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FROM THE EDITOR

Dear Reader,

This is the first issue for 2023 and we hope to be able to publish the next issue in autumn–winter 2023.

The authors are both PhD students and established academics. The articles are a heterogeneous set and cover a number of fields in the humanities and social sciences such as management, economics, economic history, environment and migration. In this issue, we have articles by authors not only from Latvia, but also from Norway, Lithuania, Nigeria and Kyrgyzstan.

A reminder for past and future authors that the journal can be found in the EBSCO Sociology Source Ultimate database. It would be useful for you if you ensure that your university library subscribes to this particular EBSCO database.

We hope you enjoy this issue and are looking forward to the next issue.

Best wishes

Viesturs Pauls Karnups
General Editor

FIGHTING OR ENCOURAGING, BUT NOT IGNORING – DIFFERENT ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION

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Abstract. Current discourse on the tendencies of the migration very often excludes migrants from the normal fabric of society, not just as aliens, but as aliens who represent risk to national security. It frames the key question about the future of the political community as one of a choice for or against migration. It sometimes reproduces the political myth that a homogenous national community or western civilization existed in the past and can be re-established today through the exclusion of migrants who are identified as cultural aliens (Huysmans 2000, 758). This article examines the roots and the reasons of such discourse while examining some recent broadly discussed cases of the migration.

Keywords: Human migration, refugee, war in Ukraine, Syria.

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Introduction

After the Second World War overturned the international order and caused millions of migrants inside the Old Continent, a status of refugee within the international conventions has been established. The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees signed in Geneva in 1951 has been initially designed for the refugees of war, but later geographical limitations were removed. After many decades the Convention still stands, but the time has passed since then and the nature of human migration has changed a lot. It became highly complex, not only social but also economic, political, military issue that affects humans, states and regions.

Migrants and migration may impact political processes in the country or even inter-state relations. The host societies sometimes try to isolate the new-comers at least in the first stage, which may cause different type of crises: social unrest and partition in the society that leads to the governmental crisis or rise of the sense of unity in the recipient country. If migrants are being manipulated and misused as an instrument on the neighbouring country, the response can even cause international tensions. On the other hand, migration may be seen as a positive phenomenon as well: not as destroying societies, but as a factor for positive transformations and economic development happening in any society.

Two major crises that happened in Europe in the 21st century are related to the civil war in Syria and Russian invasion to Ukraine. The scale of the migration flow following the Syrian Civil War was reasonably lesser, but reached 1.5 million of refugees and caused migration crisis in 2015. In comparison with 2015, migration influx of 2022 from Ukraine notably surpassed the first mentioned crisis with the largest number of refugees fleeing the country within 6 months. In Ukraine from the beginning of the armed conflict a total number of 7.5 million Ukrainian refugees have been registered outside of Ukraine as of end of September 2022.

The aim of this article is to define the migration and related terms from the legal, social and political perspectives – the most important definitions are provided and discussed in the first part of this work. Another goal of the analysis is to examine, whether classical formulation of migration as the one, which weakens national tradition and societal homogeneity is still correct. Methodology of this article is based on the recent migration policies and attitudes comparison therefore practical examples from recipient states like from Hungary, Poland and Lithuania will be used: based on official data, legislation, and amendments of immigration laws also taking into account official reports,

statistics and interviews, this article is an attempt to explain the differences between EU member states' and go deeper into the causes of these differences. In other words, this article is an attempt to confirm or neglect Jef Huysmans' insight that migration represents an internal and external danger for the western civilization.

Definitions, distinctions and related problems

Following the Convention, a **refugee** is someone who "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it." Accordingly, the definition of **migrant** usually involves any person who changes his or her country of usual residence not for business nor tourism. In this regard a person who moves into a country generally is defined as an **"emigrant"** from the perspective of the country of departure and an **"immigrant"** from the perspective of the country of arrival.

The immigrants can become **"irregular"** if they enter a country without documentation that acts as proof of identity or their right to enter the country. If a documented migrant overstays after the expiring of the document or does not obey the removal order for repatriation could become irregular as well. **Country of origin** in this context means a country of nationality or of former habitual residence of a person or group of persons who have migrated abroad. **Country of destination** is the one, which is the destination for a migrating person or a group of persons, irrespective of whether they migrate regularly or irregularly.

In the context of the EU acquis the term "**migration**" is mainly used in relation to the immigration of third-country nationals. Here migrants are sometimes divided by societies and law into "desired" and "undesired" since "there is not only one migrant, but many" (Nail 2015, p. 15). According to Kmak, migration law differentiates unofficially three groups of migrants:

- "the Good" – EU citizens and highly qualified third-country nationals desired by the Global North;
- "the Bad" – other migrants working in member states, with EU legislation focused not on securing their rights, but on preventing their entry and effectiveness of their removal;

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- "the Ugly" – encompassing asylum seekers or undocumented migrants, i.e., a thoroughly unwelcome group of visitors, lumped together under one label, shunned by EU countries, which try to deter them by, among others, building physical obstacles at borders and introducing controls on their territory. (Klaus 2017, 87–91)

Definition and understanding of the migration are very closely related to the definition of the boundary and border. So, the **boundary** is defined as an imaginary line that determines the territorial limits of a State. The **border**, specifically, is the separating territory between politically defined boundaries. Since the border is not only a limit of a country, but also a connection point with the neighbours, it consists of crossing points, transit zones, and "no-man's land". The political power realizes itself as sovereignty in that portion of the territory of any country which lies close along the borderline of another country, called **frontier**, more than in other parts. The frontier of the modern states, similar to Roman *limes*, is the subject of the different dimensions of military and civil power.

The priority of protecting the border from the influx of "unwanted" migrants by means of various measures became a priority for many national states. Conceived as an issue of sovereignty, migration therefore now is controlled by the states and perceived as a matter of national security. On the other hand, the modern states manage the migration flows following the **principle of non-refoulement** and the concept of **border management** which contains detection, rescue, interception, screening, interviewing, identification, reception, referral, detention, removal and return procedure.

At this point it must be stressed, that one of the most distinctive differences between definition of **"migrants"** and **"refugees"** is the fact that the latter is defined and protected under the international law: States are obliged to comply with norms of refugee protection and asylum that are defined in both national legislation and international law. In other words, the status of being refugee must be legally accepted by a State: following the 1951 Convention the person, who fled the country and arrived to the new State, should be recognized as a "refugee" if certain conditions are fulfilled. That is, "the State has to protect the person against refoulement, permit the person to remain on the territory and provide access to humane standards of treatment and to a durable solution."[3] However, strategies and policies of some countries still identify the momentum of arrival of migrants, particularly "irregular migrants", as a threat to their national security and refuse them the status of "refugee".

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3   *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees*, https://help.unhcr.org/faq/how-can-we-help-you/asylum-and-refugee-status/

Another source of problem is that the refugees, to pass across borders in order to apply to the asylum procedures, turn to the **smugglers**. The migrant smuggling consists in assisting migrants to enter or stay in a country illegally, for financial or material gain. Smugglers make a profitable business out of migrants' need and/or desire to enter a country and the lack of legal documents to do so. International law requires governments to criminalize migrant smuggling, but not those who are smuggled. Since migrants give their consent to the smuggling venture, mostly due to the lack of regular ways to migrate, they are not considered victims in absolute terms. However, **smuggled migrants** are often put in danger-ous situations by smugglers (such as hazardous sea crossings) and might therefore become victims of other crimes during the smuggling process, including severe human rights violations. ("Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling", n.d.)

Attitude towards migration: cases inside the EU

The *1951 Refugee Convention* and its *1967 Protocol* are the two fundamental documents that obliges and regulates the policies of the States regarding "refugees" and migrants in general requiring the application of the principles of non-refoul-ment, non-discrimination and non-penalisation. Additionally, Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime is aimed "to prevent and combat the smuggling of migrants, as well as to promote cooperation among States Parties to that end, while protecting the rights of smuggled migrants."[4]

Nevertheless, since the 1980s, immigration has been increasingly politicized in the EU countries. In some cases migrants are linked to criminals or "identified as being one of the main factors weakening national tradition and societal homo-geneity"[5]. Politicians don't mind putting additional pressure on the issue provok-ing the sentiments of people and further feeding the discrimination. The result is increased security and control measures that may lead to the dismissal of the humanitarian aspect of exile. This way refugees are becoming a security issue rather than a human-rights issue.

On the other hand, people may accept refugees, even culturally different ones. Governments in this case shift from closed-door policies to the open

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4   The original document of the *Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crimes* https://www.refworld.org/docid/479dee062.html

5   J. Huysmans, op. cit., p. 758.

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door policies under certain circumstances. Further we will analyse, how some selected countries respond to the migration phenomenon in comparison between the Migration Crisis of 2015 and the one of 2022 as a "new phase" of migration.

Hungary – from push-backs to solidarity

One of the large-scale flows of migrants and refugees after World War II took place in 2015 following the Syrian War, where millions of refugees were forced to flee the country mainly to neighbouring Turkey, and Lebanon, targeting the EU, especially Germany by using dangerous routes such as crossing the Mediterranean Sea. (See the map 1)

Map 1. Source: European Commission; International Centre for Migration Policy Development (Map data); International Organization for Migration; Eurostat; UNHCR – Credit: Reuters

An overwhelming majority of the migrants reached the EU by sea, from Turkey to Greece, where most of them applied for asylum. Despite developing migration laws, the EU was completely unprepared for this migrant crisis. Countries that accepted several million refugees were left to handle the situation practically without any real support on the part of the international community.

Hungary has been the first EU member state which migrants entered on their way to the West. The so called "Balkan route" has been used already before for migration, although on a smaller scale: between 2003 and 2012, the number of applications for asylum ranged between 1,600 and 4,600 annually, though usually not exceeding 3,000. The shift began in 2013, which saw 18,900 applications, with 42,700 applications the following year and a record 177,100 applications in 2015 (the actual number of migrants passing through Hungary was most likely at least twice as high since only some of them submitted the applications for asylum officially).[6]

Before 2015 Hungary has been considered as the one, who made considerable efforts to be in line with the standards set by the United Nations (UN) regarding refugees and asylum seekers, including the ratification of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHRC], 2012)[7]. In 2007, Hungary adopted the Law on Asylum which implemented an asylum policy that also incorporated the asylum policies of the EU (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2008). While Hungary did implement the Law on Asylum, its approach to adopting the 1951 Convention in 1989 was less satisfactory (Law-decree 15/1989).

With the gradual increase of the number of asylum seekers, Hungarian authorities modified some migration laws, introducing a list of safe countries of origin and safe third countries of transit, with Serbia and Macedonia on the said list. It was motivated by the fact that between 2013 and 2014, Kosovars constituted the most numerous group of applicants (accounting for 32 % and 50 %, respectively, of all applicants), the number of whom reached 24,700 in 2015. Additionally,

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6   W. Klaus et al. Refugees and asylum seekers in Central-European Countries – reality, politics and the creation of fear in societies. H. Kury, S. Redo (eds). *Refugee Law and Policy. Challenges and Opportunities for Global Civic Education*. Springer International Publishing, forthcoming; B. Nagy. Sharing the Responsibility or Shifting the Focus? The Responses of the EU and the Visegrad Countries to the Post-2015 Arrival of Migrants and Refugees. Budapest: Central European University, 2017, pp. 11–12; B. Nagy. Hungarian Asylum Law and Policy in 2015–2016: Securitization Instead of Loyal Cooperation. *German Law Journal*, 17 (6), 2016, pp. 1035–1039.

7   Hungary has ratified this convention but initially did so under the condition that only applicants from European countries would be accepted. ("Asylum-Seekers and Refugees, a statistical report", n.d.)

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owing to the lists, it was possible to turn away to Serbia all the remaining asylum seekers who came to Hungary via Serbia (""Shifting Immigration Policies" by Anna M. Winslow", n.d.). Though fence on the Hungarian-Slovenian border remained unfinished for fear of violating the Schengen Agreement, full border controls have been resumed.[8]

Following the 2015 migration crisis Hungary revised its migration policy considerably: system could not handle more than 175,000 asylum applications that were submitted in Hungary, with an estimated 64,000 applications presented by Syrian nationals only (Eurostat, 2015). Noticing, that there was little solidarity within the EU at that period, Hungarian government announced that they suspend the Dublin System[9] in order to find another solution to the problem. This pounce was met with a firm reaction from Brussels, but nevertheless Hungarian Parliament decided to go further and pull barbed wire to the border with Serbia on 7th of July, 2015.

The number of asylum applications submitted does not reflect the number of refugees that entered Hungarian borders without any application. Pressured economically and politically, Hungary pursued border control measures. The construction of a fence between Serbia and Hungary was completed in September 2015, while the Croatia-Hungary border fence was finished in October 2015, effectively closing the border between these countries. Following the completion of the Serbia-Hungary fence in September, only 185 asylum seekers were allowed to enter the transit zone in a single day. This action left hundreds more waiting in Serbia with no food, water, or shelter provided to them by either Hungary or Serbia. These actions came shortly after Hungary had allowed refugees to pass through open borders and provided them with transport closer to the Austrian border (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2015)[10].

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8   A. M. Winslow, op. cit., pp. 103–104; A. Kallius, D. Monterescu and P. Kumar Rajaram, op. cit., p. 3.

9   Dublin System – determines which of the countries would be responsible for the asylum application. There are four criterias for identifying the responsible country. 1) The Member state where the family of the asylum applicant lives under asylum seeker status, that is, if the relative approves this unification and is already an asylum seeker (only for spouse or children younger than 18 years). 2) The Member State which granted residence permit or VISA for an applicant 3) The Member State which recorded the fingerprints of the applicant 4) The Member State where applicants have stayed or have been transferred through another state, even though the fingerprints have not been recorded. https://euromedrights.org/members/human-rights-league-ldh/ Human Rights League

10   "The unpredictable behavior of the authorities continued. When the fence between Serbia and Hungary was ready, migrants and refugees from Serbia crossed into Croatia and from there into Hungary. Then, the Hungarian state offered train

In 2015, so-called "transit zones" were created as an integral part of the fences, which are treated as exterritorial areas – the Hungarian government maintains that migrants detained there have not yet crossed the Hungarian border. There were four "transit zones," two on the Serbian border, in Tompa and Roszke. These are the only places where migrants can legally cross the border and apply for asylum. These zones have been equipped with shipping containers, where those who have managed to cross the border are detained for the duration of the accelerated border procedure, which aims to determine whether the application is admissible, i.e., whether they will be allowed to enter Hungarian territory.

Due to dangerous roads used by migrants, S. Bianchini compares the case of the 2015 migration influx to Hungary to the migration of the East Germans towards West Germany up to 1989. According to S. Bianchini, both East Germans and Syrians trying to reach Germany were similar in a sense that both were "seeking freedom, a new chance to live decently and improve their opportunities in peace. In both cases it was about the human future."[11] In fact, the situation in 2015 was even worse as people arriving to Hungary were demanding respect for their human right to live as of East Germans were aspiring to a better life and enjoyment of full freedom.

Hungarian attitude towards Ukrainian refugees in the context of the Ukrainian war was the exact opposite to the 2015 migration crisis. On the one hand, as Coakley notices, "in 2015, Hungary closed its border with Serbia and erected a razor fence to deter people from crossing into the EU via the Balkan route" (Coakley 2022). On the other hand, the same Hungary applied open-door policy for refugees from Ukraine when war started in the neighbouring country. Illustration of this is Beregsurany village of Hungary that supported Orban's anti-migrant policies in 2015 and has acted differently while meeting asylum seekers from Ukraine. In fact, most European countries, especially neighbouring ones, have taken direct and cooperative actions in receiving refugees from Ukraine.

Comparing attitude towards two migration flows one can notice, that in July 2016 Hungarian government passed a law that legalized the so called "push-backs" – the practice of pushing asylum seekers back across borders without due

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services to more than 200,000 of the migrants, without registering them and politely delivering them to the Austrian-Hungarian border, enhancing their walking through it, without a hint of intention to prevent their departure." ("Closing Gates to Refugees: The Causes and Effects of the 2015 "Migration Crisis" on Border Management in Hungary and Poland" 2017)

11   Stefano Bianchini. *Liquid Nationalism and State Partitions in Europe.* Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017.

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process. (Coakley 2022) However, this policy and practice has not been used at all towards migrants from Ukraine in 2022. Moreover, Hungary, which built fencing walls on its border with Serbia against the approaching wave of migrants and refugees in 2015, has factually embraced and supported refugees fleeing the war in Ukraine. On the other hand, Orban's government has been accused of inflating the number of refugees from Ukraine to secure European funds to finance their welfare which may signal the desire to profit rather than help[12]. In any case, in opposition to the harsh policy towards migrants from the Middle East in 2015 (which attracted distrust and accusations), this time Hungary by no doubt has been supportive to the policies of the other EU countries and demonstrated clear solidarity with them and Ukrainians.

Case of Lithuania: spectator, opponent and then – supporter?

Lithuania has seen a slow development in immigration policy, with little response to the 2015 refugee crisis. The country ratified the 1951 Convention in 1997 adopting the Law on Refugee Status (UNHRC, 2011). In 2013, the Lithuanian government moved towards a defined immigration policy and agreed upon a comprehensive set of guidelines regarding immigration, specifically refugees and asylum seekers. ("Shifting Immigration Policies" by Anna M. Winslow", n.d.). Therefore it may be concluded that all in all Lithuania favours an EU immigration strategy. This is demonstrated by the establishment of migrants' accommodation centres, such as the Foreigner's Registration Centre or the Refugees Reception Centre.

It is important to notice, that Lithuania receives a considerably low number of asylum applications, with the government reporting 2,600 applications between 2008 and 2012 (UNHCR, 2011). Since June of 2015, there have only been an estimated 100 asylum applications submitted to the government. In 2009, Lithuania granted international protection to 42 persons of 211 applications, and this number dropped to only 15 of 373 applications in 2010 (UNHCR 2011). This highlights that Lithuania has a significantly low acceptance rate (8 %) of asylum applications – if the government did have a list of safe countries of origin, that number might have been even lower.

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12 "Zoltán Kovács, the government's international spokesperson, once said that Hungary welcomed more than 540,000 people escaping the conflict, whereas Hungarian Helsinki Committee found these statistics misleading and said that arrived refugees crossed the country in order to reach their relatives in other European countries. (Tait 2022)

In response to the 2015 refugee crisis, Lithuania's policies did not seen a dramatic shift in the beginning. The most explicit of Lithuania's responses have been from the parliament, with a law passed on refugee settlement in November of 2015 (Agora Portal, 2015). The parliament amended the Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Nationals, which further defined the rights of asylum seekers and specified resettlement procedures. Prior to the adoption of these amendments, Lithuania had no law regarding the resettlement of refugees from other countries (UNHRC, 2015). This amendment allowed Lithuania to "transpose the EU directives on refugees into national law", which is significant considering the announcement of Lithuania to accept 1,105 refugees over a two-year period (Agora Portal, 2015, para. 1).

In 2021, the first "non-specific" migration crisis in Europe following the "plane crisis" happened after Belarussian authorities decided to ground a plane flying from Athens to Vilnius in Minsk due to a faked bomb alarm on board. Following this incident Belarus has faced sanctions by Western and European countries, after which, Belarus' President Lukashenko reacted by introducing a new instrument of the hybrid warfare in the region: delivery of the people from the Middle East to the external EU and NATO borders. Over 4,000 migrants, mostly from the Middle East and Africa, were misled and then forced to cross into Lithuania from Belarus in July 2021, but another 8,000 have been turned away since August 2021[13].

According to Frontex data, Iraq was the main country of origin for migrants detected crossing Lithuanian, Polish or Latvian border from Belarus. There were smaller numbers from Afghanistan and Syria, as well as other countries. The vast majority of them arrived at Minsk – the capital of Belarus – by air, and then travelled: in most of the cases – with the assistance or threatening from Belarussian authorities.[14] The European Commission has formally accused Belarus of luring migrants to Minsk with the false promise of easy entry to the EU. President Lukashenko admitted to the BBC that it was "possible" that his country had helped migrants into the EU, but he denied inviting them to Belarus.

Thus, the migration crisis that happened in 2021 on a Belarus / Lithuania border has a background that clearly differs from the 2015 crisis in Hungary – irregular immigrants were to cross the border since the Belarusian government

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13   LRT English, Lithuanian volunteer rescuing irregular migrants: 'I'm told I'm harming my country' – opinion.
https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1668034/lithuanian-volunteer-rescuing-irregular-migrants-i-m-told-i-m-harming-my-country-opinion

14   BBC News. "Belarus Border Crisis: How are migrants getting there?", by Reality Check 26.11.2021. Accessed on 18.01.2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/59233244

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contributed a lot: initiated visa free entry to the country, organized additional air flights to Minsk and transportation to the border, facilitated illegal border crossing. As a consequence, many of these people became victims of the regime – they were first tricked into Belarus and then had to spend days in forests, wandering on foot in freezing cold and with no food.

Called upon the Government to undertake all possible measures, on 13th of July the Parliament of the Lithuanian Republic adopted Resolution No. XIV-505 entitled "On countering hybrid aggression". In August 2021 Parliament amended the laws to state that all people entering the territory can be directly returned to the border, without examination of an application for international protection. In other words, Lithuania, as a country that has never faced a migration influx, declared a state of emergency and decided to secure its borders and national security by factually applying the Orban's anti-migrant policy and the push-backs (MSF, 2021). Nongovernmental organizations organized massive support campaign to ease the life of the forcefully arriving to the border people, but Lithuania's official policy has been harsh (though generally recognized as the only possible): to push migrants back into Belarus and only accept asylum applications at the embassy in Minsk and official border checkpoints[15].

Amendments to the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens raised compliance since the response to the crisis may challenge some core EU laws such as Schengen Agreement and Dublin Principles. The legalized "push-backs" by some experts are considered as hostile behaviour that may even contradict to 1951 Convention. Nevertheless, L. Kasčiūnas, chairman of the parliamentary Committee on National Security and Defence, explained that amendments on the legislation are aimed to make Lithuania unattractive to irregular migrants, as well as to prevent them from leaving their accommodation centres and travelling freely to Western Europe.[16]

Another U-turn happened then Lithuania has been faced with the challenge of Ukrainian, Belorussian and Russian migrants running from war in Ukraine and related sanctions also political decisions of Russia and Belarus. Lithuania, a country with a population of 3 million, first accepted proportionally huge number of Belarusians fleeing the country in reaction to the Lukashenko's violence and then Ukrainians running from Russian atrocities in the occupied territories.

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15 Worth to notice, that very soon Poland and Latvia adopted the positions of solidarity and cooperation to counterattack against a hybrid warfare in a similar way as Lithuania.

16 LRT News English, "Lithuanian parliament allows restricting migrants' movement for up to a year". https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1570850/lithuanian-parliament-allows-restricting-migrants-movement-for-up-to-a-year

In relation to Ukrainians, reaching Lithuania from Ukraine was possible by crossing the border and registering in Poland. All Ukrainians were allowed to apply for temporary residence permits in Lithuania in one of the seven registration centres.

Moreover, on 4th of April 2022, the Lithuanian government has announced that persons fleeing the war in Ukraine who are granted temporary protection in Lithuania will be exempted from language requirements for certain jobs. The EU resolution of temporary protection lasts for one year and can be extended for one more year if necessary according to the Ministry of Social Insurance and Labour.[17] For the refugees from Ukraine it became possible to apply for a residence permit or national visa in Lithuania subject to the fast-track, also to benefit from free assistance related to education, psychological support, food aid, material aid, social services, child care and other services[18]. Moreover, it is possible for residents in Lithuania to offer a ride or accommodation to the Ukrainian refugees via https://stipruskartu.lt/. By 01 August 2022, 10.119 of people offered their flats to the refugees and 5009 to ride from the borders.[19]. According to the latest data of the UNHCR, there are 60,755 refugees from Ukraine in Lithuania registered for Temporary Protection. This way from being practically non-engaged in 2015 crisis (then refugees were fleeing Syrian Civil war) and continuing with the push-backs of migrants coming via Belarus in 2021, Lithuania finished up of demonstrating strong solidarity with Ukrainians in 2022. Knowing the context and the background of the arriving people and country of their origin was a crucial factor of this shift.

Changing attitude of Poland

The year 2015 marked the beginning of increased tensions related to the reception of asylum seekers also in Poland even though the country has not been affected by the influx of refugees from the south of Europe. Admittedly, the number of asylum seekers grew consistently, but only once, in 2013, did it exceed 15,000. In 2015–2016, it remained stable at slightly over 12,000 individuals, most of whom were Chechens, Ukrainians, Georgians, and Tajiks.

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17   LRT English, Lithuania Exempts From Language Requirements Ukrainian Refugees Wishing to Get Employed. https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/lithuania-exempts-from-language-requirements-ukrainian-refugees-wishing-to-get-employed/

18   Information for a war refugee from Ukraine. https://migracija.lrv.lt/uploads/migracija/documents/files/info%20ua_new_ENG(1).pdf

19   Assistance to war refugees from Ukraine. https://stipruskartu.lt/

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Despite the ongoing conflict in Donbas in 2014, only 4,300 Ukrainians applied for international protection in Poland[20]. On the other hand, large numbers of people got refused entry on the grounds of incomplete documents: in 2015 on the Belarusian border 3.399 refusals were issued to Russian citizens, in 2016 the number increased to 74.391.[21]

As of 2014, the number of Ukrainians in Poland had increased several-fold, reaching around a million in 2016.[22] However, the influx of asylum seekers from Ukraine to Poland was insignificant in the beginning because there existed many legal channels of migration. Besides that, most of the Ukrainians who arrived did not come from the regions affected by the conflict (thus, were not eligible for asylum status), nor did the Polish government offer them any exceptional integration support. Having arrived, the individuals were left mostly to their own devices and subject to laws applied to economic migrants.

The first half of 2017 even saw some restrictions in receiving asylum applications in Terespol and therefore new anti-terrorist bill has been issued. Based on it, any person without Polish citizenship was deemed suspicious and subject to unlimited surveillance, e.g., in the form of phone tapping.[23] As a consequence, the number of asylum applications dropped by 81 % in comparison with the respective period in 2016. Only 382 applications were received, covering 1,214 individuals

20   W. Klaus et al., op. cit.; M. Pachocka. The Eastern Partnership in Times of the Migrant and Refugee Crisis in the European Union. C. E. Pacheco Amaral, V. Cucerescu, G. Gabrichidze, I. Horga, A. Kruglashov, E. Latoszek and M. Pachocka. *EU Association Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine: Through Cooperation Towards Integration.* Chişinău-Tbilisi-Chernivtsi: Tipografia "Print-Caro", 2017, p. 25.

21   Many refugees made multiple attempts to submit the application – with one reported record holder covering the distance from Brest (in Belarus) to Terespol (in Poland) over 60 times. Large part of them finally succeeded in entering Poland after their applications were eventually accepted, which raised a question if they should have been admitted in the first place. See A. Chrzanowska et al. *At the border. Report on monitoring of access to the procedure for granting international protection at border crossings in Terespol, Medyka, and Warszawa-Okęcie Airport.* Warsaw: Association for Legal Intervention, 2016, pp. 35–45. https://interwencjaprawna.pl/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/at-the-border.pdf

22   It is difficult to quote the exact number since Poland lacks credible instruments to count migrants living in our country. See: P. Kaczmarczyk. 'Polska jako kraj emigracji i imigracji' [Poland as an emigration and immigration country]. P. Kaczmarczyk (ed). *Mobilność i migracje w dobie transformacji. Wyzwania metodologiczne* [Mobility and migration in the time of transformation. Methodological challenges]. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2011.

23   W. Klaus et al., op.cit.; W. Klaus. Security First – New Right-Wing Government in Poland and its Policy Towards Immigrants and Refugees. *Surveillance and Society*, 15 (3/4), 2017, pp. 524–526.

(in 2016, there were 1,979 applications for 5,566 people), which means that only 2–3 families were allowed to enter Poland daily. Altogether, in the whole country, there was a 60 % drop in the number of received asylum applications.[24]

The intensification of war since February 2022, direct attacks against Ukraine's civil infrastructure objects and general condemnation of the Russia's aggressive policy determined new flow of people to Poland. The increase of fleeing people has been very sudden: if in the first weeks of the war in Ukraine the number of refugees was more than half a million, it has exceeded 4.5 million within one month after the beginning of the war. Within 6 months the number skyrocketed to 10 million of refugees who crossed borders from Ukraine to Poland which has a population of approximately 41 million. According to the latest data of the UNHCR as of 3 August 2022, 5.1 million of individual refugees crossed Polish border in total.

As experts notice, among people fleeing the war in Ukraine were other nationals who at the beginning of the invasion faced difficulties crossing borders: "Ukraine has long been a destination for students and immigrants from around the world. According to government data from 2020, 80.000 international students were in the country, with the largest groups from India, Morocco, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Nigeria. These students, and people from numerous countries who immigrated to Ukraine for work, now find themselves desperately trying to get out of a war zone."[25] Nonetheless, reacting to the dramatically increased number of people running from war, the Government of Poland has announced that all non-Ukrainians who were living in Ukraine before the war now were able to register online to apply for temporary protection.

The political component of this decision included the provisions related to the so-called Polish card – not a passport, but a document confirming the foreigner's belonging to the *Polish* nation. Exploring migration issue for the political purposes has not been a novelty in Poland – after the Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki has said he is protecting "holy Polish territory" during the Belarus regime initiated and supported migration crisis in August 2021, many analysts noticed the right-wing government playing the anti-immigration card that helped

24   *Biuletyn statystyczny Straży Granicznej za I półrocze 2017 r*. [Border Guards Statistical Bulletin for the 1st half of 2017], p. 8. http://strazgraniczna.pl/download/1/14456/bieltynIpolrocze2017.pdf

25   Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: Unequal treatment foreigners attempting flee. Access on 04/04/2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/04/ukraine-unequal-treatment-foreigners-attempting-flee

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it win in 2015[26]. Thus, following the governmental decision, foreigners that possess the Polish-card, including family members of Ukrainian residents who do not hold Ukrainian citizenship and are not spouses of Ukrainian nationals or close family members of a Ukrainian citizen holding a Polish card could get a temporary protection and stay in Poland until March 4, 2023. ("Poland: Foreigners Living in Ukraine Before the War Can Now Apply Online for Temporary Protection – SchengenVisaInfo.com" 2022). With 3.5 million of people reaching Poland in few first months of war in Ukraine, in the past sceptical Poland became the country of blue and yellow flags.

Conclusions

Motives for movement vary from war in the first place, followed by discrimination, human rights violations, economic and political instability, racism, inequality and other factors. Nevertheless, since the end of the Second World War, the international migration has changed in character and direction. While for centuries Europeans have been moving outward and settling in lands elsewhere on the globe, these patterns were partly reversed in the second half of the twentieth century. Together with rising of the modern nation-state, the rising political oppression, genocides, poverty, wars, ethnic cleansing, and violence millions of people are forced to flee their countries of origin. In this context the European Union as a free trade and migration zone has emerged as a major global migration destination (Haas, Castles, and Miller 2020, p. 102).

Hungary, Lithuania and Poland provide valuable insight on how different nations inside the EU react towards migrants – different flows of migrants are treated differently as perception of migrants varies from treating them as a "weapon" that is used against the West by the criminal regimes to the people that must be supported and accommodated as refugees of wars. Treating migrants differently countries respond with the acceptance and effective integration programs or by pushing them back, providing "transit corridors" or letting to escape from the detention camps. Reaction depends on several factors: wealthier, more appealing member states usually maintain a willingness to accept refugees, but believe that the burden should be shared proportionally throughout the EU. Other countries often voice their frustration, even if it means singling themselves out from the other EU member states: Hungary, Poland and the Baltic States

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26   Losing steam, Polish government plays immigration card. EURACTIV.com with AFP, 30/08 2021. Losing steam, Polish government plays immigration card – EURACTIV.com

demonstrated that there are those who are perceived as "strangers" that cause a threat and therefore are far from welcomed on the state level. However, this did not hinder them from accepting refugees from Ukraine without complaints and with solidarity – people dying in Ukraine are met as "same Europeans".

To understand countries' attitudes towards the migration, geopolitical circumstances, cultural ties and historical relationship between country of destination, the cause party (which is often the aggressive country in the neighbourhood) and the country of origin must be analysed. As for instance, even though Polish-Ukrainian relations had many traumatic events in their historical past, full independence of Ukraine remains crucial for Poland's security – this circumstance and the aggressive Russian policy in the whole Central Eastern Europe region are they key while explaining the reasons of the enormous support to the refugees from Ukraine since Russia's military invasion. Similarities and proximities in culture, linguistics and history of the common statehood also play a positive role. On the other hand, the anti-Muslim sentiment – Islamophobia that ties all Middle Eastern men to "terrorism" is an important factor while explaining just the opposite attitudes towards the migration.

Another important reason shifting the policy from one extreme to another might be the internal political events in the country. For example, the events in Poland coincided with the parliamentary elections, and the issue of migrants became one of the main points of the electoral agenda of 2015 (some politicians, although without success tried to actualize the issue in Lithuania before the elections in 2016). Displaying a negative attitude toward refugees and migration politicians hope to win the elections and form the governments, therefore bid on negative campaigns, intimidating the public with images of "Islamic terrorists" and diseases spread by refugees. Later governments may establish the anti-immigrant rhetoric as the main instrument of communication, followed by changes in law that increases the control of services over foreigners.

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IDEOLOGY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LATVIAN CO-OPERATIVES FROM THE 19TH CENTURY TO 1934[1]

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Abstract. In this paper I will examine the ideology or the basic ideas upon which the co-operative movement in Latvia developed from its beginnings to 1934. The notion of co-operatives in Latvia entered mainly via literary sources in the early 19th Century. In particular, the translation into Latvian of the works of such people as the social reformist Heinrich Zschokke, the social reformer Johann Friedrich Oberlin and others. The ideas of the German co-operators Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch and Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen also had a lasting impact on the development of Latvian co-operatives from the second half of the 19th Century. During the interwar period of Latvian independence, such Latvian writers as Vilis Siliņš and Klāvs Lorencs, who had gained their experience of co-operatives abroad, were influential in the development of Latvian co-operatives in the 1920s. In addition, many books and pamphlets on co-operation were translated into Latvian and published during this period. These included the writings of Charles Gide from France, Johann Friedrich Schär and D'Henry Faucherre from Switzerland, Albin Johansson and Anders Hedberg from Sweden and Emma Freundlich from Austria, as well as others. Many new co-operative ideas were brought back to Latvia after Latvian participation at meetings of the International Co-operative Alliance and similar organisations, as well as attendance by Latvian co-operators at

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the International Co-operative Summer School held by the International Co-operative Alliance. After the coup d'état in 1934, the co-operative movement became an instrument of the state and fulfilled the instructions from the state. In general terms, it can said that the intellectual impulses from Western Europe motivated and activated the formation and development the Latvian co-operative movement, especially in the interwar period to 1934.

Keywords: Latvia, co-operatives ideology, International Co-operative Alliance.

Introduction

The co-operative movement in Latvia had a long history beginning in the 19th Century. In independent Latvia, it flourished from 1918 to 1934. The idea of a voluntary, democratic, and independent movement in a democratic and sovereign Latvia resonated with Latvians, especially in rural areas. The creation of the authoritarian state in 1934 took away self-initiative, democracy, and independence, which are the cornerstones of the co-operative movement.

The notion of co-operatives in Latvia entered mainly via literary sources in the early 19th century. In particular, the translation into Latvian of the works of such people as the social reformist Heinrich Zschokke, the social reformer Johann Friedrich Oberlin and others. The ideas of the German co-operators Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch and Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen also had a lasting impact on the development of Latvian co-operatives from the second half of the 19th century.

During the interwar period of Latvian independence, such Latvian writers as Vilis Siliņš and Klāvs Lorencs, who had gained their experience of co-operatives abroad, were influential in the development of Latvian co-operatives in the 1920s. In addition, many books and pamphlets on co-operation were translated into Latvian and published during this period. These included the writings of Charles Gide from France, Johann Friedrich Schär and D'Henry Faucherre from Switzerland, Albin Johansson and Anders Hedberg from Sweden and Emma Freundlich from Austria, as well as others. Many new co-operative ideas were also brought back to Latvia after Latvian participation at meetings of the International Co-operative Alliance and similar organisations, as well as attendance by Latvian co-operators at the International Co-operative Summer School held by the International Co-operative Alliance.

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The beginnings: 19th century to 1918

There were a number of ideological currents which influenced the birth of the co-operative movement in Latvia. The 19th century was an age of a modernisation and new initiatives in the territory of Latvia. Former serfs became free farmers, the division between privileged and unprivileged people was gradually weakened through implementation of equal rights for all social classes (emancipation). An important part of the modernisation was the Latvian national movement (the "National Awakening") and the emergence of the Latvian nation. Under new economic and social circumstances, Latvian farmers gained new self-confidence. Latvians turned from an ethnic community (ethnos) into a fully-fledged nation.

During the first half of the 19th century, there was an increase in the amount of information that was published in Latvian language – more diverse secular literature was available, as well as the first newspapers. A turning point for Latvians was the Revolution of 1905, which initially gained extensive support among Latvians. The revolution helped to formulate the interests of Latvians. The principal demands of Latvians were, amongst other things, agrarian reform and thus the elimination of the power of the German landed nobility. The harsh repression of the rebellion and the failure of the 1905 revolution, nevertheless facilitated political debates and the consolidation of various political directions in Latvia.

The ideas of self-help, mutual aid and co-operation were early brought to Latvia from abroad. Heinrich Zschokke's[3] famous co-operative novel *Das Goldmacherdorf* (The Goldmakers' Village or in Latvian *Ciems, kur zeltu taisa*) was translated into Latvian and published in 1830.[4] It promotes collaboration and cooperation and a restrained moral way of life. The book was translated and localised from the German by the Reverend Lundberg of the Biržu and Sala congregation. Lundberg's localisation allowed Latvian peasants to enter a new world of ideas. These are ideas regarding individual actions and co-operation or mutual help ideas. The translated story, vividly depicts the peasant's current poor status, as well as providing a vision of a future better life.

The translation was enthusiastically supported by Garlieb Merkel[5], who even corresponded directly with Zschokke regarding the book, as well as facilitating its

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3　Heinrich Zschokke was a German, later Swiss, author and reformer. Most of his life was spent, and most of his reputation earned, in Switzerland.

4　For detailed analysis of the book and its impact on the Latvian co-operative movement see Balodis, E. (1930), pp. 77–81.

5　Garlieb Helwig Merkel was a Baltic German writer and activist and an early Lettophile. He is most famed for his book about the Latvians, published in 1796,

publication and distribution.[6] Advanced subscription was opened in the newspapers "Provinzialblatt für Kur-, Liv- und Esthland" No. 48, 50. (1829) and "Latviešu Avīzes" No. 49 (1829); No. 2 (1830). By the time it was released to bookshops some 900 subscriptions were received.

Another important influence at this time were the writings of Johann Friedrich Oberlin[7], and a book about his activities and achievements was translated into Latvian and published in 1836, as well several articles about him appeared in the Latvian newspapers at that time.[8] Interestingly, the great English social reformer Robert Owen, was also influenced by Oberlin's work and ideas during his grand tour through France and Switzerland en route to the Congress of Europe at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1817.[9] Thus, both Latvians and some pioneers of British co-operation received impulses from one and the same source.

Ultimately however, it was the ideas of the German co-operators Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch[10] and Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen[11], which had a lasting impact on the development of Latvian co-operatives from the second half of the 19th Century, particularly Schulze-Delitzsch. In Latvia, the cooperative system which gained a foothold already in the late 19th century was essentially associated with were credit co-operatives (also referred to as savings and loan societies). A basic distinction could be made between urban cooperative credit institutions (Schulze-Delitzsch type) and rural savings and loan societies (Raiffeisen type).[12] Schulze-Delitzsch and Raiffeisen both established clear and binding rules for their cooperatives covering (1) membership, (2) operating capital, (3) the amount, term, and security of the loans, (4) interest rates, (5) dividends and paid-in shares,

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describing in the darkest terms the life of the Latvian peasantry and the atrocities of the Baltic German landowners and calling upon the Imperial Russian government to intervene and ameliorate the lot of the Latvians.

6   Balodis, E. (1930), pp. 82–86.

7   Johann Friedrich Oberlin was a Lutheran pastor and philanthropist, who dedicated his life to improving living conditions in his poor parishes in what is now the Alsatian region of France. He provided his parishioners with educational and economic opportunities in addition to spiritual guidance.

8   Balodis, E. (1930), pp. 72–74.

9   For a detailed examination of European influences on Robert Owen see Drolet, M. & Frobert, L. (2021), 175–190.

10   Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch promoted the co-operative idea in the area of small and medium-sized handicraft business. He also drafted the first law on cooperatives, which was passed by the Prussian National Assembly in 1867.

11   Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen, initiated mainly cooperative self-help institutions based on charitable aid for the poorer rural population.

12   For a detailed examination see Aschhoff G. (1982), pp. 19–41.

and (6) reserve funds, entry fees, and annual contributions. While Raiffeisen founded credit unions solely on the mutual liability of members and the accumulation of a reserve fund, Schulze-Delitzsch insisted on capital participation. In most other respects they independently arrived at similar rules.

In 1862, German artisans in Riga started the credit co-operative *Der Vorschusskasse für Handvverker zu Riga*.[13] This was a society of the Schulze-Delitzsch type and its rules[14] were written in accordance with the *Statut des Vorschussvereins zu Delitzsch* as published in Schulze-Delitzsch's book *Assoziationsbuch für deutsche Handwerker und Arbeiter*, 1853.[15] It was not until the 1880s did articles appear in the Latvian Press suggesting the Raiffeisen type as well, but the Raiffeisen type never gained popularity in Latvia. At the beginning of the First World War there were more than 200 credit co-operatives in Latvia and almost all of them were of the Schulze-Delitzsch type.[16]

Latvian Co-operatives 1918–1934

Although Latvia declared its independence on 18 November 1918, it was only in the second half of 1919 that the National government had stabilised. Latvia's economic situation at the end of 1919 and the beginning of 1920 was unenviable. Industry had collapsed, with buildings empty of machinery and other assets that had been evacuated to Russia in 1915.[17] The land was ruined and the population scattered. "Independence was proclaimed [..] with ruined industries, empty coffers and plundered rural economies."[18] There were major shortages of essential goods, which gave rise to the rapid expansion of black market speculators. However, in this situation cooperatives were able to provide a positive contribution to the economic recovery of the new state.

During the interwar period the Latvian co-operative movement was developing under influence of the co-operative ideologies and experiences of other, primarily Western, countries. A number of people, who were compelled to become political emigrants during the Tsarist regime, had made use of this time to study the co-operative movement abroad, and they now returned to Latvia. Such

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13 It was the first officially registered credit co-operative in Latvia.

14 For the full text of the rules see Balodis, E. (1928), pp. 38–46.

15 Balodis, E. (1928), p. 47.

16 Balodis, E. (1937), p. 4.

17 *The Latvian Economist* (1923), p. 159.

18 Hiden, J. & Salmon, P. (1991), p. 77.

Latvian writers as Vilis Siliņš and Klāvs Lorencs, who had gained their experience of co-operatives abroad, were influential in the development of Latvian co-operatives in the 1920s.

Vilis Siliņš (1879–1935) participated in the 1905 revolution and after its defeat in early 1906 went into exile to Finland, later to Switzerland. While in exile he studied the co-operative movements of Finland and Switzerland, as well as other countries. After 1920, he was a member of the Governing Council of the People's Bank of Latvia (*Tautas banka*), which was the bank founded by Latvian co-operatives. In the 1920s and early 1930s, Siliņš was involved in developing co-operation, being one of the leaders of the co-operative movement in Latvia. He edited the co-operative journal *Kopdarbība*, was a co-founder of the Union "Konsums" and up to 1931 head of its co-operation division and was a member of the Central Committee of the International Cooperation Alliance, as well as holding a number of other positions in the co-operative movement.

Klāvs Lorencs (1885–1971) was a Latvian social democratic politician and an influential activist within the co-operative movement in Latvia. Lorencs also participated in the 1905 revolution and after its defeat in early 1906 was arrested and exiled to Siberia, from which he escaped, ultimately working in Moscow in the co-operative field. He returned to Latvia in 1920. He was elected to all four *Saeimas* (parliament) pre-1935 and multiple times to the Rīga City Council[19], as well as being a Minister for Labour in the then government for a short time (1923). He was involved in the development of the co-operative movement in Latvia, especially consumer co-operatives and, as well as being the chairman of the Union of Latvian Consumer Co-operatives, he was the editor of their journal *Kooperators*.

In addition, many books and pamphlets on co-operation were translated into Latvian and published during this period. These included the writings of Charles Gide[20] from France, Johann Friedrich Schär[21] and D'Henry Faucherre[22]

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19 Lorencs was influential in the relocation of zeppelin hangers to become the iconic Riga Central Market.

20 Charles Gide (1847–1932) was a French economist and historian of economic thought. Gide was a champion of the cooperative philosophy, including both agricultural and consumers' cooperatives, and his book, *Consumers' Co-operative Societies*, which was published first in French in 1904, and in Latvian in 1922 (under the title *Kooperācija*), is a classic of co-operative economics.

21 Johann Friedrich Schär (1846–1924) was a Swiss educator and economist. He is considered a pioneer of the Swiss cooperative movement.

22 D'Henry Faucherre, 1941. Fifty years of activity The Co-operative Union of Switzerland (1890–1940). *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics*, 17 (1), January. Wiley Blackwell, pp. 12–23.

from Switzerland, Albin Johansson[23] and Anders Hedberg[24] from Sweden and Emma Freundlich[25] from Austria, as well as others.

The central co-operative organisations of the three Baltic States started holding joint conferences in 1924. Such conferences took place in Riga (1924), Kaunas (1928), Tallinn (1929), Riga (1933) and Klaipeda (1935).[26] At these conferences were discussed such questions as educational work, exchange of price information, and extension of cooperation in various spheres. As a result of the 1928 meeting, a Baltic Union was formed, to act as centre of information and publicity, collector of statistics, and organiser of studies of various matters of co-operative interest.

The Central Union *Konzums* and the Union of Latvian Consumer Co-operative Societies were members of the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA)[27] and Latvian representatives participated in the Congresses of 1924 (Ghent), 1927 (Stockholm) and 1930 (Vienna). Vilis Siliņš represented Latvia on the Central Committee of the Alliance. Beginning in 1921, the Alliance held an annual international cooperative school at which economists, publicists, and cooperative leaders gave courses to students from nearly a score of countries including Latvia.[28] Numerous students were themselves officials of national cooperative organisations. Many Latvian co-operators attended the International Co-operative Summer School held in various countries by the ICA – in Hamburg (1928), Vienna (1930), Basel (1931) and Stockholm (1936). In addition, there were several exchange visits in order to study the co-operative movements of Sweden,

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23 In 1907, at the age of only 21, he became head of the auditing department of the Kooperativa Förbundet. After a study trip to Germany in 1913 he persuaded several competing cooperatives to join forces to form the large cooperative Konsum Stockholm.

24 Hedberg was employed in 1920 in the Cooperative Association and was active there with organizational and propaganda tasks and as an international liaison. He published a large number of cooperative writings, many of which were published in several editions and translated into several languages. Hedberg was a member of the board of the International Cooperative Alliance from 1929.

25 Emma Freundlich President of the International Cooperative Women's Guild (ICWG) 1921–1948. Representatives established the Alliance's aims to provide information, define and defend the Co-operative Principles and develop international trade.

26 Šalčius, P. (1936), p. 3. This was a more or less translation of Šalčius, P. (1935). Ten Years of Co-operation in the Baltic States. *Review of International Co-operation*, No. 10, 1935, London, which was published over a number of issues in the co-operative journal *Kopdarbība*, Issues nos. 15, 16, 17 and 18, 1936.

27 Founded in 1895, the International Co-operative Alliance was (and still is) an independent, non-governmental organisation which united, represented and served co-operatives worldwide.

28 *Monthly Labor Review* (1944), p. 1162.

Finland and other countries. The co-operative ideas resulting from these international relations were discussed later in the many co-operative journals published in Latvia, including *Kopdarbība*, *Kooperators*, *Balss*, *Koperativais credits*, and *Kooperatīvā apdrošināšana*.

In addition, there were some other organisations in Latvia intended especially for co-operative studies and discussions. One of the oldest was the Society of Students of the Latvian University for the Promotion of Co-operation (*LU Studentu kooperācijas veicināšanas biedrība*) founded in 1922. The aims of the Society were to unify academic staff that agree with the idea of co-operation; to teach and to educate their members for practical participation in co-operative activities; and to disseminate correct views on the need for co-operation in the nation's economy.

In 1927, the Society of Latvian Co-operators (*Latvijas kooperatoru biedrība*) was founded.[29] Its basic aim was to further the development of the co-operative movement in Latvia. In the following year, 1928, the Latvian Society for the Promotion of Co-operation (*Latvijas kooperacijas veicināšanas biedrība*) was established.[30] It was a parallel organisation to the Society of Latvian Co-operators and was founded to bring together the left direction co-operative personnel. Its aims were to further and explore the various practical and theoretical issue of co-operation, how co-operative relationships relate to other types of worker movements, the principle of neutrality, co-operatives and local government, potential for cooperation of Latvian Consumer and Farmers co-operatives and regulation of their mutual relationships, etc. The new Society would pay greater attention to co-operative propaganda.

Latvian Co-operatives after 1934

On 15 May 1934, under the leadership of the then Prime Minister, Kārlis Ulmanis and the Minister for War Jānis Balodis, the home guard and the army carried out *a coup d'état*. Ulmanis dismissed the Saeima (parliament), banned all political parties, closed most newspapers, and promised a new constitution (which never eventuated). The reasons for *the coup d'état* were more political than economic in nature.[31] However, the authoritarian regime actively influenced the economic life of the country.

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29   *Daugavas Vārds* (1927), No. 20, p. 3.

30   *Kooperatīvais Kredits* (1928), No. 2, p. 96.

31   Aizsilnieks, A. (1968), p. 600.

If individual empowerment, shared ownership, and democratic control are key concepts of co-operative ideology, then the advent of the authoritarian Ulmanis regime in 1934 spelled the death knell of co-operatives in Latvia. As from 1935 no Co-operative Congresses were held and Latvian representatives no longer participated in the International Co-operative Congresses. Instead of being free to deal with problems of co-operative ideology, the main task of co-operative organisations was seen as supporting and furthering the economic policies of the state.

On 18 June 1937, the regime issued a new law, the "Law on Co-operative Societies and their Unions" (Likums par kopdarbības sabiedrībām un to savienībām[32]). All previous laws and regulations regarding co-operatives were repealed. This law radically transformed the essence and substance of the co-operative movement. The law changed the aims of the co-operative movement. In place of the democratic principle of co-operatives was instituted the authoritarian principle. For example, the highest instance of supervision over the co-operatives was entrusted to Agricultural and Finance Ministers (Section 212). Co-operatives where the leadership was not sympathetic to the regime were either forced to cease operations or the leadership was purged. With the new law, the co-operative movement became an instrument of the state and fulfilled the instructions from the state.

Conclusion

The co-operative movement in Latvia had a long history beginning in the 19th century. In independent Latvia, it flourished from 1918 to 1934. The idea of a voluntary, democratic, and independent movement in a democratic and sovereign Latvia resonated with Latvians, especially in rural areas. In general terms, it can said that the intellectual impulses from Western Europe motivated and activated the formation and development the Latvian co-operative movement, especially in the interwar period to 1934. The creation of the authoritarian state in 1934 took away self-initiative, democracy, and independence, which are the cornerstones of the co-operative movement. As state power grew and became more concentrated, the more oppressive it turned out to be regarding the co-operative movement, until the oppression reached its culmination with the invasion of Latvia in 1940 by the Soviet Union and the long night of the Soviet occupation.

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32 For the full text of the law see *Likumu un Ministru kabineta noteikumu krājums* (1937), pp. 925–946.

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CORRELATE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EVIDENCE FROM NIGERIA

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Abstract. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and other macroeconomic variables such as the exchange rate, economic openness, and public sector investment are significant macroeconomic variables that drive economic growth and development. As a result, every government's ability to sustain and maintain a balance among them is critical to long-term development. The study's goals were to establish the impact of foreign direct investment on Nigeria's economic development, as well as the impact of the exchange rate on Nigeria's economic development. The ex-post facto research design was used in this study, as well as secondary data. The explanatory variable was Foreign Direct Investment, and the control variable was the exchange rate. The study spans the years 1981 through 2019. The explanatory variable was Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF), which is a proxy for economic progress, and the model was estimated using the Auto Regressive Distributed (ARDL) Model. The data for this study came from the World Bank Data Base's World Development Indicators of 2019 and the Central Bank of Nigeria's Statistical Bulletin of 2019. According to the study, a 1.4 unit increase in foreign direct investment

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leads to a 1.4 unit increase in gross fixed capital creation. In addition, a unit increase in the exchange rate causes a 0.03-unit fall in gross fixed capital formation, and vice versa. According to the findings, there is a negligible positive link between FDI and GFCF, but a strong negative relationship between the exchange rates (EXR) and GFCF. As a result, the report suggests that FDI inflows be used to fund capital projects that are not for current consumption, such as good road networks, train lines across the country, and stable electricity supply. Without a doubt, this would lower the cost of doing business in Nigeria and boost profitability. According to our findings, while FDI alone cannot lead to economic growth and development, when other factors such as a favorable climate and simplified pre-investment procedures are available, more FDI will be drawn to key economic sectors, contributing to economic growth and development.

Keywords: Nigeria, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Exchange Rate, Economic Development.

Introduction

Nigeria is the most important anglophone country in the west African sub-region, and it has long been one of the bloc's economic powerhouses (CBN, 2012a; Adediran et al., 2019). The entry of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Nigeria's economies has benefited the country substantially (Giwa, George & Okodua, 2019). To achieve the much-desired sustained growth and development in the region, African nations rely on FDI inflows from wealthy countries. Though the region has seen some significant growth in recent years, its ability to maintain that growth is a cause for concern. This is because one of the region's growth-enhancing elements has been in decline since 2015. According to available data (CBN, 2018), many of the region's countries have struggled to attract adequate FDI in recent years. Nigeria, for example, received $1,140,138 in FDI in 2000. Nigeria's FDI inflow surged to US$ 4,982,000 after half a decade. FDI inflows into Nigeria grew steadily until 2010, when they totaled US$ 6,026,232. FDI inflows into Nigeria fell by more than half to US$3,128,592 due to political and social concerns such as insecurity and pre-election uncertainty. Between 1972 and 1985, the government's FDI policy became more restricted. Between 1973 and 1988, the regulatory framework inhibited foreign participation, resulting in an annual average FDI of only 0.8 percent of GDP. Nigeria has made several efforts to improve the general investment climate through the adoption and implementation of foreign investment policies and programs, agreeing with the theoretical arguments that foreign resources can bridge the gap between targeted savings and the needed investments to bring about growth and development. These include

the industrial policies of 1988, which were considerably different from the previous policies due to attempts to build a more streamlined, inclusive, and transparent FDI policy framework (Adediran et al., 2019; Dinh, Vo & Nguyen, 2019).

In many countries, a favorable climate for FDI is a requirement for its long-term viability. Other economic characteristics such as the currency rate, the economy's openness, consistent policies, and having a politically stable government system have a high chance of attracting FDI (Amoo, 2018; Zekarias, 2016). In comparison to other developing regions, Africa receives a tiny amount of foreign direct investment. Africa's part of FDI flows fell from 19 percent in the 1970s to 8 % in 2006, whereas Asia and Oceania's share climbed from 33 percent to 62 percent during the same time period (World Bank, 2010). Since the implementation of SAP in 1986, Nigeria has taken an average of 10 % of Africa's share of FDI through various reforms. Between 1973 and 1988, FDI accounted for barely 0.8 percent of GDP on average. The Industrial Development and Coordination Decree No. 36 of 1988 was enacted to address issues such as ambiguity and confusion, contradictory information from bureaucrats, and a plethora of government entities with whom foreign investors were forced to deal. An increase in the value of a country's currency will be beneficial to the economy. The more valuable a country's currency is, the more foreigners want to invest in it, and vice versa. The value of a country's currency rises when interest rates rise. Despite the African Union's New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) initiative in 2001 to pursue new priorities and approaches to the socio-economic and political transformation of Africa for sustainable development in the region through foreign investment, the initiative's impact has left much to be desired, which, aside from being disturbing at the moment, does not raise the possibility of a better future (Akpo &Hassan, 2015; Akiri, Vehe & Ijuo, 2016). Despite the relative increase in international flows such as FDI, trade, and foreign aid since the new millennium's turn in 2000, economic, social and environmental sustainability in both economies has continued to decline. Some significant questions occurred as a result of the previous. What, for example, is the effect of FDI inflows on Nigeria's economic development?

Statement of the Problem

The Nigerian economy has been around for a long time, almost as long as the country itself. The value and quality of productive investments have been a source of concern since the early 1980s (Uwubanwen & Ogiemudia, 2016). As a result, numerous Nigerian administrations have implemented various economic strategies targeted at achieving economic independence through increased

production capacity. Industrial Inspectorate Act 1970, National Industrial Property Act 1979, National Office for Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP) 1992, and others are examples of such regulations. Although it is often said that FDI brings with it potential balance of payment (BOP) problems, their immense potential for speeding up the rate of economic advancement of developing nations (including Nigeria) cannot be overstated. For example, FDI brings capital, technological know-how, and foreign exchange, all of which are in short supply in this country. However, there are disputes among economists and policymakers over the benefits of FDI in underdeveloped countries. While some fashions swear to its developmental importance, others see it differently (Flora & Agrawal, 2017; UNCTAD, 2018). Giwa, George and Okodua (2019) stated that the Nigerian economy faced a variety of issues following the oil boom's downturn in 1980: Problems such as unsustainable balance of payments deficits, rapidly expanding debt stock, and a high debt servicing burden arose in the foreign sector. Internally, large fiscal deficits, growing unemployment, and soaring inflation were all issues. In 1981, total domestic debt was N11, 192.60 million, while external debt was N2, 331.20 million. External debt, in particular, was quickly expanding until 1987, when it more than doubled from N41, 452.40 million in 1986 to N100, 789.10 million. Until 2005, when Nigeria's external debt reached N2, 695, 072.20 million, the same situation repeated itself. The debt relief program of 2006 lowered the debt burden to N451, 461.70 million. Since then, the debt has continued to rise, reaching N560, 900.00m in 2013. (CBN, 2013; CBN 2012b). Above all, manufacturing investment plummeted, resulting in lower real production and per capita real income (Adeolu, 2007).

Despite the launch of the structural adjustment program (SAP) in 1986 and many policies aimed at encouraging FDI, these issues have persisted. Is it possible that Nigeria's share of FDI is insufficient to address these issues, or that what comes to Africa should have come to Nigeria to have a meaningful impact? Nigeria's real GDP growth rate was negative in the mid-1980s, falling from N205, 222.0 billion in 1981 to N201, 036.27 billion in 1985, with a little uptick to N204806.54 billion in 1986. From 1988 to 2013, real GDP has grown steadily, from N219875.63 billion in 1988 to 923,586.40 billion in 2013. (CBN, 2013). Due to the low level of income in Nigeria, the gap between domestic savings and investment is relatively significant. Economists have generally recognized the importance of investments in the growth process, and efforts are being made in Nigeria to revive investment. Inadequate finance for financing development projects has been a stumbling barrier in Nigeria's economic growth. In actual terms, Nigerian savings have steadily increased, from N14, 471.17 million in 1981 to N111, 112.31 million in 1992. This value grew to N878, 457.27 million

in 2000, and then to 11,034,940.93 million in 2010. In 2013, the total amount saved was N17, 548,421.2m. Furthermore, Nigeria's reliance on a single-product export (oil), which is subject to price fluctuations in the international market, has resulted in years of financial volatility for the government and has hampered the successful implementation of national development objectives (CBN, 2013). Despite changes adopted by successive Nigerian administrations, little success has been gained in attracting FDI, despite the fact that FDI has been considered as a very crucial source of capital that can bridge both the saving and trade gaps in Nigeria. The mining industry has had the most FDI inflows, whereas agriculture, building, and construction have seen less. Several scholars have attempted to investigate this topic using various estimating methodologies in order to identify characteristics that influence FDI influx and its impact on the Nigerian economy. The effect of FDI on the Nigerian economy is examined using Gross Fixed Capital Formation as the explained variable, which is a proxy for economic development. To reignite foreign investor interest in the Nigerian economy, an understanding of the factors of foreign direct investment is clearly required.

The Study's Objectives

i.   To assess the impact of foreign direct investment on Nigeria's economic development.
ii. To investigate the impact of the Nigerian exchange rate on the country's economic progress.

The Study's Hypotheses

HO1: Foreign direct investment has no substantial impact on Nigeria's economic progress.

HO2: The exchange rate has no discernible impact on Nigeria's economic development.

Literature Review

Foreign Direct Investment

Increased Foreign direct investment and technological advancements result in increased productivity and efficiency in the host country as a result of foreign

direct investment. Increased productivity and efficiency result in higher output production for both domestic and international demand (Peprah et al., 2019; Coccia, 2019). The export of goods and services generates foreign exchange money for the host country, allowing it to grow and flourish economically. Bitzer & Gorg (2009) posited that foreign direct investment (FDI) is the additional resource that a country requires to accomplish economic growth. Technology, marketing, capital, and management all play a role. It opens up new markets, marketing channels, and simple access to new technology, skills, products, financing, and production facilities for a company. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is described as a foreign investment that is a component or share of GDP that is fast growing, and it is rapidly becoming the most important source of capital flowing from developed to developing countries (Alfaro, 2017; World Bank, 2020). It is critical to underline that FDI reduces regional imbalances and increases the host region's competitiveness. By attaining the goal of improved value of the outcomes, efficient use of resources such as employment, technology, and cost results in a greater production level (Bolanovsky, 2017; Choi & Baek, 2017). FDI also results in greater labor market wages (NSB, 2017; Masipa, 2018). Lower shipping costs and enhanced technology can also benefit investors (UNCTAD, 2019). According to Pandya and Sisombat (2017) FDI and spillover effects are closely linked. Their work, which focuses on FDI, has a positive influence on the host economy as local enterprises become more innovative. According to Bermejo and Werner (2018), one of the main reasons for investing directly in another country and controlling 100 % of it is to have complete control over the technology, distribution networks, and profit margins.

Economic Growth and Foreign Direct Investment

There is broad agreement that FDI benefits local businesses by promoting expansion, which leads to increased productivity and efficiency. The developed world has agreed that productivity is the key to domestic enterprises' success. It is said that FDI's usefulness in export promotion is disputed, and that it is exclusively used for investment purposes. The fundamental agreement is that FDI spillover is dependent on the host country's ability to absorb the type of investment and foreign technology involved (Antwi et al., 2013). The relationship between economic growth and FDI is classified as conditional on the country through which it passes. The extent to which FDI contributes to growth is said to be dependent on the recipient country's economic and social conditions, or in other words, the quality of its environment (Anetor, 2019). As a result, FDI in the hosting nations creates job chances through direct employment in the domestic economy for operations, forward and backward connections, which

leads to more job creation in the economy as a result of growth. Growth may be achieved by FDI, and a consistent pace of growth over time lessens poverty (World Bank, 2017).

Foreign Direct Investment Resource Seeking FDI Types and Rationales

A resource seeking FDI is enticed by the availability of low-cost trained and unskilled labor, strategic natural resources, and low-cost raw materials. This will undoubtedly lower production costs while also increasing profit margins. In the long run, it will also make room for the firm's activities to expand. The presence of important raw resources in abundance in the host country motivates FDI in this category, making it cheaper to engage in FDI than to importing the raw material from abroad. All of the FDI frontrunners are African countries that export oil (Nigeria, Angola, Algeria and Equatorial Guinea). Their proven oil reserves are over six times bigger than those of the European Union (World Bank, 2000). Although there is no statistics on FDI flows by sector for the countries stated above, Nigeria's oil sector, which is one of the country's plentiful natural resources, has the most FDI of any sector. Shell, Chevron, Mobil, Texaco, Total, and other oil firms are all involved in oil exploration and extraction in Nigeria's Niger Delta region, which accounts for more than 80 % of the country's revenue (Egbunike et al, 2018; NSB, 2017; Akiri, Vehe & Ijuo, 2016).

The Schumpeterian Growth Theory and Solow Growth Model

The Schumpeterian Growth Theory mainly emphasized on retaining old technologies without regards to innovation. The weak point of this economic model is that it does not take into cognizance that world population is growing at a faster rate and it can only be matched with continuous innovation and invention in technology for increased output to meet the increasing demand (Arrow, 1962). Solow growth model emphasized that an improved technology and efficiency of labor which accelerate economic growth while, the recipient countries provide conducive investment climate. Developing countries that wish to grow economically will have to put in place factors that can attract FDI (Domar, 1957). This model is therefore relevant for economic growth in Nigeria and other developing countries.

Research Gap

FDI is becoming a very important area of research in Nigeria. Studies have been carried out on the impact of FDI on the Nigerian economy and also on the determinants of FDI. Having examined some literatures, it was to observe

that certain aspects of FDI were not examined thoroughly by past researches. Some of the findings from the literatures revealed that foreign direct investment has a positive impact on economic development (see Solokang (2018); Voica et al (2015); Evans and Kelikume (2018); Akinlo and Aremo (2013); Johnson and Mathew (2013); Alfaro (2017), Zekarias (2016), while others revealed a negative or inconclusive impact (see Shuaib et al, (2015); Malikane and Chitambara (2017). Different studies were done on the determinant of FDI and some of the variables revealed to have significant impact on FDI include Transport, Communication, Trade openness, Market size, stability of the current, deregulation and exchange rate (see Emmanuel (2016); Eltis and Lewis (2016), Acquah (2020); Amoo (2018). However, the effect of FDI on economic development and the effect of exchange rate on Nigeria economic development have not been well explored. Most of the researches carried out made use of ordinary least square regression which is a weak methodology for the study of FDI because it fails to capture the inter-dependency of macro-economic variables, hence Auto Regressive Distributed (ARDL) Model was employed for this study.

Methodology

This research employed the ex-post facto research design and the use of secondary data. Foreign Direct Investment was employed as the explanatory variable and exchange rate was adopted as the control variable. Gross Fixed Capital Formation being a proxy for economic development was adopted as the explained variable, while the model was estimated using Auto Regressive Distributed (ARDL) Model (Michall, 2011; Brick 2014). Data for this study were extracted from World Bank Data Base – World Developmental Indicators of 2018 and Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin of 2018. The study period covers 1981 through 2019. This study employed descriptive statistics, unit root test, correlation, serial correlation test, heteroskedasticity test, normality test and stability test. E-view 9.0 econometric statistical software package was employed for the analysis (Cresswell 2009; Easterby Smith et al 2011).

Model Specification

This research adapted the economic model previously used by Hanson (2020) that researched on foreign direct investment inflows and its effect on

the performance of the Nigerian economy (1981–2018). The econometric model of this study, which had earlier been reviewed in the preceding section, is specified below:

$$RDP = \beta_0 + \beta_1 FDI_t + \beta_2 EXR_t + \beta_3 BOT + u_t \tag{1}$$

RDP = Real Gross Domestic Product
FDI = Foreign Direct Investment
EXR = Exchange Rate
BOT = Balance of Trade
u = error term
β_0 = Constant
β_1 and β_2 = Coefficients of their respective variables
t = Time dimension

However, this study adapted the scholars' work by replacing real GDP with gross fixed capital formation as the explained variable; balance of trade was also excluded in order not to over-stock the parameters of the model; exchange rate was maintained as a controlled variable. In that regard, the regression model is specified thus:

$$GFCF = \beta_0 + \beta_1 FDI + \beta_2 EXR + \varepsilon_i \tag{2}$$

Where; GFCF = Gross Fixed Capital Formation
ε = Error term and other acronyms in the model remain as explained above.

Decision Rule for Acceptance or Rejection of Hypotheses / Expected Results

The decision rule is to reject the null hypothesis if the computed p-value is less than 5 % significant level. On the contrary, accept the null hypothesis if the computed p-value is higher than 5 % significant level. Foreign Direct Investment is expected to be positively signed. Exchange rate is expected to be negatively signed.

Data Analysis and Interpretation of Results

Estimation Test Result (Unit Root Test)

Table 1. Unit Root Test

Variables	Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic	Probability Value	Critical value at 5 %	Integration order/ Inference
GFCF	−3.450749	0.0153	−2.943427	I(0)
FDI	−7.267147	0.0000	−2.945842	I(1)
EXR	−3.537770	0.0125	−2.945842	I(1)

Source: Author's analysis using e-view 9 output

The unit root test from Table 1 above shows that the integration order of the variables were a combination of I(1) and I(0). As such, the appropriate estimation technique to employ for analysis is the Auto Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Model.

Descriptive Statistics

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics

	GFCF	FDI	EXR
Mean	36.47387	1.387343	104.4552
Median	35.36755	1.384466	111.1675
Maximum	89.38105	4.282088	306.1000
Minimum	14.90391	0.257422	4.536700
Std. Dev.	19.36187	0.855130	78.39935
Skewness	1.009675	1.208768	0.719999
Kurtosis	3.683025	5.208173	3.421495
Jarque-Bera	7.195132	16.97413	3.564487

Source: Authors' analysis using e-view 9 output

The result of the descriptive statistics in Table 2 above reveals the aggregative averages such as mean, median, and the measures of spread and variation like standard deviation. Skewness, which measures the degree of symmetry, shows that GFCF, FDI, and EXR are positively skewed. As per the kurtosis which measures the peakedness of the observations, the values of GFCF, FDI, and EXR

are above 3, hence lepturkotic. These skewness and kurtosis indicate departure from normality although such point is not strong enough to discredit the goodness of the dataset for the analysis in view.

Correlation Analysis

Table 3. Correlation matrix

	GFCF	FDI	EXR
GFCF	1.000000		
FDI	−0.193804	1.000000	
EXR	−0.515865	−0.262251	1.000000

Source: Author's analysis using e-view 9 output

From the result of correlation analysis in Table 4.3 above, both FDI and EXR variables were negatively correlated with GFCF having about –19.4 % and –52 % for FDI and EXR respectively.

Inferential Result: Results of ARDL Model

Table 4. Results of ARDL Model

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Pro b.*
GFCF(-3)	0.33 7967	0.13 4391	2.51 4808	0. 0177
FDI	1.048775	0.844548	1.241819	0.2243
EXR	−0.027172	0.012206	−2.226156	0.0339
C	8.419416	3.786140	2.223747	0.0341
R-squared	0.93 8564	Mean dependent var	32.4 2682	
Adjusted R-squared	0.927971	S.D. dependent var	13.83630	
S.E. of regression	3.713407	Akaike info criterion	5.616582	
Sum squared resid	399.8924	Schwarz criterion	5.883213	
Log likelihood	−92.29018	Hannan-Quinn criter.	5.708623	
F-statistic	88.60685	Durbin-Watson stat	1.618465	
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000			

Source: Author's analysis using e-vie w 9 output

The ARDL result as shown in Table 4 above suggests that exchange rate had a negative or inverse impact on gross fixed capital formation while foreign

direct investment was recorded to have a positive impact on gross fixed capital formation in Nigeria. The result further revealed that a unit increase in foreign direct investment would bring about a 1.4 unit increase in gross fixed capital formation. Also, a unit increase in exchange rate would bring about approximately 0.03 unit decrease in gross fixed capital formation and vice versa. The Adjusted R-squared of approximately 0.94 showed that the explanatory variables accounted for about 94 % variations in the explained variable. Put differently, about 94 % variations in gross fixed capital formation was explained by the independent variables, while the remaining 6 % may be attributed to variables not included in the model. F-statistic of 88.61 showed that the model is a good fit as confirmed by its corresponding probability value of 0.000000 which means that the model is significant both at 1 % and 5 % levels of significance. Model was free from auto correlation.

Test of Hypotheses

Table 5. Test of Hypothesis One

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Pro b.*
FD	I 1.04 8775	0.84 4548	1.24 1819	0. 2243
C	8.419416	3.786140	2.223747	0.0341

Source: Extracted from Table 4

HO1: There is no significant impact of foreign direct investment on gross fixed capital formation in Nigeria. Since the p-value for foreign direct investment (FDI) of 0.2243 (22.4 %) is > 5 % level of significance, the null hypothesis that there is no significant impact of foreign direct investment on gross fixed capital formation in Nigeria is accepted.

Table 6. Test of Hypothesis Two

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.*
EX R	−0.02 7172	0.01 2206	−2.22 6156	0.0339
C	8.419416	3.786140	2.223747	0.0341

Source: Extracted from Table 4

HO2. Exchange rate does not have any significant impact on Nigerian economic development. Since the p-value for exchange rate (EXR) of 0.0339 (3.4 %) is within the acceptable significance level of 5 %, that is, < 5 %, we reject the null

hypothesis that Exchange rate does not have any significant impact on Nigerian economic development. The result is evaluated based on economic theories and literatures in line with what is obtainable in Nigeria and what is applicable all over the world.

Discussion

This study was conducted to ascertain the effect of foreign direct investment on economic development in Nigeria. From the results, it can be deduced that there exists an insignificant positive relationship between FDI and GFCF, while there exists a negative significant relationship between EXR and GFCF. The findings of this study are in congruence with the studies of Egbunike et al, (2018) and Shuaib et al., (2015) but in negation to the studies of: Flora and Agrawal (2017), Coccia (2019), Anetor (2019). Until 1986, the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree otherwise known as indigenization policy that was introduced in 1972 was still in force. The aim of the policy was to give full or partial transfer of equity of enterprises from foreigners to Nigerians. The period witnessed reduced inflow of FDI into Nigeria which in turn reduced the country's GDP growth rate. Foreign investors were withdrawing their capitals because of the indigenization policy of the government. Though evidence from the conceptual and empirical review of FDI on economic growth shows high and positive coefficient, it is not statistically significant within the sample period. The implication of this outcome is that the policy is considered anti FDI inflow. Instead of attracting investors, they were rather withdrawing their capitals.

Empirical review result of FDI on economic growth in the Period of SAP Policy 1988–1994 shows low and positive coefficient, it is not statistically significant. This could be attributed to time lag required by foreign investors to study the content as well as adherence and sustenance of the policy by the government. Also, the system of governance (military dictatorship) that was considered unpopular was another reason foreign investors did not respond promptly in bringing their capital to the country for investment. The impact of Nigeria Investment Promotion Commission on the economy was not felt immediately due to long period of political uncertainty that existed in the country. Hence the low and negative coefficient shows that some foreign investors were relocating e.g., Micheline Tire Company and Volkswagen Assembling Company relocated within this period. Government ought to have handled the privatization / commercialization of public enterprises with caution so as not to give room for excessive capital flight in return for the capital invested. Following

the successes achieved from the deregulation of the telecommunication sector, the federal government in early 2013 commenced the deregulation of the power sector to allow distribution companies take charge of electricity distribution to consumers in the country while government now restrict self to generation and transmission of electricity. The implication is that the privatization exercise was handled in a shoddy way, i.e., the public enterprises were corruptly undervalued.

Conclusion

This study examined the effects of FDI on Nigeria economic development. During the course of the study, the problems, as well as the objectives of the study have been identified. So also, research questions and their research hypotheses have been formulated. Theories regarding FDI and economic development have been explored extensively so as to give the research a clear path of proceeding. Also, the methodologies and techniques used by the researcher are stated in which a number of econometric preliminary precautions have been employed. This shows that openness of the economy draws in more FDI into the country. Fiscal deficit if use in the provision infrastructure such as roads, railways and stable power supply will draw in more FDI. This result also shows that FDI alone cannot lead economic development without other variables such as macroeconomic, political stability and addressing the problem of corporate governance. In the light of the above, attention should be paid by policy makers on policies that can make Nigeria harness the economic gains of FDI. The policy on openness should be pursued with caution as one without some level of restriction can be counterproductive. This way, the problem of unemployment and high level of poverty in the country can be reduced to the barest minimum. In line with the Harrod-Domar theory (1939, 1946), this particular study has revealed that FDI has a positive impact on the Nigerian economic development. However, it must be noted that the impact is statistically insignificant. In emerging economies like Nigeria, lack of capital holds back economic, social, and environmental sustainability. Therefore, boosting FDI inflows could lead to sustainable development in Nigeria. The study's result supports the fact that social, environmental, and economic conditions are critical considerations for the inflows of FDI. On a practical note, the state plays a critical role in any economies' overall operations; as such, the government should provide adequate infrastructure and policy framework that will be guaranteed a conducive business environment for domestic and foreign investments to thrive.

Recommendations

Base on the research objectives and findings, the following recommendations are proffered:

To encourage FDI inflows much of government expenditure should be used in financing capital projects such good road networks, rail lines across the country and stable power supply which are not for current consumption. This will no doubt reduce the cost of doing business in Nigeria and increase profitability. From our result, FDI alone cannot lead to economic growth and development, with the availability of other factor such conducive environment and simplified pre-investment procedures, more FDI will be attracted to key economic sectors and contribute to economic growth.

Also, the privatization exercise of the government should be handled in a transparent manner. This will convince foreign investors that their money will not go down the drain. If the approach and zeal exhibited in the deregulation process of telecommunication sector is extended to the power sector, similar success will be achieved. Institutions such as the anti-graft agencies of the government (EFCC and ICPC) should be strengthened in order to give more bites in their war against corruption. This will redeem the image of the country before the outside world.

The policy of openness should be sustained and well guided as unguided one can led to massive importation of intermediate goods which can seriously affect the balance of payment position of the country. Other factors like investment in human capital (IHC) which contributed positively to growth rate could be improved upon which could further increase growth rate of GDP.

Finally, the Nigeria Investment Promotion Commission can still do more by showing foreign investors the potentials that abound in other sectors so as to give room for diversification of the economy.

Limitations and Future Directions

This study examined the effect of FDI and exchange rate on Nigeria economic development. However, the study has some limitations and criticisms that could form the basis of future research endeavors. The findings are based on two variables which are FDI and exchange rate, implying that the result may be difficult to generalize, although it is most likely that the findings apply to many emerging economies apart from Nigeria investigated. Future studies can focus on investigating the interactions between FDI, economic, social, and environmental

sustainability by conducting cross-country analysis of this relationship to ensure generalization of their findings. Methodologically, future studies can improve on present study by employing more sophisticated analytical techniques such as VAR, ARIMA, ARDL, and Maximum Likelihood (ML). A scientifically developed theory needs to be formulated such that future empirical studies can either confirm or contradict the postulations of such a theory.

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QUALITY MANAGEMENT OF RESEARCH PROJECTS: CASE STUDY OF ONE LITHUANIAN UNIVERSITY

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Abstract. This article analyses the concept of quality management of research projects and provides insights on research support services and their usage in one Lithuanian university. In the article, a literature analysis is presented on the definition of quality management of research projects and their scope. With the help of the analysis of quality management of research projects and the survey of one Lithuanian University staff, it is determined what support services the university provides to its project teams. This paper

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provides conclusions and yields recommendations on how to maximise the efficiency of support services currently available at the university.

Keywords: Lithuania, quality management; research project; support services; project management.

Introduction

In the academic world, research plays an important role in creating not only theoretical, but also practical knowledge about certain topics. A large part of how well the research is conducted is quality management within the research, which is usually based on principles of quality planning. To help project managers conduct the project and achieve the best possible results, academic institutions offer support services that help researchers to manage projects in a way that helps them achieve the best quality results. To understand how quality management affects research projects, one must define quality management and realize its scope in the academic field. After that, one can conduct research to find out what kind of quality management procedures are being used in certain academic environments. While conducting research, one can see which quality management methods have the biggest impact on academic research and offer recommendations for future research projects' quality improvement.

The aim of the paper is to investigate what services are provided in one Lithuanian University to project managers to ensure the quality management of research projects and provide recommendations.

Objectives are as follows:
1) To analyse the concept of project quality management.
2) To identify the stages of quality management of research projects.
3) To carry out empirical research in order to identify how the quality management of research projects in one of the Lithuanian universities is ensured.
4) To provide theoretical and practical implications.

Research method: this paper is based on a survey research method. To clarify the practical application of project quality management, one Lithuanian university was selected to conduct the research.

The analysis of survey results revealed that project management services at this university are provided in five areas: budget management, data management, ethical issues, law, people management, and/or conflict resolution. All these areas have been analysed in more detail.

This article is structured as follows. First, we begin with a literature review on quality management. Second, we discuss the methods used for the conducted quantitative research. Third, we review the research findings of the mentioned quantitative research. Fourth, we draw conclusions and implications while highlighting future research directions.

Defining the quality management of research projects

The concept of quality management is widespread yet not specified, meaning it could be interpreted differently in certain fields. One definition is proposed by Ebrahimi and Sadeghi (2013) that quality management is an integrative management philosophy aimed at the continuous improvement of performance. Siva and others (2016) define quality management to be a philosophy consisting of principles, practices, and tools that include principles or values such as customer focus, continuous improvement, and fact-based decisions. Both authors comply that quality management is a philosophy that is composed of practices, principles, and tools which contribute to overall performance and continuous improvement.

Quality management is no easy task when it comes to a comprehensive assessment of research projects with it being a complex definition. By consistently reviewing and editing errors that occur, it is further solidified that quality management in research projects is a crucial part within the development process. The use of quality management in research and development is a strong tool enabling exploitation and maximization of the value of research work – when done in the right way and fit for purpose (Robins, Scarll, Key, 2006). Donabedian (1996) describes quality management as a procedure that consists of obtaining information about performance and based on an analysis of performance in any given situation, leads to modification in behaviour: directly, through educational and motivational activities, and indirectly, through adjustments in system design. Another approach to further decipher quality management is that quality management is the validation and verification of the research material (Håkansson, 2013). It is apparent, that all authors have a familiar view on quality management in research projects – by using familiarized and effective tools such as auditing, procedural adjustments and performance analysis or a combination of a few aids in producing a remarkable research project that withholds validity.

Research projects are a collection of information in different formats and available in different places (García Holgado, Marcos Pablos, García Peñalvo, 2020). A research project can be defined as a scientific endeavour to answer a research question. As to how research projects differentiate from other forms

of projects, Payne and Turner (1999) state that research projects tend to be managed through the life cycle and the achievement of go/no-go decisions, whereas organisational change projects tend to be managed through a Bill of Materials or product-based milestone plan. For a successful research project to be established, project quality management must be enforced through three key stages: Plan Quality Management, Perform Quality Assurance, Quality Control.

As stated in PMBOK 5th edition, Project Quality Management employs rules and procedures to integrate the quality management system of the company into the project's environment and, when there is a need, to assist with ongoing process improvement activities on behalf of the performing organization. Project Quality Management guarantees that all project criteria, including product requirements, are satisfied and validated.

Processes covered in PMBOK 5th edition under Project Quality Management include:

1. *Plan Quality Management* – the process of identifying and documenting the project's and deliverables' quality requirements and/or standards, as well as how will the project demonstrate adherence to those criteria.
2. *Perform Quality Assurance* – the process of evaluating quality standards and quality control measures' results to facilitate the implementation of accepted quality standards and operational definitions.
3. *Quality Control* – the procedure for observing and documenting the outcomes of quality operations to evaluate performance and make required changes.

Plan Quality Management (also known as Quality Planning) is the process of determining the project's and outcomes' quality criteria and/or standards as well as a description as to how the project will show adherence to quality criteria and/or standards (Eshete, 2021). Choosing an appropriate development method and defining goal values for internal qualities are all part of quality planning (Boegh and others, 1999). As noted by Reddan (2015), this process is valuable because it is at the heart of giving governance and control over quality management throughout the project. It enables quality to be built into the project well before it begins. Defining standards and guidelines is part of quality planning as well.

Another process covered in PMBOK 5th edition is Quality Assurance. In research and development, quality assurance is a powerful instrument for maximizing the value of research effort and allowing it to be used (Krapp, 2001). Quality Assurance entails gathering data on performance and modifying behaviour depending on that data (Donabedian, 1996). Modifications on this process can be done either directly, via activities that are both informative and motivating, and indirectly, by modifying the system's design (Donabedian, 1996).

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The third component of project quality management is quality control. Project quality control is very important as it ensures that all activities are carried out in accordance with the requirements. One of the quality management tools is control quality. Control quality includes performance monitoring, registration, compliance, and other actions required to ensure the quality of the project (Tom Alby, 2022).

This article seeks to examine what services are provided to research project managers at one Lithuanian University to help ensure all three stages of quality management of research projects. The empirical research is presented below.

Method

To achieve the aim of the paper, quantitative research (survey) has been done in one Lithuanian University.

To investigate research project support services in one Lithuanian university, there were identified five fields of project services: *budget management, legal matters, data management, ethical issues, and people management and/or conflict resolution*. These services can be provided to researchers at the university. Support in mentioned five project fields gives opportunities to researchers that received funding for project implementation to increase the quality of the project.

The survey was held between staff of one University Faculty. Respondents were divided into four categories: PhD students; Junior researchers (Post-docs and Assistant professors); Senior researchers (Associate professors, Senior lecturers); and Full Professors. An "Other" category was also available. The surveys were published on an intranet page accessible for staff at one University Faculty. The number of potential respondents in the selected faculty was 116 (66 academic staff and 55 PhD students), who were informed and allowed to complete the questionnaire.

Ten responses were collected from this entire population. The distribution of respondents by occupational rank was as follows: two full professors, three senior researchers, two junior researchers, two PhD students and one respondent that has chosen "Other" (project coordinator).

Below are the main demographic characteristics of all the ten respondents that were taking the survey:

The age range of the respondents was from 26 to 55 years. Three of them were 26–35, five between 36 and 45 and two were between 46–55.

There were seven women and three men that took the questionnaire.

Eight received their PhDs from KTU, two from other universities in Lithuania.

Nine of ten respondents understood Lithuanian fluently and one "only a little bit".

Half of the respondents have been visiting scholars abroad. Three report being visiting scholars' multiple times, often within Europe and to North America. Durations vary from two weeks to six months at a time.

The collected survey data were anonymized and summarized. Data analysis and results are provided in the research findings section.

Research findings

The empirical research showed that analysed university gives five forms of support in research projects management. This support is offered to staff running research projects at the university. Assistance is given in some specialized areas of research project management, such as budgeting, ethics, legal, data management, people management, and/or conflict resolution. The assistance provided by the university in mentioned areas can be provided through three stages of project quality management: planning quality management, performing quality assurance, and quality control. As can be seen from Table 1 below, help to manage the project budget is given in all three quality management stages. The analysed university may advise the project team during planning their budget management quality steps as well as help to assure and control quality successfully during the project. With legal matters, ethical issues and people management and/or conflict resolution the university assists while planning and assuring project quality. In these project management fields university does not help to control planned project quality. However, data management assistance from one Lithuanian university is provided only in performing project quality assurance. There are no services to help plan project data management quality or control it during the project.

Table 1. Research project managing support that is given at one Lithuanian University

	Managing budgets	Legal matters	Data management	Ethical issues	People management and/or conflict resolution
Plan quality management	✓	✓		✓	✓
Perform quality assurance	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Quality control	✓				

All subsequent areas of project management in which the University provides support to researchers will be discussed in more detail below.

First of all, the one Lithuanian University is ready to offer help with managing budgets of research projects. This assistance is given to projects at the university. Staff involved in research projects can contact the University's Project Centre if they have issues with budget management. This university unit provides budget preparation assistance to projects, depending on their funding method and field of study. If necessary, project promoters can be consulted on budgeting, unforeseen budget changes and its control during the project. All support measures are flexible and can be provided according to the needs of the project team.

The second area in which one Lithuanian University provides assistance is legal issues. This type of support is available at University. The lawyers of the analysed Lithuanian University are actively involved in the concluding financing agreements with suppliers of services or raw materials required for the project, other partners. University staff preparing research projects can turn to a legal professional for advice or even to prepare a full contract. At the time of signing the contract with the funders, the lawyer may also be involved with the project team to defend the interests of the university and staff as needed.

The university also provides support in the field of data management. Project promoters can receive a wide range of assistance in data management activities. This type of support can be provided during the planning, perform and control phases, through a variety of tools provided by the university. Depending on the direction of the research and the type of data being analysed, the university provides advice and may even assign a person to data management during the project. Issues related to project data management are handled by specialized university staff who work on the data analysed by the project.

Moreover, research project managers can contact the university for help with ethical issues. Tools to address ethical issues can be used to improve the quality of research projects. The University Science Ethics Commission may provide ethical support to project teams if they conduct research involving people. This unit also evaluates the ethics of research when collecting and/or processing personal data. Based on the evaluation, the panel may provide recommendations, advice or other assistance to the project team in correcting ethical issues.

Finally, the university provides assistance related to people management and conflict resolution. Professionals provide people with management support tools and can be used for project management. The initial problems encountered by the project team or with other people at the university are addressed by the project manager. If the project manager fails to control people or resolve conflicts, HR specialists from the project team faculty join in. In practice, help in managing

people and/or resolving conflicts is rarely needed, so the range of measures is small.

Survey participants were asked in which areas of project management they had used assistance from the University and, if so, whether they would use it again. The results of these questions are given in the Table 2 below.

As can be seen in the Table 2, the majority of respondents, that is seven, are satisfied with the services provided by the university for project budgeting and would like to use it again. However, three out of ten respondents noted that they had not heard of the availability of such services at university so far.

Legal assistance had been used by six respondents and they would agree to use it again. This result shows that more than half of the participants are satisfied with the services provided by the analysed university related to the legal matters of the project. Nevertheless, four questioned university employees had not heard about the legal aid provided for research projects.

Moving on to data management support services, the majority of respondents were unaware that the services existed. It is worth mentioning that this type of aid measures had been used only by three of ten respondents. All of them were happy with the results and would like to use these services again.

The results of the survey were more widespread in terms of helping the project address ethical issues. Two respondents knew about such support given by university and said that they would use it again. One of study participants never felt the need for this type of service to be used. Unfortunately, six respondents had never heard of access to assistance from the university to deal with ethical issues.

The last area of research project support examined was people management and conflict resolution. Half of the survey participants were unaware that such measures existed at the university. Three respondents never felt the need for people management and/or conflict resolution service. Only two researchers had availed themselves of assistance in this area and remained satisfied with it.

Table 2. Responses from staff of one Lithuanian University

Support service regarding	Would use it again	Would not use it again	Unaware that the service existed	Never felt the need for the service
Managing budgets	7	0	3	0
Legal matters	6	0	4	0
Data management	3	0	6	0
Ethical issues	2	0	6	1
People management and/ or conflict resolution	2	0	5	3

To sum up, all available services at the analysed Lithuanian university in research project managing support have been used by at least two people. All participants who used these services once would like to use them again. It is worth to be mentioned that the majority of respondents who said that they never used support measures from mentioned five areas did not do it because they did not know they exist. The smallest need of support is required from research project teams is ethical issues. Three of ten respondents said that they never felt the need for this type of support in any project stage.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the definition of quality management can be interpreted in various ways, but most authors comply that quality management is an integrative management philosophy aimed at the continuous improvement of performance with the usage of numerous tools to produce a high-quality research project that withholds validity. Quality management can be expressed through three main stages: quality management, quality assurance, and quality control.

In this article, five fields of project services were identified (budget management, data management, ethical issues, law, people management, and/or conflict resolution) which help to ensure quality management of research projects. One Lithuanian University was selected for the research. This university offers assistance to researchers during the quality planning, assurance, and control stages of each project management field. Most services are provided to researchers on budget matters in the project and least services are provided on data management issues in the project.

The results of the survey showed that all the researchers who used the analysed services provided by the university were satisfied and would be willing to use them again. However, it is disappointing to learn that a large proportion of respondents had not heard of such project management support services in their environment and the analysed university has not made it quite well known that such assistance exists.

Based on the findings of the empirical study, it is recommended that the university communicate in a more efficient way about its project management support services to university researchers. Respondents who used the analysed services rated them positively and want to continue using them. This finding shows that the dissemination of the services provided by the university is important to increase the quality management of research projects. Greater use of these services would contribute to improving the quality of projects at the university.

It is also recommended to provide more services for the management of research projects. These services would contribute to improving the quality of research projects.

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PERFORMANCE: DIFFERENCES IN MEASURING PERFORMANCE

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Abstract. An important issue in human resources is the procedure of the employees' performance evaluation. The appraisal is essential in the sense of employee appreciation and motivation. Most employers use a subjective performance evaluation of a single superior or a group of persons involved in the employee's working processes. The subjective evaluation of a group or one person is often questioned about being appropriate. An often-named solution for a more objective criteria could be data driven performance measures. Professional sport provides a unique opportunity to compare objective and subjective performance evaluation measures. A data set of the German Bundesliga was used to test if the two different performance measure come to equal results. It is shown that differences in means exist but equivalence tests support the hypothesis that both measures could be treated as equal. In toto, it seems that in an environment where performance is relatively good to measure objective and subjective performance evaluations lead to equivalent results.

Keywords: performance appraisal, subjective and objective performance.

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Introduction

> *"There is perhaps not a more important human resources system in orga-*
> *nizations than performance evaluation."*   (Judge and Ferris 1993, 80)

A huge majority of employers use performance appraisals as a part of their human resources management (Cappelli and Conyon 2018, p. 89). The procedure is important for many decisions in human resources management (HRM) and due to its impact, an important tool for the companies' performance. "Performance appraisal is a key tool in companies that provides information about employees performance in order to make important decisions, such as salary adjustments, promotions, identification of training and development needs, documentation of performance levels or behaviours that may cause firing or sanctions." (Espinilla et al. 2013, p. 459)

In a standard performance appraisal supervisors evaluate the performance of their supervisees, requesting employees to act in the interests of the employer (Cappelli and Conyon 2018, p. 88). Typically the process follows a yearly routine, beginning with the definition of the performance goals which can be assessed or redefined until the final performance appraisal by the superior (Frederiksen et al. 2017, p. 411). "Traditional conceptualizations of the performance-rating process imply that performance is a knowable and observable objective reality and that performance ratings are reasonable reflections of that reality." (Judge and Ferris 1993, 97)

Because of its important role in HRM many researchers promoted a better understanding of the employee evaluation processes. Organisational justice is an often-cited theory in the appraisal context. It can be distinguished into four dimensions, distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational justice (Colquitt 2001, p. 386). Whereas Colquitt (2001) demonstrated that the justice dimensions influence important corporate outcomes as commitment. Important for this article is the procedural justice, which is defined as the perceived fairness of the procedures the decision is based on (Roberson and Stewart 2006, p. 284). Procedural justice is fostered by a fair decision making process (Colquitt 2001, p. 386). Roberson and Stewart suggested that perceived accuracy in the employee feedback process might motivate to improve performance (Roberson and Stewart 2006, p. 293).

In the study of Taylor et al. employees perceived a greater accuracy and fairness in the appraisal system when evaluated with a due-process appraisal (Taylor et al. 1995, 518). One of the favourable rules of this evaluation method is the accuracy rule, accordingly, managers and employees record performance accurately

and use these records for the justification of performance evaluations. Albright and Levy concluded that the more credible the sources and their feedback were the more favourable was the evaluation of the feedback (Albright and Levy 1995).

Additionally, many other researchers focus on the biases that can occur during the performance evaluation of the supervisor. The process of performance appraisals is often perceived as unfair because employees often only depend on the single opinion of the supervisor (Selvarajan and Cloninger 2012, p. 3067). Subjectivity in performance appraisals are prone to different biases such as social relations (Choon and Embi 2012, p. 190) or demographic similarities that can influence the evaluation process (Judge and Ferris 1993, 87). "Supervisors can (ab) use their discretion in determining subjective performance evaluations by directing subordinates toward activities that are not valued by the organization. Biased supervision is costly and reduces the optimal strength of subjective performance pay, as in case of incongruent verifiable performance measurement." (Delfgaauw and Souverijn 2016, p. 120) A brief digression: Objective criteria for quantitative and qualitative employee performance could be a turnover rate whereas subjective indicators could be the perceived satisfaction with the employees work (Wesche and Sonderegger 2019, pp. 200–201).

The arguments for the use of algorithms in the decision-making process are often focusing on such biases and the discretion of the supervisor. With automatization of the decision making processes human discretion and biases can be limited (Danaher 2016, pp. 262–263). The use of data mining in human resource management (HRM) is also a prospering research field (Strohmeier and Piazza 2013, p. 2410). Taking this into account, a reduction of human limitations with the help of an algorithm should lead to a fairer perceived process.

This article uses the definition of Lee for algorithms, who defined it as "[..] a computational formula that autonomously makes decisions based on statistical models or decision rules without explicit human intervention. This reflects the recent advancement of the autonomous decision-making capabilities of algorithms from artificial intelligence and machine learning, and current usage of the term in popular media." (Lee 2018, p. 3)

Nevertheless, it is not said, that an algorithmic decision leads per se to a higher perceived fairness of the decision-making process. Nagtegaal (2021) focused on the effect of the inclusion of algorithms in managerial decisions on procedural justice perceptions. Her research results suggest that adding an algorithm to a manager's decision-making process can increase the perception of procedural justice for high complexity practice (Nagtegaal 2021, p. 1). Whereas decisions in high complexity made only by computers would be perceived as lower in procedural justice than decisions made by a manager.

Lee (2018) arguments that the perceived fairness of an algorithmic decision would depend on task characteristics. With tasks that require human skills, like hiring and work evaluation, the human decisions were perceived as fairer than the algorithmic decisions (Lee 2018, p. 1).

The phenomenon of negative tendencies toward algorithmic decision-makers of people, knowing about the algorithmic presence, is called algorithm aversion (Köbis and Mossink 2021, p. 2). These reservations about automated processes also occur when it is obvious that an algorithm can achieve better results than an expert (Filiz et al. 2021, p. 1).

> *"If verifiable performance measures are imperfect, subjective performance evaluation may provide a more accurate assessment of employees' performance, thereby providing better incentives for employees."*
>
> (Delfgaauw and Souverijn 2016, p. 107)

This article uses a sports data set to test if subjective and objective performance measures come to equal performance evaluation results. Professional soccer offers a unique chance to undertake this analysis, to the author's knowledge, this is the first article, which uses this opportunity to gain new helpful insights regarding performance evaluation processes.

Research results

> *"Sport* [..] *provides opportunities to observe, accurately measure, and compare variables of interest over time and to test hypotheses with highly motivated respondents in quasi-laboratory conditions."* (Wolfe et al. 2005, p. 185)

The research setting of this article is professional football and uses the unique research opportunities that come with it. "There is no research setting other than sports where we know the name, face, and life history of every production worker and supervisor in the industry. Total compensation packages and performance statistics for each individual are widely available, and we have a complete data set of worker-employer matches over the career of each production worker and supervisor in the industry." (Kahn 2000, p. 75)

As performance is relatively good to measure in sports like professional football, many statistical measures exist. Even if these football statistics are not (yet) as distinctive as they are in the big North American sports like Baseball or Basketball. There are some differences between football and the popular North American sports. Work interdependencies between the players are often named

as a factor that makes evaluating football players more complicated than in other sports, where isolated actions can be assessed with statistics (Della Torre et al. 2018, p. 126). Nevertheless, in recent years, more and more statistical analyses appear also in professional football.

From the literature three streams in measuring performance can be distinguished. Firstly, some authors use composite performance measures or simple indexes. An index is a numerical result of several individual indicators. An important criterion for the quality of an index is the indicator selection and the indicator weight. Experts can, for example, rate the weights of the indicators or be estimated empirically with statistical analyses. However, the simplest form of an unweighted indicator is to use an additive index. Therefore, the numerical indicator results are summed up and averaged (Bortz and Döring 2006, pp. 143–149).

The second possibility to measure performance in football stems from the media coverage of the industry. Several sports magazines or newspapers in Europe rate football players (e.g., the German Kicker, the Spanish Marca or the Italian Gazzetta dello Sport). The rating person could be a group of many or a single journalist which elaborate on each player's game performance. In the case of the German sports magazine kicker, the ratings correspond to German school grades ranging from 1 (exceptional) to 6 (very poor) (Frick 2011, p. 102). According to Della Torre et al., the specialized journalists' performance perception of a player captures two performance dimensions, the quantitative (e.g., goals scored) and the qualitative dimension (e.g., effectiveness) (Della Torre et al. 2018, p. 125). Nevertheless, these ratings are subjective performance measures (Frick 2011, p. 102), which makes them prone to individual biases.

Thirdly, there are more and more algorithmic performance measures in professional sports. Such as the LigaInsider Performance index for the players of the first German division in professional football. Their algorithms take more than 250 variables into account and calculates depending on the players position a school rating as the journalists from the kicker magazine do (LigaInsider). The authors of the webpage claim to have the fairest performance evaluation because it would not depend on a journalist's subjective perception. The biggest difference towards the first category is the sheer amount of data which is used for the calculation of the index. In the first stream researchers only focus on a few indicators like assists, tackling or goals.

The data set of this article consists of two different sources. The performance measures of all 1. Bundesliga players were collected for the seasons 2019–2020 and 2020–2021. On the one hand, from the homepage of the German sports magazine kicker, the player's average evaluation the kicker Note. On the other

hand, the same was done for all average performance index from LigaInsider of all players which were evaluated during the mentioned campaigns. Both measures are good to compare because both follow the abovementioned German school grade system, the grades can range from 1 (exceptional) to 6 (very poor). A school grade would be technically speaking classified as an ordinal variable. Nevertheless, if a variable has at least five increments, it can be treated as a metric variable (Berry 1993, p. 47). Furthermore both data sources treat the variable as metric, as they offer an average and additionally, researchers as well, used the kicker grade as dependent variable of their regression analysis (Frick 2011, p. 104).

Table 1 demonstrates important statistical measures of both performance measures. In total 794 evaluations were made by kicker and 435 were made by LigaInsider. From the mentioned quartiles it can be already seen that both evaluations have 50 percent of the observations in a pretty similar range. Which is also graphically demonstrated with the following Boxplot analysis.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Min	1st Qu	Median	Mean	3rd Qu	Max	N
Kicker	1.500	3.283	3.605	3.636	3.970	6.000	794
LigaInsider	2.350	3.480	3.740	3.722	3.980	4.680	435

Figure 1. Boxplot Kicker and Liga Insider Ratings

Figure 1 displays the data for all ratings which were allotted during the two seasons. The analysis shows that the kicker has outliers on both ends whereas the LigaInsider has only outliers on the lower end of the rating system. The minimum and maximum kicker grade show that almost the full spectrum from 1 to 6 was used. Indeed, both mean and median seem to be very similar, as well as the 3rd quartile which is symbolized with the upper end of the boxes.

For 432 player / season data points a kicker as well as a LigaInsider rating is given. In Figure 2 the data was plotted against each other.


Figure 2. Plot

From the data points and the regression line a positive correlation between the two measures can be assumed. This impression is supported by the Pearson and Spearman correlation test, the test results are displayed in Table 2. Normally Spearman's rank correlation test is used for ordinal data and Pearson correlation for continuous data. Spearman's rho is with 0.78 very high, one would indicate a perfect association of ranks. The same strong positive relationship between the kicker and the LigaInsider grades supports the assumption drawn from the Pearson correlation. The higher the kicker grade, the higher the LigaInsider grade, and vice versa. Not only the high rho-value but the low p-value below 0.05 allows to rejects the null hypothesis, which assumes that there exists no correlation between the two variables.

Table 2. Correlation Test

Correlation Test / Variable	Kicker- LigaInsider	p-value
Spearman	0.782	< 2.2e-16
Pearson	0.775	< 2.2e-16

For further investigations of the differences between the average grades of kicker and LigaInsider, a normality test was performed. The results of the performed Shapiro-Wilk normality test suggest no normal distribution. The null hypothesis, that the variables are from a normal distribution, is rejected because the p-value is lower than 0.05. Therefore, the data seems not to be sampled from a normal distribution. Therefore, the test results advocate to proceed with non-parametric test for the analysis of the differences between the two grades.

Table 3. Normality Test

Variable / Normality Test	Shapiro-Wilk
Kicker and LigaInsider	p-value = 0.001748

To compare the two means of the different performance measures a paired t test will be used. T tests are especially in clinical research a widely used research method (Kim 2015, p. 540). As the sample data does not seem to meet standard distributional assumptions the bootstrap method is considered as an alternative approach (Frey 2018, p. 218). To test for differences between the paired samples of the kicker and the LigaInsider performance evaluation, a bootstrapped paired t tests was performed. The null hypothesis tests if the difference in means is zero and the alternative hypothesis is therefore that the difference in means is different from zero. If there is no difference between the two performance ratings the results would be close to zero and the differences in the means would be zero (Kim 2015, p. 544). Table 3 displays the test results. The low p-value indicates that there exit differences in means between the two performance measures. Nevertheless, the goal of this paper is to test if the two measures can be considered as equivalent and not if the difference in means equals zero. Therefore, the next step is to test for equivalence of the two performance ratings.

Table 4. Bootstrapped t test

estimate	statistic	p. value	parameter	conf. low	conf. high	method	Alter-native
−0.193	−15.309	1.47E-42	431	−0.2180	−0.1684	Bootstrapped Paired t-test	two.sided

To conclude statistical equivalence, the difference between groups is smaller than what is considered meaningful and statistically falls within a previously defined interval, the equivalence bounds (Lakens et al. 2018, p. 260). With two one-sided tests (TOST) equivalence is tested against the smallest effect size of interest (SESOI). Lakens et al. described three subjective approaches to justify the SESOI (Lakens et al. 2018, p. 262). The author divides between objective or subjective justification of the SESOI. The former variant would be based on quantifiable theoretical predictions. Whereas, three categories are described for the subjective justification. Firstly, with benchmarks, where the SESOI is set to a standardized effect size. Secondly, it can be based on related studies and thirdly, it can be based on a resource question.

As there is – to the authors knowledge – no previous research, the second approach is not applicable. As a consequence, the third approach subjective justification of raw differences will be used as first attempt. Remembering that both performance measures are using school grades from one to six. The allocation of quarter grades is a commonly used basic approach in student evaluation. That means, that the grades are commonly summarized in 0.25-steps, quarter-grades (e.g., a grade of 3.40 and a grade of 3.60 are commonly both reported as a 3.5). One of the data sources, the kicker magazine, allocates only half-grades. Nevertheless, the common use of quarter grades makes it plausible to take these steps as the borders for a significant difference. Accordingly, in the first test case, quarter grades –0.25 and +0.25 will be used as raw differences.

The results are displayed in Figure 3 and Table 5. Graphically it is shown in Figure 3 that the 90 % confidence interval lies in between the raw differences. If the confidence interval lies in between the equivalence margin [–0.25; 0,25]. If

Table 5. TOST Results with Raw Bounds

| TOST Results						
			t	df	p	
Kicker	LigaInsider	t-test	−7.72	431	<.001	
		TOST Upper	−18.5	431	<.001	
		TOST Lower	3.11	431	0.001	
Equivalence Bounds						
					90% Confidence interval	
			Low	High	Lower	Upper
Kicker	LigaInsider	Cohen's d	−0.521	0.521		
		Raw	−0.250	0.250	−0.216	−0.140

Kicker − Ligalnsider


Figure 3. TOST Results with Raw Bounds

the difference between the measures falls in these boundaries, statistical equivalence can be concluded or that the difference is too small to care about. With this result, statistical equality can be expected between the two performance measures. Table 5 displays besides the earlier discussed t-test, which assumes differences in means, the significance of the upper and lower TOST, the calculated verification that the two measures are both falling in the raw boundaries.

As a robustness check, the approach with a standardized effect size will be tested additionally. For that, the SESOI is set to a medium effect size of d = 0.5. According to the literature review of Lakens this would make it possible to reject only effects in the upper 25 %–33 % of the distribution effect sizes (Lakens et al. 2018, p. 262). Comparing Cohen's d in Table 5 and Table 6, it can be seen that both values are pretty similar (0.521 and 0.5). This shows that the boundaries do not differ much if the standardized or the raw effect size will be used. Whereas the standardized effect size is a little bit stricter than the raw effect size approach, as Cohen's d is 0.5 and therefore smaller. Nonetheless, the result does also not change, also with the stricter, standardizes effect size, statistical equivalence can be proved (see Figure 4 and Table 6).

In summary, with the bootstrapped t test differences in means where found. However, both equivalence test results proof statistical equivalence between the two performance measures. Which means that the objective and the subjective performance evaluation come to equivalent results. In the research setting of the German football Bundesliga, the evaluation of an expert, the kicker rating, seems to come to the same conclusion about performance than the data driven approach of LigaInsider does.

Table 6. TOST Results with Standardized Bounds

TOST Results						
			t	df	p	
Kicker	LigaInsider	t-test	−7.72	431	<.001	
		TOST Upper	−18.1	431	<.001	
		TOST Lower	2.67	431	0.004	
Equivalence Bounds						
					90% Confidence interval	
			Low	High	Lower	Upper
Kicker	LigaInsider	Cohen's d	−0.500	0.500		
		Raw	−0.240	0.240	−0.216	−0.140

Figure 4. TOST Results with Standardized Bounds

Discussion and Summary

> *"Objective measures are generally unavailable for workers who perform many different tasks in frequently changing environments or work in teams or in administrative and cross-divisional functions such as HR, legal, accounting, or finance."*   (Frederiksen et al. 2017, p. 409)

Despite conceptual arguments suggesting how functional performance appraisals should be, in practice they are one of the most unpopular and criticized

aspects of the modern workplace (Cappelli and Conyon 2018, p. 96). Roberson and Stewart conclude that motivating properties of feedback may depend on the perceived correctness of the feedback itself (Roberson and Stewart 2006, p. 283). The acceptance of a decision made by a computer or an algorithm is important when for example employee motivation should be addressed with it. Research results of several studies showed that humans face computer-made decisions with scepticism (Wesche and Sonderegger 2019, p. 204).

The results of this article demonstrate that it could be possible that an expert can evaluate the performance of employees as good as an algorithm can when performance is relatively easy to measure. As suggested by Nagtegaal, algorithms can be expected to become a great decision-making partner in highly complex practice, instead of becoming a substitute for manager (Nagtegaal 2021, p. 6). This describes also a transformation of the relationship between human users and computers. The clear master-slave paradigms changes to a more equal level of hierarchy between operators and computers (Wesche and Sonderegger 2019, p. 197). Delfgauw and Souverijn supposed that the combination of incongruent performance measures and biased supervision could moderate wrong incentives on employee's effort (Delfgaauw and Souverijn 2016, p. 107). The 360-degree appraisal overcomes some of the disadvantages of the traditional single source appraisal (Espinilla et al. 2013, p. 459). In this case the algorithmic evaluation can be used as another evaluating source in the process and help enhance procedural fairness.

Nevertheless, for the interpretation the specialities of the data set should be kept in mind. In total, it is important to remark that the perfect measure for the overall performance evaluation of a player is not available (Della Torre et al. 2018, p. 127). Nevertheless, performance in sport is relatively easy to measure the results of such a research setting might be different in a setting in which performance is not as easy to observe (Harder 1992, p. 332). Hall, Szymanski, and Zimbalist even state that the usually hidden information actions are not plausible in a sports context because the players regularly perform in front of large audiences (Hall et al. 2002, p. 157). However, other researchers make a direct link to the corporate world. Della Torre et al. state that a group of workers, having high skills and salaries like executive or senior management are to a certain extend comparable (Della Torre et al. 2014).

Regardless, this article demonstrated statistically that subjective and objective performance evaluation is coming to results that can be considered as equal. Further research could investigate the influence of the combination of human and algorithmic multi-source feedback on perceived procedural fairness. As the acceptance of multi-source feedback also depends as well on the perceived

procedural fairness (McCarthy and Garavan 2007, p. 912). Whether the combination of personal and data-based performance evaluation can influence the perceived fairness positively would be one of many possible research fields.

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COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION PRACTICES IN KYRGYZSTAN[1]

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Abstract. This research article studies collaborative consumption practices in Kyrgyzstan in the context of the Theory of Planned Behaviour and Auckland Individualism and Collectivism dimensions. The research aims to answer the question: To what extent are the Theory of Planned Behaviour and Individualism and Collectivism dimensions relevant framework to explaining intention to engage in collaborative consumption and collaborative consumption behaviour. A quantitative online survey of 308 respondents was conducted. A linear regression analysis was performed using the R statistics engine. The study found that dimensions of the TPB such as attitude, subjective norm, perceived behavioural control, and personal norms; and the dimension of individualism – responsibility are among the statistically significant positive predictors of intentions to engage in collaborative consumption. Whereas personal norms, behavioural beliefs, advice, and closeness are positive; biospheric value orientations and harmony are negative factors impacting the collaborative consumption behaviour of respondents.

Keywords: Kyrgyzstan, Collaborative consumption, Sharing Economy, Theory of Planned Behaviour, Individualism and Collectivism, AICS.

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Introduction

The concept of sharing economy is being widely studied and discussed in current times by researchers and businesses (Gruber, 2020). It has seen significant development in recent years within the expansion of wide online platforms usage and access to internet (Benkler, 2004; Nwaorgu, 2018).

Sharing is defined as "an alternative to the private ownership that is emphasized in both marketplace exchange and gift-giving… In sharing, two or more people may enjoy the benefits (or costs) that flow from possessing a thing. Rather than distinguishing what is mine and yours, sharing defines something as ours" (Belk, 2007, p. 127). Sharing economy and collaborative consumption emerged from mixing up different economic models that work on changing production ways and consumption cultures (Pasimeni, 2020). Its wide growth is due to several reasons including the economic crisis, expansion of internet-based technology, a paradigm shifts from hyper-consumerism to anti-consumerism as well as increasing interest in sustainable consumption (Belk, 2014; Nwaorgu, 2018).

Collaborative consumption stands for "traditional sharing, bartering, lending, trading, renting, gifting, and swapping redefined through technology and peer communities – that is remodelling business, consumerism, and the means we tend to live" (as cited in Nwaorgu, 2018, p. 240). It is one of the crucial models of economy towards sustainable consumption as sharing, bartering and swapping goods and services between several consumers reduces the use of economic resources (ac cited in Tuncel & Ozkan Tektas, 2020, p. 2). Though sharing is not a new concept as throughout history people used to share living space, food, and other items with each other (Wruk et al., 2019). Communal consumption was present for centuries as a system of survival from a scarcity of available economic resources (Perepeolkin, 2020). The practices of sharing economy were also present in the countries of the Soviet Union (Kashepov, 2020).

Chornaya Kassa (CHK) (literally, black cashbox from Russian) and Sherine (literally, treat from Kyrgyz language) are examples of sharing economy practices and traditional ROSCAs which are present today in Kyrgyzstan (Kuehnast & Dudwick, 2004; Mamadiiarov, 2019). The difference between CHK and Sherine is that the amount of funds collected in Sherine is always bigger compared to CHK. A group of people ranging from 5 to 12, usually co-workers, classmates, friends, neighbours, or relatives, agree on participation and each member of the group contributes a fixed amount of money each month. One member of the group gets the collected money or fund and the turn goes to the other one and so on. For each turn of fund collections, the group gets together over food to socialize. CHK and Sherine became widespread during the Soviet period due to the difficult

procedure of obtaining bank loans, the anti-consumerist ideology of the Soviet Union, and unpredictable purchase opportunities. Under the perestroika period and the transition economy, the demand for informal resources of loans and credits got higher and CHK became a very important informal credit mechanism for Kyrgyz people serving as means of survival in economic crisis (Nuehauser, 1993).

Several researches were done to identify the motivations behind persons' intentions to engage in collaborative consumption. However, there is a research gap in the available literature for the Kyrgyzstani context. This research article aims to fill in the research gap on people's motivations to engage in collaborative consumption in Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, the following are the research questions:

Q1: To what extent are the TPB and the AICS relevant theoretical frameworks to explain the intention to engage in collaborative consumption?

Q2: To what extent are the TPB and the AICS relevant theoretical frameworks to explain the collaborative consumption behaviour?

Literature review

The Theory of Planned Behaviour

The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) was created to analyse and predict human intention to do a certain task at a particular place or time (LaMorte, 2019). It is an extended model of the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) with an inclusion of perceived behavioural control (Rossi & Armstrong, 2008). It was effectively applied in various research papers including works on financial behaviours (Xiao, 2008), sport-related habits (Lu et al., 2011), and other types of human behaviour (Asare, 2015). TPB incorporates five components: attitude, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control (PBC), intentions, and behaviour (Passafaro et al., 2019). Attitude, subjective norms, intentions, and PBC interact with each other to determine behaviour (Figure 1). The extended model of the TPB features variables that are not previously mentioned such as personal norms, altruistic value orientation, biospheric value orientation, and egoistic value orientation (Roos & Hahn, 2017).


Figure 1. The Theory of Planned Behaviour (Hadadgar et al., 2016)

Attitude is a factor that measures the favourability scale of behaviour that is put under consideration. It also examines the outcomes of performing behaviour (LaMorte, 2019) and is a major determinant in predicting human intention (Ajzen, 1991). It consists of outcome evaluations and behavioural beliefs (Asare, 2015).

Behavioural intention refers to one's motivation of behaving in a certain way. The stronger the intention is, the more likely the action is to be fulfilled (LaMorte, 2019). Three independent constants that determine intentions are attitude toward behaviour, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control (Ajzen, 1991, p. 188).

Subjective norms are social factors that measure one's moral responsibility to attempt a behaviour or not (Ajzen, 1991, p. 188). It measures the degree to which a person can be influenced by people whose input is important in accomplishing an action (Rossi & Armstrong, 2008, p. 43).

Perceived behavioural control pertains to one's judgment of a task's difficulty level. It depends on situations and actions; therefore, it is more likely to change based on a person's perception of the situation (LaMorte, 2019). The more favourable subjective norms and attitudes towards behaviour are, the stronger PBC becomes which sequentially increases the strength of one's intention to perform a behaviour. The relevance of each component in determining intentions varies depending on the situation or behaviour in question. In some cases, the only attitude is important to assess the intentions, while in others PBC plays more of an important role (Ajzen, 1991, p. 188). PBC takes into account situations where people do not have full volitional control over the behaviour and act based on two factors: one's comfort of doing an action and availability of necessary resources (Hadadgar et al., 2016).

Auckland Individualism-Collectivism Scale (AICS)

AICS was invented by Shulruf and his colleagues to measure individualism and collectivism dimensions (Györkös et al., 2013). Individualism and collectivism framework is important due to its theoretical frugalness which means that it can help to understand differences in behaviour by only focusing on a few varying dimensions between two given cultures (Oyserman et al., 2002).

Individualism is a notion of valuing personal independence, freedom of choice, personal autonomy, and responsibility (Shulruf et al., 2007, p. 12–13). Individualists are more likely to have a distinct style of addressing and communicating as well as have a higher probability of choosing themselves over others (p. 1). Collectivists refer more to belonging and relatedness to a group of people, harmony, and a sense of duty to others. They identify themselves as part of a community rather than a separate entity and are more likely to emotionally restrain themselves to maintain harmony (p. 2).

According to the AICS, there are three dimensions of individualism and three dimensions of collectivism. They are responsibility, uniqueness, and competitiveness for individualism and advice, harmony and closeness for collectivism (Rubin et al., 2009).

Collaborative consumption

Collaborative Consumption is defined as a distribution of resources and gaining temporary access to goods and services without bearing the full costs and ownership of a service or a property (Toni et al., 2021). The notions of car sharing, house-sharing, and office sharing have risen in popularity in recent years. And popular applications such as BlaBlaCar, Uber, Yandex Drive, and many more can be considered as bright examples of collaborative consumption (UNECE, 2020, p. 44–51). Even though renting services such as car sharing is a relatively new phenomenon, the initiative itself has deep roots from traditional car renting advertisements in the Minneapolis Journal in July of 1904. It is believed that the first mention of car sharing appeared in Zürich in 1948. It was a car share program by the name of "Sefage", which is a short-term for Selbstfahrergenossenschaf or Self-Drive Cooperative (UNECE, 2020, p. 1). CC is a part of the sharing economy (John, 2013, p. 4). It is a high-tech phenomenon where people barter, rent, or exchange goods and services through social media networks and technology. There are three ways in which technology can be linked with CC: technology as an enabling factor of CC, technology as a driving factor of CC, and terminology and metaphors. John (2013) gives the technology two roles – a passive role as the medium for swapping, renting, and trading of goods and services: and an active role as the source of data exchange of GPS locations, skills, price, and availability.

Previous research on the TPB, AICS and CC

Roos and Hahn (2017) focus on control and behavioural beliefs by questioning people about the benefits and drawbacks of CC as well as the individual and general factors that facilitate such practices. Based on findings, they determined five common behavioural beliefs: cost savings, environmental protection, dependency on others' behaviour, efficient use of resources, and community with others. Cost savings was one of the most prevalent behavioural beliefs that persisted in many research papers relating to collaborative consumption (p. 11). Economic motivation is based on a man's rationalization of alternatives in terms of possible advantages and disadvantages. They also note that participating in collaborative consumption maximizes behaviour and utilizes lower-cost options (Mayasari & Chrisbaryanto, 2018).

Other papers suggest that cost-saving attracts those who are financially conscious and therefore, are willing to participate in CC practices to save funds (Kim & Jin, 2019).

Hypotheses

The previously conducted research validated the relationship between variables of the extended TPB and CC (Ianole-Călin et al., 2019; Roos & Hahn, 2017). Therefore, the first set of hypotheses are postulated and tested to validate those relationships in the context of Kyrgyzstan. The following hypotheses on respondents' intention to engage in CC are tested for validation:

H1. Respondents' attitude toward collaborative consumption positively impacts their intention to engage in collaborative consumption.

H2. Respondents' subjective norms regarding collaborative consumption positively impact their intention to engage in collaborative consumption.

H3. Respondents perceived behavioural control over collaborative consumption positively impacts their intention to engage in collaborative consumption.

H4. Respondents' personal norms positively impact their intention to engage in collaborative consumption.

More on, extensions of the TPB with behavioural beliefs, egoistic value orientations, and biospheric value orientations were proposed and tested in Ianole-Călin et al.'s study (2019). Although the initial study found them statistically insignificant, it was decided to examine them in this research project taking into consideration the new country sample:

H5. Respondents' behavioural beliefs positively impact their intention toward collaborative consumption.

H6. Respondents' biospheric values positively impact their intention toward collaborative consumption.

H7. Respondents' egoistic values negatively impact their intention toward collaborative consumption.

In addition, Ianole-Călin and her colleagues (2019) postulated and tested two more hypotheses about Individualism-Collectivism variables' impact on intention to engage in collaborative consumption. Responsibility as a dimension of individualism and advice as a dimension of collectivism in these hypotheses:

H8. Responsibility positively impacts respondents' intention to engage in collaborative consumption.

H9. Advice positively impacts respondents' intention to engage in collaborative consumption.

The following test the hypotheses validated by the study of Roos & Hahn (2017). It was found that perceived behavioural control and intention to consume collaboratively are statistically significant in explaining respondents' collaborative consumption behaviour. The latter variable was measured as an estimated frequency of purchasing items as a result of CC, or giving / receiving gifts, borrowing / ask for something.

H10. Perceived behavioural control positively related to collaborative consumption behaviour.

H11. Intention to consume collaboratively positively related to collaborative consumption behaviour.

Methodology

Pilot study

Prior to the main phase of data collection, a pilot study was conducted in mid-December 2021. The aim of the pilot study was to examine the understanding and comprehensibility of the questions. A total of 5 respondents participated in this phase. As a result, some of the questions were checked for word order, some words were replaced with appropriate ones and the time taken to complete the questionnaire was recorded.

Data collection process

Between January and March 2021, a web-based survey was conducted in Kyrgyzstan using the platform Google Forms. The link to the survey was distributed in groups on social platforms such as Telegram, WhatsApp and Facebook. The survey was also distributed by professors from two universities, including the Kyrgyz National University and the International University of Kyrgyzstan. Some carsharing companies operating in Kyrgyzstan were also asked to distribute the survey among their customers. Respondents were given information about the research and its purpose. They read the consent form to participate and agreed to participate by clicking the "Yes, I agree to participate" button. A total of 308 respondents participated in the quantitative survey. The extensive characteristics of the sample are provided in the Sample Statistics section.

Questionnaire

The questionnaire for the online quantitative survey was provided in two languages: Kyrgyz and Russian. The questions were translated from English and checked for consistency using the back-translation method. Respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement with the statements on a Likert scale from 1 to 7 and from 1 to 9, with 1 indicating strong disagreement and the earlier scores of 7 and 9 indicating strong agreement. The questionnaire included a number of questions from existing scales of TPB, AICS and CC, which were used in a previous study by Ianole-Călin et al. (2019).

The study replicated the existing theoretical framework developed for collaborative consumption by Roos & Hahn (2017). The list of items presented in Table 1 measured each dimension of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (detailed items in Appendix 1). All latent variables were based on three or more items as suggested by the authors of the original methodology. The three value orientations – Altruistic, Egoistic and Biospheric – were measured on a 9-point Likert scale, while the remaining variables were measured on a 7-point Likert scale.

The study used 30 items from the Auckland Individualism-Collectivism Scale to measure the following latent variables, which are listed in Table 2 below. The variables Competitiveness, Uniqueness, Responsibility are the dimensions of Individualism, whereas Advice, Harmony, and Closeness are the dimensions of Collectivism. All variables were measured on a 7-point Likert scale.

Table 1. The list of latent variables of the Theory of Planned Behaviour

No.	Latent Structure	Observed variables
1	Behavioural Intention (INT)	INT1, INT2, INT3
2	Attitudes (ATT)	ATT1, ATT2, ATT3, ATT4, ATT5, ATT6
3	Subjective Norms (SN)	SN1, SN2, SN3, SN4
4	Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC)	PBC1, PBC2, PBC3
5	Personal Norms (PN)	PN1, PN2, PN3
6	Behavioural Beliefs (BB)	CS1, CS2, ENV1, ENV2, DEP1, DEP2, EFF1, EFF2, COM1, COM2
7	Altruistic Value Orientation	ALT1, ALT2, ALT3, ALT4
8	Egoistic Value Orientation	EGO1, EGO2, EGO3
9	Biospheric Value Orientation	BIO1, BIO2, BIO3

Table 2. The list of latent variables for Individualism and Collectivism dimensions

No.	Latent Structure	Observed variables
1	Advice (ADVICE)	ADV1, ADV2, ADV3, ADV4
2	Harmony (HARMONY)	HARM1, HARM2, HARM3, HARM4, HARM5, HARM6
3	Closeness (CLOS)	CLOS1, CLOS2, CLOS3, CLOS4, CLOS5, CLOS6
4	Competitiveness (COMP)	COMPET1, COMPET2, COMPET3, COMPET4
5	Uniqueness (UNIQ)	UNIQ1, UNIQ2, UNIQ3, UNIQ4
6	Responsibility (RESP)	RESP1, RESP2, RESP3, RESP4, RESP 5, RESP6

The questionnaire also included control variables for collaborative consumption practices, including the frequency of CC practices such as renting, borrowing, swapping, accepting gifts or donations, buying second-hand items, resources. All items for CC were measured on a 7-point Likert scale, except for the item indicated on resources.

Control variables included age, gender, type and region of residence, education level, number of people living in the household, number of siblings, income, job presence, perceived financial status, religion, and perception of the near future.

Research Strategy

A linear regression analysis with average scores was performed using R statistics. For every variable measured using the 7 or 9-point Likert scale, the average score was calculated using the following chunk code: *mydata$averageINT < (mydata$Intention1+mydata$Intention2 +mydata$Intention3)/3 (example for Intention variable).* Before running a linear regression, the correlation and directionality of data were analysed. A step function was run to evaluate the explanatory power of dependent variables, validity and usefulness of the models. Regression analysis was run using the lm() function.

Sample statistics

A sample size of 308 respondents participated in an online quantitative survey out of which 82 % are females ($n = 254$) and 18 % are males ($n = 54$). The respondents' age ranges from 17 to 70 years old. The mean age is 29.45, with a standard deviation (SD) equal to 12.55 and median equal to 25. The sample comprises 87 % of the urban ($n = 268$) and 13 % of the rural ($n = 40$) population of Kyrgyzstan.

The majority of respondents have completed higher education (59.7 %), incomplete higher education (21.4 %), and incomplete secondary education (6.2 %).

The average number of people living in respondents' household is 5, with a SD = 1.75. There are 10 people living in the biggest household.

The average number of siblings respondents' have is 3, with a SD = 2.34. The maximum number of siblings respondents indicated is 10 siblings (Table 3).

Majority (57 %) of the respondents are currently employed (*n* = 176) while the rest of the respondents (43 %) do not currently have a job. Of those who are not employed (*n* = 143), the majority currently have student status at university or school (48.5 %), are housewives or on maternity leave (21.97 %), and temporarily unemployed but looking for a job (18.93 %). Almost every second respondent from the survey said that he/she can easily buy durable things, but buying really expensive things like a car is a big problem for them (44.8 %). 27.3 % (*n* = 84) of the respondents have enough income for food and clothing but buying expensive durable things like a TV, refrigerator is a problem for them. On the other hand, 14.6 % of the respondents find it difficult to afford clothes. Majority of the respondents (49.7 %) reported that their monthly household income is more than KGS 20,000 (more than USD 239). Whereas 10.4 % of the individuals reported their monthly household income as up to 20,000, 9.7 % as up to 18,000 and 7.8 % as up to KGS 12,000.

The vast majority of the respondents are Muslim (85.7 %). 33 respondents (10.7 %) do not profess any religion, 1.6 % are Orthodox Christians and 1.3 % are atheists. Most of the respondents who participated in the survey live in the country's capital (64 %). The rest of the respondents are from other regions, including Osh (11 %), Issyk-Kul (10.7 %), Chui (6.5 %). The summary of the sample statistics can be found in Table 4.

Table 3. Sample statistics

Variable	%	Variable	%
Gender	**N = 308**	**Financial Status**	**N = 308**
Female	82	We can easily purchase durable things, but buying really expensive things such as a car is associated with big problems for us	44,8
Male	18	There is enough income for food and clothing, but buying expensive durable items such as a TV, refrigerator is a problem for us	27,3
Residence	**N = 308**	We have enough money for food, but buying clothes causes us difficulties	14,6

Variable	%	Variable	%
Urban	87	Currently, we can afford a lot: a car, a summer vacation trip, a foreign trip	6,5
Rural	13	There is only enough money for food, but no longer enough for utilities	5,2
Education	*N* = 308	There is not enough money even for food	1,6
Complete higher education	59,7	**Employment status**	*N* = 308
Incomplete higher education	21,4	Currently employed	57
Incomplete secondary education	6,2	Currently unemployed	43
Academic Degree	4,2	Reason of unemployment status	*N* = 132
Secondary education	2,6	Student	48,5
College	2,3	Housewife / on maternity leave	21,97
Elementary education	1,6	Temporarily unemployed; looking for a job	18,93
Secondary vocational education	1,3	Retired (age, illness)	7,57
Without education	0,7	Unemployed; NOT looking for a job	3,03
Household Income	*N* = 308	**Religion**	*N* = 308
More than 20,001 KGS	49,7	Islam / Muslim	85,7
18,001-20,000 KGS	10,4	Nothing	10,7
15,001-18,000 KGS	9,74	Orthodox Christianity	1,6
10,001-12,000 KGS	7,8	Atheism	1,3
12,001-15,000 KGS	5,52	Christianity: Protestant (Baptist, Adventist, Jehovah's Witnesses)	0,6
8,001-10,000 KGS	4,9	**Region**	*N* = 308
6,001-8,000 KGS	4,5	Bishkek (capital city)	64
Up to 700 KGS	1,9	Osh	11
1,201- 1,500 KGS	1,62	Issyk-Kul	10,7
1,501-2,000 KGS	1,3	Chui	6,5
2001-3000 KGS	1	Naryn	4,5
701-900 KGS	0,6	Jalal-Abad	1,6
3001-4000 KGS	0,6	Talas	1,3
901-1,200 KGS	0,32	Batken	0,3

Research findings

CC practice frequency

The estimated frequency of purchasing items or goods in the last month due to sharing is 4 (med = 4) on a Likert scale, where 1 means never and 7 means every day. The estimated frequency of sharing something with someone in the last month is 5 (med = 5). As it is shown in the Table 4, respondents were more likely to receive / make gifts and borrow/ask for something more frequently than they were to exchange something with someone or buy second-hand items.

Table 4. Collaborative consumption practices

#	Variable	Median
Beh1	Please estimate how many times you have purchased something in the last 4 weeks as a result of collaborative consumption	4
Beh2	Please rate how many times in the last 4 weeks you have shared something.	5
	How many times in the past 4 weeks have you done one of the following?	
CC1	Rented something	3
CC2	Borrowed / Asked for something	4
CC3	Exchanged something with someone	2
CC4	Received or made a gift	5
CC5	Bought something used (Second hand)	2

30 % (n = 89) of respondents reported that they have played Chornaya Kassa or Sherine in the last 12 months. 27 % (n = 83) of respondents have rented apartment in the past 12 months. And 12 % (*n* = 37) have rented a car in the past 12 months. In total, 166 respondents (53.8 %) out of 308 indicated that they were engaged in CC in the past 12 months.

Respondents reported to share frequently with others books (*n* = 34), food and groceries (33), apartment or house (32), car (22) and clothes (20). Besides them, respondents also shared offices and business premises, electronics, household equipment and different accessories in the last 4 weeks.

Intention To Engage in Collaborative Consumption

Intention to engage in collaborative consumption practices was measured in a 7-point Likert-scale by three items including intention, try, and plan to share / consume goods and services with others in the near future. The mean score for all three items is 4.64 with a med= 4.67 and sd= 1.77. A linear regression model explains the dependent variable intention to engage in CC as a function of all latent variables of the TPB, the AICS dimensions and demographic variables. The step-wise analysis of the model resulted in 63.35. Below is the chunk code of the *Model #1:*

> *Model1 ← lm (averageINT ~ averageATT + averageSN + averagePBC + aver-agePN + averageALT + averageBIO + averageEGO + averageBB + average-Advice + averageHarmony + averageClos + averageCompet + averageUniq + averageRespons + Age + Gender + Residence + Education + Household + Siblings + Income + Job + Financial + Religion + Region, data = mydata)*

ATT, PBC, PN and BIO are significant variables in explaining respondents' intention to engage in CC. Attitude is statistically highly significant positive factor that influence intention to engage in CC with three stars of significance ($p < 0.001$). The higher the score of attitude towards CC is, the more likely respondents are to have higher intentions to engage in CC. Therefore, the H1 which states that consumers' attitude towards CC positively related to their intention to CC is confirmed. PBC and PN are also statistically significant positive factors that influence intention to engage in CC with one star of significance ($p < 0.05$). The higher the scores of PBC and PN are, the more likely respondents are to have higher intentions to engage in CC. Thus, the H3 and H4 positing that the positive impact of PBC and PN on intention are confirmed. The BIO value orientation has weak negative influence on respondents' intention to engage in CC with a p-value < 0.0873. Therefore, the H6 which posits that BIO value orientation influences consumers' intention to CC is rejected. The model also found that respondents' intention to engage in CC declines with ageing ($p < 0.05$). Poor financial situation such as inability to afford food ($p < 0.05$) and utilities ($p = 0.0644$) is also among the positive factors predicting intention. Those who have siblings are also among those who have intention to engage in CC (p-value = 0.0511). The model has good explanatory power of 72.2 %. Below is the output of the *Model #1:*

Table 5. The model- Intention as a function of TPB and AICS

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
−3.9195	−0.4571	−0.0379	0.6369	2.7169

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)	−1.69722	1.516365	−1.119	0.2641
averageATT	0.544719	0.081448	6.688	1.47e−10 ***
averageSN	0.08096	0.075744	1.069	0.2862
averagePBC	0.187721	0.081595	2.301	0.0222 *
averagePN	0.147928	0.06708	2.205	0.0283 *
averageALT	0.031096	0.068227	0.456	0.6489
averageBIO	−0.132039	0.076919	−1.717	0.0873 .
Age	−0.017703	0.007364	−2.404	0.0169 *
Siblings	0.072807	0.03715	1.96	0.0511 .
Income 901-1,200 som	2.106396	1.25336	1.681	0.0941 .
Financial (Barely afford food)	1.182472	0.569216	2.077	0.0388 *
Financial (Barely afford utilities)	0.773751	0.416505	1.858	0.0644 .

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Residual standard error: 1.033 on 250 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.7217,   Adjusted R-squared: 0.6582
F-statistic: 11.37 on 57 and 250 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

The stepwise analysis was run in order to find out better fitting model explaining intention to engage in CC. It resulted in a *Model #2* with a 17.53 AIC score which is lower compared to the score of *Model #1*. The explanatory power is 69.74 % which is very good as well. The better fitting model excluded BB, ALT, EGO factors of TPB, and some demographic variables. The *Model #2* was run in the following chunk code:

> *Model2 ← lm (averageINT ~ averageATT + averageSN + averagePBC + averagePN + averageBIO + averageClos + averageRespons + Age + Gender + Residence + Siblings + Financial, data = mydata)*

All other dimensions of TPB are statistically significant according to the result of the regression analysis. ATT is statistically highly significant positive factor that influence intention to engage in CC with three stars of significance (p < 0.001). The higher the score of attitudes toward CC is, the more likely respondents are to have higher intentions to engage in CC. Therefore, the H1 which states that consumers' attitude towards CC positively impacts their intention to CC is confirmed by the better fitting Model #2 as well. The regression model also has confirmed the hypotheses H3 and H4 with PBC and PN being statistically significant positive

factors that influence intention to CC with one star of significance ($p < 0.05$). The H9 is also rejected for BIO value orientation with a p-value of $p < 0.071$.

Compared to the result of the previous model, the current regression found SN to be a significant factor influencing respondent' intention to CC. SN is marginally significant positive factor, if the p-value threshold requirement is relaxed ($p < 0.057$). Therefore, the H2 is supported as a result of regression analysis. Below is the output of the Model #2:

Table 6. The model- Intention as a function of TPB and AICS with lower AIC

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
−3.5365	−0.5207	−0.0506	0.6522	2.5896

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)	−0.712738	0.538044	−1.325	0.186316
averageATT	0.545997	0.069931	7.808	1.06e−13 ***
averageSN	0.121238	0.06335	1.914	0.056628 .
averagePBC	0.156742	0.06997	2.24	0.025838 *
averagePN	0.13605	0.059472	2.288	0.022877 *
averageBIO	−0.088893	0.04905	−1.812	0.070971 .
averageClos	0.082099	0.058886	1.394	0.164322
averageRespons	0.14058	0.074471	1.888	0.060061 .
Age	−0.01972	0.005481	−3.598	0.000377 ***
GenderMale	−0.231546	0.158399	−1.462	0.144878
ResidenceUrban	0.530627	0.174083	3.048	0.002514 **
Siblings	0.095937	0.029323	3.272	0.001198 **
Financial (Can't afford car)	0.186727	0.248297	0.752	0.452641
Financial (Can't afford clothes)	0.226002	0.275738	0.82	0.4131
Financial (Can't afford durable items)	−0.312818	0.259781	−1.204	0.229506
Financial (Barely afford food)	0.977605	0.51325	1.905	0.057801 .
Financial (Barely afford utilities)	0.589552	0.349684	1.686	0.092876 .

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Residual standard error: 0.9988 on 291 degrees of freedom

Multiple R-squared: 0.6974,   Adjusted R-squared: 0.6808

F-statistic: 41.92 on 16 and 291 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

Besides variables of TPB, the regression analysis found Responsibility (averageRespons), a dimension of Individualism, as marginally significant positive factor, if the 0.05 threshold requirement is relaxed (p-value < 0.06). Along with predictors of respondents' intention to CC, age, place of residence and number of siblings of respondents are statistically highly significant factors. The older the respondent is, the less likely he or she is to have intention to engage in CC (p < 0.001). Consumers living in urban areas are more likely to have higher intentions to engage in CC (p-value < 0.01). And respondents who have reported to have siblings are also among those who are more likely to have intentions to practice CC. When speaking about financial situation of respondents, it is revealed by the model results that those who are facing lack of finances and cannot afford even food, are most likely to practice CC as well. The factor is marginally significant, if the 0.05 threshold requirement is relaxed (p-value < 0.058).

To summarize, ATT, SN, PBC, and PN were found statistically significant positive factors predicting respondents' intention to engage in CC. Therefore, H1-H4 are confirmed. However, both of the models did not find any relationship between intention and BB, BIO, EGO, and Advice. Thus, H5-H7 and H9 are rejected. H8 which states that responsibility is positively related to intention to engage in CC is supported by the *Model#2* if the 0.05 threshold requirement is relaxed (p-value < 0.06).

Collaborative consumption behaviour

The current practices of collaborative consumption were measured in 7 questions. They are presented in the previous section *4.1.1 CC practice frequency*. The further models predict collaborative consumption behaviour of respondents.

The *Model #3* predicts CC behaviour of respondents as a factor of latent variables of the TPB, the AICS dimensions and demographics. The stepwise analysis resulted in AIC equal 91.9. It has a good explanatory power of 42.97 %. The following chunk code was run:

> *Model3 ← lm(averageBehavior ~ averageINT + averageATT + averageSN + averagePBC + averagePN + averageALT + averageBIO + averageEGO + averageBB + averageAdvice + averageHarmony+ averageClos + averageCompet + averageUniq +averageRespons+ Age + Gender + Residence + Education + Household + Siblings + Income + Job + Financial + Religion + Region, data = mydata)*

According to the results of the regression analysis, PN, BIO, BB and dimensions of Collectivism – Advice, Harmony, Closeness are statistically significant factors in predicting CC behaviour of respondents. Intention and PBC are not

statistically significant. Thus, H10 and H11 are rejected. However, the regression model found other relationships.

PN is statistically significant positive predictor of CC behaviour (p-value < 0.05). Behavioural beliefs BB is statistically highly significant positive predictor of CC behaviour with three stars of significance (p-value < 0.001). Advice and Closeness also have a positive influence on CC behaviour with a p-value < 0.01. Along with Harmony (< 0.01), BIO orientation values (p-value < 0.01) are shown to have statistically significant negative impact on respondents' CC behaviour. The model also revealed that male respondents are more likely to practice CC compared to female respondents (p-value < 0.05). Regarding the financial situation of respondents, the model shows that the worse the financial situation of respondents is, the more likely they are to be engaged in CC. Below is the output of the *Model #3:*

Table 7. The model- CC behaviour as a function of TPB and AICS

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
−2.8749	−0.6870	0.1032	0.5411	3.0344

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)	0.299584	1.568106	0.191	0.848643
averageINT	0.015587	0.06524	0.239	0.811366
averageATT	−0.001906	0.091223	−0.021	0.983349
averageSN	0.12184	0.078311	1.556	0.121014
averagePBC	−0.078921	0.085054	−0.928	0.354362
averagePN	0.181262	0.069865	2.594	0.010036 *
averageALT	−0.015449	0.070408	−0.219	0.826497
averageBIO	−0.252966	0.079811	−3.17	0.001718 **
averageEGO	−0.032443	0.05969	−0.544	0.587251
averageBB	0.36645	0.095881	3.822	0.000167 ***
averageAdvice	0.182154	0.069865	2.607	0.009678 **
averageHarmony	−0.223112	0.100769	−2.214	0.027730 *
averageClos	0.246037	0.078597	3.13	0.001954 **
averageCompet	−0.122655	0.069122	−1.774	0.077209 .

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
averageUniq	0.109694	0.078425	1.399	0.163141
averageRespons	−0.039812	0.110833	−0.359	0.719745
Age	−0.008992	0.007684	−1.17	0.242993
GenderMale	0.469659	0.195722	2.4	0.017147 *
Financial(Can't afford car)	0.579668	0.304034	1.907	0.057725 .
Financial(Can't afford utilities)	0.938921	0.432597	2.17	0.030920 *

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Residual standard error: 1.066 on 249 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.4297,   Adjusted R-squared: 0.2969
F-statistic: 3.235 on 58 and 249 DF, p-value: 1.029e-10

The stepwise analysis was run in order to find out better fitting model predicting CC behaviour of respondents. It resulted in a *Model #4* with a 45.74 AIC score which is lower compared to the score of *Model #3*. The explanatory power is 31.63 % which is good as well. The better fitting model excluded demographic variables and thus showed the factors that have the most significant impact on CC behaviour. The chunk code for the better fitting model is below:

$$Model4 \leftarrow lm(averageBehavior \sim averageSN + averagePN + averageBIO + averageBB + averageAdvice + averageHarmony + averageClos, data = mydata)$$

The model has similar results as in the previous one with only minor changes in estimated coefficients. Intention and PBC were found not statistically significant in this regression analysis as well. Thus, H10 and H11 are rejected.

PN factor has a positive and statistically significant impact on CC behaviour (p-value < 0.01). BB, Advice, and Closeness are statistically highly significant factors impacting CC behaviour (p-value < 0.001), while BIO value orientation and Harmony have negative statistically highly significant effect (p-value < 0.001). The higher the average score for both Advice and Closeness, the more likely the respondent is to consume collaboratively with others. However, the less the average score for harmony, the less likely he/she is to share. Below is the output of the *Model #4:*

Table 8. The model- CC behaviour as a function of TPB and AICS with lower AIC
Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
−2.66645	−0.74833	0.07263	0.68507	3.10715

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)	2.12918	0.45528	4.677	4.42e-06***
averageSN	0.08142	0.05597	1.455	0.146778
averagePN	0.16588	0.05194	3.194	0.001554 **
averageBIO	−0.26698	0.05148	−5.186	3.95e-07 ***
averageBB	0.30459	0.07855	3.877	0.000130 ***
averageAdvice	0.22117	0.05832	3.792	0.000181 ***
averageHarmony	−0.30019	0.08566	−3.504	0.000527 ***
averageClos	0.25185	0.06771	3.719	0.000238 ***

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Residual standard error: 1.063 on 300 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.3163,   Adjusted R-squared: 0.3004
F-statistic: 19.83 on 7 and 300 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

In a summary of previous findings, PBC and INT were found insignificant and thus, H10 and H11 are rejected. However, PN, BB, Advice, Closeness were found statistically significant positive factors predicting CC behaviour. Whereas, BIO and Harmony were revealed to have negative relationship with CC behaviour.

Conclusion

The research article aimed to test previously validated impact of the TPB and AICS on CC. The study applied linear regression analysis with average scores of each variable. It was revealed that attitude, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control and personal norms are statistically significant positive factors impacting intention to engage in collaborative consumption. Therefore, the study confirmed the previously validated impacts of the TPB on CC as it was found out by Ianole-Călin et al. (2019) and Roos & Hahn (2017). Responsibility, the dimension of Individualism, was found to be a statistically significant positive factor impacting intention to engage in CC as well (if the 0.05 threshold requirement is relaxed (p-value < 0.06).

Personal norms, behavioural beliefs, advice, and closeness were found to be statistically significant positive factors in predicting collaborative consumption behaviour of respondents. Kyrgyzstan as a country with a post-Soviet history (Kuehnast et al., 2004) where people used to live in communal settings and have collectivist lifestyle and values. Therefore, being close to the community might be important for

Kyrgyz people and by engaging in collaborative consumption they try to be closer to each other. In addition, biospheric values and harmony were revealed to have negative relationship with collaborative consumption behaviour of respondents.

Research to date has revealed the impact of the TPB on collaborative consumption behaviour. However, the theory should be tested on different samples in order to validate its usefulness and applicability. The aim of this research article was to validate previously tested and confirmed hypotheses about the impact of latent variables of the TPB and dimensions of the AICS on intention to engage in CC, and currently estimated CC behaviour. Therefore, the research article supports and refines the proposed theoretical model as Kyrgyzstan is a country with a different country profile.

Moreover, the article works towards minimizing the existing literature gap on collaborative consumption motivators in the territory of Kyrgyzstan as there is no literature available on the aforementioned topic. The first limitation of the study is that only half of respondents (53.8 %) reported that they have practiced CC in the previous 12 months. Second, the quantitative survey was distributed on social media platforms. Third, the median age of respondents is 25 (mean 29.5). Therefore, the study's sample might not represent the entire population of the country. Further research should work more on a sampling design.

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REFLECTIONS ON GREEN SPACES AND URBAN LEADERSHIP FROM RIGA

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Abstract. Emerging Urban Leaders programme hosted by the Salzburg Global Seminar coincides with the green spaces and places gaining attention internationally and Europe-wide. This focus on the green areas as crucial enablers of sustainability and quality of life of the city dwellers sets excellent grounds for a concise autoethnographic overview of how the vast green infrastructure in and around Riga serves the urban zest to explore and benefit from safe and enjoyable spaces for recreational, educational and fitness activities during the pandemic.

Keywords: Latvia, green spaces, outdoors activities, Riga, Salzburg Global Seminar.

Introduction

To summarise the main lessons drawn from the Emerging Urban Leaders programme of the Salzburg Global Seminar, parks are socially, historically, culturally, and economically charged spaces. These intellectual, social, and spatial constructs mirror the developments of a specific local, regional and national entity. This viewpoint highlights the narratives that revolved around parks in Europe during the COVID-19 pandemic with a focus on the Latvian setting.

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The Salzburg Global Seminar was founded by three students of Harvard University (Winkler, 1999; Greene, 2003; Brownell Mitic, 2019). The Seminar has been positioned as "one of the world's foremost international educational centres committed to global understanding through broadening the perspectives of tomorrow's leaders" (Russon & Ryback, 2002, p. 97). The seminar is noted in the academic literature on soft power as a notable elite network of the Cold War era (Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 169). In 1947, the Seminar was launched as the Salzburg Seminar in American Civilization. Since then, it has gathered diverse circles of experts. Librarians (Lankes, Stephens and Arjona, 2015; Hunt, 2019) and representatives of the San José State University (Reade et al., 2014) are two contemporary examples. Emerging Urban Leaders programme is among the most recent thematic introductions to the overall panoply of the Seminar's convened circles of thought leaders.

This article is based on an autoethnographic account of a visitor to various green spaces in and around Riga, the capital city of Latvia. The visits took place in 2021 during the pandemic. As the literature review, analysis of policy documents, and personal observations synthesised in the subsequent paragraphs demonstrate, parks are a conducive topic for international exchanges and help to discover the diversity of European contexts and specific nuances of European integration. The variety of publications feeding into this article confirms the earlier acknowledgement that public space is a salient topic across several academic disciplines. Green spaces benefit from a similar level of attention.

The first part of this viewpoint outlines the international context. The second part elaborates on the European setting and developments surrounding various green spaces. The third part turns attention to the city-specific experiences of Riga. The concluding part summarises the key findings.

The International Green Drive

Discussions of the 1st cohort of the Emerging Urban Leaders programme coincided with a global turn towards green solutions and a reinforced gusto in Europe to promote sustainability. The (global) New Urban Agenda sets a conducive international context (Ažman Momirski, 2019, p. 352; Bravo, 2019; Mehaffy, 2019). The United Nations Environment Programme is among the most vocal international supporters of nature-based solutions in the urban setting (UNEP and Italian Presidency of the G20, 2021). On a local level, planning dwellings and incorporating natural elements in this highly regulated environment resonates among scholarly circles across Europe (Eidenskog, 2021; Slätmo, Nilsson and

Huynh, 2021; Stimilli and Sargolini, 2021; Yuille, 2021). In France, parks are praised as laboratories of health and well-being (Brua, 2021). Parks are salient subjects for sustainability debates and action because around 75 % European population lives in urban areas (Abdullah & Stainforth, 2021, p. 2). In specific contexts, there was a sense of the remarkable comeback of green spaces. The discussions among the Emerging Urban Leaders added up to the international sentiment that green spaces in many parts of the world are no longer seen as a nuisance for economic activities and constraints for commercial expansion within the urban setting.

The diversity of projects taken onboard by the Emerging Urban Leaders programme was a good reminder of the richness of aspects incorporated in the discussions revolving around parks. While displaying propensity towards different forms of artwork, diverse cultural influences, positioning of leisure activities and choice of plants governed by the local taste, aesthetics and weather conditions, many examples presented throughout the meetings of Emerging Urban Leaders captured a generic propensity towards certain traditions of planning and performance of gardening, various green spaces serving as "sites of environmental stewardship" (Vanni Accarigi & Crosby, 2019, p. 527) and areas where local and national traits are imagined for the future projection (Zakaria, Dali, & Hussein, 2019). The notable differences in the size and scope of green spaces in or close to urban areas are captured by the typology spanning from spacious nature reserves to compact parklets. Each of these green areas has a local functionality and a broader meaning as sites for advancing jointly agreed goals on a European level.

The European Green Deal and smaller-scale developments

One of the conducive engines for bringing into the picture on-going bottom-up dynamics that contribute to the goals of framework initiatives included in the European Green Deal is a project-based international collaboration. The scholarly calls for action coincided with implementing several research-intense projects funded by the EU Framework Programmes. Among those that address some of the topics discussed by the Emerging Urban Leaders are GREENLULUS. The project analyses greening projects of cities in Europe and the United States to identify the risks of environmental inequalities (CORDIS, 2021a). Urban GreenUP addresses various aspects of reintroducing green spaces in the city plans (CORDIS, 2021d). UNaLabsets out to boost cities' climate and water resilience (CORDIS, 2021c). proGIreg addresses the lack of green spaces

in Dortmund, Turin, and Zagreb (CORDIS, 2021b). These are some examples of the wealth of information housed by the Community Research and Development Information Service (CORDIS) that were found most relevant as background information for the debates of the Emerging Urban Leaders. The indicated projects capture some of the daily collaborative routines that translate the grand narratives of the European Green Deal and other overarching initiatives into tangible actions via step-by-step implementation of jointly agreed-on research-intense stages. Additionally, these projects contribute to the overall outreach and awareness-raising among the wider population and interested audiences seeking more elaborate accounts on the issues related to the safeguarding, development and introduction of green spaces in diverse urban settings.

Green Areas of Riga

The autoethnographic account is based on the visits of two parks in the Riga city centre "Ziedoņdārzs" and "Viesturdārzs", urban parks in the suburbs of Riga "Ziemeļblāzma" and "Mežaparks", as well as the nature reserve "Vecdaugava" and nature park "Piejūra" both located in the outskirts of Riga. These green spaces were selected randomly, in other words, either based on convenient access or personal preference. Frequenting of these green areas mirrors what the World Urban Parks have coined as the "newfound interest in amplifying the critical role that parks can play in addressing today's most pressing global health challenges and provide essential infrastructure and services during this time of crisis and recovery" (World Urban Parks, 2020, p. 5). Riga and Latvia are well-positioned to offer plenty of such services founded upon various traditions and functionality characterising specific types of green areas. The 300th anniversary of Viesturdārzs and the 120th anniversary of Mežaparks celebrated in 2021, are the best examples of the enduring efforts to maintain proper places for pleasant strolls and the well-being of city dwellers.

The visits to the listed places throughout 2020 and 2021 draw attention to the myriad of considerations that support the notion of Latvia as "one of Europe's greenest nations" (Forrest, 2020) that span well beyond the vastly forested territory. However, as the earlier listing displays, the forest is far from the only green area widely accessible to city dwellers and visitors. It is not simply a matter of distinction between various policy areas. Lifestyle patterns and traditions tied to these green areas are unique and grounded in historical and cultural influences that have shaped the city.

Conclusions

The international and European context provided excellent grounds for the discussions of Emerging Urban Leaders. The attention paid to the promotion of various green areas in the city, its outskirts, and beyond was an excellent opportunity to realise the wealth and value of recreational, cultural, and fitness resources established and preserved by dedicated professionals in and around Riga years, decades, even centuries before the global pandemic. It reminds us about the role of tradition and local lifestyle traits attuned to specific geographical and climatic settings. This autoethnographic account concludes with an enthusiastic spirit that the capital of Latvia has a lot to offer its dwellers and visitors. Nevertheless, these 'good' practices should be treated as a source of inspiration and reflection, not as 'best' practices for replication elsewhere. The tradition of embracing and cherishing green spaces and places in their variety is anchored in the local culture and ways of organising public space that might not be attuned to all logics governing city planning elsewhere, not least to mention various climatic contexts. The sustainability principles, as well as the core logic of the quality of life that allow Riga to remain a flourishing green city, are locally unique and characteristic of its historical trajectory. The Emerging Urban Leaders programme was an opportunity to fully appreciate this nuance of place-specific path dependencies and striking echoes of globally and Europe-wide sweeping trends and governance directions.

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