

LATVIJAS UNIVERSITĀTE
HUMANITĀRO ZINĀTŅU FAKULTĀTE

ETNISKO MINORITĀŠU JAUTĀJUMS LATVIJĀ UN IGAUNIJĀ PĒC IESTĀŠANĀS EIROPAS SAVIENĪBĀ

MAĢISTRA DARBS

Autore: **Madara Šulce**

Studenta apliecības nr. ms08061

Darba vadītāja: Inese Runce PhD

RĪGA 2013

UNIVERSITY OF LATVIA
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

THE QUESTION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES IN ESTONIA AND LATVIA AFTER JOINING EUROPEAN UNION

MASTER'S THESIS

Author : **Madara Šulce**

Student ID card nr. ms08061

Scientific advisor: Inese Runce PhD

RIGA 2013

ANOTĀCIJA

Maģistra darba nosaukums ir "Etnisko minoritāšu jautājums Latvijā un Igaunijā pēc iestāšanās Eiropas Savienībā". Darba mērķis ir aplūkot etniskās minoritātes un to integrāciju Latvijā un Igaunijā par pamatu izmantojot Eiropas Savienības izpratni par minoritāšu integrāciju. Galvenie uzdevumi ir aplūkot etnisko minoritāšu integrāciju Latvijā un Igaunijā un ar to saistītās problēmas. Pētījumā izmantotās metodes ir literatūras pārskats par integrācijas un etnisko minoritāšu izpratni Eiropas Savienības kontekstā un tās savietojamību ar Latvijas un Igaunijas situāciju. Etniskā identitāte aplūkota arī kā sabiedrības identitātes veidotājs. Darba ietvaros tiek vilktas paralēles ar pagātni un vēstures mantojumu un tā nozīmi līdz pat mūsdienām. Darba nozīme ir integrācijas jautājumu aktualizēšana modernā Eiropas integrācijas izpratnē.

Atslēgas vārdi:

Etniskās minoritātes

Eiropas Savienība

integrācija

Latvija

Igaunija

ANOTATION

The title of the thesis is “The Question of ethnic minorities in Latvia and Estonia after joining European Union”. The aim of the paper is to examine ethnic minorities and their integration in Latvia and Estonia using the basis of European understanding of ethnic minority integration. The main objective within this research is to look at ethnic minority integration problems. Research methods used within this work is literature and a historical overview of integration and understanding of ethnic minorities within the framework of European Union and their compatibility with Latvia and Estonia, also how ethnicity constructs society identity. This work aims to draw parallels with history and how it influences decision making now. The importance of this work is in actualizing integration processes in the modern day understanding of European integration.

Key words:

Ethnic minorities,

European Union

Integration

Latvia

Estonia

Table of Contents

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	6
INTRODUCTION	7
1. Historical background on Minority rights and history in Latvia and Estonia: 1918 - 1991	12
1.1. Minority rights in Estonia and Latvia during first independence, 1918 - 1940.....	13
1. 1. 1. Minority rights in Estonia during first independence, 1918 - 1940.....	13
1. 1. 2. Minority rights in Latvia during first independence, 1918 – 1940.....	14
1.2. Minority rights in Estonia and Latvia 1940 - 1991	16
2. Minority rights in Estonia and Latvia after 1991	19
2.1. Minority rights in Estonia after re-establishing independence	20
2.2. Minority rights in Latvia after re-establishing independence	22
2.3. Summary and conclusions	24
3. Latvian and Estonian minority policy within EU	26
3.1. Defining minorities within Europe	32
3.2. Effective introducing of EU laws in Estonia and Latvia	37
3.2.1. Language law and citizenship policies in Latvia	39
3.2.2. Language law and citizenship policies in Estonia	45
3.3. Summary and conclusion.....	49
4. Ethnicity as a political tool for society polarization	57
4.1. Recent ethnic tension in Estonia.....	57
4.2. Recent ethnic tension in Latvia.....	59
4.3. Summary and conclusions	61
Conclusions.....	64
Aknoledgements.....	68
Bibliography	69

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EU – European Union

FCNM - Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

EUMAP – European Union Accession Monitoring Program

USSR – United Soviet Socialist Republics

UNDP – United Nations Development Program

UN – United Nations

INTRODUCTION

The Baltic States find themselves geographically between Russian Federation and Europe. Nowadays as well as all throughout history it is not only a geographical location as it is a location of identity and politics. Latvia and Estonia share strong common historical bonds, both positive and negative experiences. These countries are re-established states finding their way back to Europe with their historical baggage, trying to fit back in, while keeping their own posture. Ethnicity is one of the strongest features in defining human identity, it is not however always consistent throughout a country. In the case of Latvia and Estonia the Russian-speaking community forms a large part of the inhabitants of each country. The term Russian-speaking is used to describe a group using Russian as their native language; it is formed from ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians as well as other ethnicities sharing the use of Russian language. Within this work the stress is put on Russian-speaking minorities, although we speak of ethnic minorities in general, concerning Latvia and Estonia the largest part of ethnic minorities is constituted of Russian-speakers, so the attention us put on the ethnic group needing most attention in terms of problem solving and topicality.

European Union is a large scale European country community formed on the basis of sharing common values, as well as economic ties and uniting in one structure providing peace as the overall goal amongst society. Joining the EU was a big step for both Latvia and Estonia and it was not an easy way in, meeting all the criteria one has to fulfill to be accepted in the EU. Minority rights as a part of Human rights plays a major role in the rights and values of Europeans, as it is a part and a basis for the whole idea of democratic values, tolerance and understanding amongst all people. As the whole of Europe is looking for a way to cooperate, it is necessary within every European country to find understanding between the people and to overcome differences both in a human level as well as providing laws regulating the rights on a legal basis.

The main aim of the research is to outline ethnic minority understanding in Estonia and Latvian within the context of European Union.

The main objectives of the paper are to:

- analyze the historical background of minorities in Estonia and Latvia;
- define the difference of minorities within Europe in general and compared to the situation in Latvia and Estonia;
- analyze the external impact from European Union towards Estonia and Latvia;
- analyze how the effectiveness of introducing EU laws is measured in Estonia and Latvia, through EU conditionality;
- analyze language law and citizenship policy change in Latvia and Estonia;
- analyze the procedure and success of the naturalization procedure in Estonia and Latvia;
- distinguish whether the outline of minority rights matches its content and to what extent Estonia and Latvia are independent minority policy maker;
- analyze how ethnicity can be used in politics.

Within this work the aim is to find a link between national state policies forming identity and the legal basis of equality overcoming ethnicity borders. Looking at a policy building situation of two similar countries finding their own way towards democracy and its values also having to take in consideration the rules applied by an external actor – the European Union. Estonia and Latvia both aim to keep a national perspective of government laws, keeping in balance all interests of the society, including the groups of other ethnic origin.

The issue of ethnic minorities has been studied by various Estonian, Latvian and also international researchers and experts. Therefore different literature sources will be used, researchers as Dribins, Smith, Volkovs, Galbreath, Muižnieks, Zepa, Sasse and others. This overlook of the issue is aimed towards an analysis of how different actors can form a reality, the actors within this work being Latvia, Estonia and the European Union. How a state would deal with a situation of integrating people within a country and unify the society with people of different ethnicities. This work is constructed

looking at Latvia and Estonia as similar countries having the same issues and finding different solutions.

Ethnicity as such is a realization of oneself, belonging to a group, having features that can help distinguish “me” from “others”. The term ethnicity forms a sense of kinship, group solidarity and also common culture. The sense of a common ethnicity has remained to this day as one of the strongest identification tools used by individuals. Ethnic community and the understanding of identity through an ethnic community within various parts of the world are often associated with political struggles and conflict. (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996: 3) People belonging to ethnic groups and having no country or living outside the country of their origin can feel misplaced and struggle to blend in with the major ethnic group of the society. Ethnicity of everyday life is largely unconscious, to the extent to which ethnicity is intuitively defined and experienced as a part of human beings. (Fishman, 1996: 63)

There are three main paths in Western European societies of dealing with immigration. The first is the German understanding of immigrants as “Gastarbeiter”. These large numbers of workers who are necessary for the industry are rejected from the society having minimal social rights and they are denied full citizenship. There is however tolerance of social diversity, residents who are foreigners are encouraged to maintain their original culture, so they could eventually return to their home country. (Rex, 1996: 51) The second alternative is represented by the French, in the extreme republican view. This means that all should have equal citizenship regardless of national or ethnic origin. This however means that the diversity of ethnic groups is not encouraged. (Rex, 1996: 51)

The third alternative is multiculturalism most evident in Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands. This is accepting cultural diversity along with the equality of all individuals. (Rex, 1996: 51) For Latvia and Estonia there should be leaning towards one of these options or making of our own path. Either way ethnic minority questions with both of these countries along with the amount of inhabitants excluded from citizenship is a problem in the whole construction of society. There may be a necessity for Latvia and

Estonia to re-think the concept of minorities. A number of Latvian scientists insist that Latvian Russians, the Russian-speaking minority of Latvia, do not fall under the classical definition of an ethnic minority. (Volkovs, 2013: 21)

Integration literary is understood as forming a common body. The concept of “society integration” is understood as a way of various elements of society coexisting side by side. (Volkovs, 2013: 10) Ethnic minority integration then is the co-existence of different ethnic groups within a society. The term “ethnic minorities” is understood as ethnic minority inclusion within the society of the majority, as there are no minorities without the majority.

Within this work ethnic minorities will be looked at in a historical aspect, how historical continuity has influenced our present day thinking and the overall view of ethnic minorities. Looking at integration in Latvia and Estonia historically it can be divided in three periods of time. First historical period - the situation in Estonia and Latvia during the years of first independence, as the first attempt to make laws and regulations in the field of minorities as independent governments. It is not so useful to look at minorities before first independence, not that Latvia and Estonia didn't have any, but the “ruling” or leading ethnic layer of the country was not originally Latvians or Estonians, so it is not about looking at power relations where the state majority of ethnic inhabitants has the upper hand to make laws. Second historical period Latvia and Estonia are included in the Soviet Union, introducing the overall trend towards minorities which later influenced further ways of understanding minorities and ethnicity as such. The very feel of minorities as they were understood in the USSR has left its influence of how Latvia and Estonia understands minorities and how they have developed differently from the Europe at the other side of the iron curtain.

Third historical period - regaining of independence after the collapse of Soviet Union. The author will describe dealing with minorities within restored, independent states on the wave of overwhelming patriotism, re-establishing independence in Latvia and Estonia, straightening out the relations with Russia and getting involved with Europe. From that moving on to look at European Union and its relations with Latvia and

Estonia, as the accession to the EU was a changing point for minority right implementation. How Latvia and Estonia had to change laws influenced by EU conditionality, matching them with the ones of Europe. EU influence over the change of legal basis for minorities within Latvia and Estonia. The ending section would be dedicated of how the situation is now, by briefly overlooking recent confrontations and protests initiated by minority groups. Has there been an overall positive outcome of ethnic minority integration so far? What has changed and is state minority policy heading into the right direction? As a contribution also some humble advice or things that should be taken in account for further improvement and development. Not stopping at the success made so far, but to move it even further towards a wealthy, democratic society

1. Historical background on Minority rights and history in Latvia and Estonia: 1918 - 1991

Latvia and Estonia both share a common recent history of ethnic minority developments. This work is done on the research of the most recent period of time after World War II overlooking the situation with Russian-speaking settlers, inhabiting the territory of Estonia and Latvia during the era of Soviet Union rule. Prior to World War II people of different ethnic origins inhabited the area of present day Estonia and Latvia as well. The number of ethnic immigrants varies in different times. Immigration problems were brought by incomers settling in Estonia and Latvia in large numbers at a short period of time. Immigration waves created a situation of changing society, as Russian speaking immigrants were not able to blend in with the existing society. Latvia and Estonia as countries having many neighbors have never been isolated from others, also other groups of people, on the contrary, people came here to be safe from whatever made them leave their own country.

Estonian national identity was constructed on the basis of the distinctive Finno-Ugric language and folk culture derived from tribes. Estonian nationalists could not be united on a past experience of statehood as a mobilizing ideal, because they did not have that before the establishment of the state. (Smith, 2001: 3) Estonians same as Latvians found themselves and were able to unite on the basis of culture and literature. They had to overcome many obstacles to become independent states. They are a historical success story for a regional majority ethnos to gain national consciousness and overcome their legal status: of having no rights to become the ruling ethnic group of the land.

1.1. Minority rights in Estonia and Latvia during first independence, 1918 - 1940

1. 1. 1. Minority rights in Estonia during first independence, 1918 - 1940

Both Latvia and Estonia as new countries in 1918 had no experience. They still managed not only to stay strong but even make some innovations. Estonia, for example, made an innovative law, contributing to the whole European minority rights thought and praxis. In 1925 February 12th Estonian National Council announced a law, protecting national minority cultural autonomy. Not only autonomy they also gave their minorities more structure by naming real features and listing the people belonging to a minority. The law supported 3 kinds of such minorities in Estonia in 1925. : German, Russian, Swedish and also Jewish from later on. Estonian minorities had the rights to elect their own community national cultural local government, who had the right to establish laws obligatory for the people of the community. (Dribins, 2004: 45 – 46)

These government bodies also had the right to organize collecting of resources of their ethnic group members for cultural needs, with fixed obligatory payments. Funds for the needs of their cultural and educational life the community got by the regulating law also from the government and local territorial government. These established national groups in cooperation with territorial local governments and Estonian Ministry of Education organized their own schools and other educational authorities. All these education centers were in the hands of national group cultural institutions. Minority cultural autonomy on such large scale was not practiced by any other European country at that time; Estonia gave Europe a valuable precedent. It has to be taken in consideration that Estonian minority percent in inhabitant structure at that time was relatively low, less that 10% of other ethnic groups and also Estonian Baltic-Germans where more loyal than Latvian Baltic-Germans. (Dribins, 2004: 45 – 46)

Later on the situation changed when Estonia established its authoritarian regime. Estonian authoritarian regime led by Konstantin Päts, established an

authoritarian “nationalizing” dictatorship prioritizing the interests of Estonians over those of other groups residing within the state territory. (Smith, 2005: 221) Minority nationalities or the Baltic Germans were not a major concern for Pääts, even though during the “era of silence” (how the period of time by Pääts rule is often called) great stress was placed on the ideal of national unity and national integration. (Plakans, 2011: 328)

Since Latvia and Estonia has always consisted of different groups of people inhabiting the area, both other ethnically as well as different religions groups. There was no negative heritage coming with these members of other groups, which would determine their ways in the newly established States of Latvia and Estonia. When Latvia was established in 1918 it formed a model of governance that could be named as national democracy. Minorities consisting of 25% of the whole inhabitants at that time, they were offered cultural autonomy provided by Latvian state laws - citizenship to all inhabitants as well as the right to have their own schools in their native language. (Apine, 2008: 9)

1. 1. 2. Minority rights in Latvia during first independence, 1918 – 1940

Most of the laws established in the first independence where renewed when Latvia regained independence after the collapse of Soviet Union. One of them was for example the rule concerning the use of national language in governmental structures. Year 1921 November 22nd Zigfrid Meirovics (Zigfrīds Meirovics) government put in place a special rule for knowing the national language and language qualification evaluation, reassuring that only people knowing Latvian language would be able to work in the government. (Dribins 2004: 55) Meirovics stayed strong, during the protests from Baltic-Germans and Jewish political parties and organizations. He declared that the schools and religious sphere demands will be satisfied, but the language question concerning state language and the language used in parliament is not bendable and

there can be only one Latvian national language – Latvian. Local governments were however allowed to use other languages when dealing with non-Latvian speaking minorities. And it was accepted to use Russian or German in official speeches given in both local governments and Saeima. The question of national language faded from the number one spot of arguments. (Dribins 2004: 56)

The situation did however change starting from 1931 December there was a political turn within the state that led to cut back on minority rights and promoted assimilation instead. The picture changed drastically with the overtaking of democracy by the dictatorship regime led by Kārlis Ulmanis. The power of the country was latvianized by swiping aside political opposition and ending all political influence of minorities. The authoritarian regime established a nationalistic state politic system. Minority organizations which managed to stay loyal to the new order and Ulmanis regime were supported. And also restrictions on minority rights were less than in other mid- or Eastern European countries. The government did not interfere with their religious life, allowing them to maintain traditions and the work of culture organizations. (Dribins, 2004: 58 – 60) Both new established constitutions of Estonia and Latvia forbade the discrimination on the basis of nationality, but in practice widespread sentiment was supported in the general population, demonstrating the rule of the majority indigenous people, excluding the prewar elites, such as the Baltic Germans, Russians and Poles. (Plakans, 2011: 313)

The new constitutions of Latvia and Estonia created protection of minority language rights, and the new governments subsidized minority elementary schools and cultural organizations. The new postwar states were multicultural in the same sense that they were long before the war as “littoral societies”. (Plakans, 2011: 316) As it was before the war, within the new states of Latvia and Estonia this multiculturalism took form of coexistence rather than integration. (Plakans, 2011: 316)

1.2. Minority rights in Estonia and Latvia 1940 - 1991

Soviet Union had a system promoting a way of thinking in different categories, not that they didn't have different minorities than Russian; the whole overall approach was having a unified soviet nation, bond together with totalitarian ideology and the Russian language. Soviet ethnic minority problems come from the whole state policy. The very implementation of a totalitarian regime is based on implementing an ideology pushing history interpretations. In Soviet Union myths were pushed upon people, press was filled with publications of prospering friendships of soviet nations. (Apine and Volkovs, 2007: 52 – 53) Ethnicity was not recognized and defined by the state. (Martin, 2001: 56)

So roughly expressing the situation, Latvia and Estonia were pushed towards having no traditions of ethnic origin and having common Russian language and communist ideology. Latvia and Estonia regained some rights during the later years of the Soviet rule as the happening of perestroika took place. It was already one of the steps to make towards the collapse of the soviet system and towards regaining independence.

The overall trend after the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War was to be very pro-democracy with everything that included: promoting human rights, pushing out xenophobia and overcoming intolerance. (Dribins, 2004: 111) This trend, obviously, reached the post-Soviet states after the collapse of the Soviet Union, while in the rest of Europe it emerged after World War II. A global human rights discourse, particularly concerned about minority rights and anti-racism, is focusing attention on the rights of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities as well as immigrants and indigenous people. (Muižnieks, 2010: 30)

Countries included in the Soviet Union were pushed towards taking in workers of different regions of the Soviet Union, who were not the original inhabitants of the region. Did not seem to be much of a problem at that time, because of the uniting language, which was the same for all Soviet Republics - Russian. It did however create

problems after the collapse of Soviet Union when small countries like Latvia and Estonia regained their independence and a major switch was made, not only in language policies but also shifting power, making the Russian-speaking group a minority. Not only the Russian-speaking could not believe it at first, but also they had a hard time to identify themselves as something other than the ruling layer of the society as they were pushed away from government and state administration. They had troubles accepting the language of the newly established states of Latvia and Estonia they now lived in as the state language was no longer Russian.

And speculating on this it could even be assume that this backfired was, being pushed away from public administration the Russian-speaking minority felt more isolated and had the need to form stronger informal communities, or relate to the neighbor of the East more. Russians were also having difficulties getting used to the new history interpretations within the land of their inhabitation, because the new rewritten history was different from the one thought in soviet ideology. Not only the difference but also the negative positioning of the Russian character within the national history, it made both a surprise and a strong re-reaction. The new made Russian-speaking minority had identity related difficulties positioning themselves in the new society. (Dribins, 2004: 70 – 71)

A strong impression that immigration was pressed upon Latvia has developed. During Soviet times it was true in a large scale, especially active in demobilized army personal and workforce in Soviet production factories and other cases. Many of the incomers were however driven by economic reasons, because life quality in the Baltics was higher than in overall USSR. Until the end of 1980's migration overwhelmed the natural growth of the inhabitants, coming to 10-20 thousand people a year, making it 27-55 people a day. (Krūmiņš, 2004: 65) These numbers were a little less in Estonia, but still both Latvia and Estonia were the leading European countries having the highest number of inhabitants born outside the country borders at that time. It is important to understand that it is not only having different ethnic groups with in a country. In the case of Latvia and Estonia it is about having them in large numbers, which means

dealing with them differently than an ethnic group which is facing dissolving, therefore needs cultural protection. Also the reasons for incoming forms the feel of belonging to a country, coming here for a better life voluntarily one would be more state oriented and loyal, than say simply placed here without intentionally wanting it.

It has to be understood that during the Soviet times, minority policy situation was very much different from Latvian and Estonian minority policy as independent states. Within the Soviet block the government paid no attention at all to different country ethno-politics or minorities. USSR did not even admit that there are such minor ethnicities in the inhabitant structure of the USSR. Soviet ideology denied having minorities, because that would mean having a ruling layer and since socialism claims the working class equality – everyone was the same and there was no need for minority rights. They did however distinguish ethnic community forms: tribes, nationalities and nations, who could also be called as “nationalities”. Not admitting minority groups was crucial for promoting Russification as process amongst Soviet bloc countries. (Dribins, 2004: 70 – 71)

2. Minority rights in Estonia and Latvia after 1991

Within few years of Soviet Union collapse and being able to re-establish Latvia and Estonia as independent countries, national movements adopted legal continuity as their main guiding principle. For both Latvia and Estonia independence was never considered as a question of leaving the USSR, since for both of them it was never a voluntarily formed Union and they had never legally joined the Soviet state. While they never stepped down from the idea of the legal continuity position, it was a challenge for the Western governments in terms of accepting the new states, because they would only give full recognition to Baltic state independence once it became clear that the Soviet power has collapsed and could never be restored. Legally the governments of the West did not recognize new, post-Soviet states, but they had to renew the diplomatic ties established with the Baltic countries in 1940, honoring the principle of legal continuity the countries had chosen for themselves. This decision, to adopt legal continuity, was to have wide-reaching consequences. (Smith, 2008: 190)

In terms of developing a domestic policy, legal continuity had a major impact setting a course of state and nation building. (Smith, 2008: 191) Choosing to restore our constitution as it was before the USSR Latvia and Estonia also chose to have our citizens as they were pre-USSR. Latvian and Estonian leaders of the Popular Front movements had initially declared their preference for the zero option on citizenship. (Smith, 2008: 191) The so-called “zero option” solution was adopted in states that consisted of a majority of their own ethno-national group and under this zero option solution citizenship is granted to all people living in the republic either at the time of independence or at the moment the new nationality or citizenship law was passed. (Henckaerts, 1995: 92) This would simply mean all people currently living in the state receive citizenship.

Estonia and Latvia signed the inter-state treaty with Russia in January 1991, when Yeltsin’s government recognized the three republics’ right to sovereignty, establishing the basic legal document governing the relations between the two sides.

Yet signing a treaty does not mean immediate simultaneous understanding between the involved parts. So for Moscow the treaty would imply that citizenship would be given to all residents of the state at the time – an interpretation that was denied by both Estonia and Latvia. (Smith, 2008: 193) Estonia and Latvia were most likely intimidated by the Russian-speaking communities now making up a large part of each republic's population. (Smith, 2008: 191) Most likely the fear was in the area of possible power shift in a direction towards Russian-speaking people having more power in the country and government than Latvians or Estonians in their own country. For Latvians and Estonians the so called "Baltic question" of handling the weight of postwar immigration has been a question of national survival. (Smith, 2008: 192)

2.1. Minority rights in Estonia after re-establishing independence

After the collapse of Soviet Union Russia rejected the legal continuity argument, insisting that the current Estonian Republic came into existence in August 1991 as a Soviet successor state denying the relationship with the first independence that was cut short. (Smith, 2001: 159) For Russia to admit legal continuity for the Baltic States would mean to admit the illegal annexation to the USSR. The Estonian-Russian treaty of January 1991 is considered to be the only valid basis for interstate relations. On the question of Estonian citizenship policy, Russia claims that the January 1991 treaty provides for a "zero option" variant, an interpretation which is denied by the Estonian side. (Smith, 2001: 159) Signing of a common treaty did not create a common understanding of the situation. Russia insisting on a "zero option" citizenship and Estonia denying this as an option.

In the mid-1990s Estonia found its ways dealing with problems faster than Latvians, rushing ahead in developing a social integration program. Estonian government in cooperation with United Nations Development Program (UNDP) prepared a program in 1997, the same year they appointed a Minister for Population

and Ethnic Affairs. On 2 March in 1999 the Estonian government adopted an integration program called “The Integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society.” These developments in our northern neighbor had a big impact on debates in Latvia in conferences held in 1989 and the following year. (Rozenvalds, 2010: 45)

This effort of promoting legal continuity in the sphere of citizenship policy was motivated by a fear that the local Russian population at that time might block a vote for independence in the Supreme Soviets court of the two republics. This however turned out to be without a reason and such fears proved groundless in the spring of 1990, when the mobilization of a significant minority of Russians behind the campaign for sovereignty seemed to justify the pragmatic strategy adopted by the Popular Fronts. (Smith, 2008: 192) A large part of the Russians within Latvia and Estonia supported the idea of independence. Later on it also felt like injustice to them to be pushed away by not gaining citizenship without undergoing the naturalization procedure.

Intense relationship with Russia Federation right after the collapse of Soviet Union was not only a threat to lose our newly gained independence, but also a threat to our further developments. In April 1992, Estonian and Russian delegates gathered for negotiations on solving of concerning issues the main agenda on the table for Estonians being troop withdrawal from the now former Soviet territory. Russian representatives however refused to commit themselves to fixed dates for the withdrawal of the troops. (Smith, 2001: 160)

Due to Russian hesitation with the troop withdrawal, as one of the top priority issues for the new Baltic States, Estonia joined its Baltic neighbors in lobbying western states in every international forum at its disposal in order to gain support and attention to this issue. The effort was rewarded at the Helsinki summit of the CSCE in July 1992, which called for an “early, orderly and complete” withdrawal of Russian troops from the territories of the Baltic States. (Ozolins, 1994: 57 – 58, in Smith, 2001: 161) A month earlier, the United States Senate had threatened to suspend humanitarian aid to Russia if no progress over the withdrawal of troops was noted within a year. (Eesti Ringvaade, 1992 in Smith, 2001: 161) The withdrawal of troops from Estonia continued with the

same hurry and soon enough Russian foreign policy statements began to insist that the withdrawal of troops from Estonia could be completed in hand of putting a stop to “systematic discrimination” against the Russian speaking population residents there. (Smith, 2001: 161) Russia made a verbal counter attack accusing the Baltic States of discrimination and human rights violations.

Russia made statements making accusations of “ethnic cleansing” taking place and “apartheid” without any basis in reality. Moscow’s rhetoric’s towards Latvia and Estonia had been inspired by geopolitical objectives rather than any real concerns for the fate of ethnic Russians living in these countries. (Smith, 2001: 172) Russia used powerful statements in the direction of the Baltic countries, especially Estonia and Latvia claiming they are doing “ethnic cleansing” and “systematic discrimination”. These accusations were however proved to be false when foreign observers found no such human rights violations. This did however influence the minds of Russians confirming the feeling of being somehow mistreated, creating identity problems and difficulties for further integration.

2.2. Minority rights in Latvia after re-establishing independence

At the beginning of our newly re-made state it was a strong belief that a large number of the Russian-speaking incomers would leave. That is one of the reasons no fast action in concerns of the large scale minority took place right after re-gaining independence. When this did not happen and they stayed present, it became clear non-Latvians would remain in Latvia and Western pressure was applied which destroyed the hopes of delaying the issue of non-Latvians, non-citizens for indefinite amount of time. It was only later on clear that the issue had to be resolved and Latvian states relationship with a large number of non-ethnic Latvian inhabitants had to be regulated. This question entered center stage and has been more or less on the priority list ever since. (Rozenvalds, 2010:44)

European Commission Parliamentary assembly 1990 1st October recommended all European countries to recognize national minorities existing in their territory and their rights to develop their culture, establish their own institutions of education, religion and culture. In exchange they asked minority loyalty to their country of inhabitation, and respect to the laws of their country. Especially they separated linguistic minority legal rights aspect, pointing out that people belonging to them have another circle of rights – the right to have education and information in their mother tongue. This same commission a year later established a making of a convention a legal document, defining minorities, minority rights, separating minorities belonging to a country by nationality, religion or ethnicity and also describing the sphere of influence, it being either religious, culture and or tradition based. This shows that even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were things happening towards promoting East European societies to understanding national minorities and protecting their rights. (Dribins, 2004: 136 – 137)

As much as human rights violations were completely false, the lack of dialogue between the government and Russian-speaking inhabitants were not. Rozenvalds (2010: 45) explains how the lack and desire of the power holders to create a consistent dialog with their opposition during the first years of independence became a problem in Latvian politics. The lack of communication was visible between different Latvian political groups, as well as relations between the political elite and the rest of the society. This unwillingness to communicate took place and maybe even did the most damage in relations with minorities. (Rozenvalds, 2010: 45) Most of Latvia's minorities are post-war settlers, the search for compromise from Latvia's side was perceived within the society as betrayal of national interests (Rozenvalds, 2010: 45) Neither the politicians already elected or the soon to be elected wanted to risk their positions and take a chance by taking the "enemies" side, while the citizens with voting rights were mostly ethnic Latvians.

Somehow it has developed that in the politic sphere ever since the establishment of Russian parties; they are usually received as "the other" from the side

of Latvian society. The rhetoric's used in the media and amongst politicians is always "us" against "them" and almost never finding new solutions together. Rozenvalds (2010: 46) takes it even further saying it is a characteristic of Latvian political elite - inability to adopt strategic decisions. Latvian politicians lack the power to see the bigger picture, instead of short-term considerations of political gain. (Rozenvalds, 2010:46) Politics should not be about setting people against each other, it is hard to talk about society integration if there is no example set for the people in the government level. Our own political struggles were influenced by external actors, help and a democratic example came from the west, as Europe came into the picture, joining EU was a political step, taken in the direction of a much brighter future for Estonia and Latvia.

2.3. Summary and conclusions

History and its interpretations was one of the many bases for arguments and misunderstandings. After the collapse of the USSR Russians were also struggling with defining their past, both the ones in their own country, but even more those left behind in other countries. They choose to form their own national identity promoting a restoration of the Soviet fiction that the Baltic people voluntarily joined the USSR, refusing to admit their defeat and viewing themselves as World War II winners bringing freedom instead of occupation. (Morozov, 2005: 193)

The complex of unresolved issues arising from occupation has led to an acute sense of security threat from the "eastern neighbor" Russia. (Smith, 2001: 147) The extension of legal continuity to the sphere of citizenship policy has not in any way been help to improved Estonia's and Latvia's relations with Russia. Russia didn't want to accept the concept of legal continuity. For Russia the easy way out would be to assume that the three countries would simply draw a line under the past, move on and accept the realities that had changed these countries by half a century of Soviet rule.

For many Russians, the end of the USSR brought a profound identity crisis, in as much as existing conceptions of Russian identity could not easily be separated from

Soviet identity. Ethnic Russians living within the USSR had been encouraged to identify with the territory of the USSR as a whole and not to embrace their uniqueness and ethnic traditions. USSR was producing their own mass culture, which was the destruction of past traditions. The Soviet ideological sphere had to promote the public enemy the capitalist West, so even the Soviet identity-building project had to firmly oppose to the West. The deeply disruptive effects of Western inspired neo-liberal economic reform and the continued trends towards disintegration of the former Soviet space developed a feeling of impotence and humiliation among Russians within the post-Soviet area. (Smith, 2008: 194) This was on a large scale so with the most recent of the incomers, the situation was different with the Russians living in Latvia and Estonia before the big waves of immigration during the Soviet times.

3. Latvian and Estonian minority policy within EU

The present Baltic State decision making goes hand in with our history. Estonia's and Latvia's history influences the ongoing processes of ethnic policy development and minority issue solving. When the possibility of joining the EU was first introduced to both Latvian and Estonian society it was not accepted with open hands. There was a large proportion of people doubting the accession, people were concerned not only of the changes both Estonia and Latvia had to undergo legally but also of the very fact - being included in a union. On one hand there was willingness to reunite with Europe and seal our cooperation of both security and safety issues, becoming a part of developing and prosperous Europe, on the other hand a large proportion of inhabitants were Eurosceptic, having doubt of the changes that Estonia and Latvia would have to make.

It was somehow clear with the EU comprehensive approval procedures how Latvia and Estonia would have to ensure willingness and ability to be a part of the EU by complying with all the EU's standards and rules. So joining the EU and adopting EU laws at the very beginning of the negotiations was seen as two sided in the Latvian society. There was mistrust in a larger power that would be able to control us, as it was during the Soviet times, when Latvia and Estonia had very limited self-determination as countries. At the same time people were thrilled to turn their backs on Russia. Being a part of Europe through the membership of NATO and EU, it was seen as the "ultimate guarantee" of the restored Baltic independence and a proven framework for nurturing stability and prosperity. (Smith 2008: 189) The thought simplified could be expressed as "better to be with Europe than with Russia" and people arguing pro EU were using this as the last argument, realizing that the benefits with joining the EU would be greater than and the benefits of not "getting in".

As much as the events of 2004 - EU enlargement, officially including Latvia and Estonia in the brotherhood of the new post-Cold War Europe was a great success it also had a remaining side on the East called Russia and many new problems to come with it.

The success of the Baltic States in “returning” to the Western world has exposed the position which Russia still occupies in relation to Europe. (Smith, 2008: 189) Russia as a country remains outside EU but that does not mean it has no influence, Russia as a big country is also a global player, providing Europe with goods such as gas and other products of export, as well as being in other tight economic ties with European countries. Also it means having Russia border with the European Union as the Baltic States border with Russia.

Overcoming the Eurosceptic position and any problems concerning our Eastern neighbor both Latvia and Estonia found their ways to become member states of the EU. For several countries including Latvia and Estonia, the 1997 Opinions of the Commission on the applications for membership proved to be a key turning point in state policy, as the governments realized that they have to embark on policy reforms if they do not want to jeopardize their membership aspirations. (Rachel, 2009: 11) European understanding of ethnic minorities had to be compatible with the case of Latvian and Estonian Russian-speaking minority. The ability to interfere with the processes has weakened since Latvia and Estonia joined the EU as withdrawal from negotiations was the biggest threat for making adjustments.

The threat to withdraw the offer of EU membership proved to be the most effective mechanism available to the EU. Once the countries had become EU members, the power of conditionality was weakened. Rachel (2009:11) argues that a major reason why the EU did not have a greater impact on minority rights in Central and Eastern Europe is that it was not concerned with minority rights as such, either for lack of interest or lack of capacity. Even in the case of Estonia and Latvia, which excluded a significant part of their statehood and citizenship, the EU accepted the basic parameters of statehood and citizenship and only exerted considerable pressure with regard to specific policy details, such as stateless children or language requirements for political candidates or private business. (Rachel, 2009: 11)

Prior to accession of Estonia there were a lot of concerns in the citizenship question area, concerning that it could complicate Estonia’s accession negotiations.

(Smith, 2001: 149) In comparison with Latvia, Estonia was further distinguished by its faster progress in terms of drafting citizenship legislation and regulating the legal status of non-citizens. (Smith, 2001: 101) In the interest of continued stability and future political integration, the EU did insist that Estonia and Latvia modify their citizenship laws to allow everyone born in the country after 1992 the right to automatic citizenship. (Smith, 2001: 149)

Main threat prior 2004 was of course non-membership to the EU, although not everything was pushed, lawmakers ignored a number of recommendations. Galbreath and Muižnieks (2009: 139) write that as naturalization in the following years was still very slow the pressure was renewed by international organizations on Latvia to liberalize the Law on Citizenship. The main focus here was on cancelling the naturalization timetable, thereby allowing the eligible candidates to apply, and granting citizenship automatically to stateless children born in Latvia since independence. The authors stress that there is a broad consensus among most scholars that the role of conditionality was quite significant in influencing Latvian minority policy. (Galbreath and Muižnieks, 2009: 139)

Berned Rechel (2009: 3) writes how conditionality is a contested concept, in particular with regard to how it works and when it is effective. Here he mentions Schimmelfennig and how according to him conditionality was not a clear causal relationship, but a creative reinforcement of democratization. And a principal theoretical division in discussion of conditionality can be run between both rational choice theory and constructivist approaches. (Rachel, 2009: 3) So for Latvia and Estonia it is also visible in making of the decisions – granting citizenship, developing education laws and minority protection, was based on both rational choice and constructivist approach. Latvia and Estonia with new decision making has to consider history, to choose a wise policy not to endanger the new position of the State while also to make steps towards development and improving the situation of a large population of non-majority ethnic inhabitants.

All the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe have made legislative changes to fulfill this part of the *acquis*¹ (it means all legal acts, court decisions constituting the body of European Union law), although with varying degrees of speed and comprehensiveness. Another point showing convergence is that all ten member state countries have acceded to the FCNM - Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Instead of promoting to set up its own standards in the area of minority rights, the EU has encouraged candidate countries to adopt the Framework Convention and to strictly follow the recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, creating a strong mechanism for the protection of minorities. In contrast to the Framework Convention, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which was not promoted by the European Commission in the accession process, had, by the end of 2007, only been ratified by four of the ten new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe. (Rachel, 2009: 7) Showing us, how strong of an influence in implementing change can EU be. Encouraging the FCNM, there was still some freedom given within the Framework for each country, for example choosing our own “minority” definition.

The Framework Convention has been described as the European Commission’s “primary instrument for translating the minority criteria into practice”. However, as important as it is, this criterion was not applied so strictly, as Latvia did not ratify the Convention by the time it became a member of the EU in 2004, but only acceded to the Convention in 2005. All countries did however establish governmental bodies dealing with minority questions. This has helped to raise the political profile of minority issues, but these new institutions tended to remain consultative bodies without sufficient authority to implement minority programs. (Rachel, 2009: 7) Implementation is a somehow tricky question, as long as all the rights are provided, it does imply government funding. As far as allowing minorities to be free in promoting their culture

¹ “acquis” in French means “that which has been agreed upon”, this term is used in EU as the Community acquis or *acquis communautaire*, sometimes also called the EU acquis or just shortened by *acquis*, it means all legal acts, court decisions constituting the body of European Union law.

and values, there was no hesitation; there were some holding back on the areas needing help in funding of the government.

Although providing a detailed regulation of some policy areas, others, including the area of minority protection, have not been covered in any detail. The “thinness” of the *acquis* in these areas resulted in a “conditionality gap” where *acquis* leverage was weak, increasing the scope of action for candidate countries. Where the *acquis* density was low, candidate states were “free to pick and choose (or ignore) prevailing Western models”. In these policy areas, policy changes were “more strongly affected by path – dependent factors in the domestic political settings”. This was also the case in the sphere of minority rights. (Rachel, 2009: 8) In the sphere of minority rights an appliance of a “Western model” was simply impossible due the situation of our so called “minorities”, as it is not the same of any existing western models in use. Latvia and Estonia benefited from this conditionality gap, accepting the Minority Convention but being able to choose the degree of implementation. Latvia and Estonia were free to choose who does the minority rights apply to, they could define what minorities mean in the convention.

In general overall Europe, minority rights regimes were more strongly shaped by specific historical legacies, dominant national narratives, and the size and status on minorities, whereas it means that the impact of the EU was muted. Generally, there are various ways in which the state can respond to minority rights claims, or, more broadly, to ethnic diversity. Policies that accommodate diversity and grant members of minorities certain rights can be classified as minority rights regimes. (Rachel, 2009: 8) As much as EU insists on accepting the Framework Convention for Minority Rights, it did leave a lot of freedom for each country to fulfill it with a reasonable amount of individual content. Establishing minority rights regimes in Latvia and Estonia, providing the minimal necessary legal privileges of preserving cultural heritage and language for minorities. This does not however mean to have successfully resolved the problems of ethnic minorities in terms in political integration and overall integrated society.

Galbreath and Muižnieks (2009: 138) form their opinions in claiming that the international community has been an active participant in shaping Latvian minority policy throughout the 1990s and up to early 2000s, focusing on legislation and policy pertaining to both citizenship and language. This involvement as they explain, has been taking form in official visits, monitoring reports, evaluation of draft legislation and recommendations by officials from the United Nations (UN), the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the EU and others. International involvement, according to these authors begun soon after the restoration of independence in 1991 and continued until Latvia's accession to the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004, during this time conditionality was a critical part of this international involvement and operated primarily through the threat of non-membership. A big part of international involvement took forms of providing funding for language training and social integration program, while at the same time representatives of international and regional organizations frequently engaged in direct lobbying, provided advice on draft legislation, and attempt to persuade Latvian officials to liberalize minority policy. (Galbreath and Muižnieks, 2009: 138)

Any discussion about the impact of EU conditionality struggles with the difficulty of isolating the effect of international factors from the domestic incentives for legal, institutional or behavioral change. As a result, many studies tend to assume or overestimate the effects of EU conditionality vis-à-vis domestic factors. The increasingly empirically grounded discussion of concrete policy areas and countries has demonstrated that the record of conditionality is mixed and highly dependent on domestic conditions and actors. The EU is increasingly being given less credit for the democratization process in Central and Eastern Europe – with the exception of the minority condition, the effect of which is widely assumed. (Sasse, 2009: 18) As much as EU conditionality was a strong influence on Latvia and Estonia policy making, it is hard to separate EU influence from the changes that would have to be made either way. Minority condition is perhaps one of the areas with the most EU interference, as it is an

area implementing somewhat of an ideology as well – ethnic tolerance and democratic values on a human level basis.

3.1. Defining minorities within Europe

European minority rights in a traditional sense are aimed towards ethnic groups that could face extinction. Facing extinction is not the case for the Russians in Eastern Europe. Europe is much more concerned about Roma rights, than they are concerned of Russian-speaking rights. Germany, for example, drew a strict line making sure work emigrants are not considered a minority and wouldn't go under the category of having the rights to preserve their culture. (Dribins, 2004: 141) The main problem with Latvian ethnic minorities is not that we do have them, but the motives for settling here, incomers had no connection through Latvian history, they were not familiar with Latvian traditions and interests.

According to data provided by “The Central Statistical Bureau” (Centrālā Statistikas datu pārvaldes datu bāze) the ethnic structure of Latvia in 2012 consists of 60.5% Latvians, 26.6% Russians, 3.5% Belarusians, 2.4% Ukrainians. The rest of the inhabitants being: 2.2% Polish, 1.2% Lithuanians and 3.5% Jewish, with only a little procent of Roma, Estonian, German and other. (Centrālās statistikas pārvaldes datu bāze, Patstāvīgo iedzīvotāju etniskais sastāvs 2012. gada sākumā, <http://data.csb.gov.lv>) Estonia in comparison has 69.04% of ethnic Estonians, 25.44% Russians, 2.04% Ukrainians and 1.13% Belarusians and only a small percent of other ethnic inhabitants (Statistics Estonia, Population by ethnic nationality 2012 January 1, <http://www.stat.ee/34278>) These numbers show us that 70% of Estonia's inhabitants are ethnic Estonians and only 60% of Latvia's inhabitants are ethnic Latvians. Latvia's Russian-speaking community summing up to a number of 32.2% of the inhabitants. While Estonian Russian-speaking community consists of almost the same but a little less 28.61% of the overall inhabitants.

Slavic origin inhabitants flooded this territory as mostly workers placed here from other parts of the Soviet Union. They were raised in the atmosphere of bolshevism ideology, having no idea of democratic values or the idea of a national country or minority cultural independence. They did however have different motives of coming here – moving here voluntary , looking for better quality of life, incomers being sent here to do work, in factories or construction work, people trying to escape other countries, looking for a safer place and more security. (Dribins, 2004: 2006 – 2007) At Soviet times Latvia and Estonia were the West and people came here not only to do labor but also as to be more free in their view point of life, to be further away from the eye of Moscow.

While this is said, it should be in consideration that European praxis differs from the ones that can successfully be applied in Latvia and Estonia. While European minority rights in most cases are meant for small almost distinct ethnic groups which need to have their identity preserved, their culture and traditions saved and promoted as cultural heritage the situation of Russian-speaking people in the Baltic States is not so. Post-war settlers and their descendants should have a distinct legal status somehow similar to that of, say, Turkish *Gastarbeiter* in Germany. (Smith, 2001: 75) This comparison between German *Gastarbeiter* and Russian-speaking non-citizens in Estonia, however, ignore the particular context arising from the collapse of the Soviet Union. While in other EU states immigration usually consists of less than 10% of the total people population in Estonia the same number is about 30% of the population. (Smith, 2001: 75)

It would be unthinkable for Germany to transform their immigrants into citizens. For both Germans and the immigrants the legal fact of naturalization is associated with cultural assimilation. Neither German political culture nor the cultural context of post-war immigration is favorable to assimilation. So as long as assimilation to the post war incomers is impossible, naturalization of the post war immigrants in Germany is impossible as well. (Brubeiker, 1996: 170) A number of the Latvian scientists implement the thought that the Latvian Russians do not fall under the classical definition of ethnic

minority. Thus having analyzed the features of the Latvian media space existing in the Latvian and Russian languages Ilze Šulmane applies the concept “community” in relations to Russians. In her opinion the spiritual needs of ethnic minorities are aimed towards satisfaction of “specific cultural needs” exclusively and cannot create a self-sufficient alternative to the nationwide cultural space. (Volkovs, 2013: 21)

Naming the Russian-speaking population as a community not an ethnic minority is not only an issue of terminology. As there are fundamental international documents, that both Estonia and Latvia are a part of, that protect the interests of the population which is named to be different from the ethnic majority of the country. Using the concept “community” instead of “minority” Latvia and Estonia would exclude the largest ethnic group other than the majority from the basic legal discourse. (Volkovs, 2013: 22) Volkovs (2013: 22) also states that “in the last decade it is typical of the Latvian social science to synonymously apply the terms “ethnic minority” and “ethnic community” in relation to the Latvian Russians.” As the ethnic minority is expected to be different in terms of culture from the majority, like folklore, as well as private life aspects and communication.

Galbreath and Muižnieks also (2009: 140) compares Latvia’s situation to that of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom with their recent immigrant populations, saying it is closer to them than traditional minorities found in Bulgaria, Romania or Slovakia, because most persons belonging to minorities in Latvia are relative newcomers, having arrived in the early Soviet period as part of a policy of colonization and industrialization. They point out that the state of Latvia’s minorities has changed little since the country became a member of EU in May 2004. Although Latvia has seen large, but peaceful social protests over the education reforms that came into force in September 2004, facing the challenges over Latvia’s large Russian-speaking community, stated by the authors, social integration is a long term objective promoted by the EU membership. (Galbreath and Muižnieks, 2009: 140)

The complex situation with *Gastarbeiter* is the very different culture they have from the majority of inhabitants within the country of their settlement. German

emigration workers being for example Turkish, have different appearance features, Islam as their religion and carry different values of life and the world. Russian – speakers are however not distinguished by the rest of the society by their visual features and their religion is traditionally Russian orthodox, relatively closer to Christianity than, say, Islam. Society, becoming more secular, religion is not a strong point of worries, time of religious wars is long gone. Germany is however not considering their foreign workers ethnic minorities, but claiming to have Latvian and Estonian national minorities more similar to the situation with German workers, then it Russian-speakers is no longer a case of ethnic minority issues. By saying this, it has to be understood that having problems different from the ones that Western Europe consider their immigrant problems, there must be different ways found to cope with our social structure difficulties within the system of larger structure we are a part of.

For Latvia and Estonia it matters a great deal how citizenship is defined, as well as it does matter for the large Russian immigrant minority. The politics of citizenship is also the politics of identity at least in the case of Germany. (Brubaker, 1996: 173) In other parts of Europe it is also a matter of interests as a large minority population can bring ethnic tension and potential violence, meaning much more is at stake. (Brubaker, 1996: 173)

The experience of the past decade does however suggest that states are still the defining actors in the regionalization process, whilst the nation itself remains the central referent in identity politics. (Smith, 2003: 51) From a western point of view, the former Soviet bloc was re-conceptualized as a post-socialist eastern “other”, which was to be held at arm’s length until it could prove its “European” credentials. (Smith, 2003: 51) Proving to be Europeans was the top one priority for Latvia and Estonia and they did well, as joining the EU was a success. Changing our laws to the ones compatible to the European ones did not however change our understanding of things. The politics of memory did receive comparatively little attention prior to EU accession, but its significance has since become increasingly clear. (Smith, 2003: 51) Latvia and Estonia should not underestimate the power of past still being pulled into present as the

wounds are still fresh and alive in the memory of society. Not only the laws had to be adjusted as well as understanding of things had to be set straight with the way Europe understood ethnic minorities and their rights. Latvia and Estonia managed to negotiate their way in EU through EU conditionality.

Naming the society structure has a great deal in influencing society dynamics. For the Russian-speaking population in Latvia and Estonia to be named to be “ethnic minority” instead of just immigrants or after War settlers, means how they see themselves in the society. Naming a status in society or being named means having an identity within a country. Russian-speakers inhabiting Latvia and Estonia to be undermined as a “minority” although constituting a large part of the society to their understanding means pushing their limit of being recognized at all. Undermining an important societies group does not benefit the whole society, nor does it benefit the self-realization of the group. The process of re-naming the Russian-speaking population is active amongst researchers concerned with society structure issues.

Estonia and Latvia have a similar path, one of the factors differentiating Estonia from neighboring Latvia is the way in which it has addressed the somewhat thorny criteria relating to “respect for and protection of minorities.” The refusal to grant automatic citizenship rights to large Russian-speaking settler population is the issue which has aroused the greatest controversy amongst outside observers since 1991. (Smith, 2001: 67) The EU and the Council of Europe have been very much interested in solving the juridical bases of Estonia’s citizenship and minority legislation, for these organizations are themselves far from reaching a consensus on the definition of “minority” and the future nature of citizenship within a united Europe. (Smith, 2001: 67)

Implementation is one thing, but how is it being realized in praxis can be a whole lot different. Researcher opinions vary on the level of influence from the EU to Latvia and Estonia. Latvia and Estonia have both fulfilled EU joining criteria and are legal system, interlocked by a higher European law. There is a degree of freedom given to Latvia and Estonia within these laws, in most cases it is more about the frame of law rather than the content. Giving Latvia and Estonia a frame to work within and to choose

instruments and working techniques for these countries themselves. In the case of integration and minority policy it is difficult to separate it is sometimes hard to distinguish EU driven effect and changes made by logical path dependent factors of countries. European Union should be thought of as a suggestive body rather than a strictly implementing. EU's tools for making sure the rules are brought into praxis were monitoring reports and they were used during negotiation talks as well as after joining EU.

3.2. Effective introducing of EU laws in Estonia and Latvia

There were several tools within the EU to measure and over watch the transition period, the accession period to EU. One of them was monitoring reports. These reports were made both pre-accession as well as after, to see how the laws are being introduced. Pre-accession the "EU Accession Monitoring Program", (EUMAP) was started at the year 2000, to promote an independent joining the EU monitoring process. EUMAP reports were made by independent experts, from the countries doing the monitoring. (Pirmsiestāšanās procesa ES monitorings: Mazākumtautību aizsardzība, 2002: 7)

EUMAP reports on the countries soon to be a part of EU are important not only to draw attention to improvement of standards, but also bringing these standards in action. These reports in the making process and also as a result stress the importance of creating a political society. Also pointing how crucial it is to formulate these standards and keep them both during the accession process and also after joining the EU. Monitoring is a principle, an important tool for bringing principles into praxis. All candidate states had to affirm special programs, applied for ethnic minority group protection and to improve their role in society as well as their integration in society. Also EU funds are devoted to promote these actions flooding money into the field of

minority protection. (Pirmsiestāšanās procesa ES monitorings: Mazākumtautību aizsardzība, 2002:7)

Within the reports there can be found different kinds of generalizations when talking about integration and how Latvia and Estonia have already met most of the requirements. In many cases, if Latvia and Estonia are not there yet, they are both making progress and are about to be there soon. The words used within the reports make general references to meet “international standards” or “European standards” as they are expected in regards to activities and documents both of the Council of Europe and the OSCE recommendations. This kind of practice takes place in both the case of Latvia and Estonia. The 1999 report on Latvia, for example, states that “Latvia now fulfills all recommendations expressed by the OSCE in the area of naturalization and citizenship” (European Commission 1999a). (Sasse, 2009: 23)

The use of standard phrases or, one could say, European preferred phrases like these are frequent and sometimes do not represent the situation realistically, fresh concerns on this topic were expressed over the linguistic rights of the Russian - speaking minority in the 2001 report on Latvia, which refers to “joint efforts” of the EU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe to establish guidelines for the new language law (European Commission 2001b). These reports can also be somehow controversial. The 2002 reports on Estonia and Latvia, report that the OSCE mission in these states closed in late 2001, but on the other hand the EU’s claims to have continued concerns within these regions about these same problems of already closed missions. The report on Latvia, had issues pushing the country towards ratifying the Framework Convention, because the ratification took place later than it should have been. Both the EU and the OSCE were concerned regarding Latvian naturalization policy and also the issue of effective minority participation in political life of the country, due to very restrictive language laws. (Sasse, 2009: 23)

Latvia and Estonia both were one of the most strong and visible examples in the intensity of international involvement taking place regarding minority interest, within EU’s transformative impact on legislative and behavioral change. EU’s intense and

continuous involvement in Estonia and Latvia could be explained based on three benchmarks, highlighted in the Commission's Opinion and its Regular Reports: first the changes of citizenship and language legislation, second the rate of naturalization and third the ratification of the Council of Europe's Framework Convention. One thing is accepting a Convention another case is how it works, within the continuing problems with integration and occasional protests toward different agendas of minority concerned issues, shows us to demonstrate that the legal changes promoted by EU accession were not sufficient for bringing about significant political will and behavioral change. (Sasse, 2009: 25 – 26)

Monitoring reports can however just show us the “perfect on paper” situation, which in some times has almost nothing or little to do with the real situation within the country the report is on. Minority reports describe how the laws have been made or how expectations are fulfilled; it does not deal with how people feel within the country to what level they feel as a part of the society they live in. Work done with citizenship, language, naturalization and the Framework Convention has left out the importance of history and the formation of citizen identity through history. Effective introduction of the laws by the standards of EU monitoring reports as the legal document of affirming progress simply does not reflect the situation from a human identity perspective.

3.2.1. Language law and citizenship policies in Latvia

The education law made in 1991, June 19 regulated that Latvia guarantees the right to have education in both state language and minority language and the country will make positive circumstances to establish these rights. (Dribins, 2004: 219) The problem with establishing this law was there were too many Russian language schools already, so it wasn't about making new ones, rather than keeping them Russian. This would be the opposite of praxis where a minority needs schools for promoting and

saving their language. The schools with Russian teaching language didn't turn into national schools, they kept their teaching language, turning into Russian language schools, where a big part of other minorities would choose to have their education as well. Other minorities in this case being Belarusians and Ukrainians together with ethnic Russians making up a strong Russian speaking community. It was a step back towards nationalism, because it was keeping up the Russification traditions. (Dribins, 2004: 221)

These schools did not have enough subjects in Latvian. Negative influences at that time were coming from reorganizing the ministries work the Ministry of Education deconstructed the minority department in 1992. After that they lost a view full enough to understand the situation in Russian schools and their needs, it was left to flow on its own. It was later on realized that it has also been a mistake to get rid of the National case department in 1994. Changes were made within the government and its departments not realizing the later consequences upon the society at that point. (Dribins, 2004: 221) Government work was not as good as it could be simply not taking enough control over society processes and undermining their own role in forming a healthy democracy, due to lack of budget resources or unwillingness.

David J. Galbreath and Nils Muižnieks (2009: 137) explaining the situation show that, having a large proportion of Russians and Russian-speakers (most Ukrainians and Belarusians who use Russian as a native language) in Latvia, the first post-Soviet governments were keen to strengthen the state's independence, as well as to overcome the consequences of Soviet policies and Russification. Latvian politicians instituted a restorationist² policy of nation-building. The restorationist logic was an extension of the claim that Latvia had been illegally occupied by the Soviet Union and Latvia still existed despite having lost its sovereignty for nearly 60 years. The restorationist logic effected Latvian politics and political institutions, since it reinstated the 1922

² Restoration means restitution of something taken away or lost, as well as the state of being restored. In Latvian politics it is understood as choosing to restore the constitution established before the Soviet occupation and choosing legal continuity as state policy after reestablishing independence.

constitution and pre-war citizenship. All residents who had hereditary links to Latvian citizens before the Second World War automatically received citizenship, while other residents now needed to pass a language and civic history examination before becoming citizens.

Also issues had to be resolved in the language area, a new language policy was made to strengthen the position of Latvian as the single state language, because Russian language has been the leading language in the Soviet Union and it had to be reduced to the status of a minority language in Latvia. Within the national language promotion the state also began a policy of promoting bilingualism among Russian-speakers, a policy reinforced in the minority school curriculum. In 1998, the Latvian parliament passed an education law calling for Latvian to become the primary language of instruction in all state-funded secondary schools. In 2003 this law was amended and since then minority language schools follow a 60:40 proportional split between Latvian and the minority language. (Galbreath and Muižnieks, 2009: 137)

The focus concerning citizenship has been on the group having the specific status of non-citizen as it is a large number of personas living in Latvia's territory. The Citizenship Law adopted in 1994, determines who can access citizenship through registration or a special procedure and who the ones who can gain citizenship throughout naturalization. (Brands-Kehris, 2010: 96 – 97) Naturalization, as a process of gaining citizenship has received many critics, both in implementation pace and the whole structure of the procedure, arguing against claiming its difficulty. Naturalization as a form of political integration, with the case of Latvia and Estonia provides the individual with a certain amount of privileges given by law. As minorities within the minority rights convention is defined as citizens having a different ethnicity than the majority of inhabitants.

The relationship experience between members of different ethnic groups on an individual level is very positive, but it is seen different on a group level. Most Russian speakers would think their interests are not taken in consideration enough, while at the same time more than half of Latvians would say Russian speaking interests are taken in

consideration too much. Latvians are tended to view Russian-speakers as a group jeopardizing Latvian language and culture, while Russian speakers are concerned about not considered equal citizens – they feel unheard, insulted and not represented. (Šņitņikovs, 2007: 10)

Naturalization as a process has not been so overall well received, because of how it was presented – language exam, oath of loyalty, Russians who were already feeling loyal to the country felt as being insulted to make an exam of being worthy to be a part of the society. In the case of Latvia it is hard to tell whether ethnic contrasts exist in society or they exist because being brought up and kept alive by either political parties or media or other factors. Tension between ethnic groups is really observed in individual level, it is being done in a group level, associating with a group. (Smith, 2001: 74)

Colliding ethnic groups under politics is a task which takes many efforts. And at times it means pushing through the interests of the majority. For politics to work they have to legitimate and for ethnic minorities to except the governments legitimacy is to be somehow included in the political processes and representation in the government. (Rotčailds, 1999: 95) For the legal situation in Latvia, it is only possible through being also a citizen of this country, this is why naturalization as a process of gaining citizenship is the most important instrument for promoting sense of political belonging and acceptance within the country.

As much as Naturalization has been a success it is not over yet as there is still a large number of people without any citizenship inhabiting Latvia and Estonia. Numbers provided by Central statistics biro of Latvian resident nationality shows us that 83.7% of people living in Latvia are Latvian citizens. The number of non-citizens is 13.74% of all inhabitants and 1.83% have Russian citizenship. Less than one percent are other citizens inhabiting the area. (Centrālās statistikas pārvaldes datu bāze, Patstāvīgo iedzīvotāju valstiskā pederība 2012 gada sākumā, <http://data.csb.gov.lv>) Naturalization has worked well in terms of giving the possibility to show belonging and confirming legitimacy by choosing to be citizens of the land they inhabit. In many cases people have also chosen not to go through naturalization as it felt insulting to them, that the country they are

born in is asking them to show additional trust in the government and the state, as they are already living here, making their business here and having their children here. For elder generations of people it may seem like too much effort to undergo a process similar to school exams, proving both language skills and knowledge of history, as they also chose not to do it.

National minority Convention was established as the legal document for preserving minority rights in various spheres of interests, mostly working its way in culture, language and religion as the main characteristics forming an ethnicity. This Convention is a legal basis for minority group rights to preserve and maintain their culture; these laws are an extension from overall human rights and should be understood as a part of them. National Republic of Latvia ratified European Commission Convention of National minority protection in 26th May 2005 and it as a legal document it entered into force on 1st October 2005. The document does not say how minorities should be defined, so that every country accepting the convention can choose to whom to apply these rules. Latvia chose to defined minorities within the Convention to be applied to citizens who are not ethnically Latvian, but are citizens of the Republic of Latvia however non-citizens can also use the rights included in the Convention, if the law doesn't make exceptions. (Nacionālo minoritāšu konvecija, 2007: 6)

Rainer Hofmann (2009: 47) analyzing the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities points out Latvia being a special case, due to very strong opposition, for Latvia it took more than ten years to ratify the FCNM. Therefore it is too early, as he claims to assess Latvia's post-ratification compliance. Estonians FCNM in comparison entered into force at 1998 February 1st.

David J. Galbreath and Nils Muižnieks (2009: 136) analyzing the situation in Latvia state that although European institutions no longer condition minority policies as they did in the pre-accession period, they do continue to influence the legal space in state-minority relations. So the main focus of integration would have to be – naturalization, Educational reform and non-discrimination. In terms of naturalization, Galbreath and Muižnieks (2009: 142) point out that there are still a large number of

non-citizens who may never wish to naturalize, since January 2007 the labor markets of many EU member states have been opened to Latvia's non-citizens, eliminating a powerful economic incentive for naturalization. The authors mention here that currently a discussion is under way within the government and the parliament that the citizenship law should be amended to allow dual citizenship for children of labor immigrants born abroad, if the law is amended certain other liberalizing changes are also likely. (Galbreath and Muižnieks, 2009: 142)

Looking at politics from another angle, Atis Pabriks (2002: 23) in his work has done research of minority groups included in governmental structures and state administration. Comparing both proportions of overall ethnic minority inhabitants in the country and locally in the city and the percent working in the government structure in cities. Pabriks (2002: 23) comes to conclusions that people living in the area for longer are more involved in the governmental structures, like Poles and Ukrainians who have been here longer are represented more in local governments and administration, compared to Russians. He also states the main reason - that it is a matter of language skills and people living here for longer are more fluent in Latvian language.

Researches like these giving numbers and comparisons to percent in the country and percent in the state body can make a very wrong picture of integration, if it is without reasons and explanations. Lack of ethnic diversity in governmental structures does not necessarily point towards discrimination; it can also be unwillingness to participate, which shows us to other problems, but not discrimination. It is crucial to recognize problems correctly, because work that needs to be done towards creating a more politically involved society in general is very different from the work that is done eliminating discrimination. The main piece here being language skills, knowing the state official language is the breaking point in getting a state job or any other job.

3.2.2. Language law and citizenship policies in Estonia

Estonia declared national minority rights in 1993 October 26 Estonian parliament (Riigikogu), a law determining minority culture autonomy, the new law was made analogue the one established in 1925, but changed according to the new situation. The law gave automatic cultural governance to the minorities who had them until 1940. The law also includes prohibiting disdainful attitude toward minority culture traditions and religious rituals. Estonia made the decision to permit non-citizens passive participation in municipality elections, which gave positive consequences establishing trust towards the government. Passive meaning they could vote but could not be elected. (Dribins, 2004: 163 – 165)

Almost half of the after war incomers used this opportunity to contribute in politics and social life, decreasing the level of mistrust towards the Estonian national government. In Tallinn communal administration a lot of Russian speakers were involved receiving one third of the deputy seats. It was harder to cope with incomer separatism in Narva and its surroundings where the percent of Estonian inhabitants is very low, only about four or six percent. Narva is a special case in Estonia, having the highest percent of Russian speaking inhabitants living in this area, due to this being the region at the Russian border. Around year 1997 Estonia decided to develop active ethno-politics with the aim to include most of the foreigners in states national society. Estonians assigned state nationality minister, who introduced a strategy for non-Estonian integration, confirmed in 1998 based on it Estonia made its integration program. Estonian government actively promoted non-citizen naturalization. (Dribins, 2004: 163 – 165)

Incomers who made the most part of other ethnicities had a choice to take Estonian or Russian citizenship. Until year 2003, 120 thousands took Estonian about the same amount took Russian and another 160 thousand remained non-citizens (mostly elder people). Integration program is young people oriented, putting a lot of effort in

learning the Estonian language. Education reform plans starting to change to Estonian language completely in schools starting from high school from year 2002, establishing that 60 percent of subjects are being taught in Estonian. Taking in consideration schools not being ready for such a change it was pushed back to start at 2007 and that was also banned. So now the transition period is being made individual to every school, coordinating with the local government. It is not prohibited to keep teaching in Russian, intensively teaching Estonian language. (Dribins, 2004: 163 – 165)

Estonia also has two Russian language political parties, but they failed to gain seats in year 2003 parliament elections, although the voter structure held 13 percent Russian speakers (Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians), none of the parties overcame the five percent barrier. Other nationalities promoted Estonian national parties, because they also held their representatives. Six Russian speakers were elected in the parliament from the political parties elected. All these events could count as positive example for integration. (Dribins, 2004: 163 – 165)

In Estonia Soviet-era settlers and their descendants wanting to obtain Estonian citizenship were required to undergo a process of naturalization, the terms modeled on a citizenship law introduced by the Päts regime in 1938. Applicants for naturalization were required to: take an oath of loyalty to the Estonian Republic; possess a basic-albeit unspecified-knowledge of the Estonian language and to have resided permanently in Estonia for two years after March 30 1990 (officially deemed the end of Soviet occupation). They then had to undergo a further waiting period of one year following submission of the citizenship application. (Smith, 2001: 72)

Naturalization was made open to all permanent residents of Estonia, except for the ones who have served in the armed forces or security services of the Soviet state. The law also included a clause on “citizenship for special services” with this certain individuals, like members of the 1990-92 Supreme Council and local authority representatives could be granted citizenship without undergoing the normal naturalization procedures. (Smith, 2001: 72) For the naturalization criteria introduced in

1992 ensured that settlers and their descendants would not be able to participate in the first post-Soviet parliamentary elections. (Smith, 2001: 74)

The main issue of concern regarding Estonia according to Hoffmann (2009: 53) is the number of persons without citizenship. As well as the transfer to Estonian as the main language of instruction in minority schools, also regards towards private signs in minority languages and language proficiency requirements in public employment sector. It is further noted that the proportion of persons belonging to national minorities employed in public service remained relatively low, and that the National Minority Cultural Act had remained unchanged despite the fact that it was generally considered to be ineffective. (Hofmann, 2009: 53)

Overall, Estonia is considered to have shown remarkable devotion to engage in a constructive dialogue with the FCNM monitoring bodies. Estonia has made increasing use of EU funds to address shortcomings in its compliance with the FCNM. EU funds support new teacher training programs and other implemented initiatives, like offering free language training and increasing proficiency of the Estonian language among members of the public services. (Hofmann, 2009: 53)

Estonia had problems with the very declaration of minorities, making only Russians present in Estonia prior 1945 citizens and restoring their old constitution within the end of the collapse of Soviet Union. So this kind of categorical nature of Estonian minority policy declaring a quarter of the population “non-citizens” entailed numerous practical challenges. As Vello Pettai and Kristina Kallas (2009: 107 – 108) explains the situation in Estonia, in addition to the denial of automatic citizenship, as well as the complications over issuing permanent residence permits, the government did little to stop non-citizens from having the citizenship of other former Soviet republics, mostly Russian Federation. About 13 percent of the population used this chance and became citizens of the Russian Federation. Another Estonian government stance reduced the non-Estonian inhabitation in the East region of Estonia, when a total of 80,000 people left Estonia during the period from 1990 to 1996, a process supported of the Migration Foundation which provided grants up to 100,000 Estonian kroons (which would be

about 6 526 euros) for non-Estonians leaving for the former Soviet Union. (Pettai and Kallas, 2009: 107 – 108)

Estonia developed a nation-state oriented state policy, by adopting a citizenship law and tightening the requirements by extending the required residency period from two years to five and by introducing a civics examination alongside the Estonian language exam. The parliament also adopted a new Language Act, declaring Estonian the official language and all other languages “foreign languages”, establishing a new ethno-political order. Estonian language requirements were required for electoral candidates both national and local level, candidates had to sign a written statement confirming that their level of Estonian was sufficient to take part in legislative bodies, if it was not, the elected deputy would lose his mandate, stripped by a court. On the positive side, they did manage to establish permanent resident voting at the municipal level, leading to a strong showing among Russian parties in the capital Tallinn and the north-east Ida-Viru county. (Pettai and Kallas, 2009: 108)

Pettai and Kallas (2009: 111) claims that it was only after the EU stood behind most of the OSCE’s policy suggestions that Estonia took heed, while the OSCE mission played a key role, it was only hand in hand with the power of the EU that changes were made. EU turned its main attention to its pre-accession financial instruments as the tool to influence policy in Estonia, the EU channeled a total of 6.8 million euros to Estonia, mostly in support of Estonian language training program for non-Estonian, getting in exchange a seat on one of the steering committees, being able to monitor continually both the spirit and practice of the policy.

Opinions on pressure applied from the EU towards Estonia vary. Pettai and Kallas (2009: 112) analysis lean towards the opinion that EU was the master of political conditionality and the Council of Europe straddled the divide using persuasion at times and conditionality at other times. Also they stress the ability of the EU to put real pressure on Estonia to revoke a number of measures in violation of either international law or EU law. It is noted that also despite OSCE’s on the ground presence, was not able to stop Estonia from adopting laws, such as the language requirements for electoral

candidates, while the OSCE and the Council of Europe often helped facilitate the actual modalities of reaching a compromise on certain minority right issues, either by dispatching a team of experts or providing behind-the-scenes diplomacy, the political muscle in each case was exerted by the EU and its conditionality in terms of future accession. (Pettai and Kallas, 2009: 112)

Pettai and Kallas (2009: 114) explain that EU did not determine what “integration” and “naturalization” will be for Estonia, instead EU picked up an already going on process and showed the desire to keep Estonia on the track. And by doing so, EU helped to bring Estonia’s own catchphrase of “integration” into one of its first binding political documents, EU helped to make this process irreversible. They show that this created a kind of under grinding for the policy, without which it would have probably been politically unsustainable. The amounts of money the EU pledged through its aid program show how the EU’s conditionality played a role in moderating Estonia’s ethno-political situation. It is stated that this does not mean Estonia has become a bi-national or even multicultural state, but it has reduced its degree of ethno-political imbalance. (Pettai and Kallas, 2009: 114)

3.3. Summary an conclusion

Prior to 2004, the literature on nation-building and ethnic relations within the country focused for the most part on issues of citizenship and on the political and socio-economic status of Russian-speaking “resident aliens”. (Smith, 2011: 282) As these are the main largest problems within our ethnic minority area, the number of resident aliens – people as non-citizens and gaining of citizenship as it is not moving forward as fast as expected. Citizenship problems are provoking other issues, people being excluded from political agendas, feeling overall left out of the society.

The European Union (EU) has not developed a specific, legally-binding instrument on “minority rights”, but treaty references to culture and education and to European cultural and linguistic diversity are significant. EU institutions have often

considered issues relevant for minority protection, such as the respect for different cultural and ethnic identities, the respect for linguistic diversity, and combating racism and xenophobia, when considering internal community policy, especially in the fields of education, the media, access to the labor market and the free movement of persons more generally. (Thornberry and Estébanez, 2004: 19)

Ethnic minority rights are usually understood as a part of Human rights. Adding the “Ethnic” to minority rights is to stress that these minorities are a part of a broader community within a State, usually by definition they are citizens within a state that are not the national majority, meaning they have a different ethnicity (culture, religion, language). Jennifer Jackson Preece (2005: 170) shows us that ethnicity connected with human rights is not in significant difference to each other. She states that the human rights discourse is not intended to promote the rights of ethnic communities and their members but instead the rights of individuals as humans.

Overall human rights link humans to a sphere of rights where equality is promoted and all humans are legally equal in front of the law. Ethnicity is however considered to be a specific feature thinking in terms of overall humanity. Psychologically ethnicity has advantages compared to other human identity social models, it is able to awaken stronger and deeper intimate emotions. It can however also change according to individual life situation of a person. Once ethnic identity and ethnic interests are activated they tend to include abstract functional social group ties. (Rotčailds, 1999:57) This can be both a positive and a negative feature. Ethnicity can be brought up and manipulated when in need and it can also play a minor role in one’s life. Here other factors like the government’s attitude towards ethnic groups are brought in, that can complement overall wellbeing together with ethnic peace and when used correctly, wrongly used the same tools can trigger into ethnic tension and in more radical cases even riots.

The politicization of ethnicity in its current guise is a consequence of the emergence of popular sovereignty and its ongoing ideology of nationalism. Once popular identity becomes the focus point of political authority, this is when the minority

identifications and stereotyping of the nation-state are starting to be perceived as potential threats to the prevailing social and political order within as well as between communities. The belief that peace and stability requires the preservation of a common public identity is pervasive within both civic and ethnic nation-states and may therefore in either case act as a justification for homogenizing policies directed at ethnic or other minorities. The minority rights response offers a potential way out of the nationalist impasse with respect to minorities by rethinking the relationship between diversity and stability. From this perspective, minorities who are recognized and respected by the state – and thus become integrated (not assimilated) within its public persona – are considered less likely to challenge existing political arrangements. Instead of viewing diversity as a “threat” which must be contained or, if possible, eliminated, the proponents of minority rights see diversity as a “value” which should be affirmed and protected. (Preece, 2005: 180)

Present-day politics of collective memory in Estonia and Latvia is openly a post-colonial approach to nation-building, focusing on providing justice for the majority ethnicity, gone through a half a century of “illegal occupation” by the USSR. Soviet –era settlers and their descendants were branded “colonists” and “illegal immigrants” who had no automatic claim to membership of the political community. Estonia and Latvia both practiced the politics of “othering”, casting the local Russians as a domestic extension of an external threat. (Smith, 2011: 281)

At this point it is hard to out weight possible outcomes of different decision making process, granting immediate citizenship to all inhabitants at the process of regaining independence was simply not possible. Here it is seen, that both Russia with the claim of “zero option” and EU insisting on more liberal citizenship laws are trying to deal with the visible side of the problem. Including everyone in the society as citizens Latvia and Estonia could jeopardize nation interests. Citizenship as the basic ground for a democratic country is not making up for the lack of unification or the knowing of the national language. Having just moved away from inclusion in the Soviet Republic Union

it cannot be risked to promote citizenship amongst people within a small state completely un-loyal to the established order.

The overall society inclusion in questions of national matter could have had a higher degree. And it could have been more grey, instead of a black and white situation – where it is either citizenship to all or no citizenship at all. Having such a high percent of minorities, you cannot let them be on their own, not thinking of how it will split the society.

The tools used to make integration happen have to be understood as just tools. Naturalization as a process of gaining citizenship is not going to be a fix for all ethnic problems. The ethnic gap itself is not a problem for people in everyday lives, but it is kept alive artificially, it is turned around to be a problem. In many cases ethnic questions are confused with them of social origin. (Gaugere, 2007: 98 – 99) People, angry with the overall situation in the country, their low salary, high taxes and inability to pay rent or other problems are somehow being dragged into the sphere of minority issues, integration and ethnic tension. Society integration should not be taken out of context, but seen with other ongoing society processes, at the same time it cannot be view technically as it needs not only changing laws but a change of society mind set as well.

From the very beginning of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), has been concerned with minorities, started as an intergovernmental conference in the mid-1970s (the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe – CSCE – also known as “Helsinki process”). The question of minority protection is already present in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the founding document of the CSCE process of East-West dialogue during the Cold War, and it has been an essential element of the comprehensive approach to international peace and security which has characterized the Organization ever since. The OSCE regards human rights and the protection of human rights and the rule of law, together with political, military and economic considerations, as constituent elements of security and as closely interlinked. The OSCE participating states have affirmed that issues concerning national minorities, as well as compliance with international obligations and commitments concerning the rights of

persons belonging to them are matters of international concern and they are no longer a matter for each state alone. (Thornberry and Estébanez, 2004: 17)

There has not been a broadly accepted minority definition. ANO decided to hand in the minority rights explanation without defining “minority” as such. Minority rights were not included in citizen basic rights; but they were admitted to be a part of overall human rights. (Dribins, 2004: 252) It could be argued that it is an advantage in the somewhat slippery case in Latvian and Estonian minority rights. Both Latvia and Estonia have defined minority rights within citizen rights. The ability to set the border for our own minority rights, making them rights for citizens, could also be considered as a tool for promoting integration. Gaining more privileges for ethnic minorities in Estonia or Latvia you should firstly confirm your stand as a citizen of the country and then be legally supported to promote the culture of your ethnic group.

The main aim of this convention is to legally underline the necessity for a country tied with these legal ties to not only let the minority of the country develop passively in its own pace, but on the contrary, take part in its agendas and help these minorities to preserve their culture firstly meaning financial help and support. It is stressed by the experts of the convention that extra attention should be applied for both indigenous peoples and Roma people (gypsies) because it is taught that their traditions and culture heritage are very vital for their identity, so they need more government active action as other groups. (Nacionālo minoritāšu konvecija, 2007: 14) So how the signing of such a treaty would apply for the situation of the case of Latvia and Estonia with an overwhelming number of minorities inhabiting these countries? Does the promotion of such culture of mid 90’s urban settlers is the proper use for this law? Official Soviet culture claimed to be socialist realism. (Brooks, 2000: 108)

Rechel (2009: 7) talks about how the impact of the EU on minority protection within the candidate countries is most likely more visible in the area of anti-discrimination legislation. The directives on non-discrimination were adopted in 2000 and candidate states were required to transpose them into national legislation. The Council Directive 200/43, also referred to as “Race Directive”, “Racial Equality Directive”

or “Race Equality Directive”, prohibits direct and indirect discrimination on the grounds of race or ethnicity in the areas of employment, training, social protection, education, and access to public goods and services.

Guido Schwellnus (2009: 32) offers a more simple approach to an old problem, simpler at the first glance. He speaks about how minority rights can also be protected, besides, providing them specific minority rights is to promote anti-discrimination measures, which will ensure equal opportunities for members of minority groups and also combat discrimination and social exclusion. Schwellnus (2009: 32) explains that the adoption of anti-discrimination legislation in Central and Eastern Europe is closely related to European Union rules and conditions. And strong problems do occur in this area while most post-communist constitutions do not contain specific anti-discrimination laws or the other way around those that include positive measures to actively promote equal opportunities, just because no such tradition is developed in Central and Eastern Europe, states the author. (Schwellnus, 2009: 32)

Since legal protection against discrimination is predominantly a negative right that needs to be claimed individually, one important obstacle to implementation, once the necessary legislation is in place, is the lack of willingness or ability of victims to bring cases of discrimination before a court. In many countries in Central and Eastern Europe, only a few cases regarding discrimination have been reported directly after the introduction of anti-discrimination legislation. One reason is the lack of information and state authorities failing to prosecute the cases as cases of discrimination. (Schwellnus, 2009: 40) Schwellnus (2009: 42) points that within countries facing weak conditionality like Estonia and Latvia a low number of complains and a lack of sanctioning does not show that discrimination is absent but the opposite, that there is awareness missing within these countries.

Discrimination, as a negative effect to fight against, is already a society dysfunction, which can be avoided with the promotion of tolerance and respect. One of the main goals of democracy and value is human respect, which is a process. Human respect is not a political goal to reach, it is an ongoing process, taking place in a society

were human values and tolerance are promoted. Human respect most important aspects are: wellbeing, people relations with one another, their behavior and self-respect, thoughts, awareness, freedom of religious beliefs, equality, legal, political autonomy and brotherhood. (Tauriņš, 2001: 17) Respect reflects human moral attitude towards himself and others. Respect together with conscience makes responsibilities and obligations moral underlined both in everyday life and politics. (Tauriņš, 2001: 17)

It is very well explained by Bern Rachel, (2009: 8) looking at three main aspects when talking about minority rights in Eastern Europe and its protection from discrimination, positive minority rights (related to language and culture) and citizenship. Rachel (2009: 8) points out that EU conditionality has been partially applied in the sphere of citizenship, the EU had to accept Estonia's and Latvia's restoration argument according to which the Russian-speaking immigrants in these countries were illegal settler populations. He argues that EU pressed for some liberalizing changes of citizenship and language laws for the integration for stateless residents, but the basic parameters of minority policies remained unchanged.

Providing ethnic equality and avoiding discrimination is crucial character for social wellbeing of the society and its protection and full functioning of democracy. Not seeking help, when a human rights violation is taking place, could make the whole society mistrust social justice, even if it is just individual cases. Evaluating discrimination is difficult because of many obstacles. Firstly these kinds of infractions are hard to prove in court. Secondly Latvian citizens are very passive in seeking justice in court and providing their rights. There are not enough court decisions on this topic, so the society has not enough legal orientation. Third point people do not have a broad and deep enough understanding what justice by the law means and how they could benefit from it. Sometimes laws are considered discriminating even though they match the ones used in overall praxis. In other cases people think of discriminating requirements, defending other groups of people. There are different valuation of how high can the state requirements be made upon the people and how many of them are legitimate. (Nacionālo minoritāšu konvecija, 2007: 17)

Much more important than the number of inhabitants or the ethnic structure of them is the quality of them – a good level of education, high level of health care, professional structure. (Krūmiņš, 2004: 67) Improving language skills in every direction, teaching Latvians Russian, Russians Latvian, both Russians and Latvians learning good English, it would help to overcome differences and reach towards a more open society, to better communication with one another. For an overall educated person it is easier to overcome stereotypes, alienation, as well as understand complexity of history and have a sense of belonging within a society.

4. Ethnicity as a political tool for society polarization

4.1. Recent ethnic tension in Estonia

Change of laws does not necessarily change the minds of people. Integration supported by law is perfect on paper it does not however mean it works in praxis. Overall peaceful Russian-speaking minorities did not show any sign of violence. Estonia was taken by surprise with the riots on 26-27 April 2007, with the re-location of the Soviet-era memorial known as the Bronze Soldier from a location in downtown Tallinn to a more distant military cemetery. This brought to the surface issues that neither Estonian integration program nor any international organization had dealt with sufficiently: history. While Estonians saw the monument – erected to commemorate the Soviets' recapture of Tallinn in 1944 – as a painful reminder of the Soviet occupation of their country, Russian speakers generally viewed the statue as an essential element of their historical identity – the Soviet Union's victory in the Second World War. (Krūmiņš, 2004: 67)

Estonia's "War of Monuments", was a sequence of incidents not only concerning statues, but public memory as such. Dealing with both misunderstood history and different interpretations of history and the lack of judging Soviet crimes in the same categories as Nazi crimes are judged. Having different memory regimes has erupted in society confusion, why are some war heroes and some are not, even though the Baltic States seem to see things differently from western Europe, winning the War for Europe meant losing our freedom for us. A monument was erected in Estonian town of Lihula, by Estonian nationalist Tiit Madisson, the Mayor of the town, and Second War veterans' organization. (Smith, 2011: 282)

It happened shortly after Estonia joined the EU in 2004, these groups of enthusiast were originally concerned about marginalization of history and rushing to be integrated with the West. The monument itself was dedicated to "Estonian men who in 1940-45 fought against Bolshevism and the restoration of independence", the actual sculpture was a soldier wearing the uniform of the Estonian Waffen-SS Legion. (Smith,

2011: 282) The decision made by the Estonian government to remove the statue due to external protests from a range of states and international organizations touched a nerve within broader Estonian society. (Smith, 2011: 282)

The other case is the opposite of monuments called the “Bronze Soldier” originally located in the very center of the capital city of Estonia Tallinn. As the original title of the statue is “Monument to the Liberation of Tallinn from Fascism” in the eyes of Estonians it does symbolize a period of Soviet rule that was not their voluntary choice. So as ironic as it is the monument of Liberation on the one side it could just as good be called the monument of occupation. The “Bronze Soldier” in Estonia has the same monumental and common historical memory value as the “Victory monument” in Riga, Latvia, being the centerpiece for annual 9 May commemoration of the Soviet Union’s final victory over Nazi Germany. (Smith, 2011: 283) Replacing the name of the monument in 1995 to be more approachable “to the fallen of World War Two” didn’t help much as in 2005 this monument failed to be a simple war memorial and was again recognized in the Estonian public very strongly as symbol of Soviet occupation and repression. (Smith, 2011: 283)

The statue issue provoked an escalation of the longstanding war of words between Tallinn and Moscow. The actual relocation of the “Bronze soldier” in April 2007 ended in three nights in rioting, this mobilization amongst Russian-speakers, many of whom belonged to the generation raised in the post-Soviet period. In later commentaries by the Estonian side it was revealed that they were “simply unaware” of the depth of the attachment to the “Bronze Soldier” amongst the local Russian-speaking population. (Smith, 2011: 283) Later focus was brought upon the criminal side of the rioters and implied external forces from the Russian side being involved in the happenings, searching for an external actor to blame rather than looking for answers in the ongoing identity crisis amongst young people.

4.2. Recent ethnic tension in Latvia

One of the long term results of national political forces in Latvia was the adoption of the new Education Law adopted 1998 set on a date to be brought in force, at that time seemingly distant date of 1 September 2004. The law stated that both in state and local government education is acquired in the state language. The date of adoption set so far away from the date of implementation would assume it had a lot of pre-work needed to be done, a lot of explaining of how it is going to work and a step by step procedure to make it work as planned. It did on the contrary evoke unprecedented protests on the part of Latvia's Russian speaking population. (Rozenvalds, 2010: 51)

These protests were overall peaceful and not even directed against the general goal of the education reform as they were against the methods for achieving this goal. These protests against the education reform had a snowball effect unexpected to the nationalists, the strengthening of civic bonds among members of the Russian-speaking population. Coming together in protests for a common aim they gained power as a group transforming themselves from a politically divided group into a well-organized political force. (Rozenvalds, 2010: 51)

The education reform itself as it was said in the law, was made to increase the qualification of minority group children to be able to speak the national language, increase their ability to receive higher education and compete in the job market. The methods bringing these ideas into praxis received serious critic. From the professional sphere of education, the discussions were brought up amongst politicians and into the society developing into a political fight. Sociologist researches were a warning that the society is not ready for such a shift. The government was not able to find partners and come to a compromise with the Russian schools organization representatives. Serious protests were made and Russian organizations were collided in these protests endangering their language. It became an ethnic mobilization, which was aimed against the country and its education politics. It was a major step back in integration process. (Apine, 2008: 12)

To improve the situation in general, there should be moving away from casual stereotyping of entire groups towards a mutual appreciation of the complexities of recent history and the diversity of individual experiences, to do so recognition is entitled that representatives of other ethnic groups are not simply perpetrators but they have also experienced persecution and repression on themselves. This would also mean accepting that one's "own" group has not consisted uniquely of heroes and victims, but also contained perpetrators and collaborators. (Smith, 2011: 294)

Let us have a look at landmarks in everyday life. In Latvia every year the March 16th brings attention not only because it is politically oriented and supported by national parties, but also well covered in the media, both before and after the actual event. March 16th is the day of remembering soldiers who passed away during World War II, as Latvians would consider them to be fighting for an independent state instead of pro-Nazi Germany. Year 2013 brought confrontations by the monument of freedom, where the culmination of the event takes place every year. Parliamentary Public cohesion commission chairman Ilmar Latkovskis in an express interview right after the event for one of the most popular Latvian newspapers "Diena" (2013: 3) talks about how it is crucial to work on history questions, especially second World War, because these are the ones that draw the most attention also in the European level. This is where within Latvian society there is an ongoing fight between 16th of March and 9th of May being held as opposites and flagged out as an ethnic argument Latvians versus Russians. May 9th is the traditional celebration held for the end and also victory of WWII for Russians, as at the same time Latvians view this as the begging of occupation.

Latkovskis (2013: 3) also points out that colliding the society is a very important matter connected with the question of national state identity and firstly it is a matter of culture. But it is no secret that after the war a lot of the incomers were of a different kind of a culture, which felt no need to integrate and this type of attitude has been promoted in the following generation, says Latkovskis. He also talks about citizenship and its prestige, no matter what ethnicity a person holds, citizenship should be one of the overall connecting elements of the whole society. And it should be a thing people

look forward to having. To overcome the past there should be a common viewpoint towards the future.

Latkovskis (2013: 3) also admits politics and media interfering with the relationship of Latvians and “others”, admitting that in everyday life level our relationships are good, but there are deeper levels of inner feeling breaking out once in a while. In the end he stresses the absurd of putting down politicians, showing that politicians are also products of the society, being raised by the same teachers and families and all citizens should take full responsibility of not being completely happy with their political elite. It is our own fault not being to choose representatives of whom Latvians can be proud of and it is a very dangerous position, especially for a small nation, swimming in an ocean on a small ship to claim the captain of a ship is stupid or drunk. (Latkovskis, 2013: 3)

4.3. Summary and conclusions

There is a point of view that the political elite is not promoting integration, but rather keeping it back. Another threat is the media, which still has dangerously big influence on the overall society thoughts. (Apine, 2007: 26) Politicians having to take part of the blame of integration dysfunctions is just a logical consequence of the overall negative atmosphere in government – society relations. There are simply not enough explanations given of the law before or after it is brought in action. As well as the media coverage on laws is sometimes tendentious. This promotes mistrust between the government and society simply not understanding why some laws are made the way they are especially on such a hot topic as integration. There should be more understanding and government – society explanation work done in the very beginning phases of law change to avoid miscommunication and provocations escalating from a lack of knowledge. (Apine, 2007: 22- 23)

Many experts share the thought that the responsibility for lacking an effective integration policy should be shared amongst politicians and political parties. Fighting for their political power, they lack the responsibility that they have amongst people, affecting their minds on a large scale. Ethnic and linguistic belonging is often used as

political capital, polarizing the society. It is visible by the outcome of the elections; there is lack of political parties that both Latvians and Russian-speakers would vote for. Instead politicians have developed a tendency to fight for their votes attracting only Latvians or the ones belonging to the minority. (Zepa u.c., 2006: 20)

History is not an issue itself it is how it is used. History in politics is one of the few issues that can be used to gain the support of an increasingly apolitical citizenry. Historical disagreements and the use of the ethno-linguistic other is kept alive as society threatens and used together with historical blame. Historical arguments are used to delegitimize policy demands concerning cultural and linguistic diversity. (Makarov, 2009: 149)

Despite the ethnic polarization of voters, nobody is interested in developing a deeper ethnic gap between the inhabitants. At the same time politicians are interested in a tension kept alive in the society, to benefit from it. (Zepa u.c., 2006: 20) Whenever an election is close, either local government or the parliament historical passages are brought up as defining lines for showing the separation between the Russian-speaking and Latvian. Russian politicians are confronted by those in Latvian parties to admit occupation, which they would not do due to loss of votes from the Russian-speaking side, as well as Russian parties also tend to promise more rights for Russians-speakers. This kind of praxis is kept alive, manipulating voters from one election to another, not taking in consideration how it leaves scars in the societies memory.

Ethnicity should be approached more seriously, even sympathetically, as a social dimension that has received too little attention and too much abuse during the past two centuries. An approach like this would benefit not only Eastern European specialists, but all of social theory. Ethnicity has always been experienced as a kinship phenomenon a continuity having common ancestors. It is crucial to realize and recognize ethnicity as a living reality of a human experience from generation to generation – from past ancestors to those in the future. (Hutchinson and Smith, 2009: 63)

There is no going around ethnicity as it is very much alive in our society. Throughout minority policy and other instruments there should be promotion of a healthy well-

functioning society. Ethnicity is used by politicians to have their support in the election, actualizing and exaggerating society sensitive historical issues. There should be a larger sense of responsibility of both words and actions in the political sphere of Estonia and Latvia. Time has passed since the major changes Latvia and Estonia had to make, accepting EU laws and regulations, EU minority rights convention and here it is seen how far Latvia and Estonia has developed. Written privileges are still different from society realities. Russian-speaking demonstrations in Tallinn due to the “War of Monuments” was unexpected, which shows that there is tension between groups of different history understanding. It means there are still unresolved issues, although integration does not happen overnight and some of the processes happening now can have results only in the future.

Conclusions

The main aim of this paper is to analyze ethnic minority understanding in Estonia and Latvia within the context of European Union. The author chose to divide this paper in four parts. First giving a historical background on minority right developments in Latvia and Estonia starting from first independence, throughout Soviet period and then the re-gaining of independence. Second part defining ethnic minorities in Europe compared to the situation of Latvia and Estonia. Third part analyzing Latvian and Estonian language law and citizenship policy. Fourth part looking at how ethnicity can be used in politics. The goal was to show how Latvian and Estonian ethnic policy has been influenced by European Union and its understanding of ethnic minorities.

Comparing the case of Estonia and Latvian as much as they are similar there are also some differences. Both Latvia and Estonia within the EU Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities have named their minorities to be citizens, providing minority protection for citizens with ethnicity different from Estonian or Latvian. Within European countries ethnic minorities are distinguished from immigrant communities, who have recently arrived from distant countries. Russians of the Baltic Republics bear features of both ethnic minorities and immigrant societies. (McGarry J. and Keating M., 2006: 2) EU policy towards ethnic minorities is aimed towards preserving cultural heritage which enriches the society within a state.

Soviet Union among other ideologies kept alive a view of brotherhood where there was no need and space for any difference, thus also no need for minorities and their rights. Within Soviet Union Estonia and Latvia developed a path different from the rest of the Europe, so after the collapse of Soviet Union Estonia and Latvia had to catch up with the rest of the Western Europe in both developing and understanding of democracy and the values it includes, like tolerance and equal human rights and values.

Both Latvia and Estonia declined “zero option” after regaining independence. Both joined the EU, both of them ratified the FCNM, both defined ethnic minorities the same way and implemented change in language laws as well as they both have

naturalization as a process gaining citizenship. With all the changes being made they both still have ethnic problems, due to recent ethnicity based confrontations, case of the Bronze soldier and education protests being examples for showing the situation still containing unsolved issues in terms of identity and understanding history in different ways. Looking at integration and naturalization is not easy, because of the emotional level it has to it, there is still a lot of suppressed anger, the feeling of injustice and other emotional scars. Even though establishing democracy for over twenty years now, before that Latvia and Estonia lived in a different time space from the rest of Europe and its democratic values.

As laws can be changed, the minds of people cannot be changed so easily. Forming of an identity is much more different and difficult than the single act of changing laws within a country, changing of laws does of course change the atmosphere establishing a legal basis for rights, but without overlooking history that comes with it there cannot be a change of identity. Identity that could provide the sense of belonging to a state. If law changing is just a formality with no real effect, society can never profit of it. Latvian and Estonian integration policy is different from overall European policy with its focus. For both Estonia and Latvia suggestions to re-consider re-naming the Russian-speaking population to Russian-speaking community instead of Russian-speaking minority. That would not be the solution for all our problems, like mistrust in the government, alienation from the country and large number of non-citizens, but re-naming our so called minorities would help us to maybe change our thinking in the right direction.

Both Latvia and Estonia have adopted positive ethnic minority rights by ratifying the Minority Rights Convention. Positive rights promote possibilities of development for ethnic minorities in cultural and other spheres of life to preserve their ethnicity. As in opposite anti-discrimination laws are made for fighting with the negative outcome of lack of successful integration policy. Equality by law and ethnic minority rights does not however mean that the content will be fulfilled to maximum extent. In most cases providing a legal basis means it can be complied with content. Estonia and Latvia can

choose for themselves that only citizens are ethnic minorities for both countries and to what degree to be involved in their agendas. Political involvement is crucial in terms of promoting a sense of belonging. Both Latvia and Estonia have fulfilled EU minority right criteria on a law level.

The processes taking place in Latvia and Estonia – granting citizenship, developing education laws and minority protection, was based on both rational choice and constructivist approach. Joining the EU not only the laws had to be adjusted as well as understanding of things had to be set straight with the way Europe understood ethnic minorities and their rights. Latvia and Estonia managed to negotiate their way in EU through conditionality. Estonia differs from Latvia with implementation of rules, outrunning Latvia in implementing European legislations. Estonia was further distinguished by its faster progress in terms of drafting citizenship legislation and regulating the legal status of non-citizens. Estonia after regaining independence was also successful in implementing more rights for non-citizens providing passive participation in local government elections, promoting the overall feel of belonging to the country.

Minority integration is not a destination to reach it is a state policy a state position to take. There is no way to reach integration as it is an ongoing process, which needs to be frequently reevaluated. It is not a bad thing to keep these issues alive, as long as they are kept in positive lighting making sure not to question is there or is there not integration, just improving the system and making some changes if it is necessary. The framework convention for the protection of national minorities was officially accepted by both Estonia and Latvia and a long way has been walked since then towards a more stable society.

Whenever it is said that integration should be a two way street, these words should not be taken for granted. Integration should mean promoting of overall tolerance, understanding of differences and a well-functioning society based on trust and respect for one another. The whole society would benefit from setting aside ethnic

differences and concentrating our attention to other crucial areas, for example lack of workplaces or the overall wealth of State inhabitants.

Ethnic minorities have always existed and most probably will exist in every European country all throughout time. Ever since Europe has made Nation State borders there has been people living in these nation states not having the ethnicity of the majority. Integration as a state policy is a way to better understand minorities, their needs and provide them their basic legal possibilities to protect their culture. The main problem with ethnic minority integration is not with our legal system, it is however in the view, in our society memory in the need to re-define history. Much more ideological work has to be done in this field. There is a need to promote a democratic thinking, letting go of the image of the enemy, viewing the Russian-speaking community as a part of the society and not trying to fight them whenever there is such a possibility. As much as ethnic minority integration after joining EU has been a success, Latvia and Estonia taking huge steps towards society integration, it is not over yet, as society is a live process defining itself, in terms of identity and sense of belonging.

Aknoweledgements

I would like to express my very great appreciation to the supervisor of my thesis Dr. hist. Inese Runce for her valuable and constructive suggestions during the planning and development of this research work. Her willingness to give her time so generously and provide positive encouragements throughout this work has been very much appreciated.

I would also like to thank my family and friends supporting me during the period of writing, especially Renate, Zane and Uldis, as well as all the people engaging in discussions of ethnic minority policy situation in the region.

Bibliography

1. Apine I. (2007) "Etnopolitikas analīze", in Dr.hist Dribins L. Šņitņikovs A. (Zin.red.), *Pretestība sabiedrības integrācijai: Cēloņi un sekas*, Rīga: Latvijas Universitātes Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts
2. Apine I. (2008) "Latvijas etnopolitikas attīstība neatkarības gados", in Sabiedrības integrācijas tendencies un prettendences. Latvijas un Igaunijas pieredze. Etnisko attiecību aspekts, Rīga: LU Akadēmiskais apgāds
3. Apine I., Volkovs V. (2007) *Latvijas krievu identitāte, vēsturisks un socioloģisks apcerējums*, Rīga: Latvijas Universitātes Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts
4. Boldāne I. (2007) Latviešu etniskā identitāte un tās loma sabiedrības integrācijas procesā Latvijā in Dr.hist Dribins L. Šņitņikovs A. (Zin.red.), *Pretestība sabiedrības integrācijai: Cēloņi un sekas*, Rīga: Latvijas Universitātes Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts
5. Brooks J. (2000) *Thank you, comrade Stalin! : Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press
6. Brands Kehris I. (2010) Citizenship, Participation and Representation in Muižnieks N. (ed.) *How Integrated is Latvian Society? An Audit of Achievements, Failures and Challenges*, Riga: University of Latvia Press
7. Brubaker R. (1996) Civic and Ethnic Nations in France and Germany in Hutchinshon J. and Smith A. D. (ed.) *Ethnicity*, New York: Oxford University Press
8. Centrālās statistikas pārvaldes datu bāze, Patstāvīgo iedzīvotāju etniskais sastāvs 2012. gada sākumā, [Online], Available: <http://data.csb.gov.lv> [15 May 2013]
9. Centrālās statistikas pārvaldes datu bāze, Patstāvīgo iedzīvotāju valstiskā pederība 2012 gada sākumā, [Online], Available: <http://data.csb.gov.lv> [15 May 2013]
10. Dribins L. (2004) *Etniskās un nacionālās minoritātes Eiropā. Vēsture un mūsdienas*, Rīga: Latvijas Universitātes Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts

11. Fishman J. (1996) Ethnicity as Being, Doing, and Knowing in Hutchinshon J. and Smith A. D. (ed.) *Ethnicity*, New York: Oxford University Press
12. Galbreath D. J. and Muižnieks N. (2009) Latvia. Managing post-imperial minorities in Rachel B. (ed.) *Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe*, New York: Routledge
13. Gaugere K. (2007) Nevalstisko organizāciju loma sabiedrības integrācijā in Dr.hist Dribins L. Šņitņikovs A. (Zin.red.), *Pretestība sabiedrības integrācijai: Cēloņi un sekas*, Rīga: Latvijas Universitātes Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts
14. Hofmann R. (2009) The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in Rachel B. (ed.) *Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe*, New York: Routledge
15. Henckaerts J. M. (1995) *Mass Expulsion in Modern International Law and Practice*, Hague: Kluwer Law International
16. Hutchinshon J. and Smith A. D. (1996) *Ethnicity*, New York: Oxford University Press
17. Krūmiņš J. (2004) Nacionālās intereses, iedzīvotāji, ekonomika un attīstība, *Nacionālās intereses: formulējuma meklējumos, Stratēģiskās analīzes komisija, Zinātniski Pētnieciskie raksti 1/2004* Rīga: Zinātne
18. Latkovskis I., Zanders M. (2013) "Pilsonībai jābūt apvienotai", *Diena*, 19.Marts, p.3.
19. Makarov V. (2009) The real problem Latvians Have with History id Weirsmā J.M. (Ed.), Belgium: Socialist Group in the European Parliament
20. Martin T. (2001) *The affirmative action empire: nations and nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923 – 1939*, New York: Cornell University Press
21. McGarry J. and Keating M. (2006) *European Integration and the Nationalities Question*, New York: Routledge
22. Morozov V. (2005) The Baltic States and Russia in the New Europe: a Neo-Gramscian Perspective on the Global and the Local in Smith D. J. (ed.), *The Baltic States and their Region: New Europe or Old?*, Amsterdam: Rodopi

23. Nacionālo minoritāšu konvencija – diskriminācijas novēršana un identitātes saglabāšana Latvijā, red. N. Muižnieks, Latvijas Universitātes Sociālo un politisko pētījumu institūts, LU Akadēmiskais apgāds, 2007
24. Pabriks A. (2002) *Etniskās proporcijas, nodarbinātība un diskriminācija Latvija*, Rīga: Nordik
25. Plakans A. (2011) *A Concise History of the Baltic States*, New York: Cambridge University Press
26. Pettai V and Kallas K. (2009) Estonia. Conditionality amidst a legal straightkacket in Rachel B (ed.) *Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe*, New York: Routledge
27. Preece J. J. (2005) *Minority Rights, Between Diversity and Community*, Cambridge: Polity Press
28. *Pirmsiestāšanās procesa ES monitorings: Mazākumtautību aizsardzība, Ziņojums, Latvija*, (2002) Rīga: Preses nams
29. Rachel B. (2009) *Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe*, Ed.by B.Rachel, New York: Routledge
30. Rex J. (1996) *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State, Working Papers in the theory of Multiculturalism and Political Integration*, London: Macmillan Press LTD
31. Rotčailds Dž. (1999) *Etnopolitika: Konceptuālās aprises*, Rīga: Izdevniecība AGB
32. Rozenvalds J. (2010) The Soviet Heritage and Integration Policy Development Since the Restoration of Independence in Muižnieks N. (ed.) *How Integrated is Latvian Society? An Audit of Achievements, Failures and Challenges*, Riga: University of Latvia Press
33. Sasse G. (2009) Tracing the construction and effects of EU conditionality in Rachel B. (ed.) *Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe*, New York: Routledg
34. Schwellnus G. (2009) Anti-discrimination legislation in Rachel B. (ed.) *Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe*, New York: Routledge
35. Smith A. D. (1991) *National Identity*, New York: Penguin Books

36. Smith D. J. (2003) Nordic Near Abroad or New Northern Europe? Perspectives on Post-Cold War Regional Co-operation in the Baltic Sea Area in Lehti M. and Smith D. J. (ed.) *Post – Cold War Identity Politics, Northern and Baltic Experiences*, London: Frank Cass
37. Smith D. J. (2008) The end of the “Baltic question”? The Baltic states, Russia and the West in the post-Cold War era in Hiden J., Made V. and Smith D. J. (ed.) *The Baltic Question during the Cold War*, London: Routledge
38. Smith D. J. (2011) “You’ve got to know History!” Remembering and Forgetting the Past in the Present-Day Baltic in Houseden M. and Smith D. J. (ed.) *Forgotten pages in Baltic History. Diversity and Inclusion*, Amsterdam: Rodopi
39. Smith D. J. (2001) *Estonia independence and European integration*, London: Routledge
40. Smith D. J. (2005) *The Baltic States and their Region, New Europe or Old?*, Amsterdam: Rodopi
41. Statistics Estonia, Population by ethnic nationality 2012 January 1, [Online], Available: <http://www.stat.ee/34278> [16 May 2013]
42. Šņitņikovs A. (2007) Ievads. Valsts, etnicitātes un pilsoniskās sabiedrības mijiedarbība integrācijas procesā in Dr.hist Dribins L. Šņitņikovs A. (Zin.red.), *Pretestība sabiedrības integrācijai: Cēloņi un sekas*, Rīga: Latvijas Universitātes Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts
43. Tauriņš G. (2012) *Demokrātija bez tautas*, Rīga – Štutgarte: Poligrāfists
44. Thornberry P. and Estébanez M. A. M. (2004) *Minority rights in Europe; A review of the work and standards of the Council of Europe*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing
45. Volkovs V. (2013) Society integration in Latvia: Overview of current scientific discourse in Volkovs V., Hanovs D., Runce I. (ed.) *Ethnicity, Towards the Politics of Recognition in Latvia: 1991 – 2012*, Riga: Zinātne
46. Zepa B., Šūpule I., Krastiņa L., Ķešāne I., Grīviņš M., Bebriša I., Ieviņa I. *Integrācijas Prakse un Perspektīvas*, Rīga: Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, 2006

Maģistra darbs "Etnisko minoritāšu jautājums Latvijā un Igaunijā pēc iestāšanās Eiropas savienībā" istrādāts LU Humanitāro zinātņu fakultātē.

Ar savu parakstu apliecinu, ka pētījums veikts patstāvīgi, izmanoti tikai tajā norādīties informācijas avoti un iesniegtā darba elektroniskā kopija atbilst izdrukai.

Autors: Madara Šulce _____
/paraksts un datums/

Rekomendēju darbu aizstāvēšanai

Vadītājs: Dr. hist. Inese Runce _____
/paraksts un datums/

Recenzents:

Asoc. prof. Valdis Muktupāvels

Darbs iesniegts Humanitāro zinātņu fakultātē _____

Lietvede: Liene Kalviša _____
/paraksts/

Darbs aizstāvēts maģistra gala pārbaudījuma komisijas sēdē _____

protokols nr. _____, vērtējums _____

Komisijas sekretāre: lektore Inese Runce _____
/paraksts/