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Anotācija

Viens no būtiskākajiem notikumiem politikas sfērā ir Eiropas Savienības referendums, kurā Lielbritānijas pilsoņi nobalsoja par Lielbritānijas izstāšanos no Eiropas Savienības. Tā kā aptauju rezultāti pirms referenduma rādīja pretēju rezultātu, tika izdarīts pieņēmums, ka Britu politiķu retorika un runas pirms referenduma atstāja nozīmīgu iespaidu uz tā iznākumu. Maģistra darbā tika analizētas argumentācijas stratēģijas, ieskaitot lingvistiskās un kognitīvās manipulācijas līdzekļus un aiz tām slēpjošās ideoloģijas, kas iespējams tika lietoti balsotāju pārliecināšanai. Izmantojot vēsturisko diskursa analīzes pieeju, kā kritiskās diskursa analīzes veidu, kā arī korpusa lingvistisko un runu salīdzinošo analīzi, tika secināts, ka pret Brexit noskaņotie politiķi lietoja tādas *argumentācijas stratēģijas* kā *draudi un briesmas, realitāte, vēsture, skaitļi* un *finanses*, kas ļāva klausītājiem izdarīt izvēli, balsojot pret Lielbritānijas izstāšanos no Eiropas Savienības. Savukārt politiķi, kas aģitēja vēlētājus balsot par izstāšanos no Eiropas Savienības vairāk lietoja tādas *argumentācijas stratēģijas* kā *apgrūtinājums un noslogojums, draudi un briesmas, atbildība*, kā arī *skaitļi*, kas iespējams lika klausītājiem secināt, ka jābalso par Lielbritānijas izstāšanos no Eiropas Savienības, lai valsts atgūtu finansiālo un juridisko kontroli. Tāpat tika secināts, ka Brexit atbalstošo politiķu retorikā bieži tika lietoti emocionālās manipulācijas valodas līdzekļi kā arī populistiski izteicieni, taču Eiropas Savienības atbalstošo politiķu retorikā tie visbiežāk bija saistīti ar racionālu manipulāciju. Tādējādi šķiet, ka emocionālās un manipulatīvās argumentācijas stratēģijas politiķu runās varēja ietekmēt Brexit referenduma iznākumu.

Atslēgvārdi: politiskais diskurss, Brexit retorika, kritiskā diskursa analīze, argumentācijas stratēģijas, lingvistiskā manipulācija un pārliecināšana

Abstract

One of the most essential events in the field of politics is the European Union referendum where the citizens of the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. Since opinion polls before the referendum indicated the opposite result, it seems that the political rhetoric and pre-Brexit speeches given by the leading British politicians may have influenced the outcome of the referendum. The present study investigated the argumentation strategies including the linguistic and cognitive means of manipulation and therein embedded ideologies that were applied to persuade the electorate to vote for or against Brexit. The Discourse historical approach to critical discourse analysis as well as a corpus linguistic study and a comparative analysis of speeches were selected to conduct the research. It was concluded that the against-Brexit politicians tended to use such argumentation strategies as the *topoi of threat and danger, reality, history, numbers and finances*, which may have helped to persuade the electorate to vote in favour of staying in the EU. In contrast, the pro-Brexit politicians tended to use the *topoi of burdening and weighting, threat and danger, responsibility* as well as the *topos of numbers* to link the arguments to the conclusion that the UK should leave the EU to regain its financial and legal control. Likewise, the use of linguistic means of emotional manipulation as well as populist expressions were more frequent in the pro-Brexit speeches, while the means of rational manipulation were identified in the against-Brexit corpus, leading to the conclusion that the employed emotional and manipulative argumentation strategies seem to have influenced the outcome of the referendum vote.

Key words: political discourse, Brexit rhetoric, critical discourse analysis, argumentation strategies, linguistic manipulation and persuasion

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Introduction

The United Kingdom European Union membership referendum also known as the EU referendum held on 23 June 2016 and Brexit rhetoric have been one of the most discussed themes in the media and society all around the world. The reason for the continuous discussions and analyses is the unexpected result of the referendum in which the electorate of the United Kingdom voted for triggering Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty thereby opting to leave the European Union.

The most prominent and crucial information that can influence the masses is given by politicians and by the media, whose discourse is often aimed at influencing the beliefs and opinions of people that can in turn lead to specific actions of the information recipients. Further on, it is significant to highlight that argumentation as the main characteristic feature of political discourse is a topical issue to study which contributes to the novelty of the present paper. Thus, it is crucial to investigate what means of language are used to disseminate the information, how they are used, and what functions or purposes they serve. Consequently, the theme of the present paper deals with critical discourse analysis of politicians' speeches relating to the referendum of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union (publicly referred to as Brexit).

Moreover, despite the fact that the EU referendum was a relatively recent event, it has been of interest to political, social, linguistic and cultural studies. A research paper dealing with the analysis of 'rhetorical construction of European identity in the Brexit debate' has been written by White (2016), and a study on immigration and anti-immigration discourses in the early Brexit rhetoric' has been conducted by Cap (2016). Although the authors have analysed Brexit rhetoric in terms of immigration discourses or rhetorical construction of European identity in the Brexit debate, there is still a lack of detailed information and research on the language used in the Brexit arguments for persuasive and manipulative purposes. In other words, there is place for the present study in the field of linguistics and specifically political and critical discourse studies.

Hence, **the goal** of the present study is to analyse the argumentation strategies as well as the applied techniques of manipulation in the pre-Brexit rhetoric of British political figures and to investigate the cause and effect relations between the argumentative language, the ideologies represented in the speeches and the hypothetical persuasive effect of the combination. **The research questions** posed are:

1. Which linguistic argumentation strategies are used in the speeches in order to construct arguments and how they differ in pro-Brexit and against-Brexit arguments?
2. Which are the most frequently applied argumentation strategies and manipulation techniques carrying the function of persuasion in the pre-Brexit speeches?
3. What are the underlying ideologies in the arguments and how are they represented?

The **enabling objectives** set for the research are as follows:

1. to read and select the theories on political discourse and argumentation strategies, techniques of manipulation and persuasion in political rhetoric as well as critical discourse analysis and political ideologies;
2. to collect politicians' speeches in relation to Brexit and to compile corpora for the qualitative and quantitative analysis;
3. to classify the argumentation strategies identified in the selected corpora and compare the application of these strategies for the purposes of persuasion and manipulation;
4. to discuss the role of political ideologies in the Brexit arguments;
5. to draw conclusions.

The discourse-historical approach to critical discourse studies (CDS) has been selected as the underlying methodological approach for the present research. An analytical literature review and a corpus-based approach to critical discourse analysis from the qualitative and quantitative research perspectives have been also applied to validate the results of the analysis. The theoretical contribution of such scholars as Chilton (2004), Wodak (2008-2015), van Dijk (1997-2011) and Fairclough (2012-2013), Sears, Huddy and Jervis (2013), van Eemeren (2015) and Leach (2015), Wodak and Meyer (2001-2016), Bevir and Rhodes (2016) and Musoff (2017) on political discourse and rhetoric, critical discourse analysis, argumentation strategies and political ideologies have been selected as a theoretical basis for this research.

The present paper consists of three chapters.

Chapter 1 deals with the theories and definition of politics, political discourse and rhetoric as well as the concept of ideology and classification of political ideologies in Britain.

Chapter 2 discusses the notion of argumentation in politics, its relation to persuasion and manipulation as well as reviews the linguistic strategies of political rhetoric.

Chapter 3 introduces the methodological background for the present study as well as displays a detailed analysis of argumentation strategies, techniques of manipulation and the role of ideology in Brexit arguments.

1. Political Discourse, Rhetoric and Ideology

Chapter 1 deals with the analysis of theories relating to the nature and concept of politics, political discourse, rhetoric and ideology. The ideas in the theories provided by Teun van Dijk (2009), Isabel Fairclough and Norman Fairclough (2012) and Ruth Wodak (2009-2015) are reviewed. The chapter also introduces the background for the present study and discusses the various political ideologies that can be related to the stances taken in the United Kingdom towards European Union membership referendum (henceforth the EU referendum).

1.1. Concept of Politics and Nature of Political Discourse

The concept of politics has emerged at the time of Greek philosophy and has been discussed by such a well-known philosopher as Aristotle. Nevertheless, the term itself has not acquired one 'universally agreed upon definition', and many scholars such as Chomsky (2004), Chilton (2004) and Wodak (2009) across time have referred to politics from various perspectives and provided a number of definitions (Hawkesworth and Kogan, 2004: 20). Aristotle referred to the concept and essence of politics as 'the participation of equals in collective decision making concerning the content and direction of public life' (ibid.). Another similar definition of politics claims that it is a 'testament to human freedom', which presupposes that 'equal citizens identify the value they wish to live by and create rules and institutions to instantiate those values' (ibid.: 21). Thus, it could be deduced that politics is a field that deals with decisions taken by equals for the common good of society.

However, nowadays there exist 'conceptions of politics' that view the political world from a different perspective and 'derive from different understanding of reason, evidence and explanation' (ibid.). Hence, it can be concluded that politics deals to a large extent with argumentation, where language is an important tool for political communication. This can be supported by Hague et al.'s (1998) view that 'politics involves reconciling differences through discussion and persuasion' and that 'communication is central to politics' (cited in Chilton, 2004: 4). Wodak (2009) sees politics as a 'struggle to impose the legitimate principle of vision and division [...] related to dominance and symbolic violence' (2009:1). In addition, the term *politics* is defined as 'one of the social domains whose practices are virtually exclusively discursive' and that *political cognition* or political thinking and reasoning are ideologically based, ideologies being 'largely reproduced by discourse' (van Dijk, 2006b: 728).

Conclusively, an indicative feature of politics is its function of 'acquiring, maintaining and sustaining power: it is about how resources are allocated and how social actions are harmonised to predetermined purposes' (Charteris-Black, 2005: 4). Moreover, it is

emphasized that ‘language is the lifeblood of politics’, as it is used to exercise power and show dominance, and it is typically achieved via political discourse (Charteris-Black, 2005:4).

As with the concept of politics, political discourse has also been analysed by numerous authors, for example, van Dijk (1997; 2006a), Chilton (2004), Chomsky (2004), Killingsworth (2005), Wodak, De Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (2009), Wodak (2011), Fairclough (2013), and Leach (2015). It is a field that relates to ‘political systems, ideologies, institutions, the political process, political actors, and political events’ (van Dijk, 1997: 25). Aristotle’s (1253a) idea of man being ‘a political animal, [...] whose nature is to live in a polis’ seems to be relevant, because people nowadays are governed, led and influenced by ideologies that are hidden in political rhetoric of the leading politicians in particular nations (cited in Chilton, 2004: 5).

Finally, *political discourse analysis* is defined as ‘a form of argumentation involving [...] mainly practical argumentation, argumentation for and against particular ways of acting, argumentation that can ground decision’ (Fairclough, I. and Fairclough, N., 2012: 2). Consequently, political discourse may be analysed not only from the perspective of written political texts but also from the perspective of spoken political statements, arguments, debates and speeches, which can be included under the concept of rhetoric.

1.2. Concept of Rhetoric

Nowadays, rhetoric is seen as ‘an attempt to move someone, either to incite people to action or to inspire a shift in attitude and position’ (Killingsworth, 2005: 4). Thus, it is political in itself, because politics as mentioned above is also about choice and deliberation, and *rhetoric* as a term is derived from Aristotle’s philosophy, where he ‘distinguishes three types of rhetoric, namely, deliberative, forensic and epideictic’ (cited in Fairclough, 2002: 18). For the goal of the present study, the term *deliberative rhetoric* which is also referred to as *political rhetoric* ‘and deals with decision making, argumentation and influence’ is of use (ibid.). Thus, Aristotle’s concise definition of rhetoric seems to be relating directly to political rhetoric, because he states that rhetoric is ‘the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion’ (cited in Herrick, 2015: 69). The reason for the aforementioned claim is the fact that political rhetoric comprises such rhetorical practices as deliberative speeches which ‘propose future actions based on current trends’ (Killingsworth, 2005: 38). In other words, deliberative speeches aim at persuading people to take certain action or at least to change their way of thinking in favour of the way the speaker thinks or wants the audience to think. Nevertheless, scholars have disputed Aristotle’s claim about rhetoric and persuasion and argued that rhetoric ‘has always been more than merely the art of persuasion’ (Roberts

and Good, 1993: 2). Thus, it can be agreed that ‘rhetoric is essentially and inevitably complex, reflexive, argumentative, fluid and contextual’ (Sears et al., 2013: 287).

1.3. Political Rhetoric and Speech

To begin with, it should be noted that political rhetoric, although still seen as art of persuasion and oratory, deals with slightly different techniques and is generally seen as being distinct from rhetoric in the traditional sense. Załęska (2012) maintains that there are three criteria which may be used to address *political rhetoric*, namely, *the way of speaking*, *the source*, and *the theme* (2012: 2). The aforementioned criteria are ‘commonly used while addressing rhetoric *and/of/in* politics [...] and are often combined’ (ibid.). Here again Aristotle’s ideas can be referred to, and the concept of *genus deliberativum* as ‘a way of speaking that enhances making good choices with the available possibilities’ can be noted (ibid.).

Deliberative speaking, however, cannot be limited only to political rhetoric. Similarly, the functions of *exercising power* and *power abuse* cannot be limited only to politics and political discourse but also to media discourse and business discourse (ibid.). Thus, it can be concluded that although political rhetoric traditionally deals to a large extent with power and deliberative speaking, it should not be seen as the only type of discourse relating to these concepts.

Recently, scholars (e.g. Charteris -Black, 2005, 2014; Turnbull, 2015) have referred to rhetoric in politics not anymore as *a type of speech* but rather as ‘the basis for an analytical framework for the study of political language’ (Turnbull, 2015: 1). Today, rhetoric can be conceptualised as a term representing *political language* with specific emphasis on *persuasive dimensions* of this language (ibid.). Turnbull (2015) refers to this approach to political rhetoric as *thick* in comparison to the previously existing *thin* approaches, which have insofar seen rhetoric ‘as mere technique of speech’ (ibid.: 2). The most outstanding example of political rhetoric as an approach to persuasive speaking is that used by *political leaders* arguing that ‘the ability to persuade [...] other political actors and the public has always been a crucial skill for leaders in elections, in seeking to gain, use and hold on to power on day-to-day basis’ (Tulis, 1987 cited in Turnbull, 2015: 3). The scholar further touches upon three terms that are also of importance for the present study, namely, *argument*, *ethos* and *ideology*, which are discussed in the following subchapters.

Furthermore, political speeches can be seen as belonging to political rhetoric and accordingly to political discourse. Charteris-Black (2014) provides quite a simple but comprehensive definition stating that political speech is ‘a coherent stream of spoken language that is usually prepared for delivery by a speaker to an audience for a purpose on a political occasion’ (Charteris-Black, 2014: 13). There are two functions of political speeches,

the first being ‘concerned with making political decisions’ or *policy-making* and the second aimed at ‘establishing common values’ of *consensus building* (Charteris-Black, 2014: 13). Hence, it follows that the functions of political speeches differ to a large extent by the type of audience they address and the persuasive effect they aim at. Audience is the most significant aspect of political rhetoric, and ‘political speakers should always have the audience in mind’, specifically when making linguistic choices for their speeches (ibid.). Accordingly, the language used by political figures in political speeches will always ‘be influenced by the politicians’ assumptions about the audience’s current state of knowledge’ (ibid.).

1.4. Concept of Ideology in Political Rhetoric

From all the above discussed concepts including politics, discourse and rhetoric, ideology seems to be the most ambiguous, as there is only one common agreement among various scholars (e.g. Van Dijk, 1998; Wodak, 2009; Wodak and Boukala, 2015; Wodak and Meyer, 2016) referring to the concept of ideology, namely, that it is a ‘fuzzy and controversial concept’ (van Dijk, 1998: 1). Van Dijk (1998) even asserts that ‘the various versions of the concept of ideology are simply the scholarly constructs of competing theories’ (ibid.). Some of these competing theories that are relevant to the goal of the present study are summarised below.

The first idea that typically may come to one’s mind when referring to ideology is that it refers to ‘a system of wrong, false, distorted or otherwise misguided beliefs typically associated with social or political opponents’ (van Dijk, 1998: 2). Henceforth, the most typical associations or beliefs that people hold for ideology or ‘the tenets of the classical tradition’ are described by van Dijk (1998)

(a) ideologies are false beliefs; (b) ideologies conceal real social relations and serve to deceive others; (c) ideologies are beliefs others have; and (d) ideologies presuppose the socially or politically self-serving nature of the definition of truth and falsity. (1998: 3)

In other words, the scholar has described the fact that traditionally people perceive ideology as something that other people holding a position of *power or dominance* try to impose on the people who do not have these assets (ibid.). Thus, the concept of ideology is seen as a ‘combination of meaning and form’ as well as a ‘sampling of the variety of human thinking on politics, contained within and presented through a communicative and action-inspiring pattern’ (Freeden, Saehan and Stears, 2013: 199).

Further on, political rhetoric is often closely related and intermingled with political ideology, or rather specific ideologies may be identified as underlying political rhetoric. Freedon et al. (2013) note that ‘political theory of ideologies is concerned not only with the internal organisation of political thinking but also with its external face’ (2013: 197). The

internal organisation is the conceptual political thinking in which the ideologies are rooted, and the *external face* refers to how this thinking is represented to a wider public or ‘the ways in which political ideas are presented in public, communicated to varied constituencies and made persuasive’ (Freeden et al., 2013: 197). Thus, ideologies embody four central characteristics, namely, ‘power over cognition, [...] capability to guide individual’s evaluations’, capability to guide individuals to a specific actions and logical coherence (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 8). The power over the cognition of individuals can further be subdivided into *overt power* where the domination in conflict situations is not hidden and *covert power* where the domination or control over one’s cognition is obscured (ibid.).

The exercise of power via ideologies can thereby be analysed in political arguments as the study of argument is ‘vital to political theory and analysis of ideologies’ (Freeden et al., 2013: 198). Hence, political ideologies are realised in political thinking and when shaped by political arguments, they result in political acts and responses (ibid.). Henceforth, ideologies can be seen not only as something abstract or rather as *internal organisation of political thinking* but also as the *external portrayal* of political rhetoric or the way of presenting, communicating and persuading the wider public (ibid.: 197). Thus, ideology and political rhetoric are closely related in the way the various existing ideologies are represented in public.

1.5. Classification of Political Ideologies in the UK

It seems important to point out that a number of different ideologies have been discussed by, for example, van Dijk (1998) and Freedden et al. (2013). Nevertheless, for the purpose of the present study, only the ideological notions or ideological families that are dominating in the UK will be addressed.

The first ideology that should be mentioned is *conservativism* or the family of *conservative ideologies*, which are typically seen as *right-wing* stances that ‘accept inequality and are resistant to change’ (Freedden et al., 2013: 236). It is further noted that ‘the endorsement of conservative ideology is motivated by the desire to vindicate the social system’ (ibid.). Conservative ideology has been much criticized in recent years due to its *unrealistic ideas*, because for *conservatives* this ideology lies in an ‘excessively optimistic belief in the ability of political action to transform society into a rationally grounded order in which power will survive only as a benign instrument for facilitating desirable ends’ (Freedden et al., 2013: 293). Van Dijk (1998) points out that ‘conservatism is not a specific group ideology, but rather a meta-ideology that organizes some basic principles of other group ideologies’ (van Dijk, 1998: 290). The aforementioned principles of conservatism are rather

beliefs that are based on *conservative values* such as ‘freedom from state intervention, individualism, law and order and family structure’ (van Dijk, 1998: 290). Thus, conservatism is the opposite of progressive ideologies, and it ‘constrains other ideologies such as racism’ (ibid.). Other features of values that can be considered as basis of conservative beliefs are ‘punctuality, dependability, willingness to perform routine tasks, acceptance of authority’ (ibid.: 302). It is, however, noteworthy to point out that racism and inequality are also often seen as being a part of conservative ideology, as it still sees some particular members of society as being *inferior* to others (ibid.).

The second type of ideology that has recently gained more favour not only with political figures but also with society in some nations is *nationalism*. In order to describe the idea of nationalism, it is important to consider the etymology of the word. The word ‘nation derives from Latin terms *nasci* (to be born) and *nation* (belonging together by birth or place of birth)’ (Freeman et al., 2013: 452). Accordingly, nationalism concentrates specifically on the idea of one nation consisting of only the people born in a particular nation and a particular country. Nationalism may often be misunderstood for conservatism, and it also shares a similar belief system, as it tends to neglect *outsider groups* or people who do not belong to the specific nation by birth (ibid.). This is due to the fact that nationalism bases its ideas on biological or ethnocentric views similarly to several other ideologies, for instance, *anarchism*, *fascism*, *liberalism*, *conservatism* and *socialism* (ibid.: 453).

Another type of ideology that is dominating in the UK is *liberalism* (Leach, 2015: 25). Although liberalism is one of the so-called *mainstream ideologies* common in the western world since the nineteenth century, and other ideologies such as *Marxism* are seen as descendants of liberalism, it is still slightly different in its beliefs and values (ibid.: 26). Typical *liberals* or *liberal politicians* are considered to be ‘open-minded, tolerant, freedom loving, sceptical of the claims of tradition and authority, but strongly committed to the values of liberty, competition and individual freedom’ (ibid.). Liberalism is thereby the opposite of such an ideology as conservatism. Furthermore, the main features of liberalism as compared with, for instance, nationalism or conservatism are ‘internationalism, personal and human rights [...], consent between law and individual’, justice and equality between people, freedom of choice and freedom of language, rationalism, universalism and individualism (ibid.: 26-31).

The aforementioned ideologies have existed through the last centuries and have been represented in governments by political parties calling themselves conservatives, liberals or democrats; nevertheless, numerous protesting and *progressive ideologies* have emerged in recent years as a reaction to the conservative and authoritative politics (Leach, 2015: 25). One

of the less seriously perceived, albeit quite a well-known and succeeding term, is *populism*. Populism has generally been perceived with confusion or lack of understanding and tolerance and, therefore, has not been considered to be a meaningful term in the social sciences (Freeman et al., 2013: 494). It is also seen to be a ‘primarily normative term, which should be confined to media or politics’ (ibid.). The term *populism* is defined as ‘a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps’, namely, that of *the poor people* and that of the *corrupt elite* (ibid.). Another typical feature of this ideological approach is that it ‘argues that politics should be an expression of general will of people’ (ibid.). It can be concluded, accordingly, that populism appeals to such groups of people as *working class* or *lower class*, which typically constitutes a major part of the population. It seems logical to draw parallels between this type of ideology and the covert exercise of power, as populism tends to *ignore* or even *obscure* the criticism directed towards it (ibid.). Finally, by defining populism as *thin-centred ideology*, Freeman et al. (2013) separate it from other ideologies, which are in their view *thick-centred* or *full*, meaning that other ideologies in contrast to populism do not incorporate any parts from other political approaches (ibid.). Furthermore, it is suggested that the ‘very thinness of the populist ideology’ lies in the fact that it is a ‘transitory phenomenon’ meaning that it ‘either fails or, if successful, transcends itself’ (Weyland, 2001 cited in Freeman et al., 2013: 499).

To summarize, Chapter 1 has dealt with the discussion of underlying concepts behind political discourse analysis and specifically the analysis of political rhetoric and political ideologies that often serve as the driving force for this type of rhetoric. Political discourse has been defined as the institutionalised way of communication relating to the views and beliefs of political figures, the underlying ideologies and the exercise of power through discourse. Political rhetoric accordingly is seen as the realisation of political discourse in a spoken form with the aim of addressing the public and persuading people to make the decisions proposed by the specific political figures. Political rhetoric includes the notions of speech as well as public debates and statements where the politician or the speaker is given the floor and the audience’s attention for a given period of time. The chapter has likewise introduced briefly the role of language in political communication, which will serve as a basis for the analysis of Brexit rhetoric. The next chapter will review in more detail the constituents of political rhetoric that deal specifically with the function of persuasion via argumentation strategies and means of manipulation with the target audience of political discourse and the specific political rhetoric.

2. Argumentation Strategies and Manipulation as Means of Persuasion

Chapter 2 reviews the existing theories on three significant concepts in political rhetoric, namely, the notions of argumentation, persuasion and manipulation. First, the definitions of argumentation, persuasion and manipulation are introduced. Second, the role of the aforementioned concepts in political discourse is discussed. Third, the strategies of argumentation, persuasion and manipulation are introduced and compared.

2.1. Persuasion in Politics

Before going into detail about the notion of argumentation and its strategies in political speeches, the term *persuasion* should be introduced. *Persuasion* is a term, which may be often perceived as analogous or synonymous with argumentation and sometimes even with manipulation, because it also deals with influencing people to think or act in a certain manner. However, it should be pointed out that, although the three terms may overlap when it comes to the political context, they are not synonyms, as the functions and the strategies used to fulfil these functions differ.

Traditionally, neither manipulation nor argumentation has been considered the main function of political rhetoric but rather ‘political rhetoric has been considered one of the typical areas of persuasion’, and in recent times it has been even ‘joined with the language of advertising’ (Halmari and Virtanen, 2005: 105). The linguistic means that are mentioned among the strategies of persuasion are emotive vocabulary items, ‘rhetorical questions, appeal to logic and authority, use of superlatives, alliterations, vocatives, inclusive first person pronoun and evocation of history’ (ibid.). Other persuasion strategies that can be seen as manipulation in certain contexts are, for instance, ‘frequent repetition’, which can be seen as a ‘salient strategy for pushing one’s agenda’ (Wodak, 2009: 137).

However, it has been observed that ‘persuasion per se rarely leads to the desired result’ or effect on the audience that has been intended by an active persuader; therefore, argumentation strategies and manipulation techniques are often applied as well (Halmari and Virtanen, 2005: 17). Moreover, some authors such as Charteris-Black (2014) point out that argumentation is actually one of the means of persuasion. The scholar notes that political persuasion is about ‘being right’ via ‘having the right intentions (establishing integrity – ethos), thinking right (expressing political arguments –logos), sounding right (heightening emotional impact – pathos), telling the right story (mental representations, myths, frames and schemata) and looking right (dress, hair, and gestures)’ (Charteris-Black, 2014: 94).

In conclusion, persuasion as the main aim of political rhetoric incorporates argumentation strategies including the linguistic means or techniques of manipulation such as

‘sarcasm and irony as a face saving’ techniques (Orwenjo, Oketch and Tunde, 2016 :16). Although some of the linguistic means are common for all the discussed functions of political rhetoric, their goals or intentions differ; therefore, it is only possible to provide an objective analysis of argumentation and manipulation in political speeches by looking critically at the type of discourse and taking into account the immediate and also historical context of the specific political event.

2.2. Argumentation Strategies in Political Speeches

Argumentation is one of the tools in political discourse that is applied on a daily basis and can, accordingly, be considered as one of the most important tools of political rhetoric (Neagu, 2013: 1). According to Bevir and Rhodes (2016), the ‘analysis of political texts should give primacy to practical argumentation and deliberation’ (2016: 191). *Argumentation* is said to be a ‘linguistic and cognitive action pattern which follows the aim of justifying or questioning validity claims that have become problematic or have been questioned’ (Hart and Cap, 2014: 73).

Another definition of the term has been provided by Habermas (1984), whereby *argumentation* is seen as ‘the type of speech in which participants thematise contested validity claims and attempt to vindicate or criticise them through arguments’ (cited in Fairclough, I and Fairclough, N, 2012: 33). The aforementioned definition also refers to the term *argument* from which *argumentation* derives (ibid.). Moreover, if argumentation is a type of speech containing a number of arguments in it, then an argument is structured by and contains ‘reason or grounds that are connected in a systematic way with the validity claim of a problematic expression’ (ibid.). Thus, it follows that argumentation can carry the function or can serve ‘the pragmatic purpose of persuasion’ (Hart and Cap, 2014: 33).

A similar definition is provided by Wodak and Meyer (2016) wherein they acknowledge that argumentation is ‘a linguistic as well as cognitive pattern of problem-solving that manifests itself in a more or less regulated sequence of speech acts which form a complex [...] and coherent network of statement’ (2016: 35).

Considering all the definitions above, it can be concluded that argumentation is a cognitive or mental rather than an exclusively linguistic category of achieving specific actions through reasonable and valid statements and via different strategies and techniques.

The term *strategy* refers to ‘more or less accurate plan adopted to achieve a certain political, psychological or other kind of objective’ (Wodak et al., 2009: 31). Strategies cannot be seen as acts, instead acts and also techniques are the *realisations of strategies* (ibid.: 32). Accordingly, it follows that strategies ‘underlie [...] discursive acts and [...] are automated

activity plans [...] based on models of comprehensive and stereotyped discursive activities which are located on different levels of mental or cognitive organisation and which are elaborated' (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 34). In other words, a strategy may be perceived as a counterpart for 'frame, *scheme* or script' with the difference that in contrast to the aforementioned terms, strategies may be observed to fulfil aims of political *discourse activities* via patterns of language use (Wodak et al., 2009:34).

However, argumentation strategies should not be confused with discursive strategies, because the latter are rather 'understood in terms of the linguistic choices the social actors or [...] political figures as in this case make from available resources according to what they judge to be best means to achieve their ends' (Bevir and Rhodes, 2016: 190). An approach typically used for the analysis of discursive strategies in political and media genres is the Discourse-Historical Approach (henceforth DHA) developed by Wodak (2009). It is proposed that 'DHA identifies five discursive strategies, namely, nomination (reference), predication, argumentation, perspectivization (involvement), and intensification (mitigation), which [...] are realized linguistically in texts' (Bevir and Rhodes, 2016 :190). Thus, argumentation is a type of discursive strategy that pertains to the 'shaping of the lines of attack and defence' (Lewinski and Mohammed, 2015: 16). To look into more detail, argumentation strategies can be seen as

vertically and horizontally coordinated series of strategic manoeuvres aimed at influencing the result of particular dialectical stage, and the discussion as a whole, methodically in a certain direction which manifest themselves at a certain stage of a discourse in a systematic and simultaneous exploitation of the available opportunities. (van Eemeren, 2009: 7)

Furthermore, it should be pointed out that argument analysis comes from Aristotle's ideas about political argumentation and 'topoi' (ibid.). Boukala (2014) notes that 'topoi are the arguments that humans use when they argue for the truth' (2014: 490). According to Aristotle's idea of rhetoric, 'topoi are means of persuasion' (ibid.). The term is also discussed by Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (2009), who suggest that *topoi* are 'highly conventionalised parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory elements of argumentation and take the form of either explicit or inferable premises' (2009: 34). *Topoi* are also aimed at 'gaining the upper hand and producing successful speeches' (Wodak, 2015: 51). According to Wodak and Meyer (2009-2016), *topoi* are 'formal or content-related warrants or conclusion rules which connect arguments with the claims', thus being 'part of argumentation' as such (2009: 110). These argumentation strategies are not always easily recognisable, as they are not always 'expressed explicitly but can be made explicit as conditionals or causal paraphrases such as *if x, then y* or *y, because x*' (ibid.). Although there

are several hundred of *topoi* mentioned in Aristotle’s writings, the list of typical *topoi* that can be found in political rhetoric is as follows:

Table 2.1. The list of topoi for the analysis of content-related argument schemes (Wodak, 2006:74)

Usefulness, advantage	Uselessness, disadvantage
Definition, name-interpretation	Danger and threat
Humanitarianism	Justice
Responsibility	Burdening, weighting
Finances	Reality
Numbers	Law and Right
History	Culture
Abuse	

The aforementioned argumentation strategies (*topoi*) are characterised as follows:

1. The topos of **usefulness, advantage**, namely the idea that an act that is advantageous and useful for ‘us, them or everyone’, should be performed and is accordingly referred to as *pro bono eorum*, *pro bono nobis*, and *pro bono publico* (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 74);
2. The topos of **uselessness, disadvantage** is the opposite of the aforementioned *topoi* in the way that it ‘relies on the conditional’ presupposing that if a specific action does not lead to the desired goal, it has to be rejected or changed (ibid.: 75);
3. The topos of **definition, name-interpretation** has also been referred to as *locus a nominis interpretatione* and presupposes that if a specific action, object or person is given a specific name, it should have the qualities ‘contained in the literal meaning’ of that name (ibid.);
4. The topos of **danger and threat** is a topos that is also based on conditionals, namely, ‘there are specific dangers or threats, one should do something against them’ (ibid.);
5. The topos of **humanitarianism** can be said to comply with *the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, because it presupposes that everyone should be treated equally, and that an act that goes against equal rights for all people, should not be performed;
6. The topos of **justice** is similar to the topos of humanitarianism, as it also presupposes ‘equal treatment for all’ (ibid.);

7. The topos of **responsibility** is a conditional topos. It refers to the idea that if state officials or the government have performed actions that have led to a problem situation, they should take the responsibility to correct it or ‘find solutions’ (Wodak and Meyer.: 76);
8. The topos of **burdening, weighting** is also referred to as the *topos of consequence* presupposing that if a state is weighted down by burdens, ‘one should act in order to diminish these burdens’ (ibid.: 76);
9. The topos of **finances** is rather a simple conditional as it presupposes that if a situation or action within an institution or a country leads to the loss of financial resources, it should not be performed or should be acted upon in order to avoid the potential loss of money (ibid.);
10. The topos of **reality** is characterised as ‘rather a tautological argumentation scheme’ that weights on the fact that actions that correspond to the real situation should be taken (ibid.);
11. The topos of **numbers** is a scheme that can be ‘subsumed under a conclusion rule that if the numbers prove a specific topos, specific actions should be taken’ (ibid.). However, ‘this topos can become *fallacious*’ when related to incorrectly interpreted statistics or numbers (ibid.);
12. The topos **law and right** presupposes the condition that if a specific action is against the law, it should not be performed;
13. The topos of **history** presupposes that one should learn from the history wherein a specific act has already taken place and led to specific unwanted conclusions, thus showing that similar acts should not be performed in future;
14. The topos of **culture** is an argument scheme related to the nature of specific cultures and issues that may and do arise due to this nature as well as actions that must be performed to avoid the issues;
15. The topos of **abuse** refers to the condition that if specific groups of people or specific actions abuse the laws of a country or its people, they should be dealt with.

Thus, the topoi listed above show causal and conditional relationships. The topoi are also deemed *political argumentation schemes* and can be of two types, namely, *reasonable* or *fallacious* (Wodak and Koller, 2010: 254; Wodak and Meyer, 2009 and 2016).

Furthermore, although Wodak and Meyer’s (2009 and 2016) approach to argumentation analysis via topos as warrants of truth or factuality is taken as a basis for the present study, the criticism that has been received towards this approach should also be considered. Thus, Žagar (2010 and 2011) argues that Wodak’s treatment of topoi is ‘very general and superficial’ due

to the lack of an in-depth analysis of the claim or warrant and the conclusion rule it leads to in a specific topos (Žagar, 2010: 11). The scholar also asserts that the concept of topos as derived from Aristotle's *topics* and Cicero's *loci* is more complex and demanding in terms of analysis than simply giving a list of most often found topoi and their identification in specific texts (ibid.). Although Žagar's severe criticism seems to be overemphasizing the simplification of topoi in CDA, it gives a reasonable argument that topoi can be used not only as 'tools for finding arguments' but also for 'testing the given arguments against the background of the given list of topoi' (Žagar, 2011: 18). Two steps have been proposed for the detailed analysis of arguments via the given list of topoi, the first step being the identification of *arguments* and *conclusions* in the specific discourses and the second step being the reproduction of 'how possible topoi might relate to these arguments' (ibid.). Thus, in the present study Wodak's approach to the identification of topoi will be combined with the two steps for detailed analysis proposed by Žagar (2011).

In addition, since sound arguments are supposed to be *logical* and never *fallacious*, ten rules of discerning reasonable and sound arguments from fallacies exist:

1. Freedom of arguing – parties must not prevent each other from advancing or challenging claims;
2. Obligation to give reasons- parties request to give a claim [...] must never refuse to do so;
3. Correct reference to the previous discourse by antagonist- attacks on claims may not bear on claim that has not actually been put forward by the other party;
4. Obligation of matter-of-factness – claims may not be defended by non-argumentation or argumentation that is not valid to the claim;
5. Correct reference to implicit premises- parties may not falsely attribute unexpressed premises to the other party, nor disown responsibility for their own unexpressed premises;
6. Acceptance of shared starting points – parties may not falsely present something as an accepted starting point or falsely deny that something is an accepted starting point;
7. Use of plausible schemes of argumentation – claims may not be regarded as conclusively defended if the defence does not take place by means of appropriate argumentation scheme correctly applied;
8. Logical validity – an argumentation that is presented in an explicit and complete way must not contradict the rules of logic;
9. Acceptance of the discussion's results- inconclusive defences of claims may not lead to maintaining these claims, and conclusive defences of claims may not lead to maintaining expressions of doubt concerning these claims;
10. Clarity of expression and correct interpretation – parties may not use any formulations that are insufficiently clear or ambiguous, and they may not deliberately interpret the other party's formulations. (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 36)

Albeit the ten rules for reasonable rather than fallacious topoi in arguments seem to rather apply to political debates as a type of political rhetoric, they can likewise be applied to political speeches, because political figures often refer to other parties in their speeches

especially in events where the votes of the audiences are involved. Hence, the rules of logic, reason giving, clarity of expression and correct and truthful reference to other parties are also applicable to the analysis of topoi in political speeches.

Significant features of political argumentation strategies are *lexical units and syntactic devices* such as *personal, temporal and spatial references*, the *passive voice* and *tropes* such as *personification, synecdoche and metonymy* (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 35). However, it should be noted that the aforementioned strategies can also be used for manipulative purposes as described further in the chapter.

Another strategy of argumentation serving the function of manipulation (if applied frequently) is the strategy of *positive-self* and *negative-other representation*. The self and other construction strategy can also be referred to as the *inclusion and exclusion* strategy (Wodak, 2015: 45). Wodak (2015) further notes that ‘the strategic use of many linguistic indicators to construct in- and out-groups is fundamental to political discourses’ (ibid: 46). One of the main strategies of inclusion and exclusion as noted above is ‘positive self-presentation and the negative presentation of others’ (ibid: 49). Furthermore, five types of linguistic strategies pertaining to self and other representation via linguistic means can be distinguished.

The first type of strategies is the *referential or nomination strategies* that include such linguistic means as pronouns, metaphor, synecdoche and metonymy (Wodak, 2015: 50). This type of strategy pertains to the construction and representation of *social actors* through the creation of ‘in-groups and out-groups’ (ibid.). The most typical examples of this type of strategy is representing ‘part as standing for whole or whole standing for a part [...] of something’, which is linguistically referred to as synecdoche (ibid.).

The second type is *predication strategies* that are realised through the use of *implicit and explicit predicates* or assertions and are considered to correspond to the aforementioned referential and nomination strategies (ibid.). However, these types of strategies concentrate on emphasizing either positive or negative traits of something via linguistic forms of predicates (ibid.).

The third and the fourth type are *argumentation* and *discourse representation strategies* where such devices as ‘reporting, description and quotation’ are used (ibid.). Finally, two seemingly opposite strategies are combined in the fifth type of self and other representation in political rhetoric and those are *intensifying and mitigation strategies* that include the use of various adjectives, adverbs, the passive voice, etc. (Wodak, 2015: 50).

Furthermore, Simpson and Mayr (2013) refer to such strategies of political rhetoric as *presupposition and implicature*, which make use of indirect transfer of information to the target audience to ‘deduce meaning and make assumptions’ (2013: 43). Thus, the

aforementioned strategy is useful to political actors, as it can help them ‘evade responsibility for what they say’ (Simpson and Mayr, 2013: 43). Among the linguistic means used in this strategy, metaphor, pronouns, euphemisms and parallelisms are mentioned (ibid.).

Metaphor is seen as a *conceptual* or indirect use of language for the purpose of *persuasion* or influence (Simpson and Mayr, 2013: 44). Although metaphor is best known from literary theory and analysis, nowadays it has become a ‘deliberatively and intentionally persuasive’ device used in politics and media (ibid.). Thus, relating to presupposition and implicature, it can be stated that ‘metaphors are [...] of the linguistic ways [...] for concealing underlying power relations’ (ibid.). It seems, thus, that metaphor would rather be a strategy used in certain arguments used for the purpose of manipulation. Here it would be logical to agree with Musoff (2017) who asserts that ‘discourse in general – and political discourse in particular – is much about rhetoric, emotion arousal and interactional influence as about factual information’ (2017: 2-3). The author analyses the media approaches to perspective Brexit as an emotional rather than rational decision via the use of rhetorical devices such as metaphor. It should however be noted that political discourse today is much related and incorporated in the media discourse as they share the aforementioned approaches. As Musoff (2017) maintains that metaphoric expressions and metaphors as such are ‘mini scenarios or narratives that carry [...] both speakers and listeners to evaluative stance’ thus being ‘one of the chief framing devices of public discourse’ (Musoff, 2017: 3). The author elaborates on the popular metaphoric expression used by the media ‘Britain is the heart of Europe’ which is also applied by the politicians and derives from the metaphor NATION IS A BODY.

Apart from metaphor in political discourse, there is also a figure of speech referred to as *euphemism*, which is the use of ‘mild, inoffensive or vague words as a means of making something seem more positive than it might otherwise appear’ (ibid.: 44). In politics, euphemisms are usually applied when referring to such controversial subjects as ‘war, unemployment, downsizing, etc.’ (Simpson and Mayr, 2013: 44).

Another linguistic feature pertaining to power play and implying some degree of *presupposition* and *implicature* is pronouns (ibid.). Although pronouns are seemingly neutral and structural part of language use, they may play a crucial role when it comes to their application in politics. Further on, in political discourse and accordingly in political rhetoric the ‘pronoun use by [...] political speakers has an important persuasive function’ (ibid.). This function is specifically crucial when political figures refer to ‘themselves, their parties or the nation as a whole’ (ibid.). Two types of the use of third person pronoun *we* can be distinguished, namely, *the inclusive we* and *the exclusive we*, where the former refers to the

speaker and the target audience and the latter excludes certain participants from the reference (Simpson and Mayr, 2013: 45).

In other words, speakers often tend to use the *inclusive we* more often in politics, because it can help political figures to achieve several goals, that is, to ‘obscure responsibility and agency, share responsibility with someone else, and [...] persuade the nation’ to take a specific action (ibid.: 44).

Finally, another feature which is used by political figures and as such is present in political rhetoric and political discourse is parallelism. The term *parallelism* refers to the act of expressing ‘several ideas through a series of similar grammatical structures’ (ibid.: 45). The function of parallelism in political rhetoric is ‘to make some [...] specific parts of a message stand out’ (ibid.). In other words, parallelisms are used by political figures to emphasize the notion they want people to consider and on which to concentrate.

2.3. Manipulation Techniques in Political Arguments

As mentioned above, persuasion in political arguments has been at times seen to be combined or covering for the function of manipulation. Hansson (2015) refers to the term *communicative manipulation* noting that it is based on various linguistic strategies that deal with ‘discursive power abuse’ (Hansson, 2015: 304). Manipulation is also seen as ‘a form of social power abuse, cognitive mind control and discursive interaction’ (van Dijk, 2006: 359). Moreover, manipulation ‘not only involves power, but specifically the abuse of power’ (van Dijk, 2006: 360) such as domination and ‘claims to power’ (Partington, 2003: 165). Due to the deceiving and covert nature of manipulation, it has been also seen as being the counterpart of propaganda (Jowett and O’Donnel, 2006: 110). It even pointed out that propaganda is in fact ‘manipulation of popular impulse’ and note that the word propaganda should be used instead of manipulation in political discourse (ibid.; Wodak and Koller, 2010: 319). The term further implies ‘the exercise of a form of illegitimate influence by means of discourse: manipulators make others believe or do things that are in the interest of the manipulator, and against the best interests of the manipulated’ (van Dijk, 2006: 360).

Van Dijk (2006) offers a three-layered view on the notion of manipulation. The three layers are as follows: the social layer, cognitive layer and discourse layer.

On the social layer, ‘manipulation is defined as illegitimate domination confirming social inequality’ (2006: 360). This type of manipulation which often occurs on the social level depends on the control of ‘the beliefs of the recipients’ which lead to particular actions of these recipients or the target audience (ibid: 162). Moreover, the social level also deals with

social groups such as family, social circles and cultural groups; therefore, manipulation may target the needs of the aforementioned groups such as financial needs (van Dijk, 2006: 152).

On the cognitive layer, ‘manipulation as mind control involves the interference with processes of understanding, the formation of biased mental models and social representations such as knowledge and ideologies’ (ibid.). In other words, cognitive manipulation goes further into human mind and experimenting with their internal beliefs, thoughts, perceptions and ideologies they trust in (ibid.: 164; Edelman, 2013: 104). Manipulation typically conceals some relevant information and provides only the facts that are ‘in the interest of manipulator and against the interest of the target’ (ibid.). It can likewise be mentioned that cognitive manipulation is typically covert as ‘the transparency of manipulative attempt would compromise its success’ (Kamil and Al-Hindavi, 2017: 31).

Furthermore, the specific linguistic and graphical tools that may be used by manipulators at the cognitive level target the *short-term memory* of the recipients and include the structuring of text so that the manipulative statements are placed in the beginning and emphasized accordingly, for example, slogans in bold or intonation in speeches (van Dijk, 2006: 164).

On the discourse level, ‘manipulation generally involves the usual forms [...] of ideological discourse, such as emphasizing *our good things*, and emphasizing *their bad things*’ (ibid.). In other words, the model proposed by van Dijk (2006) relates to what has already been discussed above, namely, argumentation, representation of self and other as well as ideologies. Van Dijk (2006) points out that manipulation on the discourse level goes beyond language and includes such tools as gestures, music, and pictures (2006: 172). Moreover, ‘manipulative discourse typically occurs in public communication controlled by dominant political, bureaucratic, media, academic or corporate elites’, accordingly the aforementioned tools are displayed and emphasized throughout the speech, broadcast or text (ibid.; Bouvier, 2016: 2). Here it would be logical to agree with Musoff (2017) who asserts that ‘discourse in general – and political discourse in particular – is much about rhetoric, emotion arousal and interactional influence as about factual information’ (2017: 2-3). In other words, what the scholars seem to be claiming is that political discourse nowadays is about manipulation with information, however, the purposes and forms of that manipulation may differ.

More recent theories presuppose that due to the complex and diverse nature of manipulation, several types can be distinguished depending on which *mental sphere* is targeted, for instance, *rational* and *emotional manipulation*. Rational manipulation targets the rational sphere and typically uses ‘convincing facts and arguments to affect listener’s

consciousness’; whereas, emotional manipulation is the ‘expression of the speaker’s emotions with the aim of targeting the listener’s emotions’, and it can be direct or overt and indirect or covert realised through figurative language (Kamil and Al-Hindawi, 2017: 46). Thus, it can also be concluded that manipulation is pragmatic or contextual in nature.

Furthermore, since manipulation is often considered as being related to different ideological stances, the linguistic strategies of *ideological reconstruction* are also of importance for the present study. Wodak (2009) refers to a ‘particularly promising methodology’ to be used for this type of analysis listing several techniques of ideological reconstruction and thus manipulation in political rhetoric:

- *lexical-semantic technique* (analysis of catchwords and value words, euphemisms, ideological polysemy);
- *Sentence and text-semantic procedures* (analysis of tropes, semantic isotopes, inclusions and exclusion strategies);
- *Pragmatic and text-linguistic techniques* (analysis of forms of address, speech acts, allusions, presuppositions, conversation, argumentations, rhetoric, quotations, intertextuality);
- *Semiotic techniques* (icon, symbol, and semiotic analysis). (Wodak, 2009: 7)

Other techniques that are seen as being used for manipulative purposes in political rhetoric are ‘spreading and repetition of connotative words, generalisation of new terminology, elimination of some items from public discourse, unmotivated or misleading analogies, acronyms, abbreviations, numbers and naming of elements of everyday environment’ or simplified, informal language (de Saussure, 2005 cited in Kamila and Al-Hindawi, 2017: 103). Thus, it can be concluded that manipulation is one of the aspects that requires a critical standpoint or critical perspective.

To summarize, Chapter 2 has discussed the notions of argumentation, persuasion and manipulation as related to political discourse. It has been concluded that, although argumentation and manipulation are techniques used for persuasive purposes, the linguistic means and the strategies that are applied for the aforementioned three functions differ slightly when used in different contexts, because as such argumentation supports one’s claims via facts, while manipulation misguides audience’s views to achieve one’s political goals. It has also been concluded that argumentation strategies may employ several linguistic means such as figurative language that are used for manipulative purposes. Thus, the chapter has provided a basis for further analysis of political speeches in the Pre-Brexit campaign, as it has reviewed the linguistic means and strategies that are typically used for the purposes of argument construction, persuasion of masses as well as for manipulative purposes. The next chapter will introduce and discuss the methods and tools selected for the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the argumentation strategies and the analysis and the results of the present study.

3. Critical Discourse Analysis of Political Rhetoric in Brexit Rhetoric

Chapter 3 presents the empirical part of the present study. The first part of the chapter discusses the methods and approaches that have been used in the present study, namely, the concept of critical discourse analysis and critical discourse studies, the steps of discourse historical approach that have been taken in the analysis of argumentation, the procedure and application of corpora in the statistical analysis of the linguistic means of persuasion and the social and political setting of the EU referendum and the circumstantial background of the political figures under the discussion. The second part of the chapter deals with the analysis of the argumentation strategies and the techniques of manipulation and persuasion as related to political ideologies in the Brexit rhetoric. More specifically, the results of critical discourse analysis of pro-Brexit and against-Brexit speeches provided by British politicians such as *David Cameron, Boris Johnson, Nigel Farage, Theresa May* and *Micheal Gove* are explored in this chapter. First, a detailed analysis of argumentation strategies in the selected speeches is provided. Second, a qualitative and quantitative analysis of linguistic means of persuasion as part of the Brexit argumentation is outlined. Finally, the role of ideology in the EU referendum and its communication is discussed and analysed. Therein, the political standpoints of pro-Brexit politicians and against-Brexit politicians are reviewed.

3.1. Critical Study of Discourse and Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is an academic school or movement led by Ruth Wodak, Norman Fairclough and Teun van Dijk. CDA studies discourse from multiple critical perspectives and sees it as being related to ‘power actions, society and culture, ideology, history and social action’ (van Dijk, 2009: 366-373). Although CDA has often been perceived to be a method to the linguistic study of texts, it is in fact a way of thinking and interpreting discourses wherein the social exercise of power and discrimination takes place. Even more, it has been argued by van Dijk (2013) that CDA is no longer a term applied to the critical studies of discourses, but rather a *paradigm* that implies ‘everything that is studied from critical perspective’ (cited in Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 3). Accordingly, the critical study of discourse or CDS in this paper will be used to look not only at the selected political speeches as texts per se, but also to look ‘with a considerable dose of critique’ at the arguments and ideologies as well as power relations that transcend these texts and to underpin the goals and effects of this type of discourse (ibid.).

Further on, referring back to the operating fields of CDS, it seems relevant to agree with Wodak’s (2009) view that *political argumentation* is a form of *political action* and that

‘politics work the way politicians work’ (Wodak, 2009: 199). In this regard, such functions as argumentation or persuasion (including manipulation) can be perceived to be types of political action, because although argumentation and manipulation do not physically perform any type of action, they may provoke or evoke people, the target audience of political discourse, to perform actions desired by the political figures. This also seems to be the case with Brexit referendum as discussed in the next chapter.

There is, however, a slightly different view on the aim of critical discourse analysis presupposing that its typical feature is the tendency to ‘focus [...] the analysis upon representations of persons, social or ethnic groups, objects, processes, events and places rather than upon action and accordingly on discourses rather than genres’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2016: 189). Thus, it can be concluded that CDA of political discourse studies the political text as well as the actions, the views, the histories and the context behind the specific political texts. The three levels of critique that are distinguished when analysing political texts are first of all the process of ‘looking at inconsistencies and dilemmas within the text itself’, secondly, embedding the selected text in its specific context and looking ‘at the persuasive features the discursive practice might have’ and finally ‘trying to improve something in the process or doing something to apply the results’ (Wodak, 2008). Consequently, for the purpose of the present study, both views are considered and used, as the analysis focuses on practical argumentation in political texts.

3.1.1. Discourse-Historical Approach

One of the approaches used in CDS to study political argumentation is the *discourse-historical approach (DHA)*. It does not base its analysis on observational methods but rather ‘focuses on the analysis of elite texts’ (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 21). Since the present study focuses on the analysis of political discourse including political rhetoric in the form of texts (the selected speeches and debates have been transcribed), DHA has been selected as the most appropriate approach. Furthermore, as with the other approaches to the study of discourse, DHA has also specific guidelines to be followed, namely, a comprehensive eight-step guide for the analysis which has been proposed by Wodak and Meyer (2016: 39-41) and has been applied in the present study.

The first step is the reference to and consideration of the previous study on the topic, which has been done and displayed in the first chapters of this study. The following step has been the gathering of evidence and data for the analysis as well as observation of the contextual information around this data, namely, political speeches as representatives of Brexit rhetoric. After that the selected data in the form of a corpus of texts and transcribed

speeches has been reviewed for selecting and narrowing of the specific linguistic means that are analysed in the paper, namely, the strategies of argumentation (*topoi*) and therein applied techniques of persuasion and manipulation.

Step number four was the formulation of the research questions, which have been presented in the introduction of the paper. Further steps that have been proposed by Wodak and Meyer (2016) already deal with the empirical part of research, namely, ‘qualitative pilot, context, macro and micro analysis’ of the discursive event, ‘detailed case studies (qualitative and quantitative)’ of the particular selected discourses, ‘formulation of a critique (interpretation and explanation of results)’ and ‘practical application of analytical results’ (ibid.: 39). The final steps of the procedure are accordingly implemented in the empirical part of the present study, that is, further in Chapter 3. The analysis of argumentation in political discourse and specifically in the Brexit rhetoric can also be carried out following Wodak and Meyer’s (2016) guidelines for implementing DHA to the analysis of arguments, which includes:

1. function categories (e.g. claim, argument/premise, conclusion, rule, modality);
2. formal categories (formal *topoi*/fallacies, such as the scheme of definition, [...] of authority, comparison and example);
3. content-related categories ([...] such as the scheme of ignorance, the scheme of nature and the scheme of manipulation);
4. categories describing argumentative meso- and macro- structures (such as stages of argumentation, the complexity of argumentation and the inter-dependency of arguments). (2016: 41)

In the present paper, all the aforementioned steps will be taken, but special attention will be given to the analysis of Wodak and Meyer’s (2016) function categories, formal and content-related categories, namely, *topoi*, *fallacies* and manipulation.

3.1.2. Corpus-Based Approach to Critical Analysis of Political Discourse

Apart from the DHA approach which will be implemented to the study of arguments in the selected samples of Brexit rhetoric, a statistical approach is required to validate the data. Van Dijk (2009) points out that ‘a relatively recent development in CDS has been its incorporation of computer-based methods of analysis’ and that nowadays an approach referred to as *corpus-based CDS* can be identified in sociolinguistic research (van Dijk, 2009: 366). It is recognized by many scholars, for instance, McEnery, Xiao and Tono (2006), van Dijk (2009), Wodak (2009) and Wodak and Meyer (2016), that there is considerable potential of corpus-based approach to CDA. This potential relies on three main factors. First, the value of the corpus approach to CDS lies in that it ‘allows analysts to work with much larger data volumes than they can when using purely manual techniques’ (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 123). Second, by

applying corpus data for the critical analysis of discourses ‘the researcher bias may be reduced or avoided thus pertaining to arguments against the ‘harsh and persistent’ criticism that has been given to CDA (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 123). Finally, one of the important advantages is the opportunity to apply both the qualitative and quantitative perspectives to the textual data analysis and interpretation by ‘computing frequencies and measures of statistical significance, as well as presenting data extracts in such a way that a researcher can access individual occurrences of search words’ as well as examine qualitatively the collocational environment of the search words, ‘describe salient semantic patterns and identify discourse functions’ (ibid.: 121; McEnery et al., 2006: 55).

Thus, a corpus of pro-Brexit and against-Brexit speeches has been compiled and is used to provide a more detailed analysis and data that show the statistical use of the linguistic means of persuasion and manipulation in the Brexit arguments. The corpus tools are used not only for identifying quantitatively such linguistic means as the pronouns of inclusion and exclusion, but also for describing their contextual environment in the texts. The selected corpus consists of 20 political speeches delivered by 15 British politicians (see sample speeches in the appendices). The total number of words in the designed corpora is 55 353 words, which includes 28 935 words in the *Corpus of Against-Brexit Speeches* (C1) and 26 418 words in the *Corpus of Pro-Brexit Speeches* (C2). Further analysis and statistical description of the number of words in a separate speech corpora per politician is provided in the analysis of the empirical data below. However, it should be noted that due to the fact that the lengths of speeches differ among the selected political figures, normalised frequency will be counted via Wordsmith calculator provided by the Lancaster University.

3.2. EU Referendum

It has already been noted that the word *Brexit* is a blend of the words *Britain* and *exit* and that it is used to commonly refer to the EU referendum (Tekin, 2016: 4). The label emerged during the preparation for the referendum of the European Union (henceforth EU) that was held on 23 June 2016 on whether the United Kingdom (UK) should remain a member state of the EU or leave it after 43 years of being a member of the European Community and later the EU (Curry, 2016: 1). The referendum was initiated by the former Prime Minister of the UK and a member of the Conservative party David Cameron prior to the general parliament election in the year 2013 in his so-called *Bloomberg speech* (Tekin, 2016: 3). Cameron then proposed that the UK could opt to trigger *Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty on European Union* presupposing that ‘any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements’ (Rose, 2016: 6).

During the years 2013 through 2014, the bill for the referendum was officially accepted by the Queen and the government and announced in the year 2015. The official referendum question was ‘Should the UK remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?’ (Online 3). The announced polling day was 23 June 2016, and until then active political debates, discussions and speeches were held by numerous authorities, including members of parliament and individual state politicians.

Surveys and voting polls were carried out before the referendum, and the results indicated that the majority of the surveyed population would vote for staying in the EU. Nevertheless, the result turned out to be the contrary; namely, it showed that more than 51.90% of the electorate voted for the country to leave the EU, while 48.10% voted to remain (Online 3). It should also be noted that the statistical distribution of voters across age groups, social strata and regions differed, thus making it an important factor for this analysis. According to the results of the referendum published by the UK parliament, the proportion of people voting for Brexit was ‘strongly related to the proportion that voted for the UKIP (UK Independence Party) in the European Parliament Election in 2014’ (Online 3). Moreover, the results estimated that the proportion of pro-Brexit voters was also strongly related to the proportion of non-graduates and people older than 60 years (ibid.). One of the polls by *Lord Ashcroft* distributed after the referendum surveyed 12 369 people aiming to explain their choice (Online 6). The survey targeted a number of categories that might have influenced the final decision, namely, age, employment and education, race and religious beliefs, political party support as well as the beliefs and opinions about the benefits and disadvantages of being an EU member country. The survey also included a question about the timeliness of the decision made for or against Brexit.

The results suggested that ‘the older the voters, the more likely they were to have voted to leave the EU’ (Online 6). It was also concluded that a majority of the people having ‘full or part-time job’ voted to stay in contrast to those not being employed or retired who voted to leave (ibid.). The poll also showed that ‘a majority (57%) of those with a university degree voted to remain [...] and 64% of those with a higher degree and more than four in five (81%) of those still in full time education’, while a majority of people ‘whose education ended with secondary school voted to leave’ (ibid.). It is also significant that the analysis of the polling results indicated that a majority of ‘professionals and managers (57%)’ voted to remain in the EU, while a majority of unskilled workers, that is, ‘64% voted to leave’ the EU (ibid.). As regards the support for the political parties, it was concluded that ‘those who backed the Conservative party in 2015 voted to leave the EU (58%), as did more than 19 out of 20 UKIP supporters’ (ibid.). In contrast, ‘nearly two thirds of Labour and SNP voters (63% and 64%),

seven in ten Liberal Democrats and three quarters of Greens, voted to remain' (ibid.). Finally, a significant conclusion made when analysing the polling results was that 57% of the surveyed voters claimed that they had made up their mind about the vote during the last year before the referendum, while 43% claimed that they had always known their decision (ibid.). From the discussed results, it seems logical to conclude that all the aforementioned factors had a large influence on the result of the EU referendum, and moreover that people seemed to have been influenced by the debates and arguments put forward by the politicians during the year before the referendum. Thus, it is significant to study the content and presentation of the arguments used in the campaigns in order to analyse the possible consequences or conclusions that might have influenced their final decision.

The speeches of the leading campaign politicians have been selected as a corpus for the analysis of arguments and linguistic means used. As Jackson, Thorsen and Ring conclude 'the top five most frequently reported participants' in the media were 'David Cameron (8.9% of all appearances), Boris Johnson (6.7%), George Osborne (4.0%), Nigel Farage (3.2%) and Michael Gove (2.8%)' (2016: 34). Consequently, it can be stated that the aforementioned politicians were the spokespeople of the referendum campaigns.

3.2.1. Pro-Brexit Politicians

The campaign arguing for the UK leaving the EU or the pro-Brexit campaign was entitled *Vote Leave and Take Back Control* (Online 5). The campaign consisted of numerous public speeches, press briefings, interviews and statements by British politicians from all the leading political parties, namely, the Conservative Party (referred to as the Tories), the Labour Party and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). Furthermore, the political background of the leading political figures that advocated the pro-Brexit campaign is discussed below.

Boris Johnson is a former member of the *Conservative Party* and a Mayor of London and currently the *Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs* (Online 1). B. Johnson is one of the leading politicians of the pro-Brexit campaign and 'the most prominent opponent of David Cameron' (Jackson et al., 2016: 24). Two speeches given by the politician have been selected for Corpus 2 (pro-Brexit speeches). They consist of 6196 words.

Nigel Farage is the leader of the UKIP. Previously positioning himself as a conservative politician, N. Farage changed his political views and joined the Eurosceptic movement after the EU referendum was initiated (Ford and Goodwin, 2014: 277). It is considered that the UKIP 'focuses their energies on recruiting and retaining support from middle-class, moderate swing voters' (ibid.). Nevertheless, as noted by scholars such as Ford and Goodwin (2014), the UKIP is a right-wing populist and Eurosceptic party that has

‘developed into an effective electoral machine which looks to win and retain the loyalties’ of British voters (Ford and Goodwin, 2014: 277). Moreover, as concluded in Jackson et al. (2016), ‘Farage has taken his place among a wave of right-wing populist politicians across Europe’ (2016: 86). His speeches are typically short, and the speech selected for the pro-Brexit corpus consists of 271 words.

Michael Gove is a member of the *Conservative Party* and the previous *Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice* (Online 1). He is also a columnist in the British tabloid newspaper *The Daily Mail* (ibid.). Two speeches given by the politician have been selected for Corpus 2 (pro-Brexit speeches), and they consist of 7693 words.

David Davies is a member of the *Conservative Party* and a Member of Parliament in the House of Commons (ibid.). The speech selected consists of 5459 words.

Gisela Stuart is a member of the *Labour Party* and MP in the House of Commons (Online1). She was the leading politician advocating the *Leave Campaign* together with Boris Johnson and Michael Gove (Online 5). The speech selected consists of 840 words.

Iain Duncan Smith is a member of the *Conservative Party* and the previous *Secretary of State for Work and Pensions* (Online 1). The speech selected comprises 367 words.

Liam Fox is also a member of the *Conservative Party* and the current *Secretary of State for International Trade and President of the Board of Trade* (ibid.). The chosen pre-Brexit speech consists of 1661 words.

Chris Grayling is a member of the *Conservative Party* and the current *Secretary of State for Transport* (ibid.). Grayling’s pro-Brexit speech consists of 2205 words.

3.2.2. Against-Brexit Politicians

The campaign advocating the so-called *Remain side* consisted of representatives from the Conservative Party, and they had the support of the Labour Party as well (Jackson et al., 2016: 90).

David Cameron was the Prime Minister of the UK through years 2010-2016 and is a member of the *Conservative Party* being a liberal and a democrat (Seldon and Snowden, 2015: 1). D.Cameron together with B.Johnson have been referred to as the most ‘prominent spokespeople in their party appealing to the majority of the electorate’ (Johnson et al., 2016: 26). As noted above, D. Cameron has been one of the spokespeople of the Brexit referendum campaigns and, therefore, has numerous speeches. Four of them have been selected for the corpus of against-Brexit speeches (Corpus 1), which consists of 11973 words.

Theresa May is a member of the *Conservative Party* and First Lord of the Treasury and Minister for the Civil Service (Online 1). Previously being the Home Secretary, she became

the new leader of the Conservative party and the new PM of the UK after Cameron's resignation (ibid.). The speech made by Theresa May before the Brexit referendum consists of 5893 words.

Tim Farron is the leader of the *Liberal Democrat Party* and an MP in the House of Commons (ibid.). Farron together with the Liberal Democrats have been said to be the 'most sympathetic to the European ideal' and; therefore, they also advocated the Remain side (Johnson et al., 2016: 83). His pre-Brexit speech consists of 716 words.

Jeremy Corbyn is the leader of the *Labour Party* (Online 1) and an MP, who also supported the claim for the UK to remain in the EU. Corbyn's speech consists of 2680 words.

Philip Hammond is a member of the *Conservative Party* and the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the House of Commons (ibid.). Hammond's speech consists of 2612 words.

Hilary Benn is a member of the *Labour Party* and the former *Shadow Foreign Secretary* (ibid.). Benn's speech is one of the longest, and it consists of 3597 words.

George Osborne is a member of the *Conservative Party* and the former *Chancellor of the Exchequer and First Secretary of State* (ibid.). Osborne's speech consists of 1475 words.

Consequently, it can be stated that there is no unanimous agreement between the leading political parties on the *Leave* side and on the *Remain* side, as several members of parties such as the Conservatives and the Labour Party have campaigned for both sides. Moreover, it is concluded that the most visible split of political stances on the EU referendum is among the Conservative party, as the equal number of MP's campaign for both sides. Nevertheless, party members of the UKIP, as the name of the party suggests, campaign for the Leave side.

To sum up, CDA has been selected as the framework for the analysis, and the DHA as an approach to CDA that studies political argumentation as occurring in specific contexts and arising from specific histories. The following section presents the discussion of the main findings and the results of the empirical part of the study, namely, the analysis of the argumentation strategies in Brexit rhetoric and the linguistic means of persuasion and manipulation as tools for argumentation in the corpus of political speeches.

3.3. Argumentation Strategies and Manipulation as Means of Persuasion in the Brexit Rhetoric

Based on the definition of argumentation as a 'cognitive problem solving pattern that manifests itself in complex and coherent network of statements' and on strategy as a 'plan of practice to achieve [...] certain goals' (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 35), several argumentation strategies have been identified in both sides of the campaign. The arguments will be discussed below. Moreover, it should also be noted that the strategies used for argument construction

and presentation include not only *topoi* and *fallacies*, but also numerous other linguistic means of persuasion and manipulation, for instance, *parallel structures*, *rhetorical questions*, *metaphors*, *repetitions* and *references*. The aforementioned strategies are analysed further in the chapter.

3.3.1. Argumentation Strategies in Speeches for Remaining in the EU

The speeches of seven politicians who were the leading figures in the *remain campaign* foreground five key arguments for the British citizens to vote for remaining in the EU. The first and the main argument used by all the speakers advocate is the *European Single Market* as one of the main economic advantages for the UK to remain in the EU. The second argument is *security* and *protection* provided by the EU in terms of military alliances and information networks. The third argument is about the *global influence* in the world that the EU helps the UK to acquire and sustain. The fourth argument made is about the *free movement* of people across Europe and their ability to work, live and travel in other EU countries. The final argument is about securing the *union between Scotland and the UK*, which may be threatened if the UK decided to leave and Scotland decided to stay in the EU.

The aforementioned arguments are based on validity claims and conclusions that arise from them as well as on several strategies that connect these claims with the conclusions. The *topoi* that have been identified in the arguments made by the politicians supporting the Remain side are as follows: the *topos of usefulness and advantage* of staying in the EU in contrast to the *topos of uselessness and disadvantage* of leaving the EU, the *topos of responsibility* for the security and union between the countries of the continent, the *topos of finances and numbers*, the *topos of history*, the *topos of reality* and *topos of danger and threat*. The analysis of each type of the identified *topoi* in the arguments given by the selected politicians is provided below.

David Cameron's speeches present all the above mentioned arguments both as problem solving patterns and as counter arguments to the claims of the opposing party. See below table 3.1. summarizing Cameron's arguments and the *topoi* used to lead the electorate to the conclusions arising from these arguments:

Table 3.1. David Cameron's arguments and the topoi used

Argument	Topoi	Conclusion
EU Single Market and UK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Numbers • Finances • Advantage • Disadvantage • Threat 	<p>The EU provides jobs and money; therefore, the UK should vote to remain;</p> <p>The EU gives advantages to free trade among member states; therefore, the UK would be at disadvantage after leaving the EU;</p>

economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reality 	Reality is that the UK imports and exports more to the EU than the world; therefore, if voting to leave, the UK would lose its most important trade deals.
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advantage • History • Reality • Threat 	The EU provides security and information to its members; therefore, the UK should vote to remain; History shows that the UK has always been safer within unions and reality is that if the UK leaves the EU, it would be threatened;
Influence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • History • Advantage • Threat 	History shows that the UK has been able to influence important decisions and gain advantages while in the EU; therefore, this influence would be lost after the UK would leave the EU;
Free movement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advantage • Threat 	The EU provides an opportunity for free travel; therefore, if leaving the EU, the UK would lose this advantage.

The very first and most expanded of Cameron’s arguments (found in all four of the selected speeches) emphasises that, while being in the EU, the UK ‘is a part of a single market of 500 million people’ and their products and services ‘account for almost 80% of the economy’, which helps to create and sustain ‘almost 2.4 million jobs and keep the taxes low’ (DC1). The validity claims of this argument via the *topos of numbers*, *topos of reality* and *topos of finance* point to the conclusion that since the UK is currently doing well in terms of finances and the number of employment places within the EU, it should remain there and continue the progress. Another *topos* that has been identified in this argument is *the topos of advantage*, as Cameron directly states that ‘the advantages of [...] staying far outweigh the disadvantages’ (DC1). In addition to the *topos of advantage* in this argument, Cameron further draws via the *topoi of threat*, *finances* and *disadvantage* on the consequences of leaving noting that ‘the cost of every household in Britain would be as high as 4300 £ by 2030 if [...] the UK leaves’ (DC1). It has also been observed that Cameron directly states what is implied by his arguments, as he emphasizes that the conclusion of leaving the EU would be a threat, for example, ‘in my experience, there are calculated risks, there are clever risks, and there are unnecessary and dangerous risks. [...] Brexit sits firmly in the latter camp’ (DC1). The impact on the UK economy in both scenarios is contrasted via the *topos of advantage and disadvantage* as well as via the intensifying strategy in the form of the adjectives *clever*, *calculated*, *good*, *unnecessary* and *dangerous*, again refer to the conclusion that the UK would be ‘better off’ in the EU, for example,

The single market is biggest in the world and that is good for jobs, it’s good for companies, it’s good for investment, it brings business to [...] Britain. It’s good for our economy and so if we were to leave it would be bad for our economy. It would mean less growth, [...] fewer jobs, [...] higher prices [...] and recession for our economy (DC3).

The second argument Cameron draws upon is the security of the UK and the protection the EU provides to its members from military and terrorism threats. This argument is supported by validity claims and the *topoi of history* that refer to the former military conflicts and wars that the UK was part of before joining the EU, for example, ‘our lone stand in 1940, when Britain stood as a bulwark against a new dark age of tyranny and oppression, that was true in 1914, 1940 [...] you could add 1588, 1704, 1815’ (DC1). The *topos of history* above emphasizes the sacrifice of the country took in the wars mentioned and leads to the conclusion that being an EU member country may prevent from such sacrifices. The *topos of reality* and the *topos of threat* in Cameron’s validity claims emphasize the current situation in the world and the real threat the country might face alone after leaving the EU. Moreover, via the intensifying strategies and the use of emphasizing adjectives and adverbs, Cameron draws on the threatening effect of leaving the EU, for instance,

The newly belligerent Russia, the rise of the Daesh network to our East and to our South, the migration crisis. [...] the international situation confronting Britain today means that the closest possible cooperation with our European neighbours isn’t an optional extra (DC1).

The next argument is the opportunity of the British politicians to influence global decisions on various economic, social, military and other issues in the name of the British citizens. The first validity claim is supported by *the topos of advantage* and *topos of reality*: ‘EU helps us achieve the things we want – [...] fighting Ebola in Africa, tackling climate change, taking on the people smugglers’ which leads to the conclusion that it is easier to achieve the goals the country has set with the help of the EU (DC1). The second claim uses the *topos of history*: ‘our history teaches us: the stronger we are in the neighbourhood, the stronger we are in the world. [...] for 200 years we have written Europe’s history and Europe has written ours’ (ibid.).

The final argument that has been identified in Cameron’s speeches is the opportunity of free movement of people within the EU borders for all the EU citizens. With this argument, the politician makes a validity claim via the *topos of advantage* that leads to the conclusion that UK citizens have more social and cultural advantages while being a member of the EU, for instance, ‘to have the opportunity to work, live and travel in other EU countries’ (DC1). This argument has been identified only in one of the speeches selected from Cameron’s rhetoric and can be said to be the weakest of his arguments, as it is not supported by any other validity claims than the ones mentioned above.

Theresa May’s speech that has been selected for the analysis also features her arguments for remaining in the EU and counter arguments that oppose the claims presented not only by the opposing party but also by the Remain campaigners. Four arguments have

been identified in the selected speech. See the arguments and the topoi used to point to the conclusion these arguments propose in Table 3.2. below:

Table 3.2. Theresa May's arguments and the topoi used

Argument	Topoi	Conclusion
Influence in the EU and the world	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • History • Advantage • Reality 	<p>History shows that the UK has always had more influence and advantage to take and change important decisions within the EU; therefore, the UK should vote to remain;</p> <p>Reality is that the decisions taken within the EU will always influence the UK; therefore, the UK should be able to participate in making these decisions.</p>
Military security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advantage • History • Reality • Numbers 	<p>The development of information networks in the EU benefits the security of the UK; therefore, the UK should remain in the EU;</p> <p>History shows that the EU has sustained peace in the world, and reality shows that numbers of criminals found with the help of EU increase; therefore, the UK should vote to remain.</p>
EU trade and UK economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Numbers • Finances • Reality 	<p>The EU helps to sustain stable economic growth and the number of jobs for the UK citizens; therefore, the UK should stay within the union.</p>
Union with Scotland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat 	<p>If the UK votes to leave the EU, Scotland could vote to leave the UK.</p>

The first argument made by T. May in her Brexit speech on 25 April 2016 is that being part of international institutions including the EU helps the UK to influence matters of their concern such as the ‘reformation of human right laws, security policies and economic trade agreements’ (TM1). This argument is supported by the *topos of advantage*, where May notes that the EU helps the UK to take control over the aforementioned matters, and *the topos of history* showing the target audience that ‘looking back at history we know what a world without international, multilateral institutions looks like’ (TM1). The speaker draws on the conclusion that the UK without an EU membership and other international institutions would be thrown into a similar situation like it was during the world wars period, for example,

Any student of the way in which Europe stumbled its way to war in 1914 knows that the confused lines of communications between states, the ambiguity of nations’ commitments to one another, and the absence of any system to de-escalate tension and conflict were key factors in the origins of the First World War (TM1).

The next argument supports the previous one by adding that without the international influence offered by the EU, UK military security would be threatened as well. This argument is supported by the *topoi of numbers, history, advantage and reality* and leads to the conclusion that the electorate should reconsider all the pros and cons of this membership

before voting on the polling day. Via the *topos of numbers*, May emphasizes the number of criminals and terror suspects who have been identified via the EU information networks, for example, ‘European Arrest Warrant has allowed us to extradite more than 5000 people from Britain to Europe in the last few years and bring 675 suspected or convicted individuals back to Britain’ (TM1).

She also shows the consequence of not having this type of network, for instance, ‘in 2005, Hussain Osman – who tried to blow up the London Underground on 21/7 – was extradited from Italy using the Arrest Warrant in just 56 days. Before the Arrest Warrant existed, it took ten long years to extradite Rachid Ramda, another terrorist, from Britain to France.’ (ibid.). The validity claims of remaining in the EU for the security of the nation are also supported by the *topos of advantage*, where May points out that ‘the police in the EU will be soon able to check DNA records for EU nationals in just fifteen minutes. Under the old system, it took 143 days’ (ibid.). By the contrasting examples showing what the UK gains by being inside the union and what it would lose by leaving, May aims at leading the listeners to the conclusion in favour of staying within the EU.

The third argument is about the trade and economy benefits that the UK has within the EU Single Market. This argument is based on similar validity claims and the *topoi of numbers, finances and threat* as made by Cameron and leads to the conclusion that the UK economy gains more by being a member of the single market and would lose a lot after leaving the EU, for instance,

The EU is a single market of more than 500 million people, representing an economy of almost £11 trillion and a quarter of the world’s GDP. 44 per cent of our goods and services exports go to the EU, compared to five per cent to India and China. We have a trade surplus in services with the rest of the EU of £17 billion (TM1).

May’s final argument is about the future relationship between the UK and Scotland after the UK would vote to leave and Scotland would wish to remain. This argument is supported only by one validity claim and the *topoi of threat*, for example, ‘if the people of Scotland are forced to choose between the United Kingdom and the European Union we do not know what the result would be’. Via the *topos of threat* and the emphasis on the verb ‘forced’ that denotes involuntary choice and therefore negative emotions, the argument leads to the conclusion that the decision to leave the EU would lead to another referendum of Scotland to leave the UK.

Tim Farron’s speech is based on a single argument that the UK would face an economic crisis after leaving the EU, for example, ‘I cannot stand back and allow the leave campaign to guide us towards economic ruin’ (TF1). As the sentence above suggests, Farron

uses the *topoi of threat* to point to the conclusions that the opposing party is giving false information on the economic future of the UK. In this speech, Farron lists the arguments given by the opposing party and gives counterclaims to these arguments using the *topos of numbers* and *topos of threat*, for instance, ‘they have said they’d spend millions and millions filling in Britain’s portholes. But if you add all these things up, it would cost £113bn. [...] where would this magic money come from?’ (TF1). Farron’s argument or rather counter arguments for the Leave Campaign use the *topoi of threat and numbers* that point to the conclusion that the opposing party has false or fallacious arguments that are not logical and that the electorate should be cautious of these fallacies.

Jeremy Corbyn’s speech uses three main arguments to convince the UK citizens to vote to remain in the EU. See table 3.3. displaying the arguments and the topoi that support the arguments below:

Table 3.3. Jeremy Corbyn’s arguments and the topoi used

Argument	Topoi	Conclusion
Security and influence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat • Advantage • Numbers 	After leaving the EU, the UK would lose the military protection and influence in the world whereby millions of people could be threatened.
Economy and trade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Finances • Advantage 	The EU provides economic growth and income to the UK; therefore, the UK should remain.
Free movement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advantage • Numbers 	Millions of people use the opportunity to travel, work and live in the EU countries without restrictions; therefore, the UK should vote to remain and keep this advantage.

The first argument of Jeremy Corbyn shows that the UK would be more secure and strong within the EU. *The topos of advantage* is used to lead listeners to the conclusion that the EU has brought the UK numerous benefits in terms of race, economy, employment and security, for example, ‘we believe that the European Union has brought investment, jobs and protection for workers, consumers and the environment, and the best chance of meeting the challenges we face in the 21st century’ (JC1). Further, the politician lists the challenges that the UK is facing such as immigration, terrorism threat, global warming and cyber-crime and points out that ‘Britain will be stronger if we co-operate with our neighbour in facing them (threats) together’ (JC1).

The *topoi of threat and numbers* is used to support the argument of security as well and to lead people to the conclusion that the EU protects the UK from the threats it may face, for example, ‘it has been regulations agreed upon in Europe that have improved Britain’s beaches and waterways and that are forcing us to tackle the scandal of air pollution which will kill 500000 people in Britain by 2025, unless we act’ (JC1). Finally, the *topos of advantage* is

used to lead listeners to the conclusion that the EU offers its citizens the opportunity of free movement across the member states, for example, ‘there are nearly three-quarters of a million British people living in Spain and over two million in the EU as a whole. Learning abroad and working abroad increases the opportunities and skills of British people and migrations brings benefits as well’ (JC1).

Philip Hammond’s speech also emphasizes three main arguments, namely, that the UK would be ‘stronger, safer and better off’ remaining an EU member (PH1). In other words, the Chancellor of the Exchequer puts forward the arguments of global influence, security and finances or access to the EU single market, see table 3.4.:

Table 3.4. Philip Hammond’s arguments and the topoi used

Argument	Topoi	Conclusion
Global influence and security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reality • Threat 	Within the EU, the UK can influence the decisions made for the countries of the continent including the UK; therefore; the UK should remain to keep this possibility.
Access to the single market	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Finances • Numbers • Threat • Reality 	The EU gives access to the world’s largest trade market with millions of consumers; therefore, the UK would be financially more secure in the EU and less secure outside.

The topoi that have been identified in Hammond’s speeches are the *topos of reality*, *topos of advantage*, *topoi of finances and numbers*, and *topoi of reality and threat* as indicated in the table above. The speaker introduces the three aforementioned arguments in a single sentence:

Stronger, because our global influence is enhanced by being a leading member of the world’s largest trading bloc, safer because of the work we do together with EU partners to strengthen our defences against organised crime and terrorism, and better off because of our access to a market of 500 million consumers (PH1).

Hammond elaborates on each of the arguments by setting out the opposite option, namely, by describing the consequences of the UK leaving the EU. The most often applied topoi to lead from the arguments to the conclusions are the *topos of reality* and *the topos of advantage*, for example,

The deal that the Prime Minister won in Brussels twelve days ago ensures that the UK can remain in the EU with a special status: outside the Euro; outside Schengen; with an opt-in on Justice and Home Affairs matters, an exemption from ‘ever closer union’ and a new mechanism to limit access to our benefits system for EU migrants (PH1).

In the argument above, the speaker describes the fact that a better deal for the UK has been agreed upon if staying in the UK and the advantages this deal embodies for the citizens of the country.

Further on, *the topos of threat* is used to outline the consequences of leaving the EU, for instance,

A vote to leave on June 23rd would trigger a two-year window, under the terms of the Treaties, for the UK to negotiate the terms of our exit from the EU. And in the meantime, we will be able to offer British businesses no assurance at all about their future access to EU, or for that matter, to other markets. We will have nothing to say to American, Japanese, Chinese companies looking for a base in which to invest to supply the EU market. Our economy would literally be on hold, whilst our competitors, including our European competitors, forge ahead. [...] our access to the Single Market would cease. Our trading agreements with more than 50 markets around the world would lapse, with an immediate and negative effect on confidence, on growth, on investments, and on jobs. Years of uncertainty for Britain, just as we are getting back on our feet (PH1).

The speaker emphasizes the negative effect on the UK economy in the first period after the vote to leave and the future of uncertainty about the further economic growth or decline for the UK businesses.

Other *topoi* that are used to lead the electorate to the conclusion that the UK would be financially unstable outside the EU are the *topos of numbers* and *topos of finances*, for example, ‘the fact is that in 2014 half of the goods Britain exported went to the EU – just 7% of the goods the EU exported came to the UK’ and ‘WTO rules mean we could sell into the Single Market, but at a price: the EU imposes a ‘common external tariff’ on goods and services from countries outside the EU who don’t have free trade deals agreed. 10% on cars. 30% on confectionary. 36% on dairy produce’ (PH1). As indicated in the exemplified analysis above, Hammond makes validity claims about the UK being stronger in terms of its influence in the world, safer in terms of military security and more advantaged economically in terms of the single market. Hammond also uses the *topoi of advantage, reality, finance* and *numbers* to point to the conclusion that people should vote for remaining in the EU.

The politician further outlines the consequence of choosing the opposite side and makes validity claims about the UK losing money, financial security and uncertainty about its future. Via *the topos of threat and numbers*, the speaker describes the possible negative future consequences and negative impact on the UK economic sector, which leads to the conclusion that people should not vote to leave the EU. Moreover, as indicated in the examples above, the speaker takes the approach of depicting the negative future of the UK choosing to leave the EU and emphasizes the threats that the country would face instead of highlighting the advantages and positive effects of EU membership.

Hilary Benn bases his speech on the same three arguments the previously discussed politicians, namely, security, economy and trade within the EU single market and strength and influence in the world. Nevertheless, it is significant to point out that H. Benn positions his

arguments as counterclaims to the arguments set by the *leave campaign* or *pro-Brexit* politicians, for example,

Britain leads in Europe, from trade to climate change, from good governance to debt relief for the poorest nations, and in turn Europe helps to lead the world. And so I say to those who advocate that Britain should abandon the European Union that they bear a very heavy responsibility to prove their case. And I wish directly to address each of these [...] arguments in turn (HB1).

Thus, as indicated by the example above, the politician aims at repudiating the arguments set out by the opposing party in order to lead the target population to the conclusion that they should not vote to leave the EU, see the list of topoi used in these arguments in table 3.5. below:

Table 3.5. Hilary Benn’s arguments and the topoi used

Argument	Topoi	Conclusion
Economy and finances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Finances • Numbers • Advantage • Threat 	<p>The UK is a member of the largest trade market with most consumers in the world that helps the UK to be more financially secure; therefore, the UK should vote to remain in the EU;</p> <p>If the UK leaves the EU it would lose trade deals and money as well as all advantages of trading within the single market.</p>
Security in terms of immigration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat • Reality • History 	<p>Immigration will not stop if the UK leaves the EU, because the UK needs people to come to do the jobs which are available;</p> <p>History shows that the working population is decreasing, and the retiring population is growing, therefore, increasing the demand for more workers; thus, immigration will continue even after leaving the EU.</p>
Global influence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • History • Numbers 	<p>The history shows that the UK’s status in the world is secured by the cooperation with such organisations as the EU; therefore, the UK should remain in the EU and keep its influence in the world.</p>

As indicated in the table above, the first argument deals with economy and financial security of the UK. It is made via *the topoi of finances and numbers* and *the topoi of advantage and disadvantage* as a counterclaim to the statement about the costs of the UK being an EU member, for instance,

Now that the Leave campaign’s claim that EU membership costs us £350 million a week has been utterly discredited, they seek to argue that there will be no cost to Britain's economy if we leave. [...] They recklessly deny the clear benefits to our businesses, workers, consumers and our national wealth from membership of the single market which, let us be clear, Boris Johnson, Nigel Farage and Michael Gove have all said they want to walk away from. And yet it is the benefits of membership of the single market that are precisely why every survey of business opinion, why the Bank of England, the IFS, the Treasury, the IMF, the OECD, the World Bank and 90% of independent economists say that leaving the European

Union would damage our economy and end up costing Britain money, not saving us money. (HB1).

The extract from Benn's speech above exemplifies the *topoi of finances and numbers* as well as the *topoi of advantages and threat* complemented with evaluative adjectives and adverbs such as 'utterly discredited, recklessly deny' (underlined) to target audience and lead them to the conclusion that the opposing party presents false arguments and claims to convince the voters to leave vote and that they therefore should reconsider this decision. The *topoi* used in the argument also suggest the conclusion that the UK would be economically weaker after it would leave the EU. The speaker also uses similar claims as the above discussed politicians about the benefits of being a member of the single market and emphasizes that the advantages of staying are worth considering, for instance,

The single market allows British businesses to do business with 500 million consumers, increasing tenfold the number of people to whom we can sell our goods without tariffs, just as if we were selling them here at home. This open trade benefits the economy. It generates taxes which help pay for our NHS, our schools, our pensions, our housebuilding, our infrastructure and our welfare state (HB1).

The next argument the politician makes is a counterclaim of the negative effects of immigration. The politician argues via the *topoi of reality, history and numbers* that 'immigration works both ways' leading to the conclusion that the UK benefits from the people who come to work there and from the possibility for the UK citizens to work and travel across the EU member states (HB1), for example,

Free movement is part of the deal and the reason why so many people have come here from other EU countries is because jobs are available. Jobs that need doing and jobs that, if it had not been for this migration, employers would have been shouting about because of the difficulty they were having in filling them. Vacancies for doctors, nurses, lecturers, factory workers, chefs and waiters, receptionists, scientists and cleaners. Britain has always welcomed those who wish to come here to work, to live and to contribute. Just reflect for a moment on the greatest social challenge that confronts us; the demographic time bomb that will see the number of people aged 65 and over rise by nearly five million over the next two decades. Already, one in five of our care workers come from outside the United Kingdom – from Europe and the rest of the world—and we will need more carers as more people need looking after. The truth is we are a nation of migrants. From the Romans to the Anglo-Saxons and the Normans. From the Jews fleeing persecution to the Irish fleeing famine (HB1).

The extract above emphasizes that through history the UK has always been a nation that welcomes migrants to help to contribute to their economy, and currently the country also needs more workers than the job market within the national borders can offer.

The final argument made by the politician refers to the strength and influence of the UK within the EU. The argument targets the pro-Brexit politicians' claim about sovereignty and nationality, for example,

The Leave campaign claim that we have somehow lost absolute sovereignty and can regain it. Here too they are wrong. We are still a sovereign nation. A sovereign British Parliament joined the Common Market, a sovereign British people voted to stay in 1975, a sovereign House of Commons has agreed every treaty change since and a sovereign House of Commons will abide by the decision of the British people in 10 days' time. We are not in the Euro. We are not in the Schengen free passport area. We are excluded from ever closer union. And yet we still wield great influence in the European Union. [...] We are on the winning side in the Council of Ministers the vast majority of the time (HB1).

As indicated in the above cited argument, Benn claims that the UK has been a sovereign and influential state within the EU since the time it voted to join it. Here the *topoi of reality and history* are applied to lead one to the conclusion that the claims of the opposing party are arguable and that the UK 'never stopped to be great and can be great in the future' by staying within the EU (ibid.).

Further on, **George Osborn's speech** also presents only one argument, yet it is supported by several validity claims and statements using the *topoi of threat, advantage and disadvantage, numbers, finances and reality* as well as counter claims opposing the arguments that have been presented by the Leave campaign. The first topos the politician uses is *the topos of threat* in combination with the *topos of finances* where he points to the amount of money people would lose, for example, 'Britain would be permanently poorer to the tune of £4300 per household - £4300 each and every year. That's the long-term bill for leaving the EU' (GO1). This is the same topos used by Cameron when presenting the economic consequences of losing the EU single market access, and this leads to the conclusions that the UK would lose more than it would gain if it chose to leave.

Via *the topos of disadvantage and threat*, the politician aims at showing how many job places would be lost after leaving the union, for instance,

Within two years, at least half a million jobs would be lost. That's 80000 jobs in the Midlands. 100000 jobs is across the North. Over 40000 in Scotland, over 20000 in Wales, almost 15000 in Northern Ireland. In London over 70000 jobs would be lost. Here across the South, almost 120000 jobs would go' (GO1).

With the help of the *topos of advantage*, the politician shows what the UK would gain after choosing to remain in the EU, for instance, 'If we remain, British building firms will go on building homes, and people will have the confidence to do-up their own homes, [...] and if we remain our economy won't lose half a million jobs, but instead we'll create more than a million jobs over the coming years (GO1).

It can, thus, be concluded that the politicians arguing against Brexit tend to apply the *topos of reality* emphasizing the facts and the numbers that show the benefits and advantages of the UK within the EU, and the *topos of threat* warning the people of the negative effects on the economy, security, influence, relationship with Scotland and free movement of people across the EU after choosing to leave the bloc. The speakers also make use of the *topoi of numbers and finances* as well as the *topoi of advantage and history* to lead the target audience to the main conclusion arising from their arguments, namely, that the UK has always been and will be more secure, advantageous and economically stable within the EU. Moreover, the speakers also apply evaluative adjectives and adverbs as well as modality markers such as ‘would’ to position the speaker’s stance on the future of the country outside the EU and within the EU.

3.3.2. Argumentation Strategies in Speeches for Leaving the EU

The speeches of the leading politicians in the campaign ‘Vote Leave’ are analysed below. The leave campaign has three main arguments to support their claim for leaving the EU; those are *the costs for being the member of the EU, sovereignty* and *immigration*.

Boris Johnson’s speeches draw on the aforementioned arguments, namely, finances , for example, ‘it is between taking back control of our money – or giving a further £100bn to Brussels before the next election’ (BJ2) , sovereignty, e.g. ‘it is a choice between getting dragged ever further into a federal superstate, or taking a stand now’ and immigration e.g. ‘between deciding who we want to come here to live and work – or letting the EU decide’ (BJ2), and emphasize both the positive effects of leaving the EU and the negative effects of staying in terms of these arguments. Here it can also be referred to Wodak’s (2016) discussed body politics, because Johnson portrays Brussels as a political body that is threatening the UK’s national existence and identity. The three arguments are presented by the *topoi of threat, burdening, responsibility, numbers* and *finances*, see table 3.6. below:

Table 3.6. Boris Johnson’s arguments and the topoi used

Argument	Topoi	Conclusion
Sovereignty	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat • Burdening and weighting 	EU regulations are too large a burden in the UK as a sovereign country, and the laws and regulations passed in the EU will increase unless the UK votes to leave and regain control over the laws and regulations in the country.
Costs of being in the EU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat • Numbers • Finances 	The UK sends millions of pounds to the EU every week, and the EU costs will not change unless the UK votes to leave the EU and regain control over its spending.

Immigration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat • Burdening and weighting • Responsibilities 	<p>The government had promised to cut immigration, but failed and therefore it should take responsibility for their decisions and support leaving the EU;</p> <p>The numbers of immigrants who live in the UK increase greatly every year; therefore, the UK should vote to leave to control who comes to live in the country and enjoy the benefits offered.</p>
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As the table above indicates, B. Johnson draws on three arguments for leaving the EU and uses five types of *topoi* to lead his listeners from the arguments to the conclusion to vote for leaving the EU. The first argument is that of sovereignty that has been presented via the *topos of threat and danger* and the *topos of burdening and weighting*, for example, ‘Europe as a political project that has basically been going on now for decades, which Britain has been a member of since 1975 and I now think is in real danger of getting out of proper democratic control’ (BJ1). The *topos of danger and threat* is used explicitly in the example above, as the politician claims that the EU is an uncontrolled political project that poses a threat to the democracy of the UK as an independent state; this accordingly leads to the conclusion that the control should be ‘taken back’ (BJ1). The argument is also supported by *the topos of burdening and weighing* which leads to the conclusion that the EU legislation and rules are too large a burden on the UK and should therefore be rejected, for instance,

the trouble is with Europe that that is being very greatly eroded and you’re seeing it more and more over employment, over border controls, over human rights, over all sorts of stuff. And you’ve got a supreme judicial body in the European Court of Justice that projects down on this entire 500 million people territory a single unified judicial order from which there is absolutely no recourse and no comebacks. [...] there’s too much judicial activism, there’s too much legislation coming from the EU’ (BJ1).

As indicated above, the argument of sovereignty is outlined via the *topoi of threat and burdening* where the EU is again positioned as a political body that destructs the UK’s independence. This leads to the conclusion that people should vote to leave the EU to avoid the future danger of losing control over legislation and avoiding the burden of the laws passed in the EU.

The next argument is that of economy in terms of costs and spending the UK has to make as a member of the bloc. As indicated in the table above, Johnson uses the *topoi of numbers and finances* to imply the conclusion that the membership in the EU costs too much money, and that this money could be used more effectively after leaving the EU, for instance, ‘our gross contributions to the EU budget are now running at about £20bn a year, and that the net contribution is £10 bn; and it is not just that we have no control over how that money is spent. [...] That is why there is such cavalier waste and theft of EU funds: because it is

everybody's money, it is nobody's money' (BJ2). This argument is also supported by the *topos of threat*, as the example indicates that the EU funds that come from the investments of its member states are wasted and stolen (ibid.). This again leads to the conclusion that in order to be able to save the money and to get control over expenses, the people should vote to leave the EU.

The final argument targets the issue of immigration not only in the UK, but also in the EU. Johnson presents the issue of immigration as the responsibility of the government that has been taken by the EU leaders, for instance, 'I am in favour of immigration; but I am also in favour of control, and of politicians taking responsibility for what is happening; and I think it bewilders people to be told that this most basic power of a state – to decide who has the right to live and work in your country – has been taken away and now resides in Brussels' (BJ2). The use of the *topos of responsibility* connects this argument with the conclusion that if the UK left the EU, the control over the borders and over immigration would be given back to the politicians of the UK, which is their direct responsibility. It is also noteworthy to point out that Johnson mitigates the negative effect of his argument and the corresponding impression of him as a racist by claiming that he *is in favour of immigration* before stating that it should be limited (BJ2). The *topos of responsibility*, *topos of threat* and *topos of burdening* are also used to connect this argument with the conclusion that politicians fail to control immigration, which limits the opportunities of the UK citizens, for example,

It is deeply corrosive of popular trust in democracy that every year UK politicians tell the public that they can cut immigration to the tens of thousands – and then find that they miss their targets by hundreds of thousands, so that we add a population the size of Newcastle every year, with all the extra and unfunded pressure that puts on the NHS and other public services (BJ2).

Thus, the politician advocates that the problems of immigration, laws and finances are the responsibility of the UK politicians and that this responsibility has been taken away and governed by the EU politicians and that UK has no control of.

Nigel Farage's speech is rather short (274 words) and targets only the argument of immigration via the *topos of burdening*, for example, 'make Out-ism all about immigrants and foreigners. Indelibly associate it with gripes about how many people speak English on your train to work, mutter about abolishing protection from racial discrimination in the workplace, stuff your mouth full of dog-whistles and blow until you can blow no more' (NF1). Thus, Farage's argument leads to the conclusion that immigrant workers from the EU are burden on British nationals, as they do not speak English. The argument presents an evaluative stance, because it is complemented with sarcasm and irony (as indicated in the example) to intensify the effect of the conclusion arising from it and to target the electorate's emotions.

Michael Gove's speeches also advocate the same three arguments of sovereignty, economy and immigration. Nevertheless, Gove bases his arguments as counterclaims to the arguments made by the *Remain politicians*. See below table 3.7. outlining Gove's arguments and the topoi applied therein:

Table 3.7. Michael Gove's arguments and the topoi used

Argument	Topoi	Conclusion
Sovereignty and Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • History • Abuse 	The history shows that the UK has invented and kept the democratic form of government until the EU, the regulations of which abuse the UK form of government and therefore, the UK should vote to leave the EU and regain control over their laws.
Economic decline within the EU and loss of money	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Numbers • Finances • Threat • Burdening and weighting • Abuse 	<p>The UK sends millions of pounds of taxpayers' money to the EU every week and will send millions more if the UK remains a member of the EU;</p> <p>The money sent to the EU could have been used for the UK healthcare and education systems; therefore, the UK should vote to leave and get taxpayers' money back.</p>
Immigration control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat • Numbers 	If the UK votes to stay in the EU, the numbers of immigrants will increase by thousands; therefore, the UK should leave the EU.

As indicated in the table above, the first argument M. Gove presents is that of democracy and sovereignty of the UK outside the EU. The politician uses the *topos of history* to lead one to the conclusion that the UK was more democratically successful prior to joining the EU. The statement is complemented with adjectives and adverbs in the superlative degree (in bold), which are aimed at intensifying the emotional effect of the argument, for instance,

Democratic self-government, the form of Government we in Britain actually invented, has been a roaring success for most of the nations who've adopted it. While we enjoyed democratic self-government we developed the world's **strongest** economy, its **most respected** political institutions, its **most tolerant** approach towards refugees, its **best** publicly funded health service and its **most respected** public broadcaster (MG1).

Gove also argues that the EU is the opposite of a democratic and successful institution; therefore, leading one to conclude that the UK should vote to leave the EU to get back what they once had, for example, 'it is a fact that the EU is a multi-national federation with no democratically elected leader or Government, with policies decided by a central bureaucracy, with a mock parliament which enjoys no popular mandate for action and with peripheries which are either impoverished or agitating for secession' (MG1). Via the *topos of abuse*, the politician claims that the EU bureaucracy does not allow the UK citizens to exercise their rights and control over decisions taken by the politicians, for instance,

But our membership of the European Union prevents us being able to change huge swathes of law and stops us being able to choose who makes critical decisions which affect all our lives. Laws which govern citizens in this country are decided by politicians from other nations who we never elected and can't throw out. We can take out our anger on elected representatives in Westminster but whoever is in Government in London cannot remove or reduce VAT, cannot support a steel plant through troubled times, cannot build the houses we need where they're needed and cannot deport all the individuals who shouldn't be in this country. (MG2)

This argument claims that the rights of the UK citizens are abused by the EU laws and regulations and that nothing can be done unless the UK chooses to leave the bloc. Moreover, as with other Gove's arguments, the statement is complemented with intensifying and emphasizing adjectives as well as with the positioning of in-groups and out-groups via pronouns and adverbs (in bold) that are used to manipulate with the listener's consciousness and emotions.

The next argument opposes the one made by the *remain side* on the economic and financial advantages of staying within the EU and within the single market. Via the *topoi of numbers* and *finance*, Gove proposes that the UK loses more than it gains by remaining in the EU, for example, 'the EU and its members are projected to grow more slowly than other advanced economies in the years ahead. Eurozone members are projected to grow at 1.5% while the US is projected to grow at 2.4%, China at 6.5%, New Zealand at 2.0%, Australia at 2.5% and India at 7.5%' (MG1). It should, however, be noted that the *topos of numbers* may be fallacious as well, especially when manipulating with numbers and not revealing all the facts and numbers. Similarly, it has been done in Gove's arguments, where he points out the expenses of being a member of the EU and the single market but fails to point out the total long term income from the trade, only mentioning a small part of the income, for example,

If we left the EU we would take back control over nineteen billion pounds which we currently hand over every year - about £350 million each and every week. Now it is true that we get some of that money back - £4.4 billion through a negotiated rebate - and £4.8 billion in money the EU spends in this country on our behalf. But it is also vital to note that the amount we give to the EU is due to go up - and up - and up. From £19.1 billion this year to £20.6 billion in 2020-21. Since 1975, we have already sent the staggering sum of over half a trillion pounds to Brussels. If we vote to stay we will send about another £200 billion to Brussels over the next decade. Just think what we could do with this money. It could be invested in new infrastructure, apprenticeships and science. It could be deployed in our NHS, schools and social care. It could pay for tax cuts, enterprise allowances and trade missions. It could pay for fourteen Astute Class Submarines. It could enhance this nation's security, productivity, social solidarity and competitiveness (MG1).

In the argument above, the *topos of numbers* is used together with the *topos of finance* and the *topos of threat* to outline the large amounts of money sent to the EU and to put additional

emphasis on the threat that these investments would increase in further years if the UK chose to stay in the bloc. The conclusion that should be connected with this argument is that the UK should opt to leave in order to prevent economic decline. The *topos of burdening and weighting* as well as the *topos of abuse* are also used in the argument above, where it is claimed that the EU with its costs abuses the rights of people of the UK to get proper education, healthcare and security because the money is invested elsewhere. Thus, the argument positions the investment in the EU as a burden on the UK taxpayers and targets the emotions of people who may feel this burden the most.

Gove's final argument is that of immigration. He claims that leaving the EU would help take back control over borders.

If we vote to stay in the EU then immigration will continue to increase by hundreds of thousands year on year. Over 250,000 people came to Britain from Europe last year. As long as we are in the EU we cannot control our borders and cannot develop an immigration policy which is both truly humane and in our long term economic interests (MG1)

The argument above uses the *topos of numbers* to emphasize the number of immigrants entering the country, and the *topos of threat* is used to point out that this number would increase if the people did not take control over it. The conclusion that is supposed to be drawn from this argument is that this control cannot be taken back by staying within the EU rather by gaining independence. Thus, it seems that Gove's speeches are comparatively more emotional and threatening than the argumentation strategies in the speeches described above, as Gove emphasizes the numerous threats and burdens that the EU 'imposes' on the UK thereby addressing the disappointment and anger of the listeners.

David Davies' speech is mainly positioned on the argument about the dysfunctionality of the EU, and the idea that the UK would be 'better off' as an independent, sovereign and democratic country (DD1). The arguments about immigration and economic disadvantages of being an EU member are also discussed in the speech. The arguments and the topoi therein applied are summarized in table 3.8. below:

Table 3.8. David Davies's arguments and the topoi used

Argument	Topoi	Conclusion
Control and sovereignty	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat • History 	The EU has been in decline in recent years, and this decline will continue for the UK as well if the UK votes to remain in the EU.
Immigration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat • Numbers 	The difference between UK and EU wages will continue to draw large numbers of immigrants every year if the UK votes to remain in the EU.
Economic decline and loss of money	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Finance • Numbers 	The UK is one of the world's largest export markets, and it imports from the EU less than it exports to the world; therefore, the UK would be more successful outside the EU.

As indicated in the table above, Davies's first and main argument rests on the idea that the EU has 'become less democratic, less competitive and more dysfunctional, and 'Britain has become more side-lined' within it (DD1). Via the *topos of threat*, the politician leads the listeners to the conclusion that there is much decline ahead of the UK within the EU, for example,

The EU has been in decline for some time now. There is no change of course in sight. The risks involved in staying are clear for all to see – low growth, high unemployment, and waning influence. In 1975 the EU was the bright future, a vision of a better world. Now it is a crumbling relic from a gloomy past. We must raise our eyes to the wider world (DD1).

As the example above indicates, the argument scheme is complemented with evaluative adjectives such as 'bright, gloomy, high and low' that emphasize the opposite effects addressing the two scenarios of staying and leaving the EU.

The second argument as stated above is that of immigration, where the politician uses the *topoi of numbers and threat* to lead the voters to the conclusion that being in the UK already draws in a large number of migrants across the EU and the world, and it will draw even more in future if the UK opted to remain a member of the bloc, for example,

265,000 people migrated to the UK from the EU in the last year. Many of them from poorer, Eastern European countries. Such high levels of migration are to be expected given the enormous wage differentials across Europe. There are 6 EU members where the average wage is less than a third of the UK's minimum wage, and a further 8 countries where it is less than half.

The argument above proposes that the migration from the EU to the UK would not cease due to such factors as UK wage policies and difference between the wages in the EU countries. The conclusion to be drawn from this argument is that there is no other way to control or stop immigration in future unless the UK leaves the EU and closes the borders. Via the *topos of numbers*, Davies also repudiates Cameron's argument about the limited access for immigrants to the benefits the UK provides, claiming that although Cameron has secured that immigrants would not be able to claim benefits within the first four years of residing in the UK (DK2), there would not be much change because 'in the first year after arrival, only 10% of EU national claim tax credits [...] and around 20% by the fourth year' (DD1). By this statement, the politician argues that migration would not be limited as the majority of migrants are not interested in the benefits, but in the minimum wage difference which would reach '£9 per hour by 2020 and be an even greater multiple of the average wage of the poorest EU members' (DD1). This leads to the conclusion that the terms agreed upon by Cameron for the UK on immigration control would not lead to any better consequences or limitation of immigration and that there is no other choice but leaving the EU to control the numbers of migrants entering the country.

The last argument Davies puts forward is that of economy, where he again repudiates Cameron's argument about the single market benefiting the UK trade and claims that 'balance of trade is in Europe's favour' (DD1). Via the *topoi of numbers and finance*, the politician leads the listeners to the conclusion that it would not be financially effective for the EU to limit UK's access to the single market after leaving the EU; therefore, there is no threat of losing money from trade with the EU, for instance, 'We currently import £59 billion more from Europe than we export. After Brexit, we would be Europe's largest export market, worth £289 billion in 2014, larger than China' (DD1). The argument if complemented with the use of comparative adjectives and comparison with other countries to simplify the message and intensify the effect of the numbers used in the argument.

Consequently, David Davies positions his Brexit arguments on top of David Cameron's arguments for remaining in the UK. Thus, the politician makes counterclaims or counterarguments and via the *topoi of threat, numbers, finances and history* leads the electorate to the conclusion that the EU would not change its policy towards immigration and laws and there would be no money lost in terms of trade because it would not be economically beneficial for the EU to leave the UK out of the single market.

Gisela Stuart's speech does not overtly draw on any of the arguments made by the other pro-Brexit politicians, yet it proposes a covert argument that the UK should leave the EU in order to take back control over all laws and regulations that are now decided by the EU. As examples the politician mentions the protection of the EU workers that the leaders of the bloc claim to provide, but at the same time 'demolishes workers' rights in Greece and other countries that received an EU bailout' (GS1). She also mentions that the EU aims at 'undermining NATO, believing it can replace it' (GS1). Her main argument is that if the UK did not vote to leave now, there would be no such opportunity in the future, e.g. 'If Britain votes to remain, we will have endorsed a short-term fix in a referendum that won't be held again for decades' (ibid.). The *topos of treat* is used in this argument to imply that the EU wishes to take control over every process and law within the bloc as a result diminishing the independence of the member states.

Iain Duncan Smith's arguments emphasize the disadvantage of the poorest UK citizens if staying in the EU thereby addressing the emotions of the electorate, for example, 'My plea to better off Britons who have done well in recent years is to consider using their vote in the referendum to vote for a better deal for people who haven't enjoyed the same benefits as them. Because the EU, despite its grand early intentions, has become a friend of the haves rather than the have-nots' (IDS1). This argument is secured by two sub-arguments, namely, immigration and economic costs, see the table below:

Table 4.9. Iain Duncan Smith's arguments and the topoi used

Argument	Topoi	Conclusion
Immigration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Numbers • Threat 	The number of people entering the EU is increasing and will increase unless the UK votes to leave the union;
Economic costs and taxes in the EU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Finances • Numbers • Burdening and weighting 	The economic costs and the taxes the EU imposes on the UK are too large a burden for the taxpayers; therefore, the UK should vote to leave to save millions of taxpayer's money.

As indicated in the table above, the politician further mentions the Eurozone countries such as Spain, Portugal and Greece that have met *serious unemployment for millions of citizens* of the countries (IDS1). Nevertheless, the politician avoids mentioning that the UK is not expected to join the Eurozone and; therefore, his argument would not be applicable in the specific situation. Accordingly, it can be said that the argument contradicts the rule of logical validity discussed in Chapter 2 and can thereby be considered to be a fallacy.

The next argument is about immigration where, via the *topos of threat* and *topos of numbers*, the politician leads one to the conclusion that immigration cannot and will not be limited by the UK remaining a member of the EU, for instance,

We know that EU migration has increased by 50% since 2010. If the number of EU jobseekers entering the UK over the next decade remains at current levels, some 690,000 people would be added to the UK population as a direct result. And with 5 more countries due to join, that number looks conservative. This would be the equivalent of a city the size of Glasgow. (IDS1)

The politician further extends his argument by using practical examples and, via *topos of threat*, connects the argument with the conclusion that immigration increase would result in more loss of land due to building of additional housing for migrants, for example, ‘We need to build around 240 houses every day for the next 20 years just to be able to cope with increased demand from future migration’ (ibid.).

Further on, the politician argues that the EU regulation of taxes puts too large a burden on the poorer part of the British citizens, because ‘the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy artificially inflates food prices and that consumer prices across a range of other goods imported from outside the EU are raised as a result of the common external tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade imposed by the EU. These include footwear (a 17% tariff), bicycles (15% tariff) and a range of clothing (12% tariff)’ (IDS1). This argument creates a negative emotional effect and connects the argument with the conclusion that actions must be taken in order to lower this burden on the poorest people of the UK, for example, ‘This may not sound a lot for better off British families – but for many it might be the difference between paying

the rent or not paying the rent' (ibid.). Thus, a conclusion is made that the politician specifically targets the people with low income or no income to vote to leave the EU and secure their opportunities for living and working in the UK.

Liam Fox bases his claim for leaving the EU only on one argument, namely, that of immigration control. Moreover, he uses the *topoi of numbers and threat* to lead the electorate to the conclusion that the UK should leave the EU to avoid immigration increase and the threat that come with it. L. Fox further claims that the threat of immigration increase can be referable not only to the economic factors but also the global or environmental factors such as loss of the green spaces, for example, 'if we remain in the European Union we will be forced to accept unlimited free movement of people – but there will be no free movement of space coming with them. The inevitable result will be worsening overcrowding in our land limited country' (LF1). Apart from the statement above and the *topos of threat*, the politician also applies the *topos of numbers* to measure the extent of land that would be lost, for instance, 'more than 7,000 hectares of forest was felled, 14,000 hectares of farmland concreted and 1,000 hectares of precious wetland was drained to make way for urban sprawl' (ibid.). The conclusion to be drawn from this argument via the applied validity claims is that control must be taken before immigration reaches the consequences described.

Chris Grayling's speech that has been selected for the pro-Brexit corpus concentrates on a single argument, namely, *the democracy, independence or sovereignty argument*. Via the *topos of threat and danger*, the politician proposes that the EU would eventually become one nation state or 'the united states of Europe' where the separate states inside this union would have 'no say [...] or no opt-out [...] and inevitably giving up independent nation status' (CG1). The politician further emphasizes the consequences of the integration process and remaining in the EU, and via parallel structures and repetitions (examples are underlined) manipulates with the emotions such as fear and insecurity of the electorate about the EU laws, for instance, 'if we vote to remain in the EU then it would be EU rules that would determine our minimum wage, EU rules that would say how our pensions work, it would be EU rules to govern our skills system and even EU rules that would tell us how health services should work' (ibid.). The politician acknowledges that Cameron has agreed on the terms that would prevent the UK from 'Eurozone, the Schengen Area and some Justice and Home Affairs measures'; however, as he claims 'there would not be an opt-out from other matters' (CG1). This leads the electorate to the conclusion that the UK must vote to leave the EU to become an independent and self-governing country.

In conclusion, the politicians propagating pro-Brexit arguments rest their validity claims on three main arguments, namely, immigration control, sovereignty and control over laws and

regulations and control over the monetary funds. The most often applied argumentation strategies in the pro-Brexit speeches are the *topos of threat* in a similar way to the speeches of against-Brexit politicians, *the topos of numbers*, *topos of finance*, *topos of burdening and weighting* and *topos of responsibility*. Accordingly, these strategies connect the key arguments with the conclusion that the UK is at disadvantage politically, economically and socially while being a member of the EU. Moreover, the argumentation strategies typically include intensifying manipulation techniques such as adjectives and adverbs that emphasize the good nature of the pro-Brexit politicians and their goal to leave the EU and the bad character of the against-Brexit politicians and their wish for the UK to remain in the EU. It has also been observed that the pro-Brexit rhetoric incorporates comparatively more intensive use of evaluative adjectives and adverbs as well as the use of modal markers such as ‘would, should, must’ than the against-Brexit rhetoric thereby pointing to the involvement and stance of the politicians on the future of the UK. Additionally, it has been observed that the pro-Brexit politicians tend to exemplify complex figures and numbers by using familiar figures, for example, *number of immigrants in the size of the city of Glasgow or Liverpool* etc. The aim of such strategies is not only to familiarize the listeners with the concepts but also to intensify the threatening effect and thus to manipulate with the listeners’ consciousness. Other manipulation techniques are discussed further in the chapter.

3.4. Manipulation Techniques in Brexit Arguments

As mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the techniques of manipulation is the use of numbers, acronyms and abbreviations in the argumentation strategies to deliberately but overtly influence the listener’s consciousness. This has also been noted in the chapter above, where the use of *the topoi of numbers* and *finances* has been analysed in the pro-Brexit and against-Brexit arguments. Thus, this chapter will further look at other manipulation techniques that have been identified in arguments from the selected corpora of Brexit speeches, namely, *keywords* or *connotative words* and *slogans* as well as *linguistic elements of every day environment*, *figurative language*, specifically *metaphoric expressions and similes*, *inclusion and exclusion strategies*, *quotations and intertextuality* as well as *rhetorical questions* and *parallelisms*. The examples in the analysis below will be underlined for emphasis.

The remain campaign’s or against-Brexit politicians’ main slogan is ‘better off in’ which is also combined with the adjectives in the comparative degree, namely, ‘stronger, safer and better off in the EU’ (DC2). This slogan has been at times used by the pro-Brexit politicians who use it to claim the opposite, namely, ‘better off outside’ (MG1). Another slogan used by the against-Brexit politicians is ‘to have best of both worlds’, which implies Cameron’s agreement with the EU on the terms of their remaining, namely, the security of

pound as a currency, immigration and benefit limitations and withdrawal from the Schengen area (DC2). In contrast, pro-Brexit speeches also have a phrase which tends to reappear across the speeches, namely, ‘take back control’ if leaving the EU versus ‘give up control’ if voting to remain in the EU (MG2), (BJ1), (BJ2), (DD1), (IDS1), for example, ‘If we vote to stay we are not settling for the status quo - we are voting to be a hostage, locked in the boot of a car driven by others to a place and at a pace that we have no control over. In stark contrast, if we vote to leave, we take back control’ (MG1). As the example above indicates, the slogan about the lack of control of the UK if remaining an EU member is combined with a metaphoric expression of being a hostage, which emphasizes the state of the country being held against its will. The metaphor also draws on strong negative emotions thereby enhancing the possibility for actions taken by the electorate. The repetition of slogans throughout the speeches also execute the function of keeping therein embedded into the recipients’ short-term memory.

It seems important to point out that according to the keyword analysis (see Appendix 4), the most frequently used words in Corpus 1 (against-Brexit speech corpus) are *EU, Britain, European, Europe, people, world, union* and the most frequently found word combinations are *the European Union, the single market, in the world* and *our membership of*. Similarly, keywords in Corpus 2 (pro-Brexit speech corpus) are *EU, European, trade, people, Britain, union, control* and *leave*, while the key phrases are *the European Union, we vote to, the European court, if we vote* etc. (see Appendix 4). Accordingly, it is concluded that both parties tend to use similar keywords and repeat them frequently throughout the speeches, while the attributives in the form of adjectives and intensifiers differ in both speeches, for instance, ‘Britain today is a proud, successful, thriving nation, a nation the world admires and looks up to, and whose best days lie ahead of it’ (DC1), and ‘the in-campaign want us to believe that Britain is beaten and broken’ (MG1). It should be noted here that M. Gove’s statement does not correspond to the rules discerning arguments from fallacies described in Chapter 2, because the speaker does not make ‘correct reference to implicit premises of the other party, attributing unexpressed premises of the other party’ (Wodak and Meyer, 2016: 130).

As regards the manipulative language in the against-Brexit arguments, several examples of metaphor have been identified (see a list of tropes in Appendix 6). The most often applied metaphor is that the UK should not leave the EU and ‘take a leap into the dark’ meaning that the UK should not leave the EU because the future would be unknown (DC1), (PH1), (DC4). The metaphor targets the associations between going into darkness and going into something unknown and frightening that one would rather avoid. Another metaphor which has been identified as reoccurring in the speeches across the corpus is ‘emergency brake’ referring to

the right of the UK to veto growing immigration numbers that are to come to the UK (DC2), (PH1), (GO1). This metaphor also targets the association of between brakes and stopping something, for instance, stopping the car before a crash. The next metaphor is that of cooperation between the UK and the EU which has been depicted as ‘marriage’ and the UK exiting this cooperation as a ‘divorce’, for instance, ‘like any divorce, the negotiations with our former EU partners are likely to be difficult’ (PH1).

It is significant to point out that in contrast to the against-Brexit corpus, a considerably larger number of manipulative language examples have been identified (see comparative statistics in Appendix 2). One of the metaphoric expressions that has been identified in several speeches including M. Gove’s and B. Johnson’s speeches is about the ‘muscle of the EU’ without which the UK would not have strength to survive or which would be used against the UK after leaving the bloc, for example, ‘Brexit would lead to EU nations using their massive muscle to punish us’ (MG2) and ‘As for the argument that we need the muscle of EU membership, if we are to do trade deals’ (BJ1). This metaphoric expression is typically used to structure counterarguments to the against-Brexit arguments via more emotional and appealing language as well as irony. The metaphor of game has also been applied across the speeches in the corpus to denote that the UK would be winning the game if they chose to leave the EU, for instance, ‘The day after we vote to leave we hold all the cards and we can choose the path we want’ (MG1). The metaphors of LIFE IS A JOURNEY and OPPORTUNITY IS A DOOR are also used in the pro-Brexit speeches indicating that leaving the EU would be the first step toward the now opened door to the brighter future for the UK, for instance, ‘We can see the sunlit meadows beyond. I believe we would be mad not to take this once in a lifetime chance to walk through that door’ (BJ2). Other metaphors that are used in the pro-Brexit speeches refer to the against-Brexit arguments being a ‘horror story’ or ‘a painted picture’, for instance, ‘I sometimes think that the In campaign appears to be operating to a script written by George R.R Martin and Stephen King - Brexit would mean a combination of a Feast for Crows and Misery’ (MG1). The example above also shows the emotional appeal to the audience via familiar items such as popular fiction. This appeal also makes the speakers appear more similar and closer to the listeners and their emotions, yet this argument does not correspond to the rules of arguments and fallacies either as due to the language used it is ambiguous and open for interpretation, namely, it is not clearly and correctly formulated.

Moreover, the pro-Brexit politicians also use similes to create an ironic and humorous effect and arise emotions about the arguments of the opposing party, for example, ‘and to keep insisting that the EU is about economics is like saying the Italian Mafia is interested in

olive oil and real estate' (BJ2), 'EU's internal borders policy is like hanging a sign welcoming terrorists to Europe' (MG2), 'negotiating on behalf of the EU is like trying to ride a vast pantomime horse, with 28 people blindly pulling in different directions' (BJ2). The similes target the emotions of the electorate via familiar associations thus creating negative connotations with the EU and the arguments of the against-Brexit politicians that are described. It is noteworthy to point out that not only figurative language used by the pro-Brexit politicians but also the use of simpler language creates a positive emotional appeal to the listeners, leading them to perceive these politicians as being closer or similar to them, for instance, 'because the EU, despite its grand early intentions, has become a friend of the haves rather than the have-nots' (IDS1). It can be stated accordingly that via this type of language the politicians use overt or emotional manipulation to appeal to the audience's consciousness.

Furthermore, pronouns of inclusion and exclusion have also been identified in Corpus 1, where the UK and its citizens together with the politicians who campaign to remain in the EU are positioned as in-group, whereas the pro-Brexit politicians are positioned as out-group. The strategies typically use the personal pronouns *we*, *us* and *ours* as well as the demonstrative pronouns *this* and *these* pointing to closeness, for example, 'in 45 days' time, the British people will go to polling stations across our islands and cast their ballots in the way we have done in this country for generations' (DC1). On the other hand, exclusion or the positioning of out-groups is achieved through the use of the personal pronouns *they*, *them* and *their* as well as the demonstrative pronouns *that* and *those* indicating distance, for example, 'and I understand and respect the views of those who think we should leave, even if I believe they are wrong and that leaving would inflict real damage on our country, its economy and its power in the world' (DC1). As regards the pro-Brexit speeches in Corpus 2, it is concluded that the use of inclusion and exclusion via the creation of in-groups and out-groups is similar to that of the against-Brexit speeches, namely, the UK citizens and the pro-Brexit politicians are positioned as in-groups and the against-Brexit politicians together with the EU leaders and EU citizens are positioned as out-groups, for example, 'If we vote to stay, the EU's bosses and bureaucrats will take that as *carte blanche* to continue taking more power and money away from Britain. They will say we have voted for 'more Europe' (MG1).

Furthermore, the against-Brexit politicians also use quotations and references to the opinion and findings of specialists, for example, 'As Portugal's new Socialist Prime Minister, Antonio Costa, has said: 'in the face of all these crises around us. We must not divide Europe – we must strengthen it' (JC1). The elements of intertextuality are used here to refer to other people's opinion, typically a specialist's view. The pro-Brexit speeches also make more use of intertextuality referring to the opinions and judgements of specialists in the field as well as

quilting the arguments of the opposing party, for instance, ‘Angela Merkel has said: “We need more Europe, we need not only a monetary union, but we also need a so-called fiscal union, in other words more joint budget policy.”’ (GG1). By quoting the opposing party, namely, using the statements of the opposing party out their original context, the pro-Brexit politicians aim to emphasize the dangerous and negative effect of staying in the EU and ‘losing more control’ and at the same time manipulating the information.

Finally, rhetorical devices such as rhetorical questions and parallel structures have also been identified in the speeches, for instance, ‘Let us make our decision with the great challenges of the future in mind. Let us have more confidence in our ability to get things done in Europe. This is about our future. Let us, Great Britain, stand tall and lead’ (TM1). The parallel structures are used to dwell on listeners’ consciousness and emphasize the idea that is being presented as well as to keep it in the listeners’ memory as it is being done via repetitions. As regards rhetorical questions, few cases have been identified, where they are used to make the listeners think about a possible answer to these questions, while the answer is not expected or rather it is obvious, for instance, ‘How betrayed will people feel if they vote to leave Europe based on the reasons presented by the Leave Campaign, only to see in the weeks, months and years that follow that those reasons were utter, invented rubbish?’ (TF1). In the example above, T. Farron addresses the pro-Brexit politicians’ arguments, claiming that they are misleading and false at the same time asserting that people will feel betrayed if they would believe the arguments and vote to leave the EU.

The use of rhetorical questions for the purpose of manipulation is also more frequently found in the speeches of the pro-Brexit politicians, because they tend to use rhetorical questions triggering the emotions of the audiences by a supposed negative answer and then giving this answer themselves and repeating or emphasizing it via parallel structures, for instance, ‘And Britain? What happens to us? Our influence will diminish. Our sovereignty will diminish. Our ability to look after our own national interest will diminish’ (IDS1), ‘Are we really too small, too weak and too powerless to make a success of self-rule?’ (MG2).

In summary, it can be stated that both types of manipulation discussed in Chapter 2 have been identified in the selected corpora of Brexit speeches, namely, the rational manipulation and emotional manipulation. Rational manipulation has been more applied by the against-Brexit politicians, as they draw heavily on facts and opinions of specialists to convince the listeners that the EU would be a better option, while emotional manipulation is more often applied in the pro-Brexit speeches where emotional appeal is used to repudiate the argument of the opposing party as well as to create a negative image of the EU. It has likewise been observed that in addition to emotional language and the use of figurative expressions, the

pro-Brexit politicians have used such manipulative techniques as emphasizing the wanted information and concealing the unwanted facts, for examples, emphasizing the costs of the membership in the EU, but concealing the income from the EU. This technique is also referred to as cognitive manipulation, as discussed in Chapter 2. Consequently, given the results of the EU referendum and the results of the surveys that have been carried out after the vote, it seems that the emotional appeal and manipulation techniques have been more effective and persuading. This is due to the fact that the majority of people with lower level of education and lower job positions as well as social factors have tended to vote for leaving the EU, while the graduate and postgraduate managerial level UK citizens seem to have voted for staying in the EU. To support the analysis discussed and validate the results, the statistical analysis of the strategies discussed above will be provided further on.

3.5. Linguistic Means of Persuasion in Brexit Arguments: Comparative Statistics

After the qualitative analysis of argument strategies and topoi as well as the analysis of manipulation techniques in the Brexit arguments, it is also important to provide quantitative or statistical evidence of the use of these strategies in the selected corpora. It is also imperative to compare the statistical use of these strategies in pro-Brexit rhetoric versus against-Brexit to denote the possible effect of linguistic means on the referendum outcome.

To begin with, it should be emphasized that five arguments have been identified in the against-Brexit speeches, and three arguments have been identified in the pro-Brexit speeches. Furthermore, 152 cases of topoi have been found within the five arguments of the ten against-Brexit politicians, and 146 topoi have been identified in the 20 speeches of ten pro-Brexit politicians (see the illustrative comparison of statistics in Appendix 2). Hence, the most frequently applied topos in the against-Brexit arguments is the *topos of danger and threat* (47 cases identified) which accounts for 30.39% of the total number of the topoi found. In comparison, the pro-Brexit arguments include 36 cases of the *topos of threat and danger* accounting for 24.66% of the total number of topoi identified. As discussed in the qualitative analysis of topoi in the identified arguments from both parties, the second most applied topos is the *topos of numbers* which accounts for 13.16% (20 cases) in the against-Brexit arguments and 19.18% (28 cases) in the pro-Brexit arguments. The *topos of advantage* has also been applied quite frequently, as it accounts for 19% (29) of topoi in the against-Brexit arguments in contrast to 8.9% (13) in the pro-Brexit arguments.

Furthermore, it is also significant to point out that while 11.64 % (17 cases) of the total number of the identified topoi in the pro-Brexit speeches is the *topos of abuse* and 13.70% (20 cases) is the *topos of burdening and weighting*, these topoi have not been found in the

arguments of the opposing party. The other *topoi* that have been identified are the *topos of finances* accounting for 7.89% (12 cases) in the against-Brexit arguments and 6.16% (9 cases) in the pro-Brexit arguments, as well as the *topos of history* accounting for 7.89% (12 cases) in the against-Brexit arguments and 5.48% (8 cases) in the pro-Brexit arguments.

Henceforth, a significant difference has been identified in the use of the *topos of reality* which accounts for 19.72% (30 cases) of the total number of *topoi* found in the against-Brexit arguments, while it accounts for 5.48% (8 cases) of the *topoi* used in the pro-Brexit arguments. Thus, it can be concluded that the against-Brexit arguments tend to base their validity claims on the *topoi of threat, advantage, reality, history and numbers* as well as *finances* to lead the listeners to the conclusion that the UK would be ‘stronger, safer, and better-off in the EU’ (Corpus 1), while the pro-Brexit politicians base their claims on *the topoi of numbers, threat and danger, abuse, burdening and weighting* as well as *advantage* to lead one to the conclusion that ‘the expenses and regulations of the EU are too large a burden on the UK, it abuses its citizens and takes away control and sovereignty’ (Corpus 2).

Furthermore, it should also be pointed out that the arguments identified in the Brexit speeches include several techniques of manipulation as discussed in the analysis above (see statistical data in Appendix 2). The against-Brexit speeches use more inclusion strategies (4.94%) than exclusion strategies via pronouns (2.84%). Similarly, the pro-Brexit politicians also put more emphasis on the inclusion strategies, which account for 3.85% in contrast to the exclusion 3%. Moreover, as indicated in the analysis of inclusion and exclusion above, the tendency to exclude the opposing party and include the citizens of the UK is similar, yet the against-Brexit speeches also show the tendency to include the EU, its citizens and politicians when referring to the whole EU via the pronouns *us, our* and *we*, while in the pro-Brexit speeches the EU is excluded from the in-group via the pronouns *those, them, and their*. More importantly, other manipulation techniques contribute to the effect of creating in-groups and out-groups, as they emphasize and characterize these groups thereby intensifying the manipulative effect of these strategies on the human cognition.

The number of manipulation techniques in the pro-Brexit speeches is comparatively larger than in the against-Brexit speeches (394 cases versus 261 cases), accounting for 1.62% versus 0.9% of the total number of words in the corpora (see the examples in Appendix 6 and more detailed statistical output in Appendix 2). Moreover, the most frequently applied types of techniques in the corpora are *metaphoric expressions* accounting for 0.44% (108 cases) in the pro-Brexit speeches and 0.29% (83 cases) in the against-Brexit speeches, *slogans or the campaign phrases* accounting for 0.25% (60 repetitions) in the pro-Brexit speeches and 0.18% (17 repetitions) in the against-Brexit speeches, *simplified and informal language*

expressions accounting for 0.25% (61 cases) in the pro-Brexit corpus (C2) and 0.13% (37 cases) in the against-Brexit corpus (C1), parallel sentences structures accounting for 0.08% (18 cases) in the pro-Brexit corpus and 0.12% (35 cases) in the against-Brexit corpus, and *intertextuality or references to other texts* or speeches accounting for 0.12% (29 references identified) in the pro-Brexit corpus and 0.10% (21 references) in the against-Brexit corpus. Furthermore, 11 cases of ironical expressions (0.05%) and 4 cases of sarcastic expressions (0.02%) have been identified in the pro-Brexit speeches, while no such cases were found in the against-Brexit speeches (see concordance plot for inclusion and exclusion in C1 and C2 in Appendix 5 and examples of irony and sarcasm in Appendix 6).

In addition to figurative language, the intensifying technique via means of adjectives and adverbs is used in the pro-Brexit and against-Brexit speeches (see statistics in Appendix 7 and corpus tags in Appendix 8). It has been calculated that the number of adjectives and adverbs in the against-Brexit speeches (C1) is 2444, which accounts for 8.46 % of the overall corpus size, while the number of the same in the pro-Brexit speeches (C2) is 2477, which accounts for 9.38% of the overall corpus size. Additionally, it has been noted that the most frequently used type of mitigation techniques in both corpora are general adjectives, the number of which is 1991 (6.89%) in Corpus 1 and 2106 (7.98%) in Corpus 2. Examples of such adjectives in Corpus 1 include *great, confident, proud, dangerous* which are used to describe the country and the decision it is about to make. Examples of these adjectives in Corpus 2 are *positive, negative, optimistic, pessimistic, tremendous, grotesque, patronising, predatory*, which are used to contrast the future of the UK after leaving the EU and the future of the country when staying in the union as well as to characterise the EU institutions such as the EU Court of Justice, for instance, ‘the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg has *predatory* qualities to it that could be very inimical to some of our national practices’ (MG1).

As a result, it seems that there is a correlation between the frequency of manipulation techniques and argumentation strategies and the persuasive effect on the audience. Nevertheless, the effect depends on the contextual information about the target audience, namely, their social status, education, and age because it seems that individuals with lower social status and education would be more responsive to the emotional manipulation than those with higher status and level of education. It also seems that the pro-Brexit politicians have aimed to target the consciousness and emotions of the target audience via the *topos of abuse and burdening* as well as figurative language use, while the against-Brexit politicians have aimed at persuading the audience by approaching the fear of uncertainty about future and negative consequences in terms of finances, security and relationship with Scotland via the frequent application of the *topos of threat and danger*. Moreover, it seems that emotional

manipulation and the appeal to the hopes of the target audience have proved to be more successful in terms persuasion than rational manipulation and factual appeal to the common sense.

3.6. Role of Ideology in Brexit Arguments

To begin with, it can be stated that the Brexit rhetoric does not seem to have a single type of underlying ideology in the arguments therein presented. The conclusion derives from the fact that Brexit referendum seems to have caused a major division between the political parties in the UK, as for instance the Conservative party was divided after such well-known politicians as Boris Johnson, Michael Gove and David Davies announced that they would support the *leave campaign* and argue for the UK to leave the EU. Other Conservative party members and leading politicians in the UK such as David Cameron, Theresa May (before the vote) and George Osborne made the case for the UK to remain in the EU. It is also notable that the members of the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats party such as Tim Farron and Jeremy Corbyn support and argue for the UK to remain within the EU. Thus, the fact shows that political ideologies in the Brexit referendum were not based on or connected with the political affiliation of the specific political figures but rather with the beliefs and types of mind-set these individual politicians shared towards the EU.

Thus, the ideology identified in the against-Brexit arguments is conservatism, as the politicians base their arguments on validity claims about the EU as an institutionalised political authority that works to hold its nation together to sustain peace and steady economic growth in the continent. Patterns of conservatism can be identified in such arguments as, ‘again, it has been regulations agreed in Europe that have improved Britain’s beaches and waterways and that are forcing us to tackle the scandal of air pollution which will kill 500,000 people in Britain by 2025, unless we act. Working together in the European Union is vital for tackling climate change and vital in protecting the environment we share’ (JC1). In the argument above, the emphasis is put on the fact that the rules and laws made by the EU politicians are advantageous to the UK and that without these regulations the country would face threat. A Similar argument is provided about the security of the UK, for instance, ‘the European Union has helped reconcile countries which were once at each other’s throats for decades. Britain has a fundamental national interest in maintaining common purpose in Europe to avoid future conflict between European countries’, where it is emphasized that the agreement and cooperation between the EU leaders help to maintain peace.

Furthermore, referring to the pro-Brexit arguments, it is significant to note that although several of the politicians arguing for the UK to leave the EU belong to the *Conservative* or

Labour Party, the ideology patterns that are identified in their arguments seem to belong rather to populism, nationalism and in some cases to racism. As indicated in Chapter 1, populism addresses the so-called common people with the idea that their rights as individuals are being limited by the elites or those who hold the power. As also noted, populism has started to gain global popularity as people lose trust and confidence in the judgements of politicians. Thus, it seems that patterns of populism underlie numerous pro-Brexit arguments, as they tend to emphasize the burden of the EU regulation on the citizens and working people of the EU as well as the idea that the costs of the membership in the EU and the growing number of immigrants abuse the rights of the UK nationals, for instance, ‘If we vote to stay, British taxpayers will inevitably be paying ever higher bills for years to come as the EU uses its growing and unchecked power to transfer resources to subsidise failure’ (MG1). The next example emphasizes the idea that the EU is led by elites who assume more power, for example, ‘If we vote to stay, the EU’s bosses and bureaucrats will take that as carte blanche to continue taking more power and money away from Britain’ (ibid.). Hence, the statements above indicate the appeal to the *common people* to take the power away from the elites, which is a typical feature of populism as discussed in Chapter 1.

As populism targets people’s emotions both in covert manipulative ways and in an explicit or overt way, it can be said that the arguments and statements identified in the pro-Brexit speeches are more overt than covert, for instance, ‘But if the EU is working for Germany, for banks, for big corporates and for the public affairs companies with large lobbying operations in Brussels, the EU isn’t working for over regulated small businesses and lower-paid and lower-skilled Britons. They now have to compete with millions of people from abroad for jobs and a wage rise’ (IDS). The statement above claims that the EU is an institutionalised body that exercises its power for the benefit or other in the position of power while neglecting or abusing those who do not have the power. Finally, other features that point out to the populism in the pro-Brexit arguments is the positioning of the EU in the out-group or being different from the UK, for instance, ‘It is true, but profoundly uninformative about the real aims of that organization. What was once the EEC has undergone a spectacular metamorphosis in the last 30 years, and the crucial point is that it is still becoming ever more centralizing, interfering and anti-democratic’ (BJ2).

Furthermore, as one of the strongest pro-Brexit arguments is immigration, it is noteworthy to point out that the patterns of nationalism have been identified as well, for example, ‘in London, despite the rapid growth in population the number of households headed by a British born person has actually fallen in the last ten years’ (LF1). In the statement above, Liam Fox claims that the UK nationals and the people born in the UK lose their

opportunities for property, as it is taken away by foreign-born people, e.g. ‘Official figures show that in the last ten years, two thirds of additional households in the UK have been headed up by an immigrant (that is to say that they had a foreign born “Household Reference Person (HRP) - what used to be known as head of household’ (ibid.). Consequently, it can be concluded that nationalism is the main ideology applied to the argument of immigration, while populism dominates in the arguments of sovereignty and the costs of the EU.

In summary, Chapter 3 has introduced the methodological background of the present study and outlined the analysis of argumentation strategies in the Brexit rhetoric and means of manipulation that have been applied to persuade the audience to vote for or against the UK leaving the EU. It has been concluded that the against-Brexit politicians such as David Cameron, Theresa May and Jeremy Corbyn have tried to persuade the citizens of the UK to vote for remaining in the EU using five arguments, namely, economy and the Single Market, security, global influence, free movement of people and union with Scotland. The arguments have mainly been based on the *topoi of history, reality, threat* as well as the *topoi of finances and numbers* leading to the conclusion that the UK has always been safer and more secure within organisation such as the EU and that leaving the EU would leave overall negative consequences on the aforementioned arguments. In contrast, the pro-Brexit speeches are based on three arguments, namely, costs of the EU, sovereignty, and immigration which are based on *the topoi of burdening, abuse, numbers, threat and advantage* leading to the conclusion that the EU imposes laws and regulations which are a burden on the UK politics and economy thereby abusing the rights of its citizens and that remaining in the EU would lead to more regulations, more immigrants and more costs, while leaving the EU would mean ‘regaining control over their country’ (C2). It has been likewise concluded that the dominating ideology in the against-Brexit arguments is conservatism although it has not been emphasized and seems to be more covert in the rhetoric of the against-Brexit politicians. The dominating ideologies in the pro-Brexit arguments, however, are nationalism and populism being used both covertly and overtly making explicit statement about elites, power and immigration.

Conclusions

Politics is one of the most discussed fields of social and linguistic studies, as it deals with power and domination as well as the exercise of that power via various strategies and ideologies. One of the latest political events that has been of interest to scholars in numerous fields is the UK European Union referendum (Brexit). The expressive character of the pre-Brexit campaign and the unexpected outcome of the referendum wherein the majority of the UK citizens voted to leave the EU and trigger article 50 of the Lisbon treaty has drawn not only the attention of the media but also the interest of scholars and laypeople across the world.

The goal of the present study was to analyse the argumentation strategies and techniques of manipulation in the pre-Brexit rhetoric and to investigate the cause and effect relations between the argumentation strategies, manipulative language, the ideologies represented in the speeches and the hypothetical persuasive effect of the combination. Three research were posed to reach the goal of the study, and the discourse historical approach to critical discourse analysis as well as the corpus-based approach and a comparative analysis were used to answer the posed research questions. Several conclusions were drawn as a result of the study.

First, the against-Brexit politicians such as David Cameron, Theresa May and Jeremy Corbyn have tried to persuade the citizens of the UK to vote for remaining in the EU using five arguments, namely, economy and the Single Market, military security, global influence, free movement of people and union with Scotland. The aforementioned arguments have been based on *the topoi of history, reality, threat* as well as *the topoi of finances and numbers* leading to the conclusion that the UK has always been safer and more secure within organisation such as the EU, and that leaving the EU would leave overall negative consequences on the factors proposed in the aforementioned arguments. Although the argumentation has been complemented by techniques of manipulation such as inclusion and exclusion, repetition, references and metaphoric expressions, it seems that the negative and threatening aspect of the persuasive language as well as the formal character of the language used has led to the loss of trust and belief in the target audience.

In contrast, the pro-Brexit speeches are based on three arguments, namely, costs of the EU, sovereignty, and immigration, which are based on the *topoi of burdening, abuse, numbers, threat and advantage* leading to the conclusion that the EU imposes laws and regulations which are a burden on the UK politics and economy thereby abusing the rights of its citizens and that remaining in the EU would lead to more regulations, more immigrants and more costs, while leaving the EU would mean regaining control over their country. The

arguments already appeal to the emotions of the target audience, but the effect has been intensified via the use of emotional manipulation techniques such as figurative language, irony, sarcasm and simple and appealing language, whereby the politicians identify with the audience and create the effect of similarity and equality between them.

Second, it has been concluded that the argumentation strategies of intensifying and mitigation are also present in the politicians' attempts to persuade the electorate, as the politicians often apply numerous intensifying adjectives and adverbs that emphasize their claims and intensify the effect of the language used. Adjectives are also used to express the speaker's emotions as well as to draw on the listener's emotions, which is a manipulation technique that targets the audience's cognition. Additionally, it has been concluded that the pro-Brexit speeches contain more general adjectives in the comparative and superlative degrees which are frequently emphasized with adverbs to intensify the emotional effect and colouring.

Furthermore, it has been found that the dominating ideology in the against-Brexit arguments is conservatism although it has not been emphasized and seems to be more covert in the rhetoric of the against-Brexit politicians. The dominating ideologies in the pro-Brexit arguments, however, are nationalism and populism being used both covertly and overtly making explicit statement about elites, power and immigration. Moreover, by the application of populist and nationalistic beliefs in the Brexit arguments, the pro-Brexit rhetoric addresses the mistrust and suspicion of the lower or working class in the dominating political parties at the same time emphasizing the equality between the electorate and the pro-Brexit politicians and the common wish to regain control of the power over their country.

Given the referendum results and results of surveys carried out after the referendum to analyse the social and economic factors influencing the Brexit vote, it seems that the pre-Brexit rhetoric has been one of the factors that has influenced the outcome of the vote as the referendum has had the higher participation statistics after the Scottish referendum and the most notable correlation between the voting results and factors such as education, employment and age. As a result, it seems that there is a correlation between the frequency of argumentation strategies and therein used manipulation techniques and the persuasive effect on the audience. Nevertheless, the effect depends on the contextual information about the target audience, namely, their social status, education, and age, because it seems that individuals with lower social status and education would be more responsive to the emotional manipulation than those with higher status and level of education. Additionally, it seems that formal language and factual representation of numbers and figures in long speeches seem to have the effect of creating a distance between the speaker and the recipient. Thus, the research

questions posed in the present study have been answered. Moreover, the reliability and validity of the results of the present study are justified via the application of combined approaches to critical discourse analysis from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives.

Conclusively, it must be noted that although the present study can be considered successful, it has certain practical limitations such as the limited availability or opportunity to provide objective evidence on the impact of ideologically embedded language on the voting population. The reason is that political rhetoric and argumentation can be perceived as having impact only within a given situation and given context. Moreover, the conclusions of the present study are partially limited because there were several factors that might have influenced the voting decision of the electorate apart from the political speeches. These factors include media publications and broadcasts as well as the ad hoc effect of social media communication that has recently gained more trust and support of the people across the world. Hence, the present research may be expanded and further implemented by looking at various events where argumentation is of particular importance and serves the function of persuasion to analyse whether the same strategies have been implemented by the winning or succeeding parties within various situations and contexts. It can also be continued by applying critical discourse study to analyse the cooperation of political discourse and media discourse in addressing the discourse recipients. Thus, it can be stated that there is place for further interdisciplinary research in the fields of linguistics and social sciences.

Theses

1. Political discourse and political rhetoric are complex fields of study due to their multi-faceted nature and influence over masses; therefore, the study of political discourse requires a critical perspective.
2. The unexpected result of the EU referendum has resulted in numerous social, cultural and political studies on the outcome of the vote, however, an insufficient amount of research has been found on the argumentation strategies in the Brexit rhetoric; therefore, the present research contributes to the field of political language studies.
3. The Brexit referendum outlined a rupture between the UK politicians who campaigned both for and against leaving the European Union.
4. The against-Brexit politicians used five arguments for the UK to remain in the EU, namely, the Single Market, security, global influence, free movement of people and union with Scotland, while the pro-Brexit politicians contemplated on three main arguments for leaving the EU, namely, the costs of the EU, sovereignty, and immigration.
5. The against-Brexit politicians have balanced their arguments on the *topoi of history, reality, threat, finances and numbers* that connect the five arguments with the conclusion that the UK should remain in the EU, while the pro-Brexit politicians' arguments are connected to the conclusion that the UK should leave the EU to get back control via *the topoi of threat, burdening, abuse and numbers*.
6. The most frequently applied manipulation techniques in the pro-Brexit arguments were parallelisms, metaphoric expressions, similes, synecdoche and irony, repetition as well as inclusion and exclusion strategies and simple language that draw on the recipient's emotions.
7. The most frequently used techniques of manipulation in the against-Brexit arguments are intertextuality, parallelisms, means of inclusion and repetition of the campaign slogan that are aimed at rational manipulation and appeal to the audience's common sense.
8. Pro-Brexit politicians apply frequent use of general adjective in the comparative and superlative degree that are combined with adverbs to intensify the emotional effect on the audience and to emphasize the good nature of leaving the EU and the bad effect of staying within the union.

9. Populism and nationalism as well as racism have been found as underlying pro-Brexit argumentation strategies, while conservative ideology has been found to be dominating the against-Brexit arguments.
10. Appeal to the audience's emotions via linguistic and cognitive strategies of argumentation and the use of ideology seems to be a more effective tool of persuasion and manipulation than formal language and factual arguments.

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Appendix 1 Corpora of Pre-Brexit Speeches

Corpus 1 (C1): Against-Brexit Speeches

1. DC1- David Cameron's Speech on 9 May 2016. Available from <http://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2016/05/camerons-speech-on-brexit-full-text.html> [Accessed on 1 December 2016]
2. DC2- David Cameron's Conference Statement on 20 February 2016. Available from <http://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2016/02/camerons-press-conference-statement-full-text.html> [Accessed on 1 December 2016]
3. DC3 – David Cameron Speech on 24 May 2016. Available from <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-easyjet-on-why-the-uk-should-stay-in-a-reformed-eu> [Accessed on 19 March 2017]
4. DC4- David Cameron Speech on 23 May 2016. Available from <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-on-the-short-term-economic-impact-of-a-vote-to-leave-the-eu> [Accessed on 19 March 2017]
5. TM1 – Theresa May's Speech on 25 April 2016. Available from <http://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2016/04/theresa-mays-speech-on-brexit-full-text.html> [Accessed on 1 December 2016]
6. JC2 – Jeremy Corbyn's Speech on 19 April 2016. Available from <https://www.scribd.com/doc/309694809/Michael-Gove-pro-Brexit-speech> [Accessed on 12 February 2017]
7. TF1 – Tim Farron Speech on 9 June 2016. Available from <http://www.ukpol.co.uk/tim-farron-2016-speech-on-the-eu-2/> [Accessed on 12 February 2017]
8. PH1 – Philip Hammond Speech on 2 March 2016. Available from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SYLQtDpVWCA> and <http://www.ukpol.co.uk/philip-hammond-2016-speech-on-alternatives-to-eu-membership/> [Accessed 1 March 2017]
9. HB1- Hilary Benn Speech on 13 June 2016. Available from <http://europe.newsweek.com/brexit-hilary-benn-speech-full-text-469547?rm=eu> [Accessed on 19 March 2017]
10. GO1- George Osborn Speech on 23 May 2016. Available from <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/hm-treasury-analysis-on-the-immediate-economic-impact-of-leaving-the-eu-george-osbornes-speech> [Accessed on 19 March 2017]

Corpus 2 (C2): Pro-Brexit Speeches

11. BJ1- Boris Johnson's Speech on 9 May 2016. Available from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1jvbkf87Tg> and <http://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2016/05/boris-johnsons-speech-on-the-eu-referendum-full-text.html> [Accessed on 1 December 2016]
12. BJ2- Boris Johnson's Speech on 22 February 2016. Available from <http://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2016/02/boriss-eu-statement-full-text.html> [Accessed on 1 December 2016]
13. CG1- Christ Greyling Speech on 31 May 2016. Available from http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/chris_grayling_we_must_vote_leave_to_protect_our_sovereignty_and_democracy_from_further_eu_integration.html [Accessed on 19 March 2017]
14. DD1 - David Davies Speech on 6 February 2016. Available from <http://www.ukpol.co.uk/david-davis-2016-speech-on-brexit/> [Accessed on 12 February 2017]
15. GS1- Gisela Stuart Speech on 1 March 2016. Available from <http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/brexit-is-the-left-wing-choice> [Accessed on 1 March 2017]
16. IDS1- Iain Duncan Speech on 6 June 2016. Available from <http://www.ukpol.co.uk/iain-duncan-smith-2016-speech-on-the-eu/> [Accessed on 12 March 2017]
17. LF1 – Liam Fox Speech on 2 June 2016. Available from http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/rt_hon_liam_fox_mp_memories_of_green_the_cost_of_uncontrolled_migration.html [Accessed on 19 March 2017]
18. MG1- Michael Gove's Speech on 20 February 2016. Available from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FF_pL7b2z_w and <http://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2016/02/goves-statement-in-full-by-leaving-the-eu-we-can-take-control.html> [Accessed on 1 December 2016]
19. MG2- Michael Gove's Speech on 19 April 2016. Available from <https://www.scribd.com/doc/309694809/Michael-Gove-pro-Brexit-speech> [Accessed on 12 February 2017]
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Appendix 2 Comparative Statistics of the Use of Linguistic Means in Brexit Rhetoric

Results of the statistical analysis in Chapter 3.5. are displayed in the tables and figures below.

1. Frequency of Topoi in Brexit Arguments

Table 2. 1. Types of topoi in corpus 1 and corpus 2

Topoi in the Against-Brexit Speeches	Raw frequency in C1	Topoi in the Pro-Brexit Speeches	Raw frequency C2
Usefulness/advantage	29	Usefulness/advantage	13
Definition	-	Definition	2
Responsibility	2	Responsibility	5
Finances	12	Finances	9
Numbers	20	Numbers	28
History	12	History	8
Abuse	-	Abuse	17
Danger/threat	47	Danger/threat	36
Justice	-	Justice	-
Burdening	-	Burdening	20
Reality	30	Reality	8
Law and right	-	Law and right	-
Culture	-	Culture	-
Total	152	Total	146

As the table above indicates, the most frequently applied topoi in the pro-Brexit arguments are *the topoi of threat and danger, the topoi of numbers, the topoi of burdening and the topoi of abuse*, while the most frequently applied topoi in the against-Brexit arguments are *the topoi of danger and threat, the topoi of reality, the topoi of usefulness and advantage and the topoi of numbers*.




Figure 2.1. Frequency of topoi in the Brexit rhetoric

As indicated in figure 2.1. above, the against-Brexit politicians have applied more topoi in their arguments; nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the corpus of pro-Brexit speeches is smaller than that of the against-Brexit Brexit speeches. Moreover, the number of arguments displayed in the pro-Brexit speeches is three, while the number of arguments proposed in the against-Brexit speeches is five. Figure 2.2. below displays the division of the types of topoi across the corpora:




Figure 2.2. Types of topoi in corpus 1 and corpus 2

As indicated in the figure above, the most frequently identified topoi in the Brexit rhetoric is the *topos of threat and danger*, which has been used comparatively more frequently than the other topoi in the identified arguments in the corpora. Moreover, as the chart outlines, the against-Brexit politicians tend to use the *topos of threat and danger* more frequently than the pro-Brexit politicians. The next most frequently employed argumentation strategies are the *topos of usefulness and advantage* and the *topos of reality*, which are also applied by the against-Brexit politicians more frequently than by the opposing party. It is significant to point out however, that the topoi of numbers is used by both parties; however, the pro-Brexit politicians tend to apply it more frequently. Likewise, such argument schemes as the *topos of abuse* and the *topos of burdening and weighing* are used exclusively by the pro-Brexit politicians. The *topoi of justice, culture, law and right* have not been identified in either of the parties' arguments.

2. Creation of In-groups and Out-groups

Table 2.2. Raw and relative frequency of inclusion and exclusion in corpus 1 and corpus 2

Category	Raw Frequency C2	Relative Frequency C2	Raw Frequency C1	Relative Frequency C1
we	426	1.75%	596	2.06%
our	231	0.95%	441	1.51%
us	79	0.33%	137	0.47%
this	168	0.69%	191	0.66%
these	31	0.13%	69	0.24%
Total inclusion	935	3.85%	1434	4.94%
they	107	0.58%	146	0.37%
them	32	0.13%	46	0.16%
their	63	0.26%	76	0.26%
that	482	1.98%	502	1.73%
those	44	0.18%	57	0.20%
Total exclusion	728	3%	827	2.84%

As indicated in the table above, the most frequently applied strategy of inclusion in both corpora is the use of pronouns *we*, *us*, *our* in contrast to *they*, *them*, and *those*. Moreover, it is observed that both parties tend to emphasize inclusion strategies more than exclusion strategies (see detailed analysis in Chapter 3.5.). Figure 2.3. below displays the comparison between the raw frequency of inclusion and exclusion in the corpora.




Figure 2.3. Inclusion and exclusion in the Brexit rhetoric

As indicated in Figure 2.3. above, both parties tend to apply the exclusion markers with a relatively similar frequency, while the inclusion markers tend to be more frequently used by the against-Brexit politicians, who tend to appeal to and emphasize the importance of in-groups rather than out-groups (see analysis in Chapter 3).

3. Manipulation Techniques in Brexit Arguments

Table 2.3. Raw and relative frequency of manipulation techniques in corpus 1 and corpus 2

Category	Relative frequency in C1 %	Raw Frequency C1	Relative frequency in C2 %	Raw Frequency C2
Metaphoric expressions	0.29 %	83	0.44 %	108
Similes	0.01 %	3	0.06 %	15
Personification	0.03 %	8	0.01 %	3
Synecdoche	0.02%	5	0.01 %	3
Irony	-	-	0.05 %	11
Sarcasm	-	-	0.02 %	4
Rhetorical questions	0.09%	27	0.13 %	31
Simple (informal) language	0.13%	37	0.25 %	61
Intertextuality	0.10%	21	0.12 %	29
Slogan	0.07%	18	0.25 %	60
Parallelisms	0.12%	35	0.08 %	19
Repetition	0.04%	11	0.2 %	49
Total	0.9 %	261	1.62 %	394

As the table above indicates, the most frequently applied linguistic devices in both corpora are metaphors and metaphoric expressions. Moreover, a relatively higher frequency of metaphoric expressions has been identified in the pro-Brexit speeches, as indicated in the analysis discussed in Chapter 3.5. In total, the pro-Brexit politicians have applied more manipulation techniques than the against-Brexit politicians and they have been used with relatively higher frequency (0.9% in Corpus 1 versus 1.62% in Corpus 2), see figure 2.2. below:




Figure 2.4. Frequency of manipulative language in pro-Brexit speeches and against-Brexit speeches

As indicated in the figure above, the relative frequency of manipulation techniques in the selected pro-Brexit speech corpus is comparatively higher than that in the selected against-Brexit speech corpus. Figure 2.5. outlines the frequency of types of manipulation techniques across the corpora:




Figure 2.5. Types of manipulation techniques in Brexit Rhetoric

As figure 2.5. displays, metaphoric expressions are the most frequently applied type of manipulation techniques; however, the pro-Brexit politicians have used the it with comparatively higher frequency. Another type of linguistic manipulation tool is the use of simplified and appealing language in the speeches of both parties but has been used comparatively more frequently by the pro-Brexit politicians. A similar situation is with slogans and repetitions as described in Chapter 3, where the pro-Brexit politicians have applied these strategies with relatively higher frequency throughout their speeches. However, such a tool as parallelism has been found more frequently in the against-Brexit speeches. Finally, traces of irony and sarcasm have been identified only in the corpus of pro-Brexit speeches, while rhetorical questions, personification and synecdoche have been used with relative similar frequency in both corpora.

Appendix 3 Brexit Speech Samples

Textual mark-up in the corpora:

Inclusion and exclusion
Keywords
Slogans
Everyday language
Intertextuality
Figurative language
Rhetorical questions
Parallelisms
Repetition
<i>Arguments and Topoi</i>

1. Boris Johnson's Speech Sample

"I am pleased that this campaign has so far been relatively free of personal abuse – and long may it so remain – but the other day someone insulted me in terms that were redolent of 1920s Soviet Russia. He said that I had no right to vote Leave, because I was in fact a "liberal cosmopolitan".

That rocked me, at first, and then I decided that as insults go, I didn't mind it at all – because it was probably true. And so I want this morning to explain why the campaign to Leave the EU is attracting other liberal spirits and people I admire such as David Owen, and Gisela Stuart, Nigel Lawson, John Longworth – people who love Europe and who feel at home on the continent, but whose attitudes towards the project of European Union have been hardening over time.

For many of us who are now deeply skeptical, the evolution has been roughly the same: we began decades ago to query the anti-democratic absurdities of the EU. Then we began to campaign for reform, and were excited in 2013 by the Prime Minister's Bloomberg speech; and then quietly despaired as no reform was forthcoming. And then thanks to the referendum given to this country by David Cameron we find that a door has magically opened in our lives.

We can see the sunlit meadows beyond. I believe we would be mad not to take this once in a lifetime chance to walk through that door because the truth is it is not we who have changed. It is the EU that has changed out of all recognition; and to keep insisting that the EU is about economics is like saying the Italian Mafia is interested in olive oil and real estate.

It is true, but profoundly uninformative about the real aims of that organization. What was once the EEC has undergone a spectacular metamorphosis in the last 30 years, and the crucial point is that it is still becoming ever more centralizing, interfering and anti-democratic.

You only have to read the Lisbon Treaty – whose constitutional provisions were rejected by three EU populations, the French, the Dutch and the Irish – to see how far this thing has moved on from what we signed up for in 1972. Brussels now has exclusive or explicit competence for trade, customs, competition, agriculture, fisheries, environment, consumer

protection, transport, trans-European networks, energy, the areas of freedom, security and justice, and new powers over culture, tourism, education and youth. The EU already has considerable powers to set rates of indirect taxation across the whole 28-nation territory, and of course it has total control of monetary policy for all 19 in the eurozone.

In recent years Brussels has acquired its own foreign minister, its own series of EU embassies around the world, and is continuing to develop its own defence policy. We have got to stop trying to kid the British people; we have got to stop saying one thing in Brussels, and another thing to the domestic audience; we have got to stop the systematic campaign of subterfuge – to conceal from the public the scale of the constitutional changes involved. We need to look at the legal reality, which is that this is a continuing and accelerating effort to build a country called Europe.

Look at that list of Lisbon competences – with 45 new fields of policy where Britain can be outvoted by a qualified majority – and you can see why the House of Commons Library has repeatedly confirmed that when you add primary and secondary legislation together the EU is now generating 60 per cent of the laws passing through parliament.

The independence of this country is being seriously compromised. It is this fundamental democratic problem – this erosion of democracy – that brings me into this fight.

People are surprised and alarmed to discover that our gross contributions to the EU budget are now running at about £20bn a year, and that the net contribution is £10 bn; and it is not just that we have no control over how that money is spent.

No one has any proper control – which is why EU spending is persistently associated with fraud. Of course the Remain campaign dismisses this UK contribution as a mere bagatelle – even though you could otherwise use it to pay for a new British hospital every week. But that expense is, in a sense, the least of the costs inflicted by the EU on this country.

It is deeply corrosive of popular trust in democracy that every year UK politicians tell the public that they can cut immigration to the tens of thousands – and then find that they miss their targets by hundreds of thousands, so that we add a population the size of Newcastle every year, with all the extra and unfunded pressure that puts on the NHS and other public services.

In our desperation to meet our hopeless so-called targets, we push away brilliant students from Commonwealth countries, who want to pay to come to our universities; we find ourselves hard pressed to recruit people who might work in our NHS, as opposed to make use of its services – because we have absolutely no power to control the numbers who are coming with no job offers and no qualifications from the 28 EU countries. I am in favour of immigration; but I am also in favour of control, and of politicians taking responsibility for what is happening; and I think it bewilders people to be told that this most basic power of a state – to decide who has the right to live and work in your country – has been taken away and now resides in Brussels.

And, as I say, that is only one aspect of a steady attrition of the rights of the people to decide their priorities, and to remove, at elections, those who take the decisions. It is sad that our powers of economic self-government have become so straitened that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has to go around personally asking other finance ministers to allow him to cut VAT on tampons, and as far as I can see we still have not secured consent.

It is very worrying that the European Court of Justice – Luxembourg, not Strasbourg – should now be freely adjudicating on human rights questions, and whether or not this country has the right to deport people the Home Office believes are a threat to our security; and it is peculiar that the government is now straining at the gnat of the Convention and the Strasbourg court, whose rulings are not actually binding on UK courts, while swallowing the camel of the 55-article charter of Fundamental rights, which is fully justiciable by the European Court in Luxembourg, when you consider that it is the rulings of this court that are binding and that must be applied by every court in this country, including parliament.

It is absurd that Britain – historically a great free-trading nation – has been unable for 42 years to do a free trade deal with Australia, New Zealand, China, India and America.

It is above all bizarre for the Remain campaign to say that after the UK agreement of February we are now living in a “reformed” EU, when there has been not a single change to EU competences, not a single change to the Treaty, nothing on agriculture, nothing on the role of the court, nothing of any substance on borders – nothing remotely resembling the agenda for change that was promised in the 2013 Bloomberg speech.

In that excellent speech the Prime Minister savaged the EU’s lack of competitiveness, its remoteness from the voters, its relentless movement in the wrong direction.

As he said – ‘The biggest danger to the European Union comes not from those who advocate change, but from those who denounce new thinking as heresy. In its long history Europe has experience of heretics who turned out to have a point.

‘More of the same will not see the European Union keeping pace with the new powerhouse economies. More of the same will not bring the European Union any closer to its citizens. More of the same will just produce more of the same – less competitiveness, less growth, fewer jobs.

‘And that will make our countries weaker not stronger. That is why we need fundamental, far-reaching change.’

He was right then. We were told that there had to be “fundamental reform” and “full-on” Treaty change that would happen “before the referendum” – or else the government was willing to campaign to Leave.

And that is frankly what the government should now be doing. If you look at what we were promised, and what we got, the Government should logically be campaigning on our side today.

We were told many times – by the PM, Home Sec and Chancellor – that we were going to get real changes to the law on free movement, so that you needed to have a job lined up before you could come here. We got no such change.

We were told that we would get a working opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights – which by the way gives the European Court the power to determine the application of the 1951 Convention on Refugees and Asylum, as well as extradition, child protection and victims’ rights. We got nothing.

We were told that we would be able to stop the Eurozone countries from using the EU institutions to create a fiscal and political union. Instead we gave up our veto.

The Five Presidents’ report makes it clear that as soon as the UK referendum is out of the way, they will proceed with new structures of political and fiscal integration that this country should have no part in, but which will inevitably involve us, just as we were forced – in spite of promises to the contrary – to take part in the bail-out of Greece. They want to go ahead with new EU rules on company law, and property rights and every aspect of employment law and even taxation – and we will be dragged in.

To call this a reformed EU is an offence against the Trades Descriptions Act, or rather the EU Unfair Commercial Practices Directive that of course replaced the Trades Descriptions Act in 2008. The EU system is a ratchet hauling us ever further into a federal structure.

We have proved to ourselves time and again that we cannot change the direction. We cannot change the pace. We cannot interrupt the steady erosion of democracy, and given that we do not accept the destination it is time to tell our friends and partners, in a spirit of the utmost cordiality, that we wish to forge a new relationship based on free trade and intergovernmental cooperation.

We need to Vote Leave on June 23, and in the meantime we must deal with the three big myths that are peddled by the Remain campaign.

The first is the so-called economic argument. The Remainers accept that there is a loss of political independence, but they claim that this trade-off is economically beneficial.

The second argument **we** might broadly call the peace-in-Europe argument – that the EU is associated with 70 years of stability, and **we** need to stay in to prevent German tanks crossing the French border.

The third argument is more abstract, but potent with some people. It is that you can't really want to leave the EU without being in some way anti-European, and that the **Remain camp** therefore have a monopoly on liberal cosmopolitanism.

All three arguments are wholly bogus.

The most important mistake is to think that there is some effective and sensible trade-off between the loss of democratic control and greater economic prosperity. The whole thrust of the Remain argument is that there is a democratic cost, but an economic benefit – that if **we** accept that 60 per cent of **our** laws are made in Brussels, **we** will see some great boost in **our** trade and **our** exports and in the overall economic performance of the EU. This is turning out to be **simply false**.

The **loss of democratic control** is spiritually damaging, and socially risky – and the economic benefits of remaining subject to the Single Market law-making machine, as opposed to having access to the Single Market, are in fact very hard to detect.

*What the government wants is for **us** to remain **locked into the Single Market law-making regime**, and to be exposed to 2500 new EU regulations a year. What **we** want is for Britain to be like many other countries in having free-trade access to the territory covered by the Single Market – **but not to be subject to the vast, growing and politically-driven empire of EU law**.*

*There is a **good deal** of evidence that **this** is the more sensible position to be in. Take the two relevant 20 year periods, before and after the creation of the Single Market, in other words from 1973 to 1992, and from 1992 to 2012.*

Now when the single market dawned, **we** were told that it was going to be a great dynamo of job and wealth creation – 800 billion euros, the Cecchini report said, of extra European GDP. **We** were told that it was going to send exports whizzing ever faster across borders. So what happened?

Did Britain export more to the rest of the EEC 11, as a result of the Single Market? On the *contrary, the rate of growth slowed, as Michael Burrage has shown this year. British exports of goods were actually 22 per cent lower, at the end of the second 20 year period, than if they had continued to grow at the rate of the 20 years pre-1992. And before you say that this might be just a result of Britain's sluggish performance in the export of manufactured goods, the same failure was seen in the case of the 12 EEC countries themselves.*

We were told that goods would start pinging around the EEC as if in some supercharged cyclotron; and on the contrary, the rate of growth flattened again – 14.6 per cent lower than the previous 20 years when there was no single market.

So what was the decisive advantage to Britain, or any other country, of being inside this system, and accepting these thousands of one-size-fits-all regulations? *In fact you could argue that many countries were better off being outside, and not subject to the bureaucracy. In the period of existence of this vaunted single market, from 1992 to 2011, there were 27 non-EU countries whose exports of goods to the rest of the EU grew faster than the UK's; and most embarrassingly of all – there were 21 countries who did better than the UK in exporting services to the other EEC 11.*

So where was this great European relaunch that was supposed to be driven by the 1992 Single Market? *In the 20 years since the start of the Single Market, the rate of growth in the EU countries has actually been outstripped by the non-EU countries of the OECD. It is the independent countries that have done better; and the EU has been a microclimate of scandalously high unemployment. This year the US is projected to grow by 2.4 per cent, China by 6.5 pc, NZ by 2 pc, Australia by 2.5 pc and India by 7.5 pc. The Eurozone – 1.5 per cent.*

*All **that** extra growth we were promised; all **those** extra jobs. The claims made for the Single Market are looking increasingly fraudulent. It has not boosted the rate of British exports to the EU; it has not even boosted growth in exports between the EU 12; and it has not stopped a generation of young people – in a huge belt of Mediterranean countries – from being thrown on to the scrapheap.*

What has that corpus of EU regulation done to drive innovation? There are more patents from outside the EU now being registered at the EU patent office than from within the EU itself. The Eurozone has no universities within the top 20, and has been woefully left behind by America in the tech revolution – in spite of all **those** directives I remember from the 1990s about les reseaux telematiques; or possibly, of course, the EU has been left behind on tech precisely because of **those** directives.

There are plenty of other parts of the world where the free market and competition has been driving down the cost of mobile roaming charges and cut-price airline tickets – without the need for a vast supranational bureaucracy enforced by a supranational court.

I hear again the arguments from the City of London, and the anxieties that have been expressed. *We heard them 15 years ago, when many of the very same Remainers prophesied disaster for the City of London if **we** failed to join the euro. **They** said all the banks would flee to Frankfurt. Well, Canary Wharf alone is now far bigger than the Frankfurt financial centre – and has kept growing relentlessly since the crash of 2008.*

As for the argument that **we** need the muscle of EU membership, if **we** are to do trade deals – well, look, as I say, at the results after 42 years of membership. The EU has done trade deals with the Palestinian authority and San Marino. Bravo. But it has failed to conclude agreements with India, China or even America.

Why? *Because negotiating on behalf of the EU is like trying to ride a vast pantomime horse, with 28 people blindly pulling in different directions. For decades deals with America have been blocked by the French film industry, and the current TTIP negotiations are stalled at least partly because Greek feta cheese manufacturers object to the concept of American feta. They may be right, aesthetically, but it should not be delaying us in this country.*

Global trade is not carried on by kind permission of people like Peter Mandelson. People and businesses trade with each other, and always will, as long as they have something to buy and sell.

*But it is notable that even when the EU has done a trade deal, it does not always seem to work in Britain's favour. In ten out of the last 15 deals, British trade with **our** partners has actually slowed down, rather than speeded up, after the deal was done.*

Is that because of some defect in **us**, or in the deal? Could it be that the EU officials did not take account of the real interests of the UK economy, which is so different in structure from France and Germany? And might that be because the sole and entire responsibility for UK trade policy is in the hands of the EU commission – a body where only 3.6 per cent of the officials actually come from **this** country?

*In trying to compute the costs and benefits of belonging to the Single Market, **we** should surely add the vast opportunity cost of not being able to do free trade deals with the most lucrative and fastest-growing markets in the world – because **we** are in the EU.*

*When you consider that only 6 per cent of UK business export to the EU 28; and when you consider that 100 per cent of **our** businesses – large and small – must comply with every jot and tittle of regulation; and when you consider that the costs of **this** regulation are estimated at £600m per week, I am afraid you are driven to the same conclusion as Wolfgang Munchau, the economics commentator of the FT, who said, “whatever the reasons may be for remaining in the EU, they are not economic.”*

And so I return to my point; that **we** must stop the pretence. This is about politics, and a political project that is now **getting out of control**. To understand **our** predicament, and the trap **we** are in, **we** need to go back to the immediate post-war period, and the agony and shame of a broken continent.

There were two brilliant Frenchmen – a wheeler-dealing civil servant with big American connexions called Jean Monnet, and a French foreign minister called Robert Schuman. **They** wanted to use instruments of economic integration to make war between France and Germany not just a practical but a psychological impossibility.

It was an exercise in what I believe used to be called behavioural therapy; inducing a change in the underlying attitudes by forcing a change in behaviour. **Their** inspired idea was to weave a cat's cradle of supranational legislation that would not only bind the former combatants together, but create a new sensation of European-ness.

As Schuman put it, "Europe will be built through concrete achievements which create a de facto solidarity." Jean Monnet believed that people would become "in mind European", and that **this** primarily functional and regulatory approach would produce a European identity and a European consciousness.

Almost 60 years after the Treaty of Rome, I do not see many signs that this programme is working. **The European elites** have indeed created an ever-denser federal system of government, but at a pace that far exceeds the emotional and psychological readiness of the peoples of Europe. The reasons are obvious.

There is simply no common political culture in Europe; no common media, no common sense of humour or satire; and – this is important – no awareness of each other's politics, so that the European Union as a whole has no common sense of the two things you need for a democracy to work efficiently. You need trust, and you need shame. There is no trust, partly for the obvious reason that people often fail to understand each other's languages. There is no shame, because it is not clear who you are letting down if you abuse the EU system.

That is why there is such cavalier waste and theft of EU funds: because it is everybody's money, it is nobody's money.

If you walk around London today, you will notice that the 12 star flag of the EU is flying all over the place. That is because this is Schuman day. It is the birthday of the founder of this project, and the elites have decreed that it should be properly marked.

Do **we** feel loyalty to that flag? Do **our** hearts pitter-patter as **you** watch it flutter over public buildings? On the contrary. The British share with other EU populations a growing sense of alienation, which is one of the reasons turn-out at European elections continues to decline.

As Jean-Claude Juncker has himself remarked with disapproval, "too many Europeans are returning to a national or regional mindset". In the face of that disillusionment, **the European elites** are doing exactly the wrong thing. Instead of devolving power, **they** are centralizing.

Instead of going with the grain of human nature and public opinion, **they** are reaching for the same corrective behavioural therapy as Monnet and Schuman: more legislation, more federal control; and whenever there is a crisis of any kind the cry is always the same. "**More Europe, more Europe!**"

What did **they** do when the Berlin wall came down, and the French panicked about the inevitability of German unification? "**More Europe!**" And what are **they** saying now, when the ensuing single currency has become a disaster? "**More Europe!**"

They persist in the delusion that political cohesion can be created by a forcible economic integration, and **they** are achieving exactly the opposite. What is the distinctive experience of the people of Greece, over the last eight years? It is a complete humiliation, a sense of powerlessness. The suicide rate has risen by 35 per cent; life expectancy has actually fallen. Youth unemployment is around 50 per cent. It is an utter disgrace to **our** continent.

That is what happens when you destroy democracy. Do the Greeks feel warmer towards the Germans? Do **they** feel a community of interest? Of course not.

In Austria the far-right have just won an election for the first time since the 1930s. The French National Front are on the march in France, and Marine le Pen may do well in the Presidential elections. You could not say that EU integration is promoting either mutual

understanding or moderation, and the economic consequence range from nugatory to disastrous.

The answer to the problems of Europe today is not “**more Europe**”, if that means more forcible economic and political integration. The answer is reform, and devolution of powers back to nations and people, and a return to intergovernmentalism, at least for this country – and that means Vote Leave on June 23.

And of course there will be some in this country who are rightly troubled by a sense of neighbourly duty. There are Remainers who may agree with much of the above; that the economic advantages for Britain are either overstated or non-existent. But **they** feel uneasy about **pulling out of the EU** in its hour of need, when our neighbours are in distress; and at this point they deploy the so-called “Peace in Europe” argument: that if Britain leaves the EU, there will be a **return to slaughter on Flanders Fields.**

I think this grossly underestimates the way Europe has changed, and the NATO guarantee that has really underpinned peace in Europe. I saw the disaster when the EU was charged with sorting out former Yugoslavia, and I saw how NATO sorted it out.

And it understates the sense in which it is the EU itself, and its anti-democratic tendencies that are now a force for instability and alienation.

Europe faces twin crises of mass migration, and a euro that has proved a disaster for some member states; and the grim truth is that the risks of staying in this unreformed EU are intensifying and not diminishing.

In the next six weeks **we** must politely but relentlessly put the following questions to the Prime Minister and to the Remain campaign...

- 1) How can you possibly control EU immigration into this country?
- 2) The Living Wage is an excellent policy, but how will you stop it being a big pull factor for uncontrolled EU migration, given that it is far higher than minimum wages in other EU countries?
- 3) How will you prevent the European Court from interfering further in immigration, asylum, human rights, and all kinds of matters which have nothing to do with the so-called Single Market?
- 4) Why did you give up the UK veto on further moves towards a fiscal and political union?
- 5) How can you stop us from being dragged in, and from being made to pay?

The answer is that the Remain campaign have no answers to any of these questions, because they are asking us to remain in an EU that is wholly unreformed, and **going in the wrong direction.**

If we leave on June 23, we can still provide leadership in so many areas. We can help lead the discussions on security, on counter-terrorism, on foreign and defence policy, as we always have. But all those conversations can be conducted within an intergovernmental framework, and without the need for legal instruments enforced by the European Court of Justice. we will still be able to cooperate on the environment, on migration, on science and technology; we will still have exchanges of students.

We will trade as much as ever before, if not more. We will be able to love our fellow Europeans, marry them, live with them, share the joy of discovering our different cultures and languages – but we will not be subject to the jurisdiction of a single court and legal system that is proving increasingly erratic and that is imitated by no other trading group.

We will not lose influence in Europe or around the world – on the contrary, you could argue we will gain in clout. We are already drowned out around the table in Brussels; we are outvoted far more than any other country – 72 times in the last 20 years, and ever more regularly since 2010; and the Eurozone now has a built-in majority on all questions.

We will recapture or secure our voice – for the 5th biggest economy in the world – in international bodies such as the **WTO** or the **IMF** or the **CITES**, where the EU is increasingly replacing **us** and laying a claim to speak on **our** behalf. If you want final and conclusive proof

of **our** inability to “**get our way**” in Brussels – and the contempt with which **we** will be treated if **we** vote to Remain – look again at the UK deal and the total failure to secure any change of any significance.

Above all – to get to the third key point of the Remainers – if **we** leave the EU **we will not, repeat not**, be leaving Europe. Of all the arguments **they** make, this is the one that infuriates me the most. I am a child of Europe. I am a liberal cosmopolitan and my family is a genetic UN peacekeeping force.

I can read novels in French and I can sing the Ode to joy in German, and if **they** keep accusing me of being **a Little Englander**, I will. Both as editor of the Spectator and Mayor of London I have promoted the teaching of modern European languages in **our** schools. I have dedicated much of my life to the study of the origins of our common – **our** common European culture and civilization in ancient Greece and Rome.

So I find it offensive, insulting, irrelevant and positively cretinous to be told – sometimes by people who can barely speak a foreign language – that I belong to a group of small-minded xenophobes; because the truth is it is Brexit that is now the great project of European liberalism, and I am afraid that it is the European Union – for all the high ideals with which it began, that now represents the ancient regime.

*It is **we** who are speaking up for the people, and it is **they** who are defending an obscurantist and universalist system of government that is now well past its sell by date and which is ever more remote from ordinary voters.*

It is **we** in the **Leave Camp** – not **they** – who stand in the tradition of the liberal cosmopolitan European enlightenment – not just of Locke and Wilkes, but of Rousseau and Voltaire; and **though they are many, and though they are well-funded, and though we know that they can call on unlimited taxpayer funds for their leaflets, it is we few, we happy few** who have the inestimable advantage of believing strongly in **our** cause, and that **we** will be vindicated by history; and **we** will win for exactly the same reason that the Greeks beat the Persians at Marathon – because **they** are fighting for an outdated absolutist ideology, and **we** are fighting for freedom.

That is the choice on June 23.

It is between **taking back control** of our money – or giving a further £100bn to Brussels before the next election.

Between deciding who **we want to come here to live and work – or letting the EU decide.**

Between a dynamic liberal cosmopolitan open global free-trading prosperous Britain, or a Britain where **we remain subject to a undemocratic system devised in the 1950s that is now actively responsible for low growth and in some cases economic despair.**

Between believing in the possibility of hope and change in Europe – or accepting that **we have no choice but to knuckle under.**

It is a choice between getting dragged ever further into a federal superstate, or taking a stand now.

Vote Leave on June 23, and **take back control** of our democracy.”

Boris Johnson’s Speech on 9 May 2016. Available from

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1jvbkf87Tg> [Accessed on 1 December 2016]

2. Theresa May's Speech Sample

Thank you. Today I want to talk about the United Kingdom, **our** place in the world and **our** membership of the European Union.

But before I start, I want to make clear that – as you can see – **this is not a rally. It will not be an attack** or even a criticism of people who take a different view to me. It will simply be my analysis of the rights and wrongs, the opportunities and risks, of **our** membership of the EU.

Sovereignty and membership of multilateral institutions. In essence, the question the country has to answer on 23rd June – whether to Leave or Remain – is about how **we maximise** Britain's security, prosperity and influence in the world, and how **we maximise our** sovereignty: that is, the control **we** have over **our** own affairs in future.

*Use the word “**maximise**” advisedly, because no country or empire in world history has ever been totally sovereign, completely in control of its destiny. Even at the height of **their** power, the Roman Empire, Imperial China, the Ottomans, the British Empire, the Soviet Union, modern-day America, were never able to have everything their own way. At different points, military rivals, economic crises, diplomatic manoeuvring, competing philosophies and emerging technologies all played their part in inflicting defeats and hardships, and necessitated compromises even for states as powerful as **these**.*

Today, **those** factors continue to have **their** effect on the sovereignty of nations large and small, rich and poor. But there is now an additional complication. International, multilateral institutions exist to try to systematise negotiations between nations, promote trade, ensure cooperation on matters like cross-border crime, and create rules and norms that reduce the risk of conflict.

***These** institutions invite nation states to make a trade-off: to pool and therefore cede some sovereignty in a controlled way, to prevent a greater loss of sovereignty in an uncontrolled way, through for example military conflict or economic decline.*

Article 5 of NATO's Washington Treaty is a good example of how **this** principle works: NATO member countries, Britain included, have agreed to be bound by the principle of collective defence. An attack on any single member will, according to the Treaty, be interpreted as an attack on all members, and collective defence measures – including full military action – can be triggered. Britain could find itself bound to go to war because of a dispute involving a different country – a clear and dramatic loss of control of **our** foreign policy – but on the other hand, NATO membership means **we** are far more secure from attack by hostile states – which increases **our** control of **our** destiny. This is an institutionalised trade-off that the vast majority of the public – and most political leaders, apart from Jeremy Corbyn – think is worthwhile.

*Looking back at history – and not very distant history at that – **we** know what a world without international, multilateral institutions looks like. Any student of the way in which Europe stumbled its way to war in 1914 knows that the confused lines of communications between states, the ambiguity of nations' commitments to one another, and the absence of any system to de-escalate tension and conflict were key factors in the origins of the First World War.* The United Nations may be a flawed organisation that has failed to prevent conflict on many occasions, but nobody should want an end to a rules-based international system and – so long as **they** have the right remit – institutions that try to promote peace and trade.

How **we** reconcile **these** institutions and **their** rules with democratic government – and the need for politicians to be accountable to the public – remains one of the great challenges of this century. And the organisations of which the United Kingdom should become – and remain – a member will be a matter of constant judgement for **our** leaders and the public for many years to come.

Principles for Britain's membership of international institutions

We need, therefore, to establish clear principles for Britain's membership of these institutions. Does it make us more influential beyond our own shores? Does it make us more secure? Does it make us more prosperous? Can we control or influence the direction of the organisation in question? To what extent does membership bind the hands of Parliament?

If membership of an international institution can pass these tests, then I believe it will be in our national interest to join or remain a member of it. And on this basis, the case for Britain remaining a member of organisations such as NATO, the World Trade Organisation and the United Nations, for example, is clear.

But as I have said before, the case for remaining a signatory of the European Convention on *Human Rights – which means Britain is subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights – is not clear. Because, despite what people sometimes think, it wasn't the European Union that delayed for years the extradition of Abu Hamza, almost stopped the deportation of Abu Qatada, and tried to tell Parliament that – however we voted – we could not deprive prisoners of the vote. It was the European Convention on Human Rights.*

The ECHR can bind the hands of Parliament, adds nothing to our prosperity, makes us less secure by preventing the deportation of dangerous foreign nationals – and does nothing to change the attitudes of governments like Russia's when it comes to human rights. So regardless of the EU referendum, my view is this. *If we want to reform human rights laws in this country, it isn't the EU we should leave but the ECHR and the jurisdiction of its Court.*

I can already hear certain people saying this means I'm against human rights. But human rights were not invented in 1950, when the Convention was drafted, or in 1998, when it was incorporated into our law through the Human Rights Act. This is Great Britain – the country of Magna Carta, Parliamentary democracy and the fairest courts in the world – and we can protect human rights ourselves in a way that doesn't jeopardise national security or bind the hands of Parliament. A true British Bill of Rights – decided by Parliament and amended by Parliament – would protect not only the rights set out in the Convention but could include traditional British rights not protected by the ECHR, such as the right to trial by jury.

I also know that others will say there is little point in leaving the ECHR if we remain members of the EU, with its Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Court of Justice. And I am no fan of the Charter or of many of the rulings made by the Court. But there are several problems that do apply to the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, yet do not apply to the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. Strasbourg is in effect a final appeals court; Luxembourg has no such role. Strasbourg can issue orders preventing the deportation of foreign nationals; Luxembourg has no such power. Unlike the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Treaties are clear: "national security," say, "remains the sole responsibility of each Member State."

And unlike the ECHR, which is a relatively narrow human rights convention, our membership of the EU involves cooperation – and, yes, rules and obligations – on a much wider range of issues. The country's decision in the referendum is therefore a much more complex undertaking. So I want to spend some time to go through the most important issues we need to consider.

Arguments that do not count

But before I do that, I want to deal with several arguments that should not count. The first is that, in the twenty-first century, Britain is too small a country to cope outside the European Union. That is nonsense. We are the fifth biggest economy in the world, we are growing faster than any economy in the G7, and we attract nearly a fifth of all foreign investment in the EU. We have a military capable of projecting its power around the world, intelligence services that are second to none, and friendships and alliances that go far beyond Europe. We have the greatest soft power in the world, we sit in exactly the right time zone for global trade, and our language is the world's language. Of course Britain could cope outside

the European Union. But the question is not whether **we** could survive without the EU, but whether **we** are **better off**, in or out.

Neither is it true that the EU is the only reason the continent has been largely peaceful since the end of the Second World War. Nor is it about **“the kind of country we want to be”**, as the cliché is usually put. Nor is the decision **we** face anything to do with our shared cultural heritage with Europe. Of course **we** are a European country, but that in itself is not a reason to be an EU member state.

And nor is this debate about the past. Really, I cannot emphasise this enough. **We** are not in 1940, when Europe’s liberty was in peril and Britain stood alone. **We** are not in 1957, when the Treaty of Rome was agreed, Europe was a Group of Six and the Cold War was a generation away from its conclusion. **We** are not in 1973, when Britain was the “sick man of Europe” and saw the European Economic Community as its way out of trouble. **We** are not even in 1992, when Maastricht was signed and the reunification of Germany had only just taken place.

We are in 2016, and when **we** make this important decision, **we** need to look ahead to the challenges **we** will face – and the rest of Europe will face – over the next ten, twenty, thirty years and more. Those challenges – about security, trade and the economy – are serious, complex and deserve a mature debate. **We** need **our** decision to be the result of a hard-headed analysis of what is in **our** national interest. There are certainly problems that are caused by EU membership, but of course there are advantages too. **Our** decision must come down to whether, after serious thought about the pros and the cons, **we** believe **there is more in the credit column than in the debit column for remaining on the inside**.

Security

So I want to talk now about those three big, future challenges – security, trade and the economy. A lot has been said already during this referendum campaign about security. But I want to set out the arguments as I see them. *If **we** were not members of the European Union, of course **we** would still have **our** relationship with America. **We** would still be part of the Five Eyes, the closest international intelligence-sharing arrangement in the world. **We** would still have our first-rate security and intelligence agencies. **We** would still share intelligence about terrorism and crime with our European allies, and **they** would do the same with **us**.*

*But that does not mean **we** would be as safe as if **we** remain. Outside the EU, for example, **we** would have no access to the European Arrest Warrant, which has allowed us to extradite more than 5,000 people from Britain to Europe in the last five years, and bring 675 suspected or convicted wanted individuals to Britain to face justice. It has been used to get terror suspects out of the country and bring terrorists back here to face justice. In 2005, Hussain Osman – who tried to blow up the London Underground on 21/7 – was extradited from Italy using the Arrest Warrant in just 56 days. Before the Arrest Warrant existed, it took ten long years to extradite Rachid Ramda, another terrorist, from Britain to France.*

*There are other advantages too. Take the Passenger Name Records Directive. This will give law enforcement agencies access to information about the movements of terrorists, organised criminals and victims of trafficking on flights between European countries and from all other countries to the EU. When I first became Home Secretary, I was told there wasn’t a chance of Britain ever getting this deal. But I won agreement in the Council of Ministers in 2012 and – **thanks to** Timothy Kirkhope MEP and the hard work of my Home Office team – the final Directive has now been agreed by the European Parliament and Council.*

Most importantly, this agreement will make **us** all safer. *But it also shows two advantages of remaining inside the EU. First, without the kind of institutional framework offered by the European Union, a complex agreement like this could not have been struck across the whole continent, because bilateral deals between every single member state would have been impossible to reach. And second, without British leadership and influence, a Directive would never have been on the table, let alone agreed.*

These measures – the Arrest Warrant and PNR – are worthwhile because **they** are not about grandiose state-building and integration but because they enable practical cooperation and information sharing. Britain will never take part in a European police force, **we** will never sign up to a European Public Prosecutor, and two years ago we took Britain out of around a hundred unhelpful EU justice and home affairs measures. But when **we** took that decision, **we** also made sure that Britain remained signed up to the measures that make a positive difference in fighting crime and preventing terrorism.

*The European Criminal Records Information System, Financial Intelligence Units, the Prisoner Transfer Framework, SIS II, Joint Investigation Teams, Prüm. **These** are all agreements that enable law enforcement agencies to cooperate and share information with one another in the fight against cross-border crime and terrorism. **They** help us to turn foreign criminals away at the border, prevent money laundering by terrorists and criminals, get foreign criminals out of our prisons and back to their home countries, investigate cases that cross borders, and share forensic data like DNA and fingerprinting much more quickly.*

*In the last year, **we** have been able to check the criminal records of foreign nationals more than 100,000 times. Checks such as **these** mean **we** have been able to deport more than 3,000 European nationals who posed a threat to the public. The police will soon be able to check DNA records for EU nationals in just fifteen minutes. Under the old system it took 143 days. Last year, the French used information exchanged through the Prüm agreement to locate one of the suspected perpetrators of the November attacks in Paris.*

***These** are practical measures that promote effective cooperation between different European law enforcement organisations, and if **we** were not part of them Britain would be less safe.*

Now I know some people say the EU does not make **us** more secure because it does not allow us to control **our** border. But that is not true. Free movement rules mean it is harder to control the volume of European immigration – and as I said yesterday that is clearly no good thing – but **they** do not mean **we** cannot control the border. *The fact that **we** are not part of Schengen – the group of countries without border checks – means **we** have avoided the worst of the migration crisis that has hit continental Europe over the last year. It means **we** can conduct checks on people travelling to Britain from elsewhere in Europe. And, subject to certain rules and the availability of information, it means **we** can block entry for serious criminals and terrorists.*

*I have heard some people say – especially after the terrorist attacks in Brussels last month – that the very existence of extremists and terrorists in Belgium, France and other EU member states is reason enough to leave. **But our** response to Paris and Brussels cannot be to say that **we** should have less cooperation with countries that are not only **our** allies but **our** nearest neighbours. And anyway leaving the EU would not mean **we** could just close ourselves off to the world: the 9/11 attacks on New York were planned in Afghanistan. The 7/7 attackers trained in Pakistan. And most of the international terrorism casework that crosses my desk involves countries beyond Europe's borders.*

*So my judgement, as Home Secretary, is that remaining a member of the European Union means **we** will be more secure from crime and terrorism.*

But now I want to turn to the other challenges **we** face in the coming decades: trade and the economy. The headline facts of Britain's trade with Europe are clear. *The EU is a single market of more than 500 million people, representing an economy of almost £11 trillion and a quarter of the world's GDP. 44 per cent of **our** goods and services exports go to the EU, compared to five per cent to India and China. **We** have a trade surplus in services with the rest of the EU of £17 billion. And the trading relationship is more inter-related than even these figures suggest. Our exporters rely on inputs from EU companies more than firms from anywhere else: nine per cent of the 'value added' of UK exports comes from inputs from within the EU, compared to 2.7 per cent from the United States and 1.3 per cent from China.*

So the single market accounts for a huge volume of our trade, but if it is completed – so there are genuinely open markets for all services, the digital economy, energy and finance – we would see a dramatic increase in economic growth, for Britain and the rest of Europe. The Capital Markets Union – initiated and led by Britain – will allow finance to flow freely between member states: the first proposal alone could lead to £110 billion in extra lending to businesses. A completed energy single market could save up to £50 billion per year across the EU by 2030. And a digital single market is estimated to be worth up to £330 billion a year to the European economy overall. As Britain is the leading country in Europe when it comes to the digital economy, that is an enormous opportunity for us all.

These changes will mean greater economic growth in Britain, higher wages in Britain and lower prices for consumers – in Britain. But **they** will not happen spontaneously and **they** require British leadership. And that is a crucial point in this referendum: if we leave the EU it is not just that we might not have access to these parts of the single market – these parts of the single market might never be created at all.

The economic case for remaining inside the European Union isn't therefore just about **risk**, but about opportunity. And it isn't just about fear, but **about optimism – optimism** that Britain can take a lead and deliver more trade and economic growth inside Europe and beyond.

There are **risks** we need to weigh, of course. And there are **risks** in staying as well as leaving. There is a big question mark, for example, about whether Britain, as a member state that has not adopted the euro, **risks** being discriminated against as the countries inside the Eurozone integrate further. When the European Central Bank said clearing houses dealing in large volumes of euros had to be located in the Eurozone, it could have forced LCH Clear net to move its euro business out of London, probably to Paris. That was struck down by the EU's General Court, but the threat was clear. And that is why it was so important that the Prime Minister's negotiation guaranteed a principle of non-discrimination against businesses from countries outside the Eurozone.

If we were not in the European Union, however, no such deal could have been agreed. There would be little we could do to stop discriminatory policies being introduced, and London's position as the world's leading financial centre would be in danger. The banks may be unpopular, but this is no small risk: financial services account for more than seven per cent of our economic output, thirteen per cent of our exports, a trade surplus of almost £60 billion – and more than one million British jobs.

But **this** is all about trade with Europe. What about trade with the rest of the world? It is tempting to look at developing countries' economies, with their high growth rates, and see them as an alternative to trade with Europe. But just look at the reality of our trading relationship with China – with its dumping policies, protective tariffs and industrial-scale industrial espionage. And look at the figures. We export more to Ireland than we do to China, almost twice as much to Belgium as we do to India, and nearly three times as much to Sweden as we do to Brazil. It is not realistic to think we could just replace European trade with **these** new markets.

And anyway, **this** apparent choice is a false dichotomy. We should be aiming to increase our trade with **these** markets in addition to the business we win in Europe. Given that British exports in goods and services to countries outside the EU are rising, one can hardly argue that the EU prevents this from happening. Leaving the EU, on the other hand, might make it considerably harder. First, we would have to replace 36 existing trade agreements we have with non-EU countries that cover 53 markets. The EU trade deals Britain has been driving – with the US, worth £10 billion per year to the UK, with Japan, worth £5 billion a year to the UK, with Canada, worth £1.3 billion a year to the UK – **would be in danger of collapse.** And while we could certainly negotiate our own trade agreements, there would be no guarantee that they would be on terms as good as those we enjoy now. There would also be a considerable opportunity cost given the need to replace the existing

agreements – not least with the EU itself – that **we** would have torn up as a consequence of **our** departure.

Inside the EU, without Britain, the balance of power in the Council of Ministers and European Parliament would change for the worse. The liberal, free-trading countries would find **themselves** far below the 35 per cent blocking threshold needed in the Council, while the countries that tend towards protectionism would have an even greater percentage of votes. **There** would be a very real danger that the EU heads in a protectionist direction, which would damage wider international trade and affect for the worse Britain's future trade with the EU.

So, if **we** do vote to leave the European Union, **we** risk bringing the development of the single market to a halt, **we** risk a loss of investors and businesses to remaining EU member states driven by discriminatory EU policies, and **we** risk going backwards when it comes to international trade. But the big question is whether, in the event of Brexit, **we** would be able to negotiate a new free trade agreement with the EU and on what terms.

Some say **we** would strike deals that are the same as the EU's agreements with Norway, Switzerland or even Canada. But with all due respect to **those** countries, **we** are a bigger and more powerful nation than all three. Perhaps that means **we** could strike a better deal than **they** have. After all, Germany will still want to sell us **their** cars and the French will still want to sell us **their** wine. But in a stand-off between Britain and the EU, 44 per cent of **our** exports is more important to us than eight per cent of the EU's exports is to **them**.

With no agreement, **we** know that WTO rules would oblige the EU to charge ten per cent tariffs on UK car exports, in line with the tariffs they impose on Japan and the United States. **They** would be required to do the same for all other goods upon which they impose tariffs. Not all of these tariffs are as high as ten per cent, but some are considerably higher.

The reality is that **we** do not know on what terms **we** would win access to the single market. **We** do know that in a negotiation **we** would need to make concessions in order to access it, and those concessions could well be about accepting EU regulations, over which **we** would have no say, making financial contributions, just as we do now, accepting free movement rules, just as we do now, or quite possibly all three combined. It is not clear why other EU member states would give Britain a better deal than they **themselves** enjoy.

All of this would be negotiable, of course. For the reasons I listed earlier, Britain is big enough and strong enough to be a **success story** in or out of the EU. **But the question is not whether we can survive Brexit: it is whether Brexit would make us better off.** And that calculation has to include not only the medium to long-term effects but the immediate **risks** as well.

The Union with Scotland and the other risks of Brexit

Now it is sometimes suggested that Brexit could lead to other countries seeking to leave the European Union. Some even believe that Brexit might be a fatal blow to the whole EU project. And some, I know, think that this would be a good thing. But I'm afraid I disagree. The disintegration of the EU would cause massive instability among **our** nearest neighbours and biggest trading partners. With the world economy in the fragile state it is, that would have real consequences for Britain. But if Brexit isn't fatal to the European Union, **we** might find that it is fatal to the Union with Scotland. **The SNP have already said that in the event that Britain votes to leave but Scotland votes to remain in the EU, they will press for another Scottish independence referendum.** And the opinion polls show consistently that the Scottish people are more likely to be in favour of EU membership than the people of England and Wales. If the people of Scotland are forced to choose between the United Kingdom and the European Union **we** do not know what the result would be. But only a little more than eighteen months after the referendum that kept the United Kingdom together, I do not want to see the country I love at risk of dismemberment once more. I do not want the people of Scotland to think that English Eurosceptics put their dislike of Brussels ahead of **our** bond

with Edinburgh and Glasgow. I do not want the European Union to cause the destruction of an older and much more precious Union, the Union between England and Scotland.

Brexit also risks changing our friendships and alliances from further afield. In particular, as President Obama has said, it risks changing our alliance with the United States. Now I know as well as anybody the strength and importance of that partnership – our security and intelligence agencies have the closest working relationship of any two countries in the world – and I know that it would certainly survive Britain leaving the EU. *But the Americans would respond to Brexit by finding a new strategic partner inside the European Union, a partner on matters of trade, diplomacy, security and defence, and our relationship with the United States would inevitably change as a result.* That would not, I believe, be in our national interest.

So I want to return to the principles I set out to help us judge whether Britain should join or remain a member of international institutions. *Remaining inside the European Union does make us more secure, it does make us more prosperous and it does make us more influential beyond our shores.*

Of course, we don't get anything like everything we want, and we have to put up with a lot that we do not want. And when that happens, we should be honest about it. The Common Agricultural Policy, the Common Fisheries Policy, the free movement of people: none of these things work the way we would like them to work, and we need to be smarter about how we try to change these things in future. But that does not mean we have no control over the EU. Britain can and often does lead in Europe: the creation of the single market was driven by Mrs Thatcher, the competitiveness and trade agendas now pursued by the Commission were begun at the behest of Britain and Germany, and I can tell you that on matters of counter-terrorism and security, the rest of Europe instinctively looks towards us. But it shouldn't be a notable exception when Britain leads in Europe: it must become the norm.

And turning to the final test: to what extent does EU membership bind the hands of Parliament? Of course, every directive, regulation, treaty and court ruling limits our freedom to act. Yet Parliament remains sovereign: if it voted to leave the EU, we would do so. But unless and until the European Communities Act is repealed, Parliament has accepted that it can only act within the limits set by the European treaties and the judgments of the Court of Justice. The freedom to decide whether to remain a member of the EU or to leave will therefore always be in the hands of Parliament and the British people.

I do not want to stand here and insult people's intelligence by claiming that everything about the EU is perfect, that membership of the EU is wholly good, nor do I believe those that say the sky will fall in if we vote to leave. The reality is that there are costs and benefits of our membership and, looking to the years and decades ahead, there are risks and opportunities too. The issues the country has to weigh up before this referendum are complex. But on balance, and given the tests I set earlier in my speech, I believe the case to remain a member of the European Union is strong.

For each of the principles I set out earlier, however, I cannot help but think there would be more still in the credit rather than debit column if Britain adopted a different approach to our engagement with the EU. *Because we should be in no doubt that, if we vote to remain, our relationship with the European Union will go on changing. And that change – with new treaties on the horizon – might be for the better or worse.*

We all know the game that has been played in the past. Prime Ministers like Tony Blair and Gordon Brown went into the Council of Ministers without a positive agenda for what Britain wanted, their advisers briefed about the five red lines they were not prepared to cross, they gave way on three, and returned triumphant claiming to have stopped the Europeans in their tracks. If we go back to the same way of doing business, Britain will not get what it needs from the EU and the public will grow more cynical and more dissatisfied.

We have become so used to being in this permanently defensive crouch that when it comes to the EU, Britain has forgotten how to stand up and lead. And to those who say

Britain cannot achieve what it needs in Europe, I say have more belief in what Britain can do. I say think about how Britain built the single market, and let's be that ambitious – in the British national interest – once again.

Let us set clear objectives to complete the single market, to pursue new free trade deals with other countries, to reform the European economy and make it more competitive. Let's work to ensure the countries of Europe can protect their borders from illegal immigrants, criminals and terrorists. Let's try to make sure that more of our European allies play their part in protecting western interests abroad.

We need to have a clear strategy of engagement through the Council of Ministers, seek a bigger role for Britain inside the Commission, try to stem the growth in power of the European Parliament, and work to limit the role of the Court of Justice. We need to work not only through the EU's institutions and summits, but by also pursuing more bilateral diplomacy with other European governments.

And it is time to question some of the traditional British assumptions about our engagement with the EU. Do we stop the EU going in the wrong direction by shouting on the sidelines, or by leading and making the case for taking Europe in a better direction? And do we really still think it is in our interests to support automatically and unconditionally the EU's further expansion? The states now negotiating to join the EU include Albania, Serbia and Turkey – countries with poor populations and serious problems with organised crime, corruption, and sometimes even terrorism. We have to ask ourselves, is it really right that the EU should just continue to expand, conferring upon all new member states all the rights of membership? Do we really think now is the time to contemplate a land border between the EU and countries like Iran, Iraq and Syria? Having agreed the end of the European principle of "ever closer union", it is time to question the principle of ever wider expansion.

So this is my analysis of the rights and wrongs, the opportunities and risks, of our membership of the EU – and the reasons I believe it is clearly in our national interest to remain a member of the European Union.

And I want to emphasise that I think we should stay inside the EU not because I think we're too small to prosper in the world, not because I am pessimistic about Britain's ability to get things done on the international stage. I think it's right for us to remain precisely because I believe in Britain's strength, in our economic, diplomatic and military clout, because I am optimistic about our future, because I believe in our ability to lead and not just follow.

But I know what a difficult decision this is going to be for a lot of people. I know, because of the conversations I have with my constituents every Saturday. Because of the discussions I've had with members of the public – and members of the Conservative Party – up and down the country. And because I myself have already gone through the process of carefully weighing up what is in Britain's interests, now and in the future, before making my decision. Ultimately, this is a judgement for us all, and it's right that people should take their time and listen to all the arguments.

So as we approach polling day, and as the country starts to weigh up its decision, let us focus on the future. Instead of debating the peripheral, the ephemeral and the trivial, let both sides of the argument debate what matters. And let us do so in a serious and mature way. Let us concentrate on Britain's national interest. Britain's future. Our influence around the world. Our security. And our prosperity. Let us make our decision with the great challenges of the future in mind. Let us have more confidence in our ability to get things done in Europe. This is about our future. Let us, Great Britain, stand tall and lead.

Theresa May's Speech on 25 April 2016. Available from <http://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2016/04/theresa-mays-speech-on-brexit-full-text.html> [Accessed on 1 December 2016]

3. David Cameron's Speech Sample

“In 45 days’ time, the British people will go to polling stations across **our** islands and cast their ballots in the way **we** have done in **this** country for generations.

They will, as usual, weigh up the arguments, reflect on them quietly, discuss **them** with friends and family, and then, calmly and without fuss, take **their** decision.

But **this** time, **their** decision will not be for a Parliament, or even two.

They will decide the destiny of **our** country, not for 5 years or for 10, but in all probability for decades, perhaps a lifetime.

This is a decision that is bigger than any individual politician or government.

It will have real, permanent and direct consequences for this country and every person living in it.

Should **we** continue to forge **our** future as a proud, independent nation while remaining a member of the European Union, as **we** have been for the last 43 years? Or should **we** abandon it?

Let me say at the outset that I understand why many people are wrestling with **this** decision, and why some people’s heads and hearts are torn.

And I understand and respect the views of **those** who think **we** should leave, even if I believe **they** are wrong and that leaving would inflict real damage on our country, its economy and its power in the world.”

Where I stand

“I believe that, despite its faults and its frustrations, the United Kingdom is stronger, safer and better off by remaining a member of the European Union. Better off? Certainly.

We are part of a single market of 500 million people which Britain helped to create. Our goods and, crucially, our services – which account for almost 80% of our economy – can trade freely by right. We help decide the rules. The advantages of this far outweigh any disadvantages.

Our membership of the single market is one of the reasons why our economy is doing so well, why we have created almost 2.4 million jobs over the last 6 years, and why so many companies from overseas – from China or India, the United States, Australia and other Commonwealth countries invest so much in the UK.

It is one of the factors – together with **our** superb workforce, the low taxes set by the British Government, and **our** climate of enterprise – which makes Britain such an excellent place to do business.

All this is alongside – let us note – **our** attractive regulatory environment. According to the OECD, it is second only to the Netherlands, itself an EU member – giving the lie to **those** who claim that the British economy is being strangled by regulation from Brussels.

If we leave, the only certainty we will have is uncertainty.

The Treasury has calculated that the cost to every household in Britain would be as high as £4,300 by 2030 if we leave. £4,300.

The overwhelming weight of independent opinion – from the International Monetary Fund to the OECD, from the London School of Economics to the Institute for Fiscal Studies – also supports the fact that Britain will suffer an immediate economic shock, and then be permanently poorer for the long-term.

The evidence is clear: **we will be better off in, and poorer if we leave.**

As Charles Dunstone, the founder of Carphone Warehouse, an entrepreneur not averse to risk, has said: ‘In my experience there are calculated risks, there are clever risks, and there are unnecessary and dangerous risks. And from all I can conclude, Brexit sits firmly in the latter camp.’

So the onus is on **those** who advocate leaving to prove that Britain will be better off outside the EU. **Those** advocating Brexit have spent many years preparing for this moment.

And yet **they** seem unable to set out a clear, comprehensive plan for **our** future outside the EU.

Some admit there would be a severe economic shock, but assert nonchalantly that it would be **'a price worth paying'**.

Others are in denial that there would be a shock at all. **And they** can't agree what their plan for post-Brexit Britain would look like.

One minute **we** are urged to follow Norway, the next minute Canada. A few days later Switzerland offers the path forward, until it becomes clear that their arrangement doesn't provide much access for services to the EU's single market – and services, as I've said, are almost four fifths of the British economy.

Most recently, the Leavers have noticed that a number of European countries that sit outside of the EU have negotiated separate trade arrangements with the EU.

They called this collection of countries the **"European free trade zone"**.

But in fact, this doesn't exist: it is a patchwork of different arrangements, all of them far inferior to what **we** have now.

They have gone on to suggest that Britain might join this non-existent zone, just like Albania.

Seriously? **Even the Albanian Prime Minister thought that idea was a joke.**

The Leave campaign are asking **us** to take a massive risk with the future of our economy and the future of our country.

And yet **they** can't even answer the most basic questions.

What would Britain's relationship be with the EU if **we** were to leave? Will **we** have a free trade agreement, or will **we** fall back on World Trade Organisation rules?

The man who headed the WTO for 8 years thinks this would be and I quote **"a terrible replacement for access to the EU single market."**

Some of **them** say **we** would keep full access to the EU single market.

If so, **we** would have to accept freedom of movement, a contribution to the EU budget, and accept all EU rules while **surrendering** any say over them.

In which case, **we** would have given up sovereignty rather than taken it back.

Others say **we** would definitely leave the single market – including, yesterday, the Vote Leave campaign – despite the critical importance of the single market to jobs and investment in **our** country.

I can only describe this as a reckless and irresponsible course. **These** are people's jobs and livelihoods that are being **toyed with**.

And the Leave campaign have no answers to the most basic questions.

What access would **we** try to secure back into the single market from the outside? How long would it take to negotiate a new relationship with the EU? What would happen to the 53 trade deals **we** have with other markets around the world through the EU?

The Leave campaign can't answer them because **they** don't know the answers. **They** have no plan.

And yet sceptical voters who politely ask for answers are denounced for **their** lack of faith in Britain, or met with sweeping assurances that the **world will simply jump to our tune**.

If you were buying a house or a car, you wouldn't do it without insisting on seeing what was being offered, and making sure it wasn't going to fall apart the moment you took possession of it.

So why would you do so when the future of your entire country is at stake?

The British people will keep asking these questions every day between now and 23 June, and demanding some answers.

Nothing is more important than the strength of **our** economy.

Upon it depends the jobs and livelihoods of **our** people, and also the strength and security of **our** nation.

If we stay, we know what we get – continued full access to a growing single market, including in energy, services and digital, together with the benefit of the huge trade deals in prospect between the EU and the United States and other large markets.

If we leave, it is – genuinely – a leap in the dark.

But my main focus today will not be on the economic reasons to remain in the EU, important though **they** are.

I want to concentrate instead on what **our** membership means for **our** strength and security in the world, and the safety of **our** people, and to explain why, again, I believe the balance of advantage comes down firmly in favour of staying rather than leaving.

Because this decision is a decision about **our** place in the world, about how **we** keep **our** country safe, about how Britain can get things done – in Europe and across the world – and not just accept a world dictated by others.”

A proud, confident nation

“So today I want to set out the big, bold patriotic case for Britain to remain a member of the EU.

I want to show that if you love this country, if you want to keep it strong in the world, and keep our people safe, **our** membership of the EU is **one of the tools – one of the tools – that helps us to do these things, like our membership of other international bodies such as NATO or the UN Security Council.**

Let **us** accept that for all our differences, one thing unites both sides in this referendum campaign.

We love this country, and **we** want the best future for **it**. **Ours** is a **great country**.

Not just a **great country** in the history books, although it surely is that.

But a **great country** right now, with the promise of becoming even greater tomorrow.

We’re the fifth largest economy in the world. Europe’s foremost military power. **Our** capital city is a global icon. **Our** national language the **world’s** language.

Our national flag is worn on clothing and t-shirts the world over – not only as a fashion statement, but as a symbol of hope and a beacon for liberal values all around the world.

People from all 4 corners of the earth watch **our** films, dance to **our** music, flock to **our** galleries and theatres, cheer on **our** football teams and cherish **our** institutions.

These days, even **our** food is admired the world over.

Our national broadcaster is one of the most recognised brands on the planet, and **our** monarch is one of the most respected people in the world.

Britain today is a proud, successful, thriving nation, a nation the world admires and looks up to, and whose best days lie ahead of it.

We are the product of our long history – of the decision of **our** forebears, of the heroism of **our** parents and grandparents.

And yet **we** are a **country that also has our eyes fixed firmly on the future** – that is a pioneer in the modern world: from the **birth of the internet** to the decoding of the genome.”

The character of the British people

“If there is one constant in the ebb and flow of **our** island story, it is the character of the British people.

Our geography has shaped **us**, and shapes **us** today. **We** are special, different, unique.

We have the character of an island nation which has not been invaded for almost a thousand years, and which has built institutions which have endured for centuries.

As a people **we** are ambitious, resilient, independent-minded. And, I might add, tolerant, generous, and inventive.

But above all **we** are obstinately practical, rigorously down to earth, natural debunkers.

We approach issues with a cast of mind rooted in common sense. **We** are rightly suspicious of ideology, and sceptical of grand schemes and grandiose promises.

So we have always seen the European Union as a means to an end – the way to boost our prosperity and help anchor peace and stability across the European continent – but we don't see it as an end in itself.

We insistently ask: why? How?

And as we weigh up the competing arguments in this referendum campaign, we must apply that practical rigour which is the hallmark of being British.

Would going it alone make Britain more powerful in the world? Would we be better able to get our way, or less able?

Would going it alone make us more secure from terrorism, or would it be better to remain and cooperate closely with our neighbours?

Would going it alone really give us more control over our affairs, or would we soon find that actually we had less, and that we had given up a secure future for one beset by years of uncertainty and trouble with no way back?

Would going it alone open up new opportunities, or would it in fact close them down and narrow our options?"

Stronger in the World

"That is certainly the approach I have taken to judging whether Britain is stronger and safer inside the European Union or leaving it.

And I have just one yardstick: how do we best advance our national interest?

Keeping our people safe at home and abroad, and moulding the world in the way that we want – more peaceful, more stable, more free, with the arteries of commerce and trade flowing freely.

That is our national interest in a nutshell – and it's the question that has confronted every British prime minister since the office was created: how do we best advance Britain's interests in the circumstances of the day?

If my experience as Prime Minister had taught me that our membership of the EU was holding Britain back or undermining our global influence, I would not hesitate to recommend that we should leave.

But my experience is the opposite.

The reason that I want Britain to stay in a reformed EU is in part because of my experience over the last six years is that it does help make our country better off, safer and stronger.

And there are 4 reasons why this is the case.

First, what happens in Europe affects us, whether we like it or not, so we must be strong in Europe if we want to be strong at home and in the world.

Second, the dangerous international situation facing Britain today, means that the closest possible cooperation with our European neighbours isn't an optional extra – it is essential. We need to stand united. Now is a time for strength in numbers.

Third, keeping our people safe from modern terrorist networks like Daesh and from serious crime that increasingly crosses borders means that we simply have to develop much closer means of security cooperation between countries within Europe. Britain needs to be fully engaged with that.

Fourth, far from Britain's influence in the world being undermined by our membership of the EU, it amplifies our power, like our membership of the UN or of NATO. It helps us achieve the things we want – whether it is fighting Ebola in Africa, tackling climate change, taking on the people smugglers. That's not just our view; it's the view of our friends and allies, too.

Let me go through them in turn."

What happens in Europe affects us

"First: Europe is our immediate neighbourhood, and what happens on the continent affects us profoundly, whether we like it or not.

Our history teaches us: the stronger we are in **our** neighbourhood, the stronger **we** are in the world.

For 2000 years, our affairs have been intertwined with the affairs of Europe. For good or ill, we have written Europe's history just as Europe has helped to write ours.

From Caesar's legions to the wars of the Spanish Succession, from the Napoleonic Wars to the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Proud as we are of our global reach and our global connections, Britain has always been a European power, and we always will be.

We know that to be a global power and to be a European power are not mutually exclusive.

And the moments of which **we** are rightly most proud in **our** national story include pivotal moments in European history.

Blenheim. Trafalgar. Waterloo. Our country's heroism in the Great War.

And most of all our lone stand in 1940, when Britain stood as a bulwark against a new dark age of tyranny and oppression.

When I sit in the Cabinet Room, I never forget the decisions that were taken in that room in **those** darkest of times.

When I fly to European Summits in Brussels from RAF Northolt, I pass a Spitfire just outside the airfield, a vital base for brave RAF and Polish pilots during the Battle of Britain.

I think of the Few who saved this country in its hour of mortal danger, and who made it possible for **us** to go on and help liberate Europe.

Like any Brit, my **heart swells with pride** at the sight of that aircraft, or whenever I hear **the tell-tale roar** of those Merlin engines over our skies in the summer.

Defiant, brave, indefatigable.

But it wasn't through choice that Britain was alone. **Churchill** never wanted that. Indeed he spent the months before the Battle of Britain trying to keep our French allies in the war, and then after France fell, he spent the next 18 months persuading the United States to come to our aid.

And in the post-war period he argued passionately for Western Europe to come together, to promote free trade, and to build institutions which would endure so that our continent would never again see such bloodshed.

*Isolationism has never served this country well. Whenever **we** turn our back on Europe, sooner or later **we** come to regret it.*

***We** have always had to go back in, and always at a much higher cost.*

The serried rows of white headstones in lovingly-tended Commonwealth war cemeteries stand as silent testament to the price that **this** country has paid to help restore peace and order in Europe.

Can **we** be so sure that peace and stability on our continent are assured beyond any shadow of doubt? Is that a risk worth taking?

I would never be so rash as to make that assumption.

*It's barely been 20 years since war in the Balkans and genocide on our continent in Srebrenica. In the last few years, **we** have seen tanks rolling into Georgia and Ukraine. And of this I am completely sure.*

*The European Union has helped reconcile **countries which were once at each others' throats for decades.** Britain has a fundamental national interest in maintaining common purpose in Europe to avoid future conflict between European countries.*

And that requires British leadership, and for Britain to remain a member. *The truth is this: what happens in **our** neighbourhood matters to Britain.*

That was true in 1914, in 1940 and in 1989. Or, you could add 1588, 1704 and 1815. And it is just as true in 2016.

Either **we** influence Europe, or it influences **us**.

And if things go wrong in Europe, let's not pretend we can be immune from the consequences."

The international situation means cooperation with Europe is essential

"Second, the international situation confronting Britain today means that the closest possible cooperation with our European neighbours isn't an optional extra.

It is essential for this country's security and our ability to get things done in the world.

We see a newly belligerent Russia. The rise of the Daesh network to our East and to our South. The migration crisis. Dealing with these requires unity of purpose in the West.

Sometimes you hear the Leave campaign talk about these issues as if they are – in and of themselves – reasons to leave the EU.

But we can't change the continent to which we are attached. We can't tow our island to a more congenial part of the world.

The threats affect us whether we're in the EU or not, and Britain washing its hands of helping to deal with them will only make the problems worse.

Within Europe they require a shared approach by the European democracies, more than at any time since the height of the Cold War.

It is true, of course, that it is to NATO and to the Transatlantic Alliance that we look to for our defence.

The principle enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty – that an attack on one is an attack on all – that remains the cornerstone of our national defence.

That fundamental sharing of national sovereignty in order to deter potential aggressors. That is as valid today as it was when NATO was founded in 1949.

It is an example of how real control is more important than the theory of sovereignty.

The European Union – and the close culture of intergovernmental cooperation between governments which it embodies – is a vital tool in our armoury to deal with these threats.

That is why NATO and top military opinion – British, American, European – is clear that the common purpose of the EU does not undermine NATO, it is a vital reinforcement to it.

And they are equally crystal clear: Britain's departure would weaken solidarity and the unity of the West as a whole.

Now some of those who wish us to leave the EU openly say that they hope the entire organisation will unravel as a result.

I find this extraordinary.

How could it possibly be in our interests to risk the clock being turned back to an age of competing nationalisms in Europe?

And for Britain, of all countries, to be responsible for triggering such a collapse would be an act of supreme irresponsibility, entirely out of character for us as a nation.

Others suggest that Britain stalking out could lead to and I quote 'the democratic liberation of an entire continent'. Well, tell that to the Poles, the Czechs, the Baltic States and the other countries of central and eastern Europe which languished for so long behind the Iron Curtain.

They cherish their liberty and their democracy. They see Britain as the country that did more than any other to unlock their shackles and enable them to take their rightful place in the family of European nations.

And frankly they view the prospect of Britain leaving the EU with utter dismay. They watch what is happening in Moscow with alarm and trepidation.

Now is a time for strength in numbers. Now is the worst possible time for Britain to put that at risk. Only our adversaries will benefit."

Security risks

"Now third, the evolving threats to our security and the rise of the Daesh network mean that we have to change the way we work to keep our people safe. Security today is not only a matter of hard defence, of stopping tanks – it is also about rooting out terrorist networks, just

as it is about detecting illegal immigrants, stopping human trafficking and organised crime. And that makes much closer security cooperation between **our** European nations essential.

I have no greater responsibility than the safety of the people of **this** country, and keeping **us** safe from the terrorist threat.

As the Home Secretary said in her speech a fortnight ago: being in the EU helps to make us safer.

We shouldn't put ourselves at risk by leaving.

One of her predecessors, Charles Clarke, reiterated that only this morning.

And the message of Jonathan Evans and John Sawers, former heads of MI5 and MI6 respectively, is absolutely unmistakable: Britain is safer inside the European Union.

During the last 6 years, the terrorist threat against **this** country has grown.

Our threat level is now at Severe, which means that an attack is 'highly likely'. Indeed such an attack could happen at any time.

But the threat has not only grown, it has changed in its nature.

The attacks in Paris and Brussels are a reminder that **we face this threat together** – and **we** will only succeed in overcoming it by working much more closely **together**.

These terrorists operate throughout Europe; their networks use **technology to spread their poison** and to organise beyond geographical limits.

People say that to keep our defences up, you need a border. And they're right.

That's why **we** kept our borders, and **we** can check any passport – including for EU nationals – and **we** retain control over who **we** allow into **our** country.

But against the modern threat, having a border isn't enough. **You also need information, you need data, you need intelligence. You need to cooperate with others to create mechanisms for sharing this information.**

And, just as the Home Secretary said a fortnight ago, I can tell you this: whether it's working together to share intelligence on suspected terrorists; whether it's strengthening aviation security; addressing the challenge of cybercrime; preventing cross-border trade in firearms; tackling the migration crisis; or enhancing our own border security, the EU is not some peripheral institution, or a hindrance we have to work around – it is now an absolutely central part of how Britain can get things done.

Not by creating a vast new EU bureaucracy. Nor by sucking away the role and capabilities of **our** own world beating intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

But because their superb work depends on much closer cooperation between European governments and much faster and more determined action across Europe to deal with **this** new threat.

As the historian Niall Ferguson observed, it takes a network to defeat a network.

And European measures are a key weapon.

The European Arrest Warrant allows us to bring criminals and terrorists, like one of the failed 21/7 tube bombers who had fled to Italy, we can bring them back to the UK to face justice straight away.

Our membership of Europol gives us access to important databases that help us to identify criminals.

And we have begun to cooperate on DNA and fingerprint matching across borders, too. These tools help us in real-time, life-or-death situations.

One of the Paris attackers, Salah Abdeslam, was only identified quickly after the attack because the French police were able to use EU powers to exchange DNA and fingerprints with the Belgians.

Before this cooperation, DNA matching between two countries didn't take minutes, it could take over 4 months.

In the last few months alone, we have agreed a new Passenger Name Records directive, so that EU countries will have access to airline passenger data to enable us to identify those on terror watch-lists.

These new arrangements will also provide crucial details about how the tickets were bought, the bank accounts used and the people they are travelling with.

And the EU has recently switched on a new database, called SIS II, which is providing real-time alerts for suspected jihadists and other serious criminals.

Now I don't argue that if we left we would lose any ability to cooperate with **our** neighbours on a bilateral basis, or even potentially through some EU mechanisms.

But it is clear that leaving the EU will make cooperation more legally complex – and make **our** access to vital information much slower and more difficult.

Look at for instance Norway and Iceland: **they** began negotiating an extradition agreement with the EU in 2001 and yet today it is still not in force.

And of course **we** will miss out on the benefits of these new arrangements, and any that develop in future.

Now you can take the view that **we** don't need this cooperation – that **we** can just do without **these** extra capabilities.

That in my view is a totally complacent view. Especially in a world where the difference between a prevented attack and a successful attack can be just one missing piece of data; one piece of the jigsaw that the agencies found just too late.

You can also decide, as some on the Leave side seriously do, that even though working together is helpful for keeping **us** safe, it involves giving up too much sovereignty and ceding too much power over security cooperation to the European Court of Justice.

My view is this: when terrorists are planning to kill and maim people on British streets, the closest possible security cooperation is far more important than sovereignty in its purest theoretical form. *I want to give our country real power, not the illusion of power.*"

Britain's power in the world

"Fourth, Britain's unique position and power in the world is not defined by **our** membership of the EU, any more than it is by **our** membership of the Commonwealth or the UN Security Council or the OECD or the IMF or the myriad other international organisations to which **we** belong.

But our EU membership, like **our** membership of other international organisations, magnifies **our** national power. Britain is a global nation, with a global role and a global reach.

We take **our** own decisions, in **our** own interests. **We** always have done, **we** always will do.

In the years since **we** joined the EU, **we** have shown that time and again with British, national, sovereign decisions about **our** foreign and defence policy taken by British prime ministers and British ministers.

Liberating the Falkland Islands in a great feat of military endeavour. Freeing Kuwait from Iraq.

And, more recently, our mission to prevent Afghanistan continuing to be a safe haven for international terrorists.

As I speak here today, **we** are flying policing missions over the Baltic states. Training security forces in Nigeria. And of course, taking the fight to **Daesh** in Syria and Iraq.

So the idea that **our** membership of the EU has emasculated our power as a nation – **this** is complete nonsense.

Indeed, over the last 40 years, **our** global power has grown, not diminished.

In the years before **we** joined the EU, British Governments presided over a steady retrenchment of **our** world role, borne of **our** economic weakness.

The decision to retreat East of Suez and abandon **our** aircraft carriers was taken in 1968.

Since then, starting with the transformation of **our** economy by Margaret Thatcher, **we** have turned around **our** fortunes.

In the 21st century, Britain is once again a country that is advancing, not retreating,

We have reversed the East of Suez policy, we are building permanent military bases in the Gulf, we are opening Embassies all around the world, particularly in Asia.

We have a new strategic relationship with both China and India, have committed to spending 2% of our GDP on defence – one of only five NATO nations to be meeting that target.

Our expertise in aid, development and responding to crises is admired the world over.

We are renewing our independent nuclear deterrent.

Our 2 new aircraft carriers will be the biggest warships the Royal Navy has ever put to sea.

These are the actions of a proud, independent, self-confident, go-getting nation, a nation that is confident and optimistic about its future, not one cowed and shackled by its membership of the European Union.

On the contrary, our membership of the EU is one of the tools – just one – which we use, as we do our membership of NATO, or the Commonwealth, or the Five Power Defence Agreement with Australia, New Zealand and our allies in South East Asia, to amplify British power and to enhance our influence in the world.

Decisions on foreign policy are taken by unanimity. Britain has a veto.

So suggestions of an EU army are fanciful: national security is a national competence, and we would veto any suggestion of an EU army.

And as we sit in Britain's National Security Council, time and again I know that making Britain's actions count for far more means working with other countries in the EU.

Let me just take 3 specific examples of what I mean.

When Russia invaded Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, there was a real risk of a feeble European response, and of a split between the United States and Europe.

I convened a special meeting of the key European countries in Brussels, agreed a package of sanctions, and then drove that package through the full meeting of EU leaders – the European Council – later that same evening. I could not have done that outside the EU.

An example of Britain injecting steel into Europe's actions; delivering sanctions which have been far more effective because 28 countries are implementing them, not just the UK. And at the same time, we maintained that crucial unity between Europe and the US in the face of Russian aggression.

On Iran, again, it was Britain that pushed hardest for the implementation of an EU oil embargo against that country.

And it was the embargo which helped bring Iran to the negotiating table, and ultimately led to the UN sanctions that led to Iran abandoning its ambition to build a nuclear weapon. Who led those negotiations? It was the EU, with Britain playing a central role.

And on Ebola, it was Britain that used a European Council to push leaders into massively increasing Europe's financial contribution to tackling the disease in West Africa, thereby helping to contain and deal with what was a major public health emergency.

If Britain left the EU, we would lose that tool.

The German Chancellor would be there. The French President. The Italian Prime Minister. So would the Maltese, the Slovak, the Czech, the Polish, the Slovene, as well as all the others.

But Britain – the fifth largest economy in the world, the second biggest in Europe – would be absent, outside the room.

We would no longer take those decisions which have a direct bearing on Britain.

Instead we would have to establish an enormous diplomatic mission in Brussels to try and lobby participants before those meetings took place, and to try and then find out what had happened at them once they broke up.

Would we really be sitting around congratulating ourselves on how "sovereign" we feel, without any control over events that affect us?

What an abject act of national retreat that would be for **our** great country, a diminution of Britain's power inflicted for the first time in our history not by economic woe or military defeat, but entirely of **our** own accord.

And when it comes to the strength of **our** United Kingdom, **we** should never forget that **our** strength is that of a voluntary union of four nations. So let me just say this about Scotland: you don't renew your country by taking a decision that could, ultimately, lead to its disintegration.

So as **we** weigh up this decision, **let's do so with our eyes open.**

And, of course, there is something closely connected to our power and influence that is absolutely vital: and that's the view of **Britain's closest friends and allies.**

Before you take any big decision in life, it's natural to consult those who wish you well, those who are with you in the tough times as well as in the good.

Sometimes they offer contradictory advice. Sometimes they don't have much of a view.

That's not the case here.

Our allies have a very clear view. **They** want **us** to remain members of the European Union.

Not only **our** fellow members of the EU – they want **us** to stay, and could be resentful if **we** chose to leave.

The Leave campaign keep telling **us** that there is a big world out there, if only **we** could lift our sights beyond Europe.

But the problem is they don't seem to hearing what that big world is saying.

There is **our** principal and indispensable ally, the guarantor of **our** security – the United States – whose President made the American position very plain, as only the oldest and best **friends can.**

And then there are the nations to which **we** are perhaps closest in the world, **our** cousins in Australia and New Zealand, whose prime ministers have spoken out so clearly.

The Secretary-General of NATO says that a weakened and divided Europe would be "bad for security and bad for NATO".

Only on Thursday, the Japanese Prime Minister – whose country is such a huge investor and employer in the United Kingdom – made very clear that Japan hoped the UK would decide to remain in the EU.

So too have big emerging economies like Indonesia. And then there are **our** major new trading and strategic relationships – China and India – in whom some of the Leave campaign claim to invest such great hopes, at least when **they're** not saying they want to impose hefty tariffs on **them.** **They** too want **us** to remain in the EU.

So from America to Asia, from Australasia and the Indian sub-continent, **our friends** and **our** biggest trading partners, or potential trading partners, are telling **us** very clearly: **it's your decision. But we hope you vote to stay in the European Union.**

By the way, so too are our own Dependent Territories – Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands – with whom **we** have such a special bond and for whom we have a special responsibility."

Conclusion

"And so?"

Next month we will make our choice as a nation.

I am very clear.

Britain is **stronger and safer in the EU, as well as better off.**

And the EU benefits from Britain being inside rather than out.

This is a Europe that Britain has helped to shape.

A continent that Britain helped liberate not once in the last century, but twice.

And **we** always wanted two things from the EU.

One: the creation of a vast single market; one we thought would benefit our economy enormously and spread prosperity throughout our neighbourhood.

And two: a Europe in which Britain helped the nations which languished under Communism return to the European fold; nations who still **look to us as a friend and protector** and do not want us to abandon them now.

We've got both of those things.

We did all that.

And imagine if **we** hadn't been there.

Who would have driven forward the single market?

Who would have prevented Europe from becoming a protectionist bloc?

Who would have stopped the EU from becoming a single currency zone?

Who would have stood up and said no to those pushing for political union?

Who would have done these things?

Because the truth is that if **we** were not in it, the European Union would in all likelihood still exist.

So **we** would still have to deal with it.

Now **we** have the opportunity to have what **we** have always wanted: to be in the single market, but out of the euro. To be at the European Council, with our full voting and veto rights, but specifically exempted from ever closer union.

To have the opportunity to work, live and travel in other EU countries, but to retain full controls at our border.

To take part in the home affairs cooperation that benefits our security, but outside those measures we don't like.

And to keep our currency.

That is, frankly, the **best of both worlds**.

No wonder our friends and allies want us to take it. To lead, not to quit.

It is what the Chinese call a win win.

The Americans would probably say it's a slam dunk.

We are Britain.

No one seriously suggests any more that after forty years in the EU, **we** have become less British.

We're proud. **We're** independent. **We** get things done.

So let's not walk away from the institutions that help us to win in the world.

Let's not walk away from the EU, any more than we would walk away from the UN, or from NATO.

We're bigger than that.

So I say – instead, let us remain, let us fight our corner, let us play the part we should, as a great power in the world, and a great and growing power in Europe.

That is the big, bold, and patriotic decision for Britain on 23 June.”\

David Cameron's Speech on 9 May 2016. Available from

<http://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2016/05/camerons-speech-on-brexite-full-text.html> [Accessed on 1 December 2016]

4. Michael Gove's Speech Sample

One of the most striking things about the debate on Britain's future relationship with Europe is that the case for staying is couched overwhelmingly in negative and pessimistic terms, while the case for leaving is positive and optimistic.

Those of us who want to Leave believe Britain's best days lie ahead, that our country has tremendous untapped potential which independence would unleash and our institutions, values and people would make an even more positive difference to the world if we're unshackled from the past.

In contrast, the In campaign want us to believe that Britain is beaten and broken, that it can't survive without the help of Jean -Claude Juncker and his Commission looking after us and if we dare to assert ourselves then all the terrors of the earth will be unleashed upon our head. It treats people like children, unfit to be trusted and easily scared by ghost stories.

RESTORING A SENSE OF PROPORTION TO THE DEBATE

Indeed, if you listen to some of those campaigning for Britain to stay in the European Union, you would think that for Britain to leave would be to boldly go where no man has gone before. In fact, of course, it would be to join the overwhelming majority of countries which choose to govern themselves. The In campaign ask repeatedly 'what does out look like?' - as if the idea of governing ourselves is some extraordinary and novel proposition that requires a fresh a priori justification.

Democratic self-government, the form of Government we in Britain actually invented, has been a roaring success for most of the nations who've adopted it. While we enjoyed democratic self-government we developed the world's strongest economy, its most respected political institutions, its most tolerant approach towards refugees, its best publicly funded health service and its most respected public broadcaster.

Under democratic self-government countries such as Australia, Canada, the USA and New Zealand all enjoy excellent economic growth, global influence, the ability to control their own borders, to act independently either to close their borders or open them to more refugees, and strong, durable, trusted security links.

And democratic self-government has manifestly brought benefits to India, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, South Africa, South Korea and scores of other nations all making their way in the world.

STAYING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION IS THE REAL DANGER

Indeed the truth is that it is membership of an organisation like the European Union which is an anomaly today. The former President of the Commission himself, Manuel Barroso, likes to describe the EU as an 'empire ... because we have the dimension of empires'. The facts suggest he has a point though not quite the one he intended.

It is a fact that the EU is a multi-national federation with no democratically elected leader or Government, with policies decided by a central bureaucracy, with a mock parliament which enjoys no popular mandate for action and with peripheries which are either impoverished or agitating for secession.

It's a fact that also describes Austria-Hungary under the Habsburgs, the Russian Empire under Nicholas the Second, Rome under its later Emperors or the Ottoman Empire in its final years.

It is hardly a model for either economic dynamism or social progress. Which is why we should not be surprised that the countries of the EU are proving neither particularly economically dynamic or socially progressive.

It's a fact that youth unemployment in Spain is 45.3%, in Portugal it is 30.0%, and in Greece it is 51.9%.³

It's a fact that in Spain, Portugal and Greece eurozone austerity policies have meant cutting spending on health, welfare and public services.

It's a fact that not a single one of the world's top 20 universities is in the Eurozone.

It's a fact that euro bailouts have meant taxpayers money from across the EU has gone into paying off the bankers who got European nations into a mess in the first place.

And yet we are somehow expected to believe that if Britain left the organisation which gave us the economic disaster of the euro and turned the world's richest continent into its slowest growing, that it's this country which would be acting irrationally.

The only thing that's irrational is the picture the In campaign paints of life as an independent nation.

Some of the In campaigners seek to imply, insinuate and sometimes just declare, that if we left the EU we would not be able to take the train or fly cheaply to European nations. If, by some miracle, we somehow managed to make it to distant Calais or exotic Boulogne we would find that - unique among developed nations - our mobile telephones would no longer work. And heaven help us if we fell ill, as citizens from a country outside the EU we would be barred from all of Europe's hospitals and left to expire unmourned in some foreign field. But the consequences wouldn't end with the Continent becoming a no-go zone. *According to some In campaigners, independence also means the devastation of large areas of our national life. Our football teams would be denuded of foreign players, so Premier league matches would have to become - at best - five-a-side contests. And we'd better not schedule those fixtures for dark evenings because there'd be no electricity left for the floodlights after our energy supplies would have suffered a shock akin to the meltdown of a nuclear power plant.*

The City of London would become a ghost town, our manufacturing industries would be sanctioned more punitively than even communist North Korea, decades would pass before a single British Land Rover or Mr Kipling cake could ever again be sold in France and in the meantime our farmers would have been driven from the land by poverty worse than the Potato Famine. To cap it all, an alliance of Vladimir Putin, Marine Le Pen and Donald Trump, emboldened by our weakness, would, like some geopolitical equivalent of the Penguin, Catwoman and the Joker, be liberated to spread chaos worldwide and subvert our democracy.

I sometimes think that the In campaign appears to be operating to a script written by George R.R Martin and Stephen King - Brexit would mean a combination of a Feast for Crows and Misery.

It's a deeply pessimistic view of the British people's potential and a profoundly negative vision of the future which isn't rooted in reality.

The idea that if Britain voted to leave the European Union we would instantly become some sort of hermit kingdom, a North Atlantic North Korea only without that country's fund of international good will, is a fantasy, a phantom, a great, grotesque patronising and preposterous Peter Mandelsonian conceit that imagines the people of this country are mere children, capable of being frightened into obedience by conjuring up new bogeymen every night.

LEAVING MEANS A FRESH START

The truth is that the day after Britain voted to leave the European Union we would not fall off the edge of the world or find the English Channel replaced by a sulphurous ocean of burning pitch. Quite the opposite. We would be starting a process, a happy journey to a better future. But, crucially, a journey where we would be in control, whose pace and direction we would determine for ourselves. And whose destination we could choose.

By contrast, if we stay in the EU we give up control. Because just as leaving is a process, not an event, so staying in the EU means accepting a process, not settling for a resting place.

Before I explain how the process of leaving would work for Britain and Europe, let me first say a little about the risks of staying.

STAYING MEANS BEING A HOSTAGE NOT SETTLING FOR THE STATUS QUO

If we vote to stay, the EU's bosses and bureaucrats will take that as carte blanche to continue taking more power and money away from Britain. They will say we have voted for 'more Europe'. Any protests on our part will be met with a complacent shrug and a reminder that we were given our own very special negotiation and our own bespoke referendum and now we've agreed to stay and that's that. Britain has spoken, it's said "oui" and now it had better shut up and suck it up. In truth, if we vote to stay we are hostages to their agenda.

Brussels has already set out their official timetable for the next great transfer of powers from EU members to EU institutions after our referendum is safely out of the way. It's all there in the "Five Presidents' Report".

It's a fact that under the Qualified Majority Voting rules of the Lisbon Treaty, which the Conservative Party campaigned against, the Eurozone countries have a permanent and unstoppable majority allowing them to set the agenda and overrule British interests.

Worse, under the terms of the recent deal we've struck with the other EU nations we've surrendered our veto on their next leap forward.

Some might argue that we're insulated from that process because we're outside the Eurozone and we're no longer committed to the goal of "ever closer union". Wrong. The Eurozone nations can vote together to impose rules on every EU state - whether in or out of the euro. And we can't veto that. Deleting the phrase 'ever closer union' offers no protection.

It's a fact that as a phrase - or doctrine - in its own right, 'ever closer union' has only been cited in 0.19% of cases before the ECJ and has not been relevant to any of the ECJ's seminal judgments that expanded its power.

The In camp cannot name a single decision of the court that would have been decided differently had the phrase never been in the Treaties.

The Court has the power and freedom to interpret the Treaties as it wishes - which is always in the service of greater European integration, regardless of what our deal might say about "ever closer union". The inclusion of the phrase has not been a driving factor in the EU's expansion.

Removing it makes no difference and will not stop the next EU power grab. And if we try to object, the European Court of Justice - the supreme court of the EU - can force us to submit to the judgment of others regardless of what our population, our parliament or even our own judges might think is right.

It is a fact that the European Communities Act 1972, and subsequent judgments, make clear that EU law, as decided by QMV and interpreted by the ECJ, trumps the decisions of, and laws passed by, democratically-elected politicians in Britain.

Further, the European Court now has the perfect legal excuse to grab more power - the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which goes even further than the older post-war European Convention on Human Rights. Of course, we were promised that we had a cast-iron opt-out.

The Blair Government originally said the Charter would have all the force in our law of 'The Beano'.

In which case Dennis the Menace must be the single most powerful figure in European jurisprudence, because the ECJ has now informed us that our opt-out was worthless and has started making judgments applying the Charter to UK law.

The ECJ can now control how all member states apply the crucial 1951 UN convention on asylum and refugees because the Charter incorporates it in EU law.

So Britain has lost control of a vital area of power and the European Court will increasingly decide how our policy must work. The ECJ has recently used the Charter to make clear that it can determine how our intelligence services monitor suspected terrorists.

How long before the ECJ starts undermining the Five Eyes intelligence sharing agreements that have been a foundation of British security since 1945 and which are the source of jealousy and suspicion in Brussels? *The ECJ recently used the Charter to make clear that the European Court - not our Parliament - will decide the issue of whether convicted felons can vote and if so how far this right should be extended.*

The ECJ used the Charter to tell us that the European Court will decide whether we can deport Abu Hamza's daughter -in-law.

It has even used the Charter to increase the price of insurance for women.

How long before the ECJ uses other provisions in the Charter to erode even more of our independence?

How far will the European Court go? We know it does not see itself bound by anything other than a drive to deepen integration.

It has consistently ignored and overruled anybody which stands in its way. Even decisions made and agreed by every EU state have been overturned if the court thinks they impede integration.

The Court has rejected deals on human rights which the EU nations agreed at the time of the Lisbon Treaty.

It has also overridden the deal that the Danes did with the EU on citizenship in 1992.

We know that it is entirely up to the European Court itself how to interpret the terms of our recent new deal - there is no appeal and nothing we can do about its decisions, just as there was nothing we could when it sank our supposed opt-out from the Charter.

Don't just take it from me. The former Attorney General- and In campaigner – Dominic Grieve said only last year: "the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg has predatory qualities to it that could be very inimical to some of our national practices".

It is clear that if we vote to stay we are voting to give away more power and control to unaccountable EU institutions this year and every year.

If we vote to stay the EU can then press ahead with the plans outlined in the "Five Presidents' Report" which I mentioned a moment ago.

Those plans include:

- The transfer of powers over tax - so we lose vital fiscal freedoms.
- The transfer of powers over the financial system - so we are less able to guard against a repeat of the 2008 financial crisis
- The transfer of powers over the heart of our legal system - so we are less able to safeguard the integrity of the contract and property law which is crucial to attracting global investors. If we vote to stay we also risk paying even more of the bills for the euro's failure. We were told in 2010 that we would not be liable for any more euro bailouts. Yet in 2015 those assurances turned out to be wrong.

If we vote to stay, British taxpayers will inevitably be paying ever higher bills for years to come as the EU uses its growing and unchecked power to transfer resources to subsidise failure.

If we vote to stay we are not settling for the status quo - we are voting to be a hostage, locked in the boot of a car driven by others to a place and at a pace that we have no control over.

In stark contrast, if we vote to leave, we take back control.

ONCE WE VOTE TO LEAVE WE DECIDE THE TERMS OF TRADE

The day after we vote to leave we hold all the cards and we can choose the path we want.

The leader of the In campaign, Stuart Rose, has acknowledged that there will be no turbulence or trauma on Independence Day. "Nothing is going to happen if we come out ... in the first five years, probably," he confessed, and admitted "There will be absolutely no change."

And just as it is the case that when Britain votes to leave nothing in itself changes overnight, so the process and pace of change is in our hands. There is no arbitrary deadline which we must meet to secure our future - and indeed no arbitrary existing "model" which we have to accept in order to prosper.

It has been argued that the moment Britain votes to leave a process known as “Article 50” is triggered whereby **the clock starts ticking** and every aspect of any new arrangement with the EU must be concluded within 2 years of that vote being recorded - or else...

But there is no requirement for that to occur - quite the opposite.

Logically, in the days after a Vote to Leave the Prime Minister would discuss the way ahead with the Cabinet and consult Parliament before **taking any significant step**.

Preliminary, informal, conversations would take place with the EU to explore how best to proceed. It would not be in any nation’s interest artificially to accelerate the process and no responsible government **would hit the start button** on a two-year legal process without preparing appropriately.

Nor would it be in anyone’s interest to hurry parliamentary processes.

We can set the pace. **We** will repeal the 1972 European Communities Act, which automatically gives EU law legal force. But **we** can change it on **our** terms at a time **of our choosing**. After **we** establish full legal independence we can then decide **which EU-inspired rules and regulations we want to keep, which we want to repeal and which we wish to modify**. It is also important to realise that, while **we** calmly take our time to change the law, one thing which won’t change is **our** ability to trade freely with Europe.

BRITAIN CONTINUES IN THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ZONE

The In campaign often argues that **we** would find it impossible to reach a trading agreement with EU nations after **we** vote leave. While there are, of course, some questions up for negotiation which will occupy our highly skilled Foreign Office civil servants, resolving them fully and properly **won’t be any more complicated or onerous than the day-to-day work they undertake now navigating their way through EU recitals, trialogues and framework directives**. **Indeed, if we vote to stay, that work will only grow more complex, and negotiations in the EU will only become more burdensome. But if we vote to leave, the need for this bureaucratic processology will come to an end.** The core of **our** new arrangement with the EU is clear.

There is a free trade zone stretching from Iceland to Turkey that all European nations have access to, regardless of whether **they** are in or out of the euro or EU. After **we** vote to leave **we** will remain in **this** zone. **The suggestion that Bosnia, Serbia, Albania and the Ukraine would remain part of this free trade area - and Britain would be on the outside with just Belarus - is as credible as Jean-Claude Juncker joining UKIP**.

Agreeing to maintain this continental free trade zone is the simple course and emphatically in everyone’s interests.

As our European friends adjust to the referendum result **they** will quickly calculate that it is in **their** own interest to maintain the current free trade arrangements they enjoy with the UK. After all **they** sell far more to us than **we** do to **them**. *In 2015, the UK recorded a £67.7 billion deficit in the trade of goods and services with the EU, up from £58.8 billion in 2014. German car manufacturers, who sell £16.2 billion more to us each year than we sell to them, will insist their Government maintains access to our markets. French farmers, who sell us £1.37 billion worth of wine and other beverages, £737 million more than we sell to them, will insist on maintaining access to our supermarkets. Italian designers, whose fashion houses sell the UK £1.0 billion of clothes will similarly insist on access to our consumers.*

It has been suggested that, in a fit of collectively-organised and intensively-sustained international pique, all 27 nations of the EU would put every other priority aside and labour night and day **for months to bury their own individual differences** and harm their own individual economic interests just to punish us.

Now I accept that **some in the Brussels** elite will be cross at our temerity in refusing to accept **their** continued rule. But the idea that the German government would damage its car manufacturers – and impoverish workers in those factories - to make a political point about Britain’s choices; or the French Government would ignore its farmers - and damage **their**

welfare – to strike a pose; or the Italian Government would undermine its struggling industries just to please Brussels, is ridiculous.

And the idea that all of them - and 24 other nations - would have as their highest economic priority in the months ahead making it more difficult to sell to Britain - and the belief that they would bend all their diplomatic, political and financial muscle to that sole end - is preposterous.

Why would any of them wish to commit an act of profound economic self-harm? And if any of them did, why would the other EU nations let them?

It is sometimes claimed that we will only get free trade if we accept free movement. But the EU has free trade deals with nations that obviously do not involve free movement. You do not need free movement of people to have free trade and friendly co-operation. Indeed, worldwide, it's been countries outside the EU's bureaucracy which have been selling more and more goods to EU nations. Over the last five years exports of goods from the United States to the EU increased faster than the exports from the UK to the EU.

Indeed the amount we sold to Europe actually declined after the EU moved to setting more and more common bureaucratic rules in the name of the so-called 'Single Market'.

After joining the EEC in 1972 our trade with it did grow. And in 1993, 51.7% of our exports went to the EU.

After 1993, however, our trade with the EU flatlined then declined. Now 56.3% of our exports go to countries outside the EU.

Of course increased trade isn't the property of politicians, it's testament to the endeavours and hard work of British entrepreneurs and British workers.

And it's certainly no thanks to the EU's trade negotiators.

CUTTING DEALS ON OUR TERMS - AND IN A WAY WHICH HELPS THE POOREST

The EU after years of trying still doesn't have trade deals with the US, China or India.

But if we vote to leave we can take control of our trade negotiations and seal those deals more quickly.

We can strip out the protectionism and special interests that drag down EU negotiations, and focus more energetically on reducing barriers to trade - to creat more jobs for British workers, greater opportunities for British exporters, and cheaper prices for British consumers.

Instead of having to wait until every concern raised by 27 other nations is addressed during negotiations we can cut to the chase. It's striking how successful countries outside the EU have been at negotiating trade deals. Switzerland has opened markets of \$40 trillion while Canada has negotiated 10 trade deals since 2009 alone.

Critically, new deals could include enhanced arrangements for developing nations. At the moment the EU maintains a common external tariff on goods of up to 183%.

That means produce from Africa or Asia's poorer nations costs far more to import than it should. By maintaining such a punitive level of tariffs on imports the EU holds developing nations back.

An independent Britain could choose to strike free trade agreements with emerging economies and lower tariffs, extending new opportunities to developing nations and in the process, allowing prices in Britain to become cheaper. Leaving the EU would thus help the poorest nations in the world to advance and it would help the poorest people in this country to make ends meet. This is just one of a number of ways in which leaving the European Union allows us to advance more progressive policies.

STRENGTHENING OUR ECONOMY

Taking back control of our trade policy would strengthen our country's economic power.

But that's not the only direct benefit of voting to leave.

If we left the EU we would take back control over nineteen billion pounds which we currently hand over every year - about £350 million each and every week. Now it is true that we get some of that money back - £4.4 billion through a negotiated rebate - and £4.8 billion in money the EU spends in this country on our behalf. But it is also vital to note that the amount we give to the EU is due to go up - and up - and up. From £19.1 billion this year to £20.6 billion in 2020-21. Since 1975, we have already sent the staggering sum of over half a trillion pounds to Brussels. If we vote to stay we will send about another £200 billion to Brussels over the next decade.

It is also important to recognise that our rebate is not a permanent and unalterable feature of our membership anchored in the treaties. It's a negotiated settlement – which has had to be re-negotiated before - and which could be eroded, whittled away or rendered less and less significant in future negotiations.

One of the reasons we have the rebate is fear Britain might leave. Once we've voted to stay then it will be open season on that sum.

I also acknowledge that some of the money we send over we get back - whether in support for farmers or scientists - although we don't control exactly where it goes. And we don't know how efficiently that money is allocated to those who really need it because of the opaque nature of the EU's bureaucracy.

Indeed there's a lot of evidence the money sticks to bureaucratic fingers rather than going to the frontline.

The physicist Andre Geim, the genius who won the Nobel prize for his work on graphene, said of the EU's science funding system, 'I can offer no nice words for the EU framework programmes which ... can be praised only by Europhobes for discrediting the whole idea of an effectively working Europe.'

In any case, no-one arguing that we should Vote Leave wants us to reduce the amount we give to our farmers or our scientists. Indeed some of us believe we should give more. The only British citizens we want to deprive of European funding are our MEPs. We'd like to liberate them to flourish in the private sector.

Yet, even if we acknowledge the rebate and the sums already spent here, £10.6 billion of taxpayers money is given to the EU in a year. That's twice the UK's science budget and twice Scotland's school budget.

Just think what we could do with this money.

It could be invested in new infrastructure, apprenticeships and science.

It could be deployed in our NHS, schools and social care.

It could pay for tax cuts, enterprise allowances and trade missions.

It could pay for fourteen Astute Class Submarines.

It could enhance this nation's security, productivity, social solidarity and competitiveness.

And the economic benefits of Leaving wouldn't end there.

We would also be able to reduce the regulatory costs imposed on British business.

The cost of EU regulation on British companies has been estimated by the independent think tank Open Europe at about £600 million every week.

Now some of those costs are incurred in a good cause. But many EU regulations - such as the Clinical Trials Directive, which has slowed down and made more expensive the testing of new cancer drugs, or absurd rules such as minimum container sizes for the sale of olive oil, are clearly not wise, light-touch and proportionate interventions in the market.

They also show how the so-called Single Market is, as Jacques Delors promised, a vehicle for expanding the power of the EU, not a tool for expanding free trade.

If we leave the EU, we can, progressively, reduce the burden of EU regulation and help generate new jobs and industries. We can also insulate ourselves from new EU rules that other nations are planning which are designed to hold back innovation.

It is striking that EU institutions have already repeatedly tried - and will of course continue to attempt - to fetter the tech companies that are changing the world economy.

As Harvard's Professor John Gillingham has pointed out, the development of fifth generation (5G) telecoms technology and the arrival of the "internet of things" promise massive productivity gains. But the EU has tried to stand in the way of the companies driving this change.

Professor Gillingham argues that the EU's stance is 'guerrilla warfare' which is 'futile as well as self-defeating. It can only accelerate the rate of European decline.' And the figures back him up.

The EU and its members are projected to grow more slowly than other advanced economies in the years ahead. Eurozone members are projected to grow at 1.5% while the US is projected to grow at 2.4%, China at 6.5%, New Zealand at 2.0%, Australia at 2.5% and India at 7.5%.

But it's not just freedom from EU regulation that leaving would liberate us to enjoy.

WE WILL TAKE BACK CONTROL OF IMMIGRATION

We could also benefit economically from control of immigration.

At the moment any EU citizen can come to the UK to settle, work, claim benefits and use the NHS. We have no proper control over whether that individual's presence here is economically beneficial, conducive to the public good or in our national interest. We cannot effectively screen new arrivals for qualifications, extremist connections or past criminality. We have given away control over how we implement the vital 1951 UN Convention on asylum to the European court. We cannot even deport convicted murderers.

Further, there are five more countries - Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey - in the queue to join the EU - and the European Commission, as we have just experienced ourselves during the recent negotiation process, regards 'free movement' as an inviolable principle of EU membership.

Yesterday's report from the Treasury is an official admission from the In campaign that if we vote to stay in the EU then immigration will continue to increase by hundreds of thousands year on year. Over 250,000 people came to Britain from Europe last year. As long as we are in the EU we cannot control our borders and cannot develop an immigration policy which is both truly humane and in our long term economic interests.

It is bad enough that we have to maintain an open door to EU nationals - from the shores of Sicily to the borders of the Ukraine - it's also the case that as the price of EU membership, we have to impose stricter limitations on individuals from other nations whom we might actively want to welcome.

Whether it's family members from Commonwealth countries, the top doctors and scientists who would enhance the operation of the NHS or the technicians and innovators who could power growth, we have to put them at the back of the queue behind anyone who's granted citizenship by any other EU country.

I think we would benefit as a country if we had a more effective and humane immigration policy, allowing us to take the people who would benefit us economically, offering refuge to those genuinely in need, and saying no to others.

And my ambition is not a Utopian ideal - it's an Australian reality.

Instead of a European open-door migration policy we could - if a future Government wanted it - have an Australian points-based migration policy. We could emulate that country's admirable record of taking in genuine refugees, giving a welcome to hard-working new citizens and building a successful multi-racial society without giving into people-smugglers, illegal migration or subversion of our borders. So leaving could mean control over new trade deals, control over how we can help developing nations, control over economic rules, control over how billions currently spent by others could be spent, control over our borders, control over who uses the NHS and control over who can make their home here.

BETTER FOR EUROPE

Leaving would also bring another significant - and under-appreciated - benefit. It would lead to the reform of the European Union.

At different points in campaigns like to argue either that Brexit would lead to EU nations using their massive muscle to punish us, or that Brexit would lead to contagion and the collapse of Europe - just as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union collapsed following secession from those unions.

Manifestly both cannot be true. An EU without the UK cannot simultaneously be a super-charged leviathan bent on revenge and a crumbling Tower of Babel riven by conflict.

But both points have a grain of truth. There will be anger amongst some in European elites. Not because the UK is destined for a bleak, impoverished future on the outside. No, quite the opposite.

What will enrage, and disorientate, EU elites is the UK's success outside the Union.

Regaining control over our laws, taxes and borders and forging new trade deals while also shedding unnecessary regulation will enhance our competitive advantage over other EU nations. Our superior growth rate, and better growth prospects, will only strengthen. Our attractiveness to inward investors and our influence on the world stage will only grow. *But while this might provoke both angst and even resentment among EU elites, the UK's success will send a very different message to the EU's peoples. They will see that a different Europe is possible. It is possible to regain democratic control of your own country and currency, to trade and co-operate with other EU nations without surrendering fundamental sovereignty to a remote and unelected bureaucracy. And, by following that path, your people are richer, your influence for good greater, your future brighter.*

So - yes there will be "contagion" if Britain leaves the EU. But what will be catching is democracy. *There will be a new demand for more effective institutions to enable the more flexible kind of international cooperation we will need as technological and economic forces transform the world.*

We know - from repeated referenda on the continent and in Ireland - that the peoples of the EU are profoundly unhappy with the European project. We also know that the framers of that project - Monnet and Schumann - hoped to advance integration by getting round democracy and never submitting their full vision to the verdict of voters. That approach has characterised the behaviour of EU leaders ever since. But that approach could not, and will not, survive the assertion of deep democratic principle that would be the British people voting to leave.

Our vote to Leave will liberate and strengthen those voices across the EU calling for a different future - those demanding the devolution of powers back from Brussels and desperate for a progressive alternative.

For Greeks who have had to endure dreadful austerity measures, in order to secure bailouts from Brussels, which then go to pay off bankers demanding their due, a different Europe will be a liberation.

For Spanish families whose children have had to endure years of joblessness and for whom a home and children of their own is a desperately distant prospect, a different Europe will be a liberation.

For Portuguese citizens who have had to endure cuts to health, welfare and public services as the price of EU policies, a different Europe will be a liberation.

For Italians whose elected Government was dismissed by Brussels fiat, for Danes whose opt-out from the Maastricht Treaty has been repeatedly overridden by the European Court, for Poles whose hard-won independence has been eroded by the European Commission, a different Europe will be a liberation.

For Britain, voting to leave will be a galvanising, liberating, empowering moment of patriotic renewal.

*We will have rejected the depressing and pessimistic vision advanced by In campaigners that Britain is too small and weak and the British people too hapless and pathetic to manage **their** own affairs and choose **their** own future.*

But for Europe, Britain voting to leave will be the beginning of something potentially even more exciting - the democratic liberation of a whole Continent.

*If we vote to leave we will have - in the words of a former British Prime Minister - saved our country by our exertions and Europe by our example. We will have confirmed that we believe **our** best days lie ahead, that we believe **our** children can build a better future, that **this** country's instincts and institutions, its people and its principles, are capable not just of making our society freer, fairer and richer but also once more of setting an inspirational example to the world. It is a noble ambition and one I hope **this** country will unite behind in the weeks to come.*

Michael Gove's Speech on 19 April 2016. Available from

<https://www.scribd.com/doc/309694809/Michael-Gove-pro-Brexit-speech> [Accessed on 12 February 2017]

5. Gisela Stuart's Speech Sample

On 23rd June, we will have a once-in-a-generation chance to decide whether to remain a member of the European Union. We should vote to leave it—this is the left-wing choice.

When Prime Minister David Cameron started his negotiations, he said that if the reform package offered to the UK wasn't good enough, he would recommend that Britain reject it. Now that he has struck a deal, he's predicting hellfire and brimstone if Britain votes to leave. His concern over the risks of Brexit seems sudden. Was his initial display of EU scepticism insincere?

Having promised fundamental reform, Cameron came back with little more than an exemption from the (largely symbolic) phrase “ever closer union,” a brake on in-work benefits to EU migrants, and protection for the City of London as a financial hub. Welcome as these things are, they amount to mere tinkering.

Cameron is now encouraging us to move on from these specifics to see the “big picture”—why Brexit would harm our international standing. This was expected: he never thought he could achieve fundamental reform. Nor did he ever seriously think Britain might be better off outside the EU; he called the referendum to placate Eurosceptics within his party and to keep Ukip at bay. I do not have much in common politically with either group, but I agree with them that we must leave the European Union. I am convinced that the UK can and must do better.

I am puzzled that the Labour Party seems to have mislaid its radical roots. Why are we storming the barricades to be on the side of the FTSE 100, the status quo, and an institution that threw millions of young people on the unemployment scrapheap in Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal just to save the euro?

True, in the 1980s the EU's Delors Commission gave British women the equal pay that the Thatcher government denied us. But it was a Labour government that gave us the minimum wage, increased parental leave, and brought in legislation to deal with gang masters—and that fought for rights for temporary, part-time and agency workers in the face of opposition from the Tories and other EU countries. Without national protections and rights for workers, the free movement of labour championed by the EU is little more than a race to the bottom.

Leaving the EU will not mean a tearing up of workers' contracts. Anyone who argues that the EU protects workers' rights should look no further than how the troika (the European Central Bank, European Commission and International Monetary Fund) demolished workers' rights in Greece and other countries that received an EU bailout. And how significant are rights like guaranteed holidays if our steel industry has to close? *The consistent rulings of the European Court of Justice have put business interests above workers.* The Laval and Viking Line cases in 2007, for example, placed restrictions on the right of employees to strike.

In addition, the EU has become institutionally incapable of change. EU leaders should allow countries like Greece to leave the common currency without anyone suggesting that they must then leave the Union. Some member states will in future want to join up to the common currency, which will require deeper political and fiscal integration. Other countries will not. The structure of the EU's institutions, the way decisions are made, must be built to cope with such complexity.

Furthermore, the EU has to stop undermining NATO, believing it can replace it. Independent European military capacity is much discussed but rarely delivered. I cannot think of a single significant military operation the EU could have executed without NATO assets. We keep spending less and less, hoping the US will fill the void, but the US wants us to step up and provide capacity. *The real danger is that the US may decide it is no longer prepared to underwrite our collective defence, leaving us dangerously exposed.*

This links to the need for a policy of offering countries in our neighborhood alternatives to EU membership, such as a trading relationship. We may want to reflect on the longstanding

shortcomings of **our** relationship with countries like Turkey, which has wanted to be part of the European project for decades.

*If Britain votes to remain, **we** will have endorsed a short-term fix in a referendum that won't be held again for decades. Moreover, the next time a British Prime Minister were to ask the EU to give Britain special treatment, **they** would be rejected on the grounds that Britons have given their democratic endorsement. Rather than being terrified by the prospect of leaving, **we** should be excited by it. It is natural to huddle together in a time of crisis and to fear the unknown, but these are impulses to be fought.*

I reject the stifling establishment consensus across the political parties. **The EU has fulfilled its dream of preventing war between France and** Germany. It now needs a new one—and so does the United Kingdom. That's why I will vote to leave.

Gisela Stuart Speech. Available from <http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/brexit-is-the-left-wing-choice> [Accessed on 1 March 2017]

Appendix 4 Keyword List in Corpus 1 and Corpus 2

Figures 4.1. and 4.2. display the output of keyword density in both corpora. The analysis of most frequently found words is displayed in Chapter 3.

Word	Count	Density	2 Word Phrases	Count	Density	3 Word Phrases	Count	Density
eu	267	0.95%	of the	215	1.53%	the european union	66	0.71%
britain	199	0.71%	in the	199	1.42%	the single market	42	0.45%
european	154	0.55%	the eu	191	1.36%	in the world	39	0.42%
europe	135	0.48%	the european	103	0.73%	of the european	26	0.28%
people	119	0.42%	to the	102	0.73%	in the eu	23	0.25%
world	111	0.40%	we have	87	0.62%	of the eu	22	0.24%
union	98	0.35%	and the	81	0.58%	membership of the	20	0.21%
leave	94	0.34%	the world	78	0.56%	one of the	20	0.21%
country	90	0.32%	european union	75	0.53%	our membership of	19	0.20%
british	89	0.32%	of our	66	0.47%	access to the	18	0.19%
trade	80	0.29%	it is	62	0.44%	the british people	17	0.18%
market	80	0.29%	would be	62	0.44%	the world and	17	0.18%
single	67	0.24%	if we	60	0.43%	the leave campaign	17	0.18%
countries	66	0.24%	single market	60	0.43%	the eu and	16	0.17%
economy	64	0.23%	we are	59	0.42%	with the eu	16	0.17%
want	63	0.22%	on the	52	0.37%	to leave the	15	0.16%
just	60	0.21%	with the	48	0.34%	leave the eu	14	0.15%
years	60	0.21%	will be	46	0.33%	leaving the eu	14	0.15%
jobs	51	0.18%	the single	43	0.31%	vote to leave	13	0.14%
membership	46	0.16%	in europe	40	0.29%	the eu is	13	0.14%
security	46	0.16%	that we	40	0.29%	we need to	13	0.14%
future	46	0.16%	to be	40	0.29%	member of the	12	0.13%
access	45	0.16%	to leave	40	0.29%	if we were	12	0.13%
today	45	0.16%	we would	39	0.28%	to the single	12	0.13%
say	45	0.16%	that is	39	0.28%	it would be	12	0.13%
work	44	0.16%	want to	38	0.27%	in the european	12	0.13%
rights	44	0.16%	is the	37	0.26%	outside the eu	12	0.13%
take	43	0.15%	that the	35	0.25%	the rest of	11	0.12%
need	41	0.15%	access to	33	0.24%	if we leave	11	0.12%
remain	41	0.15%	the british	32	0.23%	the united states	10	0.11%
time	40	0.14%	the uk	32	0.23%	part of the	10	0.11%

Figure 4.1. Corpus 1 keyword density in against-Brexit speeches

Word	Count	Density	2 Word Phrases	Count	Density	3 Word Phrases	Count	Density
eu	309	1.21%	the eu	201	1.57%	the european union	30	0.35%
european	118	0.46%	of the	200	1.57%	of the eu	25	0.29%
trade	107	0.42%	in the	143	1.12%	the eu is	22	0.26%
europe	95	0.37%	it is	99	0.78%	we vote to	21	0.25%
people	78	0.31%	to the	94	0.74%	the european court	20	0.23%
britain	70	0.27%	the european	74	0.58%	if we vote	18	0.21%
union	69	0.27%	that the	68	0.53%	in the eu	18	0.21%
control	60	0.23%	and the	66	0.52%	the single market	16	0.19%
countries	56	0.22%	will be	50	0.39%	that it is	14	0.16%
leave	56	0.22%	on the	50	0.39%	of the european	14	0.16%
country	55	0.22%	to be	49	0.38%	the eu has	14	0.16%
economic	48	0.19%	the uk	49	0.38%	there is no	13	0.15%
vote	47	0.18%	if we	47	0.37%	vote to leave	13	0.15%
british	45	0.18%	with the	45	0.35%	the eu and	12	0.14%
single	44	0.17%	would be	45	0.35%	to the eu	12	0.14%
just	44	0.17%	we have	44	0.34%	be able to	11	0.13%
government	42	0.16%	we are	41	0.32%	outside the eu	11	0.13%
want	40	0.16%	for the	40	0.31%	with the eu	10	0.12%
years	40	0.16%	of our	40	0.31%	we would be	10	0.12%
nations	39	0.15%	is the	39	0.31%	in this country	10	0.12%
market	39	0.15%	from the	37	0.29%	ever closer union	10	0.12%
world	38	0.15%	by the	37	0.29%	the eu we	10	0.12%
take	38	0.15%	european union	34	0.27%	vote to stay	10	0.12%
time	38	0.15%	we will	34	0.27%	there will be	10	0.12%
change	37	0.14%	that we	33	0.26%	the prime minister	9	0.11%
year	36	0.14%	this is	33	0.26%	is that the	9	0.11%
need	35	0.14%	at the	33	0.26%	it is not	9	0.11%
court	34	0.13%	we can	33	0.26%	court of justice	8	0.09%
eurozone	34	0.13%	that is	31	0.24%	membership of the	8	0.09%
policy	34	0.13%	to leave	31	0.24%	european court of	8	0.09%
better	32	0.13%	there is	29	0.23%	more and more	8	0.09%

Figure 4.2. Corpus 2 keyword density – pro-Brexit speeches

Output from: *SeBook Key word extraction*. Available from

<http://tools.seobook.com/general/keyword-density/> [Accessed on 27 March 2017]

Appendix 5 Pronominal Inclusion and Exclusion Concordance Plots

Figures 5.1., 5.2, 5.3., 5.4 and 5.5 below display the concordance output from the pro-Brexit and against-Brexit corpora for the entry of pronouns of inclusion and exclusion using the AntConc corpus tool. A more detailed analysis has been provided in Chapter 3.

Corpus Files	Concordance	Concordance Plot	File View	Clusters/N-Grams	Collocates	Word List	Keyword List
LEAVE CAMPAIGN.txt	Concordance Hits 44						
	Hit	KWIC					
1		e case for leaving is positive and optimistic. Those of us who want to Leave believe Britain\					
2		DEBATE Indeed, if you listen to some of those campaigning for Britain to stay in the Europ					
3		contests. And we\x92d better not schedule those fixtures for dark evenings because there\x92					
4		port\x94 which I mentioned a moment ago. Those plans include: ? The transfer of powers ove					
5		ble for any more euro bailouts. Yet in 2015 those assurances turned out to be wrong. If we					
6		manufacturers - and impoverish workers in those factories - to make a political point about					
7		e control of our trade negotiations and seal those deals more quickly. We can strip out the					
8		w how efficiently that money is allocated to those who really need it because of the opaque					
9		t\xA3600 million every week. Now some of those costs are incurred in a good cause. But					
10		I benefit us economically, offering refuge to those genuinely in need, and saying no to others.					
11		t Union collapsed following secession from those unions. Manifestly both cannot be true. An E					
12		ur vote to Leave will liberate and strengthen those voices across the EU calling for a different					
13		across the EU calling for a different future - those demanding the devolution of powers back from					
14		to become a minister. If you take on those roles, which are great privileges, you also					
15		their priorities, and to remove, at elections, those who take the decisions. It is sad that					
16		ger to the European Union comes not from those who advocate change, but from those who deno					
17		from those who advocate change, but from those who denounce new thinking as heresy. In its					
18		All that extra growth we were promised; all those extra jobs. The claims made for the Single					
19		the tech revolution \x96 in spite of all those directives I remember from the 1990s about I					
20		een left behind on tech precisely because of those directives. There are plenty of other parts					

Figure 5.1. Concordance lines for the entry of exclusive pronoun *those* in the pro-Brexit corpus

Corpus Files	Concordance	Concordance Plot	File View	Clusters/N-Grams	Collocates	Word List	Keyword List
LEAVE CAMPAIGN.txt	Concordance Hits 107						
	Hit	KWIC					
1		taking more power and money away from Britain. They will say we have voted for \x91more					
2		state have been overturned if the court thinks they impede integration. The Court has rejected de					
3		or onerous than the day-to-day work they undertake now navigating their way through E					
4		ean nations have access to, regardless of whether they are in or out of the euro or					
5		European friends adjust to the referendum result they will quickly calculate that it is in their					
6		t to maintain the current free trade arrangements they enjoy with the UK. After all they sell					
7		arrangements they enjoy with the UK. After all they sell far more to us than we do					
8		to sell to Britain - and the belief that they would bend all their diplomatic, political an					
9		ch and proportionate interventions in the market. They also show how the so-called Single Market					
10		different message to the EU\x92s peoples. They will see that a different Europe is possible.					
11		times, cannot build the houses we need where they \x92re needed and cannot deport all the					
12		world what a free people could achieve if they were allowed to govern themselves. In Britain					
13		the Government, we forced our rulers to recognise they ruled by consent not by right, we led					
14		, and there are tens of thousands of them, they are inimical to creativity, growth and progre					
15		on ministers\x92 ability to do the things they were elected to do, or to use their					
16		EU\x92s bureaucrats oppose us leaving is they fear that our success outside will only under					
17		their lives and to make sure the people they elect are able to cast the laws that					
18		every year UK politicians tell the public that they can cut immigration to the tens of thousands					
19		tens of thousands \x96 and then find that they miss their targets by hundreds of thousands,					
20		the UK referendum is out of the way, they will proceed with new structures of political					

Figure 5.2. Concordance lines for the entry of exclusive pronoun *they* in the pro-Brexit corpus

Corpus Files	Concordance	Concordance Plot	File View	Clusters/N-Grams	Collocates	Word List	Keyword List
LEAVE CAMPAIGN.txt	Concordance Hits 230						
	Hit	KWIC					
210		growth on the present scale means making our urban areas still more overcrowded or building					
211		the Office for National Statistics project that our population will continue to grow by around hal					
212		of life for those who already live in our country. A satellite survey by a research team					
213		of migration will inevitably result in more of our open spaces and natural greenery being turned					
214		of that may be inevitable, with growth of our own population, or changing social behaviours,					
215		get a school place and you will see our green spaces disappear at an even greater rate					
216		but how the inevitable reform that is coming our way is very different to what they are					
217		financial Union that guarantees the integrity of our currency across the Monetary Union and increas					
218		the people of the United Kingdom to control our rights and protections. If we vote to remain					
219		it would be EU rules that would determine our minimum wage, EU rules that would say how					
220		minimum wage, EU rules that would say how our pensions work, it would be EU rules to					
221		work, it would be EU rules to govern our skills system and even EU rules that would					
222		the EU starting to set the rules for our NHS. With no opt-out. And millions more					
223		but. And millions more people able to access our free at the point of delivery service as					
224		the EU controls more and more aspects of our benefit system. A treaty we signed in good					
225		anything controversial in Brussels until after our referendum is an open secret there. Legislatio					
226		currency. And Britain? What happens to us? Our influence will diminish. Our sovereignty will					
227		happens to us? Our influence will diminish. Our sovereignty will diminish. Our ability to look					
228		will diminish. Our sovereignty will diminish. Our ability to look after our own national interes					
229		signty will diminish. Our ability to look after our own national interest will diminish. There wil					
230		. I want us to take back control of our democracy. If we all want that, there is					

Figure 5.3. Concordance lines for the entry of inclusive pronoun *our* in the pro-Brexit corpus

Corpus Files	Concordance	Concordance Plot	File View	Clusters/N-Grams	Collocates	Word List	Keyword List
REMAIN CAMPAIGN.txt	Concordance Hits 441						
	Hit	KWIC					
1		British people will go to polling stations across our islands and cast their ballots in the way					
2		even two. They will decide the destiny of our country, not for 5 years or for 10, but in					
3		living in it. Should we continue to forge our future as a proud, independent nation while re					
4		and that leaving would inflict real damage on our country, its economy and its power in the					
5		100 million people which Britain helped to create. Our goods and, crucially, our services \x96 which					
6		Britain helped to create. Our goods and, crucially, our services \x96 which account for almost 80% of					
7		our services \x96 which account for almost 80% of our economy \x96 can trade freely by right. We					
8		advantages of this far outweigh any disadvantages. Our membership of the single market is one of					
9		single market is one of the reasons why our economy is doing so well, why we have					
10		is one of the factors \x96 together with our superb workforce, the low taxes set by the					
11		low taxes set by the British Government, and our climate of enterprise \x96 which makes Britain					
12		this is alongside \x96 let us note \x96 our attractive regulatory environment. According t					
13		to set out a clear, comprehensive plan for our future outside the EU. Some admit there would					
14		take a massive risk with the future of our economy and the future of our country. And					
15		future of our economy and the future of our country. And yet they can\x92t even					
16		the single market to jobs and investment in our country. I can only describe this as a					
17		assurances that the world will simply jump to our tune. If you were buying a house or					
18		. Nothing is more important than the strength of our economy. Upon it depends the jobs and liveliho					
19		. Upon it depends the jobs and livelihoods of our people, and also the strength and security of					
20		people, and also the strength and security of our nation. If we stay, we know what we					

Figure 5.4. Concordance lines for the entry of inclusive pronoun *our* in the against-Brexit corpus

Corpus Files		Concordance	Concordance Plot	File View	Clusters/N-Grams	Collocates	Word List	Keyword List
REMAIN CAMPAIGN.B		Concordance Hits 57						
Hit		KWIC						
1	. And I understand and respect the views of those who think we should leave, even if I							
2	an EU member \x96 giving the lie to those who claim that the British economy is being							
3	latter camp.\x92 So the onus is on those who advocate leaving to prove that Britain w							
4	Britain will be better off outside the EU. Those advocating Brexit have spent many years prep							
5	decisions that were taken in that room in those darkest of times. When I fly to European							
6	whenever I hear the tell-tale roar of those Merlin engines over our skies in the summer.							
7	the West as a whole. Now some of those who wish us to leave the EU openly							
8	airline passenger data to enable us to identify those on terror watch-lists. These new arrangement							
9	ambition to build a nuclear weapon. Who led those negotiations? It was the EU, with Britain pl							
10	, outside the room. We would no longer take those decisions which have a direct bearing on Bri							
11	in Brussels to try and lobby participants before those meetings took place, and to try and then							
12	in life, it\x92s natural to consult those who wish you well, those who are with							
13	natural to consult those who wish you well, those who are with you in the tough times							
14	them now. We\x92ve got both of those things. We did all that. And imagine if							
15	would have stood up and said no to those pushing for political union? Who would have							
16	operation that benefits our security, but outside those measures we don\x92t like. And to							
17	. Out of the Euro. And out of all those schemes in which Britain wants no part. Let							
18	it, Universal Credit, while looking for work. And those coming from the EU who haven\x92t							
19	at all. And we should be suspicious of those who claim that leaving Europe is an automati							
20	are safer, I really mean it. By contrast, those who want to leave can\x92t tell							

Figure 5.5. Concordance lines for the entry of exclusive pronoun *those* in the against-Brexit corpus

Output from: Anthony, L. (2014). AntConc (Version 3.4.3) [Windows]. Tokyo, Japan: Waseda University. Available from <http://www.laurenceanthony.net/> [Accessed on 10 January 2017]

Appendix 6 Manipulation Techniques in Corpus 1 and Corpus 2

Table 6.1. below displays the figurative language samples in the pro-Brexit and against-Brexit speeches.

Table 6.1. List of figurative language samples in the corpora

Type	Example	Corpora/ Speech
Metaphoric expression (CHOISE IN AN ILLNESS)	Let me say at the outset that I understand why many people are <i>wrestling with this decision</i> , and why some <i>people's heads and hearts are torn</i> .	C1, DC1
Synecdoche	Responsibility for supervising the financial stability of the UK <i>remains in the hands of the Bank of England</i> .	C1, DC2
Metaphoric expression (UNKNOWN IS DARKNESS)	Now leaving this arrangement, our special status in the EU, is a <i>leap in the dark</i> , because no one has said what we'd have in its place.	C1, DC4
Balance sheet metaphor	Our decision must come down to whether, after serious thought about the pros and the cons, we believe <i>there is more in the credit column than in the debit column for remaining on the inside</i> .	C1, TM1
Simile	Another <i>clear as day</i> example of one of their cons was just this week.	C1, TF1
Metaphoric expression (UNKNOWN IS DARKNESS)	And as the British people decide whether to take it and remain in a reformed European Union, offering Britain the best of both worlds or to take <i>a leap into the unknown</i> , I want to <i>shine some light</i> on what a future outside the EU might look like for Britain.	C1, PH
Metaphoric expression (UNION IS BODY)	And for more than forty years, <i>Britain has been at the heart</i> of the European Union.	C1, HB1
Metaphoric expression	So let's go out there and <i>win this battle</i> for the future of a great Britain	C1, HB1

(REFERENDUM IS A BATTLE)		
Metaphoric expression (ECONOMIC RECESSION IS AN ILLNESS)	Every part of our country <i>suffered</i> .	C1, GO1
Metaphoric expression	The only thing that's irrational is the <i>picture the In campaign paints</i> of life as an independent nation.	C2, MG1
Simile	I sometimes think that the In campaign appears to be operating to a <i>script written by George R.R Martin and Stephen King - Brexit would mean a combination of a Feast for Crows and Misery</i> .	C2, MG1
Sarcasm	The truth is that the day after Britain voted to leave the European Union we would not fall off the edge of the world or find the English Channel replaced by a sulphurous ocean of burning pitch	C2, MG1
Metaphoric expression	In truth, if we vote to stay we are hostages to their agenda.	C2, MG1
Metaphoric expression	Indeed there's a lot of evidence the money sticks to bureaucratic fingers rather than going to the frontline.	C2, MG1
Simile	EU's internal borders <i>policy is like hanging a sign welcoming terrorists to Europe</i>	C2, MG2
Metaphor (OPPORTUNITY IS A DOOR)	And then thanks to the referendum given to this country by David Cameron we find that a door has magically opened in our lives. We can see the sunlit meadows beyond. I believe we would be mad not to take this once in a lifetime chance to walk through that door	C2, BJ2
Sarcasm	Exchequer has to go around personally asking other finance ministers to allow him to cut VAT on tampons.	C2, BJ2
Simile	Because negotiating on behalf of the EU is like trying to ride a vast pantomime horse, with 28 people blindly pulling in different directions.	C2, BJ2
Metaphoric	The <i>siren calls for 'more Europe'</i> have only increased.	C2, DD1

expression		
Metaphoric expression	In 1975 the EU was the bright future, a vision of a better world. Now it is a <i>crumbling relic from a gloomy past</i> .	C2, DD1
Personification	Within minutes of a vote for Brexit the CEO's of Mercedes, BMW, VW and Audi will be knocking down Chancellor Merkel's door demanding that there be no barriers to German access to the British market.	C2, DD1
Metaphoric expression	And in today's global economy it's not speed that kills but indecision.	C2, IDS1
Metaphoric expression	<i>This is not a scare story</i> , simply an extrapolation of how today's immigration figures will impact on our society in the years ahead if changes are not made to policy.	C2, LF1
Simile	In my view the countries that joined the euro created the economic equivalent of the San Andreas fault.	C2, CG1
Metaphoric expression	<i>This European pillar of social rights</i> should complement what we have already jointly achieved when it comes to the protection of workers in the EU.	C2, CG1
Synecdoche	It is vaguely worded, and <i>gives both the Commission and the European Court of Justice free rein</i> to expand their brief and take over competences from the member states.	C2, CG1
Metaphoric expression	Instead we will be subject to most of the integration that the <i>Eurozone is poised to embark upon</i> whether we like it or not.	C2, CG1
Metaphoric expression	Now that he has struck a deal, he's <i>predicting hellfire and brimstone</i> if Britain votes to leave.	C2, GS1
Sarcasm, metaphoric expression (PLAN IS A RECIPE)	Of course, while such an <i>approach is a recipe for failure</i> in a referendum, it may simultaneously be a <i>recipe for maximising support</i> for your party among the 20 per cent or so of voters whom you hope will hand you the <i>greatest partisan advantage</i> , and to <i>hell with the impact on our chances of actually leaving the EU</i> .	C2, NF1

Appendix 7 Adjective and Adverb Use in Corpus 1 and Corpus 2

Adjectives and adverbs were identified via CLAWS7 tagset below. The table lists the tags used, the keys to these tags, raw and relative frequencies in both corpora as well as examples from the speeches.

Table 7.1. Adjectives and adverbs in the corpora

Tag	Key	Raw Frequency C1	Relative Frequency C1 %	Examples	Raw Frequency C2	Relative Frequency C2 %	Examples
JJ	general adjective	1991	6.89%	great, confident, proud, dangerous	2106	7.98%	positive, negative, optimistic, pessimistic, tremendous, grotesque, patronizing
JJR	general comparative adjective	121	0.42%	closer, easier, stronger, better, poorer	103	0.39%	greater, cheaper, richer, better, fairer, deeper
JJT	general superlative adjective	77	0.27%	closest, biggest, best, fastest	46	0.17%	slowest, poorest, worst, biggest
RG	adverb of degree	120	0.42%	so clearly, far more effective	110	0.42%	very different, too powerless, very hard
RGR	comparative degree adverb	62	0.21%	more secure, more complex, less peaceful	53	0.20%	more expensive, less competitive, more centralized
RRR	comparative general adverb	62	0.21%	faster, safer, better, sooner	54	0.20%	brighter, better
RRT	superlative general adverb	11	0.04%	least, best, hardest, longest	5	0.02%	most

Appendix 8 Tagged Samples from the Corpora

1. Corpus 1- DC1

In_II 45_MC days_NNT2 time_NNT1 ,_, the_AT British_JJ people_NN will_VM go_VVI to_II polling_NN1 stations_NN2 across_II our_APPGE islands_NN2 and_CC cast_VV0 their_APPGE ballots_NN2 in_II the_AT way_NN1 we_PPIS2 have_VH0 done_VDN in_II this_DD1 country_NN1 for_IF generations_NN2 ._. They_PPHS2 will_VM ,_, as_RR21 usual_RR22 ,_, weigh_VV0 up_RP the_AT arguments_NN2 ,_, reflect_VV0 on_II them_PPHO2 quietly_RR ,_, discuss_VV0 them_PPHO2 with_IW friends_NN2 and_CC family_NN1 ,_, and_CC then_RT ,_, calmly_RR and_CC without_IW fuss_NN1 ,_, take_VV0 their_APPGE decision_NN1 ._. But_CCB this_DD1 time_NNT1 ,_, their_APPGE decision_NN1 will_VM not_XX be_VBI for_IF a_AT1 Parliament_NN1 ,_, or_CC even_RR two_MC ._. This_DD1 is_VBZ a_AT1 decision_NN1 that_CST is_VBZ bigger_JJR than_CSN any_DD individual_JJ politician_NN1 or_CC government_NN1 ._. It_PPH1 will_VM have_VHI real_JJ ,_, permanent_JJ and_CC direct_JJ consequences_NN2 for_IF this_DD1 country_NN1 and_CC every_AT1 person_NN1 living_VVG in_II it_PPH1

2. Corpus 2 – MG1

Those_DD2 of_IO us_PPIO2 who_PNQS want_VV0 to_TO Leave_VV0 believe_VV0 Britains_NN2 best_JJT days_NNT2 lie_VV0 ahead_RL ,_, that_CST our_APPGE country_NN1 has_VHZ tremendous_JJ untapped_JJ potential_NN1 which_DDQ independence_NN1 would_VM unleash_VVI and_CC our_APPGE institutions_NN2 ,_, values_NN2 and_CC people_NN would_VM make_VVI an_AT1 even_RR more_RGR positive_JJ difference_NN1 to_II the_AT world_NN1 if_CS were_VBDR unshackled_JJ from_II the_AT past_NN1 ._. It_PPH1 treats_VVZ people_NN like_II children_NN2 ,_, unfit_JJ to_TO be_VBI trusted_VVN and_CC easily_RR scared_JJ by_II ghost_NN1 stories_NN2 Indeed_RR ,_, if_CS you_PPY listen_VV0 to_II some_DD of_IO those_DD2 campaigning_VVG for_IF Britain_NP1 to_TO stay_VVI in_II the_AT European_JJ Union_NN1 ,_, you_PPY would_VM think_VVI that_DD1 for_IF Britain_NP1 to_TO leave_VVI would_VM be_VBI to_TO boldly_RR go_VVI where_CS no_AT man_NN1 has_VHZ gone_VVN before_RT ._. In_II fact_NN1 ,_, of_RR21 course_RR22 ,_, it_PPH1 would_VM be_VBI to_TO join_VVI the_AT overwhelming_JJ majority_NN1 of_IO countries_NN2 which_DDQ choose_VV0 to_TO govern_VVI themselves_PPX2 ._.

Dokumentārā lapa

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Ar savu parakstu apliecinu, ka pētījums veikts patstāvīgi, izmantoti tikai tajā norādītie informācijas avoti un iesniegtā darba elektroniskā kopija atbilst izdrukai.

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