere, 26.10.2021.).

Veidā, kā 9. maiju atzīmē pirmās grupas līderes sekotāji, var saskatīt neapzinātu vēlmi rast līdzsvaru starp Uzvaras dienas izmantošanu politiskajā ideoloģijā un Otrajā pasaules karā kritušo pieminēšanu: “Mēs to [9. maiju] arī atzīmējam. To atzīmējam tādā veidā. 80 kilometru attālumā ir vieta, kur it kā esot apbedījumi ar padomju karavīriem, kas miruši gūstā.

Jāpateicas, ka ilgus gadus šo vietu apkopa somu, teiksim, somu un krievu draudzības klubs. Kad mēs par to uzzinājām, mēs pievienojāmies šim procesam. Un, lūk, jau 12, laikam 13 gadus, katrā ziņā līdz ar manu pievienošanos [krievu kultūras tradīciju saglabāšanas grupai], jo es to visu [apbedījumus] atradu, mēs to darām kopā. Tā ir mūsu kopīgā vieta, kur mēs pulcējamies 9. maijā. Mēs to tīrām, sakopjam, ziedus noliekam, sveces, jo atmiņa ir atmiņa, lai arī kāda tā ir. Tā ir vieta, kur atnākt un padomāt par to, lai nekad tā [kara] vairs nebūtu, lai kaimiņvalstis, kas dzīvo blakus, draudzējas. Tām ir jādraudzējas, jo karš ir pats briesmīgākais, kas var notikt. Un, lūk, nāk ļoti daudzi no tās [somu un krievu draudzības biedrības] puses cilvēki, nāk mūsu cilvēki. Mēs ļaudis vedam veseliem autobusiem, tā ir vienkārši piemiņas vieta. Tādā veidā mēs atzīmējam 9. maiju” (Valentīna, siev., 55 gadi, grupas līdere, 11.10.2021.).

Lai arī tiek pieliktas pūles, lai 9. maijs tiktu svinēts iespējami masveidīgāk (“ļaudis vedam veseliem autobusiem”), atsaucība vietējā krievu diasporā nav simtprocentīga, jo tiek izmantota iespēja vērot Uzvaras dienas svinības attālināti ar Krievijas TV starpniecību: “Kad esam mājās, skatāmies parādi Sarkanajā laukumā, reizumis pagatavojam kopā ar mammu krievu [virtuves] ēdienu. Klausāmies, kad Putins runā” (Anna, siev., 20 gadi, studente, 17.11.2021.). Tomēr Somijā dzīvojošo krievu jauniešu vidē var saziņēt vēlmi distancēties no šiem pasākumiem. Viena no intervētajām izteicās: “9. maijs ir it kā svētki, Krievijā to atzīmē, man tas neko neizsaka” (Lola, siev., 21 gads, studente, 14.12.2021.). Zīmīgi, ka šajā gadījumā tomēr neiezīmējās paaudžu konflikta aprises, respektīvi, jaunieši nenoraidīja Uzvaras dienu kā vecākās paaudzes svētkus, no kuriem būtu jāatsakās. Jauniešu attieksme pret 9. maiju ļauj izprast, ka Somijā dzīvojošo krievu jauniešu gadījumā svētku kultūra ir viens no faktoriem, kas nosaka jauniešu pašidentificēšanos: “Uzvaras diena. Man tā nav ļoti tuva, jo es uzskatu sevi laikam nedaudz vairāk par somu, nevis krievu, ja runājam par tādiem svētkiem, tāpēc ka man, piemēram, Ziemassvētki ir 24. datumā, bet pēc tam Jaunais gads 31. [...] Vadoties pēc svētkiem, es sevi uzskatu vairāk par somu, un man nav tādu sajūtu kā laikam krieviem 9. maija sakarā” (Bils, vīr., 34 gadi, IT speciālists, 12.12.2021.).

2.4. Somijas Neatkarības diena

Lai gan intervijas notika laikā pirms vai pēc Somijas Neatkarības dienas, kas tiek svinēta 6. decembrī, gan grupu līderi, gan jaunieši to minēja, tikai atbildot uz pētnieces tieši uzdotajiem jautājumiem. Intervēto skatījumā vēsturiskās atceres dienas, tai skaitā Neatkarības diena, Somijā tiek atzīmētas bez citām kultūrām raksturīgā vērīena. Jaunieši šo svētku svinēšanu salīdzināja ar lielvalstu piekopto praksi mobilizēt masas:

J.: Kā tiek svinēta Neatkarības diena Somijā?

A.: Nu, tos pat nevar saukt par ļoti lieliem svētkiem. Kāds mājās riko [svinēšanu] personiski, bet citādi tie neskaitās tādi... Lai gan nē, jā, skaitās, un vienmēr izkar karogus pie mājām. Bet tie nav tik lieli svētki kā Neatkarības diena tajā pašā Krievijā vai ASV. Somijā tie nav tik lieli svētki, pēc mēroga tie ir daudz mazāki svētki (Aleksandrs, vīr., 20 gadi, students, 13.11.2021.).

Tā kā Somijā svētku kultūra nav politizēta un vērsta uz plašu tautas masu mobilizāciju, arī skolās intervētie nav novērojuši aktīvu Neatkarības dienas svinēšanu: “Vienīgā reize, kad tā [Neatkarības diena] tika svinēta, bija tad, kad bija [Somijas] simtgade. Tad skolā atzīmēja” (Veronika, siev., 19 gadi, skolniece, 14.10.2021.).

Kā Somijas Neatkarības dienas atribūti tika minēti karogi ielās un no mācībām un darba brīva diena (Veronika, siev., 19 gadi, skolniece, 14.10.2021.). Intervētā stāstīja, ka “tikai Helsinkos, galvaspilsētā, riko kaut ko līdzīgu parādei. Bet tikai Helsinkos” (Veronika, siev., 19 gadi, skolniece, 14.10.2021.). Atbildot uz jautājumu, kāpēc somiem tie nav lieli svētki, intervētais pauda savas iepriekšējās pārdomas: “Man pašam tā ir mīkla, tāpēc ka somi tomēr ir samērā lieli patrioti, bet kāpēc viņi svētkos ir tādi mierīgi? Nezinu, varbūt kas tāds ir somu kultūrā, ka svētkus ne pārāk spēcīgi atzīmē. Jaunais gads – tie visiem ir lieli svētki, bet citi ne. Visi ļoti klusi svin savus svētkus. Tas laikam ir viņu kultūrā, tāda mentalitāte” (Aleksandrs, vīr., 20 gadi, students, 13.11.2021.).

Salīdzinot ar vēsturisko atceres dienu svinībām lielvalstīs, Somijas Neatkarības dienas svinēšana krievu jauniešiem šķiet pieticīga un

nepievilcīga, tāpēc, noprotams, ka līdzdalība ir zema, jo uz jautājumu: “Vai apmeklējāt Somijas Neatkarības dienas pasākumus šeit pilsētā vai Helsinkos?” – atskanēja viennozīmīgi asa atbilde: “Nē!” Kā šķēršļi līdzdalībai bija minēts gan fiziskais attālums no svinību vietām (“es dzīvoju tālu no [pilsētas] centra, Helsinki no mums ir ļoti tālu”) (Oļegs, vīr., 46 gadi, grupas līderis, 10.12.2021.), gan emocionālā atsvešinātība (“Man kaut kā, kad ir Uzvaras diena 9. maijā, to es vairāk jūtu kā savus svētkus”) (Anna, siev., 20 gadi, studente, 17.11.2021.), gan neinformētība par pasākumu norisi (“kaut kādi pasākumi notiek pilsētas pārvaldē”) (Oļegs, vīr., 46 gadi, grupas līderis, 10.12.2021.), gan iespēja vērot Somijas Neatkarības svinības attālināti (“skatāmies pa televizoru, redzam pieņemšanu pie prezidenta”) (Oļegs, vīr., 46 gadi, grupas līderis, 10.12.2021.). Krievu izcelsmes iebraucēji ir pārņēmuši somu sabiedrībā plaši izplatīto praksi uzmanīgi sekot līdz TV ekrānos pieņemšanai pie prezidenta (Sumiala 2013, 64).

Individuāli krievu jaunieši Somijā nav aktīvi Somijas Neatkarības dienas atzīmētāji, jo uz jautājumu: “Ko darīsiet 6. decembrī?” – skanēja, piemēram, šāda atbilde: “Nezinu. Laikam svecītes noliksim, kaut ko ēdamu pagatavosim” (Anna, siev., 20 gadi, studente, 17.11.2021.). Toties iezīmējās vienas grupas aktivitāte, jo, cenšoties izrādīt cieņu mītnes zemei, krievu kultūras tradīciju saglabāšanas grupa mēdz organizēt Somijas Neatkarības dienas svinības. Grupas līdere skaidroja: “Vēl mums ir decembrī, 6. decembrī, Neatkarības diena. Mums noteikti būs kaut kāds sabiedrīks..., kaut kāds... pasākums, ko mēs paši gan organizējam, gan ielūdzam kaut kādus viesus. Un somi vienmēr labprāt nāk pie mums, jo pie mums ir mazliet tādi dzīvāki svētki, citādāki” (Valentīna, siev., 55 gadi, grupas līdere, 11.10.2021.). Tādējādi, no vienas puses, tiek uzsvēta Somijā dzīvojošo krievu vēlme svinēt politiska rakstura svētkus kopā ar vietējo sabiedrību, bet, no otras puses, iezīmējas vēlme tos atzīmēt “citādāk”, vienlaikus izsakot neizpratni – kādā veidā. Arī reliģiskajā grupā tiek svinēta Somijas Neatkarības diena. Grupas līderis stāstīja: “[..] pareizticīgajiem tie ir ļoti lieli svētki – Neatkarības diena. Kāpēc? Tāpēc ka tā ir Brīnumdarītāja Nikolaja diena, Ziemas Nikolaja. [..] Mēs to, protams, ļoti svinam. [..] Mums ir ļoti lieli svētki, ļoti, ļoti lieli. Manai dzīvesbiedrei vēl arī

dzimšanas diena šajā dienā, tāpēc mums ir ļoti lieli svētki, paši saprotiet” (Oļegs, vīr., 46 gadi, grupas līderis, 10.12.2021.). Pētnieces veiktie novērojumi apstiprināja šo apgalvojumu, jo reliģiskās grupas pasākumā 6. decembrī bija liels dalībnieku skaits. Reliģiskās grupas rīkotajā pasākumā saplūda reliģiskā un vēsturiski politiskā svētku nozīme: “[Somijas Neatkarības dienas svinībās] piedalījās mūsu valditājs [*vladika*], dziedājām patriotiskas dziesmas, un es nodziedāju dziesmu par Nikolaju Brīnumdarītāju somu valodā. [...], tāpēc mums Nikolajs Brīnumdarītājs un 6. decembris ir nesaraujami saistīti un lieli, ļoti lieli svētki” (Oļegs, vīr., 46 gadi, grupas līderis, 10.12.2021.).

2.5. Lieldienas

Runājot par Lieldienām, intervētie lietoja apzīmējumu “krievu” Lieldienas, ar to saprotot Lieldienu svinēšanu pēc Jūlija kalendāra. Vienā gadījumā tika uzsvērts, ka tiek svinētas tikai “krievu” Lieldienas: “Mēs svinam krievu Lieldienas. Tieši mūsu baznīcas Lieldienas. Mums ir Pareizticīgo baznīca, tāpēc svinam Lieldienas. Somu Lieldienas mēs kaut kā nesvinam, bet, kad Somijā pienāk šie svētki un tiek dota no darba brīva diena, skaidrs, ka mēs sēžam mājās” (Aleksandrs, vīr., 20 gadi, students, 13.11.2021.). Turpretim otrā gadījumā tika skaidrots, kāpēc ģimene svin abas – “krievu” un “somu” Lieldienas:

J.: Kādus svētkus svinat ģimenē?

A.: [...] mēs svinam divas Lieldienas: pareizticīgās un, lūk, somu luteriskās.

J.: Kāpēc divas?

A.: Vecāki man ir ticīgi, un viņiem ir svarīgi svinēt tieši “krievu” [Lieldienas], bet tā kā mēs dzīvojam Somijā, [svinam] pie reizes arī “somu” [Lieldienas] (Veronika, siev., 19 gadi, skolniece, 14.10.2021.).

Jaunās paaudzes atkāpšanās no reliģisko priekšrakstu ievērošanas iezīmējās arī stāstījumā par to, cik svarīgi ir svinēt Pesahu: “Man ir ļoti svarīgi apzināties, kas ir Pesaha svētki un kā tie attiecas uz manu ģimeni, manu

kultūru, un pēc tam, piemēram, kad mēs neēdam [raudzētu] miltu izstrādājumus Pesaha laikā. Bet man tagad ir tā, ka es negribu sevi īpaši ierobežot svētku dēļ. Mēs ēdam macu, tā ir tāda sausa maizīte. Tagad kā kurš var... Manuprāt, svarīgi ir vienkārši tas, ka tu apzinies, ka ir svētki” (Alise, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 01.12.2021.).

Runājot par Lieldienu tradīcijām ģimenē, tika apgalvots: “Nu, neko tādu īpašu mēs Lieldienās nedarām” (Lola, siev., 21 gads, studente, 14.12.2021.). Kā galvenie Lieldienu svētku atribūti intervijās bija norādīta pashas gatavošana un olu krāsošana:

J.: Vai mamma gatavo pashu?

A.: Mamma, jā, viņa vienmēr, katru gadu krāso olas, pashu, to pīrāgu gatavo katru gadu. Un kopā ar manu māsu viņas vienmēr krāso olas. Es pats nemilu krāsot olas, bet tas ir skaisti, kad tās ir nokrāsotas (Aleksandrs, vīr., 20 gadi, students, 13.11.2021.).

Ja vienā ģimenē šīs tradīcijas tiek ievērotas regulāri, cita intervētā ģimenē tās ir izzudušas:

J.: Vai ģimenē krāsojat olas?

A.: Nē! Nu, pāris reizi tas bija, bet lai tur... Nezinu (Marija, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 10.12.2021.).

Intervijās neieskanējās entuziasms par Lieldienu tradīciju saglabāšanu un pārmantošanu:

J.: Vai mamma gatavo pashu?

A.: Jā!

J.: Vai pati pratīsi to pagatavot?

A.: Domājams, ka jā (Veronika, siev., 19 gadi, skolniece, 14.10.2021.).

Lieldienu svētki Somijā tika raksturoti kā sinkrētisks fenomens – “ļoti sajaukta kultūra, [kurā ir] visa kā pa druskai” (Alise, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 01.12.2021.). To spilgti raksturo cita intervētā stāstījums par Lieldienu ieražu: “Lieldienas, jā, bērni pie mums staigā tērpos, vāc saldumus. Lieldienu tērpi – kāds par zaķīti sapucējies, kāds par meitenīti ar vasar-

raibumiem, sarkaniem vaigiem un bizīti. Pie mums tā ierasts, tā ir labā *noīta*, ragana, bet ar vasarraibumiem, lakatiņu, ļoti krāsaini tērpta. Tas laikam pats vieglākais [vieglāk pagatavojamais] tērps. Ar vasarraibumiem un bizīti. Mamma [mani] vienmēr tā pucēja” (Marija, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 10.12.2021.).

2.6. Tradicionālās kultūras svētki: *Juhannus*, Masļeņica un Helovīns

Skaidrojot, kādus “luterāņu” svētkus mēdz svinēt ģimenē, līdzās Somijas Neatkarības dienai intervētā minēja arī vasaras saulgriežus – *Juhannus*. Viņas ģimenē “[...] citus [“somu” svētkus] ne[svin]. Mums vairāk ir krievu svētki” (Karla, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 19.11.2021.). Runājot par vasaras saulgriežiem, tika apliecināta krievu jauniešu atvērtība mītnes zemes svētku kultūrai, vienlaikus paliekot uzticīgiem savai kultūrai: “Mēs svinam arī somu svētkus vasarā. Mēs svinam arī krievu svētkus. Tas kaut kā mums ir kļuvis par tradīciju – svinēt šos svētkus: gan somu, gan krievu” (Aleksandrs, vīr., 20 gadi, students, 13.11.2021.).

Somijas svētku kultūrā īpaši izceļas vasaras saulgrieži – *Juhannus*, kas tiek aktīvi svinēti, un to ir novērojuši arī Somijā dzīvojošie krievu jaunieši. Raksturojot vasaras saulgriežu svinēšanas tradīcijas Somijā, intervētais norādīja uz somu sabiedrībai piemītošo individuālismu: “[...] *Juhannus*, ir mums tādi svētki, tikai tad viņi [somi] stipri svin, un pat tad [tikai] ar ģimeni. Viņi vienmēr svin atsevišķi” (Aleksandrs, vīr., 20 gadi, students, 13.11.2021.).

Kā vasaras saulgriežu svētku atribūts bija minēts ugunskurs, nomoda nakts, alkohols un jautrība: “Parasti [ir] liels ugunskurs, un... ugunskursus kurina visās pilsētās, visās iespējamās vietās, neguļ un vienkārši daudz iedzer. Nomoda nakts visiem. Visi liksmo [*guļajut*]” (Marija, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 10.12.2021.).

Individuāli vasaras saulgriežus ir svinējuši arī Somijā dzīvojošie krievu jaunieši, kuriem tā ir jauna pieredze: “Pēdējos divos gados es biju mūsu kompānijā, tas ir, ar viņu [krieviski runājošiem] draugiem, ar māsām

liksmojām visu nakti. Mēs vienkārši sēdējām, liksmojām, sagaidījām [rīt- ausmu]... Tā ļoti mierīgi. Jautri, mierīgi, pieskatījām ugunsroku. Pirms tam es īpaši nesvinēju [vasaras saulgriežus] un neko nedariju” (Marija, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 10.12.2021.). Par citām *Juhannus* svinēšanas tradīcijām jaunieši nerunāja, tādējādi liekot noprast, ka tās nav iepazīnuši:

J. Kāds ir šo svētku tradicionālais ēdiens?

A.: Manuprāt, tāda nav. Nav. Nekāds (Marija, siev., 19 gadi, stu-
dente, 10.12.2021.).

Kolektīvās vasaras saulgriežu svinēšanas intervijās nebija minētas, jo krievu diasporas grupas neorganizē to svinēšanu. No vienas puses, to varētu skaidrot ar atvaļinājumu perioda iestāšanos, kas apgrūtina grupas pasākumu organizēšanu, bet, no otras puses, jānorāda uz krievu kopienas vēlmi saglabāt pirmām kārtām savu tradicionālo kultūru, piemēram, rīkojot Masļeņicas svinēšanu. Stāstot, kā norit Masļeņica, grupas līdere akcentēja somu atvērtību: “To [Masļeņicu] no mums gaida pat somi un mūsu partneri” (Valentīna, siev., 55 gadi, grupas līdere, 11.10.2021.). Ar vietējās pašvaldības atļauju krievu kultūras tradīciju saglabāšanas grupa rīko šos svētkus vai nu pilsētas laukumā, vai nu sporta stadionā, vai arī slēpošanas trasē. Tas ļauj noprast gan par svētku mērogu, gan krievu diasporas un somu sabiedrības lielo atsaucību. Raksturojot svētku norisi, grupas līdere norādīja uz īpaši jautro Masļeņicas atmosfēru: “Mēs to taisām skaļu, jautru, ar mūziku un [tautas] dejām [*plaskām*] uz ielas, obligāti ar pankūkām, ar visādiem spilgtiem elementiem. Tie var būt... labākos gados pie mums brauca ciemiņi [krievu kopienas no citām pilsētām], mēs aicinājām [piedalīties] dažādus [tautas] deju kolektīvus. Tā [Masļeņica] vienmēr notika uz ielas, tas bija šovs” (Valentīna, siev., 55 gadi, grupas līdere, 11.10.2021.). Tā kā plašām svinībām ir nepieciešams materiālais atbalsts, nereti grupa ir saskārusies ar finansiāliem šķēršļiem, ko ir pratusi apiet: “Kad mums ir pavisam maz naudas, mēs, piemēram, nevaram nevienu ielūgt, uztaisīt kaut kādu muzikālu šovu, tad mēs rīkojam vienkārši atvērto sporta dienu, bet tā tik un tā ir Masļeņica. Tas ir, mēs spēlējam [spēles], mēs aicinām [piedalīties], piemēram, metam velteni, sniega pikas,

[rikojam] aktīvas rotaļas svaigā gaisā, noteikti ar mūziku un pankūkām. Tā ir mūsu tradīcija. Masļeņica [tiek rīkota] obligāti” (Valentīna, siev., 55 gadi, grupas lidere, 11.10.2021.). Kā liecina interviju dati, tieši krievu tradicionālā kultūra spēj ieinteresēt vietējo mītnes zemes sabiedrību un radīt labvēlīgu augsni kultūru dialogam.

Īru tradicionālās kultūras Helovīns ir nostiprinājies Rietumu kultūrā, it īpaši angļiski runājošajās zemēs, kā amerikāņu masu kultūras elements. Tas ir klātesošs arī Somijā, kur iebraukušo krievu kopienas locekļu vidē ir raisījis neviennozīmīgu attieksmi. Krievu jauniešiem ir savi novērojumi par īru tradicionālās kultūras svētku globālo izplatību: “Helovīns, protams, ir Krievijā un Somijā” (Anna, siev., 20 gadi, studente, 17.11.2021.). Pēc grupas līderes uzskatiem, Helovīna gadījumā atklājas “asi atšķirības momenti kultūras kodos, kad principiāli nesakrīt krievu kultūras kods ar somu [kodu]. Tad rodas kaut kādi sarežģījumi, it īpaši, kad saduras ģimenes tradīcijas, tad... murgi...” (Olga, siev., 52 gadi, grupas lidere, 26.10.2021.).

Pirmkārt, attieksme pret Helovīnu iezīmē robežšķirtni starp mītnes zemes sabiedrību un krievu imigrantiem Somijā, kur “visi svin to skolās, rīko pasākumus, tā ir vispārīga somu..., visi rīko šos svētkus” (Olga, siev., 52 gadi, grupas lidere, 26.10.2021.). Otrkārt, Helovīns iezīmē uzskatu dažādību krievu kopienas locekļu vidē. Grupas lidere, kas organizē Helovīna pasākumu savā grupā, skaidroja, ka “ir pāris cilvēki, kas principiāli nesvin [Helovīnu] dažādu pareizticīgo reliģisko apsvērumu dēļ, nesvin šos svētkus. Un, lūk, bērni, piemēram, manā grupā nenāk uz šiem svētkiem, lai gan mēs visi kopā tiem gatavojamies” (Olga, siev., 52 gadi, grupas lidere, 26.10.2021.). Pareizticīgās baznīcas teoloģiski motivētā nosodošā attieksme pret Helovīnu tomēr nav destruktīvi ietekmējusi krievu kultūras mantojuma saglabāšanas grupas un krievu reliģiskās kopienas attiecības: “Ir liela [krievu] diasporas daļa, kas apmeklē baznīcu, tā organizē dievkalpojumus krievu valodā šeit, un arī bērni tos apmeklē. Lūk, šie [bērni] nenāks svinēt Helovīnu, bet viņi piedalīsies citos pasākumos. Tas [Helovīns] nav nekam pretrunā. Mēs esam cieši saistīti, piemēram, organizējam nometnes viņu [pareizticīgo] bāzē” (Olga, siev., 52 gadi, grupas lidere, 26.10.2021.).

Līdzīgi kā Uzvaras dienas svinēšana, arī Helovīna atzīmēšana ir faktors, kas apdraud imigrējušo krievu kopienas locekļu savstarpējās attiecības. Helovīna gadījumā lidere cenšas radīt grupā līdzsvarotu attieksmi pret šiem svētkiem, lai nerastos nesaprašanās, konflikti un šķelšanās: “Nu, te man vajag kaut kā lavierēt, man nākas kaut kā izskaidrot citiem, kāpēc šie [bērni] nenāks, ka tas nav nekas briesmīgs, ja mums katram ir savas ģimenes tradīcijas un svētki. Tie ir ļoti sarežģīti jautājumi, un es domāju, ka katra ģimene tos risina citādāk” (Olga, siev., 52 gadi, grupas lidere, 26.10.2021.).

Citas grupas lidere ir novērojusi, ka “vienu laiku mūsējie, jaunieši, aktīvi svinēja Helovīnu. Bet divus trīs gadus pasvinēja un tad beidza” (Valentīna, siev., 55 gadi, grupas lidere, 11.10.2021.). Viņa nevarēja izskaidrot, kāpēc ir zudusi Somijā dzīvojošo krievu jauniešu interese par Helovīnu, bet to vērtēja pozitīvi: “Nezinu [kāpēc], bet mēs esam priecīgi. Šādi svētki... tie nav mūsu svētki” (Valentīna, siev., 55 gadi, grupas lidere, 11.10.2021.).

Somijā krievu jauniešu iesaistīšanās Helovīna dienas aktivitātēs ir izteikti individuāls lēmums pat tajā gadījumā, ja grupa organizē svinēšanu. No interviju datiem var noprast, ka šie svētki nav īpaši populāri Somijā, kur liela daļa iedzīvotāju ir pareizticīgie, tāpēc arī krievu imigrantu jaunā paaudze nav aktīva šo svētku svinētāja: “Helovīnā [...] es nekad netērpos. Tas ir, es ierados [skolā] kā parasti. Kāds tur bija baigi satērpies. Bet tā kā puse skolas netērpās, tad es kaut kā pat nepamanīju šos svētkos, tie mums nav kaut kā izdevušies. Bet mēģinājumi [svinēt] bija” (Marija, siev., 19 gadi, studente, 10.12.2021.).

3. Secinājumi

Svētku kultūras pētnieki ir nonākuši pie dažādiem slēdzieniem par svētku funkcijām, nozīmi un struktūru. Svētkiem ir raksturīgs sociālo vērtību aspekts, jo, pirmkārt, tos svinot, rodas kopības sajūta, kas veicina dalībnieku izpratni par kultūras mantojumu, otrkārt, tie palīdz pāriet no viena dzīves posma citā, nodrošina kultūras tradīciju pārmantošanu (Cudny 2014; Addo 2009; Cocco & Bertran 2021; Perry et al. 2020). Kultūras pētnieku vidē dominē uzskats, ka svētki ir integrāla sociālās dzīves sastāvdaļa, kas

veido kultūras pamatu un stiprina sociālās saites. Starp krievu jauniešiem Somijā veiktais pētījums ļauj pievienoties uzskatam, ka svētki palīdz imigrantiem nenoslēgties izolētā vidē un ka ar to starpniecību tiek uzturēta kultūru daudzveidība, kam ir sociāli pozitīva vērtība (Frost 2016).

Somijā dzīvojošie krievu jaunieši svētku vērtību saskata to sociālās integrācijas, tradīciju pārneses un audzinošajā funkcijā. Uzvedības modeļu aspektā pētījuma dati ļauj secināt, ka, pirmkārt, svinēšanas prakse ir sabiedrības vai atsevišķas tās grupas vitalitātes indikators. Krievu imigranti akcentē savu svētku tradīciju vitalitāti, ko uzskata par īpašu savas kultūras vērtību, kas varētu bagātināt Somijas kultūru, kurā intervētie saskata dinamisma trūkumu. Otrkārt, pētījums atklāj, ka krievu jaunieši svētku vērtību saskata kolektīvajā svinēšanā, kritizējot somu mentalitātē saskatīto individuālismu.

Antropologu ieskatā svētki sniedz stabilitātes garantiju, kas īpaši tiek novērtēta mūsdienu haotiskajā un strauji mainīgo apstākļu laikmetā (Svoboda 2010; Miller 2017). Somijā veiktā pētījuma dati liecina, ka svinēšanas ieražas un tradīcijas veido pastāvīgu svētku struktūru un repetitīvātī, kuras regularitāte sniedz stabilitātes sajūtu krievu imigrantu kopienai. Svētku rituāliem ir piešķirta īpaša vērtība: tos svin noteiktā vidē (mājās) un kopā ar noteiktām personām (ģimenes locekļiem un draugiem). Pulcēšanās svinībām ļauj aizmirst ikdienas raizes un stiprina ģimenes un draugu emocionālās saites. Jauniešu uztverē svētku galvenā vērtība ir saskaņas starp tuviniekiem nodrošināšana, jo viņu svētku atmiņās dominē priecīga noskaņa, garšīgs ēdiens un ģimenisks siltums. Intervētie jaunieši ir domājuši par krievu kultūras tradīciju pārmantošanu un somu kultūras tradīciju apgūšanu, tāpēc intervijās klāstīja, kā gribētu svinēt svētkus savā ģimenē un ar saviem bērniem, respektīvi, kādas svētku tradīcijas būtu pārmantojamas, kādas nav saglabāšanas vērtas, kādas tradīcijas būtu pārņemamas no somu svētku kultūras.

Stāstījumos par Ziemassvētkiem un Lieldienām jaunieši neietvēra atsauci uz to reliģiskajiem aspektiem. Tādējādi reliģiskās izcelsmes svētki ir zaudējuši savu sakrālo vērtību, toties ir ieguvuši tādu pašu antropoloģisko vērtību kā sekulārie svētki. Somijā Ziemassvētku laikā ierasto

dāvanu sniegšanu krievu jaunieši vērtē kā pārņemšanas vērtu ieražu, ko labprāt praktizē gan savā ģimenē, gan draugu vidē, un tajā nesaskata svētku komercializācijas draudus. Nereti dāvināšanas prakses pārņemšana ir mudinājusi mainīt arī Ziemassvētku svinēšanas laiku, pārejot no Jūlija kalendāra uz Gregora kalendāru. Piešķirot īpašu vērtību ģimeniskumam, gadumijas periodā krievu imigrantu ģimenēs Somijā notiek akcenta pārnese no Jaungada svinībām uz Ziemassvētkiem.

Svētki palīdz būvēt sapratnes tiltu starp sociālajām grupām, ko nošķir etniskā piederība. Svētku ēdienu gatavošana, atrašanās pie svētku galda un kopīga maltīte nodrošina komunikāciju radu un draugu vidē, palīdz spēcīnāt ģimenes un draugu kopību. Lauka darba dati ļauj pārliecināties, ka svētku maltītes pavada rituāli, kas krievu imigrantu gadījumā ir mantoti gan no krievu tradicionālās kultūras, gan no padomju sadzīves, kā arī pārņemti no somu kultūras. Krievu jauniešu svētku pieredze liecina, ka krievu imigranti Somijā augstu vērtē savas virtuves tradīcijas, tās uztur un arī popularizē mītnes zemes kultūrā. Tas bagātina Somijas gastronomisko pieredzi un rada priekšnoteikumus sekmīgam kultūru dialogam.

Intervijās iegūtie dati ļauj secināt, ka Somijā dzīvojošie krievu jaunieši piedzīvo integrācijas procesu, kam ir raksturīga sevis identificēšana ar abām, t. i., mītnes zemes kultūru un izcelsmes zemes kultūru. Tomēr jaunieši diferencē “krievu” un “somu” svētkus, nereti arī “pareizticīgo” un “luterāņu” svētkus. Turklāt šis nošķirums ir izteikts arī tajos gadījumos, kad svētki ģimenē tiek svinēti pēc abām tradīcijām. Atšķirīgā meklējumu pārsvars pār kopīgā saskatīšanu traucē pārvarēt kultūru robežas un veicina krievu kultūras nošķiršanu no mītnes zemes kultūras. Svētku dalījums pēc kritērija “mūsu” un “viņu” svētki ļauj identificēt kultūru konflikta draudus, ko rada vērtību sadursme. Spilgts piemērs ir Helovīna diena, kuras svinēšanā jaunieši saskata konflikta draudus arī pašā krievu imigrantu kopienā. Konflikta draudi iezīmējas arī Uzvaras dienas gadījumā, kuras svinēšanā ir ideoloģizētas izvēles un “tradīcijas tirānijas” (Martí 2004) iezīmes. Daļa krievu imigrantu 9. maija rituālos saskata savas identitātes marķieri, turpretim jaunieši, kas pauž vienaldzību pret šiem svētkiem, akcentē savu piederību Somijas kultūrai. Apzinoties, ka konflikts atstātu smagas kon-

sekvences krievu imigrantu kopienā, grupu līderi apzināti mēģina rast līdzsvaru starp pretējos vektoros orientētām vērtībām.

Imigrantu kultūras identitātes veidošanās nereti tiek traktēta kā bināra izvēle: ieceļotāji sevi identificē vai nu ar mītnes zemes kultūru, vai arī ar savas etniskās izcelsmes kultūru. Turklāt tiek norādīts uz tieši proporcionālām attiecībām: jo stiprāka piesaiste mītnes zemes kultūrai, jo vājāka saikne ar etniskās izcelsmes kultūru. Šāda pieeja ir kritizēta kā pārlietu vienkāršota, jo starpkultūru attiecību studijas liecina, ka identitātes veidošanās procesā iezīmējas sarežģītāki modeļi (Berry 1980; Berry 1984; Berry 1997; Phinney 1990; Phinney et al. 2001). Svētku kultūra ir komplicēts fenomēns, kas skar vairākus sociālās dzīves līmeņus – etnisko, nacionālo, lokālo un globālo. Somijā dzīvojošo krievu jauniešu piemērs ilustrē daudzslāņainu svētku pieredzi, kurā paralēli vēsturiskās atmiņas (Uzvaras diena) un etnisko pamatvērtību pēctecībai (Mašļeņica) iezīmējas integrācijas (Somijas Neatkarības diena, *Juhannus*), globalizācijas (Ziemassvētki, Lieldienas), komercializācijas (Jaungads) un masu kultūras (Helovīna svinēšana) slānis.

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Social and Cultural Values of Festivities from the Perspective of Russian Youth in Finland

Abstract

The article analyses the views on festivity celebrations of Russian youth living in Finland, emphasising that festivities as an indicator of cultural identity can help to understand the formation of immigrants' identity. Part One of the article explains data collection methods and describes the methodology used in the research. Part Two of the article contains data analysis of qualitative interviews (n=16). This analysis reveals the experience gained by young people when celebrating various secular and religious festivities. Findings on the social and cultural values that young people see in celebrating festivities conclude the article. Russian youth living in Finland recognise that the value of festivities is determined by the role they play in social integration, transfer of traditions and education. The forming of the cultural identity of immigrants is usually regarded as a binary choice: immigrants identify themselves either with the culture of their host country or with the culture of their origin. The study carried out in Finland among Russian immigrants suggests that the process of identity formation is more complex. The interview data lead to the conclusion that young Russian people living in Finland experience an

integration process characterised by identifying themselves with both cultures, i.e. the culture of the host country and that of their country of origin. The example of Russian youth living in Finland illustrates a multi-layered experience of festivities. In parallel with continuing historical memory and ethnic fundamental values, the layer of integration, globalisation, commercialisation and mass culture is becoming more apparent in their experience.

Keywords: festivities, celebration of festivities, social and cultural values, identity, identity formation

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KULTŪRA KĀ VĒRTĪBA UN KULTŪRAS VĒRTĪBAS JAUNIEŠU UZTVERĒ: PĒTĪJUMA REZULTĀTI FORMĀLĀS IZGLĪTĪBAS IESTĀDĒS

Būdamā etniski, vēsturiski, reliģiski, politiski un citādi nosacīta, kultūra ir vispār-cilvēcisku vērtību glabātāja un ģenerētāja – tas nodrošina cilvēces vienotību, indivīdu un nāciju saprašanos, neskatoties uz etniskajām, reliģiskajām u. c. atšķirībām. Mūsdienā Latvijas likumdošanā kultūra tiek uzskatīta par svarīgāko vērtību, kas veido nācijas identitātes kodolu un kam piemīt neierobežots valsts ekonomiskās attīstības potenciāls. Arī izglītības dokumentos kultūra minēta kā nozīmīga vērtība, par kuru izglītības procesā skolēniem jāveido izpratne. Skolas uzdevums, kas definēts izglītības standartos un izglītības politikas dokumentos, ir radīt bērniem un jauniešiem visaptverošu izpratni par tādām vērtībām kā dzīvība, cilvēka cieņa, brīvība, ģimene, laulība, darbs, daba, kultūra, latviešu valoda un Latvijas valsts, veidojot vērtējošu attieksmi un atbildību par sevi un savu rīcību. Veiktā pētījuma par četrpadsmit– astoņpadsmitgadīgo jauniešu kultūras vērtību izpratni rezultāti ļauj ne tikai labāk izprast jauniešu vērtību sistēmu un viņu darbības iemeslus un motivāciju, bet arī raksturot, kā viņi jūtas dažādu kultūru līdzās-pastāvēšanas apstākļos un kā viņi definē savu kultūras piederību, ņemot par pamatu sev nozīmīgās vērtības. Raksta mērķis ir analizēt jauniešu kultūras uztveri un viņu viedokļus par kultūras vērtībām un noteikt, kā jauniešu minētās kultūras vērtības korelē ar politikas plānošanas dokumentos un izglītības standartos minētajām prioritātēm kultūras vērtību apguvē. Informantiem kopumā ir svarīgas gan lokālās, gan reģionālās un nacionālās kultūras vērtības, kuras noteiktas politikas plānošanas dokumentos un izglītības standartos, kā, piemēram, tolerance, līdzdalība, komunikācijas prasme.

Atslēgvārdi: kultūras vērtības, jaunieši, izglītība, politikas plānošanas dokumenti

Ievads

Indivīda, kā arī lielākas vai mazākas kopienas vērtības pastāv un atklājas noteiktas kultūras ietvaros. Kopienas līmenī kultūras vērtības veido savdabīgu nerakstītu likumu kopumu, kas jāievēro, dzīvojot attiecīgajā kopienā (Hofstede 1980; House 2004). Tie ir dzīves pamatprincipi, kas ietekmē to, kā cilvēki uztver procesus un objektus un kā viņi rikojas saskaņā ar saviem uzskatiem (Schwartz 1992). Kaut arī cilvēkam ir universālas motivācijas (piemēram, bioloģiskās un sociālās vajadzības), kas ir kopīgas neatkarīgi no dzīvesvietas un kultūrvides (Schwartz & Sagiv 1995), tomēr vērtības tās variē un pārvērš attieksmē un darbībā atkarībā no individuālām vai kolektīvām interesēm. Ikdienas apstākļos cilvēki ne vienmēr apzinās sev svarīgākās vērtības, tās atklājas viņu darbībā un uzvedībā, nosaka priekšstatus par labo un ļauno, normu un antinormu. Vērtības un kultūra ir jēdzieniski cieši saistīti. Vērtības veido kultūras kodolu. Un pati kultūra (un tās veidojošie komponenti) ir uzskatāma par vērtību, vienlaikus tā veido arī indivīda un sabiedrības vērtību sistēmu, jo cilvēka vērtības lielā mērā ir atkarīgas no konkrētas kultūrvides, kurā viņš mājō.

Kultūras vērtību pētījumos ir sastopamas divas pretējas pieejas – analizēt kultūras vērtības noteiktas valsts ietvaros (Hofstede 2001; Kirkman et al. 2006; Kirkman et al. 2017) vai akcentēt indivīdu kā unikālas vērtību sistēmas nesēju (Triandis 1980; Triandis 1994; Triandis & Gelfand 1998; Lee 2000; Shavitt & Barnes 2020). Kritizējot pieeju par noteiktas valsts ietvaros veidotās kultūras homogenitāti un vienotību, pētnieki piedāvā aizstāt valsti ar kopieni, uzskatot, ka tai piemīt lielāka homogenitāte nekā valstij. Kopienas kultūra balstās kopīgajās atmiņās, simbolos, izjūtās un tradīcijās. Tādējādi tiek pieteikta ideja par to, ka vienotas kultūras vērtības ir raksturīgas noteiktam cilvēku kopumam ar līdzīgiem uzskatiem – tā var būt jebkura lielāka vai mazāka kopiena. Izvēloties vienu no minētajām pieejām pētījuma realizācijai, pastāv draudi nesaskatīt kādu nozīmīgu aspektu, ko nosaka respondentu individuālās vai kopienas īpatnības. Šajā pētījumā tiek pieņemts, ka dažādu indivīdu īpatnības vienas valsts ietvaros var būt ļoti atšķirīgas. Tai pašā laikā valstij ir nozīmīga loma iedzīvotāju

vērtību sistēmas veidošanā – valsts ideoloģiskā, politiskā, sociālā sistēma, kā arī vēsturiskās īpatnības nosaka tās iedzīvotāju kultūras vērtības, sociālo uzvedību, uzskatus, tradīcijas un citas vērtības.

Mūsdienu pētnieki uzskata, ka kultūra ir dinamiska, tā pastāvīgi attīstās, mainās un korelē ar apkārtējo vidi (Hall 2000; Halbert & Chigeza 2015). Savā nesenaajā grāmatā, kas dekonstruē kultūras identitāšu esenciālismu un kopējo ideju par Rietumu/Eiropas/kristiešu kultūru, Entonijs Apiahs (*Appiah*) uzskata kultūru par kosmopolitisku attēlu, kurā katrs elements ir atdalāms no pārējiem. Viņaprāt, kultūras prakses un objekti ir mobili, tie tiecas atdalīties un izplatīties, tādēļ kultūra kļūst daudzveidīga un mainīga ne tikai kopumā, bet katrā tās atsevišķā aspektā (Appiah 2018, 207–208). Tādēļ arī indivīda un kopienas kultūras vērtības, kas tiek apgūtas socializācijas un kultūras attīstības gaitā, strauji mainās un attīstās (Feather 1988).

Analizējot mūsdienu sabiedrības kultūras vērtības, jaunieši tiek uzskatīti par īpaši nozīmīgu grupu, jo viņi veidos sabiedrības nākotni, viņi ir jūtīgi pret sociālajām pārmaiņām, gatavi tās uztvert un mainīties un ir arī sociālo pārmaiņu virzītāji. Tai pašā laikā jaunieši ir viena no sociāli neaizsargātākajām grupām, kuras vērtību sistēma ir pakļauta dažādām ietekmēm, kas ne vienmēr ir pozitīvas un vērstas uz attīstību (Kenway & Bullen 2008; Edwards & Usher 2008; Burbules & Torres 2000). Tādēļ mūsdienu strauji mainīgajā kultūrā ir nepieciešams pievērst īpašu uzmanību bērnu un jauniešu kultūras vērtību sistēmas veidošanai. Lai to darītu mērķtiecīgi, ir svarīgi zināt un izprast jauniešu uzskatus par viņiem nozīmīgākajām kultūras vērtībām. 2018.–2021. gadā tika ieviests Eiropas Komisijas atbalstītais Eiropas Savienības pētniecības un inovācijas programmas “Apvārsnis 2020” projekts “Kultūras mantojums un identitātes nākotnes Eiropā – CHIEF” (*Cultural Heritage and Identities of Europe’s Future*), kura īstenošanā starptautiskajā konsorciā, kas apvienoja zinātniskās institūcijas no deviņām valstīm (Apvienotās Karalistes, Horvātijas, Gruzijas, Turcijas, Spānijas, Slovākijas, Indijas, Vācijas un Latvijas), iesaistījās arī Daugavpils Universitātes Humanitāro un sociālo zinātņu institūta pētnieku grupa. Viens no projekta uzdevumiem bija saistīts ar jauniešu kultūras identitātes

izpēti, veicot intervēšanu formālās izglītības iestādēs un skatot kultūras izglītības situāciju politikas plānošanas dokumentos. Rakstā izmantotas projekta ietvaros apkopotās intervijas, kurās Latvijas jaunieši izsaka viedokli par, viņuprāt, nozīmīgām kultūras vērtībām. Raksta mērķis ir analizēt jauniešu kultūras uztveri un viņu viedokļus par kultūras vērtībām un noteikt, kā jauniešu minētās kultūras vērtības korelē ar politikas plānošanas dokumentos un izglītības standartos minētajām prioritātēm kultūras vērtību apgūvē. Veiktā pētījuma par kultūras vērtību izpratni jauniešu vidē rezultāti ļaus ne tikai labāk izprast jauniešu vērtību sistēmu un viņu darbības iemeslus un motivāciju, bet arī raksturot, kā multikulturālajā un strauji mainīgajā vidē jaunieši definē savu kultūras piederību, ņemot par pamatu sev nozīmīgās vērtības.

Pētījuma metodoloģija

Lauka darbam tika izvēlētas trīs valsts skolas: viena Rīgā, viena Daugavpilī un viena Daugavpils novadā. Visas trīs skolas nodrošina pilnu vidējo izglītību un piedāvā interešu izglītības plašas iespējas. Skolu izvēlē tika ņemts vērā to ģeogrāfiskais novietojums, apdzīvotās vietas ekonomiskā situācija un infrastruktūra, iedzīvotāju skaits un etniskais sastāvs un nolūks bija intervēt jauniešus, kas dzīvo un mācās dažādās sociālajās un kultūras situācijās.

Tika intervēti 60 skolēni no trim Latvijas skolām. Tika veiktas sešdesmit daļēji strukturētas intervijas ar jauniešiem vecumā no 14 līdz 18 gadiem. Informanti tika izvēlēti pēc brīvprātības principa (tas ir, skolēni varēja pieteikties intervijai paši pēc tam, kad intervētājs iepazīstināja klasi ar projekta mērķiem un uzdevumiem, kā arī ar intervijas īpatnībām), ņemot vērā vecuma (katrā skolā tika intervēti četri viena vecuma jaunieši) un dzimuma līdzsvaru (katrā skolā tika intervētas desmit meitenes un desmit zēni). Tika ievērots arī etniskās dažādības princips.

Daļēji strukturēta intervija tika izvēlēta kā piemērotāka pētījumam, jo tā ļauj pētniekiem skatīt situācijas dalībnieku acīm, uztvert viņu intencionalitāti, interpretācijas un atšifrēt nozīmes dažādās sarežģītās situācijās

(Cohen et al. 2000). Respondentiem tika lūgts pašiem izvēlēties sev pseidonīmu, izdomājot tādu, kas intervēšanas laikā šķita viņiem atbilstošs. Jaunieši izvēlējās galvenokārt kādus personvārdus, kas nav viņu vai ģimenes locekļu personvārdi. Tika izvēlēti arī pseidonīmi, kas apzīmē priekšmetus (piemēram, Krēsls, Klavieres), nodarbošanos (piemēram, Peldētājs, Mūziķis), kultūrā un vēsturē nozīmīgas personas (piemēram, Kārlis Markss, Aspazija).

Intervijas tika transkribētas un kodētas latviešu valodā, izmantojot NVivo 12 programmatūru. Kodējot datus, tika izmantota induktīvā metode, kas nozīmē, ka, analizējot intervijas, ir svarīgi koncentrēties tieši uz to tekstu, nepiemērojot nekādus iepriekšējos analītiskus modeļus vai pieņēmumus, kas var būt no teorētiskās literatūras vai citām paradigmām (Charmaz 1996).

Lai izveidotu sākotnējos kodus, divi pētnieki neatkarīgi kodēja triju interviju transkripcijas. Kodi tika salīdzināti, apspriesti un apvienoti sākotnējā kodēšanas kokā ar divu līmeņu kodiem. Pēc sākotnējā kodēšanas koka izveides viens pētnieks turpināja kodēt pārējās intervijas. Interviju tematiskā analīze tika veikta, izmantojot iteratīvu, induktīvu pieeju. Saskaņā ar iepriekš minēto pētījuma mērķi šajā rakstā tiek analizēti tikai tie tematiskie kodi, kas ietver informāciju par jauniešu kultūras vērtību sistēmu un viņu priekšstatiem par piederību Eiropas telpai, valstij, reģionam vai noteiktai vietai.

Kultūras vērtības Latvijas politikas plānošanas dokumentos un izglītības standartos

Mūsdienā Latvijas likumdošanā kultūra tiek uzskatīta par jomu, kurai ir nacionālo savdabību veidojošas un nācijas attīstību veicinošas īpatnības. Latvijas ilgtspējīgās attīstības stratēģijā līdz 2030. gadam, kas par metodi izmanto nacionālo bagātību jeb vērtību pieeju, kultūra tiek uzskatīta par svarīgāko vērtību, kurai ir neierobežotas izmantojamības iespējas: "Latvijas nākotne ir jāveido uz tādu vērtību pamata, kas neprasa fizisko resursu tālāku intensīvu izmantošanu, bet sakņojas ilgtspējas potenciālā. Tieši

kultūra ir viens no resursiem ar neierobežotu ilgspējas potenciālu. Kultūra ietver sevī mantotās, cauri laikiem saglabājušās kultūras vērtības, attīstās un turpina veidot nācijas identitātes kodolu. Tādas vērtības kā radošums, zināšanas, atvērtība jaunajam un tiekšanās uz izcilību vairo ikviena cilvēka un Latvijas kopējo cilvēkkapitāla vērtību” (Latvijas Republikas Saeima 2010). Par nozīmīgu aktualitāti mūsdienā Latvijas un Eiropas politikajā diskursā ir kļuvis kultūras vērtību izmantojums valsts ekonomiskās attīstības sekmēšanai, pārorientēšanās no resursus patērējošās industrijas uz radošo industriju. Ekonomiskās nestabilitātes apstākļos, kad daudzas sociālās grupas jūtas apdraudētas, par resursu ar neierobežotu potenciālu tiek uzskatīta kultūra. Ilgtermiņa plānošanas dokumenti Latvijā tiecas balstīt valsts turpmāko attīstību uz tādu vērtību pamata, kas rada mazāku spiedienu uz fizisko resursu izmantošanu. Šī pieeja izvirza priekšplānā cilvēkkapitāla vērtību un potenciālu un uzsver radošumu, atvērtību jaunajam, toleranci un sadarbību (kas veicina gan kultūras attīstību, gan sociālo kohēziju). Tomēr politikas dokumentos, kuru mērķis ir noteikt kultūras vērtību saglabāšanas un izplatīšanas stratēģijas, ir vērojamas sabiedrības kultūras pratības attīstību kavējošas neskaidrības un pretrunas, tostarp, netiek akcentēta jauniešu kultūras pratības attīstība un viņu loma kultūras vērtību saglabāšanā.

Oficiāli akcentēto kultūras nozīmi un kultūrpolitikas prioritātes Latvijā ir noteikuši dažādi faktori: valsts kultūrvēsturiskās attīstības īpatnības, etniskais sastāvs, ekonomiskais potenciāls u. c. Latvijas valsts kultūrvēsturiskās un socioekonomiskās attīstības īpatnības un prioritātes 21. gadsimtā nosaka pretējus kultūrpolitikas vektorus, kas, būdami savstarpējā mijiedarbībā, nodrošina Latvijas valsts kultūras neatkārtojamību. No vienas puses, tiek akcentētas nacionālās kultūras vērtības un nacionālā identitāte, kuras pamatu veido latviešu etniskā kultūra. No otrās puses, Latvijā tiek deklarēta par valsti ar atvērtu kultūru, kur tiek respektētas visas etniskās kultūras un to vērtības, kā arī par svarīgām tiek uzskatītas Eiropas kultūras pamatvērtības – demokrātiskums, daudzveidība, tolerance un citas. Latvijas politikas plānošanas dokumentos Eiropas identitāte tiek aplūkota vienotā kontekstā ar Latvijas nacionālo identitāti, kā arī

reģionālo un lokālo piederību (Ministru kabinets 2022). Politikas plānošanas dokumentos parādās vārdu savienojums “Latvijas eiropeiskā identitāte”, kas precīzi norāda uz ciešo saikni starp Latvijas un Eiropas kultūras vērtību līdzību. Šajos dokumentos akcentēta dažādu identitātes līmeņu – transnacionālā (Eiropas un globālā), nacionālā, reģionālā un lokālā – ciešā mijiedarbība.

Izglītības politikas dokumenti un mācību standarti zināmā mērā papildina un konkrētīzē politikas plānošanas dokumentus kultūras jomā un norāda, ka Latvijas izglītība lielā mērā balstās uz vērtībizglītības pieeju. Mācību satura vērtību dimensija balstīta Latvijas Republikas Satversmē, Vispārējā cilvēktiesību deklarācijā un Eiropas Cilvēktiesību konvencijā noteiktajās vērtībās (Laganovskis 2019). Valsts izglītības satura centra īstenotajā projektā “Kompetenču pieeja mācību saturā” (Skola2030) ir atrunāts, ka vērtības veido nozīmīgu lietpratības daļu. Tās ir pamats ieradumiem, kas, mērķtiecīgi attīstīti, nostiprinās par tikumiem, citiem vārdiem, par nu jau apgūtām un sev pieņemtām vērtībām. Skolas uzdevums ir bērniem un jauniešiem veidot visaptverošu izpratni par tādām vērtībām kā dzīvība, cilvēka cieņa, brīvība, ģimene, laulība, darbs, daba, kultūra, latviešu valoda un Latvijas valsts, akcentējot vērtējošu attieksmi un atbildību par sevi un savu rīcību. Programmā “Skola2030” tiek uzskaitīti arī svarīgākie tikumi, kas šajā programmā tiek traktēti kā apgūtas un ieadzinātas vērtības. Tie ir šādi: atbildība, centība, drosme, godīgums, gudrība, laipnība, līdzcietība, mērenība, savaldība, solidaritāte, taisnīgums, tolerance. Tomēr tiek norādīts, ka ne vērtības, ne tikumus tieši iemācīt vai ieadzināt nevar, tādēļ pedagogu pienākums un atbildība ir stiprināt ieradumus (Skola2030). Valsts izglītības satura centra vadītājs Guntars Catlaks norāda, ka lietpratība jeb kompetence bez vērtību komponentes nav iedomājama nevienā profesijā, jo svarīgi ir ne vien tas, ko cilvēks zina un prot, bet arī apziņa par savu zināšanu un prasmju ētisku izmantošanu. Kompetenci no zināšanām un prasmēm atšķir mērķis un griba, kas ir balstīta vērtībās (Laganovskis 2019).

Projektā “Kompetenču pieeja mācību saturā” (Skola2030) definētās vērtības pilnībā sakrīt ar Noteikumos par valsts vispārējās vidējās izglīti-

bas standartu un vispārējās vidējās izglītības programmu paraugiem norādītajām vērtībām, kas ir jāattīsta, skolēnam apgūstot vispārējo izglītību. Noteikumos norādīts, ka apgūtās vērtības ir viens no izglītības gala rezultātiem un kļūst par kritēriju noteiktai darbībai – balstoties savās vērtībās un cienot citu vērtības, viņš rūpīgi izsver un izvēlas pasākumus un ikdienas situācijas, kurās iesaistīties un iesaistīt citus, cieņpilni pamatojot savu nostāju, prot atteikties, ja pasākums neatbilst vērtībām, un spēj nepakļauties grupas spiedienam, paliekot saistīts ar tiem, kuriem nepiekrīt. Vērtības un tikumus izkopj, pedagogiem un izglītojamajiem iedzīvinot tikumus savstarpējās attiecībās un pilnveidojot savu vērtību sistēmu. Izglītojamo audzināšanu īsteno mācību stundās, klases vai grupas audzinātāja stundā, ārpusstundu nodarbībās, starpbrīžos, interešu izglītības programmās, dažādos izglītības iestādes organizētajos pasākumos un projektos (izglītības iestādē un ārpus tās), ikdienas sadzīves situācijās, pedagogiem sadarbojoties savstarpēji un ar izglītojamā ģimeni (Ministru kabinets 2019).

Tādējādi Latvijas izglītības politikas dokumentos un mācību standartos kultūra tiek minēta kā viena no vērtībām – blakus dzīvībai, cilvēka cieņai, brīvībai, ģimenei, laulībai, darbam, dabai, latviešu valodai un Latvijas valstij. Tomēr, izprotot kultūru plašāk, visas minētās vērtības var tikt uzskatītas par kultūras izpausmēm. Kultūra plašākā izpratnē tiek izmantota rakstā arī turpmāk. Šo izvēli pamato arī pašu jauniešu uzskati jaunatnā, kas ir kultūra. Jāatzīmē, ka izglītības politikas dokumentos un mācību standartos ir vērojama jēdzienu dažādība, apzīmējot vienādus nojēgumus, piemēram, ar vienādu vai līdzīgu nozīmi tiek minēti vārdi “vērtības”, “ieaudzinātas vērtības”, “tikumi” un citi.

Jauniešu viedokļi par kultūras vērtībām

Definējot kultūru, jaunieši visbiežāk izmanto dažādu kultūras veidu, procesu un fenomenu uzskaitījumu. Katrs respondents, kas izvēlas šādu stratēģiju, min 3 – 5 kultūras fenomenus, kas, viņaprāt, veido kultūru. Visbiežāk tiek minētas tradīcijas, akcentējot to nodošanas svarīgumu.

Savukārt kultūras mantojumu respondenti definē kā tradīciju ievērošanu gadsimtu gaitā. Citi biežāk minēti kultūras veidi vai fenomenī ir cilvēki, valoda, nacionālās vērtības, māksla, literatūra, pilsētas, teātris, reliģija, kino, muzeji, tehnoloģijas, uzvedības normas un citi. Var secināt, ka par kultūru tiek uzskatīts ļoti plašs procesu un parādību loks, kas ir raksturīgs mūsdienām. Savukārt, definējot kultūras mantojumu, respondenti akcentē vēsturisko dimensiju, norādot, ka par kultūras mantojumu var uzskatīt tās vērtības, kuras ir saglabājušās gadsimtu gaitā. Tieši kultūras mantojuma raksturojumā biežāk parādās vārds “vērtības”, tādējādi akcentējot to svarīgumu, kas ir pierādīts un pārbaudīts laika gaitā.

Izpratne par kultūru jauniešiem ir ļoti plaša: “Kultūra – tas ir viss, kas notiek valstī, kādā neteiktā teritorijā. [...] Kultūra ir sabiedrības joma, kur cilvēki un vispār tauta izpauž savu identitāti un savas [...] domas un uzskatus” (Jola, jaunieta, 18 gadi, Daugavpils). “Kultūra, manuprāt, ir viss, kas ir tev apkārt, cilvēki, kuri tevi ietekmē, tava uzvedība, uzskati, ģimenes tradīcijas vai varbūt arī valsts tradīcijas, kuras tu pieņem” (Aga, jaunieta, 16 gadi, Daugavpils). “Kultūrā, manuprāt, ietilpst vispirms jau māksla, literatūra, valoda, tehnoloģijas, tas, kā cilvēki uzvedas, piemēram, noteiktā reģionā. Tā jau arī ir kultūra, manuprāt” (Anna, jaunieta, 17 gadi, Rīga). “Tas varbūt ir kaut kādas darbības kopums, ko cilvēki dara, kas piemīt kaut kādai cilvēku grupai – kā viņi dzīvo, cik viņi ir aktīvi, ko viņi dara savā dzīvē, kādi ir viņu uzskati par dzīvi” (Viktorija, jaunieta, 18 gadi, Daugavpils novads). “Hm.. es nezinu, varbūt tā ir kaut kāda dvēseles attīstība. [...] Kultūra ir mūsu dzīve un mēs saskaramies ar to ikdienā” (Fritz, jaunieta, 17 gadi, Daugavpils). Jaunieši norāda, ka kultūra ir “viss, kas ir apkārt” (Krēsls, jaunieta, 15 gadi, Daugavpils), viņi akcentē, ka kultūru veido visas īpatnības, kas izpaužas gan konkrētas personības uzvedībā, gan apkārtējā vidē. Tomēr ir zīmīgi, ka tad, kad jaunieši runā par kādām kultūras izpausmēm, atbildot uz jautājumiem par viņu apmeklētajiem kultūras pasākumiem, ģimenes kultūras aktualitātēm vai tml., viņi izprot kultūru daudz šaurāk, minot tikai ļoti konkrētus fenomenus un pasākumus, kas ir sabiedrībā atzītas kultūras vērtības.

Par ārkārtīgi svarīgu pieredzi skolas dzīvē jaunieši uzskata veiksmīgas savstarpējās attiecības un labas attiecības ar skolotājiem, kā arī komunikācijas prasmju attīstības iespējas mācību stundās un ārpusstundu pasākumos. Respondenti akcentē, ka veiksmīga komunikācija lielā mērā nodrošina viņu labsajūtu skolā. Tieši komunikācijas prasmes ir tas, kas noderēs turpmākajā dzīvē, savukārt specifiskās zināšanas kādā noteiktā priekšmetā var arī nenoderēt nemaz. Piemēram, astoņpadsmitgadīgais jaunietis, kas mācās pēdējā vidusskolas klasē, šādi atbild uz jautājumu, kas, viņaprāt, ir svarīgākais skolā: “Klasesbiedri, draugi, sarunas ar viņiem, kaut kāds kopīgs darbs, grupu darbs, jo, manuprāt, vidusskolā iegūtās zināšanas ir ne īpaši vajadzīgas dzīvē, bet sociālās zināšanas ir vairāk svarīgas” (Kārlis Markss, jaunietis, 18 gadi, Daugavpils). Savukārt cits skolēns norāda: “Skolā svarīgi ir atrast draugus un būt labās attiecībās ar skolotājiem” (Tofiks, jaunietis, 18 gadi, Daugavpils novads). Pozitīva komunikācija ar draugiem, klasesbiedriem un skolotājiem nodrošina ne tikai sociālo prasmju attīstību, bet arī vispārīgo labsajūtu skolā, kas arī nosaka, cik veiksmīgs ir mācību process, cik lielā mērā jaunieši grib apmeklēt skolu un cik lielā mērā viņi ir motivēti mācīties un apgūt prasmes, kompetences un vērtības. Jaunieši pozitīvi vērtē tās mācību metodes un ārpusstundu pasākumus, kas ir vērsti uz komunikācijas prasmju attīstību, viņi norāda, ka šādu aktivitāšu vajadzētu būt vairāk. Par īpaši svarīgu iespēju tiek uzskatīta komunikācija svešvalodās, jo tas palīdz atbrīvoties no kompleksiem, runājot ar ārzemniekiem, un sniedz papildus iespējas iepazīt citu valstu kultūru. Jaunieši atzīst, ka viņi labprāt izmanto iespēju runāt ar ārzemniekiem, kad tie apciemo skolu, tā viņi attīsta savas starpkultūru komunikācijas prasmes, uzlabo zināšanas svešvalodā un iepazīst citu kultūru īpatnības.

Komunikācijas prasmes veicina tolerances attīstību, ko jaunieši uzskata par ļoti svarīgu. Eiropas un Latvijas politikas plānošanas dokumentos tolerance tiek minēta kā nākotnē nozīmīga vērtība, savukārt Latvijas izglītības politikas dokumentos tolerance tiek definēta kā tikums (tas ir, apgūta un ieaudzināta vērtība). Jaunieši apraksta, ka, kontaktējoties ar dažādiem cilvēkiem, kuri domā un arī izskatās citādi un kuriem ir svarīgas

citas kultūras vērtības, tiek attīstīta tolerance. Viņi raksturo apkārtējo cilvēku kultūras intereses kā ļoti atšķirīgas. Tās ir atkarīgas gan no jauniešu personības psiholoģiskajām īpatnībām (temperaments, raksturs, konkrēta psiholoģiskā situācija), gan no ārējiem faktoriem (skola, ģimene, draugi, dzīvesvieta, masu mediji u. c.). Vispārīgi raksturojot savas kultūras prioritātes, draugu uzskatus un atšķirības, neviens respondents nenorādīja, ka viņam var būt nepieņemama kādas citas kultūras izpausme vai citas dzīves prioritātes, vienīgais izņēmums bija kritisks kādas konkrētas rīcības vai rakstura īpašības novērtējums. Jaunieši akcentēja, ka tieši atšķirības veido cilvēka personību, savukārt personību daudzveidība padara dzīvi spilgtāku un interesantāku, tas sniedz iespēju savstarpēji bagātināties kontaktējoties. Svarīga vērtība, kas nosaka cilvēka laimīgu eksistenci nākotnē, ir spēja, saglabājot personības īpatnības, just vienotību ar apkārtējiem, būt tolerantiem pret citādo: "Cilvēkiem var atrast kaut ko kopīgu un nav jāšķiro savējie un svešie utt. Tas palīdz būt vienotiem" (Yan, jauniešs, 18 gadi, Daugavpils). Jaunieši atzīst, ka jaunākajai paaudzei lielākā mērā piemīt iecietība pret citādo: "Manuprāt, mana paaudze ir mazliet varbūt saprotošāka tādā ziņā, ka skolā es pati personīgi neesmu piedzīvojusi tādu apbižošānu vai huligānismu. Nu huligānismu tādā ziņā, ka apsaukā vai piekauj citus vienaudzus. Es to personīgi neesmu piedzīvojusi. Manuprāt, tā ir mazāka problēma mūsdienās nekā bija iepriekšējai paaudzei, kā es emu dzirdējusi" (Aspazija, jauniešs, 16 gadi, Rīga). Tomēr individuālās atšķirības dažreiz nosaka arī to, ka jaunieši nejūtas pavisam harmoniski, jo sāpīgi izjūt savu atšķirību: "Es smaidu visu laiku. "Ko tu – amerikānis? Ko tu te smaidi?" Un tiešām es sapratu, ka, jā, es atšķirīgs, man nedrīkst smaidīt, jo tā ir pieņemts" (Yan, jauniešs, 18 gadi, Daugavpils).

Raksturojot draugus un klasesbiedrus, jaunieši pauda šķietami pretējus viedokļus, proti, ka viņi ir gan ļoti atšķirīgi, gan arī ļoti līdzīgi. Lielākā daļa respondentu akcentēja, ka visi jaunieši ir atšķirīgi, tas izpaužas ārējā fizioloģiskajā izskatā, ģērbšanās stilā, interešu dažādībā, rakstura īpatnībās u. c. Tomēr bija arī jaunieši, kas norādīja, ka nekādu lielu atšķirību starp viņiem nepastāv, jo viņi visi ir jaunieši un viņiem ir līdzīgi uzskati par dzīvi, intereses, vērtības: "Mēs esam jaunieši, vieni ir vairāk aktīvi, citi ne,

vieniem patīk valoda, citiem tehnoloģijas, bet mēs visi gribam kaut ko darīt, esam jauni un skaisti, gribam kaut ko darīt un darām. Tas ir vissvarīgākais. [...] Viss pārējais – tās ir tikai tādas mazas atšķirības” (Kārlis Markss, jauniešs, 18 gadi, Daugavpils). Lielākās atšķirības tika saskatītas starp jauniešiem un vecākās paaudzes cilvēkiem: “Manuprāt, mūsdienā jaunieši ir [...] ar plašāku skatījumu uz dzīvi. Viņiem nav stereotipu kā, piemēram, pieaugušajiem” (Besa, jauniešs, 15 gadi, Rīga). Paaudžu atšķirības starp vecākiem un jauniešiem nosaka interešu dažādību: “Ļoti maz mana kultūra ir saistīta ar vecāku kultūru” (Kārlis Markss, jauniešs, 18 gadi, Daugavpils). Jaunieši daudz vairāk jūt savu saikni un kopību ar draugiem nekā ar vecākiem. Taču, kaut arī ir jūtama interešu dažādība, tomēr ir vērojama arī cieņpilna attieksme pret visām paaudzēm kopīgajām nacionālajām, etniskajām, lokālajām kultūras vērtībām. Jaunieši apzinās un norāda, ka ir svarīgi saglabāt un nodot turpmākajām paaudzēm kultūras mantojumu, tas ir, tās kultūras vērtības, kuras ir svarīgas iepriekšējām paaudzēm.

Ģimeni un tradīcijas, kas tiek nodotas ģimenē no paaudzes paaudzē, jaunieši uzskata par svarīgu vērtību, kaut arī saskata dažādu paaudžu interešu atšķirības: “Noteikti – [apmeklēju ar vecākiem] teātri, operu, festivālus. Protams, ar vecākiem tu nebrauksi uz Positivus vai kaut ko tādu, tur vairāk ar draugiem, bet ar vecākiem ir vairāk tādi formāli pasākumi. Kaut kāda diža kunga svinības, Latvijas simtgades svinības arī kopā ar vecākiem tika svinētas, Dziesmu svētki” (Astroide, jauniešs, 18 gadi, Rīga). “Mēs parasti svinam svētkus kopā. Bieži vien dodamies kopā gan uz kaut kādiem koncertiem, gan uz muzejiem, bet tagad ar laiku jau, manuprāt, mēs to darām retāk, jo man bieži vien gribas pavadīt laiku vairāk ar draugiem. Tāpēc ne vienmēr sanāk braukt ar ģimeni” (Bauders, jauniešs, 18 gadi, Rīga).

Tieksme darboties, aktivitāte, ko jaunieši uzskata par viņiem raksturīgu īpašību, ir ieradums, kas rada cieņpilnu attieksmi pret darbu un veicina līdzdalību, kas ir svarīgas vērtības un kas tiek akcentētas politikas dokumentos un izglītības standartos. Skolas vecumā līdzdalība visbiežāk izpaužas un aizsākas kā piedalīšanās dažādās kultūras aktivitātēs. Lielākā

daļa intervēto jauniešu ir ļoti aktīvi un ar prieku piedalās dažādās aktivitātēs gan skolā, gan ārpus tās. Dažreiz jaunieši atzīst, ka viņiem nepietiek laika visam, ko viņi gribētu darīt. Īpaši vidusskolēni (16–18 gadi) akcentēja, ka nevar atļauties piedalīties visās aktivitātēs, kur viņi gribētu, tādēļ ka ļoti daudz laika aizņem nodarbības skolā (parasti tās ir līdz pulksten 16.00) un uzdoto mājasdarbu pildīšana. Savas aktīvas līdzdalības motivāciju jauniešiem bija grūti paskaidrot – tā ir viņu dzīves neatņemama sastāvdaļa, ieradums kopš bērnības. Tādējādi var secināt, ka pirmo motivāciju piedalīties kādās aktivitātēs veido ģimene.

Piedalīšanās ārpusskolas kultūras pasākumos jauniešiem notiek gan mērķtiecīgi vairāku gadu garumā, gan spontānas intereses iespaidā – kopā ar draugiem vai ģimenes locekļiem vai pēc viņu ieteikuma. Daudzi respondenti veic kādas mērķtiecīgas kultūras aktivitātes – apmeklē mūzikas, mākslas un sporta skolas, darbojas koros, deju kolektīvos un citos interešu klubos. Šo nodarbošanos respondenti uztvēra kā iespēju, kas sniedz kādas papildus profesionālās prasmes, kuras, iespējams, būs noderīgas nākotnē. Piedalīšanās dažāda veida kolektīvos un interešu skolu apmeklējums ļauj arī pilnveidot dažādas dzīvei noderīgas prasmes un spējas, piemēram, spēju organizēt un pašorganizēties, pilnveidot mērķtiecību, spēju rīkoties stresa situācijās un citas prasmes.

Daži jaunieši par pozitīvu pieredzi un nozīmīgu vērtību uzskata piedalīšanos brīvprātīgajā darbā. Īpaši populārs brīvprātīgais darbs ir Daugavpils novada skolas respondentu vidē. Tas sākas galvenokārt ar brīvprātīgu palīdzību kādiem pašdarbības kolektīviem, kuru darbība jauniešiem bija zināma jau iepriekš. Jaunieši atzīst, ka ir ļoti patīkami palīdzēt pazīstamiem cilvēkiem, kuru darbības uzdevumus un mērķus tu labi saproti un atzīsti tos par sev tuviem. Jaunieši arī stāsta, ka ir izveidota veiksmīga motivācijas sistēma un brīvprātīgā darba uzskaitē konkrētajās organizācijās, kā arī valstī kopumā. Tādējādi var secināt, ka valsts līmenī brīvprātīgais darbs tiek pozicionēts kā svarīgs jauniešu ieradums, kas vēlāk veido vērtību sistēmu, kurā liela nozīme ir darbam un līdzdalībai.

Apzinot jauniešu izpratni par Latvijas kultūras vērtībām un to saglabāšanas un nodošanas nozīmīgumu, tika noskaidrots viņu viedoklis par

nacionālās piederības apzināšanos. Lielākā daļa respondentu atzina savu piederību Latvijas tautai, neatkarīgi no viņu etniskās piederības, kas bija dažāda (visbiežāk tika pārstāvētas tādas nacionālās minoritātes kā krievu, poļu, baltkrievu, lietuviešu), un dzimtās valodas. Visi respondenti, neatkarīgi no viņu etniskās piederības, labi runāja latviski un atzina latviešu valodu un Latvijas kultūru par vērtību. Jaunieši norādīja, ka ir svarīgi saglabāt gan latviešu kultūru, gan etnisko minoritāšu kultūru, tādējādi atzīstot multikulturālismu Latvijā par vērtību. Dažādas latviešu kultūras parādības tiek iepazītas skolas un ārpuskolas pasākumos, ko organizē skolas un klases ietvaros. Savukārt etniskā kultūra tiek iepazīta galvenokārt ģimenē vai attiecīgajā kopienā.

Atbildot uz jautājumu, ko nozīmē būt latvietim, jaunieši akcentēja, ka svarīga ir nacionālā apziņa un Latvijas kultūras vērtību apzināšanās. Nacionālā apziņa paredz vienotības izjūtu un lepnumu par savu valsti un tās kultūru, kas izpaužas ne tikai pasīvi, kā cilvēka apziņas sastāvdaļa, bet arī uzvedībā un darbībā – gan dzīvojot Latvijā, gan ārpus tās. “Ir jālepojas ar tiem cilvēkiem, kas ir uzlabojuši Latviju un padarījuši to zināmāku citur pasaulē” (Bauders, jauniete, 18 gadi, Rīga). “Latvietis apzinās, ka viņš ir latvietis. Viņš apmeklē dažādus kultūras pasākumus. Viņš nebaidās par sevi runāt ne Latvijā, ne citur. Viņš lepojas ar savu valodu [...] viņš pieder Latvijai un zina, ka šis ir viņa mūžīgi īstās mājas, un viņš vienmēr šeit jutīsies labi, pieņemts un saprasts. Tās, ka mēs, latvieši kā tādi, esam maza tauta, mums līdz ar to tā pasaule liekas mazāka. Ja mēs aizbraucam uz kādu citu pilsētu, mēs satiekam kādu radnieku vai draugu pilnīgi negaidīti. Jā, mēs visi esam tādā kopienā” (Anna, jauniete, 17 gadi, Rīga). Viens no svarīgākajiem nacionālās piederības nosacījumiem ir spēja runāt latviešu valodā. Latvietība respondentiem-jauniešiem lielākā mērā asociējas ar nacionālo piederību un nacionālo kultūras vērtību apzināšanos, nevis ar tautību.

Eiropas identitāti un visiem Eiropas iedzīvotājiem kopīgās raksturīgās īpašības jauniešiem ir samērā grūti definēt; bieži vien pirmais, kas nāk prātā, ir ģeogrāfiskā atrašanās: “Vienkārši nāk prātā tā Eiropas daļa kartē” (Dzinis, jaunietis, 14 gadi, Daugavpils novads). Tomēr, vairāk iedziļinoties,

jaunieši atzīst, ka Eiropas kultūras telpā ir saskatāmas kopīgas vērtības (piemēram, tolerance un demokrātiskums). “Par Eiropu runājot, mums ir tolerance. Eiropai ir jābūt tolerantai, jo mūsu laikā tas ir ļoti nozīmīgi” (Sergejs, jaunietis, 16 gadi, Daugavpils novads). “Demokrātiskumam senas saknes Eiropā, jau kopš Senās Romas. Ir svarīgi, ka mēs varam vēlēt, izvēlēties un piedalīties dažādos procesos” (Džentlmenis, jaunietis, 15 gadi, Daugavpils). Secinot, ka Eiropas vērtības ir svarīgas arī Latvijā un viņiem personīgi, jaunieši atzīst savu piederību Eiropai. Svarīgi argumenti piederības pamatojumam ir saistīti gan ar formālajiem rādītājiem (piederība Eiropas savienībai, ģeogrāfiskā atrašanās), gan ar mentālo tuvību. Jauniešiem šķiet nozīmīgi, ka Eiropā ir vienota komunikācijas telpa un cilvēki tajā veiksmīgi sazinās: “Tas noteikti ir tas, ka visi salīdzinoši labi sazinās. Tas, ka viņi var sazināties vieglāk. Manuprāt, tām valstīm, kas ir Eiropā, ir vieglāk sazināties. Tas, ka mēs visi esam salīdzinoši līdzīgi” (Bauders, jauniete, 18 gadi, Rīga). Nosaucot sev svarīgas Eiropas kultūras vērtības, jaunieši min arī populārus arhitektūras pieminekļus, piemēram, Eifeļa torni, Kolizeju, Pizas torni un citus.

Noslēgums

Mūsdienu Latvijas politikas plānošanas dokumentos kultūra tiek uzskatīta par svarīgāko vērtību, kas veido nācijas identitātes kodolu un kurai piemīt neierobežots valsts ekonomiskās attīstības potenciāls. Arī izglītības dokumentos kultūra tiek minēta kā svarīga vērtība, par kuru izglītības procesā skolēniem jāveido izpratne. Latvijas skolām mūsdienās tiek izvirzītas jaunas prasības, lai tās radītu pamatus tādai nākotnes sabiedrībai, kurā cilvēki būtu gatavi pielāgoties mainīgiem darba tirgus apstākļiem, būtu sociāli aktīvi, atbildīgi un pilsoniski, kā arī spētu veicināt valsts konkurētspēju. Lai to sasniegtu, Latvijas izglītības sistēmā tiek ieviestas vērienīgas reformas visos līmeņos, tiek akcentēts kompetenču pieejas svarīgums, kas tieši saistīta ar izglītību kultūras un vērtību jomā. Izglītības politikas dokumentos tiek uzskaitītas nozīmīgākās vērtības, kuras jāapgūst izglītības

procesā. Minētās vērtības ir nesaraujami saistītas ar kultūrvidi, kurā jaunieši dzīvo. Skolas uzdevums, kas definēts izglītības standartos un izglītības politikas dokumentos, ir veidot bērniem un jauniešiem visaptverošu izpratni par tādām vērtībām kā dzīvība, cilvēka cieņa, brīvība, ģimene, laulība, darbs, daba, kultūra, latviešu valoda un Latvijas valsts, veidojot vērtējošu attieksmi un atbildību par sevi un savu rīcību. Kultūra šajā uzskaitījumā ir izdalīta kā atsevišķa vienība, tomēr, izprotot to plašāk, visas minētās vērtības var tikt uzskatītas par kultūras vērtībām.

Jaunieši tiecas skatīt kultūras jēdzienu caur subjektīvo prizmu un akcentē, ka kultūras jēdziena izpratne ir katram cilvēkam atšķirīga, jo ir atšķirīgas vērtības, kuras tiek uzskatītas par svarīgākajām. Lai gan pasaulē eksistē vispāratzītas kultūras vērtības, kā arī katrai valstij ir savas nozīmīgas kultūras vērtības, tomēr katra cilvēka izpratne par to ir subjektīva, viņa dzīves pieredzes un konkrētas dzīves telpas noteikta. Tādējādi jauniešu kultūras vērtību uztverē atklājas zinātnieku definētās tendences, kur svarīgas ir gan cilvēka individuālās īpatnības, gan noteiktas kopienas, valsts un vispārcilvēciskās vērtības.

Vērtību jēdziena izpratne un uztvere jauniešiem atšķiras. Bieži vien, akcentējot kādus sev nozīmīgus kultūras aspektus un fenomenus, jaunieši vārda “vērtības” vietā izmanto kādas aprakstošas konstrukcijas ar vārdiem “svarīgi”, “nozīmīgi”, “interesanti” utt. Vārdu “vērtības” jaunieši nereti attiecina arī uz prasmēm un kompetencēm, kas izglītības politikas dokumentos tiek definētas kā nozīmīgs posms vērtību apgūšanā.

Eiropas kultūras nozīmīgākās vērtības, kas vieno Eiropas iedzīvotājus, pēc jauniešu atziņām, ir daudzveidība, tolerance (iekļaujot cieņpilnu komunikāciju), demokrātija, brīvība un līdzdalība. Daudzveidība un tolerance izpaužas kā daudznacionālā Eiropas iedzīvotāju sastāva cieņpilnas savstarpējās attiecības un kā pozitīva attieksme pret citām pasaules kultūrām. Savukārt demokrātija un brīvība ir Eiropas valstu un Eiropas Savienības oficiālās politikas viennozīmīga dominante, kas ļauj Eiropas iedzīvotājiem brīvi paust savas domas un aizstāvēt savas tiesības. Jauniešiem šķiet svarīga arī šo vērtību vēsturiskā dimensija, viņi min piemērus, kā veidojās Eiropas demokrātija, līdztiesība un citas svarīgākās

vērtības. Jaunieši akcentē, ka eiropietis ir arī nacionālists pozitīvajā šī vārda izpratnē, jo viņš zina un vērtē savas valsts kultūru un rūpējas par savas nācijas kultūras vērtību saglabāšanu. Nacionālā identitāte nav eiropiskās identitātes pretstats, bet gan tās sastāvdaļa. To apliecina arī jauniešu kultūras vērtību izpratne, piemēram, tolerance un daudzveidība, kas, pēc jauniešu uzskatiem, ir raksturīgas Eiropas kultūrai un ieņem augstu vietu arī viņu pašu individuālajā vērtību sistēmā. Lielākoties jaunieši atzīst savu piederību Eiropas kultūrai, tomēr Eiropas kultūru un tās vērtības viņi uztver daudz abstraktākā līmenī nekā nacionālo un etnisko kultūru. Latviskumu, latviešu tautas tradīcijas, dažādus pagātnes un mūsdienu kultūras fenomenus jaunieši atzīst par sev svarīgām nacionālās kultūras vērtībām, kuras ir jā saglabā, nododot tās no paaudzes paaudzē.

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Culture as a Value and Cultural Values in the Perception of Young People: the Results of Research in Formal Educational Settings

Abstract

The values of an individual, as well as of a larger or smaller community, exist and are revealed within the framework of a certain culture. Being ethnically, historically, religiously, politically, and otherwise determined, culture is the custodian and creator of universal human values – it ensures the unity of humanity, and understanding of individuals and nations, despite ethnic, religious, etc. differences. In Latvian policy documents, culture is considered the most important value, which forms the core of the nation's identity and has unlimited potential for the state's economic development. Moreover, in educational documents, culture is mentioned as an important value, an understanding of which should be formed in schoolchildren during the educational process. The school's objective, which is defined in curricula and education policy documents, is to develop a comprehensive understanding among children and young people of such values as life, human dignity, freedom, family, marriage, work, nature, culture, the Latvian language and the Latvian state, developing an appreciative attitude and responsibility for themselves and their actions. The results of the conducted study on the understanding of

cultural values among 14-18-year-olds provide not only for better understanding of the value system of young people and the reasons and motivations for their activities but also describe how young people understand the similarities and differences of different cultures (European, national, ethnic, regional, local), how they feel in the conditions of coexistence of different cultures and how they define their cultural belonging on the basis of values that are important to them. Using the broader understanding of culture as a basis, it can be concluded that local, regional and national cultural values are important for young people. Young people, on the other hand, have a rather abstract understanding of European cultural values. They also cite communication skills, tolerance, and participation as important values of universal human culture.

Keywords: culture, values, young people, education, policy documents

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