

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES  
DEPARTMENT OF BALTIC SEA REGION STUDIES

**RUSSIA`S COMPATRIOT POLICY IN LATVIA  
SINCE 2000**

MASTER THESIS

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## ANOTĀCIJA

Maģistra darbs *Krievijas īstenotā tautiešu politika Latvijā kopš 2000. gada* aplūko attiecības starp Latviju un Krievijas Federāciju, kuras nosaka Krievijas ārpolitikas mērķi attiecībā uz tās tautiešiem ārvalstīs. Pētījuma mērķis bija noskaidrot, vai Krievijas tautiešu politika rada Latvijai politiskos draudus, un izpētīt, kādi ir Krievijas tautiešu aizstāvības organizāciju darbības slēptie mērķi Latvijā. Maģistra darbs ir aprakstoša un analītiska gadījuma izpēte, kurā ir izmantotas kvalitatīvās pētniecības metodes: dokumentu analīze, sekundāro datu, kritiskā diskursa, video un interviju analīze. Pēc empīriskā materiāla analīzes, kas tika balstīta uz politisko draudu un politiskās destabilizācijas galvenajām pazīmēm, maģistra darba hipotēze – Krievijas tautiešu politika rada politiskos draudus Latvijai; un tās mērķis ir destabilizēt politisko situāciju Latvijā – tika apstiprināta. Tika secināts, ka Krievijas tautiešu politika ir efektīvs un ietekmīgs ārpolitikas instruments Krievijas maigās varas īstenošanai.

**Atslēgvārdi:** tautieši, krievi, krievvalodīgās minoritātes, Krievijas tautiešu politika, maigā vara, aizstāvība, politiskie draudi, drošība, politiskā stabilitāte, Latvija

## ABSTRACT

The Master Thesis *Russia`s Compatriot Policy in Latvia since 2000* looks at the relations between Latvia and the Russian Federation which are determined by Russia`s foreign policy aims regarding to its compatriots abroad. The purpose of the study was to find out if Russia`s compatriot policy creates political threats to Latvia and to investigate what are the hidden aims of activities of Russia`s compatriot defence organizations in Latvia. The Master Thesis is a descriptive and analytical case study in which qualitative research methods are used: document analyses, secondary data, critical discourse, video and interview analysis. After the analysis of empirical material, which was based on the main characteristics of political threats and political destabilization, the hypothesis of the Master Thesis – Russia`s compatriot policy creates political threats to Latvia; and it is aimed to destabilize political situation in Latvia – proved true. It can be concluded that Russia`s compatriot policy is an effective and influential foreign policy instrument of Russia`s soft power wielding.

**Key words:** compatriots, Russians, Russian-speaking minorities, Russia`s compatriot policy, soft power, defence, political threats, security, political stability, Latvia

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## INTRODUCTION

Security – either individual, national, or international – has always been the most important concept on political agenda. People, states, and international system can be threatened military, politically, economically, societally, or environmentally. Not all the time these threats make or leave a dramatic impact on mankind –, for instance, very rarely global security is on high alert. However, there are so many cases in the world`s history when threats, especially, military threats are followed by military conflict or even war. That is why, it so important to identify threats and their source at the early stage and to elaborate countermeasures. To feel safe, individuals and states need protection and defence capabilities. On the national level, in the most of the cases, threats are created by external powers, other states etc.; however, the source of threats can be found also inside the state, or both sources can be simultaneous. That is why, such terms as hybrid threats or hybrid war are so often used in nowadays, especially, after the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia in 2014.

Latvia the same as all states is concerned about its security. The level of concerns has increased as the result of Russia`s aggressive behaviour at Latvia`s borders and in Ukraine. Although Latvia is the EU and NATO Member, it is worried if the same hybrid warfare tactic can be used also in Latvia. The Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia (e.g. in 2016, there are 566 681 ethnic Russians in Latvia of whom 165 316 are non-citizens<sup>1</sup>) which are defined as ‘compatriots’ of the Russian Federation can be used as a powerful tool in a preparatory or attack phase of hybrid war to reach Russia`s political aims. Dr. Ammon Cheskin (University of Glasgow) writes that “‘compatriots’ figure prominently in the *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2013*, where they are named as an important element in the implementation of Russia’s foreign policy objectives.”<sup>2</sup>

It must to be taken into account that, in 2018, there will be the Presidential Election in the Russian Federation – in the same year, there will be also the Parliament Elections held in Latvia –, can these politically significant events be used for the increase of the Kremlin’s influence and power? Does Latvia need to be prepared for increasing political threats where Russia`s compatriot policy has an important role?

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<sup>1</sup> Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs of the Republic of Latvia (2016). *Latvijas iedzīvotāju sadalījums pēc nacionālā sastāva un valstiskās piederības*. Riga: PMLP, p. 4

<sup>2</sup> Cheskin, Ammon (2014). *Russia`s Compatriot policy: The Consolidation and ‘Rossiisification’ of Russian Speakers Abroad*. Edinburgh: University of Edinburg Press, p. 3

Wars in Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria (in support of Bashar al-Assad's undemocratic regime) have shown that Russia's President Vladimir Putin (in office 2000-2008; 2012-present; Prime Minister 1999-2000; 2008-2012) is ready to increase the Kremlin's power – either hard or soft power – at any costs. Using hybrid tactics, Russia is prepared to use different tools to reach its aims. That is why, such questions arise: is Russia's compatriot policy a tool of soft power; how big is the level of the Kremlin's present influence on the domestic politics of Latvia; does Russia's compatriot policy seek a political overturn in Latvia, and is it possible in the coming years? The author of the Master Thesis considers that the regime in the Russian Federation since 2000 has acquired most of the characteristics of authoritarian regime and several totalitarianism characteristics. The regime of the Russian Federation since 2000 cannot be considered democratic according to Robert Dahl's democracy theory and criteria. The analysis, evaluation, and prognosis about relations between Russia and Latvia are based on the assumption that Russia is an undemocratic state since 2000, and the present political system will not change towards democracy at least till 2018 (the end of V. Putin's current presidency term and next Presidential Election in Russia).

To find out the real aims of foreign policy of the Russian Federation in Latvia, such **research questions** of the Master Thesis are set: Is Russia's compatriot policy aimed to destabilize political situation in Latvia? Does Russia's compatriot policy create political threats to Latvia? Can Russia's compatriot policy be considered as a method of hybrid war?

**Hypothesis:** Russia's compatriot policy creates political threats to Latvia; and it is aimed to destabilize political situation in Latvia.

To verify the hypothesis of the Master Thesis such **aims** are set: to find out if Russia's compatriot policy creates political threats to Latvia; and if a political overturn is possible in Latvia in the coming years, i.e. 2017-2018.

To reach the aim of the Master Thesis such **objectives** are set:

- to study theoretical literature about the security concept and political threats;
- to study theoretical literature about the compatriot concept and soft power;
- to give a theoretical overview of the concepts of ethnicity, nationality and their role in compatriot policy;
- to give a historical and political context of the Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia;
- to study and analyse the documents which determine Russia's foreign and compatriot policy;
- to examine academic literature and programmes related to Russia's soft power and compatriot policy;

- to investigate and analyse academic literature, information available on the Internet and secondary data regarding to the Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia or Russia's compatriots;
- to hold expert interviews and make the analysis of qualitative data;
- to make the analysis of empirical material and draw conclusions based on the theoretical part of the Master Thesis.

The Master Thesis is a descriptive and analytical case study of the relations of Latvia and Russia, in which qualitative **research methods** are used: document analyses, secondary data analysis, critical discourse – predicate analysis, video and interview analysis.

**Main sources of data:** documents: *Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013*; regulations of *the Federal Agency for the CIS, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation – Rossotrudnichestvo*; *International Coordinating Council for Russian Compatriots Living Abroad*; *Russkiy Mir Foundation* etc.; secondary data (*CSB, PMLP* statistics, *SKDS* surveys etc.); academic researches: *The Hidden and Forbidden History of Latvia under Soviet and Nazi Occupations* published by Institute of the History of Latvia; *Latvian Foreign and Security Policy Yearbook 2016* published by Latvian Institute of International Affairs etc.; reports by Latvian Security Police (DP); videos; mass media; expert interviews with: 1) Dr. oec. Viesturs Pauls Karnups (*Deputy of the 5<sup>th</sup> Saeima (LNNK): 6.07.1993.-7.11.1995.; Deputy Minister of the 1<sup>st</sup> Government of I. Godmanis; Head of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Office (PMLP): 1992*) – held by Una Plauka on 12 April 2016 in Riga, Latvia; and 2) Dr. habil. philol. Ina Druviete (*Minister of Education and Science of the Republic of Latvia (2004-2006; 2014); Member of Latvian Parliament (Saeima) since 2002; the 3<sup>rd</sup> Class Order of the Three Stars of the Republic of Latvia since 2012*) – held by Una Plauka on 20 April 2016 in Riga, Latvia.

**Theoretical framework:** the analysis of the empirical material is based on the works about security and threats by Barry Gordon Buzan, Emeritus Professor of International Relations; American political scientist Joseph Samuel Nye's descriptions of soft power and its methods; works about ethnicity and nationality, and their role in compatriot policy by David Miller, British Professor of Political Theory etc. (Chapters 1 and 2).

The objects of description and analysis of the Master Thesis are Russia's compatriot policy and compatriots in Latvia or ethnic Russians and other Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia according with the definitions and statutes of Russia's compatriot policy. The subject of analysis is the impact of Russia's compatriot policy on the political situation in Latvia. That is why, in the Chapter 3, the historical and political context of the Russian-speaking minority

in Latvia is given. The Chapter 4 gives an analytical genesis of compatriot policy of the Russian Federation since the collapse of the USSR in 1991 till nowadays. The Chapter 5 of the Master Thesis is an empirical analysis of Russia`s compatriot policy and its impact on the political situation in Latvia since 2000. In this chapter, first, the introductory analysis of Russia`s compatriot policy in relation with Latvia in the time period from the dissolution of the USSR till 2000 is given. Then the analysis of Russia`s compatriot policy in Latvia since 2000 follows with the focus on the most important political events and processes in Latvia which led to confrontations between the Government of Latvia, Russian-speaking community and Latvian society, and the Russian Federation as well. The cases of the *School Reform 2004*, *Constitutional Referendum 2012*, *9<sup>th</sup> May Victory Day Celebrations*, *Latvian Parliament Elections*, role of social media, and the connection of Kremlin`s organizations for defence of Russia`s compatriots in Latvia with these political processes are analysed.

# 1. THE THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF SOFT POWER

The most known author who has published works and developed theory about *soft power* and its significance in the international relations is an American political scientist Joseph S. Nye. He writes that power has two natures or aspects: the first aspect is hard power but “the second aspect of power – which occurs when one country gets other countries to *want* what it wants – might be called **co-optive or soft power** in contrast with the hard or command power of *ordering* others to do what it wants.”<sup>3</sup> Taking it broadly, “power is the ability to affect the behaviour of others to get the outcomes you want, and there are three basic ways to do that: you can coerce them with threats; you can induce them with payments; or you can **attract and co-opt** them. Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others.”<sup>4</sup>

“Political leaders and philosophizers have long understood the power of attractive ideas or the ability to set the political agenda and determine the framework of debate in a way that shapes others` preferences. The ability to affect what other countries want tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions.”<sup>5</sup> It is considered that **co-optive power means** getting others to want what you want; and **soft power resources** are cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions. Greg Simons, a researcher at the Uppsala University, also writes that, according to Nye`s theory, soft power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. Each country`s soft power is connected to its resources of culture, values and policies. If a country is liked and admired, it is more likely to be mimicked or copied. Therefore the power of attraction is the basis for soft power, which is used to shape the preferences of others.<sup>6</sup>

Nancy Snow, Pax Mundi Professor of Public Diplomacy, identifies several dimensions that can create a soft power advantage for a country. These are when culture and ideas match prevailing global norms, when a nation has greater access to multiple communication

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<sup>3</sup> Nye, S. Joseph (1990). *Soft Power. Foreign Policy*, No. 80, p 166

<sup>4</sup> Nye, S. Joseph (2006). *Soft Power, Hard Power and Leadership*. Oct. 27, p. 2. Available from [http://www.hks.harvard.edu/netgov/files/talks/docs/11\\_06\\_06\\_seminar\\_Nye\\_HP\\_SP\\_Leadership.pdf](http://www.hks.harvard.edu/netgov/files/talks/docs/11_06_06_seminar_Nye_HP_SP_Leadership.pdf) [Accessed on 10 February 2016]

<sup>5</sup> Nye, S. Joseph (1990). *Soft Power. Foreign Policy*, No. 80, pp. 166-167

<sup>6</sup> Simons, Greg (2015). Perception of Russia`s Soft Power and Influence in the Baltic States. *Public Relations Review*, Elsevier: Vol. 41, pp. 2-3

channels that can influence how issues are framed in global news media, and when a country's credibility is enhanced by domestic and international behaviour.<sup>7</sup>

Soft power is connected also with the **attractiveness of a leader** – “the ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, values, institutions, and a vision that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority. If a leader represents a vision and values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead. Soft power often allows a leader to save on costly carrots and sticks. Simply put, in behavioural terms, soft power is attractional power. In terms of resources, soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction, e.g. charisma or leadership by persuasion or propaganda.”<sup>8</sup>

Greg Simons writes that soft power, influence, and propaganda are interlinked when performed in public relations and foreign policy. For example, Russia's *Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Foundation* which primary role is to perform an organising and coordinating body for other NGOs working in the sphere of international relations. The organisation is intended to create an interactive dialogue with different foreign target groups, and to form a relationship with them in order to be able to influence opinions and perceptions concerning Russia. It can be seen as a part of Russia's soft power instruments. The *Gorchakov Foundation* run a number of special programmes, such as the *Baltic Dialogue* since 2012 (for Russian-speaking youth from the Baltic States) and the *Caucasus Dialogue*. Other examples are: *Russkij Mir* (Russian World) foundation which was established by the president V. Putin in 2007 and is an agency tasked with increasing Russia's soft power base; and the public diplomacy agency *Rossotrudnichestvo*, which was created in 2008 via a presidential decree.<sup>9</sup>

It cannot be divided that hard power is the bad one but soft power is the good one, because “soft power is not good *per se*, and it is not always better than hard power. Nobody likes to feel manipulated, even by soft power. Like any form of power, it can be wielded for good or bad purposes, and these often vary with the eye of the beholder.”<sup>10</sup> Soft power can be used for bad deeds in the same way as hard power – the only difference is in methods which are used to achieve the goals.

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<sup>7</sup> Simons, Greg (2015). Perception of Russia's Soft Power and Influence in the Baltic States. *Public Relations Review*, Elsevier: Vol. 41, p. 3

<sup>8</sup> Nye, S. Joseph (2006). *Soft Power, Hard Power and Leadership*. Oct. 27, p. 3. Available from [http://www.hks.harvard.edu/netgov/files/talks/docs/11\\_06\\_06\\_seminar\\_Nye\\_HP\\_SP\\_Leadership.pdf](http://www.hks.harvard.edu/netgov/files/talks/docs/11_06_06_seminar_Nye_HP_SP_Leadership.pdf) [Accessed on 10 February 2016]

<sup>9</sup> Simons, Greg (2015). Perception of Russia's Soft Power and Influence in the Baltic States. *Public Relations Review*, Elsevier: Vol. 41, pp. 4-5

<sup>10</sup> Nye, S. Joseph (2006). *Soft Power, Hard Power and Leadership*. Oct. 27, p. 4. Available from [http://www.hks.harvard.edu/netgov/files/talks/docs/11\\_06\\_06\\_seminar\\_Nye\\_HP\\_SP\\_Leadership.pdf](http://www.hks.harvard.edu/netgov/files/talks/docs/11_06_06_seminar_Nye_HP_SP_Leadership.pdf) [Accessed on 10 February 2016]

## 1.1. The Compatriot Concept and Compatriot Policy as a Tool of Soft Power

A *compatriot* can be described as a person who comes from the same country; a fellow citizen or national of a country; a person who was born in, or is a citizen of the same country as somebody else.<sup>11</sup> The compatriot and patriot concepts have close connection as patriotism has been defined as love of one's country, identification with it and with one's compatriots, and a special concern for its well-being and that of compatriots. A patriot has a need to belong to a collectivity and be part of a wider narrative. A patriot loves his/her *patria* (country), identifies with it, and shows special concern for its well-being and that of compatriots. Patriotism is also considered as a type of group egoism; and when two persons – a compatriot and non-compatriot – are in need of help, one must choose to help the compatriot. That shows that patriotism and compatriotism can make for indifference to and indeed hostility towards other countries, encourages militarism, and leads to international tension and conflict. It can be distinguished a political type of patriotism and the pre-political ties among compatriots such as common ancestry, language, or culture, and enjoins love of, and loyalty to, one's polity, its laws and institutions, and the common liberty they make possible –, however, since the time of ancient Rome, patriotism is a political notion.<sup>12</sup>

David Miller – British Professor of Political Theory, who has defined that “duties which individuals owe to their compatriots may be more extensive than the duties they owe to strangers, simply because they are compatriots”<sup>13</sup>, or, in other words, individuals have special duties to their fellow citizens that they do not have to non-patriots<sup>14</sup> – has raised such question: are the relationships that exist among compatriots intrinsically valuable? He writes that it is sometimes argued that, insofar as national identity and national solidarity have any value at all, it is purely instrumental – it makes it possible for states with a national basis to achieve certain political goals, such as stable democracy. That means, compatriot issue does not have as much emotional value but it is mostly used or manipulated in practical and rational way to reach political aims of the government or leader. But to reach the aims, compatriots themselves must believe that their association is valuable for its own sake, and be committed to preserving it over time, in order to be able to reap the other benefits that national solidarity

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<sup>11</sup> Wehmeier, Sally and M. Ashby (eds.) (2000). *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 260

<sup>12</sup> Griffiths, Marin (ed.) (2005). *Encyclopaedia of International Relations and Global Politics*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 638-640

<sup>13</sup> Miller, David (1988). The Ethical Significance of Nationality. *Ethics*, Vol. 98, No. 4, p. 647

<sup>14</sup> Riker, J. Walter (2011). Compatriot Partiality Thesis. In: Chatterjee, K. Deen (ed.). *Encyclopaedia of Global Justice*. Salt Lake City: Springer, p. 53

brings with it. If from the governmental perspective compatriotism has more rational and instrumental value with which it is possible to manipulate, then from the compatriots' perspective the way how most people think about their nationality reveals that its value for them is indeed intrinsic. Miller still points out to artificiality of compatriotism if compared with a family and friendship, because the bonds that link someone to friends and relationships are based on direct knowledge and interaction (they are 'real') –, but in the case of nations, the bonds are 'artificial' or 'imaginary', since a person can have no direct experience of 99.9% of his or her compatriots.<sup>15</sup>

Miller also looks at such questions: whether special duties to compatriots are integral to the idea of nationhood? The answer might be – if something is lost when compatriots cease to recognise special duties to one another, this is more than compensated for by the potential gain in justice overall; and whether injustice is integral to national attachments in the way that it is, for instance, to membership in a racist group? Here the answer could be – much depends on whether the advantages gained by one nation are always bought at the expense of other nations, so that by acknowledging special duties one is worsening the position of people elsewhere, or, on the other hand, that relationships between nations can be mutually beneficial.<sup>16</sup>

### **Compatriot Policy as a Tool of Soft Power**

If follow David Miller's idea, then compatriotism includes possibility or opportunity of manipulation by the government or political authorities to reach their political aims. Because, although compatriots can have common ancestry, language, culture, it can be considered that compatriotism has an instrumental or even artificial value. It leads to the linkage between compatriotism and soft power where appropriately elaborated compatriot policy can be used as a tool of soft power for political purposes.

States invest huge resources and devote much time for the implementation of policies which are based on the aim to wield soft power in the target zone. There are different methods how to do it – compatriot policy is one of the most effective tools of soft power which is usually accompanied with systematic propaganda. Not only the work with social media is involved in the implementation of compatriot policy, – there are different organizations, funds, discussions, congresses, and even paid political parties and many other components

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<sup>15</sup> Miller, David (2005). Reasonable Partiality towards Compatriots. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, Vol. 8, No. 1/2, pp. 67-68

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 69-71

which constitute compatriot policy. Compatriot policy which is also the division of state`s foreign policy is a very significant tool of soft power. The main task of compatriot policy is to attract and consolidate state`s compatriots – to show the state, its leader (s), and nation in a positive and most attractive way that compatriots would *want* to be a part of it.

For example, “on the 28<sup>th</sup> of October 2011, the question of how Russia can create a more positive image in the local media was discussed by the *Baltic Forum of Compatriots* in the Russian town of Pushkin in the Leningrad region”<sup>17</sup>; and on the 5-6<sup>th</sup> of November 2015, the plenary meeting of the *Fifth World Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad* was held in Moscow where V. Putin, the president of the Russian Federation, took part and held the speech. The event brought together about 400 representatives of Russian communities from 97 countries. It was devoted to the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the ‘Victory in the Great Patriotic War’. And the main activities of the Congress were stated: to consolidate Russian compatriots, protect their rights and lawful interests, strengthen ties with their historical Homeland, preserve cultural heritage and the Russian language abroad.<sup>18</sup>

There are cases when soft power is more effective than hard power or military attack: “to wield soft power might be a more effective tactic in a conflict than a traditional military attack – especially if the target is protected militarily through an alliance with bigger and more important actors”<sup>19</sup> –, how it is in the case of Latvia which is the Member of the EU and NATO. And compatriot policy is especially effective and important tool in the cases where compatriot diaspora of one state is concentrated in another country at such big numbers as it is in Latvia or Estonia – one quarter of all population in each of these countries is constituted of ethnic Russians. What else is very important about the case of Russia`s compatriots living in the Baltic states that the common historical homeland of these people is not only the present day Russian Federation but also the USSR which collapsed and was dissolved in 1991. That means, they still might see the Baltic states as their true homeland within Russia as it was in a recent past.

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<sup>17</sup> Simons, Greg (2015). Perception of Russia`s Soft Power and Influence in the Baltic States. *Public Relations Review*, Elsevier: Vol. 41, p. 4

<sup>18</sup> Putin, Vladimir (2015). *Putin at the World Congress of Compatriots*. Video available from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SLy-vcscUyk> [Accessed on 10 March 2016]

<sup>19</sup> Winnerstig, Mike (ed.) (2014). *Tools of Destabilization: Russian Soft Power and Non-military Influence in the Baltic States*. Försvarsdepartementet Report No. FOI-R--3990—SE, p. 4

## 1.2. The Concepts of Ethnicity, Nationality, and Compatriotism

The concept of nationality has two aspects which are slightly different: the aspect of **ethnicity** – nationality is inherited by genes, ethnic origin or descent; and the aspect of **citizenship** – gained by birth or naturalization. That is why the concept of nationality can be explained in several ways: e.g. a body of people sharing common descent, history, language, traditions etc. - a nation (e.g. Latvian nation) or nation-state; an ethnic group forming a part of one or more political nations (i.e. there can be more than one nationality represented in one state, e.g. the main nationalities of the Russian Federation); the state or fact of being a citizen of a particular nation (e.g. the USA citizen); the status of belonging to a particular nation, whether by birth or naturalization (e.g. all citizens of the Republic of Estonia). The word origin of the nationality concept can be regarded to 1690s, meaning ‘national quality’, from *national* + *-ity* (perhaps from French *nationalité*). As fact of belonging to or being a citizen of a particular state is regarded from 1828, - gradually shading into **race, ethnicity**. Meaning separate existence as a nation is recorded from 1832.<sup>20</sup>

David Miller in his works draws parallels with **nationality** and **compatriotism**. He defends the view that national boundaries may be ethically significant. The duties we owe to our compatriots may be more extensive than the duties we owe to strangers, simply because they are compatriots. Miller considers that national boundaries are not the same as borders between states. A state may include more than one national grouping (ethnic minorities); and conversely, people sharing a common national identity may be found living under the auspices of two or more states (e.g. Russians in Latvia, Estonia etc.). He writes that although there exist such criterions as language, race, or religion to define nationality, it is essentially a subjective phenomenon, constituted by the shared beliefs of a set of people: a belief that each belongs together with the rest; that this association is neither transitory nor merely instrumental but stems from a long history of living together which will continue into the future; that the community is marked off from other communities by its members` distinctive characteristics; and that each member recognizes a loyalty to the community, expressed in a willingness to sacrifice personal gain to advance its interests. Miller believes that the nation should enjoy some degree of political autonomy because a social group that had no political aspirations at all would surely be counted as an ethnic group rather than as a nation.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Online Etymology Dictionary. Nationality. Available from <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/nationality> [Accessed on 7 March 2016]

<sup>21</sup> Miller, David (1988). The Ethical Significance of Nationality. *Ethics*, Vol. 98, No. 4, pp. 647-648

According to Miller, people owe special duties to their compatriots. One reason for that is the *mutual benefit* which is gained by taking part in this process which is beneficial for all members of particular social group or nationals. The special obligations to fellowmen or compatriots are derived from common participation in a practice from which all may expect to benefit. These duties or contributions can be obligatory if an individual in return receive certain benefits. Another reason can be that people share *attachment* to their compatriots that is why they support practices which are beneficial to their fellowmen. However, Miller also admits that Benedict Anderson has expressed view that nations are ‘imagined communities’. Then those who acknowledge national attachments believe themselves to be bound to their compatriots by ties of communities, but these ties are an important sense fictitious. It is characteristic of nations which identities are formed not through spontaneous processes of ethnic self-definition but primarily according to the exigencies of power – the demands of states seeking to assure themselves of the loyalty of their subjects. Nationality is to a greater or lesser degree a manufactured item.<sup>22</sup>

Anthony Smith distinguishes between two cases how a nation can be build. “In the first, the nation is based on a single dominant ethnic group, and the culture of that group imposed more or less successfully on ethnic minorities falling within the territorial boundaries of the emergent nation. In the second, a dominant culture is lacking and has to be forged in order to create a nation out of series of disparate ethnic groups. In this case, nation-building is a work of invention, in particular the invention of a common national past. It creates myths of decent, historical memories, common culture. It must differentiate itself from its closest neighbours, distinguish its culture from theirs, and emphasize the historic kinship of its constituent *ethnie* and their common ties of ideological affinity. This is done by creating or elaborating an ‘ideological’ myth of origins and decent.”<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Miller, David (1988). The Ethical Significance of Nationality. *Ethics*, Vol. 98, No. 4, pp. 651-654

<sup>23</sup> Smith, D. Anthony (1986). *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 147

## 2. THE THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF THE SECURITY CONCEPT AND POLITICAL THREATS

The *security concept* can be looked at in several dimensions. Barry G. Buzan, Emeritus Professor of International Relations, offers a five-dimensional approach to the concept: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental security. “**Military security** concerns the two-level interplay between the armed offensive capacity and the defensive capabilities of states and their perceptions of each other’s intentions. **Political security** concerns the organisational stability of states, their systems of governance, and the ideologies that provide them with legitimacy and authority. **Economic security** regards the level of access the state has to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. **Societal security** concerns the sustainability of traditional patterns of language, culture, religion, national identity and customs. **Environmental security** concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system upon which all other human enterprises depend.”<sup>24</sup>

“According to Ole Wæver, the **concept of security** has two meanings. First, it is used in everyday language to describe a freedom from threat, and, second, it is employed in *Security Studies* to capture the **survival of the state**.”<sup>25</sup> In general, according to Arnold Wolfers, **security** refers to an absence of objective dangers, i.e. of security ‘threats’, ‘challenges’, ‘vulnerabilities’ and ‘risks’, and of subjective fears or concerns, and to the perception thereof.<sup>26</sup>

Ian Bellany writes that “**security** itself is a relative **freedom from war**, coupled with a relatively high expectations that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur”<sup>27</sup>. It can be considered that security requires the freedom of all forms of war, i.e. if a cyber or hybrid warfare is present then security is threatened or limited. John E. Mroz defines

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<sup>24</sup> Buzan, Barry (2009). *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd ed. Oxford: ECPR Press, p. 38

<sup>25</sup> Tarry, Sarah (1999). ‘Deepening’ and ‘Widening’: *An Analysis of Security Definitions in the 1990s*. Calgary: University of Calgary, p 4. Available from <http://www.jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/viewFile/272/286> [Accessed on 22 February 2016].

<sup>26</sup> Brauch, G. Hans (2011). Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks. In: Spring, Oswald, Mesjasz, Ú., Grin, C. and J. Kameri-Mbote (eds.). *Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security*. Mosbach: AFES-PRESS, pp. 61-62

<sup>27</sup> Buzan, Barry (2009). *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd ed. Colchester: ECPR Press, p. 36

that “security is the *relative freedom from harmful threats*”<sup>28</sup>, which means that any kind of harmful attacks (including non-military) can be considered as threats to security. And according to Arnold Wolfers, - “security, in any objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked”<sup>29</sup>.

## 2.1. Political and National Security

“During the Cold War, within the framework of **national security**, Barry Buzan pointed to a dual threat to state institutions by force (capabilities) and ideas (ideology). The state’s territory can be threatened by seizure or damage, and the threats can come from within and outside of the state.”<sup>30</sup> B. Buzan also emphasizes the fear which is created by the absence of security on three levels – individual, national, and international: “Few people would deny that security, whether individual, national, or international ranks prominently among the problems facing humanity. National security is particularly central because states dominate many of the conditions that determine security at the other two levels, and states seem unable to coexist with each other in harmony. Throughout the history of states, each has been made insecure by the existence of others.”<sup>31</sup>

The national security concept is interlinked not only with the security concept and different kinds of threats which can be created to it but also with the concept of power, i.e. hard and soft power. According to B. Buzan, “security is not the only concept through which the national security problem can be approached. Traditionally, most of the literature that attempted analysis or prescription was, and to some extent still is, based on the concepts of power and peace”<sup>32</sup>.

The Realist school of International Relations, which are represented by such writers as E. H. Carr and H. Morgenthau, sees security as a derivative of **power**: an actor with enough power to reach a **dominating position** would acquire **security** as a result. That means, – the security of that actor (a state) would be reached who has enough resources of power to

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<sup>28</sup> Buzan, Barry (2009). *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd ed. Colchester: ECPR Press, p. 36

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 36

<sup>30</sup> Brauch, G. Hans (2011). Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks. In: Brauch, H. G., Oswald Spring, Ú., Mesjasz, C., Grin, J. etc. (eds.). *Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security: Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks*. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, p. 62

<sup>31</sup> Buzan, Barry (2009). *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Colchester: ECPR Press, p. 25

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 25

dominate. Idealist school tends to see security as a consequence of peace: a lasting peace would provide security for all.<sup>33</sup>

There can be found different definitions of the national security among authors of the field of politics and international relations. Frank N. Trager and F. N. Simonie have defined that “**National Security** is that part of government policy having as its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries. Giacomo Luciani writes that national security may be defined as the ability to withstand aggression from abroad. According to Walter Lippmann, – a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war. Michael H. H. Louw`s definition mentions also the concept of defence: national security includes traditional defence policy and the non-military actions of a state to ensure its total capacity to survive as a political entity in order to exert influence and to carry out its internal and international objectives.”<sup>34</sup>

*The National Defence College of Canada* also offers its definition of the **national security** – “it is the preservation of a way of life acceptable to the people and compatible with the needs and legitimate aspirations of others. It includes freedom from military attack or coercion, freedom from internal subversion and freedom from the erosion of the political, economic and social values which are essential to the quality of life.”<sup>35</sup>

## 2.2. Characteristics of Political Threats

The security of a state can be affected by different types of threats – military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. In this chapter, the attention is brought to political threats which, the same as military threats, directly affect the national security of a state. According to Richard Ullman, - “a **threat to national security** is an action or sequence of events that: threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state; or threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy

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<sup>33</sup> Buzan, Barry (2009). *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd ed. Colchester: ECPR Press, pp. 25-26

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 36

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 36

choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.”<sup>36</sup>

Barry Buzan writes that military threats usually have political objectives (seizure of territory, change of government of institutions, manipulation of policy or behaviour), but some political objectives can also be pursued by political means. Since the state is an essentially political entity, it may fear political threats as much as military ones. Even when the state is both strong and powerful, political threats might still be a source of concern. Political threats stem from the great battle of ideas, information and traditions. Because the contradictions in the ideas are basic, states of one persuasion may well feel threatened by the ideas represented by others. And the competition among ideologies is extraordinarily complex. Specific political interventions by one state in the domestic affairs of another define the category of political threats the most precisely.<sup>37</sup>

B. Buzan mentions different aspects of political threats: e.g. propaganda produced by interfering state –, because even the interplay of ideas and communication can produce politically significant social and cultural threats; matters of language, religion and local cultural tradition all play their part in the idea of the state, and may need to be defended or protected against seductive or overbearing cultural imports. If the local culture is weak or small, even the unintended side-effects of casual contact could prove disruptive and politically charged. But if it is affected by intended and systematic propaganda and cultural, educational, language etc. interference then these political threats can become destructive for the stability and security of the state. B. Buzan emphasizes that unintended cultural-political threats blend upwards into more intentional political meddling, such as propaganda support for political groups of similar persuasion, and from there into the funding and creation of such groups; all the way up to the quasi-military activities of political assassination and arms aid to rebels.<sup>38</sup>

Randall L. Schweller in his work concerning threats writes how important role in the international and domestic affairs *balancing* has and what this concept means: “In its traditional usage, *balancing* means the creation or aggregation of military power through internal mobilization or the forging of alliances to prevent or deter the territorial occupation

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<sup>36</sup> Buzan, Barry (2009). *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd ed. Colchester: ECPR Press, p. 36

<sup>37</sup> Buzan, Barry (1983). *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books LTD, pp. 76-77

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77

or the political and military domination of the state by a foreign power or coalition.”<sup>39</sup> By his definition, it can be understood that there has to be a strong unity inside the state and cooperation among allies to prevent the intervention. Schweller also considers that such situation does not include the presence of war because “*balancing* involves a situation in which a state is not directly menaced by a predatory state but decides to balance against it anyway to protect its long-term security interests. Jack Levy has also stated that it would not be *balancing* if war is forced on the potential balancer by a direct military attack by the aggressor”<sup>40</sup>. That means, – political stability and prevention of military conflict or war by responding to military and political threats involve the process of *balancing* (e.g. coercive diplomacy with the aggressor). The main aim is to prevent aggressor (foreign power) from invading or gaining political domination.

Political threats are referred to situations when the *core values* of a state are threatened. The concerns about security of core values appear in works of such authors as Buzan, Wofers, Baldwin, Wæver etc. who write that core values are the values that are considered more important than other values – e.g. **national sovereignty** has been declared an essential value. Identity, particularly **national identity**, is another concept that is identified as an essential value. If the national sovereignty and identity are threatened and there are no counter actions to these threats, it can lead to the political destabilization of a state.<sup>41</sup>

According to Buzan, together, identity and sovereignty are the cement that bonds the components of the state-building project together: the state as idea, its physical basis and its institutional form. When a country occupied for decades by a foreign power regains its independence, it becomes crucial not only to safeguard the country’s sovereignty, but also to build national identity. It is assumed that a strong feeling of identity is necessary and healthy for individuals. According to this assumption, conflict and instability between different groups or nations may be an expression of poorly-developed identities. That means, a weak national identity of titular nation can be considered as threat to its own national security if faced with a strong minority’s national identity and its struggle for domination within a state. Especially, if the national identity of minority is developed and based on the values of another or aggressor state.<sup>42</sup> Such situation can lead to political destabilization, political or hybrid

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<sup>39</sup> Schweller, L. Randall (2006). *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power*. Woodstock: Princeton University Press, p. 9

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9

<sup>41</sup> Eriksson, Johan and Erik Noreen (2002). *Setting the Agenda of Threats: An Explanatory Model*. Uppsala: Uppsala University Press, p. 6

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14

war; or even to a large scale military warfare, – as it is in the case of Eastern Ukraine which followed the annexation of Crimean Peninsula by Russia in 2014.

### **Political Destabilization**

Political destabilization can be created by inner groups of a state or outer powers – in many cases they can be united. One of the reason why inner groups (minorities etc.) seek for the overturn of the present government or destabilization of the political situation in a state can be real or unreal (imaginary, artificially created, propaganda influenced etc.) threats to their individual security within a state. Barry Buzan tries to give the answer to the question which arises from such situation: “Hoe might the actions of individuals motivated by their own security needs have feedback effects up to the national security level?”<sup>43</sup>

B. Buzan writes that beyond the personal level, it is possible for individuals to set up or join **organizations** of many kinds aimed at improving their security. These can be of a direct defence kind, such as the Catholic and Protestant militant groups in Northern Ireland; they can be militant political groups such as the Red Army factions in Europe and Japan, or the Chinese secret societies of pre-communist days. They can also be more indirect and political in nature, working as pressure groups on governments and trying to turn state policy in direction more conducive to the security needs of the individuals involved. These organizations include minority rights groups, peace organizations, political parties, local community groups, human rights organizations, environmental organizations etc.<sup>44</sup>

**According to Barry Buzan, this considerable range of individually oriented security concerns and policies can have very substantial implications (threats) for national security in at least four ways:**

- first, individuals or sub-state groups can become a national security problem in their own right. Assassins, terrorists, separatists, coup-makers and revolutionaries all pose threats to the state. Governments everywhere devote resources to preventing revolutions against their authority. For example, military resources have to be allocated against separatist movements in Britain, Iran, Sri Lank etc; Spanish, Latin American and many other governments must guard themselves against coup-makers;<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Buzan, Barry (2009). *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed.* Colchester: ECPR Press, p. 60

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61

- second, and related to the direct domestic security problem, is the role that citizens can play as a fifth column in support of some other state's interests. For example, Nazis in France during the 1930s, Moscow-oriented communists in many countries during the Cold War, Palestinians in Israel and such-like, have all either played, or been cast in, this role. The permeability of states to both ideas and peoples associated with other states blurs the boundary between domestic and national security;<sup>46</sup>
- the third implication of individual security for national security lies in the stimuli and constraints which bear upwards from level 1 to level 2. Their essence stems not from direct threats to the state or government, but from the influence which public opinion exerts on state policy, or, to put it another way, from the limits to the state's ability to mould public opinion to its own ends. For example, Woodrow Wilson's and Franklin Roosevelt's struggle against isolation opinion in the USA respectively after the WWI and before the WWII; popular opposition to particular wars or actions – America over Vietnam; and the restraint on state war-making capabilities arising from the need to justify the enormous costs and sacrifices of mobilising for modern war;<sup>47</sup>
- fourth, - the role that individuals play as leaders of the state. Each of these individuals has his or her own universe of security concerns and perceptions which makes the influence on state policy. At the extreme of centralised dictatorship, as in Germany under Hitler, or the Soviet Union under Stalin, individual and state merge to the point of indistinguishability, whereas at the extremes of democracy, as in the USA, the intricate divisions of power make it difficult for any individual to have much impact on the totality of national policy.<sup>48</sup>

### **Political War**

It can be concluded that political threats may result in political destabilization. In such case it is possible to speak about **political war** or unconventional conflict. According to George F. Kennan, the former U.S. Foreign Service Officer, “political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures, and ‘white’ propaganda to such covert operations as support of ‘friendly’ foreign elements, ‘black’ psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile

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<sup>46</sup> Buzan, Barry (2009). *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd ed. Colchester: ECPR Press, pp. 60-61

<sup>47</sup> Buzan, Barry (1983). *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books LTD, pp. 32-33

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33

states”<sup>49</sup>. Kennan also wrote about the necessity of counter-measures to fight political war. In 1948, due to hostile relations with the USSR and its Communist allies, “he called for countering Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world through the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy. Such a policy, Kennan predicted, would promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power”<sup>50</sup>.

In nowadays, the example of counter-measures against foreign non-military threats is the NATO centres of excellence in the Baltic States – e.g. *NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence* in Latvia, which was opened in 2015. *NATO StratCom COE* became functional already in January 2014, and its main activities in 2015 were: “to support the development of a *NATO Military Committee Strategic Communications* policy and doctrine; research how to identify the early signals of a hybrid warfare scenario; develop Academic Magazine *Defence Strategic Communications*; study Russia’s Information Campaign against Ukraine; research how NATO and its members could protect themselves from subversive leverage; research the implementation of Strategic Communications within Allied nations; study how social media is being used as a weapon in hybrid warfare”<sup>51</sup> etc.

### **Hybrid War**

The concept of *hybrid war* has begun to be used frequently of late by the leadership of the North Atlantic alliance. In March 2015, NATO’s deputy secretary-general Alexander Vershbow gave the following definition: **hybrid war**, combining military threat, covert intervention, secret supplies of arms and weapons systems, economic blackmail, diplomatic dissimulation and manipulation of the media with outright disinformation. For example, it can be considered that Russia started the hybrid war against Ukraine before annexing Crimea which destabilized and disabled the new Ukrainian government in a way that it was not able to prevent the Russian annexation of Crimea. The Russian authorities had a prepared plan of action against Ukraine, at the earliest from the end of 2013 or even earlier, and that this plan was consistently implemented, leading to success for Russia and defeat for Ukraine. The

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<sup>49</sup> Kennan, F. George (1948). *George F. Kennan on Organizing Political Warfare*, April 30. Document available from <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114320.pdf?v=941dc9ee5c6e51333ea9ebbbc9104e8c> [Accessed on 11 March 2016]

<sup>50</sup> U.S. Department of State: Office of the Historian. Kennan and Containment, 1947. Available from <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/kennan> [Accessed on 11 March 2016]

<sup>51</sup> NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. About Us. Homepage available from <http://www.stratcomcoe.org/about-us> [Accessed on 12 March 2016]

*attack phase* against Crimea was preceded by the *preparatory phase*, which must have included strategic, political and operational preparations.<sup>52</sup>

Despite sounding new and in vogue, the analytical utility of the term *hybrid war* is limited. The *hybrid* aspect of the term simply denotes a combination of previously defined types of warfare, whether conventional, irregular, political or information. The *hybrid* concept is well established in modern Western military discourse today, while the problem set it seeks to define is not novel, but rather has been cited frequently under concepts of *unconventional warfare* and *political warfare*. That means – the term includes also non-military warfare.<sup>53</sup>

Andis Kudors, Executive Director of the *Centre for East European Policy Studies* in Latvia, writes that the “**hybrid war can be defined** as a conflict executed by either state and/or non-state threats that employs multiple modes of warfare to include conventional capabilities, irregular tactics, and criminal disorder to destabilize situation. In 2010, the *NATO Military Working Group (Strategic Planning & Concepts)* approved the following definition: a hybrid threat is one posed by any current or potential adversary, including state, non-state and terrorists, with the ability, whether demonstrated or likely, to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively, in pursuit of their objectives.”<sup>54</sup>

Hybrid conflicts involve multi-layered efforts designed to destabilise a functioning state and polarise society. Unlike conventional warfare, the *centre of gravity* in hybrid warfare is the **target country’s population**. According to the *Latvian Security Policy* expert Jānis Bērziņš, e.g. the Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battleground is the mind (information, propaganda etc.). As the result, Several NATO and EU member states are already reviewing their defence plans and paying closer attention to mitigation of non-military threats and risks. That means, in the case of hybrid war, operations in the information space are much more important than military action. In this context, creation of NATO centres of excellence in the Baltics (e.g. the *Strategic Communications Centre* in Latvia) in recent years has been a significant step towards preventing non-military risks.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Topychkanov, Petr (2015). Hybrid War – a Scholarly Term or a Propaganda Cliché? Carnegie: Moscow Center. Available from <http://carnegie.ru/2015/07/17/hybrid-war-scholarly-term-or-propaganda-clich%C3%A9/idyl> [Accessed on 1 March 2016]

<sup>53</sup> Kofman, Michael and M. Rojansky (2015). A Closer look at Russia’s “Hybrid War”. *Kennan Cable*, April, No. 7. Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, p. 2

<sup>54</sup> Kudors, Andis (2015). *Hybrid War – A New Security Challenge for Europe*. Riga: Centre for East European Policy Studies, p. 1

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1-3

Systematic propaganda (media) and compatriot policy (compatriots), e.g. Russians living abroad or terrorists, are considered to be the most important means in a modern hybrid war. It can be concluded that the hybrid war can be carried out with the help of military threats and non-military attacks, especially, if the aim is to reach political aims without direct, military seizure of territory by aggressor. However, in the most of the cases, non-military warfare is combined or followed by military operations, e.g. Russia`s invasion of Ukraine or terrorist attacks.

For example, “in *Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine*, **modern warfare** (or hybrid war) is described as entailing the integrated utilization of military force and forces and resources of a non-military character, and, the prior implementation of measures of information warfare in order to achieve political objectives without the utilization of military force and, subsequently, in the interest of shaping a favourable response from the world community to the utilization of military force”<sup>56</sup>. (See Appendix 1: *Gerasimov Chart*)

By Frank Hoffman`s definition, **hybrid war** is defined as “a tailored mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behaviour in the same time and battlespace **to obtain** (a group`s) **political objectives**”<sup>57</sup>. This definition points out to the nature of hybrid war – it has more than one component and it is aimed to reach political aims.

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<sup>56</sup> Kofman, Michael and M. Rojansky (2015). A Closer look at Russia`s “Hybrid War”. *Kennan Cable*, April, No. 7. Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, pp. 2-3

<sup>57</sup> Kofman, Michael (2016). Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts, March 11. Available from <http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/> [Accessed on 11 March 2016]

### 3. THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE RUSSIAN-SPEAKING MINORITY IN LATVIA

Traditionally, as the Russian-speaking minority of Latvia is considered the composition of ethnic Russians, Belarussians, and Ukrainians. However, the Jewish and Roma ethnic minorities are also among those who can be included in the Russian-speaking minority. But as these two minorities are not with the Slavic origin then they can be distinguished from the ethnic Russians, Belarussians, and Ukrainians – or the East Slavs which constitute three largest ethnic minorities of Latvia. The fourth largest ethnic minority of Latvia, which can also be considered as the Russian-speaking minority, is Poles – or the West Slavs. According to *Population Census of Latvia 2011* results, 82.6% Russians, 79.7% Belarussians, 76.4% Ukrainians, and 68.2% Poles in their communication at home mostly use the Russian language<sup>58</sup> (See Appendix 2: *Population of Latvia by Ethnicity and Mostly Used Language at Home, 2011*).

According to the *Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs of the Republic of Latvia*, on 1 January 2016, there were 566 681 ethnic Russians, 70 803 ethnic Belarussians, and 51 576 ethnic Ukrainians in Latvia. And this Russian speaking-minority constituted 32.1% of the population of Latvia. Together with 46 453 Poles they made 34.26%.<sup>59</sup> As it can be seen by numbers, ethnic Russians constitute the largest ethnic minority in today`s Latvia and they mostly use the Russian language in their everyday communication.

In this chapter, the historical and political context of the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia will be given. According to Russia`s compatriot policy, this part of Latvia`s society is defined as Russia`s compatriots<sup>60</sup> which have to be defended<sup>61</sup> and involved in popularization of the Russian language, religion, and culture<sup>62</sup>; and which are used for Russia`s foreign

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<sup>58</sup> Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (2015). *Pastāvīgo iedzīvotāju tautību sadalījums pa statistiskajiem reģioniem, republikas pilsētām un novadiem pēc mājās pārsvarā lietotās valodas 2011. gada 1. martā*. Available from [http://data.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/lv/tautassk\\_11/tautassk\\_11\\_\\_tsk2011/TSG11-071.px/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=992a0682-2c7d-4148-b242-7b48ff9fe0c2](http://data.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/lv/tautassk_11/tautassk_11__tsk2011/TSG11-071.px/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=992a0682-2c7d-4148-b242-7b48ff9fe0c2) [Accessed on 3 April 2016]

<sup>59</sup> Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs of the Republic of Latvia (2016). *Latvijas iedzīvotāju sadalījums pēc nacionālā sastāva un valstiskās piederības*. Riga: PMLP, p. 4

<sup>60</sup> Zakem, Vera, Saunders, P. and D. Antoun (2015). *Mobilizing Compatriots: Russia's Strategy, Tactics, and Influence in the Former Soviet Union*. Arlington: CNA Analysis and Solutions, pp. 3-4

<sup>61</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2013). *Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation*. Approved by President of the Russian Federation V. Putin on 12 February 2013. Available from [http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign\\_policy/official\\_documents/-/asset\\_publisher/CptICk6BZ29/content/id/122186](http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICk6BZ29/content/id/122186) [Accessed on 18 April 2016]

<sup>62</sup> Фонд Русский мир. About Russskiy Mir Foundation. Available from <http://russskiymir.ru/en/fund/index.php> [Accessed on 23 April 2016]

policy aims.<sup>63</sup> It is important to look at the historical and political context of the Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia also before 2000, to comprehend the non-citizen issue, the Russian and Latvian language status in Latvia, the different attitudes of Latvians and Russians towards the ‘9<sup>th</sup> May Victory Day’ celebrations which are analysed in the Master Thesis, and main causes why Latvia has such a big number of ethnic Russians living in its territory in nowadays.

### **Ethnic Russians in Latvia**

On 1 January 2016, there were 566 681 ethnic Russians in Latvia which constituted 26.4% of the total population of Latvia.<sup>64</sup> But not always the number of this ethnic minority, which reached its peak (34%) in the years before the collapse and dissolution of the USSR in 1991, was so big. Even in the recent history – during the years of the independent Latvia before WWII, the percentage of ethnic Russians was about 10%. The inflow of ethnic Russians in the territory of Latvia is connected with three main obstacles or historical events – Old Believers’ escape from persecutions in their homeland in the 17<sup>th</sup> century; the rule of the Russian Empire (1710-1918); and the Soviet Occupation of Latvia (1940-1991). The geographical location of Latvia – the border with Russia or Slavic lands – has also always been a significant role in the process of Russian or Slavs arrival and influence, especially in the Eastern and South-Eastern parts of Latvia, and in the capital of Latvia – Riga.

If look back into the history, then it is evident that the territory of Latvia has been inhabited mainly by the Balts (the Baltic tribes/peoples) for thousands of years: “it is difficult to say at what time the Balts first inhabited the Baltic area but archaeologists have found skeletons dating from around 6000 B.C. (it is supposed 10 000-9000 B.C. for the settlement of proto-Baltic hunter-gather tribes; and 3000-2500 B.C. for the Indo-European and Finno-Ugric arrival<sup>65</sup>) that were different from the Uralic (Asian) hunter-gatherers that sometimes visited that area; the skeletons were the remains of tall Europeans who had many similarities with the Nordic peoples in Scandinavia and Northern Europe. The Baltic peoples originally lived in a much larger area that stretched from the Vistula River (in the territory of our day Poland) to the Oka River (in the territory of our day Russia), but from the 4<sup>th</sup> century A.D. onwards

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<sup>63</sup> The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund. Mission and Goals. Available from <http://gorchakovfund.ru/en/about/mission/> [Accessed on 27 April 2016]

<sup>64</sup> Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs of the Republic of Latvia (2016). *Latvijas iedzīvotāju sadalījums pēc nacionālā sastāva un valstiskās piederības*. Riga: PMLP, p. 4

<sup>65</sup> The History Files. Northern Europe: Latvia. Available from <http://www.historyfiles.co.uk/KingListsEurope/EasternLatvia.htm> [Accessed on 17 March 2016]

the Balts started losing land to the Slavs who expanded their territory in Eastern Europe<sup>66</sup> (See Appendix 3: *Map of the Balts in Europe*).

By 900 A.D. in the territory of Latvia, four Baltic tribal cultures had developed: Curonians, Latgallians, Selonians, and Semigallians; who lived alongside with the Finno-Ugric Liivs. The battles between these tribes occurred, but the attacks by Slavic tribes were more common and severe. There were also trade contacts with Slavs already at that time when Latgallians had established their ancient kingdom with the centre and palace in Jersika (the 9<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup> century). The Slavic peoples (Russians, Byelorussians, and Poles) lived also in Livonia (in the 16<sup>th</sup> century – about 4% of all population).<sup>67</sup>

The first most known noticeable immigration of Slavs to the territory of Latvia dates back to the 17<sup>th</sup> century and is the consequence of Nikon`s Reform of the Russian Church. “Nikon or Nikita Minin was a religious leader – patriarch of Moscow, who unsuccessfully attempted to establish the primacy of the Orthodox Church over the state in Russia and whose reforms that attempted to bring the Russian Church in line with the traditions of Greek Orthodoxy led to a schism. The Old Believers split – a group of Russian religious dissenters who refused to accept the liturgical reforms imposed upon the Russian Orthodox Church by Nikon – were under persecutions and executions in their homeland.”<sup>68</sup> As the result, many of them fled to our day Estonia and Latvia. The first Old Believer groups arrived already in 1659. The 17<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> centuries were the time when mass immigration of Old Believers took place, especially to Latgale but also to Riga and Selonia and other parts of Latvia. In such way, thousands of ethnic Russians arrived and settled in the territory of Latvia: in 1772, there were about 12 000 Old Believers in Latgale region who built their churches and stayed in Latvia for life.<sup>69</sup>

In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Latvia became a part of the Russian Empire: the Swedish Vidzeme in 1710 *de facto* and 1721 *de jure*; the Polish Vidzeme in 1771; the Duchy of Courland and Semigallia in 1795. The change of rule resulted in migration of people – many Russian and Belarussian peasants, workers, traders etc. arrived in the territory of Latvia. It is estimated

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<sup>66</sup> Reginheim (2011). The Balts. Available from <http://www.geocities.ws/regenheim/balts.html> [Accessed on 17 March 2016]

<sup>67</sup> The History Files. Northern Europe: Latvia. Available from <http://www.historyfiles.co.uk/KingListsEurope/EasternLatvia.htm> [Accessed on 17 March 2016]

<sup>68</sup> Pipes, E. Richard. Nikon: Russian Patriarch. Available from <http://www.britannica.com/biography/Nikon> [Accessed on 17 March 2016]

<sup>69</sup> Līpenīte, Anna (2015). Rēzeknes vecticībnieku vēsture. Available from <http://www.muzeji.lv/lv/museums/latgale-culture-and-history-museum/2015/rezeknes-vecticibnieku-vesture/> [Accessed on 17 March 2016]

that, in 1897, there were about 154 561 ethnic Russians in Latvia, who constituted 8% of population.<sup>70</sup>

During the period of independent Latvia (1918-1940), the number of ethnic Russians stayed approximately 10%, e.g. in 1935 there were 10.6% ethnic Russians in the territory of Latvia. By that time, the number of Latvians had reached 76% of the total population. The maximum of Latvian percentage was reported in 1941 – 83%. The increase of Latvians can be explained with the emigration of almost all Germans from Latvia in the period from 1939-1940. Also many Russians and Jews left Latvia just before the Nazi Occupation in 1941.<sup>71</sup>

### **Emigration from the USSR to Latvia: 1940-1991**

The loss of people as the consequence of WWII, deportations carried out by Soviets, and emigrations to escape from the Soviet and Nazi occupations advanced an unfavourable demographic situations for the Latvians. Furthermore, Moscow`s government tried to dilute the occupied Baltic peoples by sending a stream of people from the USSR, especially to Latvia. Most of them were Russians. In the time from 1943 till 1989 the number of Latvians in Latvia decreased from 1.5 million to 1.4 million; but the number of Russians grew more than five times – from 168 000 to 900 000. Especially large increase in Russian population were between the year 1943 and 1959. The officers and soldiers of Soviet Army just stayed in Latvia after their demobilization. Another increase was caused by economic immigrants from the USSR.<sup>72</sup>

“While the influx of colonists in Latvia was organized and arranged by USSR authorities, none of the newcomers, however, had been forced to come. In principle, Soviet citizens were allowed to move freely from one place of residence to another within the USSR. The borders between the Soviet Republics did not pose an obstacle. No visas or permits were required. This was done to release the Soviet Communist Party and government from any responsibility for the colonization and Russification of the national republics. The influx of colonists to a large extent was caused by the difference in living standards between Latvia and other regions of the USSR. In Latvia, it was considerably higher. Migrants of Russian, Belorussian, Ukrainian and other nationalities moved to Latvia mainly to improve their standard of living

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<sup>70</sup> Манаков, Г. А. (2002). *Геокультурное пространство северо-запада Русской равнины: динамика, структура, иерархия. Этнические процессы и ЭКЗ в Латвии*. Москва: Псков. Book available from <http://st.volny.edu/index.html?p%5B1%5D=14> [Accessed on 17 March 2016]

<sup>71</sup> Mežs, Ilmārs (1993). *The Ethnic Geography of Latvia*, p. 154. Available from [http://giam.zrc-sazu.si/sites/default/files/gs\\_clanki/GS\\_2401\\_153-160.pdf](http://giam.zrc-sazu.si/sites/default/files/gs_clanki/GS_2401_153-160.pdf) [Accessed on 2 April 2016]

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

and find a suitable job.”<sup>73</sup> For example, in 1946 alone, the occupied Latvia received 159 400 immigrants (See Appendix 4: *Population Movement in Cities and Towns of Latvia 1939–57*).

By 1989, Latvia had received an influx of 712 000 ethnic Russians, who, together with the already residing 193 600 (10.5%) ethnic Russian inhabitants, constituted 34% of Latvia’s population. Large complexes of apartment houses (and even whole new towns) were constructed to accommodate them. The massive industrialization which the USSR undertook in Latvia under the name of ‘internationalization of industry’ was a form of colonization. The proportion of privileged ethnic Russians in managerial positions was overwhelming. In 1986, only each third urban senior engineer was an ethnic Latvian<sup>74</sup> (See Appendix 5: *Ethnic Composition of Senior Engineers in the Latvian SSR on 1 June 1986*).

In fact, the ethnic composition was dramatically changed already in 1959 in comparison with the year of 1935 (See Appendix 6: *Ethnic Composition of the Population of Latvia in 1959 and 1935*). And if compare the situation before the WWII and the situation in the year of 1989 when the large economic immigrant waves had hit Latvia and its ethnic composition, then these dramatic changes, which still are present, can be seen: e.g. in 1935 there were 75.5% ethnic Latvians, 10.6% ethnic Russians, 1.4% ethnic Belarussians and 0.1% ethnic Ukrainians in Latvia; but in 1989, there were 52% ethnic Latvians, 34% ethnic Russians, 4.5 ethnic Belarussians and 3.5% ethnic Ukrainians in Latvia.<sup>75</sup> That means, only 3% were needed that Latvians had become less than half of the population in its ethnic, historic and geographic homeland. The Baltic country was artificially overflowed with Slavic peoples – in 1989, “93% of non-Latvians were Slavs, of which more than 77% were Russians.”<sup>76</sup> Most of them were encouraged to resettle as a part of the USSR’s Russification policies.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Riekstiņš, Jānis (2005). Colonization and Russification of Latvia 1940–1989. In: V. Nollendorfs and E. Oberländer (eds.). *The Hidden and Forbidden History of Latvia under Soviet and Nazi Occupations*. Riga: Institute of the History of Latvia, LU, pp. 231-232

<sup>74</sup> Strods, Heinrihs (2005). Sovietization of Latvia 1944-1991. In: V. Nollendorfs and E. Oberländer (eds.). *The Hidden and Forbidden History of Latvia under Soviet and Nazi Occupations*. Riga: Institute of the History of Latvia, LU, p. 219

<sup>75</sup> Riekstiņš, Jānis (2005). Colonization and Russification of Latvia 1940–1989. In: V. Nollendorfs and E. Oberländer (eds.). *The Hidden and Forbidden History of Latvia under Soviet and Nazi Occupations*. Riga: Institute of the History of Latvia, LU, pp. 234-237

<sup>76</sup> Mežs, Ilmārs (1993). The Ethnic Geography of Latvia, p. 154. Available from [http://giam.zrc-sazu.si/sites/default/files/gs\\_clanki/GS\\_2401\\_153-160.pdf](http://giam.zrc-sazu.si/sites/default/files/gs_clanki/GS_2401_153-160.pdf) [Accessed on 2 April 2016]

<sup>77</sup> Zakem, Vera, Saunders, P. and D. Antoun (2015). *Mobilizing Compatriots: Russia's Strategy, Tactics, and Influence in the Former Soviet Union*. Arlington: CNA Analysis and Solutions, p. 1

### **Non-citizens of Latvia**

On 1 January 2016, there were 354 159 Latvian citizens and 165 316 non-citizens out of 566 681 ethnic Russians in Latvia. The number of non-citizens has tendency to reduce, e.g. in 2010, there were 221 174 ethnic Russians in Latvia who were non-citizens. Other ethnic minority, which has a large number of non-citizens, is the Russian speaking Belarussian minority. On 1 January 2016, there were 70 803 ethnic Belarussians in Latvia – 34 644 of them were non-citizens. The third largest ethnic minority according to the number of non-citizens is the Russian speaking Ukrainian minority. On 1 January 2016, there were 51 576 ethnic Ukrainians in Latvia – 24 499 of them were non-citizens.<sup>78</sup> That means, the three largest ethnic minorities of Latvia or East Slavs have the biggest number of non-citizens. However, there are also other ethnic minorities and ethnicities which are the inhabitants of Latvia but they are non-citizens of Latvia, e.g. 8843 Poles out of 46 453 are non-citizens<sup>79</sup> etc. In such way, four largest ethnic minorities of Latvia – Russians, Belarussians, Ukrainians, Poles – who are considered to be the Russian speaking minorities as the mostly used language at home by these ethnic minorities is the Russian language, make the largest proportion of non-citizens in Latvia.

These persons became the non-citizens of Latvia as the consequence of historical and political events which started in the time of WWII and during the occupation of Latvia by the USSR. In fact, it was the result of the USSR migration policy – sending and inviting people from the USSR to come to Latvia. Most of them came voluntary searching for better life. The economic immigrants from other republics of the Soviet Union the same as Latvians in the occupied Latvia were the citizens of the USSR. But the situation and citizenship policy of Latvia changed when Latvia regained and restored its independence – “on 4 May 1990, the Republic of Latvia declared the restoration of its independence with all legal consequences – restoring the body of law (*Constitution, Civil Code, Property Law, the Law on Citizenship, etc.*) and democratic institutions. The USSR ceased to exist in December 1991. It was stated that the Baltic States were not successor states of the USSR. An integral part of restoration of independence of the Republic of Latvia was the restoration of the status and rights of those persons who were recognized as Latvia’s citizens under the *1919 Law on Citizenship*, as well as their descendants. At the same time, Latvian authorities recognised that a group of persons,

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<sup>78</sup> Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs of the Republic of Latvia (2016). *Latvijas iedzīvotāju sadalījums pēc nacionālā sastāva un valstiskās piederības*. Riga: PMLP. Available from [http://www.pmlp.gov.lv/lv/assets/documents/statistika/IRD2016/ISVN\\_Latvija\\_pec\\_TTB\\_VPD.pdf](http://www.pmlp.gov.lv/lv/assets/documents/statistika/IRD2016/ISVN_Latvija_pec_TTB_VPD.pdf) [Accessed on 16 March 2016]

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

who had immigrated during the period of Soviet occupation (1940-1991) and who lost their USSR citizenship after the dissolution of the Soviet Union but who had never been citizens of the Republic of Latvia or their descendants, were permanently residing in Latvia. Since these individuals were not eligible for automatic acquisition of Latvia's citizenship, a special temporary status was established for former USSR citizens: the status of *former citizens of the USSR without the citizenship of the Republic of Latvia or any other country* – i.e. **non-citizens**.<sup>80</sup> It must be admitted that the status of non-citizen of Latvia is not equivalent to a stateless person.

The non-citizens of Latvia can become the citizens of Latvia according to naturalization process since 1995 when two main citizenship laws were adopted. On 22 July 1994, the *Citizenship Law of the Republic of Latvia* was passed which entered into force on 15 August 1994. On 9 May 1995, the *Citizenship Law* was followed by another law – *On the Status of Former USSR Citizens Who are not Citizens of Latvia or Any Other State*.<sup>81</sup> According to the *Citizenship Law of the Republic of Latvia*, “a Latvian citizen is: a person who was a Latvian citizen on 17 June 1940, as well as a descendant of such person (...); a person whose both parents at the time of his or her birth are Latvian citizens or one of them is a Latvian citizen (...); a Latvian or Liiv who has certified all of the following conditions in Latvia (...) (Paragraph 1; Section 2).”<sup>82</sup> The Section 3 of *Citizenship Law* states *Recognition as a Latvian Citizen of a Child of Stateless Persons or Non-citizens Born in Latvia after 21 August 1991*.<sup>83</sup> And “on 9 May 2013, the Saeima of the Republic of Latvia adopted *Amendments to the Citizenship Law*<sup>84</sup>, which entered into force on 1 October 2013. The Amendments were endorsed by the President of Latvia (Andris Bērziņš) on 23 May 2013 and came into effect on 1 October 2013. In accordance with the Amendments, Latvian citizenship is granted automatically to children of stateless persons and non-citizens as it was after the *Amendments*

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<sup>80</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia (2015). Basic Facts about Citizenship and Language Policy of Latvia and some Sensitive History-related Issues. Available from <http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/society-integration/citizenship-in-latvia/citizenship-policy-in-latvia/basic-facts-about-citizenship-and-language-policy-of-latvia-and-some-sensitive-history-related-issues> [Accessed on 4 April 2016]

<sup>81</sup> LR Saeima (1995). *Par to bijušās PSRS pilsoņu statusu, kuriem nav Latvijas vai citas valsts pilsonības*. 12.04/09.05.1995. Available from <http://likumi.lv/ta/id/77481-par-to-bijusas-psrs-pilsonu-statusu-kuriem-nav-latvijas-vai-citas-valsts-pilsonibas> [Accessed on 31 March 2016]

<sup>82</sup> LR Saeima (1994). *Pilsonības likums*. 22.07/25.08.1994. Available from <http://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=57512> [Accessed on 31 March 2016]

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> LR Saeima (2013). *Grozījumi Pilsonības likumā*. 09.05/01.10.2013. Available from <http://likumi.lv/ta/id/256964-grozijumi-pilsonibas-likuma>. [Accessed on 4 April 2016]

to the *Citizenship Law* of 1998<sup>85</sup> – but without any additional terms (e.g. parents do not need to guarantee in the written form that they would help to their child to acquire the Latvian language as the official state language<sup>86</sup>). The Amendments also provide that pupils who have acquired more than half of the basic educational program in the Latvian language are exempt from all naturalization examinations and are registered as citizens upon submitting a naturalization application in accordance with the standard procedures.<sup>87</sup>

The subjects of the law *On the Status of Former USSR Citizens Who are not Citizens of Latvia or Any Other State* are the **non-citizens**.<sup>88</sup> These persons can become citizens through the naturalization process according to Chapters 2 and 3 of *Citizenship Law: Regulations and Procedures for Naturalisation*, and *Testing the Fluency in the Latvian Language and Knowledge of the Basic Principles of the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia, the Text of the National Anthem, the Basics of the History and Culture of Latvia*.<sup>89</sup> By adopting these laws, “the percentage of non-citizens has dropped to 11.7% (252 028) in January 2016 compared with 29% (approx. 730 000) in 1995, when the naturalization process began. 84% of Latvia`s residents are now citizens. As of 31 July 2015, 143 061 persons had been granted Latvian citizenship through the naturalization procedure. In 2015, 99% of the children born in Latvia were Latvian citizens.”<sup>90</sup>

It can be concluded that the enormous influx of the Russian-speaking minorities, mainly Russians, in Latvia occurred as the consequence of the USSR sovietisation and colonization policies after the Soviet Occupation of Latvia in 1940. Nowadays, this part of Latvia`s society is defined as Russia`s compatriots in Russia`s foreign policy documents.

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<sup>85</sup> LR Saeima (1998). *Grozījumi Pilsonības likumā*. 22.06/10.11.1998. Available from <http://likumi.lv/ta/id/50382-grozijumi-pilsonibas-likuma> [Accessed on 18 April 2016]

<sup>86</sup> Laiva, Laura (2013). Valsts prezidents izsludina Pilsonības likuma grozījumus. Available from <http://www.pmlp.gov.lv/lv/sakums/jaunumi/pazinojumi-presei/2013/05/27/valsts-prezidents-izsludina-pilson%C4%ABbas-likuma-groz%C4%ABjumus/> [Accessed on 18 April 2016]

<sup>87</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia (2015). Basic Facts about Citizenship and Language Policy of Latvia and some Sensitive History-related Issues. Available from <http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/society-integration/citizenship-in-latvia/citizenship-policy-in-latvia/basic-facts-about-citizenship-and-language-policy-of-latvia-and-some-sensitive-history-related-issues> [Accessed on 4 April 2016]

<sup>88</sup> Latvia Law Institute (1995). *Law On the Status of Former USSR Citizens Who are not Citizens of Latvia or Any Other State*. Available from <http://www.humanrights.lv/doc/latlik/noncit.htm> [Accessed on 4 April 2016]

<sup>89</sup> LR Saeima (1994). *Pilsonības likums*. 22.07/25.08.1994. Available from <http://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=57512> [Accessed on 31 March 2016]

<sup>90</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia (2015). Basic Facts about Citizenship and Language Policy of Latvia and some Sensitive History-related Issues. Available from <http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/society-integration/citizenship-in-latvia/citizenship-policy-in-latvia/basic-facts-about-citizenship-and-language-policy-of-latvia-and-some-sensitive-history-related-issues> [Accessed on 4 April 2016]

#### 4. COMPATRIOT POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

In this chapter, an analytical genesis of compatriot policy of the Russian Federation since the collapse of the USSR in 1991 till nowadays will be given. It is important to look also at the time period from 1991 till 2000 to see and comprehend the changes which occurred in the Russian Federation and its foreign policy vectors which influenced the development of its compatriot policy. That time period is also important because the citizenship laws which were adopted in Latvia in the 1990-ties have been negatively influencing the relations between Russia and Latvia till nowadays regarding to non-citizens of Latvia or Russia`s compatriots. The political and judicial reasons why such laws were adopted in Latvia are explained in the Master Thesis.

Dr. Agnia Grigas (an energy and political risk expert, specializing in Russia, Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space) considers that, after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Russia did not need the Russians who had emigrated from the Soviet Union to Latvia during the Soviet Era and Occupation of Latvia (1940-1991). There was a little interest about them in first 10-15 years. There was no interest about repatriation of those people by the Russian Federation. The posture of the Kremlin was: we do not want that those people return to Russia. The interest about them increased only by the year of 2000, when Vladimir Putin became the President of the Russian Federation.<sup>91</sup>

It can be considered that “in the post-Soviet era, after 1991, the Kremlin has had a complicated relationship with the group of individuals that it has come to refer to as its ‘compatriots abroad’. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, approximately 25 million ethnic Russians found themselves living in territories outside of the newly reconfigured space of the Russian Federation. In addition to 25 million ethnic Russians there were an additional three million people who were not ethnically Russian, but whose homeland was now located in the Russian Federation, and a further eleven million individuals who were not Russian but had a strong cultural allegiance to Russia. These individuals have, at various times, been referred to as the ‘Russian diaspora’, ‘compatriots abroad’ (RUS: *sootechestvenniki za rubezhom/ zarubezhnie sootechestvenniki*), and ‘Russian compatriots’ (*rossiiskie sootechestvenniki*).”<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> Grigas, Agnia (2016). *Generālpilāns*. Documentary by Juris Pakalniņš. Re: Baltica, ERR, LTV, LRT

<sup>92</sup> Cheskin, Ammon (2014). *Russia`s Compatriot policy: The consolidation and ‘Rossiisification’ of Russian Speakers Abroad*. Edinburgh: University of Edinburg Press, p. 2

Much more in this consolidation process has been done in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, especially, in the last ten years. As part of Russia`s attempts to unify its diaspora, in 2007, the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation established a *Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots Living Abroad*, which in 2009, became the *International Coordinating Council for Russian Compatriots Living Abroad*. ‘Compatriots’ figure prominently in the *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2013*, where they are named as an important element in the implementation of Russia’s foreign policy objectives.<sup>93</sup> It means, that, in 2016, compatriot policy is an important component and instrument of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation.

There can be found different concepts and organizations in the discourse and documents of Russia`s foreign policy: *Russkij Mir/ Russian World*; *Russkij Vek/ Russian Century*; *Rossotrudnjestvo/ Russian Cooperation* which deal with the issues of Russia`s compatriots living abroad or *rossiiskie sootchestvenniki za rubezhom*. It can be seen, that a significant genesis of Russia`s compatriot concept has occurred, and importance of compatriot policy has increased since 2000, which affect the domestic and foreign policy of the Russian Federation and countries where these compatriots have been living, e.g. Latvia.

### **Russia`s Compatriot Policy 1991-1999**

In Russia, the period from 1991 till 2000 is called the Yeltsin Era because that was the time when Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin hold the post of the president of the Russian Federation. Yeltsin was democratically elected already before the dissolution of the USSR – on 12 June 1991, and stayed in the post after the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev (General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union). He left his post on 31 December 1999 which was succeeded by that time Prime Minister of the Russian Federation – Vladimir Putin.

Under Yeltsin`s presidency six important compatriot policy documents emerged which were related to Russia`s compatriots, that is why it can be considered that the attention to compatriot issues or Russians living in the post-Soviet republics was brought by the Kremlin already in the first years after the collapse of the USSR – but not in the way that the Kremlin would welcome them back to Russia. The first document was *Report on Urgent Measures for Socio-cultural Cooperation between Citizens of the Russian Federation with their Compatriots Abroad* (1 January 1993). It was the first official document addressing the

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<sup>93</sup> Cheskin, Ammon (2014). *Russia`s Compatriot policy: The consolidation and ‘Rossiisification’ of Russian Speakers Abroad*. Edinburgh: University of Edinburg Press, p. 3

compatriot issue and containing possibly the earliest formulation and usage of the term. The second document was *Presidential Decree No. 1681, Guidelines on State Policy Regarding Compatriots Living Abroad* (11 August 1994). It was the first document in the field of policies toward compatriots abroad, regardless of the failure to give a clear definition of the term ‘compatriot’. Document also supported the idea of dual citizenship. On 31 August 1994, the supplementation of this Decree followed – *Resolution of the Russian Government No 1064, List of Primary Measures to Support Compatriots Abroad*.<sup>94</sup>

The third document gave the **first official definition of compatriots**: “Compatriots of the Russian Federation are all the natives of the USSR and Russia and all their descendants regardless of their nationality and ethnicity, language, religion, gender, occupation and place of residence and other circumstances.”<sup>95</sup> The document was called *Declaration on Support of the Russian Diaspora and Protection of Russian Compatriots* (8 December 1995). The definition is, in fact, rather confusing – it is too blur and broad because it is referred not only to the natives of the Russian Federation and their descendants but also to the natives of the former Soviet republics (SSR) which became independent states after the collapse of the Soviet Union. That means, Latvians can also be considered Russia`s compatriots by this definition – because Latvia was the Soviet republic within the USSR (1940-1991).

The fifth document “*Resolution of the Government No. 590, Action Program for Protecting Compatriots Abroad* (17 May 1996) declared a need to create a legal definition of the concept *compatriot* and its further use in the legislation. It stated that Russia was ready to assist governments of newly independent states in ensuring that Russians enjoyed the full range of their rights. The sixth document was *Federal Law on the State Policy of the Russian Federation Concerning Compatriots Abroad No. 99-FZ* (24 may 1999). This document regulated relations with compatriots. The term *compatriot* was automatically applied to all persons who in the past lived in the former USSR, or their descendants – but excluding the descendants of members of titular nations of the foreign states.”<sup>96</sup>

Yeltsin declared that “Russia should help its compatriots not with coming back to the *historically native land*, but with settling down in foreign states. In February 1994, in his speech, Yeltsin issued a call that “everywhere, where our compatriots live they should feel themselves full and equal citizens”, and defined a range of tasks of foreign policy aimed to

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<sup>94</sup> Grigas, Agnia (2016). *Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, pp. 65-67

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p. 67

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., pp. 67-68

support the interests of Russians in the CIS (*Commonwealth of Independent States*) and the Baltic states.”<sup>97</sup> His statement was aimed at the citizenship issue in the time when first debates and confrontations regarding to the citizen and non-citizen status in the Baltic states occurred both in the Kremlin and Baltic parliaments, and between Latvia and the Kremlin. On 22 July 1994, the *Citizenship Law of the Republic Latvia*<sup>98</sup> was passed which came into force on 15 August 1994. On 9 May 1995, the *Citizenship Law* was followed by another law – *On the Status of Former USSR Citizens Who are not Citizens of Latvia or Any Other State*<sup>99</sup>. Both laws were sharply criticized by the Kremlin and pro-Russian politicians in the Latvian Parliament *Saeima*, because neither Yeltsin`s calls nor protests of other activists who defended the rights of immigrants (and their descendants) who had arrived in Latvia from the Soviet Union after 1940 were taken into consideration. In fact, non-citizens of Latvia were Russia`s compatriots whose rights had to be defended by the Kremlin according to its compatriot policy which, reacting to the citizenship laws passed in Latvia, became more strongly focused on the protection of its compatriots abroad.

Documents regarding to Russia`s compatriot policy which were adopted in 1994, focused not only to the ethnic Russian emigrants from the USSR, especially, from the RSFSR or the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (including their descendants) but also to the Russian-speaking population of the former Soviet Union republics (SSRs).<sup>100</sup> That gave to the compatriot policy concept defined by the Kremlin a broad interpretation. It can be seen that by the time when Yeltsin left the office, the compatriots of the Russian Federation were considered all former USSR citizens and their descendants except the titular nations of the independent republics. By the end of 1999, Russia`s compatriot policy embodied two natures – protection of Russia`s compatriots, and possibility to influence the domestic policies of the countries where Russia`s compatriots lived regarding to compatriot issues.

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<sup>97</sup> Grigas, Agnia (2016). *Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, p. 69

<sup>98</sup> LR Saeima (1994). *Pilsonības likums*. 22.07/25.08.1994. Available from <http://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=57512> [Accessed on 31 March 2016]

<sup>99</sup> LR Saeima (1995). *Par to bijušās PSRS pilsoņu statusu, kuriem nav Latvijas vai citas valsts pilsonības*. 12.04/09.05.1995. Available from <http://likumi.lv/ta/id/77481-par-to-bijusas-psrs-pilsonu-statusu-kuriem-nav-latvijas-vai-citas-valsts-pilsonibas> [Accessed on 31 March 2016]

<sup>100</sup> Grigas, Agnia (2016). *Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, p. 69

## **Russia`s Compatriot Policy 2000-2008**

In 1999, the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, dismissed his Prime Minister and promoted former KGB (*Committee for State Security*) officer Vladimir Putin in his place. On 31 December 1999, Boris Yeltsin resigned as president of Russia and appointed Putin acting president until official elections were held; and in March 2000, Putin was elected to his first term with 52.94% of the vote. Putin was re-elected in 2004 with 72% of the vote.<sup>101</sup> In December 2004, the human right NGO *Freedom House* downgraded Russia from *partly free* to *not free* in its annual survey of global freedom referring, *inter alia*, to the flawed nature of the country`s elections. The presidential election was held on 14 March 2004. The Office for *Democratic Institutions and Human Rights* (ODIHR)/Assembly press release concluded that the election was generally well administrated but lacked elements of genuine democratic contest.<sup>102</sup>

***World Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad:*** the first *World Conference of Compatriots* was held in 2001. The *World Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad* works to unite Russians abroad, defend their rights and lawful interests, build stronger ties with their historical homeland, and preserve the Russian cultural heritage and language abroad. For example, on 5-6 November 2015, already the fifth *World Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad* took place in Moscow. It was dedicated to the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Victory in the ‘Great Patriotic War’. Four hundred representatives of Russian communities in 97 countries took place.<sup>103</sup> V. Putin in his speech at the Plenary Session emphasized the role of compatriots in the process of implication of Russia`s foreign policy goals: “*We are sincerely grateful to you, friends, for maintaining your deep internal connection to your historical Motherland, for being proud of Russia, for valuing its culture and its spiritual traditions and for sharing its fate and its current concerns. We felt your solidarity during the reunification of the Crimea and Sevastopol with Russia. This was a historic event. The decisive support of our compatriots, who expressed their firm desire to be with Russia, to support Russia definitely helped unify Russian society and became an important factor in the consolidation of Russians abroad and the entire Russian community.*”<sup>104</sup> And the Foreign Minister of the Russian

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<sup>101</sup> Vladimir Putin Biography. Available from <http://www.biography.com/people/vladimir-putin-9448807> [Accessed on 23 April 2016]

<sup>102</sup> Council of Europe: Parliamentary Assembly (2005). *Documents: Working Papers*, Vol. 5, June 20-24, pp. 43-44

<sup>103</sup> World Congress of Compatriots 2015. Available from <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50639> [Accessed on 29 April 2016]

<sup>104</sup> Putin, Vladimir (2015). Speech at the Plenary Session of the Fifth World Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad. Available from <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50639> [Accessed on 29 April 2016]

Federation Sergey Lavrov stated: that “as a result of the Soviet Union`s breakup over 25 million compatriots found themselves outside Russia. In 2001, that was still fresh in people`s minds. Most compatriots considered it extremely important to carve out their niche in the new conditions, to preserve their ethnic-cultural identity and to maintain ties with their historical Motherland. And the country`s leaders responded to their expectations.<sup>105</sup> Since 1991, the Kremlin and Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation have created and financially supported numerous different organizations, educational institutions, activists etc. which deal with Russia`s compatriot issues both in the Russian Federation and abroad.

***Russkiy Mir Foundation:*** in June 2007, President V. Putin signed a decree establishing the *Russkiy Mir Foundation*, for the purpose of promoting the Russian language, as Russia`s national heritage and a significant aspect of Russian and world culture, and supporting the Russian language teaching programs abroad.<sup>106</sup> As V. Putin stated himself: “In my view, we need to support the initiative put forward by Russian linguists to create a *National Russian Language Foundation*, the main aim of which will be to develop the Russian language at home, support the Russian language study programmes abroad and generally promote the Russian language and literature around the world.”<sup>107</sup>

The Foundation is a joint project of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science and supported by both public and private funds. The *Russkiy Mir Foundation* is headed by Vyacheslav Nikonov, Dean of History and Political Science at the International University of Moscow and founder of the Polity Foundation. The **mission** of the Foundation is to reconnect the **Russian community abroad** with their homeland, forging new and stronger links through cultural and social programs, exchanges and assistance in relocation. Its message is that the Russian world (*russkiy mir*) is much more than the territory of the Russian Federation and the 143 million people living within its borders –, because millions of ethnic Russians, native Russian speakers, their families and descendants scattered across the globe make up the largest diaspora population the world has ever known.<sup>108</sup>

In 2006, the ***International Coordinating Council for Russian Compatriots Living Abroad*** was set up. “It *de facto* took on the role of a central agency consolidating and representing their interests and ensuring permanent dialogue with the agencies of executive power in

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<sup>105</sup> Lavrov, Sergey (2015). Russian World: Steering towards Consolidation. Available from <http://valdaiclub.com/news/russian-world-steering-towards-consolidation/> [Accessed on 29 April 2016]

<sup>106</sup> Фонд Русский мир. About Russkiy Mir Foundation. Available from <http://russkiymir.ru/en/fund/index.php> [Accessed on 23 April 2016]

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

Russia, as well as Russian and foreign NGOs. The Council monitors contacts with coordination councils of individual countries.”<sup>109</sup>

### **Russia`s Compatriot Policy 2008-2012**

According to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin could not run for the third term of presidency in 2008. His successor Dmitry Medvedev who was elected on 2 March 2008 with 63% of the vote (although, officially, 70 % were announced). D. Medvedev appointed V. Putin Prime Minister of the Russian Federation which was in the accordance with the Kremlin`s election campaign. In fact, V. Putin hand-picked D. Medvedev as his successor, who announced soon after Putin`s public endorsement that, if elected, he would appoint Putin to the position of Prime Minister. Medvedev stayed in his post till 7 May 2012.<sup>110</sup>

**Rossotrudnichestvo**: the federal agency for supporting Russia`s compatriots which is now known under the name *Rossotrudnichestvo* started to operate already during Putin`s presidency. On 6 February 2002, the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin signed a decree *On the Russian Centre of International Scientific and Cultural Cooperation under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation*. After six years, in 2008, on the basis on this decree, the **Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation** or **Rossotrudnichestvo** – was created. If go back deeper in the history, then already during B. Yeltsin`s presidency, in 1994, *Russian Centre of International Scientific and Cultural Cooperation under the Government of the Russian Federation* or *Roszarubeztsentr* was established which received a status of a government body under the Government of the Russian Federation. **Rossotrudnichestvo** was created in September 2008 in accordance with *Presidential Decree No. 1315 of September 6, 2008*. The Head of *Rossotrudnichestvo* is Glebova Liubov Nikolaevna who was appointed on 23 March 2015.<sup>111</sup>

The Agency`s activities are under the purview of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and are governed by the *Constitution of the Russian Federation*, federal constitutional laws, federal laws, statutory acts of the President and Government of the

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<sup>109</sup> Chepurin, Alexander (2009). *Approaching the Far Away. Russia in Global Affairs*. Available from [http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n\\_13587](http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_13587) [Accessed on 27 April 2016]

<sup>110</sup> Biography.com Editors. *Dmitry Medvedev Biography*. Available from <http://www.biography.com/people/dmitry-medvedev-20638781> [Accessed 30 April 2016]

<sup>111</sup> Official Site of *Rossotrudnichestvo* (2016). *About Rossotrudnichestvo: History*. Available from <http://www.rs.gov.ru/en/about#history> [Accessed on 26 April 2016]

Russian Federation, international agreements, and the statutory acts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. *Rossotrudnichestvo* is represented in 79 countries, 69 Russian centres of science and culture, 8 branches in 61 countries and 23 federal representatives in the Russian Federation's diplomatic missions in 21 countries. A road map for opening *Russian Centres of Science and Culture up to 2020* has been developed. *Rossotrudnichestvo*'s activities as well as its establishments abroad are geared towards the affirmation in foreign countries of an objective perception of modern Russia, its material and spiritual potential, and the nature and direction of the country internal and foreign policy. To this end, the Agency collaborates closely in scientific, cultural, information and humanitarian fields with Russian non-profit, non-governmental, and religious organizations, governmental and non-governmental organizations from CIS countries, other foreign states, and with international and regional organizations. A key aspect of *Rossotrudnichestvo*'s activities is international humanitarian cooperation.<sup>112</sup>

The Agency has an actual active system for the support of the Russian language abroad. Thousands of people, especially young people, are currently studying the Russian language in *Rossotrudnichestvo*'s foreign establishments (more than 500) in many countries across the globe. In promoting the propagation of the Russian language, the Agency creates conditions for its active use, and also for receiving education in Russian. In conjunction with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries, institutions, and administrations of Russian regions, *Rossotrudnichestvo* participates directly in the realization of plans for the ***Government Commission on Compatriots Living Abroad***, and provides information for the State-assisted voluntary return program for compatriots.<sup>113</sup>

The Agency considers its task in the strengthening of ties with **compatriots living abroad**, and collaborating with them in expanding cultural, scientific and business cooperation with Russia. An important mechanism for tackling this task are **Russian centres abroad** which traditionally serve as a liaison for Russians in foreign countries, and also for those who have never been in our country but wish to learn more about Russian history and culture, or whose goal is business collaboration or learning the Russian language. Every year, numerous events are held in Russian centres, always **with the participation of compatriots**: meetings with members of the Russian parliament and important figures in science and culture; lectures and

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<sup>112</sup> Official Site of Rossotrudnichestvo (2016). Федеральное агентство по делам Содружества Независимых государств, соотечественников, проживающих за рубежом, и по международному гуманитарному сотрудничеству. Available from <http://www.rs.gov.ru/en/node/305> [Accessed on 26 April 2016]

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

seminars on changes and reforms in Russian socio-economic and legislative areas, foreign policy, and culture. Book and video libraries are open to compatriots, as well as common-interest clubs, and Russian language courses are available. *Russian Centres of Science and Culture* cooperate with compatriot organizations in arranging integrated events commemorating **Russia Day** (festivals such as ‘**The Great Russian World**’, ‘**Vivat Russia**’, ‘**Russian Song**’, etc.) and **Victory Day** (the international campaign ‘**St. George Ribbon**’). Events pertaining to Cross Years of international cooperation between Russia and other countries are **conducted with the direct participation of the Agency**.<sup>114</sup>

The necessity of acquainting the public of other countries with Russia’s foreign policy plays an increasingly important role in the informational activities of *Rossotrudnichestvo* and its establishments abroad; this is achieved via multidimensional endeavours of the central body as well as *Russian Centres of Science and Culture* abroad. *Rossotrudnichestvo* devotes a great deal of attention to **working with the youth**. The creation of the required regulatory structure for tackling the task of preserving memorials of spiritual culture and interment of outstanding Russian nationals abroad is in the final stages. *Rossotrudnichestvo*, in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has completed the listing of cultural heritage sites, which number over 250.<sup>115</sup>

*Rossotrudnichestvo* carries out collaboration with such non-governmental organizations as the *Russian Association for International Cooperation* (whose members include over 70 public associations), *Russian World Foundation*, *St. Andrew the First-Called Foundation*, *Russian Overseas Library Foundation*, *Russian Culture Foundation*, *International Council of Russian Compatriots*, *Union of Theatre Workers of the Russian Federation*, *International Union of Museums*, *Twin Cities International Association*, *Moscow Union of Friendship Societies*, *Saint-Petersburg International Cooperation Association* and many others. Among *Rossotrudnichestvo*’s information partners are **ITAR-TASS**, **RIA Novosti**, television channels **Russia Today** and **TVC**, the **MIR** television company, radio station **The Voice of Russia**, and other leading Russian and international Russian-language mass media organizations and publications.<sup>116</sup>

*Rossotrudnichestvo* has its missions abroad, for instance, *Mission of Rossotrudnichestvo in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*, which homepage offers

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<sup>114</sup> Official Site of Rossotrudnichestvo (2016). Федеральное агентство по делам Содружества Независимых государств, соотечественников, проживающих за рубежом, и по международному гуманитарному сотрудничеству. Available from <http://www.rs.gov.ru/en/node/305> [Accessed on 26 April 2016]

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

information about events in the Russian Federation and United Kingdom dedicated to the Russian language, culture, history etc. There is a big emphasis on the Russian language in the framework of this mission: “since 2011, *Rossotrudnichestvo* has been the state customer of the federal target program *Russian Language in 2011 - 2015*, approved by the Government of the Russian Federation on June 20, 2011 № 492. State customer-coordinator of the Program is the Russian Ministry of Education and Science.”<sup>117</sup>

*The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund* is another governmental establishment of the Russian Federation which deals with the foreign and compatriot policy issues. The Fund was established in accordance with a decree of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry A. Medvedev on 2 February 2010. The Fund’s mission in this regard involves encouraging development of the public diplomacy field and supporting establishment of a favourable for Russia public, political and business climate. Regarding to compatriot policy, the *Gorchakov Fund* holds activities in the following directions: providing support to Russian-language mass media and information resources abroad as well as to Russian mass media and information resources; implementation of international cooperation and providing support to development of international ties including in the area of advancement of democracy and protection of human rights; assistance in creating a favourable for Russia public opinion abroad; providing support to advancement of intellectual, cultural, scientific and business potential of Russia abroad.<sup>118</sup>

“The *Gorchakov Fund* organizes its own events, which focus on providing support to the field of public diplomacy, improving the foreign policy image of Russia abroad and achieving other statutory goals of the Fund. These events include thematic conferences, public lectures and meetings on foreign policy problems with the participation of recognized national and foreign experts in the area of international relations.”<sup>119</sup> The main partners of the Fund who act in the same field are: *Russian International Affairs Council*, *Rossotrudnichestvo*, *Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO)*, *Russkiy Mir Foundation*. There are lots of activities which are organized and held by the *Gorchakov Fund*, for example, on 25 April

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<sup>117</sup> Mission of *Rossotrudnichestvo* in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Federal Target Programme “Russian Language” in 2011-2015. Available from <http://gbr.rs.gov.ru/en/node/566> [Accessed on 30 April 2016]

<sup>118</sup> The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund. Mission and Goals. Available from <http://gorchakovfund.ru/en/about/mission/> [Accessed on 27 April 2016]

<sup>119</sup> The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund. Activities. Available from <http://gorchakovfund.ru/en/about/activity/> [Accessed on 27 April 2016]

2016, the Fund supported *Russia Forum New York*.<sup>120</sup> The Fund also organizes educational seminars which are aimed not only at participants from the Russian Federation but also from other countries, e.g. the *IX Diplomatic Seminar* – traditional research and educational meeting of young experts in the field of foreign affairs which took place in Kaliningrad and Svetlogorsk on May 24-28, 2016, invited young scientists and historians from different regions of Russia, the CIS States, the Baltic States, the Balkan region and Eastern Europe.<sup>121</sup>

### **Russia`s Compatriot Policy since 2012**

Now, in 2016, the President of the Russian Federation is again Vladimir Putin who took the post on 7 May 2012. “According to the final report of the *Central Electoral Commission*, Putin won 63.6% of 71.8 million votes cast, somewhat less than the 71.3% he had received in his last presidential election in 2004. In their preliminary report, monitors led by the *Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe* concluded that the election was well organized but that there were several problems. Although the report did not state outright that the election was not *free and fair*, some of the monitors at a press conference stated that they had not viewed it as *free and fair*.”<sup>122</sup> The term will expire in 2018.

Russia`s view of our day world, as well as the basic principles, priorities, goals and objectives of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation are reflected in the *Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation* adopted in 2013.<sup>123</sup> Regarding to Russia`s **compatriots**, the Concept 2013 states that, in accordance with the top priority objective of the national security policy, which is ensuring the protection of an individual, society and the state, the foreign policy should be focused primarily on pursuing the following basic goals: ensuring comprehensive protection of rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and compatriots residing abroad, and promoting, in various international formats, Russia`s approach to human rights issues; and promoting the Russian language and strengthening its

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<sup>120</sup> The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund (2016). The Gorchakov Fund Supported Russia Forum New York. Fund`s News, April 25. Available from <http://gorchakovfund.ru/en/news/18768/> [Accessed on 27 April 2016]

<sup>121</sup> The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund (2016). The Gorchakov Fund Starts Accepting Applications for the IX Diplomatic Seminar. Fund`s News, April 22. Available from <http://gorchakovfund.ru/en/news/18765/> [Accessed on 27 April 2016]

<sup>122</sup> Nichol, Jim (2012). *Russia`s March 2012 Presidential Election: Outcome and Implications*. Congressional Research Service: CRS Report for Congress, March 14, p. 2

<sup>123</sup> Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union (2016). Russian Foreign Policy. Available from <http://www.russianmission.eu/en/russian-foreign-policy> [Accessed on 18 April 2016]

positions in the world, disseminating information on the achievements of the peoples of Russia and consolidating the Russian diaspora abroad.<sup>124</sup>

The Concept also states that “**soft power** is a comprehensive toolkit for achieving foreign policy objectives building on civil society potential, information, cultural and other methods and technologies alternative to traditional diplomacy, is becoming an indispensable component of modern international relations. At the same time, increasing global competition and the growing crisis potential sometimes creates a risk of destructive and unlawful use of soft power and human rights concepts to exert political pressure on sovereign states, interfere in their internal affairs, destabilize their political situation, manipulate public opinion, including under the pretext of financing cultural and human rights projects abroad.”<sup>125</sup> In the section of *Rule of Law in International Relations*, as well as in other sections of the Concept, there can be found contradictory statements with aggression carried out by Russia, for instance, in the eastern part of Ukraine and Crimea because the Concept says that “it is unacceptable that military interventions and other forms of interference from without which undermine the foundations of international law based on the principle of sovereign equality of states, be carried out on the pretext of implementing the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’.”<sup>126</sup>

In the section of the Concept *International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights*, there can be found such objectives regarding to Russia’s **compatriots**:

- providing for the further integrated development of the system of diplomatic and consular protection of **Russian nationals abroad** subject to international law and international treaties concluded by the Russian Federation with a view to enhancing its effectiveness, including through the expansion of the network of Russian consular offices abroad;
- protecting rights and legitimate interests of **compatriots living abroad** on the basis of international law and treaties concluded by the Russian Federation while considering the numerous **Russian diaspora** as a partner, including in expanding and strengthening the space of the Russian language and culture;
- supporting **consolidation of organizations of compatriots** to enable them to effectively uphold their rights in the countries of residence while preserving the cultural and ethnic

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<sup>124</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2013). *Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation*. Approved by President of the Russian Federation V. Putin on 12 February 2013. Available from [http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign\\_policy/official\\_documents/-/asset\\_publisher/CptICk6BZ29/content/id/122186](http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICk6BZ29/content/id/122186) [Accessed on 18 April 2016]

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

identity of the **Russian diaspora** and its ties with the historical homeland, and provide conditions for facilitating voluntary relocation to the Russian Federation of **compatriots** willing to do so;

- extending the legal framework of international cooperation in order to improve the level of protection of rights and legitimate interests of **Russian children living abroad**.<sup>127</sup>

By this Concept, it can be understood that propaganda can be used as a tool of soft power, because it is stated that “in its public diplomacy, Russia will seek to ensure its objective perception in the world, develop its own effective means of information influence on public opinion abroad, strengthen the role of Russian mass media in the international information environment providing them with essential state support.”<sup>128</sup>

The role of the President (Vladimir Putin) in the implementation of the objectives of the Concept is emphasised in the section *Development and Implementation of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation*, which states that “the President of the Russian Federation in accordance with his constitutional powers directs the foreign policy of the country and as a Head of State represents the Russian Federation in international relations.”<sup>129</sup> That means, Putin takes responsibility of foreign policy carried out by the Russian Federation or Kremlin. It is also emphasised that “the *Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation* (or – *Rossotrudnichestvo*) participates in elaborating proposals and implementing the foreign policy of the Russian Federation in the field of assisting to international development, providing international humanitarian cooperation, **supporting Russian compatriots living abroad**, strengthening the position of the Russian language in the world, and developing a network of Russian scientific and cultural centres abroad.”<sup>130</sup>

The Russian Foreign Ministry also provides all-round assistance to the *Fund to Support and Protect the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad* (or – *Foundation for Defence of Rights of Compatriots Abroad*), established in January 2013. The Fund has won a reputation as a popular mechanism for defending the legitimate interests of compatriots and neutralising attempts to discriminate against them, primarily in the **Baltic states**. The Fund is making a useful contribution to combating the revision of the results of World War II, the glorification

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<sup>127</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2013). *Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation*. Approved by President of the Russian Federation V. Putin on 12 February 2013. Available from [http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign\\_policy/official\\_documents/-/asset\\_publisher/CptICk6BZ29/content/id/122186](http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICk6BZ29/content/id/122186) [Accessed on 18 April 2016]

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

of the Nazis and their accomplices, and any forms and manifestations of xenophobia, aggressive nationalism and chauvinism.”<sup>131</sup> The Fund, which was established by the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, is under responsibility of Sergey Lavrov. The Fund financially supports the *Institute of European Studies* which is based in Latvia and lead by Alexander Gaponenko since 2004.<sup>132</sup> The *Institute of European Studies*, according to the information of the *Latvian Security Police*, received from the Fund EUR 13 500 in 2012, EUR 37 531 in 2013, and EUR 29 110 in 2014.<sup>133</sup>

It can be concluded that since the dissolutions of the USSR in 1991, the Kremlin has made a huge effort for consolidation of its compatriots with the aim to regain influence in the post-Soviet space, especially since 2000, when V. Putin took the presidential office for the first time. In Latvia, what has helped the Kremlin to fulfil its foreign policy aims so far, is the evidence that, after 1991, Russians took it very personally and with exacerbate feelings that they had lost most of their privileges which they had during the years of the Soviet Occupation. They saw it as a humiliation of a great nation – the Russian nation. For example, the governmental institutions of Latvia started a special work to regain the previous dominant position of the language of the titular nation, i.e. the Latvian language.<sup>134</sup> As the consequence, the influence and status of the Russian language automatically decreased which was taken by the Russian-speaking minorities rather negatively, because only 9% of non-Latvians had the highest level and 27% had the intermediate level of knowledge of the Latvian language, but 22% of non-Latvians did not know Latvian at all in 1996.<sup>135</sup> Whereas the knowledge of the Latvian language has been the main condition to gain the citizenship of Latvia for non-citizens since the adoption of the *Citizenship Law*.

By the documents and statutes of the institutions or organizations which deal with Russia`s compatriot issue, one of the most important aim of compatriot policy is to popularize the Russian language abroad – e.g. it is supported by *Russkiy Mir Foundation*, *Rosstrudnichestvo*, *Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013* etc. It

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<sup>131</sup> Lavrov, Sergey (2015). Russian World: Steering towards Consolidation. Available from <http://valdaiclub.com/news/russian-world-steering-towards-consolidation/> [Accessed on 29 April 2016]

<sup>132</sup> Diplomatic Economic Club (2010). Gaponenko Aleksandr. Available from [http://www.dec.lv/index\\_en.php?id=514](http://www.dec.lv/index_en.php?id=514) [Accessed on 30 April 2016]

<sup>133</sup> *Ģenerālpilāns* (2016). Documentary by Juris Pakalniņš, S. Jemberga, I. Sprinģe, A. Ģiga. Re: Baltica, ERR, LTV, LRT

<sup>134</sup> Rēhis, Ainārs and A. Kudors, I. Indāns (2007). *Ārvalstu ietekme uz sabiedrības etniskās integrācijas procesu Latvijā*. Rīga: Austrumeiropas Politisko Pētījumu centrs, p. 30

<sup>135</sup> Zepa, Brigita, O. Žabko and L. Vaivode (2008). *Language Report*, March-April. Riga: Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, p. 22. Available from [http://www.biss.soc.lv/downloads/resources/valoda/valoda2008\\_en.pdf](http://www.biss.soc.lv/downloads/resources/valoda/valoda2008_en.pdf) [Accessed on 10 May 2016]

can be seen both as defence of the language which is the native tongue of Russia`s compatriots and also as the counteraction against the languages of titular nations, e.g. acting against the Latvian language. It must be taken into consideration, that the Russian language is spoken by 111 million ethnic Russians in the Russian Federation, in comparison with the Latvian language, which is spoken by 1.2 million ethnic Latvians in Latvia.<sup>136</sup>

It can be concluded that organizations, which deal with Russia`s compatriots abroad and also the *Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013* – apart popularization of the Russian language and culture, and defence of Russia`s compatriots – are aimed at consolidation of the Russian-speaking minorities in the post-Soviet countries with the purpose to gain their support for the Kremlin`s domestic and foreign policy and loyalty to the Russian Federation and its leader. In Latvia, such Kremlin`s goals can be achieved by diminishing loyalty of the Russian-speaking minorities, especially of Russians, to the Government of Latvia and Latvian state. That is why influential organizations and propaganda are needed – to help increase Russian loyalty to the Kremlin and decrease their loyalty to Latvia.

By *SKDS (Market and Public Opinion Research Centre)* survey in 2014, where all respondents were non-Latvians (69.8% of non-Latvians were ethnic Russians), only half of them (51%) answered that they ‘feel a very close belonging to Latvia’; but only 1/10 answered that they ‘feel a very close belonging to the Baltic states’, and 8% to the EU. 22.4% of the respondents answered that they ‘definitely are the patriots of Latvia’. When assessing the statement ‘The Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia are more loyal to Russia than Latvia’, 38% agreed to this statement.<sup>137</sup> These results show that there is a space left for pro-Kremlin activists and organizations to influence the opinion of those people, who do not have a strong feeling of belonging or loyalty to Latvia, in a way that they would tend to support Russia and its leader. The Kremlin and Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation use different soft power tools to gain support of the Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia – and compatriot policy is the most important and effective tool for such purpose. If these people are not loyal to Latvia and at the same time are very socio-politically active, i.e. 78.5% of respondents answered that had taken part in social and political activities during the last four years, then their activities and participation can create political threats to Latvia if influenced by the Kremlin`s propaganda carried out by Russia`s compatriot policy organizations and activists.

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<sup>136</sup> PMLP (2016). *Latvijas iedzīvotāju sadalījums pēc nacionālā sastāva un valstiskās piederības*, p. 4

<sup>137</sup> SKDS: Tīrgus un sabiedriskās domas pētījumu centrs (2014). *Piederības sajūta Latvijai: Mazākumtautību Latvijas iedzīvotāju aptauja*, May-June, pp. 7-9

## 5. THE IMPACT OF RUSSIA'S COMPATRIOT POLICY ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN LATVIA

In this chapter, the introductory analysis of Russia's compatriot policy in relation with Latvia in the time period from the dissolution of the USSR till 2000 will be given at the beginning of the chapter. Then the analysis of Russia's compatriot policy in Latvia since 2000 will be given with the focus on the most important political events and processes in Latvia which led to confrontations between the Government of Latvia, Russian speaking community and Latvian society, and the Russian Federation as well. The cases of the *School Reform 2004*, *Constitutional Referendum 2012*, *9<sup>th</sup> May Victory Day Celebrations*, *Latvian Parliament Elections*, role of social media and the connection of Kremlin's organizations for defence of Russia's compatriots in Latvia with these political processes will be analysed.

It is important to distinguish who are considered to be Russia's compatriots in Latvia according to Russia's compatriot policy. "While in English the word *Russian* can refer to both citizens of the Russian Federation and ethnic Russians, the Russian language uses two separate terms to describe these populations with greater granularity: *russkiy* – which refers to ethnic Russians; and *rossiiskiy* – which refers to citizens of the Russian Federation. A third term, *sootchestvennikii*, or *compatriots*, encompasses both of these categories as well as individuals connected to Russia by culture or family background – persons demonstrating commonality of language, history, cultural heritage, traditions and customs with the Russian state and their direct relatives; persons living beyond the borders of the Russian Federation having spiritual, cultural, and legal connections with Russia; or persons whose direct relatives lived on the territory of the Russian Federation or the Soviet Union."<sup>138</sup> "More precise definitions include: having a loyal attitude towards Russia, maintaining contacts with Russia, and preserving spiritual, cultural, and, especially, religious ties with Russia. When referring to the *Russian Diaspora* that maintains its contacts with Moscow, the Russian authorities often speak of *Pax Russica* (or the Russian World)."<sup>139</sup>

In Latvia, there are 566 681 ethnic Russians (1 January 2016) which constitute 26.4% of the total population of Latvia<sup>140</sup>, and which, according to Russia's compatriot policy can be

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<sup>138</sup> Zakem, Vera, Saunders, P. and D. Antoun (2015). *Mobilizing Compatriots: Russia's Strategy, Tactics, and Influence in the Former Soviet Union*. Arlington: CNA Analysis and Solutions, pp. 3-4

<sup>139</sup> Kureev, Artem (2015). *Russian Diaspora: A Tool of Soft Power?* Available from <http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/russian-diaspora-tool-soft-power> [Accessed on 11 May 2016]

<sup>140</sup> Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs of the Republic of Latvia (2016). *Latvijas iedzīvotāju sadalījums pēc nacionālā sastāva un valstiskās piederības*. Riga: PMLP, p. 4

considered as its compatriots. If distinguished by the Russian language, Slavic roots, and the USSR as the place of origin or former homeland, then not only the Russian minority can be considered as Russia's compatriots, but also people from other Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia, i.e. Belarusians, Ukrainians, or Poles. The same can be said about those people whose direct relatives have ethnic, historic or political ties with the Russian Federation or the Soviet Union. If all these people are counted together, then the percentage of Russia's compatriots can be far above 30% of the total population of Latvia.

After the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin (the President of the Russian Federation from 10 July 1991 – 31 December 1999), the process of consolidation of Russia's compatriots was less elaborated and intense as it became after 2000, when Vladimir Putin took the office. Russia's compatriot policy was aimed more to collaboration and friendship during Yeltsin's presidency, although, responding to Latvia's domestic policies regarding to the Russian minority of Latvia, Russia's compatriot policy started to become more protective, defensive and unfriendly towards Latvia as a state.

The relations between Latvia and Russia became more problematic when the citizenship laws were passed in Latvia: the *Citizenship Law of the Republic Latvia*<sup>141</sup> (22 July 1994), and the law *On the Status of Former USSR Citizens Who are not Citizens of Latvia or Any Other State*<sup>142</sup> (9 May 1995). These two laws divided Latvian population into two parts – the citizens and non-citizens of the Republic of Latvia. In fact, the majority of non-citizens of Latvia were Russia's compatriots whose rights had to be defended by the Kremlin according to its compatriot policy. In 1995, when the naturalization process began, there were 735 000 non-citizens in Latvia (29% of the total population)<sup>143</sup> – mainly ethnic Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians.

According to the *Citizenship Law of the Republic of Latvia 1994*, a Latvian citizen was: a person who was a Latvian citizen on 17 June 1940, as well as a descendant of such person; a person whose both parents at the time of his or her birth were Latvian citizens or one of them

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<sup>141</sup> LR Saeima (1994). *Pilsonības likums*. 22.07/25.08.1994. Available from <http://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=57512> [Accessed on 31 March 2016]

<sup>142</sup> LR Saeima (1995). *Par to bijušās PSRS pilsoņu statusu, kuriem nav Latvijas vai citas valsts pilsonības*. 12.04/09.05.1995. Available from <http://likumi.lv/ta/id/77481-par-to-bijusas-psrs-pilsonu-statusu-kuriem-nav-latvijas-vai-citas-valsts-pilsonibas> [Accessed on 31 March 2016]

<sup>143</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia (2015). *Basic Facts about Citizenship and Language Policy of Latvia and some Sensitive History-related Issues*. Available from <http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/society-integration/citizenship-in-latvia/citizenship-policy-in-latvia/basic-facts-about-citizenship-and-language-policy-of-latvia-and-some-sensitive-history-related-issues> [Accessed on 4 April 2016]

was a Latvian citizen.<sup>144</sup> That means, that all persons or economic immigrants who had arrived in Latvia from the USSR after the Soviet Occupation on 17 June 1940 (and the descendants of such persons) were not automatically recognized as citizens of the independent Latvia. They received the status of a non-citizen and had to go through the process of naturalization to receive the citizenship of Latvia.

Dr. oec. Viesturs Pauls Karnups (*Deputy of the 5<sup>th</sup> Saeima; Deputy Minister of the 1<sup>st</sup> Government of I. Godmanis; Head of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Office in 1992*) in an interview (held by the author of the Master Thesis – See Appendix 10) explained, that the reason and political aim why such laws were passed – dividing population into two parts: citizens and non-citizens according to their and their ancestors` status on 14 June 1940 when Latvia was occupied by the Soviet Union and its migration or colonization policies started to fallow –, was a logic way how to separate those people who could be considered as the citizens of Latvia within the citizenship law of pre-war independent Latvia (*1919 Law on Citizenship*) and those people who could not be considered the citizens of Latvia. Those people who received the citizenship automatically (and also their descendants) were the last citizens according to the *1919 Law on Citizenship*. Many people arrived in Latvia when the Latvia as a state did not exist anymore. It is not possible to call the Latvian SSR under the USSR Occupation – a Latvian state. And all people who came to Latvia when the Latvian state did not exist anymore could not be the citizens of the Latvian state.<sup>145</sup>

The independent Estonia had also the same problem as Latvia – they had a large proportion of people who had arrived in Estonia as immigrants from the USSR after 1940. Latvia agreed with Estonia to consider all Soviet immigrants as foreigners or aliens (later – the term ‘non-citizen’ was applied) which had the rights to live permanently in Latvia or Estonia. But Estonians changed their policy – they decided to promote those people to apply for and receive the citizenship of the Russian Federation (the heiress of the USSR). Latvia did not want so many citizens of the Russian Federation in Latvia as a possible consequence of such citizenship policy. At the same time Latvia also did not want to give them citizenship for nothing – as a reward for colonization of Latvia. The term ‘non-citizen’ was applied because they were people who did not have their country anymore – because there was no the USSR anymore, which citizens they were till 1991; and they were not the citizens of Latvia nor the

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<sup>144</sup> LR Saeima (1994). *Pilsonības likums*. 22.07/25.08.1994. Available from <http://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=57512> [Accessed on 31 March 2016]

<sup>145</sup> Karnups, Pauls Viesturs (2016). *Interview with Dr. oec. Viesturs Pauls Karnups*. Held by Una Plauka, April 12. Riga, Latvia

citizens of the Russian Federation. But they had the rights to live permanently in Latvia. The *Citizens` Congress of the Republic of Latvia* introduced the non-citizen status and non-citizen passports. The USSR immigrants could not be called foreigners because they had lived in Latvia for so long time or they were born in Latvia (to the Soviet immigrant parents). It is important to take into consideration that the USSR immigration policy – the artificial inflow of people from different Soviet republics, mainly, from Russia into Latvia – the same as the occupation of Latvia was the violation of international laws. It cannot be justified somehow. At the very beginning, when the citizenship laws were passed, there was no any recognizable reaction from the Russian population in Latvia. It is important to remember that there were 10% ethnic Russians out of all population of Latvia on 17 June 1940. After the regaining of independence, there were no problems with them or their descendants – they automatically received the citizenship of the Republic of Latvia the same as all citizens of 1940 and their descendants. That means – it was not an ethnic discrimination to pass such citizenship laws.<sup>146</sup>

In the Russian Federation, in that time, after 1994, such documents were adopted by the Kremlin with the aim to support and protect Russia`s compatriots: *Declaration on Support of the Russian Diaspora and Protection of Russian Compatriots* (8 December 1995); “*Resolution of the Government No. 590, Action Program for Protecting Compatriots Abroad* (17 May 1996) – it stated that Russia was ready to assist governments of newly independent states in ensuring that Russians enjoyed the full range of their rights; and *Federal Law on the State Policy of the Russian Federation Concerning Compatriots Abroad No. 99-FZ* (24 may 1999).<sup>147</sup>

In Latvia, *Latvian Human Rights Committee* (or – *Latvian Human Rights and International Humanitarian Co-operation Committee*) was established in 1992 which was led by Tatyana Zhdanoka and Vladimir Bogdanov. The Committee which has had close links and cooperation with the Kremlin since its foundation is still present and active in 2016. For example, in 2013, the Committee received from the Kremlin`s *Foundation for Defence of Rights of Compatriots Abroad* – led by the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov – more than EUR 98 000; but, in 2015, EUR 94 423 (it has to be admitted that expenses of the Committee were EUR 281 430 in 2015, which point to other un-transparent sources of money, probably linked with the Kremlin or other institutions, persons that support

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<sup>146</sup> Karnups, Pauls Viesturs (2016). *Interview with Dr. oec. Viesturs Pauls Karnups*. Held by Una Plauka, April 12. Riga, Latvia

<sup>147</sup> Grigas, Agnia (2016). *Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, pp. 67-68

non-citizens and pro-Kremlin activities).<sup>148</sup> Also Dr. oec. Viesturs Pauls Karnups admits in the interview, that the Committee cooperated with the Kremlin already in the 1990-ties. T. Zhdanoka was the most active and visible defender of non-citizens of Latvia and also Latvia's 'right place' within the USSR or RF. She was Alfred Rubik's (the former leader of the "Communist Party of Latvia", and chairman of the "Socialist Party of Latvia") radio voice – she tried to defend Rubik's opinion that the best option for Latvia was to stay in the USSR. T. Zhdanoka, in fact, was (and still is) a propagandist-agitator – because human rights by the essence were and are not her interest, she has always been interested in turning back Latvia in the arms of Russia.<sup>149</sup>

It is important to mention that T. Zhdanoka (today's MEP and the leader of the "Latvian Russian Union" party) voted against the restoration of independence of Latvia at the *Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia* on the 21<sup>st</sup> of August in 1991. She even fought a four-year long judicial battle against the state (Latvia) which she won on 17 June 2004, when the *European Court of Human Rights* decided that her rights had been violated when she was banned from assuming political office. T. Zhdanoka was banned from standing in political posts for her actions following the Latvian independence movement (1987-1991), when she worked against the democratically elected government of Latvia. At that time, the law banned former members of the "Communist Party", as well as former members of the KGB, from holding political posts. The court failed to find T. Zhdanoka a national security threat to Latvia although she was a member of "Communist Party of Latvia" (1971-1991) and remained active in the Party after January 1991; she was also one of the leaders of the *Interfront* – a political organization opposing Latvia's independence from the USSR.<sup>150</sup>

*Latvian Human Rights Committee (LHRC)*, which was led by T. Zhdanoka in the 1990-ties, is a member of international human rights organizations FIDH, ENAR and AEDH. Committee's co-chairpersons since 2012 are Nataliya Yolkina and Vladimir Buzayev. Basic fields of activities are minority rights, legal status of persons and housing rights. Committee mostly deals with social, economic and minority rights – especially, citizenship issues.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> DP: De facto (2015). LTV: Ar Ždanoku saistītā Cilvēktiesību komiteja no Krievijas pērn saņēmusi 94 423 eiro. Available from <http://www.focus.lv/latvija/politika/ltv-ar-zdanoku-saistita-cilvektiesibu-komiteja-no-krievijas-fern-sanemusi-94-423-eiro> [Accessed on 4 May 2016]

<sup>149</sup> Karnups, Pauls Viesturs (2016). *Interview with Dr. oec. Viesturs Pauls Karnups*. Held by Una Plauka, April 12. Riga, Latvia

<sup>150</sup> Eglitis, Aaron (2004). Zhdanoka Wins Case in Human Rights Court. *The Baltic Times*, July 1. Available from <http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/10333/> [Accessed on 4 May 2016]

<sup>151</sup> Latvia Human Rights Committee. About Us. Available from <http://www.lhrc.lv/index.php?lang=en&mendes=men1#textbegin> [Accessed on 4 May 2016]

It can be concluded that during B. Yeltsin`s presidency till the year of 2000, the relations between Russia and Latvia changed from friendly to more complicated because of non-citizen issue in Latvia as the main subject of dispute. Russia`s protective stance of its compatriots living abroad became more visible and coordinated. Many documents were adopted by the Kremlin for the support of Russia`s compatriots, and cooperation with activists and politicians who supported Russian minority`s interests in Latvia strengthened – e.g. *Latvian Human Rights Committee* and its leaders (T. Zhdanoka, V. Bogdanov etc.) started to receive not only political support from the Kremlin but also financial.

### **5.1. Russia`s Compatriot Policy in Latvia 2000-2008**

The period from 2000 till 2008 was the time when the President of the Russian Federation was Vladimir Putin. In Latvia, in that time, Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga was in the office from 1999-2007, and Valdis Zatlers – from 2007 till 2011. That was also the time when Latvia accessed to the European Union (on 1 May 2004) and joined NATO (on 29 April 2004).

In the Russian Federation, with the beginning of V. Putin`s presidency a more stronger, purposeful and successful consolidation of Russia`s patriots living abroad or diaspora began – especially, in the former USSR republics, also in Latvia. The Kremlin and V. Putin showed that Russia wants to regain influence over former Soviet space – both former territories and minds of people or compatriots. Already in 1999, when V. Putin started to act as the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, an aggressive, brutal and cruel military campaign was started in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, known as the second war between Russia and Chechnya. As the result, the territory once again became a part of the Russian Federation with a pro-Kremlin government appointed by the Kremlin. V. Putin who openly expressed his view about the collapse of the USSR as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20<sup>th</sup> century”<sup>152</sup> has been acting in the way that “it is clear that he wants to re-establish Russian hegemony within the space of the former Soviet Union”<sup>153</sup>, and he has used much effort and money to do so from the time of his first presidency, which started in 2000, till nowadays –

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<sup>152</sup> The Associated Press (2005). Putin: Soviet Collapse a ‘Genuine Tragedy’. Available from [http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7632057/ns/world\\_news/t/putin-soviet-collapse-genuine-tragedy/#.VyfFUvI97IU](http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7632057/ns/world_news/t/putin-soviet-collapse-genuine-tragedy/#.VyfFUvI97IU) [Accessed on 1 May 2016]

<sup>153</sup> Sanders, Katie (2014). Did Vladimir Putin Call the Breakup of the USSR ‘the Greatest Geopolitical Tragedy of the 20th Century?’ Available from <http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/mar/06/john-bolton/did-vladimir-putin-call-breakup-ussr-greatest-geop/> [Accessed on 1 May 2016]

e.g. his last military campaign, which started in 2014 and can be seen also now, in 2016, is the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and military conflict in the eastern Ukraine. Announcing the end of the Soviet Era a tragedy, V. Putin also explained why it was so tragic for the Russian people: “As for the Russian people, it became a genuine tragedy. Tens of millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen found themselves beyond the fringes of Russian territory.”<sup>154</sup> V. Putin considered that Russia’s compatriots who now found them living in independent former Soviet republics were in a tragic situation – because they were not Soviet citizens anymore as the great homeland, the USSR, ended to exist in 1991. He saw that consolidation, protection and gaining influence over the minds of these people were one of his main tasks in the process of turning back time to the Soviet Era.

Since 2000, different federal organizations have been created and established by the Kremlin with the aim to support, defend and consolidate Russia’s compatriots living abroad. One of the most influential and broadest organization is the *Russkiy Mir Foundation*, which was established in 2007 in accordance with V. Putin’s decree. Putin’s attempt to create the ‘Russian World’ can be seen as an attempt to unite all Russians living in the Russian Federation and abroad, i.e. Russia’s compatriots, – on the basis of a myth or belief in a great Russian nation. David Millers writes that “there are cases of nations where the process of nation-building, nationalism and compatriotism is based on the imagined national past. It can serve as a constitutive or background belief. The particular story which a nation tells itself about its past is a background belief. It is important that the story should be generally believed – there should be substantial convergence in the versions of the story that are believed – but not that it should be historically accurate. Since the story is told for the purpose of self-definition, and since the nation’s self-definition bears on the goals that its members will try to pursue in the future, we should expect a dynamic nation, actively engaged in critical debate on its common purposes, regularly to reinterpret the past as well.”<sup>155</sup>

“Nations need a common view about what they now are; a view about what distinguishes membership of this nation from membership of others. They need some conception of ‘national character’. But these beliefs are also to a large extent mythical, in the sense that they attribute a spurious homogeneity to a set of people who, if looked at objectively, vary enormously in values, lifestyle, cultural attributes, and so on.”<sup>156</sup> Especially, if the nation

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<sup>154</sup> The Associated Press (2005). Putin: Soviet Collapse a ‘Genuine Tragedy’. Available from [http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7632057/ns/world\\_news/t/putin-soviet-collapse-genuine-tragedy/#.VyfFUvI97IU](http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7632057/ns/world_news/t/putin-soviet-collapse-genuine-tragedy/#.VyfFUvI97IU) [Accessed on 1 May 2016]

<sup>155</sup> Miller, David (1988). The Ethical Significance of Nationality. *Ethics*, Vol. 98, No. 4, p. 656

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid*, p. 656

occupies a large territory, involves people who live within the borders of other republics, people who have emigrated centuries ago or were born in another countries. Such process can be seen as an artificial unification and consolidation of individuals, declared as compatriots under a mythical banner of ‘Russian World’, who have already on smaller or larger scale acquired national characteristics of other nations or ethnic groups.

Dr. habil. philol. Ina Druviete (*Member of Latvian Parliament since 2002; Minister of Education and Science of the Republic of Latvia 2004-2006; 2014*) in an interview (held by the author of the Master Thesis – See Appendix 11) also admits that it is possible to speak about an aimful awakening and stirring up of deeply founded emotions in the Russian society which are done by different pro-Kremlin organizations and activists. Because, in reality, there are no hard and enormous transnational societal problems in Latvia in spite of different disputes about ethnic minority issues. But these awakening activities of pro-Kremlin organizations and politicians can create political threats. However, it can be taken into consideration that there exist the pathos, education and upbringing in the Russian society that the Russian language and nation are something very special. And it is very easy to revitalize it – these supremacy feelings. Pro-Kremlin and Russian activists try to do it. Because it is not a question about linguistic or other national threats to the Russian minority in Latvia if one looks globally at the number of Russians and Russian-speaking population in the world or Latvia.<sup>157</sup>

### ***School Reform 2004***

In this period from 2000-2008, the most publicly visible confrontation between the Latvian Government and Russian-speaking society in Latvia was connected with the ‘School Reform 2004’ or *Amendments to the Education Law 2004*<sup>158</sup>. “On 22 January 2004 the Latvian Parliament adopted a wording of the *Law on Education* different from that adopted at first reading. The changes provided that secondary schools (starting with the form 10) teach in Latvian, except for minority languages and other subjects related to the minority identity and culture in accordance with the general standard. This ambiguous wording created an uproar among the local Russian-speaking community. On 27 January 2004, President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga stated that she would veto the law if the same wording were to remain in the

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<sup>157</sup> Druviete, Ina (2016). *Interview with Dr. habil. philol. Ina Druviete*. Held by Una Plauka, April 20. Riga, Latvia

<sup>158</sup> LR Saeima (2004). *Grozījumi Izglītības likumā*. 05.02./27.02.2004. Available from <http://likumi.lv/ta/id/84315-grozijumi-izglitibas-likuma> [Accessed on 21 April 2016]

third reading. Finally, these highly contested amendments were significantly altered at the third reading on 5 February 2004 and were promulgated by V. Vīķe-Freiberga on 10 February 2004. The final version legally consolidated the norms that were previously foreseen in government regulations. The adopted amendments to the *Law on Education* provided that from September 2004 minority secondary schools will teach 60% of subjects in Latvian or bilingually and 40% in the minority language.”<sup>159</sup>

Already in April 2003, as the countermeasure to the Education Law, the *Headquarters for the Defence of the Russian Schools* or **Russian School Defence Staff** (*Штаб защиты русских школ*) was created. As it is stated in the Headquarters’ official homepage – “when it became clear that the Latvian political elite is not going to take into account the opinion of the Russian community in deciding the fate of the Russian schools, - then politicians, community leaders, teachers and secondary school pupils of the Russian schools teamed up to coordinate the movement of non-violent resistance to the *Reform 2004*.”<sup>160</sup> The Headquarters united and included a great number of organizations: the political party PCTVL/ЗаПЧЕЛ or *For Human Rights in a United Latvia*; the *Latvian Human Rights Committee/ Латвийский Комитет по правам человека*; the *Latvian Russian Language School Support Association/ Латвийская ассоциация в поддержку школ с обучением на русском языке*; the *United Congress of the Russian Community of Latvia/ Объединенный конгресс русских общин Латвии*; *Latvian Russian Youth Association/ Латвийская ассоциация русской молодежи*; the *Latvian Russian Community/ Русская община Латвии*; *Belarusian Association “Pramen”/ Белорусское общество «Прамень»*; *Latvian Ukrainian Union/ Союз украинцев Латвии* and many other.<sup>161</sup>

Activists and representatives from educational and other institutions were welcomed to join the movement. Aims and common goals of the movement in defence of Russian schools were: cancellation of the *Reform 2004*; preservation of secondary education in Russian; the state must ensure the education and teacher training of pedagogues who are teaching pupils in Russian; to teach in the Latvian language: only the Latvian language and literature, history and geography of Latvia; other subjects must be taught and examinations held in the mother tongue of pupils; to get from the Government ensuring a qualitative education of the Latvian

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<sup>159</sup> Council of Europe: Parliamentary Assembly (2004). *Documents: Working Papers*, October 4-8. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, p. 130

<sup>160</sup> Штаб защиты русских школ. О Штабе. Available from <http://www.shtab.lv/main.php?w2=about> [Accessed on 5 May 2016]

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

language at the lessons of the Latvian language and literature; restoration in action the principles of the *Law On Education 1919*.<sup>162</sup>

The most visible leaders were: Yuri Petropavlovski, Alexander Kazakov (expelled from Latvia in September 2004), Gennady Kotov, Miroslav Mitrofanov, Vladislav Rafaljski, Mikhail Tyasin, Victor Dergunov, and Yakov Pliner. Two songs for the support of Russian schools were created and performed by them: *The Black Karlis (Чёрный Карлис)*<sup>163</sup> and *Reform – FACT! (Реформа – ФАКТ!)*<sup>164</sup>. The song *Black Karlis* was aimed at that time Minister of Education and Science of the Republic of Latvia Kārlis Šadurskis (7 November 2002 – 9 March 2004), and the main vocal was performed by Vladislav Rafaljski (the member of PCTVL since 2005). Both videos demonstrated a very negative and aggressive attitude towards the *Reform 2004* and the Government of Latvia depicting and comparing them with Nazis. These songs the same as protests, school strikes and rallies which took place in winter (January 22 and 23; February 5 and 11) and in autumn (September 1, 2-6) of 2004 can be seen as a strong exaggeration of the real situation and powerful intimidation of the Government and Latvian society as whole. Dr. habil. philol. Ina Druviete in the interview expressed her opinion about the song *The Black Karlis* as a very shocking video where V. Rafaljski with an angry and intimidating expression turns against the Reform and K. Šadurskis accompanied by inviting and aggressive music. Their aim – to create fear – was reached because even much experienced people were under neurolinguistic effect of the song.<sup>165</sup>

The fact that the *Russian School Defence Staff* was made and led by such parties as PCTVL/ *For Human Rights in United Latvia* and organizations as the *Latvian Human Rights Committee* show that they could gain also the Kremlin`s support as these organizations have always had a close cooperation with the Kremlin and its compatriot defence organizations. It can be concluded that there were also political aims and acting against the Latvian language domination in Latvia under the shield of human rights defence of ethnic minorities, i.e. the Russian-speaking community.

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<sup>162</sup> Штаб защиты русских школ. О Штабе. Available from <http://www.shtab.lv/main.php?w2=about> [Accessed on 5 May 2016]

<sup>163</sup> Штаб защиты русских школ (Kotovs, Genādijs un V. Rafaļskis, J. Pliners, M. Mitrofanovs. J. Petropavlovskis, A. Kazakovs u.c.) (2004). *Чёрный Карлис* (Pink Floyd и Чёрный Ворон). VIDEO available from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BpS3k0HD6i8> [Accessed on 21 April 2016]

<sup>164</sup> Штаб защиты русских школ. *Реформа – факт!* (Reform – Fact!). VIDEO available from [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Blgj\\_c9Gmjw](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Blgj_c9Gmjw) [Accessed on 5 May 2016]

<sup>165</sup> Druviete, Ina (2016). *Interview with Dr. habil. philol. Ina Druviete*. Held by Una Plauka, April 20. Riga, Latvia

Dr. habil. philol. Ina Druviete tells that there was a paradox that in the time when the *Reform 2004* had to be introduced, suddenly pseudoscientists' findings appeared about the negative impact of a language acquisition on children's psyche and their cognitive capabilities. The most visible speculators of such recognitions were Yakov Pliner (member of *People's Harmony Party*; PCTVL/ *For Human Rights in United Latvia*; and *Latvian Russian Union*; deputy of the 7<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> Saeima), Valery Bukhvalov (member of *Latvian Russian Union* and 9<sup>th</sup> Saeima), and Bronjislav Zeljerman (founder of the Russian schools *INNOVA* and *Eksperiments* for preparing the young Russian elite). Nowhere in the world nobody anymore recognized that bilingual education and bilingualism left a negative impact on psyche – now, Latvia was the only place on the earth where such theories appeared and gained support. The greatest paradox was that the Latvian language turned out to be the only language which had a negative impact on psyche because those people considered that learning in other languages, for instance, in English was absolutely normal and acceptable.<sup>166</sup>

It has to be admitted that bilingualism by cognitive researchers is very highly praised – “being bilingual has lots of cognitive benefits: switching between two languages has been compared to mental gymnastics. Pennsylvania State University cognitive scientist Judith F. Kroll says that bilinguals are really a model of cognitive control. The mental struggle of selecting and switching between two languages actually helps reshape the brain's networks.”<sup>167</sup>

Dr. habil. philol. I. Druviete is convinced that there was no any psycholinguistic or scientific proof to such findings and theories against the Reform and bilingualism. And the *Reform 2004* was not a sudden reform – it was a well prepared bilingual education reform since 1989. It can be concluded that the only logic motivation to such processes was political. The deprecatory attitude towards education in the Latvian language definitely was an ideological mean of fight within Russia's compatriot policy. It started already in 1994-1995 when the discussions about the new *State Language Law* began (which was adopted in 1999). It can be concluded that the *Reform 2004* was a recurrent pretence for pro-Kremlin politicians and activists for trying to prove one more time that the Latvian *State Language Law* and

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<sup>166</sup> Druviete, Ina (2016). *Interview with Dr. habil. philol. Ina Druviete*. Held by Una Plauka, April 20. Riga, Latvia

<sup>167</sup> Garza, Frida (2016). How Being Bilingual Rewires Your Brain. *World Economic Forum*. Available from <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/02/how-being-bilingual-rewires-your-brain/> [Accessed on 13 May 2016]

language policy did not correspond with international standards. And there can be found going against the independence of Latvia in the subtext of these processes.<sup>168</sup>

## **5.2. Russia`s Compatriot Policy in Latvia 2008-2012**

The President of the Russian Federation from 7 May 2008 till 7 May of 2012 was Dmitry Medvedev who appointed Vladimir Putin as the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation which was in the accordance with the Kremlin`s election campaign. That was time when the Russian Federation started a military campaign in the South Ossetia against Georgia in August 2008 or Russo-Georgian War 7-12 August 2008. The war once again showed the aggressive and unpredictable behaviour of the Russian Federation as it was since 1999 when Vladimir Putin was appointed as the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation for the first time. It is important to mention that, in fact, the real ruler of Russia since 1999 is Vladimir Putin as in Russia`s undemocratic political system “without Putin`s endorsement, Medvedev would not have been president. And by some accounts, Medvedev was merely a placeholder, having agreed to serve a single four-year term so that Putin can return to the stage in 2012 to reclaim his old job.”<sup>169</sup>

### ***Constitutional Referendum 2012***

If look at the domestic politics and processes of Latvia since 2012, then the most dangerous and significant confrontation between the Latvian society and Russian speaking minority was the constitutional referendum on the *Amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia* (18 February 2012). The proposed amendments included Articles 4, 18, 21, 101 and 104 of the *Constitution of Latvia* by adding the condition about Russian as the second official language, as well as prescribing two working languages – Latvian and Russian for self-government institutions. The referendum`s question was: “Do you support the adoption of the Draft Law *Amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia* that provides for the

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<sup>168</sup> Druviete, Ina (2016). *Interview with Dr. habil. philol. Ina Druviete*. Held by Una Plauka, April 20. Riga, Latvia

<sup>169</sup> McLaughlin, Seth (2010). Medvedev vs. Putin: Who`s Ruling Russia? *The Washington Diplomat*, November 18. Available from [http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=6194:medvedev-vs-putin-whos-ruling-russia-&catid=979:july-2009&Itemid=254](http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6194:medvedev-vs-putin-whos-ruling-russia-&catid=979:july-2009&Itemid=254) [Accessed on 8 May 2016]

Russian language the status of the second official language?”<sup>170</sup> The Referendum results summarized by the *Central Election Commission of Latvia* showed that 273 347 or 24.88% voters casted their votes FOR adopting of the amendments to the Constitution, while 821 722 or 74.8% voters were AGAINST the amendments to the Constitution. The activity of voters was 70.73%, and it must be taken into consideration that only citizens of the Republic of Latvia could take part and vote in the Referendum, that means, that a large number of Russian speaking non-citizens could not participate in the Referendum in such way reducing the percentage of FOR votes (there were 13.8% non-citizens out of total population of Latvia in 2012).<sup>171</sup>

In fact, at the beginning – since regaining of independence, there were no significant signs of negations between the Latvian and Russian-speaking communities about the language use in everyday life what were latter created by the Referendum. Harsh discussions and protests were mainly between the Government of Latvia and Russian-speaking minorities regarding to education laws and reforms. As the main factors which created such situation which led to the Referendum were the language and education policies of the Government of Latvia and counteractions by pro-Kremlin organizations, Russian interest groups and activists. The *Constitutional Referendum 2012* has left a negative impact on the unity of Latvian people – society is more divided and more nationalistic expressions on both parts can be observed even today. Although a national awakening and patriotic feelings can be assessed as very good qualities of a nation, in this particular situation it led more to negative expressions and offence by both parts than to positive emotions. That arises a question – what was the main reason for such outcome as the Referendum and who gained from this confrontation and possible introduction of Russian as the second official language of Latvia which can be seen as a political threat to Latvia?

According to the voting results, there was a strong correlation between the share of Russian minority and support for the Russian language in the voting districts and cities of Latvia. If look at three largest cities of Latvia – Riga, Daugavpils, and Liepāja, then such situation can be seen. In Riga, which is the largest and capital city of Latvia, ethnic Russians constitute 38% of total number of Riga`s inhabitants; there are also 3.9% Belarusians, 3.5%

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<sup>170</sup> Centrālā vēlēšanu komisija. Likumprojekts “Grozījumi Latvijas Republikas Satversmē” 2012. Available from <https://www.cvk.lv/pub/public/30258.html> [Accessed on 8 May 2016]

<sup>171</sup> Central Election Commission of Latvia. Referendum on the Draft Law “Amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia”. Available from <https://www.cvk.lv/pub/public/30287.html> [Accessed on 9 May 2016]

Ukrainians, and 1.9% Poles in Riga (2015)<sup>172</sup>. They all are considered as the Russian speaking-minorities. The Referendum showed that 36.03% of Riga`s inhabitants voted FOR Russian as the second official language.<sup>173</sup> Daugavpils, which is the second largest city of Latvia by number of inhabitants, shares the highest percentage of ethnic Russians – 49 269 or 50.9% of all Daugavpils`s 96 818 inhabitants in total. Latvians constitute only 18.2%, which make up 17 575 individuals. There are also 14.1% Poles, 7.4% Belarusians, and 2% Ukrainians in Daugavpils (2015)<sup>174</sup>. And the Referendum showed that 85.1% of Daugavpils`s inhabitants voted FOR Russian as the second official language.<sup>175</sup> The third largest city of Latvia is Liepāja. Liepāja shares 30.88% ethnic Russians, 4.93% Ukrainians, 3.28% Belarusians, and 1.04% Poles of all inhabitants in total. The Referendum showed that 20% of Liepāja`s inhabitants voted FOR Russian as the second official language.<sup>176</sup>

The same can be said about the regions of Latvia. If look at Latgale region in the south-eastern part of Latvia at the Russian border, which shares the highest percentage of the Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia, then the same tendency or correlation can be observed – it had also the highest percentage of the Russian language supporters. In Zilupe district – 90.25%, in Daugavpils district – 65.79%, in Rēzekne district – 44.49% voted FOR Russian as the second official language.<sup>177</sup> (See Appendix 8: *Map of the Results of Referendum 2012*)

It leads to conclude that the Russian-speaking minority with its voting behaviour created threats to the native tongue of Latvians or official language of Latvian state. In such way, supporters of the Russian language created also political threats to Latvia because the official language is the basis of country`s national identity and sovereignty. Voting FOR in the Referendum created also threats of Russification to the Latvian nation as it was during the Soviet Era when the dominant language of the USSR was Russian and there were two official languages in the occupied Latvia – Russian and Latvian. These threats inadvertently created

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<sup>172</sup> Pilsonības un migrācijas lietu pārvalde (2015). Iedzīvotāju skaits pašvaldībās pēc nacionālā sastāva. Available from [http://www.pmlp.gov.lv/lv/assets/documents/statistika/01.01.2015/ISPN\\_Pasvaldibas\\_pec\\_TTB.pdf](http://www.pmlp.gov.lv/lv/assets/documents/statistika/01.01.2015/ISPN_Pasvaldibas_pec_TTB.pdf) [Accessed on 10 May 2016]

<sup>173</sup> IR: CVK (2012). Pārlicenošs pret krievu valodu kā valsts valodu. Available from <http://www.irlv.lv/2012/2/19/pirmaja-stunda-referenduma-piedalijusies-25-191-jeb-1-63-veletaju> [Accessed on 10 May 2016]

<sup>174</sup> Pilsonības un migrācijas lietu pārvalde (2015). Iedzīvotāju skaits pašvaldībās pēc nacionālā sastāva. Available from [http://www.pmlp.gov.lv/lv/assets/documents/statistika/01.01.2015/ISPN\\_Pasvaldibas\\_pec\\_TTB.pdf](http://www.pmlp.gov.lv/lv/assets/documents/statistika/01.01.2015/ISPN_Pasvaldibas_pec_TTB.pdf) [Accessed on 10 May 2016]

<sup>175</sup> Tautas nobalsošanas rezultātu karte. Available from <http://neogeo.lv/?p=12864> [Accessed on 9 May 2016]

<sup>176</sup> Ibid.

<sup>177</sup> IR: CVK (2012). Pārlicenošs pret krievu valodu kā valsts valodu. Available from <http://www.irlv.lv/2012/2/19/pirmaja-stunda-referenduma-piedalijusies-25-191-jeb-1-63-veletaju> [Accessed on 10 May 2016]

by the choice of the Russian-speaking minority can be considered as subconscious threats because voters followed the invitation and propaganda of Referendum's organizers – however, it is undeniable that they also took into consideration their own personal interests and comfort. If such choice is offered, then there are also followers and supporters among the Russian-speaking minority who see many advantages and opportunities in possibility that Russian would become the second official language. The main factor of their choice was the fact that lots of persons who belong to the Russian-speaking minority still do not have the highest knowledge of Latvian, especially, non-citizens (although they could not vote in the Referendum, they could express their support by other means). For example, “in 2008, only 26% persons of those whose mother tongue is not Latvian claimed the highest level of proficiency in Latvian, 31% - intermediate, 36% - lowest level, and 7% claimed that they did not know Latvian at all.”<sup>178</sup> In such way – voting FOR the Russian language – they could ease their own or their relatives' etc. everyday communication, professional activities and also political participation – or even gaining the citizenship if both languages have an official and equal status.

If the Russian-speaking minority created threats to the Latvian language and nation more or less inadvertently then the organizers of the Referendum did it purposefully, deliberately and according to a refined political plan. The signatures necessary for proposal of the constitutional referendum on the *Amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia* about Russian as the second official language of Latvia which had to be submitted to the *Central Election Commission of Latvia* were collected already in April 2011. The main organizers and collectors were the youth movement *United Latvia* (the name is similar to Russia's ruling party *United Russia*) and organization (NGO) the *Native Tongue*<sup>179</sup> - both are with pro-Kremlin orientation.

Such political action against the Latvian language can be seen as counteraction or an aggressive answer to the school reform and education laws which targeted the minority schools or, as Dr. habil. philol. I Druviete put it in the interview, - “the Referendum was reaction against exhortation of the political party “Visu Latvijai!/ All for Latvia!” (“National Alliance”) to change the constitution's Section 112 to allow public finance of education only for schools whose language of instruction was Latvian. That meant that all schools had to

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<sup>178</sup> Zepa, Brigita, O. Žabko and L. Vaivode (2008). *Language Report*, March-April. Riga: Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, p. 22. Available from [http://www.biss.soc.lv/downloads/resources/valoda/valoda2008\\_en.pdf](http://www.biss.soc.lv/downloads/resources/valoda/valoda2008_en.pdf) [Accessed on 10 May 2016]

<sup>179</sup> Jākobsons, Ervīns (2011). *Minoritāšu skolas - par un pret. Laikmeta zīmes*, Jun. 13. Available from <http://www.laikmetazimes.lv/2011/06/13/minoritasu-skolas-par-un-pret/> [Accessed on 10 May 2016]

change their language of instruction to Latvian. The main catalyst was that proposal.<sup>180</sup> The collection of signatures for the constitutional amendments regarding to the language of instruction in educational establishments started in January 2011 with the opening event in the Occupation Museum of Latvia by the organization „Guard the Language and State“ and „National Alliance“.<sup>181</sup> This public proposal and exhortation by Latvian nationalists was as a complementary kindling to the Russian speaking-minority to counteract and follow Russian school and language defenders` insistent and immodest idea to act against the Latvian language with a hidden political aim. However, both ideas – to support only schools which have Latvian as the language of instruction, and planning of referendum for the official status of the Russian language – had a much longer history. But only in that particular time, 2011, the discussions and political debates led to a collection of signatures for organizing referendums.

By 9 June 2011, Latvian nationalist movement had gathered 120 433 signatures of the minimum 153 232 signatures required both in Latvia and abroad – in such way failing to initiate a referendum.<sup>182</sup> But the Russian activists were much successful – and as the consequence, the Referendum took place on 18 February 2012. To understand the political aims and pro-Kremlin links of the organizers of the Referendum, the attention must be paid to the funding of pro-Kremlin organizations and political parties and their ties or cooperation agreements with the Kremlin. In fact, support and popularization of the Russian language abroad is one of a key aims of Russia`s compatriot policy. Already since 1990-ties, but especially after 2000, members of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation have publicly announced that they would act to increase the role of the Russian language in the post-Soviet countries or even would help to gain its official status in these countries. The *Council of the Russian Language (Sovet po russkomu jaziku)* was created by the

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<sup>180</sup> Druviete, Ina (2016). *Interview with Dr. habil. philol. Ina Druviete*. Held by Una Plauka, April 20. Riga, Latvia

<sup>181</sup> \* “Nacionālās apvienības” rosinātie grozījumi paredzēja mainīt LR Satversmes 112. pantu uz šādu redakciju: „Ikvienam ir tiesības uz izglītību. Valsts nodrošina iespēju bez maksas iegūt pamatizglītību un vidējo izglītību valsts valodā. Pamatizglītība ir obligāta.” Papildus tam tika rosināts pārejas noteikums, ka “ar 2012.gada 1. septembri visās valsts un pašvaldību izglītības iestādēs, sākot ar pirmo klasi, mācības notiek valsts valodā”.

Upleja, Sanita (2011). Saskaņas pārbaudījums. *Ir*, Nov. 4;

Kārkliņš, Kristaps (2011). Vāks parakstus, lai skolās vienīgā mācību valoda būtu latviešu. *Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze*, Jan. 20

<sup>182</sup> Jākobsons, Ervīns (2011). Minoritāšu skolas - par un pret. *Laikmeta zīmes*, Jun. 13. Available from <http://www.laikmetazimes.lv/2011/06/13/minoritasu-skolas-par-un-pret/> [Accessed on 10 May 2016]

Government`s decree No. 1674 (1997) and decree No. 41 (2000). It works for the support of the Russian language abroad.<sup>183</sup>

In Latvia, “several organisations were instrumental in campaigning for the Referendum 2012, but the most prominent, which became the face of the campaign, was a new NGO *Native Tongue*, founded by Alexander Gaponenko, Vladimir Linderman, Yevgeny Osipov, and colleagues.”<sup>184</sup> V. Linderman who has carried out radical political activities both in Latvia and Russia, and also in Europe, e.g. anti-globalist vandalism in Geneva (2001), or support to separatists in Ukraine, joined the “Russian National Bolshevik Party” in 1997. As the leader of *Native Tongue*, V. Linderman together with Y. Osipov created and performed an aggressive, Dark Gothic style song with a video clip ‘*Za rodnoj jazik*’<sup>185</sup> / ‘*For the Native Tongue*’, which was used to gain the support to Russian as the second official language of Latvia. It demonstrated aggression and hate (usage of such words as ‘our enemies’) against the Government of Latvia, Latvian nation and the Latvian language. It did not look like a peaceful protest and request. Dr. habil. philol. I. Druviete also admitted that she showed this video clip on international conferences to illustrate pro-Russian activists` attacking behaviour and intimidation of the Government of Latvia and Latvian society.<sup>186</sup> The performers of the song were radicals V. Linderman, Y. Osipov (“Osipov Party”) and his wife Yelyena Osipova (who stood for a candidate to the European Parliament Elections 2014 from the party “Latvian Russian Union”), and also the politician Valery Kravcov (member of the 10<sup>th</sup> Saeima and party “Harmony”) who did not have the knowledge of the Latvian language in that time.

Alexander Gaponenko, who was one of the main organizers of the Referendum 2012 in Latvia, since 2004 leads the *Institute of European Studies* which is based in Latvia. Gaponenko`s Institute is financially supported by the *Fund to Support and Protect the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad* of the Russian Foreign Ministry. The *Institute of European Studies*, according to the information of the *Latvian Security Police*, received from the Fund EUR 13 500 in 2012.<sup>187</sup> The Referendum was supported also by politicians from “Latvian Russian Union” or “PCTVL” (MEP Tatyana Zhdanoka, Yury Petropavlovski, Miroslav

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<sup>183</sup> Lerhis, Ainārs and A. Kudors, I. Indāns (2007). *Ārvalstu ietekme uz sabiedrības etniskās integrācijas procesu Latvijā*. Rīga: Austrumeiropas Politisko Pētījumu centrs, pp. 36-39

<sup>184</sup> Druviete, Ina and Uldis Ozoliņš. *The Latvian Referendum on Russian as a Second State Language February 2012*. University of Latvia; University of Western Sydney, p. 13

<sup>185</sup> Lindermans, Vladimir un J. Osipovs. *Za rodnoj jazik* (Par dzimto valodu). VIDEO available from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vcqz1iNzBWM> [Accessed on 21 April 2016]

<sup>186</sup> Druviete, Ina (2016). *Interview with Dr. habil. philol. Ina Druviete*. Held by Una Plauka, April 20. Riga, Latvia

<sup>187</sup> *Ģenerāļplāns* (2016). Documentary by Juris Pakalniņš, S. Jemberga, I. Sprinģe, A. Ģiga. Re: Baltica, ERR, LTV, LRT

Mitrofanov etc.) and “Harmony Center” (Riga Mayor Nil Ushakov etc.). These are parties which have a pro-Kremlin orientation, cooperation with the Kremlin`s funded organizations and support from the Kremlin. “Harmony Center” has an official cooperation agreement with V. Putin`s led *United Russia* since 21 October 2009<sup>188</sup>.

Riga Mayor N. Ushakov who represented “Harmony Center” was one of the most visible supporters of the Referendum at the final stage before voting in 2012. For example, in January 2012, on the broadcast “Dienas rīts”, N. Ushakov expressed his opinion about the Referendum: “I will say my position – I will go and vote FOR in this referendum. Somebody can judge me that my thoughts are divided [because there was time when he did not express his support for two official languages in Latvia], but at this moment I have only one instrument by which I can show not Latvians but right-wing politicians that problems exist, and that these problems must be solved. And the only instrument is referendum – there is no other.”<sup>189</sup> It must be taken into consideration that not only support and ‘protection’ of the Russian-speaking minority (which is in the accordance with party`s programme and cooperation agreement with the Kremlin) led to such publicly expressed position which encouraged the Russian-speaking minority to vote FOR. “Harmony Center” won 29 seats (2<sup>nd</sup> place) in the Parliamentary elections of the 10<sup>th</sup> Saeima (2010) and 31 seats (1<sup>st</sup> place)<sup>190</sup> in the early Parliamentary elections of the 11<sup>th</sup> Saeima (on 17 September 2011) but in both cases the party was left in opposition. The Referendum was opportunity to act against the Government of Latvia and to gain more trust from its electorate and to act in the interests of the Kremlin as well.

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<sup>188</sup> Zvirbulis, Ģirts (2015). Cilevičs: “Saskaņas” līgums ar Putina partiju ir “apgrūtināts”. *Latvijas Avīze*, Jan. 23. Available from <http://www.la.lv/ligums-ar-putina-partiju-esot-apgrutinats-cilevics/> [Accessed on 10 May 2016]

<sup>189</sup> NRA (2012). Ušakovs referendumā atbalstīs krievu valodu kā otru valsts valodu. *Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze*, Jan. 5. Available from <http://nra.lv/latvija/riga/rigas-dome/63331-usakovs-referenduma-atbalstis-krievu-valodu-ka-otru-valsts-valodu.htm/komentari?cnr=4> [Accessed on 10 May 2016]

<sup>190</sup> Saskaņa: Sociāldemokrātiskā partija. Par mums. Available from <http://www.saskana.info/par-mums/> [Accessed on 10 May 2016]

### 5.3. Russia`s Compatriot Policy in Latvia since 2012

Since 2012, the President of the Russian Federation is again Vladimir Putin who took the post on 7 May 2012. His presidency will expire in 2018. In this period, the world has again seen a very aggressive behaviour performed by the Russian Federation – i.e. the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and a hybrid warfare escalation in the eastern part of Ukraine since 2014 till present; and, e.g. in 2015, NATO forces intercepted Russian military planes over Europe 250 times during the first six months of 2015. NATO officials said that it was the highest number for the same period since the end of the Cold War; and the same can be said about the airspace near the Latvian borders, e.g. on 12 June 2014, the Latvian National Armed Forces reported sightings of sixteen Russian military aircraft, but, on 29 July 2015, sightings of twelve Russian military aircraft in international airspace above the Baltic Sea close to the Latvian border were reported.<sup>191</sup>

In Latvia, in this period of time, the post of the President of Latvia was held by Andris Bērziņš (2011-2015); and, since 8 July 2015, Raimonds Vējonis is in the office. The relations between Russia and Latvia have been very tightened – both because of Russia`s aggressive behaviour and military exercises close to the Latvian borders and military conflict in Ukraine which violates *Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances 1994* and other international laws. Europe and the USA see such behaviour as dangerous for international security and stability and keep Russia under economic and political sanctions.

The main reason for military conflict in Ukraine was defence of Russians living in the Crimean Peninsula and eastern Ukraine – that is how V. Putin declared it. The hybrid warfare was started under the banner of protection of human rights and safety of Russia`s compatriots living abroad, e.g. there were 67.9% ethnic Russians living in the Crimea in 2014.<sup>192</sup> Using the tactic of hybrid warfare – military combat or secret supplies of arms and weapon system, mass media propaganda, diplomatic dissimulation and other non-military attacks with the aim to reach its political aims<sup>193</sup> – Russia has also targeted the Russian population living in Ukraine and gained lots of its support. Although the plan about creating *Novorossiya* (New

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<sup>191</sup> Ukraine Today: Latvian National Armed Forces (2015). NATO Intercepts Squadron of 12 Russian Military Planes over Baltics. Available from <http://uatoday.tv/politics/nato-intercepts-squadron-of-12-russian-military-planes-over-baltics-464997.html> [Accessed on 8 May 2016]

<sup>192</sup> Таблицы с итогами Федерального статистического наблюдения "Перепись населения в Крымском федеральном округе": Tables with the results of the Federal Statistical Observation "Census in the Crimean Federal District". Available from Национальный Состав Населения [Accessed on 11 May 2016]

<sup>193</sup> Топычканов, Петр (2015). Hybrid War – A Scholarly Term or a Propaganda Cliché? Carnegie: Moscow Center. Available from <http://carnegie.ru/2015/07/17/hybrid-war-scholarly-term-or-propaganda-clich%C3%A9/idyl> [Accessed on 1 March 2016]

Russia or New Russian State) has not been so successful as the Kremlin would wish for, the propagandistic myth about a raising of a new empire or rebirth of Soviet powerfulness has created the atmosphere of national awakening and supremacy among Russians both in the Russian Federation and abroad. The feeling of high spirits can be felt also among Russians living in Latvia –, especially, on the 9<sup>th</sup> May celebrations at the Soviet ‘Victory Monument’ in Riga who gather more people year by year with the involvement and participation of pro-Kremlin and Russian politicians, e.g. the Russian Ambassador to Latvia Alexander Veshnyakov and Riga Mayor Nil Ushakov etc. The participation of high level pro-Kremlin politicians and well organized activities at the ‘Victory Monument’ in Riga arise such questions as: who are the organizers and financial sources of these celebrations; and what is the main aim of such interpretation of history and political events regarding to Latvia whose majority of people and the Government see the 9<sup>th</sup> of May 1945 as the day when the Soviet Occupation of Latvia began?

### ***The 9<sup>th</sup> May Victory Day Celebrations***

Since 2000, the 9<sup>th</sup> May celebrations in Riga have become more and more popular with concerts, fireworks and other specially organized events. Now, ‘9<sup>th</sup> May Victory Day’ has acquired characteristics of a state level celebration – mainly for the Russian audience. After the annexation of Crimea, the spirit of victory (*pobeda*) and supremacy among celebrators is much higher than it was years before – to the exaggerated glorification of the USSR victory in the WWII and Soviet Era, the exaltation of Putin and his leadership has come as an important additional element; This year, 2016, ‘victory celebrations’ gathered at least 150 000<sup>194</sup> people (Russian speaking audience); in 2015 – more than 200 000<sup>195</sup> people; the record was hit in 2005 when about 260 000<sup>196</sup> people visited the ‘Victory Park’ celebrations.

Dr. sc. pol. Ivars Ījabs also considers that the ‘Victory’ celebration in Russia (former USSR) has become a folk celebration on the state level – it is made a more political celebration than it was in the 1960-ties. During the Soviet years, people commemorated the victims of the WWII. This commemoration day has become so political since 2000, when V.

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<sup>194</sup> Latvijas sabiedrisko mediju ziņu redakcija (2016). Pasākumus Uzvaras parkā apmeklēja 150 000 cilvēku; 23 aizturētie. Available from <https://www.lsm.lv/lv/raksts/latvija/zinas/pasakumus-uzvaras-parka-apekleja-150-000-cilveku-23-aizturetie.a182050/> [Accessed on 11 May 2016]

<sup>195</sup> Vikmanis, Ģirts (2015). Rīgā plaša 9. maija svinēšana. *Latvijas Avīze*, May 11. Available from <http://www.la.lv/riga-plasa-9-maija-svinesana/> [Accessed on 11 May 2016]

<sup>196</sup> Procevska, Olga (2012). Īsa 9. maija biogrāfija ar visām no tā izrietošajām sekām. *Ir*, May 9. Available from <http://www.irlv.lv/2012/5/9/isa-9-maija-biografija-ar-visam-no-ta-izrietosajam-sekam> [Accessed on 11 May 2016]

Putin acquired the power and returned back to the Soviet historic legacy. The 9<sup>th</sup> May celebrations have transformed a lot because, in the past, the celebration was with ‘tears in eyes’; now, it has become the proof and display of victory and supremacy. The fact that J. Stalin was at the power and most of people lost their lives in the WWII senselessly is forgotten.<sup>197</sup> And this transformation is reflected and seen also in Latvia`s society – mainly among Russians or Russia`s compatriots. The researcher of the University of Latvia Olga Procevska writes that, in the 1990-ties, the ‘Victory Day’ was not among interests of Russian speaking mass media nor Latvian, actually, nobody was interested in it except the World War II veterans. But then at the end of 1990-ties, the political party “PCTVL” (*For Human Rights in United Latvia*) highly appreciated the political potential of this celebration`s audience. And they stucked to the organization of the ‘Victory’ day, making it not only as the celebration of the first day of peace after the end of WWII but as a platform where those, who are not satisfied with the ruling political powers, can express their bitterness and resentment.<sup>198</sup> It has to be added that this idea about organized celebrations on the 9<sup>th</sup> May was in the accordance with the Kremlin`s support, especially, in 1999, when the change of power took place in Russia. “PCTVL” has always had links with the Kremlin, and they could gain even a financial support for propaganda tools and organization works.

Dr. sc. pol. I. Ījabs says that the Russian-speaking society go to the ‘Victory Park’ to demonstrate that they are not two or three radical forced into underground but a great number. They identify themselves with Russia`s propaganda that they are winners not occupants. On the opposite, Latvians do not want to identify themselves with the Soviet traditions at all. The ‘Victory’ celebrations is the possibility for the Russian minority to show their power and influence.<sup>199</sup> O. Procevska considers that the ritual of the 9<sup>th</sup> May celebration in Latvia since the end of 1990-ties is aimfully organized, cultivated and developed in the advantageous direction of organizers.<sup>200</sup>

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<sup>197</sup> Ījabs, Ivars (2011). Uzvaras svētkos krievvalodīgie apliecina savu ietekmi. Available from [http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/viedokli/376852-ijabs\\_uzvaras\\_svetkos\\_krievvalodigie\\_apliecina\\_savu\\_ietekmi](http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/viedokli/376852-ijabs_uzvaras_svetkos_krievvalodigie_apliecina_savu_ietekmi) [Accessed on 11 May 2016]

<sup>198</sup> Procevska, Olga (2012). Īsa 9. maija biogrāfija ar visām no tā izrietošajām sekām. *Ir*, May 9. Available from <http://www.irlv.lv/2012/5/9/isa-9-maija-biografija-ar-visam-no-ta-izrietosajam-sekam> [Accessed on 11 May 2016]

<sup>199</sup> Ījabs, Ivars (2011). Uzvaras svētkos krievvalodīgie apliecina savu ietekmi. Available from [http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/viedokli/376852-ijabs\\_uzvaras\\_svetkos\\_krievvalodigie\\_apliecina\\_savu\\_ietekmi](http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/viedokli/376852-ijabs_uzvaras_svetkos_krievvalodigie_apliecina_savu_ietekmi) [Accessed on 11 May 2016]

<sup>200</sup> Procevska, Olga (2012). Īsa 9. maija biogrāfija ar visām no tā izrietošajām sekām. *Ir*, May 9. Available from <http://www.irlv.lv/2012/5/9/isa-9-maija-biografija-ar-visam-no-ta-izrietosajam-sekam> [Accessed on 11 May 2016]

In fact, this compatriotism idea of Putin is not new for Russia. “Back in the 1940s, the Soviet government started working with compatriots. Right after the end of World War II, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin passed a series of laws that provided a mechanism for all former citizens of the Russian Empire and their descendants to obtain Soviet citizenship. He also developed a program that helped ‘the White emigrants who acknowledged the victory of socialism’ return to their motherland.”<sup>201</sup> As Putin wants to renovate and re-establish most of Soviet traditions and legacy (e.g. the restoration of Feliks Dzerzhinsky (the founder of the Cheka) Monument back to the old KGB headquarters<sup>202</sup>) and the Soviet or Russian Empire itself, that it is absolutely consequential that one of his priorities how to obtain and realize soft power and other political aims is to elaborate and develop compatriot policy which is advantageous for his interests and to work with compatriots abroad. And the 9<sup>th</sup> May ‘Victory Day’ celebration, which is the day of beginning of Soviet Era in the Baltics and many other occupied republics in 1945, is one of the most important tools how to unite all Russian citizens and compatriots abroad under a powerful and bold myth about Russian supremacy in the world and being main or only winners in the WWII.

The unification of the Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia by this celebration separates them from Latvians who do not consider this day as a victory but as the losing of Latvia’s independence for 50 years. Russians like to see them as winners and liberators but Latvians one more time remember about the Soviet Occupation on this particular day. In such way, the society of Latvia becomes more divided and there can be observed confrontations and anger against each other in mass and social media and inside people’s minds. And that is what V. Putin wants to reach – a positive attitude towards Russia and the Kremlin by its compatriots; and confrontations, negotiations among people in Latvia which create political threats. Dr. oec. Viesturs Pauls Karnups, in the interview, says that Latvians will never be able to make agreement with Russians about the past because Putin has built their national identity on the image of a ‘winners’ state’ – it was not possible to build it on the Revolution as it was previously, now, he has built it on the Second World War, when Russians were the ‘good guys’ against Nazis. That means, winners-good ones cannot be the bad ones.<sup>203</sup>

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<sup>201</sup> Kureev, Artem (2015). Russian Diaspora: A Tool of Soft Power? Available from <http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/russian-diaspora-tool-soft-power> [Accessed on 11 May 2016]

<sup>202</sup> Balmforth, Tom (2015). 'Iron Feliks' Inching Back to Old KGB Headquarters. *Radio Free Europe*, June 13. Available from <http://www.rferl.org/content/feliks-dzerzhinsky-statue-kgb-moscow-cheka/27070211.html> [Accessed on 11 May 2016]

<sup>203</sup> Karnups, Pauls Viesturs (2016). *Interview with Dr. oec. Viesturs Pauls Karnups*. Held by Una Plauka, April 12. Riga, Latvia

During the last years, one of the main organizers of the 9<sup>th</sup> May celebrations in the ‘Victory Park’, Riga, is the organization “9.maijs.lv” which is closely related with the pro-Kremlin political party “Harmony” and the Kremlin. In 2015, for the 9<sup>th</sup> May celebration at the ‘Victory Monument’ approximately EUR 14 000 were given by the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation. Similar amount of the money was given by Russia also in 2014. Money is transferred through the organization “9.maijs.lv”. “9.maijs.lv” board includes the “Harmony” deputies of Riga City Council – Vadim Barannyk and Svetlana Savicka, and also former “Harmony” member Danuta Dembovska – now, the employee of Riga City Council. Till 2012, “9.maijs.lv” was led by the leader of “Harmony” and Riga Mayor Nil Ushakov. V. Barannyk himself has admitted that several members of “Harmony” have got involved in the work of “9.maijs.lv” organization (NGO).

Andis Kudors, Executive Director of the *Centre for East European Policy Studies* in Latvia, considers that attention must be paid to the reason why Russia is interested to give such amount of money. The events of the 9<sup>th</sup> May cannot be seen apart from the foreign policy of Russia. It can be called a public diplomacy or soft power but it is absolutely clear that the main aim of the Kremlin is to strengthen the regional positions of Russia.<sup>204</sup>

NGO “9.maijs.lv” itself gives a rather partial information about its work, structure etc. on its official homepage which logo is the Soviet symbolic. As two main aims, it states: to help veterans who live in Latvia (all are invited to denote money), and to preserve and enhance commemoration about Victory Day in Latvia. It is emphasised that Victory Day is a big celebration, and that it is duty of young generations to carry out through generations memories about our veterans` heroic deed and Victory Day. As main supporters of the organization are mentioned only TV channel PBK (*First Baltic Channel*), the director of *Baltic Media Alliance* Oleg Solodov, *Mix Media Group*, the newspaper “МК-Латвия”. It also tells that at least 170 000 people visited 2016 celebration.<sup>205</sup>

On the homepage of “9.maijs.lv”, there can also be found, N. Ushakov`s public speech on 9 May 2016 at the ‘Victory Monument’, where he says: “The Victory Day on the 9<sup>th</sup> of May in Riga is Latvia`s celebration. It is not the Soviet celebration nor Russia`s celebration. It is Latvian celebration because it is celebrated by hundred thousands of citizens of Latvia, the

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<sup>204</sup> Barisa-Sermule, Liene (2015). Ar «Saskaņu» saistītā biedrība «9.maijs.lv» saņem Krievijas naudu. *KNAB, Latvijas Sabiedriskie mediji*, May 7. Available from <http://www.lsm.lv/lv/raksts/latvija/zinas/ar-saskanu-saistita-biedriba-9.maijs.lv-sanem-krievijas-naudu.a128640/> [Accessed on 12 May 2016]

<sup>205</sup> “9.maijs.lv”. Par projektu. Available from <http://9may.lv/lv/par-mums/par-projektu/> [Accessed on 12 May 2016]

patriots of their country. That is why, I congratulate everybody with Latvia`s celebration – the Victory Day!”<sup>206</sup>

On one side, it is not bad that N. Ushakov tries to unify the Russian community or Russia`s compatriots with Latvia not Russia by telling that celebrators are the patriots of Latvia, but, on other side, it is misinterpretation of a real political situation and history of Latvia. Because the 9<sup>th</sup> of May has never been the independent Latvia`s celebration. It is the Soviet celebration which is celebrated by Russia on that particular day – the rest of the world commemorates the victims of the WWII and victory over Nazism on the 8<sup>th</sup> of May. It is a rather dangerous tendency to falsify political and historical facts, and it is also a very audacious and insolent behaviour to call the day of beginning of Latvia`s occupation the day of Latvia`s celebration.

The same can also be said about the behaviour of celebrators. If look at the video with the title “**9. maijs 2015. g. Rīga. Afterparty**”<sup>207</sup> where can be seen people, who celebrated the 9<sup>th</sup> of May 2015 in the ‘Victory Park’ coming back from the park to the centre of Riga City, then the same pot-valiant and arrogant behaviour, which is often demonstrated by “Harmony” members (e.g. Nikolay Kabanov) or V. Putin, can be observed – here it is louder as people are in high spirits after celebrating and watching the fireworks etc. They carry Russia`s flags with an angry bear and slogan “Vpered Rossija”/ “Go Russia!” on them (it can be understood that it is their support to the aggressive foreign policy which is carried out by the Kremlin). There are lots of young people and children among celebrators. They are walking down the main street blocking the city traffic. The expression which is demonstrated by their behaviour is – all this (the city, country, world etc.) is ours, i.e. Russian. Lots of people are shouting: “Russia! Russia!” in such way showing the domination of Russians and Russia – that they support Russia and, it seems, want Russia here in Latvia. According to information provided by the Latvian mass media (*Nekā Personīga* etc.), it was speculated that maybe some provocateurs from Russia had arrived to make the noise louder; although, the whole crowd is very loud and immodest. For example, teenagers are shouting and laughing that Latvians are sitting in trams because they are afraid that Russians would kill them etc. And most of them wear ‘Saint George`s Ribbons’/ *Georgiyevskaya lenta* – a military, imperialistic and Soviet symbol of Russia popularized by V. Putin since 2005, especially popular among Russians

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<sup>206</sup> Ušakovs, Nils (2016). Rīgas mēra Nila Ušakova uzruna Uzvaras dienā. Available from <http://9may.lv/lv/par-mums/news/rigas-mera-nila-usakova-uzruna-uzvaras-diena/> [Accessed on 12 May 2016]

<sup>207</sup> *9. maijs 2015. g. Rīga. Afterparty*. VIDEO available from [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V8NavdiyI\\_Y](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V8NavdiyI_Y) [Accessed on 12 May 2016]

after the annexations of the Crimea in 2014 – the sign of separatism (for moderates – a nationalistic expression).

It can be concluded that the ‘9<sup>th</sup> May Victory Day’ celebrations are needed for demonstration of Russian and Putin’s supremacy. The day is the celebration of a mythical and heroic victory and liberation. An American-Polish journalist and Pulitzer Prize-winning author Anne E. Applebaum also speaks about this ‘Victory’ myth which is cultivated by V. Putin and is used for consolidation of Russia’s compatriots in the Kremlin’s interests. The symbol of ‘Victory’ is a guarantee of Russia’s and Putin’s legitimacy. The Russian society is under Putinism flag. It can be called the cult of ‘Victory’. Putin wants to show that the USSR, which he wants to rebuild, in a positive light – the USSR and Russian victory in the Great Patriotic War over Nazis Germany.<sup>208</sup> The ‘Victory’ myth is a perfect tool of soft power because being heroes not occupants is what the Russian minority also wants in Latvia.

By *SKDS (Market and Public Opinion Research Centre)* survey in 2014, where all respondents were non-Latvians, 61% agreed to the statement ‘Latvia was in a good position and doing well within the USSR’. The great number of participants on the ‘9<sup>th</sup> May Victory Day’ celebrations and positive attitude towards the USSR show that there are lots of inhabitants in Latvia whose opinion corresponds to the Kremlin’s ideology. And 79% of survey’s respondents do not agree to the statement ‘Russia’s politics creates threats to the independence of Latvia’, that means they do not see Russia and Putin as a threat.<sup>209</sup>

### ***Kremlin’s Organizations for Defence of Russia’s Compatriots in Latvia***

The most significant and visible Kremlin’s organizations for defence of Russia’s compatriots, which activities are aimed at Latvia, are: *Russkiy Mir Foundation* (established in 2007); *Rossotrudnichestvo* (2008); *The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund* (2010); *The Fund to Support and Protect the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad* (2013). Each organization spends from thousands till hundred thousand EUR per year to support Russia’s compatriots or Kremlin’s interests in Latvia, e.g. *The Fund to Support and Protect the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad* spent EUR 31 000 in 2012 and EUR 98 000 in 2013 for their activities. These funds have representation organizations in more than hundred countries, and for this purpose the Kremlin spends approximately EUR 100 million per year.

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<sup>208</sup> Applebaum E. Anne (2016). *Generāļplāns*. Documentary by Juris Pakalniņš, S. Jemberga, I. Sprinģe, A. Ģiga. Re: Baltica, ERR, LTV, LRT

<sup>209</sup> SKDS: Tīrgus un sabiedriskās domas pētījumu centrs (2014). *Piederības sajūta Latvijai: Mazākumtautību Latvijas iedzīvotāju aptauja*, May-June, p. 46

Different NGOs abroad are sponsored through the funds, e.g. “9.maijs.lv”, “Latvian Human Rights Committee”, “Native Tongue”, “Russkaya Zarya” (led by Yelyena and Yevgeny Osipov, Girss Illarions) etc., and also political parties – e.g. “Latvian Russian Union”, “Harmony” and “Harmony Center” (its member Jānis Urbanovičs (together with A. Gaponenko) is considered to be one of the main initiators and organizers of the *Constitutional Referendum 2012*<sup>210</sup>). The funds spend a small amount of money for cultural purposes, and the rest of the money is spent for non-transparent political activities. They finance even pro-separatist and military groups.<sup>211</sup> Jānis Kažociņš, a former head of the *Constitution Protection Bureau of Latvia* and an adviser to the President of Latvia since 2015, says that the main purpose of these Kremlin`s organizations and their supported organizations and activists abroad is to carry out the aims of Russia`s foreign policy. They use both culture and political or diplomatic pressure.<sup>212</sup>

The most important, influential and active persons, who work in the Kremlin`s foreign policy interests and receive money from its compatriot funds, are: Tatyana Zhdanoka – Member of the European Parliament since 2004, leader of “Latvian Russian Union” (former “PCTVL”) – which received EUR 10 000 in 2015, founder and member of *Latvian Human Rights Committee* – received EUR 94 423 in 2015. T. Zhdanoka and Y. Sokolovski are also the representative members from Latvia of the *Coordinating Council of Russia`s Compatriots* which is under responsibility of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation<sup>213</sup>; and Alexander Gaponenko – founder of “Native Tongue”, organizer of the *Constitutional Referendum 2012*, head of the *Institute of European Studies* – which received EUR 29 110 in 2014.<sup>214</sup>

It can be concluded that these persons and organizations not only receive money from the Kremlin`s funded institutions for its foreign policy purposes but their activities correspond with the aims of the Kremlin`s organizations for defence of Russia`s compatriots or compatriot policy abroad: i.e. to reflect the results of WWII in the Kremlin`s interests;

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<sup>210</sup> Re: Baltica – NGO of Investigative Journalism (2012). Kas ir Gaponenko, ko finansē Krievija. Available from [http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/viedokli/416859-kas\\_ir\\_gaponenko\\_ko\\_finanse\\_krievija](http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/viedokli/416859-kas_ir_gaponenko_ko_finanse_krievija) [Accessed on 13 May 2016]

<sup>211</sup> Constitution Protection Bureau of Latvia (2016). *Ģenerālpilāns*. Documentary by Juris Pakalniņš, S. Jemberga, I. Sprinģe, A. Ģiga. Re: Baltica, ERR, LTV, LRT

<sup>212</sup> Kažociņš, Jānis (2016). *Ģenerālpilāns*. Documentary by Juris Pakalniņš, S. Jemberga, I. Sprinģe, A. Ģiga. Re: Baltica, ERR, LTV, LRT

<sup>213</sup> Lerhis, Ainārs and A. Kudors, I. Indāns (2007). *Ārvalstu ietekme uz sabiedrības etniskās integrācijas procesu Latvijā*. Rīga: Austrumeiropas Politisko Pētījumu centrs, p. 39

<sup>214</sup> Security Police of Latvia and Constitution Protection Bureau of Latvia (2016). *Ģenerālpilāns*. Documentary by Juris Pakalniņš, S. Jemberga, I. Sprinģe, A. Ģiga. Re: Baltica, ERR, LTV, LRT

popularize and defend the Russian language abroad; provide books, videos etc. and work in science field (according a subjective or falsified Kremlin`s interpretation of historic and political events); work with the youth (e.g. educational establishments “INNOVA” and “Experiment” – founded by B. Zelycerman, led by A. Zelycerman); protect human rights of the Russian minority; spread information (propaganda) in the Kremlin`s interests; support and popularize the international campaign “St. George`s Ribbon”; unite and consolidate the Russian diaspora or compatriots etc.

“On 9 August 2007, the *Coordinating Council of the Organizations of Russia`s Compatriots* was also established in Latvia which is under responsibility of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Latvia.”<sup>215</sup> And according to the *Report 2015 by the Latvian Security Police*, the establishment and building “Moscow House” in Riga (Дом Москвы), which was opened on 28 May 2004 (but the work at it started already in 2001)<sup>216</sup>, - can be considered as one of the main support citadels of Russia`s compatriot policy in Latvia. The Security Policy considers that some of its pro-Kremlin activists can become more aggressive, although they do not gain much support from majority of Latvia`s Russian-speaking society. In 2015, agents of Russia`s special services (*FSB, SVR, GU*) made counterespionage risks by showing a stable interest about socio-political and economic processes in Latvia, and about the work of Latvia`s governmental institutions as well. A special interest was about the cross-border cooperation projects which can be used as a cover for their espionage activities against Latvia; and about cooperation with those people who support Russia`s compatriot policy in Latvia. They also actively tried to recruit people, especially politically active individuals, politicians and those who have connection with Russia or young people who would like to go and study in Russia, and those who are disposed to Russia`s advocated ideology in Latvia, as candidates for spying in the interests of the Kremlin. Russia`s special agents, spies collected information, tried to gain more influence, and acted in information operations against Latvia, the EU and NATO. Research institutes and journalists which are under control of Russia`s special services were are also used in their interests.<sup>217</sup>

It shows that the special services of the Russian Federation have a great interest about Russia`s compatriots in Latvia, special service agents try to increase cooperation with people

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<sup>215</sup> Lerhis, Ainārs and A. Kudors, I. Indāns (2007). *Ārvalstu ietekme uz sabiedrības etniskās integrācijas procesu Latvijā*. Rīga: Austrumeiropas Politisko Pētījumu centrs, p. 40

<sup>216</sup> Дом Москвы. О Доме Москвы. Official Homepage. Available from <http://www.mkdc.lv/ru/home/o-nas> [Accessed on 20 May 2016]

<sup>217</sup> Drošības policija (2016). *Publiskais pārskats par Drošības policijas darbību 2015. gadā*. Rīga: DP, pp. 7-8

and organizations which support Russia`s compatriot policy in Latvia or even use them as a cover for their espionage activities against Latvia, in such way creating political threats to the national security of Latvia. Recruited people, especially young people, who go to study in Russia and then return to work in governmental and other institutions in Latvia – according to instructions of Russia`s special services, can create even more political threats to Latvia in the future. According to prognosis of the Report 2015, Russian special services are most active among special agents from other countries, and that their activities will not decrease in the future and will continue to create significant threats to the security of Latvia.<sup>218</sup>

#### **5.4. The Future Prognosis: 2016-2018**

The time period from 2016 till 2018 is the time when both countries – Latvia and Russia – are approaching important political events: Parliament (13<sup>th</sup> Saeima) Elections 2018 in Latvia, and Presidential Elections of the Russian Federation 2018. As it is the first presidential term for V. Putin after his return in the post in 2012 after the presidency of D. Medvedev, then he can candidate for the second term, and he will definitely do it. He will need a powerful presidential campaign and influential steps if elected, that is why he can act unpredictably and aggressively as he did in 1999 and the following years in Chechnya, and in 2014 in Ukraine. Both aggressive tactics and the measures of soft power and other diplomatic and economic pressure and information war that are carried out by the Kremlin can increase also in Latvia.

In Latvia, in relation with the Parliament Elections, two tendencies are worrying which can create political threats to Latvia: voting orientation of Russian-speaking community and low participation in Saeima elections, especially, among Latvians as they constitute the majority of voters who have rights to vote (citizens of Latvia). For example, in the 12<sup>th</sup> Saeima elections activity was only 58.85%. As the result, pro-Kremlin oriented “Harmony” got 24 deputy seats; “Unity” – 23; “Union of Greens and Farmers” with its pro-Kremlin oriented leader Ventspils Mayor Aivars Lembergs – 21; “National Alliance” – 17; “Latvian Association of Regions” – 8; and pro-Kremlin oriented “For Latvia from the Heart” – 7

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<sup>218</sup> Drošības policija (2016). *Publiskais pārskats par Drošības policijas darbību 2015. gadā*. Rīga: DP, pp. 7-11

seats.<sup>219</sup> According to Latvian sociologist Aigars Freimanis, the head of “Latvijas fakti”, for “Harmony” voted 80% Russian-speaking voters and 20% Latvian-speaking voters, in comparison, in the 11<sup>th</sup> Saeima elections – 10% Latvian speaking voters.<sup>220</sup> That means, that “Harmony” (“Harmony Center”) has not only a stable position among Russian-speaking voters and at the top of winner parties but it also receives an increasing support from Latvian-speaking voters. (It is worth to mention that on wordpress.com site can be found an individual calculation and chart by the author of page where he concludes that, in 2014, only 3-4% Latvian and 90% Russian speaking voters voted for “Harmony” – See Appendix 9: *Home Language of Voters and “Harmony” Votes in the 12<sup>th</sup> Saeima Elections 2014*.<sup>221</sup>)

In such way, the pro-Kremlin oriented political party “Harmony” who has a cooperation agreement with Putin`s led “United Russia” has gained a significant influence in the Latvian Parliament, although it is left in opposition so far. It has to be admitted that the Mayor of Riga City Council is the leader of “Harmony Center” (“Harmony”) Nil Ushakov since 2009, and in 2013 Municipal Elections, “Harmony Center”/”GKR! (Honour to Serve Riga!)” won elections and got 39 seats leaving in opposition “Unity” and “National Alliance”.<sup>222</sup> The same tendency to support pro-Russianness among Russian-speaking citizens was also observed in the voting of the *Constitutional Referendum 2012* where the Russian language gained 24.88% support – mainly from Russians.

If such tendency or pro-Russian/pro-Kremlin orientation will persist in the next Parliamentary Elections, taking into consideration that Russian-speaking citizens will increase (and non-citizens will decrease), then possible political threats to Latvia can result from the voting behaviour of the Russian-speaking voters and low participation activity among Latvian voters. Parliamentary Elections of Latvia is in a particular interest of the Kremlin, because “the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation in its statutes emphasises the necessity to concentrate on the monitoring of the election processes and human rights situation in the EU Member states.”<sup>223</sup>

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<sup>219</sup> Centrālā vēlēšanu komisijas. 12. Saeimas vēlēšanas. Available from <https://www.cvk.lv/pub/public/30803.html> [Accessed on 14 May 2016]

<sup>220</sup> Mix Media Group (2014). Vēlēšanās uzvar “Saskaņa”. Available from [http://lat.mixnews.lv/lv/velesanas-2014/36007\\_velesanas-uzvar-saskana-teksta-tiesraide](http://lat.mixnews.lv/lv/velesanas-2014/36007_velesanas-uzvar-saskana-teksta-tiesraide) [Accessed on 14 May 2016]

<sup>221</sup> Cik īsti latviešu un krievu nobalsoja par “Saskaņu”? Available from <https://ritvars.wordpress.com/2014/11/03/cik-isti-latviesu-un-krievu-nobalsoja-par-sakanu/> [Accessed on 14 May 2016]

<sup>222</sup> Centrālā vēlēšanu komisija. 2013. gada 1. jūnija pašvaldību vēlēšanas: Rezultāti. Available from <http://www.pv2013.cvk.lv/ResNovPart-0100.html> [Accessed on 14 May 2016]

<sup>223</sup> Lerhis, Ainārs and A. Kudors, I. Indāns (2007). *Ārvalstu ietekme uz sabiedrības etniskās integrācijas procesu Latvijā*. Rīga: Austrumeiropas Politisko Pētījumu centrs, p. 41

During a pre-election period and other politically significant events (especially, during a hybrid warfare), mass media has a very important role how to win the battles where the whole society is involved. According to the Latvian Security Policy expert Jānis Bērziņš, the Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battleground is the mind – where information or propaganda has the main role.<sup>224</sup> Not only in the state of hybrid war mass media can help to win, propaganda is also a helpful tool to create a positive image about another country and its leader, i.e. Russia and Putin, in such way gaining the support of Russia`s compatriots for political aims; because compatriot policy and social media/propaganda are the main tools in the application of soft power. As both the 13<sup>th</sup> Parliament Elections of Latvia and Presidential Elections of the Russian Federation 2018 are approaching, the propaganda war in Latvia will definitely increase where the Russian and Russian-language mass media has the main role to win political battles.

It has to be taken into consideration that, in 2014, in Latgale region where Russians constitute 37.5% and Latvians – 45.3% of the total population, the most popular TV channels among non-Latvians were: *PBK*; *NTV Mir Latvia*; *3+*; *RTR Planet Baltic*; *Ren TV Baltic*, *CTC Baltics*, which all are the Russian-language channels.<sup>225</sup> Except TV channel *3+*, other channels are Russian state or commercial TV channels controlled by the Kremlin (although they can be based in other countries) which, taking into account Putin`s undemocratic regime, produce lots of propaganda in the Kremlin`s interests. For example, the “*Radio and Television Commission of Lithuania* temporarily banned rebroadcasting of *Ren TV Baltic* shows in January 2015 after experts found one of its show spread tendentious and biased information about the events in Ukraine, incited war and hatred of Ukrainians and Ukraine legitimate government as well as EU and NATO countries supporting Ukraine`s sovereignty and territorial integrity”<sup>226</sup>; in Latvia, in 2016, the “*National Electronic Mass Media Council* decided to restrict the rebroadcast of Russian TV channel *Rossiya RTR* in Latvia for a period of six months, because it concluded that the channel was deliberately broadcasting programs inciting ethnic hate. These programs were reporting biased information about Ukraine in serious contradiction with journalistic ethics principles. The channel also reported that ethnic

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<sup>224</sup> Kudors, Andis (2015). *Hybrid War – A New Security Challenge for Europe*. Riga: Centre for East European Policy Studies, p. 2

<sup>225</sup> Nacionālā elektronisko plašsaziņas līdzekļu padome (2015). *Lēmums Nr. 52 Par Latgales elektronisko mediju programmas apstiprināšanu 02.04.15.*, pp. 5-11

<sup>226</sup> The Baltic Course (2016). Lithuanian Court Rejects Company's Ren TV Baltic Appeal. Available from [http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/markets\\_and\\_companies/?doc=116275](http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/markets_and_companies/?doc=116275) [Accessed on 15 May 2016]

conflicts between Latvians and Russians in Latvia are a regular occurrence, and that this is a deliberate policy in Latvia being imposed by the Americans.”<sup>227</sup>

In such way, the Russian-speaking population is influenced by the Kremlin`s propaganda which is aimed on creation of a positive image of V. Putin and politics carried out by the Kremlin; and also of pro-Kremlin politicians and events in the Baltic states where Russians are involved – e.g. defence of Russians living in Latvia or Estonia is a very popular theme on their broadcasts, which corresponds with the aims of Russia`s compatriot policy. The same can also be said about the radio stations – the top five among the Russian-speaking audience includes only the Russian-language stations: *SWH+*; *Аеморадуо*; *Alise Plus*; *Russian Hit Radio*; *Radio Ef-Ei*.<sup>228</sup> And newspapers, magazines, informative and entertaining websites on the Internet are also available in the Russian language for the Russian-speaking population.

Although there is no scientific proof that all who watch, read and listen to these information sources support Putin and pro-Kremlin powers, systematic propaganda (on a lower or higher level) can influence opinion. Latgale is the mostly populated region by the Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia, but such tendency – to choose the Russian-language information sources among the Russian-speaking population – is observed in the whole Latvia, that is why the Kremlin uses them as a soft power tool. According to the *Report 2015 by the Latvian Security Police*, the main aim of the Kremlin`s sponsored propaganda is to gain or increase loyalty of Latvia`s society to Russia, creating distrust to the Government of Latvia, EU, NATO etc.<sup>229</sup>

Jānis Kažociņš, a former head of the *Constitution Protection Bureau of Latvia* and an adviser to the President of Latvia since 2015, considers that soft power is interlinked with hard power and imperceptibly can transform from one into another. He says that Latvia should take more seriously the methods of soft power which are used by the Kremlin to gain political influence. Russia`s compatriot policy is very well coordinated and financed since the beginning of 2000s; and, now, it is in accordance with the *Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013* – which states that soft power can be used for political destabilization or interference in political processes of other countries, and manipulation with society`s mind and opinion.<sup>230</sup>

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<sup>227</sup> Kļaviņš, Atis (2016). Electronic Mass Media Council Decides to Restrict Rebroadcast of Russian TV Channel Rossiya RTR in Latvia, April 7. Available from <http://www.leta.lv/eng/home/important/65910733-02C4-4894-9D4E-0BD6E06C4129/> [Accessed on 15 May 2016]

<sup>228</sup> Nacionālā elektronisko plašsaziņas līdzekļu padome (2015). *Lēmums Nr. 52 Par Latgales elektronisko mediju programmas apstiprināšanu 02.04.15*, p. 12

<sup>229</sup> Drošības policija (2016). *Publiskais pārskats par Drošības policijas darbību 2015. gadā*. Rīga: DP, p. 20

<sup>230</sup> Kažociņš, Jānis (2013). Krievijas maigā vara: normāla parādība vai izaicinājums Latvijas drošībai? Available from <http://www.sargs.lv/Viedokli/2013/09/01-1.aspx#lastcomment> [Accessed on 16 May 2016]

## CONCLUSIONS

Latvia the same as all states is concerned about its security – either military, political, economic, or societal. After the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia in 2014 and hybrid warfare in the eastern Ukraine, the level of concerns about Latvia`s political and military security has increased. Although Latvia is the EU and NATO Member, it is worried if the same hybrid warfare tactic can be used also in Latvia. The Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia (e.g., in 2016, there are 566 681 ethnic Russians in Latvia of whom 165 316 are non-citizens<sup>231</sup>) which is defined as ‘compatriots’ of the Russian Federation can be used as a powerful tool in a preparatory or attack phase of hybrid war to reach Russia`s political aims. That means, there is possibility that Russia`s compatriot policy can be used not only for humanitarian deeds but also to destabilize political situation in Latvia. In such way, Russia`s compatriot policy can create political threats to Latvia – to its political stability, sovereignty, independence, or territorial integrity.

It must be taken into consideration, that the regime of the Russian Federation cannot be considered democratic according to Robert Dahl`s democracy theory and criteria since 2000, when Vladimir Putin won the Presidential Election for the first time. Since then, the world has seen the Kremlin`s military aggression in Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, where Russia`s military aims are interlinked with its political aims. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are also experiencing Russia`s increasing aggression close to their borders; but Latvia and Estonia, which have a large proportion of the Russian-speaking minorities, are also threatened by the hidden aims of Russia`s compatriot policy which is aimed at the Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states and other former USSR republics.

To find out the real aims of foreign policy of the Russian Federation in Latvia, such **research questions** of the Master Thesis were set: Is Russia`s compatriot policy aimed to destabilize political situation in Latvia? Does Russia`s compatriot policy create political threats to Latvia? Can Russia`s compatriot policy be considered as a method of hybrid war? **Hypothesis:** Russia`s compatriot policy creates political threats to Latvia; and is aimed to destabilize political situation in Latvia. To verify the hypothesis of the Master Thesis such **aims** were set: to find out if Russia`s compatriot policy creates political threats to Latvia; and if a political overturn is possible in Latvia in the coming years, i.e. 2017-2018.

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<sup>231</sup> Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs of the Republic of Latvia (2016). *Latvijas iedzīvotāju sadalījums pēc nacionālā sastāva un valstiskās piederības*. Riga: PMLP, p. 4

After the analysis of Russia's compatriot policy and its impact on political situation in Latvia since 2000 such conclusions can be drawn based on the theoretical part of the Master Thesis:

- According to D. Miller, compatriot issue is mostly used or manipulated in practical and rational way to reach political aims of the government or leader.<sup>232</sup> As 'compatriots' figure prominently in the *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2013*, where they are named as an important element in the implementation of Russia's foreign policy objectives<sup>233</sup>, and are also named in other documents of the Kremlin's institutions which determine the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, then Russia's compatriot policy can be considered as one of the most important tool of implementation of **soft power** in Latvia with the aim to reach definite **political aims** for the benefit of Russia and its leader V. Putin;
- **Organizations** which are established for protection etc. of Russia's compatriots (e.g. *Russkiy Mir Foundation, Rossotrudnichestvo* etc.) and which are under supervision of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation can be seen as a part of Russia's **soft power** instruments. According to G. Simons, these organisations are intended to create an interactive dialogue with different foreign target groups (i.e. in Latvia), and to form a relationship with them in order to be able to **influence** opinions and perceptions concerning Russia etc.;<sup>234</sup>
- Latvia, which is the Member of NATO and EU since 2004, is the case when **soft power** might be a more **effective tactic in a conflict** than a traditional military attack, because Russia's target (Latvia) is protected militarily through an alliance with bigger and more important actors<sup>235</sup>;
- According to Joseph S. Nye, **soft power resources** are cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions. If a country is liked and admired, it is more likely to be mimicked or copied. Soft power is also connected with the **attractiveness of a leader** by persuasion or **propaganda to secure legitimacy of a leader**.<sup>236</sup> The best proof that such tactic is used by V. Putin is the '9<sup>th</sup> May Victory Day Celebrations' in Latvia which revitalize the Soviet myth

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<sup>232</sup> Miller, David (2005). Reasonable Partiality towards Compatriots. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, Vol. 8, No. 1/2, pp. 67-68

<sup>233</sup> Cheskin, Ammon (2014). *Russia's Compatriot policy: The consolidation and 'Rossiisification' of Russian Speakers Abroad*. Edinburgh: University of Edinburg Press, p. 3

<sup>234</sup> Simons, Greg (2015). Perception of Russia's Soft Power and Influence in the Baltic States. *Public Relations Review*, Elsevier: Vol. 41, pp. 4-5

<sup>235</sup> Winnerstig, Mike (ed.) (2014). *Tools of Destabilization: Russian Soft Power and Non-military Influence in the Baltic States*. Försvarsdepartementet Report No. FOI-R--3990—SE, p. 4

<sup>236</sup> Nye, S. Joseph (2006). *Soft Power, Hard Power and Leadership*. Oct. 27, p. 3. Available from [http://www.hks.harvard.edu/netgov/files/talks/docs/11\\_06\\_06\\_seminar\\_Nye\\_HP\\_SP\\_Leadership.pdf](http://www.hks.harvard.edu/netgov/files/talks/docs/11_06_06_seminar_Nye_HP_SP_Leadership.pdf) [Accessed on 10 February 2016]

(ideology) about Soviets or Russians as a winner and liberator not occupant nation which is attractive for the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia, and legitimize Putin`s leadership who wants to restore the Russian Empire or supremacy. In such way, Russia gets the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia to *want* what Russia *wants*;

- According to John E. Mroz, “**security** is the *relative freedom from harmful threats*”<sup>237</sup>, which means that any kind of harmful attacks (including non-military) can be considered as threats to security of a state: e. g. propaganda carried out by Kremlin`s funded and controlled social/mass media, organizations and activists which act against the national values and independence of Latvia – proposal of *Constitutional Referendum 2012*, aggressive tactic against *School Reform 2004*, organization and celebration of the day when the Soviet Occupation of Latvia began (9 May 1945) etc.;
- According to Barry G. Buzan, **ideas** (ideology), which come from within and outside of the state, can be considered as **threats to** state institutions or **national security**.<sup>238</sup> That means, Kremlin`s propaganda and popularization of the Soviet Era and Russian Empire ideas in Latvia create political threats to Latvia;
- The Russian space created by the Kremlin and popularization of its ideology in Latvia also divide Latvia`s society in two parts which can lead to increasing distrust to each other and the Government of Latvia, especially, among the Russian-speaking minorities, which create political threats to Latvia;
- B. G. Buzan defines that **political threats** stem from the great battle of ideas, information and traditions. Specific political interventions by one state in the domestic affairs of another define the category of political threats the most precisely.<sup>239</sup> According to Buzan, Russia`s compatriot policy includes all aspects of political threats: systematic propaganda, matters of language, education, religion and local cultural tradition, ideology, creation or support for political groups and their funding (i.e. Russia`s compatriot defence organizations in Russia and Latvia) which can become destructive for the stability and security of the state, i.e. Latvia;
- Such **organizations** as minority rights groups (*Russian School Defence Staff*), political parties (*PCTVL/ For Human Rights in United Latvia – Latvian Russian Union; Harmony Centre*), local community groups (*Latvian Russian Community*), human rights organizations

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<sup>237</sup> Buzan, Barry (2009). *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd ed. Colchester: ECPR Press, p. 36

<sup>238</sup> Brauch, G. Hans (2011). Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks. In: Brauch, H. G., Oswald Spring, Ú., Mesjasz, C., Grin, J. etc. (eds.). *Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security: Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks*. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, p. 62

<sup>239</sup> Buzan, Barry (1983). *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books LTD, pp. 76-77

(Latvian Human Rights Committee), NGOs (*Native Tongue*) etc., which are supported and funded by Russia's compatriot defence funds created and led by the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, and which aggressively act against the state in the interests of their subjective societal, political etc. security, according to Buzan, can lead to **political destabilization** of the state<sup>240</sup>, i.e. Latvia;

- In the process of political destabilization, B. G. Buzan points to the role of population of one country that can play as a **fifth column** in support of some other state's interests<sup>241</sup> – i.e. the big number of non-citizens of Latvia (252 028), or the Russian minority (566 681) e.g. support for revitalization of Soviet Era and imperial symbols and ideology, voting orientation of Russian-speaking citizens at elections, support for Russian as the official language of Latvia etc.;

- *Latvian Security Policy* emphasizes political threats which are created by **systemic** activists (or professional compatriots) of Russia's compatriot policy in Latvia: e.g. A. Gaponenko (*Non-Citizens' Congress* etc.), V. Gushchin, Y. Osipov, G. Illarions, T. Zhdanoka, M. Dragile, Y. Koren, E. Krivcova; and **non-systemic** activists, which usually are not members of Russia's official compatriot defence organizations in Latvia, but use more provocative rhetoric and actions, e.g. V. Linderman.<sup>242</sup>

- General Sir Alexander R. D. Shirreff (a senior British Army officer, former NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe) considers that **Putin** (already in 2017) can even military attack the Baltics. His prognosis is, that Putin could be persuaded into an intervention in the Baltics by a 'perception' of weakness in NATO, and predicted that, as in the Crimea, the Russian president would present his actions as an act of defence to **protect the large Russian-speaking minorities** in those countries. Then Latvia would experience a similar **hybrid war** which can be seen in Ukraine. However, it can be prevented by increase of NATO's defence capabilities in the Baltic states;<sup>243</sup>

- According to A. Kudors, unlike conventional warfare, the *centre of gravity* in **hybrid warfare** is the target country's population<sup>244</sup> - e.g. the Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia;

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<sup>240</sup> Buzan, G. Barry (2009). *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd ed. Colchester: ECPR Press, pp. 60-61

<sup>241</sup> Ibid., pp. 60-61

<sup>242</sup> Drošības policija (2016). *Publiskais pārskats par Drošības policijas darbību 2015. gadā*. Rīga: DP, pp. 12-15

<sup>243</sup> Cooper, Charlie (2016). NATO Risks Nuclear War with Russia 'within a Year', Warns Senior General. *The Independent*, May 18. Available from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/nato-risks-nuclear-war-with-russia-within-a-year-senior-general-warns-a7035141.html> [Accessed on 19 May 2016]

<sup>244</sup> Kudors, Andis (2015). *Hybrid War – A New Security Challenge for Europe*. Rīga: Centre for East European Policy Studies, p. 2

- According to B. Buzan`s proposed **fifth column role** in the process of **political destabilization**, non-citizens of Latvia can be considered as the most vulnerable part of Latvia`s society, because they can be used to act in the interests of the Kremlin under its protection pretence which is in the accordance with Russia`s compatriot policy; having no rights to vote, can be used as discrimination by Russia with a reason to defend them by political or military means using a hybrid tactic; but granting non-citizens the rights to vote (e.g. V. Sokolov, a head of the *Latvian Russian Community*, already works at his idea to gain the rights for non-citizens to vote at the Municipal Elections of Latvia<sup>245</sup>) can create inner political threats to Latvia by the results of elections where voting for pro-Kremlin oriented political parties by non-citizens could be the outcome;
- Military threats created by Russia`s military exercises and aggressive behaviour close to the borders of Latvia and political threats created by Russia`s compatriot policy create **hybrid threats**, which can lead to a **hybrid war** and political overturn in Latvia if there are no countermeasures carried out by NATO, EU, and the Government of Latvia, because “if the national sovereignty and identity are threatened and there are no counter actions to these threats, it can lead to the **political destabilization** of a state”<sup>246</sup>;
- At present moment, effective **counter-measures** against Russia`s military and political threats are: NATO military exercises etc. in the Baltic states; activities of *NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Latvia* (against foreign non-military threats); EU defence policy and legislation; and several countermeasures and institutions in Latvia – Latvian Security Policy, the Constitution Protection Bureau of Latvia, legislation e.g. *National Security Law*<sup>247</sup>, *Criminal Code*, especially recent amendments to it (which are aimed at hybrid war threats) that were conceptually approved by *Saeima* on 3 March 2016. Amendments were elaborated because, so far, *Criminal Code* was based on the presence of violence but it is possible to overthrow existing political power without direct violence, etc.<sup>248</sup>

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<sup>245</sup> Latvijas Avīze (2016). Vāc parakstus par tiesībām nepilsoņiem balsot pašvaldību vēlēšanās. Febr. 16. Available from <http://www.la.lv/vac-parakstus-par-tiesibam-nepilsoniem-balsot-pasvaldibu-velesanas/> [Accessed on 20 May 2016]

<sup>246</sup> Eriksson, Johan and Erik Noreen (2002). *Setting the Agenda of Threats: An Explanatory Model*. Uppsala: Uppsala University Press, p. 6

<sup>247</sup> LR Saeima (2001). *Nacionālās drošības likums*. 14.12.2000/12.01.2001. Available from <http://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=14011> [Accessed on 19 May 2016]

<sup>248</sup> Saeimas Preses dienests (2016). Saeima konceptuāli atbalsta Krimināllikuma izmaiņas, kas ļaus vērsties pret hibrīdkara radītiem apdraudējumiem. Available from <http://www.saeima.lv/lv/aktualitates/saeimas-zinas/24501-saeima-konceptuali-atbalsta-kriminallikuma-izmainas-kas-laus-versties-pret-hibridkara-raditiem-apdra> [Accessed on 19 May 2016]

Jānis Kažociņš<sup>249</sup>, a former head of the *Constitution Protection Bureau of Latvia* and an adviser to the President of Latvia since 2015, who calls V. Putin ‘the opportunist’, considers that Russia’s “**soft power with a hard edge** makes use of the common USSR history, the influence of Russian compatriots, Russian media (especially television), the language and the popularity of Russian culture, history, and sport. Russia also routinely uses economic levers to further her foreign policy. These include the weaponisation of information, energy, money, and corrupt practices thus attacking democratic societies from within.”<sup>250</sup> In case of Latvia, it can be observed that Russia’s compatriot policy creates both external and inner political threats to Latvia as there are a great number of pro-Kremlin organizations and activists, and the most important – Russia’s compatriots – inside Latvia, who are supported and encouraged by Russia. As B. Buzan stated, political threats stem from the great battle of ideas (ideologies), information (propaganda and counterpropaganda) and traditions. Specific political interventions by one state in the domestic affairs of another define the category of **political threats** the most precisely.<sup>251</sup> And that is what the Kremlin since 2000 does systematically and purposefully.

Russia has also developed new generation, asymmetric or non-linear capabilities, which are usually called **hybrid warfare methods** in the West. The aim of these, sometimes referred to as the *Gerasimov Doctrine*, is to blur the line between war and peace; internal disorder (political threats, activities to destabilize political situation, disinformation and propaganda campaigns) and external aggression (military threats). The essence of this doctrine is to do what is not expected. Therefore, there is no blueprint for future actions.<sup>252</sup> Hybrid threats and unpredictable behaviour by Russia led by V. Putin are the most dangerous aspects of today’s Russia which are rather hard to identify and counteract.

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<sup>249</sup> J. Kažociņš: *After a career of 30 years in the British Army he retired early in August 2002 with the rank of brigadier (NATO 1 star) in order to live permanently in Latvia. In May 2003 and repeatedly in May 2008 he was appointed the Director of the Constitution Protection Bureau for a period of 5 years. During 2011, he was the Chairman of NATO’s Civilian Intelligence Committee. Since 2013, he has been an adviser on international and cyber security issues to the Minister of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2015, he also became an adviser to the President of the Republic of Latvia.*

<sup>250</sup> Kažociņš, Janis (2016). Has Russia’s Syrian Adventure Made Latvia Safer? In: Sprūds, A. and I. Bruģe (eds.) *Latvian Foreign and Security Policy Yearbook 2016*. Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Zinātne, p. 85

<sup>251</sup> Buzan, Barry (1983). *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books LTD, pp. 76-77

<sup>252</sup> Kažociņš, Janis (2016). Has Russia’s Syrian Adventure Made Latvia Safer? In: Sprūds, A. and I. Bruģe (eds.) *Latvian Foreign and Security Policy Yearbook 2016*. Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Zinātne, p. 85

According to the *Report 2015 by the Latvian Security Police*, Russia actively and increasingly continues to use its compatriot policy as a powerful influential instrument to carry out Russia`s foreign policy aims in Latvia: for consolidation of Russia`s compatriots under ‘Russia`s umbrella’ and ideology; for gaining support for Russia`s interpretation of history which is against factual historic and political events in Latvia; for influencing Latvia`s domestic and foreign policy in the interests of the Kremlin etc. The Paragraph II of the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia says that “The sovereign power of the State of Latvia is vested in the people of Latvia”<sup>253</sup>, that is why Russia`s activities under the cover of its **compatriot policy**, which are aimed to influence political processes in Latvia in the interests of the Kremlin not in the interests of the people of Latvia, definitely **create a risk** to the constitutional order and political system of Latvia, which is a **political threat** to Latvia.<sup>254</sup>

It can be concluded that **Russia`s compatriot policy**, which is a foreign policy instrument of Russia`s soft power, **creates political threats to Latvia**, in some cases it is possible to observe characteristics of hybrid threats, and it is **aimed to destabilize political situation** in Latvia; but a political overturn or hybrid war is prevented by counter-measures and lack of radicalization of Russian-speaking minorities, although non-citizens can be considered as the most vulnerable part of Latvia`s society. It can be foreseen, that, if there will be the same or increasing countermeasures both on national and international level, then a **political overturn is not possible in Latvia** in the coming years, i.e. 2017-2018.

After the analysis of Russia`s compatriot policy in Latvia since 2000, which is based on the main characteristics of political threats, political destabilization, and hybrid war, it is concluded that the **hypothesis** of the Master Thesis – Russia`s compatriot policy creates political threats to Latvia; and it is aimed to destabilize political situation in Latvia – **proved true**.

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<sup>253</sup> LR Saeima. *The Constitution of the Republic of Latvia*. Available from <http://www.saeima.lv/en/legislation/constitution> [Accessed on 20 May 2016]

<sup>254</sup> Drošības policija (2016). *Publiskais pārskats par Drošības policijas darbību 2015. gadā*. Rīga: DP, p. 11

## THESES

- As Latvia is protected militarily through NATO since 2004, to wield the Kremlin's soft power, i.e. its compatriot policy as one of the most important foreign policy instruments, is a more effective and reasonable tactic than a traditional military attack carried out by Russia.
- Vladimir Putin wants to revitalize and re-establish most of Soviet traditions and legacy which are done through Russia's compatriot policy and ideology also in Latvia creating political threats to Latvia – to its independence and political stability.
- Significant genesis of Russia's compatriot concept has occurred since 1991, and importance of Russia's compatriot policy has increased since 2000, - resulting in more political threats to Latvia.
- There are many *systemic* activists or professional compatriots of Russia's compatriot policy in Latvia who create political threats to Latvia and try to destabilize political situation in Latvia; *non-systemic* activists, who usually are more radical and provocative, are not less dangerous.
- As there is a lack of radicalization among the Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia, the most dangerous elements to the political stability of Latvia are pro-Kremlin activists and politicians who cooperate and are funded by Russia's compatriot defence organizations led by the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation.
- Non-citizens of Latvia can be considered as the most vulnerable part of Latvia's society, and their defence are used as a pretext for conflicts with Latvia by Russia since 1990-ties.
- Inner political threats to Latvia are created by increasing number of the Russian-speaking citizens with a pro-Kremlin voting orientation.
- External political threats to Latvia are created by the Kremlin's security services and their agents who espionage in Latvia under a cover of Russia's compatriot defence organizations and recruit people who would be eager to act and spy in the interests of the Kremlin against the Latvian state.
- To prevent political threats to Latvia created by Russia's compatriot policy in Latvia, countermeasures must be taken both on national and international level.
- Since 2000, Vladimir Putin has done a huge effort for the development of Russia's compatriot policy and consolidation of its compatriots with the aim to influence post-Soviet space and gain support for his aggressive foreign policy and undemocratic domestic political system; i.e. during his presidency till 2018, political threats to Latvia will not decrease.

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
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# APPENDICES

## Appendix 1

### Gerasimov Chart



Source: Kofman, Michael (2016). Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts, March 11. Available from <http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/> [Accessed on 11 March 2016]


## Appendix 2

### Population of Latvia by Ethnicity and Mostly Used Language at Home, 2011

Ethnicity	Total	Language (number/%)				
		Latvian	Russian	Belarussian	Ukrainian	Polish
All	2 070 371	1 164 894 56.3%	698 757 33.8%	637 0.0	1664 0.1%	1774 0.1%
Russians	557 119	32 617 5.9%	460 044 82.6%	59 0.0	86 0.0	54 0.0
Belarussians	68 202	6350 9.3%	54 355 79.7%	441 0.6%	9 0.0	47 0.1%
Ukrainians	45 798	3645 8%	34 976 76.4%	9 0.0	1436 3.1%	8 0.0
Poles	44 772	7966 17.8%	30 517 68.2%	60 0.1%	8 0.0	1425 3.2%

Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (2015). *Pastāvīgo iedzīvotāju tautību sadalījums pa statistiskajiem reģioniem, republikas pilsētām un novadiem pēc mājās pārsvarā lietotās valodas 2011. gada 1. martā*. Available from [http://data.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/lv/tautassk\\_11/tautassk\\_11\\_\\_tsk2011/TSG11-071.px/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=992a0682-2c7d-4148-b242-7b48ff9fe0c2](http://data.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/lv/tautassk_11/tautassk_11__tsk2011/TSG11-071.px/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=992a0682-2c7d-4148-b242-7b48ff9fe0c2) [Accessed on 3 April 2016]

**Appendix 3**  
**Map of the Balts in Europa**



Source: Reginheim (2011). The Balts. Available from <http://www.geocities.ws/regenheim/balts.html> [Accessed on 17 March 2016]

## Appendix 4

### Population Movement in Cities and Towns of Latvia 1939–1957

In thousands			
Years	Immigrants	Emigrants	Mechanical Growth
1939	n/a	n/a	- 42.1*
1940	n/a	n/a	0.0
1941	n/a	n/a	- 33.2**
1942	n/a	n/a	+ <b>23.2</b>
1943	n/a	n/a	n/a
1944	n/a	n/a	n/a
1945	137.4	17.3	+ <b>120.1</b>
1946	159.4	48.0	+ <b>111.4</b>
1947	118.8	58.0	+ <b>60.8</b>
1948	92.6	578.9	+ <b>34.7</b>
1949	78.9	59.1	+ <b>19.8</b>
1950	92.4	77.1	+ <b>15.3</b>
1951	93.2	74.4	+ <b>18.8</b>
1952	95.2	75.6	+ <b>19.6</b>
1953	106.2	71.7	+ <b>34.5</b>
1954	102.1	74.2	+ <b>14.9</b>
1955	99.1	74.2	+ <b>14.9</b>
1956	91.9	72.8	+ <b>19.1</b>
1957	79.3	76.5	+ <b>2.8</b>

\* Including 42 000 Baltic German ‘repatriates’.

\*\* Including 8600 repatriates and 24 600 residents who were evacuated or transferred to other Soviet Republics due to the war.

\*\*\* Table does not show data about the deportations of 1940 and 1949.

Source: Riekstiņš, Jānis (2005). Colonization and Russification of Latvia 1940–1989. In: V. Nollendorfs and E. Oberländer (eds.). *The Hidden and Forbidden History of Latvia under Soviet and Nazi Occupations*. Riga: Institute of the History of Latvia, University of Latvia, p. 232

## Appendix 5

### Ethnic Composition of Senior Engineers in the Latvian SSR on 1 June 1986

No.	Ethnic background	Latvian SSR		In urban areas	
		number	%	number	%
1.	Russians	179	43.0	142	63.7
2.	Ukrainians	30	7.3	23	10.2
3.	Belarusians	27	6.4	18	8.0
4.	Latvians	180	43.3	72	32.1
		<b>416</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>255</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Strods, Heinrihs (2005). Sovietization of Latvia 1944 - 1991. In: V. Nollendorfs and E. Oberländer (eds.). *The Hidden and Forbidden History of Latvia under Soviet and Nazi Occupations*. Riga: Institute of the History of Latvia, University of Latvia, p. 219

## Appendix 6

### Ethnic Composition of the Population of Latvia in 1959 and 1935

In thousands	Ethnic distribution 1959 census	Proportion (%) 1959 census	Ethnic Distribution 1935 census	Proportion (%) 1935 census
Population of Latvia	2093	100.0	1950.5	100.0
<b>Latvians</b>	1298	62.0	1472.6	75.5
<b>Russians</b>	556	26.6	206.5	10.6
Belarussians	62	2.0	26.9	1.4
Poles	60	2.9	48.9	2.5
Jews*	37	1.7	93.5	4.8
Lithuanians	32	1.5	22.9	1.2
Ukrainians	29	1.4	1.8	0.1
Estonians	5	0.0	7.0	0.4
Roma	4	0.2	3.8	0.2
Tatars	2	0.1	n/a***	n/a
Germans**	2	0.1	62.1	3.2
Armenians	1.1	0.1	n/a***	n/a

\* In the Holocaust in Nazi-occupied Latvia approximately 70 000 Latvian Jews were killed.


\*\* Almost all ethnic Germans emigrated to Germany in 1939 - 1941.

\*\*\* Others constituted 4400 or 0.2%.

Source: Riekstiņš, Jānis (2005). Colonization and Russification of Latvia 1940–1989. In: V. Nollendorfs and E. Oberländer (eds.). *The Hidden and Forbidden History of Latvia under Soviet and Nazi Occupations*. Riga: Institute of the History of Latvia, University of Latvia, p. 234

## Appendix 7

### Percentage of Ethnic Russians Residing outside Russia in Former Soviet Union States (2015)






Source: Markowitz, Michael (2015). *Mobilizing Compatriots: Russia's Strategy, Tactics, and Influence in the Former Soviet Union*. Arlington: CNA Analysis and Solutions, p. 5 (percentages taken from the *CIA World Factbook*)

## Appendix 8

### Map of the Results of Referendum 2012

#### TAUTAS NOBALSOŠANAS REZULTĀTI




\*Par=For; Pret=Against

Sources: Tautas nobalsošanas rezultātu karte. Available from <http://neogeo.lv/?p=12864> [Accessed on 9 May 2016]

IR: CVK (2012). Pārliecinoties pret krievu valodu kā valsts valodu. Available from <http://www.irlv.lv/2012/2/19/pirmaja-stunda-referenduma-piedalijusies-25-191-jeb-1-63-veletaju> [Accessed on 10 May 2016]

## Appendix 9

### Home Language of Voters and “Harmony” Votes in the 12<sup>th</sup> Saeima Elections 2014



\*Dots – Municipalities of Latvia. Yellow Dot – Riga Municipality.

Source: Cik īsti latviešu un krievu nobalsoja par “Saskaņu”? Available from

<https://ritvars.wordpress.com/2014/11/03/cik-isti-latviesu-un-krievu-nobalsoja-par-sakanu/> [Accessed on 14 May 2016]

## Appendix 10

### Interview with Dr. oec. Viesturs Pauls Karnups

Held by Una Plauka on 12 April 2016 in Riga, Latvia

#### Dr. oec. V. P. Karnups:

*Deputy of the 5<sup>th</sup> Saeima (LNNK): 6.07.1993.-7.11.1995.*

*Deputy Minister of the 1<sup>st</sup> Government of I. Godmanis*

*(responsibility of migration and citizenship issues)*

*Head of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Office (PMLP): 1992*

### **Nolikums par Latvijas Republikas ieeļošanas vīzām un to izsniegšanas kārtību.**

**Latvijas Republikas Ministru Padomes lēmums Nr. 90: Par Latvijas Republikas ieeļošanas vīzu izsniegšanas kārtību un valsts robežu šķērsojošo personu kontroli (apstiprināts 19.02.1993.)<sup>255</sup>**

**Latvijas Republikas likums: Par ārvalstnieku un bezvalstnieku ieeļošanu un uzturēšanos Latvijā (apstiprināts 09.06.1992.)<sup>256</sup> Komentāri:**

Pēc šo nolikumu un likumu apstiprināšanas bija jābrauc uz Maskavu skaidroties. I. Godmanis sūtīja kopā ar J. Peteru (Latvijas Republikas valdības pilnvaroto pārstāvi Maskavā (1991-1992) un ārkārtējo un pilnvaroto vēstnieku Krievijas Federācijā (1992-1997)) izskaidrot situāciju. Jautājums, kāpēc Latvijai ir vīzu režīms ar Krieviju? Tāpēc, ka suverēnā valstī ir pienākums noteikt, kas var nākt, kas nevar. Pārbaudīt, kas nāk.

**Latvijas Republikas likums: Par iedzīvotāju reģistru (11.12.1991.)<sup>257</sup> Komentāri:**

1991. gads bija laiks, kad taisīja *Iedzīvotāju reģistru*<sup>258</sup>, gatavojoties uz Saeimas vēlēšanām, kur tikai pilsoņi var vēlē. Galvenais iedzīvotāju reģistra mērķis bija noskaidrot, kurš ir

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<sup>255</sup> Latvijas Republikas Ministru Padome (1993). *Latvijas Republikas Ministru Padomes lēmums Nr. 90: Par Latvijas Republikas ieeļošanas vīzu izsniegšanas kārtību un valsts robežu šķērsojošo personu kontroli*. Available from <http://m.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=63318> [Accessed on 16 April 2016]

<sup>256</sup> Latvijas Republikas Augstākā Padome (1992). *Latvijas Republikas likums: Par ārvalstnieku un bezvalstnieku ieeļošanu un uzturēšanos Latvijā*. Available from <http://m.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=73092> [Accessed on 16 April 2016]

<sup>257</sup> Latvijas Republikas Augstākā Padome (1991). *Latvijas Republikas likums: Par iedzīvotāju reģistru*. Available from <http://m.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=72328> [Accessed on 16 April 2016]

<sup>258</sup> 1991. gada 11. decembrī Latvijas Republikas Augstākā Padome pieņēma likumu "Par Iedzīvotāju reģistru", šī likuma 2. pants noteica, ka "Latvijas Republikas Tieslietu ministrijas Pilsonības un imigrācijas departaments vada Reģistra izveidošanu un izmantošanu". Situāciju sarežģīja tas, ka nācās reģistrēt ne tikai apmēram 2,6 miljonus Latvijas iedzīvotāju, bet reģistrācijas procesā nācās nošķirt Latvijas pilsoņus no personām, kuras nav šīs valsts pilsoņi, kā arī nošķirt tās personas, attiecībā uz kurām likums "Par Iedzīvotāju reģistru" nav piemērojams. Reģistrāciju vajadzēja pabeigt līdz 5. Saeimas vēlēšanām 1993. gadā.

1992. gada 30. jūnijā departaments pārgāja Valsts ministra J. Dinēviča pakļautībā.

Bičevskis, Mārtiņš (2002). *Pilsonības un migrācijas lietu pārvaldes buklets*. Rīga: PMLP

pilsonis un kurš nav. Pamatojums bija, vai ja tu vai tavi vecāki, vecvecāki bija Latvijas pilsoņi 1940. gada 17. jūnijā. Pēcteči automātiski varēja kļūt pilsoņi.

### **Iemesls un mērķis, kā tas tika pamatots – šāds noteikums par 1940. gadu kā atskaites punktu pilsoņa statusa iegūšanai? Politiskais mērķis?**

Tas bija loģiski – jo tie bija pēdējie Latvijas valsts pilsoņi tās pilsonības likuma ietvaros. Svarīgi bija nošķirt tos, kurus var uzskatīt par pilsoņiem un kurus nevar. Ļoti daudz cilvēki iebrauca Latvijā, kad nebija Latvijas valsts. Nevar saukt PSRS republiku (Latvijas PSR) par Latvijas valsti. Un visi, kas ienāca tad, kad nebija valsts, nevarēja būt arī pilsoņi. Šajā ziņā mēs gājām kopā ar igauņiem, jo viņiem bija tādi pati problēma. Lietuviešiem nebija tāda problēma, jo viņiem bija salīdzinoši maz tādi imigranti. Jautājums bija, ko darīt ar visiem tiem cilvēkiem, kas nav pilsoņi pēc pamatkritērijiem. Es kā PMLP direktors vienojos ar Igaunijas tāda pat veida institūcijas direktoru, ka mēs visus imigrantus uzskatīsim par ārzemniekiem (nepilsoņiem), kam ir tiesības pastāvīgi dzīvot Latvijā vai Igaunijā. Vēlāk tika sagatavotas nepilsoņu pasēs. Tās tika nodrukātas.<sup>259</sup> Igauņi neturēja vienošanos, viņi nolēma, ka viņi veicinās, lai šie nepilsoņi kļūst par Krievijas pilsoņiem – lai izņem Krievijas pilsonību. Loģika bija, ja mēs (Igaunija) gribam viņus kaut kur repatriēt, tad mums ir, kur repatriēt. Mēs (Latvija) negribējām tik daudz oficiālu Krievijas pilsoņu Latvijā, negribējām viņiem dot arī pilsonību par neko – dot kā balvu par to, ka viņi ir kolonizējuši Latviju. Tad arī kādam radās ideja viņus saukt par nepilsoņiem, jo viņiem nav vairāk valsts – nav vairāk PSRS, viņi nav Latvijas pilsoņi, un viņa nav Krievijas pilsoņi. Bet viņiem ir tiesības pastāvīgi dzīvot Latvijā. Pilsoņu Kongress izdomāja nepilsoņa statusu ar šīm nepilsoņu pasēm. Šos PSRS laika imigrantus nevarēja īsti saukt par ārzemniekiem, jo viņi te ir ilgi dzīvojuši, daudzi dzimuši Latvijā. Svarīgi ir, ka tas ir starptautiskais pārkāpums, ko Padomju Savienība (tās pēctece Krievija) izdarīja – iepludinot savus pilsoņus, to nevar kaut kā attaisnot, tas bija starptautiskais pārkāpums. No paša sākuma nebija nekāda reakcija no krievu masas. Jāatceras, ka 1940. gada 17. jūnijā Latvijā bija 10% etnisko krievu no visiem iedzīvotājiem. Ar viņu pēctečiem nebija nekādu problēmu, tie automātiski kļuva par pilsoņiem. Tādā veidā tā nebija etniskā diskriminācija.

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<sup>259</sup> Konkursā par nepilsoņu pasu izgatavošanu un personalizācijas sistēmas izstrādi uzvarēja Kanādas firma *Canadian Bank Note Company*. Līgums ar šo firmu tika parakstīts 1995. gada 7. novembrī. Bičevskis, Mārtiņš (2002). *Pilsonības un migrācijas lietu pārvaldes buklets*. Rīga: PMLP

**Latvijā, *Latvijas Cilvēktiesību komiteja*, kuru kopš 1990. gada vadīja T. Ždanoka, - vai no viņu puses bija kāda pretreakcija šim dalījuma pilsoņos un nepilsoņos?**

Bija, tāpēc ka viņai (Ždanokai) netika dota pilsonība. Kāpēc viņai netika dota pilsonība? Tā ideja bija tāda, ka pretendentam vajadzēja būt taisnajai līnijai pēctecībā. Viņa mēģināja pierādīt, ka viņas vecmāmiņa bija Latvijas pilsone. Ja Ždanokas vecāki būtu bijuši LR pilsoņi, tad viņa automātiski būtu pilsone. Bet to vecāki bija, labprātīgi, izbraukuši no neatkarīgās Latvijas uz Padomju Savienību 1930-tajos gados. Tad automātiski viņiem bija atņemta Latvijas pilsonība. Ždanokai nebija vairs tiešā pēctecības līnija. Viņa par to tiesājās. Pirmo tiesas procesu viņa zaudēja, jo tā līnija bija salauzta. Viņa turpināja tiesāties, kamēr viņai kāds tiesnesis pilsonību piešķīra. Līdz ar to Ždanoka varēja kļūt par deputāti un uzsākt politisko darbību neatkarīgajā Latvijā.

**Vai viņa un tās vadītā *Latvijas Cilvēktiesību komiteja* tad – 1990-to gadu sākumā – sadarbojās ar Kremli?**

Protams, ka viņa sadarbojās ar Kremli. Viņi visi sadarbojās ar Kremli. Viņa bija ‘Atbrīvošanas komisijas’ (Rubika) radio balss. Viņa mēģināja aizstāvēt A. Rubika viedokli. To, ka Latvijai vislabāk bija palikt Padomju Savienībā. Viņa bija propagandiste-aģitatore. Cilvēktiesības viņai pēc būtības neinteresēja. Viņas dienas kartība bija pagriezt Latviju atpakaļ Krievijas apkampienos.

**Latvijas Republikas Pilsonības likums (1994).<sup>260</sup>**

**Latvijas Republikas likums: Par to bijušās PSRS pilsoņu statusu, kuriem nav Latvijas vai citas valsts pilsonības (1995).<sup>261</sup> Komentāri šim procesam un noteikumiem:**

5. Saeimas vēlēšanās es tiku ievēlēts par deputātu no frakcijas LNNK. Tas bija laiks, kad bija nepieciešams pilsonības likums. Vairums partiju iesniedza savus projektus. Lielās bailes bija, ja dosim pilsonību visiem nepilsoņiem vai pataisīsim to iespēju ļoti atvieglinātu, tad viņi kaut kādā veidā mūs nogremdēs. Būs ārkārtīgi grūti veidot Latvijas valsti. Ideja bija tāda: labi, šiem cilvēkiem būs vieglāk kļūt par Latvijas pilsoņiem nekā īstenajiem ārzemniekiem, kas tagad (pēc neatkarības atgūšanas) iebrauc Latvijā un grib būt Latvijas pilsoņi, bet pamatu pamats bija, ka viņiem vajag saprast (zināt) latviešu valodu. Latviešu valodas kritērijs bija

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<sup>260</sup> LR Saeima (1994). *Pilsonības likums*. 22.07/25.08.1994. Available from <http://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=57512> [Accessed on 31 March 2016]

<sup>261</sup> LR Saeima (1995). *Par to bijušās PSRS pilsoņu statusu, kuriem nav Latvijas vai citas valsts pilsonības*. 12.04/09.05.1995. Available from <http://likumi.lv/ta/id/77481-par-to-bijusas-psrs-pilsonu-statusu-kuriem-nav-latvijas-vai-citas-valsts-pilsonibas> [Accessed on 31 March 2016]

pamatu pamats. Protams, skatījāties, kā citas valstis to dara – zināt arī Latvijas vēsturi, Satversmi. Partija “Tēvzemi un Brīvībai”, kas bija veidojusies no “Pilsonības Kongresa”, bija daudz radikālāka – viņi gribēja, lai būt kvotas. Pilsoņu kvotas – tik un tik gadā var kļūt par pilsoņiem; kā arī pēc cik gadiem katrs var kļūt par pilsoni. Tā bija absurda ideja, bet “Latvijas Ceļš” to pieņēma, citādāk nebūtu bijis nekāds pilsonības likums. Vēlāk tas tika izņemts laukā. Sākums tam visam bija tās lielās bailes, ka visi nepilsoņi gribēs pilsonību, ātri kļūs un izvēlēs latviešu ārā no Latvijas, ka viņi mērķtiecīgi tā balsos. Cilvēki par to uztraucās, ka tā var notikt. Latviešu valoda kā kritērijs nebija izvēlēta tāpēc, lai viņi nekad nekļūtu par pilsoņiem, bet lai ‘piespiestu’ viņus iemācīties latviešu valodu. Ideja bija, lai ‘piespiestu’ nepilsoņus runāt latviski. Un tiem, kas jau zināja latviešu valodu, tas nekādas grūtības nesagādāja. Likums vēlāk tika grozīts, ka tie, kas dzimuši pēc 1991. gada 21. augusta, visi automātiski kļūst par Latvijas pilsoņiem.

**Ja salīdzina B. Jeļcina un V. Putina prezidentūras, cik liela ir Kremļa ietekme uz Latvijas iekšpolitiku? Vai Jeļcina laikā bija tikai sadraudzība ar Latviju, kas pārauga tautiešu aizsardzībā; bet Putina laikā tas viss vērst uz Putina ietekmes palielināšanu, savu ārpolitikas interešu īstenošanu?**

Jeļcina laiki arī mainījās. Jeļcins mainījās. 1991. gadā, kad viņš arī cīnījās (pret PSRS), tad mēs (Latvija) bijām vislabākie draugi. Bet viņš mainījās – palika vairāk krievisks, vairāk šovinistisks. Un tas arī notika ar krievu kopienu šeit. KGB, kas pārvērtās par FSB un no kuras tika izraudzīts viņu izraudzītais Putins, bija milzīga ietekme Kremlī un joprojām ir. Šobrīd Putins liek tikai savus vecos cīņū biedrus no KGB laikiem vadošos amatos. Tā ir Krievijas politika. Bet atbalss no Latvijas *Pilsonības likumu* uzreiz sekoja Krievijā. Pašā sākumā nebija nekas, jo mēs (Latvija) bijām draugi, bet tad 1994.-1995. gadā jau atkal kļuvām par ienaidniekiem, kad bija skaidrs, ka mēs (Latvija) nedosim visiem, kas šeit dzīvo, pilsonību. Jo līdz tam bija cerība. Bija cerība, ka mēs (Latvija) darīsim to pašu, ko lietuvieši. Bet tā nenotika. Krievijas attieksme jau bija kļuvusi nedraudzīgāka. Tad Putins nāca – vēl nedraudzīgāk. Mēs (Latvija) vēl atbalstījām Čečeniju, tad vēl trakāk bija. Tā līdz mūsdienām, kad Krievijas aptauja liecina, ka Krievijas vislielākais drauds un ienaidnieks ir Latvija un Igaunija. Pēc Gruzijas kara – Gruzija kļuva pirmo ienaidnieku trijniekā. Latvija noslīdēja uz otro vietu. Šobrīd starp tām ir arī ASV utt. Būtībā ar krievu kopienu šeit notika viss tas, kas mainījās Krievijā un to attieksmē pret Baltijas valstīm; tā gāja līdz šim izmaiņām.

### **Vai Jūs redzat Krievijas tautiešus, kas dzīvo Latvijā, īpaši nepilsoņus, kā politisko draudu Latvijai?**

Nē. Bet viņi var tikt izmantoti Putina interesēs. Ir pagājuši 25 gadi. Šeit nav Ziemeļīrija – kur katolis dzīvoja savā geto, luterānis dzīvoja savā geto. Nav nošķirti (latvieši no krieviem). 1990-tajos gados tika mums uzdoti jautājumi: kāpēc jūs tik daudziem nedodat uzreiz pilsonību? Vai jūs nedomājat, ka te būs etniskie kari? Es teicu: aizejiet un pastaigājiet pa ielu. Un ja jūs jūtaties apdraudēts, jo var just to draudu, ka ir divu ienaidnieku nometnes, tad to var izjust, atnāciet un pastāstiet. Jo es to nejūtu. Krievs un latvietis staigā pa Rīgas ielām un nejūtas apdraudēts tāpēc, ka ir krievs vai latvietis.

### **Vai nepilsoņi nejūtas te Latvijā politiski nošķirti, un, ja sarīkos kādu akciju, piemēram kā 2012. gada referendumu par grozījumiem Satversmē - kas paredzēja krievu valodai noteikt otras valsts valodas statusu (ar tādiem pro-krieviskiem aktīvistiem-līderiem kā V. Lindermans), tad viņi noslieksies par labu Kremļa politikai?**

Ir jāatšķir tā masa no aktīvistiem. Ja aktīvisti kaut ko izdara, tad visa tā krievvalodīgo masa aplaudēs un domās, ka tas ir labi. Bet viņi paši neko nedara. Tos politiskos draudus rada politiskie aktīvisti (arī pro-Kremliskie politiķi). Viņi rada draudu tādā veidā, ka izprovocē reakcijas. Tur ir tā bīstamība. Piemēram, skolu reforma, - ka tā apdraud etniskos krievus. Jo patiesībā tas nevienu neapdraud. Ja viņi apskatītos apkārt, kas faktiski notiek, - ka jebkurš etniskais krievs var dzīvot visu savu mūžu krievu kopienas iekšienē – ir televīzija krievu valodā, ir radio krievu valodā, ir krievu valodā avīzes, ir krievu valodā skolas. Tas viss lielākā veidā ir atbalstīts no valsts puses. Ko viņi runā, ka mēs apdraudam krievu valodu? Viņi mēģina atgūt to, kas sabruka 1991. gadā. Viņi runā, ka viņiem vajag līdztiesību, latvieši viņus apdraud, viņiem vajag otru (krievu) valsts valodu – tas viss ir muļķības. Ko viņi grib, tas ir atpakaļ savas privilēģijas, kas bija etniskajiem krieviem. Ka viņi automātiski tiek vadošos amatos, automātiski dabū labākos dzīvokļus, automātiski visur priekšroka, ka tas viss ir automātiski. Tas PSRS laikos bija bāzēts uz etnisko sadalījumu. Tas ir tas, ko viņi grib dabūt atpakaļ. Tas ir viņu skats, kas ir līdztiesība. Viņi grib atkal dominēt. Krievu valodu un visu, kas nāca tam līdzī Padomju laikos. Jo viņiem tagad nav ne mazākā izpratne par to, kas īsti notiek Krievijā. Viņu skats uz šodienas Krieviju ir – Maskava un Pēterburga. Bet, izbraucot ārpus lielajām pilsētām, tāda nabadzība, tāda bezjēdzība. Latvijā pat Latgalē būtu nesaprotams. Latgalē vismaz apkārt ir cerība, maziņa, bet ir. Viņiem nav nekāda. Dzīvo Tomskā, Omskā u.c. – tur nekā nav. ‘Tuksnesis.’ Un ir šīs gaismas vietas – Maskava un

Pēterburga. Tās viņiem ir gaišie stariņi. Krievijā ir tādas vietas kā Tomska, Omska utt. un politiskā sistēma, kurā vairums šejienes Putina atbalstītāji nemaz negribētu dzīvot.

### **Vai krievvalodīgajiem, tieši nepilsoņiem, var uzticēties – lojalitātes jautājums?**

Vai viņi domās par Latviju kā latvieši? Nē. Varbūt retais. Bet tas viss atkarīgs no tā, kā definē lojalitāti. Viņi varētu būt lojāli pret Latviju kā valsti. Bet viņiem (krieviem) vienmēr būs mūsu lielie kaimiņi (Krievija). Viņiem vienmēr būs apkārt tās ietekme – no TV, radio, avīzēm, žurnāliem utt. Tāpēc viņi visu laik sevi uzskatīs par krieviem. Bet tāpēc ka viņi sevi visu laiku uzskata par krieviem, nenozīmē, ka viņi būs lojāli Krievijai un Krievijas politikai. Viņi vienmēr sevi uzskatīs par krieviem. Mums tā lielākā problēma ir tā, ka Latvijas galējie nacionālisti (arī galēji labējās partijas) vienmēr redzēs visu melnu un baltu. Un viņi nostāda visus krievus kā nelojālus Latvijas valstij vai, precīzāk, - latviešu valstij. Jautājums nav – latvietis vai krievs, jo abiem var būt lojalitāte vienai lietai. Es domāju, ka tas nav tik vienošķīgs.

### **Vai ir atbalstāma ideja piešķirt tiesības visiem nepilsoņiem balsot pašvaldību vēlēšanās (Latvijas Krievu kopienas prezidenta V. Sokolova mērķis)?**

Es domāju, ka tas nebūtu atbalstāms. Galvenokārt tāpēc, ka tā politiskā atmosfēra ir tāda, ka šobrīd katrs ir iedzīts savā nometnē, ka tas varētu izraisīt problēmas. Kaut gan lielas atšķirības nav. Igaunija to izdarīja. Igaunijā nepilsoņi var balsot pašvaldību vēlēšanās – un Tallinā tagad valda “Saskaņas” partijas ekvivalents. Abās galvaspilsētās pie varas ir pro-krieviskās partijas. Latvijā tas, ka nepilsoņi nevar balsot, neko politiski nemainīja. Tas nozīmē, ka paši latvieši (ne tikai krievi) arī balsoja pret latviešu ideju. Nelojāli.

### **Vai pro-Kremliskās un pro-krieviskās organizācijas (*Russkij Mir*, *Rossosotrudnjestvo*, *Gorchenkova* fonds utt.), kas sadarbojas ar “Latvijas Cilvēktiesību komiteju” un T. Ždanokas pārstāvēto “Latvijas Krievu savienību” u.c., var uzskatīt par politisko draudu Latvijai?**

Jā, var. Un es uzskatu, ka Latvijas drošības dienesti viņus uzrauga. Galvenokārt tāpēc, ka viņi saņem finansējumu no vienas citas valsts – mums draudīgas valsts. Vienīgais, kas mums (Latvijai) uzbruks, ir Krievija. (...) Vēl Baltkrievija kopā ar Krieviju. Dislocētais karaspēks Krievijas Rietumu apgabalā – tanku divīzija, desanta divīzija, Pleskavā armija. [Baltkrievijas-Latvijas robežas tuvumā.]

### **Kā Jūs uzskatāt, tad politiskie draudi ir lielāki vai militārie?**

Es domāju, ka pašlaik politiskie draudi ir lielāki. Galvenokārt, ne tas, ko viņi dara, bet ko mēs. Viņi ir spējīgi korumpēt pārējo valsti. Draudus rada ne tik daudz viņu aktivitāte, kamēr viņi ir maza aktīvistu grupa (banda), lai drošības dienesti viņus uzrauga, bet tas, ka viņi saņem (Krievijas) finansējumu, kuru viņi izplata tālāk. Uzpērk cilvēkus. Cik tālu tas var iet, tas ir drauds mums.

### **Nekārtību gadījumā, ja Krievija un pro-krieviskās organizācijas, aktīvistu īstenotu hibrīdkara scenāriju Latvijā, vai viņi paļautos uz Latvijas krievvalodīgajiem, tā saucamiem Krievijas tautiešiem, vai viņiem vajadzētu papildspēku – iesūtīt savējos cilvēkus?**

Viņiem vajadzētu savējos. Piemēram, 1924. gadā krievi taisīja puču Tallinā. Viņi cerēja, ka visi strādnieki ir kreisi noskaņoti, ka visi nāks palīgā un gāzīs nacionālo valdību. Bet neviens nenāca. Un es domāju, ja tagad būtu tāds mēģinājums, notiktu tas pats. Jo mūsējie krievi, kas dzīvo šeit, viņi varbūt ir lepni par to, ka pasaule tagad ņem vērā, ko Putins saka, agrāk neņēma vērā; bet viņi ir redzējuši, kas notika/notiek austrumu Ukrainā. Lai tas notiktu šeit, lai tikai izpatiktu kādam – drīzāk, ka nē. Viņiem Latvijā ir pieejami citi informācijas avoti kā Krievijā. Jautājums tikai par to, vai viņi visi to izmanto. Es domāju, ka visi domājošie krievi diez vai grib, lai viss ir izbumbots un dzīvot bunkurā utt., kā tas notika austrumu Ukrainā. Vispār viņiem vajadzētu aizbraukt paskatīties, kas šobrīd notiek Krimā, ja netic. Ja ir kādreiz bijuši Krimā, tad lai tagad paskatās, kas tur notiek. Tas ir nožēlojami, jo Krievijas kontrolētajā televīzijā un presē tas neparādās. Smadzeņu skalošana notiek.

### **Skatoties nākotnē, 2018. gada Saeimas vēlēšanas un tas, ka pieaug krievvalodīgo pilsoņu skaits, – Jūsu prognozes?**

Piemēram, ja es būtu "Saskaņas Centrs", tad es pavadītu šos 4 gadus un vervētu nepilsoņus, sakot: aizej un dabū pilsonību. Daļēji viņi arī to dara. Bet viņi to nedara kampaņveidīgi. (...) Nepilsoņi (kas nenaturalizējas) ir 'īsti Latvijas cilvēki' - viņi gaida brīnumu. Gaida, ka pataisīs Latviju par Dāniju vienā dienā. Viņi gaida, ka kaut kas notiks un viņi visi bez pūlēm uzreiz būs pilsoņi. (...) Putinam var par viņiem (nepilsoņiem) pieaugt interese, ja viņam ies slikti – ekonomiski un politiski. Novērst uzmanību no ekonomikas, cik slikta tā ir, uz to, cik vareni mēs (krievi) esam. Kari, piemēram, Sīrijā, viņam ir izmaksājuši ļoti dārgi, ko Krievija nevar atļauties. Es domāju, ka Putinam ir tik daudz saprāta (lai saprastu), ka uzņemties karot pret NATO, nebūtu prātīgi. Tāpēc es esmu laimīgs, ka mēs esam NATO, Eiropas Savienībā,

eirozonā, ka lietojam eiro – jo vairāk ir tās saites un ķēdes ar Rietumeiropu, jo grūtāk viņu (Krievijas) pusei mūs atmontēt no Rietumiem. NATO mūs aizsargās. (...) Ja Gruzijas-Krievijas un Čečenijas-Krievijas karos NATO nevarēja iet tur iekšā pret Krieviju, jo tās abas nebija NATO valstis, tad Baltijas valstu gadījumā tas ir citādi. (...) Bet mēs nekad nevarēsim vienoties par pagātņi ar krieviem, izņemot, ja tur notiek kāds brīnums; tāpēc ka Putins ir uzbūvējis viņu nacionālo identitāti uz ‘uzvarētāju valsts’ imidža – nevarēja vairāk to būvēt uz revolūcijas, kā bija pirms tam, viņš to tagad ir uzbūvējis uz Otrā Pasaules kara, kad viņi bija labie – pret fašistiem (kopā ar ASV u.c.). Tātad uzvarētāji-labie nevar būt sliktie. Un ja mēs sakām: jūsu uzvara pret fašistiem, deva mums 50 verdzības gadus; - tad viņi saka: tā ir vēstures viltošana. Viņi nāca kā atbrīvotāji – atbrīvoja mūs no fašistiem.

**Vai būtu jāaizliedz 9. maija svinības valsts līmenī ar valsts amatpersonu (Rīgas mēra N. Ušakova u.c.) dalību Rīgā pie ‘Uzvara pieminekļa’?**

Es aizlieltu abus – gan 9. maiju, gan 16. martu.

## Appendix 11

### Interview with Dr. habil. philol. Ina Druviete

Held by Una Plauka on 20 April 2016 in Riga, Latvia

#### Dr. habil. philol. I. Druviete:

*Member of Latvian Parliament (Saeima): since 2002*

*Minister of Education and Science of the Republic of Latvia: 2004-2006; 2014*

*The 3<sup>rd</sup> Class Order of the Three Stars of the Republic of Latvia: since 2012*

**2004. gada Skolu reforma<sup>262</sup> – vai tika sasniegti tās mērķi?<sup>263</sup> Saistībā ar Krievijas tautiešu politiku – vai bija kādi pretpasākumi, spiediens, ko arī Jūs pati izjutāt (vai Saeimā kopumā)? Piemēram, saistībā ar Krievijas tautiešu ‘bērnu aizsardzību ārvalstīs’?**

Paradokss ir tāds, ka tā saucamā 2004. gada Reforma, pēc būtības nebija nekāda reforma. Jo – Latvijā bilingvālās sistēmas ieviešana sākās jau no 1989. gada, kad pirmajā valodu likumā tika noteikts, ka latviešu valoda mācāma visās izglītības iestādēs, neatkarīgi no to pakļautības. Tad, kad Latvija atguva neatkarību, tika pieņemts Latvijas Republikas Valodas likums, kurā šī norma jau tika precizēta. Un varētu piebilst, ka šajā starpposmā no 1989.-1992. gadam, tika organizēta valsts valodas apguves sistēma darba laikā, darba vietās bez maksas, tostarp visās izglītības iestādēs. Tātad visiem skolotājiem, kas strādāja Latvijā, bija iespēja apgūt latviešu valodu, ja viņi to līdz šim neprata, un vairums skolotāju valodu patiešām neprata. 1992. gadā tik nodibināts arī “Valsts valodas centrs”, “Valsts valodas

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<sup>262</sup> 2004. gada 1. septembrī - valsts un pašvaldību vispārējās vidējās izglītības iestādēs, kurās īsteno mazākumtautību izglītības programmas, sākot ar 10. klasi, mācības notiek valsts valodā atbilstoši valsts vispārējās vidējās izglītības standartam; valsts un pašvaldību profesionālās izglītības iestādēs, sākot ar pirmo kursu, mācības notiek valsts valodā atbilstoši valsts arodizglītības standartam vai valsts profesionālās vidējās izglītības standartam. Valsts vispārējās vidējās izglītības standarts, valsts arodizglītības standarts un valsts profesionālās vidējās izglītības standarts noteic, ka mācību satura apguve valsts valodā tiek nodrošināta ne mazāk kā trijās piektdaļās no kopējās mācību stundu slodzes mācību gadā (60/40), ieskaitot svešvalodas, un nodrošina ar mazākumtautības valodu, identitāti un kultūru saistīta mācību satura apguvi mazākumtautības valodā.

LR Saeima (2004). *Grozījumi Izglītības likumā*. 05.02./27.02.2004. Available from <http://likumi.lv/ta/id/84315-grozijumi-izglitibas-likuma> [Accessed on 21 April 2016]

<sup>263</sup> *Skola 12 mācību gadu laikā dodot dzīvei nepieciešamās zināšanas, kas neesot abstraktas, bet esot atbilstošas noteiktam laikam, noteiktai telpai, tātad noteiktai sabiedrībai. Latvijā valsts valodas zināšanas esot priekšnosacījums tam, lai skolā apgūto varētu izmantot ikdienas darbā. (...) Vidusskola ir kvalitatīvi jaunu zināšanu apguves posms ar pilnīgi atšķirīgu pieeju mācību procesam, kura mērķis ir sagatavot skolēnu studijām augstskolā. Tāpēc būtiski esot saprast, ka zināšanu kvalitāte ir arī prasme šīs zināšanas izmantot praktiskajā darbībā un to nodrošinot bilingvālā izglītība, par kuru Latvijā faktiski varot runāt jau no 1995.gada. (7. Pieaicinātā persona – LR Izglītības un zinātnes ministre I. Druviete)*

Druviete, Ina (2005). *Latvijas Republikas Satversmes tiesas spriedums*. 13.05./13.05.2005. Available from <http://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=108255> [Accessed on 21 April 2016]

inspekcija” un “Valsts valodas atestācijas komisija”; un tika sākts valsts valodas atestācijas process, kurā pašlaik jau cauri gājuši apmēram 600 000 cilvēku – profesionālās kvalifikācijas sertifikāta iegūšanai. Un varētu teikt, ka tieši skolotāji bija tā kategorija, kur bija jāizdara grozījumi no vispārējās normas – skolotājiem tika dots pārejas periods, lai valodu varētu apgūt nevis kā toreiz augstākajā 3. pakāpē, bet tikai 2. pakāpē, tas rāda, kādas mums ir šīs izejas pozīcijas skolā. Un vienlaikus ar skolotāju izglītošanu sākās arī mērķtiecīgs latviešu valodas apguves stiprināšanas process skolās, tika pieņemti noteikumi, grozījumi Izglītības likumā par to, ka no 1995. gada divi priekšmeti pamatskolā un trīs priekšmeti vidusskolā ir jā māca latviešu valodā. Darbu sāka latviešu valodas apguves valsts vienība ar lielu ārvalstu donoru finansējumu un tātad arī ar starptautiski akceptētām vadlīnijām. Un 1999. gadā jau sākās bilingvālās izglītības ieviešana vārda tiešajā nozīmē. Tad tika izstrādāti šie, tā sauktie, modeļi, kuri ir spēkā līdz šim brīdim. Un kā jūs redzat, tie bija secīgi posmi ik pa 3-4 gadiem. Vispirms likums par latviešu valodas mācīšanu, pēc tam jau bilingvālās izglītības ieviešana, pēc tam nākamajā posmā šie modeļi; un loģiski 2004. gadā tie skolēni, kuri pamatizglītības posmā bija apguvuši latviešu valodu šo bilingvālās izglītības modeļu ietvaros, vēlējās šo procesu turpināt. Jo līdz 2004. gadam pastāvēja paradoksāla situācija, tātad šiem bērniem, kas bija mācījušies bilingvāli vidusskolas laikā, tas, ka varētu mācīties tikai un vienīgi krievu valodā un latviešu valodu kā priekšmetu, būtu lejupslīde, tas būtu atpakaļkritiens, tas gluži vienkārši nebūtu loģiski. Un tas bija pamatojums, kāpēc 2004. gadā vajadzēja pieņemt normu, kā šo procesu turpināt arī vidusskolās; un tika pieņemta, tā sauktā, 60:40 sistēma, kas visiem ir labi zināma, bet pēc idejas tas bija gluži vienkārši mērķtiecīgs, loģisks turpinājums tam, ko bērni bija darījuši pamatskolā.

Bet paradoksāli, ka, tieši gatavojoties šai reformai, pēkšņi parādījās pseidozinātnieka atziņas par valodas apguves kaitīgumu bērna psihei, viņa kognitīvajām spējām – bija izteiktas spekulācijas tieši ar šāda veida apsvērumiem, šeit īpaši izcēlās Plinera, Buhvalova, Zeļcermana kungs u.c. Tātad nekur pasaulē vairs netika atzīts, ka bilingvālā izglītība un bilingvisms kaitē psihei, Latvija bija vienīgā vieta pasaulē, kur šādas teorijas zēla un plauka. Un pie tam vēl paradoksāli izrādījās, ka latviešu valoda ir vienīgā valoda, kam ir kaitīga ietekme uz psihi, jo, piemēram, mācības angļu valodā šie pasi cilvēki uzskatīja par pilnīgi normālām un pieļaujamām, un vairumam viņu bērni arī mācījās ārzemēs. Tā ka pilnīgi skaidrs, ka nekāda psiholingvistika, zinātniska pamatojuma šiem procesiem nebija. Tā nebija nekāda pēkšņa reforma, tā bija labi sagatavota jau vairāk nekā desmit gadu garumā, un tātad pilnīgi loģiski vienīgā motivācija šādiem procesiem bija politiska. Un tik tiešām, sākot jau no 2003. gada, praktiski jau 2002. gada nogalē, kad tika pieņemti visi attiecīgie normatīvie akti

ar lielām diskusijām Saeimā un Ministru Kabinetā, ar neskaitāmām ārvalstu ekspertīzēm šiem likumdošanas aktiem, tika pieņemta šī norma, kam bija jāstājas spēkā no 2004. gada 1. septembra.

Tad ir divi stāsti. Viens ir par to, ka šis posms sakrita ar Latvijas iestāšanos Eiropas Savienībā. Kas arī, teiksim, no Karaganova doktrīnas viedokļa pilnīgi noteikti varēja būt apgrūtinājums šai (Krievijas) tautiešu politikai, jo tik tiešām mēs Latvijā redzējām īstenojamies principu, ka sākotnēji iekaroja ar ieročiem, pēc tam ar ekonomiku un pēc tam ar ideoloģiju. Attieksme pret izglītību latviešu valodā, nenoliedzami, bija tieši šīs ideoloģiskās cīņas elements. Un fons bija sagatavots jau apmēram no 1994.-1995. gada, kad Latvijā norisinājās diskusijas par jauno Valsts valodas likumu. Likums tika izstrādāts 1995. gadā, pieņemts tika 1999. gadā. Un visus šos četrus gadus likums tika pakļauts ārkārtīgi nopietnām starptautisko ekspertu un arī, diemžēl, pseidoekspertu ekspertīzēm. Pie mums ieradās gan Eiropas Padomes, gan Eiropas Savienības, gan EDSO, gan ANO, gan citu starptautisko institūciju delegācijas, kuru locekļiem vairumā gadījumu bija visai maza izpratne par Latvijas situāciju, par Latvijas vēsturi. Latvijai tika mēģināts pielāgot Rietumeiropas valsts standartus ar pilnīgi atšķirīgu vēsturi, ar pilnīgi atšķirīgu minoritāšu situāciju. Bet rezultātā tomēr šis Valsts valodas likums tika pieņemts. Bija daži panti, kuros neizdevās pierādīt savu taisnību, un tagad pēc 17 gadiem es varu teikt: Vai tad es neteicu? Mēs to paredzējām. Un arī dažos pantu formulējumos bija pietiekami neskaidri varianti, un tādēļ mūsu Valsts valodas likumam ir divpadsmit papildinoši Ministru Kabineta noteikumi, kas regulāri tiek mainīti. Tā ka šī gaisotne jau bija saspringta, un šī 2004. gada Reforma drīzāk bija iegants, lai mēģinātu lieku reizi pierādīt, ka Latvijas Valsts valodas likums un valodas politika neatbilst starptautiskiem standartiem. Un, protams, pašā zemtekstā bija vēršanās pret Latvijas neatkarību.

Toreiz LR Izglītības un zinātnes ministrs bija K. Šadurskis<sup>264</sup>. Tur bija tāda situācija, ka 2002. gada oktobra Saeimas vēlēšanās lielu balsu skaitu Parlamentā ieguva “Jaunais laiks”, E. Repše kļuva par premjerministru, K. Šadurskis vadīja Izglītības un zinātnes ministriju, un es vadīju Saeimā Cilvēktiesību un sabiedrisko lietu komisiju. Un tas jautājums tika pacelts tieši Cilvēktiesību komisijā, ne tika daudz Izglītības komisijā. Izglītības komisija, protams, pie tā arī aktīvi strādāja, bet, galvenokārt, Cilvēktiesību komisija. Blakus šīm diskusijām, kas ļoti labi, detalizēti aprakstītas grāmatās “Latviešu valoda 15 neatkarības gados” (2007) un

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<sup>264</sup> LR Izglītības un zinātnes ministri: Kārlis Šadurskis (07.11.2002.-09.03.2004.); Juris Radzevičs (09.03.2004.-02.12.2004.); Ina Druvieta (02.12.2004.-07.04.2006.)

“Valsts valodas likums: vēsture un aktualitāte” (2008), bija slavenā demonstrācija un ‘dziesma’ par ‘Melno Kārli’<sup>265</sup>. Dziesma, nenoliedzami, bija šokējoša.

### **Tā bija iebiedēšana, vai ne?**

Protams, bet kā citādi? V. Rafaļska niknais, biedējošais skatiens utt. aicinoši agresīvas mūzikas pavadībā. Un es arī varu teikt, ka to tā uztvēra – es, piemēram, neesmu nekāds bailīgākais cilvēks, tad jau biju pieredzējusi, jo es esmu valodu politikā jau no 1990-tajiem gadiem, viskaut kas ir pieredzēts. Bet kad es pirmo reizi to videoklipu redzēju, man tiešām skudriņas gāja caur kauliem. Tātad tas pat daudz pieredzējušiem cilvēkiem bija neirolingvistiski perfekti nostrādāts. Iznāca tā, ka likums tika pieņemts ar diezgan sarežģītu formulējumu, bet sistēma sāka strādāt. Tad mainījās valdības. Tad nāca Izglītības un zinātnes ministrs J. Radzevičs (“Latvijas Pirmā partija”), kas pavirzīja to visu atpakaļgaitā. Es kā (Izglītības un zinātnes ministre) sāku strādāt no 2004. gada novembra. Kas mainījās? Mainījās tas, ka man nevarēja pārnest nezināšanu šajās lietās, jo es lasīju to kursu, biju iztulkojusi K. Beikera grāmatu par bilingvismu un bilingvālo izglītību. Es piekopu ārkārtīgi intensīvu sarunu taktiku. Es vēl nebiju tik ļoti tas ‘melns tēls’ tajā laikā. Kaut, protams, sarunas bija ārkārtīgi asas. Es negribētu to otrreiz piedzīvot – vienkārši diendienā diskutēt būtībā par vienu un to pašu. To mēs darījām 1989. gadā, 1999. gadā, 2004. gadā un, diemžēl, mēs to darījām atkal 2014. gadā. Varbūt tagad atkal būs. Tās sarunas ir gandrīz viens pret vienu.

### **Tad tie uzbrukumi ir arī no “Latvijas Cilvēktiesību komitejas”?**

Jā, V. Buzajevs (“Interfronte”, “Līdztiesība”, “PCTVL”), protams. “Latvijas Cilvēktiesību komiteja”, slēpjoties tieši aiz šī cēlā cilvēktiesību lozunga, būtībā pilnībā ignorēja lielas sabiedrības daļas, tātad latviešu, cilvēktiesības to etnoģenētiskajā teritorijā saņemt pakalpojumus, informāciju un izpausties latviešu valodā. To visu mēs diendienā pārrunājām, diskutējām, bet, skaidrs, ka tur bija zināmas politiskas intereses. Tajā laikā tas bija “PCTVL”, galvenokārt, V. Buzajevs, T. Ždanoka; un vienu brīdi iznāca tā, ka viņus, jo lielākā daļa sabiedrības jau mums tomēr nav tik radikāla, neievēlēja Saeimā, un tad šo stafeti pārņēma it kā nedaudz maigākā “Saskaņa”, toreiz “Saskaņas Centrs”. Bet viens no karognesējiem šajā procesā bija Igors Pimenovs, kurš, starp citu, to turpina līdz pat šai dienai. Eiropā cīnījās

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<sup>265</sup> Krievu skolu aizstāvības štābs. Штаб защиты русских школ (Kotovs, Genādijs un V. Rafaļskis, J. Pliners, M. Mitrofanovs, J. Petropavlovskis, A. Kazakovs u.c.) (2004). *Чёрный Карлис* (Pink Floyd и Чёрный Ворон). VIDEO available from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BpS3k0HD6i8> [Accessed on 21 April 2016]

Boriss Čilevičs ar nedaudz gudrākām metodēm. Parasti bija tā, ka tur izveidojās diskusiju pāri – kur gāja Buzajevs, tur pretī bija J. Dobelis; kur gāja Čilevičs, tur pretī gāju es. Tātad mēs bijām atšķirīgos diskursos.

**Vai ir arī pierādījumi (gadījumi), ka viņi melo? Ka ir tā, Jums ir jāatspēko reāli meli? Vai viņi vienkārši sagroza tos faktus?**

Meli? (...) Augsta līmeņa demagoģija. Meli ir ne faktu līmenī. Meli, redz, ir pierādāmi, - piemēram, ja viņš pasaka, ka ir tāds likums, ir tāda norma, bet īstenībā tās nav. Bet mēs dažādi interpretējam faktus.

Tā ka tur bija runa par puspatiesībām, par vienpusēja viedokļa absolutizēšanu, par pilnīgu nevēlēšanos uz lietu paskatīties arī no latviešu viedokļa, vēstures ignorēšana. Tas bija tadā patosu uzskates līmenī, vai vispār ir svarīgi, kas ir bijis – mēs, lūk, šeit tagad visi esam *davaiļe zhitj družna* ('dzīvosim draudzīgi'). Pilnīgi ignorējot to, kas notiktu, ja, piemēram, mums būt šī hipotētiskā divvalodība, jo viņi aizsedzas ar frāzēm par minoritāšu tiesībām, izmantojot tos pašus argumentus, ko izmanto, piemēram, (apdraudētie) frīzi (kas Nīderlandē nesastāda pat 1%) un sorbi (vendi) Vācijā, vai arī sāmi kā pamattauta. Viņi vislaik izvērza šo nepatieso konceptu par divām valsts valodām.

**Jā, es esmu redzējusi, interviju, kur T. Ždanoka Eiropas līmeņa intervijā stāsta par krievu valodu kā autohtonās Latvijas minoritātes valodu, salīdzinot krievu situāciju Latvijā ar skotu, velsiešu (Lielbritānijā) vai kataloņu (Spānijā) situāciju.**

Jā, tāds diskurss arī ir. Viņi izmanto atsauci uz kļūdaini interpretētiem Eiropas aktiem. Jo ir tā, pirmkārt, nekur nav noteikts, kas ir tradicionālā valoda un kas ir pietiekams skaits. Ir tā "Vispārējā konvencija par nacionālo minoritāšu aizsardzību", kuru Latvija ir parakstījusi pēc lielām diskusijām. Viņa tika ratificēta (man ir arī par to raksts – argumenti, kāpēc šo konvenciju nevajadzēja ratificēt). Ir arī harta, ko Latvija nav parakstījusi, – 1992. gada "Eiropas reģionālo vai minoritāšu valodu harta". Tās izpildi tikai formāli uzrauga (Eiropas Padomes dokuments).

Galvenais (krievu un latviešu attiecībās Latvijā no viņu puses) ir tas: mēs te pusi uz pusi 'dzīvosim draudzīgi'. Viņi neņem vērā, ka aiz šīs krievu minoritātes Latvijā ir visa lielā Krievija. Un kā zīmē U. Ozoliņš – te ir tā zivs, te ir tie zobi, te ir mazā Latvija, kas loģiski tiks aprīta. Tāpēc mēs cīnījāties.

### **Tad būtībā tas ir par krievu dominanci Latvijā nevis par līdztiesību, kā krievu minoritātes aizstāvji to formulē?**

Pilnīgi noteikti. Man ir arī par to raksts *Linguistic Human Rights in the Baltic States*, kur es skaidri pierādu to, ka, viņuprāt, tiesības būtu ievērotas tikai tad, ja Latvijā pilnībā parietu uz krievu valodu. Tās diskusijas bija arī starptautiskā arēnā, nenoliedzami. Es toreiz ļoti aktīvi braukāju pierādot (kopā ar igauņiem, lietuviešiem), mums bija tas svarīgi. Bija ļoti daudz tādu, piemēram, starp franču zinātniekiem (tradicionāliem sociālistiem), kuriem bija jāpierāda, ka NEVAR šo divvalodību Latvijā piekopt (tad būs beigas).

Tātad, tad pieņēma šo 2004. gada Skolu reformu likumu, laikam tomēr PCTVL arī saprata, ka ar to klipu ir aiziets pārāk tālu.

### **Tas tāpat kā ar V. Lindermana klipu ('Za rodnoj jazik'<sup>266</sup>), ko izmantoja krievu valodas kā otras oficiālās valsts valodas Latvijā ieviešanas atbalstam. Tas nodemonstrēja agresiju nevis miermīlīgu aicinājumu vai protestu.**

Jā, un es nekautrējos, es arī to rādīju konferencēs (lai parādītu citiem šo viņu agresīvo taktiku). Man ir arī raksts (*Language Problems and Planning*) kopā ar U. Ozoliņu par šo 2012. gada Konstitucionālo referendumu. (...)

Tad pēc 2004. gada Skolu reformu likuma pieņemšanas viss lēnām sāka ieiet savās sliedēs. Bija ļoti pamatīga informācijas kampaņa skolotājiem, vecākiem, bet tā jau būtībā bija no 1990-to gadu sākuma. Materiāli – neskaitāmi, lekcijas, sarunas, bija tāda Mazākumtautību konsultatīvā padome gan pie prezidenta, gan Izglītības un zinātnes ministrijā. Tika runāts, pārliecināts un pierādīts. Bija sabiedrotie no dažām skolām (piemēram, Romāns Alijevs – Latvijas Azerbaidžāņu kultūras centra padomes priekšsēdētājs, Rīgas klasiskās ģimnāzijas direktors; Rafi Haradžanjana Latvijas Armēņu kultūras centrs), viņi ļoti palīdzēja. Tad būtībā tas viss vairs nebija tādā priekšplānā. Tad izvirzījās cits jautājums. Rezultāti ir ļoti normāli visai tai sauktajai reformai. Jau kopš 2008. gada ir kopīgais eksāmens. Rezultāti ir ļoti labi. Vienīgi es varu pastāstīt, kas notika 2014. gadā, kad atkal bija tāds kā 'uzrāviens' šiem visiem procesiem. Man vēl ir viena smuka bilde arhīvā, kur viņi pie Izglītības un zinātnes ministrijas bļautās (protestē) ar manu bildi. Bet šis process bija, galvenokārt, par to, ka toreiz 2014. gadā Valdības deklarācijā "Vislatvieši" ("Visu Latvijai!") uzspieda pilnīgu pāreju skolās uz latviešu valodu līdz 2018. gadam. (...)

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<sup>266</sup> Lindermans, Vladimirs un J. Osipovs. *Za rodnoj jazik* (Par dzimto valodu). VIDEO available from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vcqz1iNzBWM> [Accessed on 21 April 2016]

Principā tas nebija nepareizi, bet tajā laikā viņi to nekonsultējoties ierakstīja deklarācijā, turklāt sliktā formulējumā. Es tajā laikā biju Izglītības un zinātnes ministre, man vajadzēja to ieviest. Jo viņiem būtībā bija pateikts tā, ka TIKAI latviešu valodā (mācības), kas nav īsti pareizi. “Visu Latvijai!” atkal satracināja publiku, uzvandīja to ūdeni. Un pret to viņi protestēja. Bet es to pagriezu tā -, protams, jā, viss latviešu valodā, izņemot nacionālās identitātes priekšmetus (krievu valodu, literatūru utt.). Tad sanāk modelis 80:20, kas būtībā jau ir, tā sauktais, pirmais mazākumtautību izglītības paraugs. Mans vēstījums (patoss) bija, ka nekas jau nemainās – ka skolas gluži vienkārši tiek aicinātas līdz 2018. gadam apsvērt savas iespējas pāriet uz šo modeli, jo ļoti mazs skaits, apmēram 7% skolu, izmanto pirmo modeli, lielākā daļa izmanto otro un trešo, kur ir mazāks latviešu valodas īpatsvars. Skolām tika teikts – mēs jums sniegsim palīdzību, mācīsim skolotājus, izdosim grāmatas, saki, ko jums vajag. Un būtu tas ieviests, bet (nākamā Izglītības un zinātnes ministre<sup>267</sup>) M. Seile nedarīja pilnīgi neko, viņa pat neļāva izdot tos noteikumus, kas jau bija izstrādāti par bērnudārziem, tā ka tikai un vienīgi vērtējams negatīvi viņas darbs no šī aspekta. Un tagad valdība ir pēkšņi aptvērusi, ka nemaz jau tiks sliktā tā (mana) doma nebija, un tagad K. Šadurskis atkal mēģina. Bet tagad tas vairs nav tādā uzmanības centrā.

A. Vešņakovs (Krievijas vēstnieks Latvijā) toreiz bija pie manis atnācis, bet es viņam toreiz visu izskaidroju – to, ka nacionālā identitāte tik tiešām tiks saglabāta, kāpēc latviešu valoda ir jāprot utt. Un ir tā, ka par to pilnīgi noteikti ir jārunā – un ne uz ielas, bet kabinetā. Un, kamēr protestētāji ārā bļāustījās, tikmēr kabinetā man sēdēja A. Giļmans un V. Buzajevs; un mēs runājām, ko varētu darīt, lai skaidrotu patieso situāciju. Un pēc viņu vēlēšanās tika veikts pētījums, vai krievu skolu absolventiem ir mazākas iespējas iestāties budžeta vietās vai nav. Izrādījās, ka nav, ka zināšanas ir ļoti labas. Tātad pierādījās, ka mūsu sistēma nav kaitīga ne psihei, ne karjerai, ne tamlīdzīgi. Tas bija īstais ceļš. Un tas bija veids, kā sašķelt šos protestētājus, kas arī izdevās.

**Kā jūs domājat, vai Krievijas tautiešus Kremlis un tieši Putins izmanto, lai palielinātu savu ietekmi – gan iekšpolitiski, gan ārpolitiski –, vai vairāk tā tiešām ir viņu aizstāvība un pretreakcijas? Jo, piemēram, 2012. gada Konstitucionālais referendums par krievu valodu kā otru oficiālo valsts valodu Latvijā bija tādā laikā, kad nebija ne skolu reformas, ne kaut kādas citas it kā pret krievvalodīgajiem interpretējami vērstas darbības.**

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<sup>267</sup> Mārīte Seile: Izglītības un zinātnes ministre no 05.11.2014.-11.02.2016.

Es teiktu, ka referendums bija reakcija pret “Vislatviešu” aicinājumu skolās pilnībā pāriet uz latviešu valodu. Bija tik tiešām katalizators šis aicinājums [parakstu vākšana, kas tika uzsākta 2011. gada maija sākumā, – grozījumiem LR Satversmē attiecībā uz mācību valodu izglītības iestādēs<sup>268</sup>].

**Vai tas nebija arī tāpēc, ka “Saskaņas Centrs” netika veidot valdību, kaut 2011. gada Saeimas vēlēšanās ieguva 31 deputāta vietu (jeb vislielāko balsu skaitu)? Tā nebija tāda kā atriebība no viņu puses nedaudz?**

Es domāju, ka nē, jo tie bija toreiz citi spēki. Tas bija toreiz “PCTVL” un “Par dzimto valodu”. “Saskaņas Centrs” vienmēr šajos jautājumos patreiz ir šķietami neitrāls. Kaut gan līdz ar N. Ušakova un citu paziņojumiem, ko viņi referendumā darījuši, loģiski, ka tas tā nebija. Atklāti viņi tomēr nenostājās V. Lindermana<sup>269</sup> pusē. Kādu iemeslu pēc, nav zināms. Viņiem jau arī ir tāda kā iekšējā konkurence. Neviens jau nezināja, ka būs atkārtotas Saeimas vēlēšanas.

*[11. Saeimas (ārkārtas) vēlēšanas notika 2011. gada 17. septembrī. Parakstu vākšana 2012. gada Konstitucionālā referendumā par divvalodību rīkošanai sākās jau pirms tām (aktīvākie vācēji – jauniešu kustība “Vienota Latvija”, biedrība “Dzimtā valoda” u.c.). Pēc 11. Saeima vēlēšanām, kurās SC tika atstāts opozīcijā, N. Ušakovs publiski diezgan atklāti sāka paust savu atbalstu divvalodībai Latvijā, TV intervijās utt. sakot, ka vispār viņš ir pret krievu valodu kā otru oficiālo valsts valodu Latvijā, bet referendumā balsos par. Piemēram, portāla diena.lv pārraidē “Dienas rīts”, 2012. gadā N. Ušakovs teica: “Pateikšu savu pozīciju – es iešu un balsošu Par šajā referendumā. Var pārņemt, ka man dalās domas, bet man pašreiz ir tikai viens instruments, ar ko var parādīt nevis latviešiem, bet labējiem politiķiem, ka ir problēmas un šīs problēmas ir jārisina. Un vienīgais instruments ir referendums – cita nav nekāda.”<sup>270</sup>]*

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<sup>268</sup> “Nacionālās apvienības” rosinātie grozījumi paredzēja mainīt LR Satversmes 112. pantu uz šādu redakciju - „Ikvienam ir tiesības uz izglītību. Valsts nodrošina iespēju bez maksas iegūt pamatizglītību un vidējo izglītību valsts valodā. Pamatizglītība ir obligāta.” Papildus tam tika rosināts pārejas noteikums, ka “ar 2012. gada 1. septembri visās valsts un pašvaldību izglītības iestādēs, sākot ar pirmo klasi, mācības notiek valsts valodā”.

Upleja, Sanita (2011). Saskaņas pārbaudījums. *Ir*, 4. novembris

<sup>269</sup> Arī Borisa Zeļcermana

<sup>270</sup> NRA (2012). Ušakovs referendumā atbalstīs krievu valodu kā otru valsts valodu. *Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze*, 5. janvāris

**Saistībā ar tām krievvalodīgajām skolām kā, piemēram, B. Zeļcermana skolu “Innova” un “Eksperiments” (kur tiek audzināta ‘jaunā krievu elite’) – vai tur nav tas bīstamības moments, ka ne jau tas, ka varbūt latviešu valodu nelieto pietiekamā daudzumā, bet ka viņu vēstures un politikas atspoguļojums rada apdraudējumu?**

Ideoloģija. Pilnīgi noteikti. Arī visa “Russkij Mir” sistēma, kas ir tikai šķietami neitrāla.

**Tas ir lojalitātes jautājums, vai ne?**

Loģiski, ka tas ir lojalitātes jautājums. Un, diemžēl, ir bijis ārkārtīgi grūti pierādīt šo skolu nelojalitāti. Bet kā to var izdarīt? Nekā. Arī grāmatu dāvinājumi dažādi (šīm skolām). Labi, ir “Valsts izglītības satura centrs”, ir “Izglītības kvalitātes valsts dienests”, kas tās grāmatas cenzējis. Bet nav jau tur nekā tāda, tas viss iet zemtekstos, tas viss iet ģimenēs utt. Un ir arī ļoti grūti demokrātijas apstākļos kādu ‘apklusināt’.

**Būtībā tad tieši krievvalodīgie aktīvisti rada politiskos draudus (nevis visa tā krievvalodīgā sabiedrības daļa)?**

Es domāju, ka, jā. Pilnīgi noteikti var runāt par mērķtiecīgu sabiedrībā it kā zemstrāvās esošu jūtu uzkurināšanu. Mums Latvijā jau nav tādu smagu starpnacionālu problēmu, lai kā arī nebūtu. Bet patiesību sakot, visa audzināšana (krievu sabiedrības daļā), viss patoss tomēr ir uz to, ka krievu valoda un nācija ir kaut kas īpašs, - tas viņiem jau ir no dzimšanas. Un to ir ļoti viegli revitalizēt. (...) Un krievi nevar būt [lingvistiski utt.] apdraudēti, ņemot vērā visu šo globālo skaitu.

## ATTESTATION PAGE

### Dokumentārā lapa

Master paper “Russia`s Compatriot Policy in Latvia since 2000” („Krievijas īstenotā tautiešu politika Latvijā kopš 2000. gada”) elaborated in the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Latvia.

Herewith I confirm by putting my signature that the research has been conducted individually, as well as the fact that only the indicated sources of literature have been used in the paper and that the electronic copy of the paper corresponds to the printout.

Author: \_\_\_\_\_

I recommend/do not recommend the paper for defense

Advisor: prof. Dr. habil. oec. Juris Krūmiņš \_\_\_\_\_

/signature and date/

Opponent: prof. Dr. habil. philol. Ina Druviete \_\_\_\_\_

/signature and date/

Paper submitted in the Department of Latvian and Baltic Studies \_\_\_\_\_

Person authorized by the dean: Dr. hist. Inese Runce \_\_\_\_\_

(signature)

Paper has been defended in the session of the Commission on Master Graduation Examination \_\_\_\_\_, Minutes No. \_\_\_\_\_

(date)

Secretary of the Commission: Dr. hist. Inese Runce \_\_\_\_\_

(signature)