

LATVIJAS UNIVERSITĀTE

BAKALaura DARBS

RĪGA 2020

UNIVERSITY OF LATVIA
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES
DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH STUDIES

**AUDIENCE INVOLVEMENT TECHNIQUES IN
REITH LECTURES**

**AUDITORIJAS IESAISTES PAŅĒMIENI RĪSA
LEKCIJĀS**

BACHELOR THESIS

Herta Holste
Matriculation card No. hh14003

Adviser: lect. Rasma Mozere

RĪGA 2020

Anotācija

Šī pētījuma mērķis bija analizēt izvēlētas lekcijas, kas tika pārraidītas BBC Radio kā daļa no Rīsa lekciju projekta, un noteikt auditorijas iesaistes paņēmienus šajās lekcijās.

Šis darbs sastāv no piecām nodaļām. Pirmajā nodaļā tiek aprakstītas Rīsa lekcijas un to izcelsme. Otrajā nodaļā tiek aprakstītas lekcijas un to struktūra, kā arī apskatīta komunikācija un tās saistība ar auditorijas iesaisti. Trešajā nodaļā tiek apskatīti retoriskie līdzekļi un ceturtajā nodaļā tiek paskaidrota stāstu iesaistes nozīme lekcijās. Piektajā nodaļā tiek analizētas izvēlētas lekcijas un sniegti secinājumi.

Šī pētījuma rezultāti rāda, ka izvēlētajās Rīsa lekcijās tiek izmantoti dažādi auditorijas iesaistes paņēmieni, kas palīdz iesaistīt auditoriju lekcijā, jo tie piesaista klausītāja uzmanību un klausītāja prātu sniegtās informācijas uztverē un saprašanā.

Atslēgvārdi: Rīsa lekcijas, auditorijas iesaiste, lekcijas, retoriskie līdzekļi, stāsti, lekciju uzbūve

Abstract

The aim of the present research is to analyse a selection of lectures that have been presented on the BBC Radio as part of the Reith lecture project and establish the techniques used by the lecturers to involve their audience in the lecture.

The thesis consists of five chapters: the first chapter provides information on what Reith lectures are. The second chapter offers insight into lectures and their structure, as well as communication and involvement. The third chapter covers rhetorical devices and the fourth chapter explains the function of telling stories in lectures. The sixth chapter covers the analysis of the selected lectures and results.

The results of the research show that there are several audience involvement techniques that are used in the selected Reith lectures. All of the techniques have provided aid for the involvement of the audience as they attract the listener's attention and engage them and their minds in engaging with the communicated message.

Key words: Reith lectures, audience involvement, lectures, rhetorical devices, storytelling, lecture structure

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
1. The Reith Lectures	3
2. Lectures.....	4
2.1. Rhetoric.....	4
2.2. Lectures and lecture discourse	5
2.3. Communication and involvement	11
3. Rhetorical devices	14
3.1. Metaphors and similes	14
3.2. Allusions and references	15
4. Telling stories in lectures	18
4.1. History of storytelling in education	19
4.2. Narration in Context	20
5. Lecture Analysis	22
5.1. Research methodology.....	22
5.2. Structuring lectures	23
5.3. Question and answer sequences.....	25
5.4. Discourse markers.....	28
5.5. Metaphors and similes	29
5.6. Storytelling.....	33
5.7. Allusions and references	36
5.8. Results of the analysis.....	39
Conclusion	41
Thesis	43
References.....	44
APPENDIX 1: Marina Warner’s Lecture Transcripts	49
APPENDIX 2: Jean Aitchison’s Lecture Transcripts	92
APPENDIX 3: Anthony Giddens’ Lecture Transcripts.....	125

Introduction

The topic of this research paper is audience involvement techniques in Reith lectures. Lectures have been an integral part of academia and learning since ancient times. From the times for Aristotle and Plato up to today, lectures are the main conduit of transferring information between a lecturer and a student or listener. A university, college and even secondary school could not be imagined without lectures as they are among the main tools used for teaching. Because lectures are so prevalent and widely used, it is in the speaker's best interest to involve the listener in them. Studies have shown that by the use of several tools and techniques, lecturers can captivate their audience, directly or indirectly involving them in the lecture, which results in higher information retention rates.

As the topic reveals, the focus of this paper is audience involvement techniques in lectures. Previous research has been done on the topic of lectures and their structure. However, there have not been many research papers published that specifically look at audience involvement techniques in public lectures, most have been centred around academic lectures conducted in a classroom. Furthermore, when speaking about audience involvement, most research papers focus on reader involvement in either literary works or academic papers. It could be said that the concern has been more with engaging audiences through text rather than speech.

The **goal** of this research is to analyse a selection of lectures that have been presented on the BBC Radio as part of the Reith lecture project and find the techniques used by the lecturers to involve their audience in the lecture.

The **research questions** for this paper is:

- What audience involvement techniques are used in the selected lectures?
- What is the intended effect of the identified techniques?

The **enabling objectives** to reach the aim of the research:

1. to read and examine relevant theoretical literature on lectures, communication and involvement strategies, rhetorical devices: Bamford (2000), Young (1991, 1994), Long (1980), Walsh and Camiciottoli (2001), Flowerdew and Miller (1997), Cots (2003), (Sanchez, 2017), Abrahamson (2011), Sword (2012);
2. to read the transcripts and listen to audio recordings of the selected lectures;
3. to closely examine each lecture and identify techniques used to involve the audience;
4. to extract examples pertaining to audience involvement techniques;

5. to analyse and group the findings;
6. to draw relevant conclusions.

The following **research methods** will be employed: the examination of relevant theoretical literature on rhetoric, lectures and lecture structure, communication and involvement, tools of audience involvement such as metaphors, similes, storytelling, allusions and referencing. Furthermore, the research will involve discourse analysis of the selected lecture transcripts of audio recordings of the lectures, outlining of audience involvement techniques used in the lectures and the extraction of examples.

The paper consists of five chapters: the first chapter provides information on what Reith lectures are. The second chapter offers insight into lectures and their structure, as well as communication and involvement. The third chapter covers rhetorical devices and the fourth chapter – explains the function of telling stories in lectures. The sixth chapter covers the analysis of the selected lectures and results for overall conclusions.

To start with, there is a need to outline what exactly are Reith lectures. Thus, the first chapter will look at them, the history and motivation behind the lecture series, their significance and some notable speakers.

1. The Reith Lectures

The Reith Lectures were started in 1948 by the BBC corporation's first Director-General Sir John (later Lord) Reith to mark his historic contribution made to public service broadcasting.

John Reith stood by the opinion that broadcasting should be a public service available to anyone to enrich the intellectual and cultural life of the nation. Keeping to that spirit, each year the BBC invites a prominent public figure to deliver a series of lectures on BBC Radio Channel 4. The main aim of these lectures is to get the public more involved and informed about contemporary issues (Online 1).

The first BBC Reith Lecture speaker was the philosopher, Bertrand Russell who spoke on "Authority and the Individual". The first female speaker was Dame Margery Perham who in 1961 spoke on the impact of colonialism in her series of lectures titled "The Colonial Reckoning". The youngest Reith speaker was Colin Blakemore, who was 32 years old in 1976 when his six lectures on the brain and consciousness, "Mechanics of the Mind", were broadcast (Online 1).

Other notable speakers throughout the years have been the Chief Rabbi, Dr Jonathan Sacks (The Persistence of Faith, 1990), Aung San Suu Kyi and Eliza Manningham-Buller (Securing Freedom, 2011), Niall Ferguson (The Rule of Law and Its Enemies, 2012), Stephen Hawking (Black Holes, 2016) and Hilary Mantel (Resurrection: The Art and Craft, 2017) (Online 1).

The most recent speaker of the Reith Lectures was Jonathan Sumption, Lord Sumption, a British judge and historian (Online 4). He served as a Justice of the Supreme Court from 2012 to 2018 and has written several medieval history books (Online 3). Four of the books were dedicated to the Hundred Year War of which the third, *Divided Houses*, won the Wolfson History Prize in 2009 (Online 3). Lord Sumption in his 5-lecture series spoke about law, politics and democracy.

To analyse the techniques that are used in lectures to involve the audience it is necessary to first look at lectures in general and how they are used as a learning tool. The following chapter will look at lectures, their characteristics, structure and tactics for involving listeners.

2. Lectures

A lecture, according to *The Cambridge Dictionary* is “a formal talk on a serious subject given to a group of people, especially students” (Online 2). In the following chapter, rhetoric and lectures will be looked at as well as the structuring of lectures.

2.1. Rhetoric

Corbett (1990) in his “Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student”, offers the following definition of traditional rhetoric:

From its beginnings and throughout its history, classical rhetoric was thought of as the art of persuasive speech. Its end was to convince or persuade an audience to think in a certain way or to act in a certain way. (1990: 32)

From this it can be gathered that, according to traditional theory, all organized or prepared uses of language were either persuasive (rhetoric) or aesthetic (poetic) (Long, 1980). Following that, traditional rhetoric set out to present a systematic study of a pragmatic approach to persuasion by dividing it into five steps - invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. Long (1980) notes that this is an attempt to categorize the psychological and physiological processes the speaker should follow so that they could present their topic effectively.

Long (1980: 222) goes on to explain that each category was further divided several times, for example, arrangement was divided into introduction, narration, division, proof, refutation, and peroration, with the idea of breaking down a complex structure into more digestible steps that could be reassembled into a coherent and working whole. Furthermore, all the alternatives that appear at any point had to be recognized as part of an interrelated whole so that any choices that are made would not be done in a vacuum (Long, 1980: 222). Should this be used appropriately and understood completely, the orator has an always-present guideline to follow in order to make their persuasion as effective as possible.

Long claims that the overview of rhetoric principles clearly indicates that there is an underlying assumption between the speaker and listener. That is - the classical orator was addressing an audience similar to them - educated and with access to factual information, but with a viewpoint in opposition to that of the orator. Any tension between the orator and the audience on their views or beliefs could be resolved with a proper use of rhetoric. In this dynamic the speaker has the intent of persuasion while the audience’s stance is to resist persuasion (Long, 1980: 222). That persuasion is possible in such a dynamic implies the audience’s basic goodwill and susceptibility to the speaker’s logic. It also implies that a

deeper understanding of the audience is a factor. If the orator has knowledge about the opposition's predisposition, strengths and weaknesses, it is more likely that persuasion attempts will be more successful (Long, 1980: 222).

2.2. Lectures and lecture discourse

Goffman (1981) has pointed out that there is more to a lecture than its contents. He was the first to attempt to outline how the lecturer mediates between the subject matter and the audience to produce a positive learning experience.

There have been attempts to identify discipline-related differences in the rhetorical structure of lectures (Olsen, Huckin 1990; Dudley-Evans 1994), but the majority of studies have focused on the means used by lecturers to involve listeners and/or guide them to understanding: these include discourse markers (Chaudron, Richards 1986; Flowerdew, Tauroza 1995); questions (Thompson 1997; Bamford 2000); asides (Strodt-Lopez 1991).

Possibly the most comprehensive attempt to characterize lecture discourse is Lynn Young's phasal analysis approach (1991, 1994), which takes a look at both macro-structure and micro-features. Her approach is to look at a lecture as interweaving phases rather than an inseparable whole. One of these is the content phase which contains the information and ideas transmitted. Other phases that Young (1991, 1994) has identified are metadiscursive and their purpose is to transmit the information successfully. The speaker's purpose determines the linguistic choices realising ideational, interpersonal and textual meanings in the reoccurring phases. Young describes the metadiscursive phases as discourse structuring, conclusion and evaluation. In layman's terms, in the first phase the speaker outlines what is about to happen and the direction of the lecture. In the second they recap their message and highlights the key parts. In the third the speaker evaluates the content presented which provides the listener with their interpretation. Weaver (1981) corroborates the phases that Young outlined as a strategy to gain the audience's attention. He suggests that a speaker should let listeners know where the lecture will be going, what will be done with the lecture time and how it will relate to the audience. This can be done by giving some "initial partition", in other words, a brief review of major points or ideas to be covered in the lecture (Weaver, 1981).

The phases outlined serve a dual function - one is to overtly signal the steps taken, the other is to involve the listener in the intellectual processes that are being described in the lecture. Young stresses that speakers can include their audience in their lecture by making certain linguistic choices. For example, the speaker can involve their listeners in the discourse structuring phase by using questions, using subjunctive mood denoting wish, opinion or

emotion, or the use of inclusive pronouns. One more strategy of audience involvement that Young outlines is reference to the world outside the lecture hall, specifically with the use of examples and metaphors. In addition, asides and jokes can also be used with the same function.

There is another minor phase that Young (1991, 1994) outlines - interaction, in which the speaker's purpose is to maintain contact with the audience. It involves two main activities, the first one being questions asked by the speaker or, more frequently, using tag questions such as "right?" and "okay?" to make sure the listeners are following the lecture, the second being direct questions that require the listeners to answer. The direct questions can be related to the content of the lecture or to the lecture environment (lighting, equipment, etc.). The direct questions can also come from the listeners, but Young points out that they are mostly related to the lecture environment. In this category Young also adds statements the speaker makes regarding their own performance.

The main features of the phasal analysis model as described above are summarized in Figure 1.

Figure 1. The phasal analysis model

MACRO-STRUCTURE	MICRO-FEATURES
Phases	Metafunctional levels
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Content: lecturer relates information pertaining to lecture topic • Discourse structuring: lecturer indicates the direction that will be taken or what is about to be done • Conclusion: lecturer refers back to and summarizes main points • Evaluation: lecturer critically comments on information indicating how students should evaluate it • Interaction: lecturer interacts directly with the audience 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ideational: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - participants - relational processes • Interpersonal: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - mood - modality - attitudinals • Textual: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - links - repetition - references

Young believes that phasal analysis reveals a common pattern for lectures across a variety of disciplines, with only slight variations. However, Walsh and Camiciottoli (2001) point out that the lectures Young analysed were performed by university staff as part of regular courses. The lectures were given by the same speaker to the same audience, and the speakers were experienced lecturers that have performed the same lectures to students for several years.

Walsh and Camiciottoli (2001) expanded on Young's research by including additional corpora to their study to test Young's theory of a lecture consisting of interweaving phases. They found that the lectures they analysed have of the interactional features that Young outlined, but that they have a more significant role in a lecture than serving to "maintain contact with the audience [...] as a form of phatic communion" (Young 1990: 114). To categorize the interactions, Walsh and Camiciottoli (2001) adopted Flowerdew and Miller's (1997) term "interpersonal strategies". They were able to identify six major interpersonal strategies, the most relevant being:

- Making the lecture content relatable to the audience

In the study performed by Walsh and Camiciottoli (2001) they observed that the speaker "draws comparisons between the country dealt with in the lecture and the countries of the students" (2001; 177), not only to the speaker's country of origin, but the nationalities of listeners present in the audience.

- Making the lecture non-threatening

By being aware of the difficulty level of the lecture topic, speakers can take measures to reassure listeners that they will present the lecture in as comprehensive of manner as possible. Flowerdew and Miller (1997) observed that through the use of rhetorical questions and of the personal pronoun "we", the speaker can create an impression of the lecture being a joint effort of the speaker and the listeners.

- Putting the lecture in a "here and now" context

Walsh and Camiciottoli (2001) noted in their study that lecturers at times interacted with the listeners by addressing something outside the lecture topic, most commonly in reference to "states of mind" (e.g. mental fatigue, the need for a pause, etc.), or an external distraction. Goffman (1981) points out that in choosing to address the distraction the lecturer relates to the listeners and creates a kind of shared experience with them.

- Self-referencing and asides to create an informal atmosphere

Flowerdew and Miller (1997) and Strodt-Lopez (1991) have observed that lecturers on occasion side-track from the lecture content with self-references and asides, achieving a more

informal atmosphere, thus encouraging the listeners to interact. This also serves the purpose of reminding the listeners that the speaker has a personality. Flowerdew and Miller (1997) add that personalisation is a common interpersonal strategy used by lecturers to portray their personality to the listeners, wherein, by making self-references, the lecturer establishes a common ground with the listeners but also point out differences.

- Establishing a shared background

In the case of foreign lecturers, Walsh and Camiciottoli (2001) have noted that they will point out cultural similarities that the listeners can relate to.

Turning to Flowerdew and Miller's (1997) research, some spoken language features can be identified that lecturers tend to use:

- False Starts, Redundancies and Repetitions

Flowerdew and Miller (1997) note that the occurrence of many false starts, redundancies and repetitions is an important feature of authentic lectures. According to them, that is typical of authentic lectures presented in an informal or "conversational" (Dudley-Evans and Johns, 1981) manner and "can be attributed to the real time-processing constraints of presenting a spoken monologue" (Flowerdew and Miller, 1997). Flowerdew and Miller (1997) continued, saying that this is due to the speaker not having organised their thoughts, but, at the same time, presenting their lecture in complete grammatical sentences. This gives the speaker time to process what they want to say and the listeners time to comprehend.

Goffman (1981) in his research has identified three types of lecturing style - "memorisation", "aloud reading" and "fresh talk". Dudley Evans (1994) similarly distinguishes three types of lectures: "reading style" where the speaker reads or speaks as if reading from notes, "conversational style" where the speaker presents the lecture in an informal way without the use of notes, and "rhetorical style" where the speaker presents himself to the audience as a performer, using a wide range of intonations and making digressions that are indicated by a shift in key or tempo.

Bamford (2001: 124) notes that even though it has been observed that there are differences between spontaneous conversations and lectures, there are still significant similarities between the two, the most recent being the increasingly informal, conversational style of lectures. She claims that one of the main problems of research done on lectures is that lecturers and the audience are viewed as two non-interacting participants. Since language is a social activity, she continues, and involves the monitoring of speech production and the speech produced, giving grounds for research into the organisation in terms of speaker and listener interaction.

Bamford (2001: 124) claims that a typical lecture consists of one speaker and a group of co-participants that only listen, on some occasions they ask questions, murmur in approval or disapproval, or provide laughter. However, the listeners are co-present, and the lecturer has to take them into account. One of the main goals of lectures, as Bamford's research has uncovered, is to engage new generations or interested parties into the discourse community. This is done by familiarising the listeners with the concepts, information and practices of the community. It introduces the special lexis, typical grammatical structures and collocational patterns to the listeners, and gets access to the speaker and their ideas. According to Bamford (2001: 126), one of the ways she has found which enhance the interactive nature of lectures is the lecturer asking questions which they answer themselves.

A question/answer sequence has been previously analysed both in spontaneous conversations and institutional interactions, both implying the involvement of at least two participants. Bamford (2001: 127), however, notes that question/answer sequences in lectures have the characteristic of one participant performing both the questioning and the answering role. In such instances, they are performing the speaker/lecturer role as well as the listener role. During her research, Bamford observed that the simplest explanation to why rhetorical strategies are so frequent in lectures is that they serve to focus the attention of the listener on the answer. Bamford claims that this is a very effective way of focalising attention and give the impression to the listener that the question/answer sequence was taking place in a more interactive setting, involving the audience more into a lecture.

According to Quirk et al (1985), questions can be described syntactically as interrogatives, which can be marked in one of two ways - yes/no interrogatives or wh-interrogatives where the wh- element is positioned at the beginning of the utterance. However, Bamford (2001: 128) states that questions in oral discourse can be difficult to define as they do not always fit within this definition and go beyond the boundaries of syntactics, semantics and pragmatics. Quite often what constitutes a question depends on contextual factors, for example, an utterance that is structured as a statement can be used pragmatically as questions and listeners would perceive it as such. While questions are usually considered as a call for information, they can have the force of offers, suggestions, requests, confirmation or used as rhetorical questions. In lectures, questions are mainly used as a call for information by the speaker, but the answer is routinely provided by the speaker as well, not the listeners (Bamford, 2001: 128-129). Quirk et al have defined rhetorical questions as “interrogative in structure, but has the force of a strong assertion. It generally does not expect an answer” (Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech and Svartvik 1985: 825). Bamford considered these utterances to

belong to rhetorical questions, taking the form of set phrases and pre-patterned utterances. She says that these are utterances that normally would not require an answer but in lectures, they would have the potential to focus on the answer.

Bamford (2001: 129) states that in oral discourse, questions are an integral part of interaction, and what the speaker says depends on what they think their audience does not know and wants to know. According to her, the production of a question as well as the answer by one speaker is a “phenomenon” found in different types of discourse. The insertion of a question serves the purpose of providing an information focus as well as to “liven and dramatise a narrative” by inserting a query which the speaker thinks is on the listeners mind or thinks it should be (Bamford, 2001:129).

While the focus of this research is on lectures and how to involve audiences in them, it is beneficial to look at what makes research papers engaging for readers. In most cases, it should be safe to say that lectures have their basis in research papers, that lectures are presentations of the findings and the work done. Therefore, if the base research paper has been written so that it engages readers, then the lecture that is based on it will as well. Furthermore, there is a significant overlap of characteristics of what makes an academic paper engaging for the reader and that which involves listeners in lectures.

Helen Sword (2012) has done extensive research on academic writing and techniques used to make them interesting for readers. Sword noted that scholars achieve such abstract ends “as engagement, pleasure, and elegance not through mystical displays of brilliance and eloquence [...] but by deploying some very concrete, specific, and transferable techniques” (2012:7).

The following are the techniques Sword has compiled that are used to achieve the aforementioned ends:

- (1) interesting, eye-catching titles and subtitles;
- (2) **first-person anecdotes or asides that humanize the author and give the text an individual flavour;**
- (3) **catchy opening paragraphs that recount an interesting story, ask a challenging question, dissect a problem, or otherwise hook and hold the reader;**
- (4) concrete nouns (as opposed to nominalized abstractions such as “nominalization” or “abstraction”) and active, energetic verbs (as opposed to forms of be and bland standbys such as make, find, or show);
- (5) **numerous examples, especially when explaining abstract concepts;**

- (6) visual illustrations beyond the usual Excel-generated pie charts and bar graphs (for example, photographs, manuscript facsimiles, drawings, diagrams, and reproductions);
- (7) references to a broad range of academic, literary, and historical sources indicative of wide reading and collegial conversations both within and outside their own fields;
- (8) **humour, whether explicit or understated** (2012: 8).

From the listed techniques, the second, third, fourth, fifth and eighth points can also be applied to lectures.

2.3. Communication and involvement

Bialystok (1990) characterised “communication strategies” by three main features they present: effective (related to solutions and are productive in solving a problem), systematic (they are not selected at random by the learner but according to the type of problem that needs to be resolved) and finite (there are a limited number of strategies that can be identified) (Cots, 2003: 11).

Gumperz (1982) and Brown and Levinson (1987) refer to the concept of strategy as the speaker's and listener's systematic use of linguistic and general socio-cultural knowledge to achieve their aim when producing or interpreting a message in a given context (Cots, 2003: 11). They noted that a strategy can only be successful if the participants in the interaction if they share some “linguistic experience” which either of the participants can rely on to make the intended projection of meaning (speaker) or to successfully interpret the speaker's intent (listener).

Another concept that Gumperz (1982) has asserted as fundamental for all linguistic understanding is conversational involvement, saying that he believes:

"[...] that understanding presupposes conversational involvement. A general theory of discourse strategies must therefore begin by specifying the linguistic and socio-cultural knowledge that needs to be shared if conversational involvement is to be maintained, and then go on to deal with what it is about the nature of conversational inference that makes for cultural, subcultural and situational specificity of interpretation" (Gumperz, 1982: 2-3).

Cots (2003) notes that involvement is achieved when the speaker, by using certain "contextualisation cues," appeals to the listener to cooperate in the task of sense-making by forcing them to make certain inferences based on the speaker's linguistic choices, which "function relationally and cannot be assigned context-independent, stable, core lexical

meanings" (Gumperz, 1992: 232). Contextualisation cues may involve choices at different levels: code, dialect, style, formulaic expressions, conversational openings, closings and sequencing strategies, syntactic structures, lexical strings and prosodic elements.

Tannen has defined involvement as “an internal, even emotional connection individuals feel which binds them to other people as well as to places, things, activities, ideas, memories, and words” (1989: 12). Tannen notes that involvement is an integral part of coherence in discourse, and the perception of coherence is fundamental to achieving a sense of being-in-the-world.

Cots (2003) has based his understanding of involvement on the previously mentioned notions. He has concluded that involvement is twofold. On one hand it is the result of a conscious effort of the speaker to show the listener coherence in discourse by employing a series of “clues involving contextualisation-based, on-line, discourse-level inferencing” (Cots, 2003: 12). On the other hand, it is an attempt to create a representation of the world which can “penetrate the world of the listener” and bring them to a “communicative communion” with the speaker (Cots, 2003: 12). This falls in line with the definition of the function of involvement strategies that Georgakopoulou and Goutsos:

“[...] bringing the discourse alive by creating a sense of concreteness, particularity and familiarity. The speakers communicate their meanings and emotions through the power of evoking specific senses. In this way, they send a message of rapport and intimacy to the audience inviting their involvement with them and with the events that are so vividly recreated” (1997: 136).

The concept of involvement is also used by Chafe (1982) by proposing a distinction between *involvement* and *detachment* as a way to classify discourse types and styles. Similarly, Biber (1988) made a distinction between *involved* and *informational* production. Both Chafe and Biber have put forward a set of features that can be associated with involved discourse, which Cots (2003) has summarized in the following:

- Tendency towards concreteness by introducing details and imagery
- First- and second- person pronouns accompanied by subjective verbs such as think and feel
- Emphasis on actions and participants rather than states
- Direct speech
- Hedges and emphasizees
- Fragmentation and syntactic reduction
- Present tense (Cots, 2003: 12)

Labov (1972) and Polanyi (1985) have also suggested similar features in their research of oral stories and have used the concept of evaluative devices to refer to the devices that are not specifically concerned in reporting events that transpired but rather with getting across the narrator's feelings and attitude towards the transpired events narrated. Labov described evaluative devices as: "say[ing] to us that this was terrifying, dangerous, weird, wild, crazy or amusing, hilarious, wonderful, more generally that it was strange, uncommon, or unusual, that is worth reporting" (1972: 371). Labov further distinguishes between internal and external evaluation, depending on whether the evaluation breaks the flow of the story by means of commentary or not. He outlines four kinds of devices for internal evaluation

- Intensifiers - gestures, expressive phonology, repetition, ritual interjection, exaggerating quantifiers;
- Comparators - marked verbal phrases such as questions, negatives, futures, commands, modals, comparatives;
- Correlatives - complex syntactic constructions that bring events together in an independent clause;
- Explicatives - appended subordinate clause introduced by *while*, *although*, *since*, *because* (Labov, 1972).

Tannen (1989: 17) attempted to summarise involvement strategies that appear in conversation studies by dividing them into strategies that mainly work on sound and those that mainly work on meaning. In the group of strategies that works on sound she includes rhythm, patterns based on "repetition of phonemes, morphemes, words, collocations of words and longer sequences of discourse" (Cots, 2003: 13), and style figures of speech. Regarding strategies that mainly work on meaning and engaging the audience in sense-making, Tannen (1989) point out indirectness, ellipsis, tropes, dialogue, imagery and detail, and narrative.

To sum up, lectures and speeches have been part of academia for a very long time. There have been many attempts to identify differences in the rhetorical structure of lectures and the majority of studies have focused on the means used by lecturers to involve listeners and/or guide them to a more effective understanding. Several techniques have been identified that can be used to guide lectures and engage the listener's attention.

3. Rhetorical devices

Rhetorical devices are among of the most effective involvement strategies in various fields of communication (McGuire, 2000; Tom and Eves, 1999).

3.1. Metaphors and similes

One of these rhetorical devices is metaphor that can be described as artful deviation from an expected idea that rely on “cross-domain comparison” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 46). As a figure of speech, metaphors make a comparison between two objects or concepts that are unrelated, but at the same time share some common characteristics. Sopory and Dillard explain that a metaphor is an implied comparison between two different objects that allows aspects of one object to be transferred to a different object (Sopory and Dillard, 2002). Because of this characteristic, metaphors can enhance the persuasive power of communication (Tom and Eves 1999).

It is suggested by Jeong (2008) that metaphors promote message processing by means of the inferences or meanings they elicit in the minds of audiences. He goes on to say that these inferences can be considered as cognitive and affective elaborations, evoking content-related thoughts and feelings by means of metaphor (Jeong, 2008).

Hitchon (1997) states that in processing a metaphorical message, audiences attempt to find a relationship between two different objects in order to maximize their comprehension of what a communicated message means. Literal messages in communication can be very factual and direct so the audience does not need to examine the message in-depth or deliberately contemplate it to understand the message. But by using a metaphor in communicating a message requires the audience to focus on it deliberately in order to understand what is being communicated (Kim, Baek, and Choi, 2012: 78).

There have been previous studies conducted that have shown that rhetorical devices elicit greater cognitive responses from an audience than nonfigurative messages (McQuarrie and Mick 1999; Mothersbaugh, Huhmann, and Franke, 2002; Nelson and Hitchon, 1999). According to McQuarrie and Mick, elaboration refers to “the extent to which a reader engages a text, or the amount of interpretation occasioned by a text or the number of inferences drawn” (1999: 39). Kim, Baek, and Choi believe that due to the structure of a metaphorical message, which is essence is artful deviation from the norm, cognitive elaboration is stimulated when processing a metaphor (2012: 78). To put it in other words, audiences are likely to devote more attention and thought in order to process and comprehend the

implications of a metaphorical message (Mick, 1992). Thus, it can be argued that the more complex a metaphor is, the more cognitive effort is likely to be required from an audience to understand it.

While the use of metaphors can deepen the content-related thoughts, scholars have also suggested that affective elaborations reflecting content-related feelings can increase the persuasive effect of a message (Batra and Ray, 1986; Rosselli, Skelly, and Mackie, 1995). According to DeRosia (2007), pleasure usually is the anticipated emotional response from rhetorical devices. Thus, it can be said that metaphors not only arouse cognitive processes, but also provoke affective responses (Sopory, 2005; Toncar and Munch, 2001).

The same can be attributed to similes. Simile is a kind of figurative meaning comparing two things that are basically not the same. They express a direct comparison between two or more things, which have at least one feature in common and can be recognized using the words 'like' and 'as'.

Frost (2006) has described similes as a figure of speech by which a comparison is expressed by the use of a word or a phrase such as: like, as, than, seems or as if.

For example:

- Busy as a bee
- We ran as if to meet the star

3.2. Allusions and references

An allusion is either a direct or "indirect reference to a person, event, statement, or theme found in literature, the other arts, history, mythology, religion, or popular culture" (Murfin and Ray, 1997). Allusions, in their most basic function, can serve to pay homage to another work of literature, or they can build upon it by mocking, imitating or developing a concept of another work. They can allude to a work of literature from any period, be it contemporary or ancient.

On occasion allusions are used for the simple task of showing off one's education while other times they are used, for example, for humour or criticism. However, these are general distinctions and simplifies functions that do not fully uncover the purpose of allusions. They also can have a significant cultural purpose, building connections between people and works of literature, as well as a space, or culture, in which the works and people can position themselves in (Sanchez, 2017: 4).

Broadly speaking, one of three things happens when a reference is made:

- 1) the original context is lost and treated as irrelevant,
- 2) the original context is purposely changed or misinterpreted,

3) the original context is kept and bleeds into the new work (Sanchez, 2017: 5).

The main point is that a work of literature alone is not whole and that it exists and functions within an open system, allusions allow to go above and beyond individual works, tying them to broad network of culture and the audience (Sanchez, 2017: 8).

Allusions help place the work and audience in a particular place within the open system—essentially a system in which cultural media is stored—helping the creator tell the audience exactly what to expect. The allusion itself is actually a dialogue between reader and author; the reader therefore is also a point in the system of allusion, not just the work with the allusion and the work from which it was borrowed. (ibid.)

Everything can be viewed as an allusion. This assumption applies to a range of subjects in literature, spanning from direct quotes and adaptations to ubiquitous nouns, like blood. (Is it a reference to medicine? Jesus? Hamlet? South Park? Nothing?) Everything is a reference, whether intended or not, because everything that the writer has read or experienced previously works together and builds on itself to create this new product. There are even references that may mean something to the reader, from his or her own experience, that mean nothing to the writer. (ibid.)

Joseph Pucci, in contrast, describes allusions as only hypothetical until the reader activates them. Even though they have been in a text from the beginning, they exist only for some readers (Sanchez, 2017: 8-9). Because of this, allusions have to be carefully selected to be in line with the audience's knowledge. Sanchez believes that that is why allusions usually involve significant works that the majority of people know or have cultural relevance (2017: 9)

In *The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy*, it is described that allusions typically concern “a body of information that the author presumes the reader will know.” (Hirsch et al., 1988).

While on the topic of allusions, it is beneficial to look at references made to popular culture and recent events. Popular culture or pop culture is a fundamental part of life in today's society. No matter where we go or what we do, we are exposed to pop culture in some way, consciously or unconsciously. Clapton (2015) notes that the advancement of technology and communication networks, especially the Internet, has allowed pop culture to integrate into our daily lives at a rapid rate. According to Webber (2005: 389), “we live in a world of fantasy, exposed to a massive array of both interactive (video games) and passive (movies, TV) fictional entertainment” (quoted from Clapton, 2015). Though, it is worth mentioning that this is not a new claim and, according to Clapton (2015), has been recognized across many fields (for example, see Grayson, Davies and Philpott 2009; Ruane and James 2012). There are more and more studies being carried out that research the benefits of employing popular culture into classrooms, for which Ruane and James (2012: 8) have made viable case for. They and others (Tierney, 2007; Dougherty, 2002) have claimed that using pop culture as

a teaching tool can positively impact student interest and involvement in a course and the content that is being communicated to them.

In summary, it can be said that allusions and references to literary works, popular culture or other media are a valuable tool in lectures as they catch the attention of listeners. This is especially true if the thing alluded to or referenced is well-known, be it a famous novel or a fantasy video game, as these spark recognition in the listener's mind and, consequently, attract their attention, involving them more in the lecture that is being presented.

4. Telling stories in lectures

It can be said that telling a story during a lecture is what keeps an audience engaged. It creates a connection between the speaker and listener, allowing the listener to connect with what is being said on an emotional level, not only thought. Biber (1967) has stated that, in an academic setting, interaction between an instructor and student is the interconnected spheres of both emotion and thought, and in this process the instructor reflects a sense of oneself, student and the content in as integrated fashion (Abrahamson, 2011). In a classroom or lecture hall there is a constant sensory activity happening and new information is assimilated into one's past experiences by creating a reflective and reflexive response due to assimilation drawing on one's memory and produces emotion (Gold, 2002).

Abrahamson (2011) and Langer (1997) believe that storytelling is an integral technique of the learning and understanding process, regardless if it occurs in or out of a classroom. Using this technique allows people to gain a better understanding of one another as concrete examples are used rather than abstract generalizations that a listener cannot relate to their own experiences since, according to Maguire (1998), the sharing of experiences through storytelling allows individuals to create understanding between one another.

Abrahamson (2011) has done an extensive study on the impact storytelling in lectures have on learning and engagement, primarily based on his personal experiences as a lecturer. He has described several approaches to telling stories, one of them being relating in story form different professional or non-professional readings the speaker has been exposed to. Abrahamson (2011) also notes that it can be helpful to read published stories to listeners are connected to a specific topic in a particular course.

He stresses that there are countless opportunities to liven up course content by using human stories. Abrahamson (2011) gives several examples of how this can be done – inviting specialists from different fields to give presentations or employing technology and showing short clips of individuals telling their stories that pertains to the topic of the lecture or course, or using textbooks that include discs that have information in story format that has the purpose of emphasizing important concepts.

Of course, these are not the only ways storytelling can be incorporated into a lecture. The most basic approach is for the speaker to utilize storytelling in their lecture themselves. According to Abrahamson (2011), a story told during a lecture provides a context for listeners to better understand others by giving them a key to their own personal experiences. This allows a listener to relate to the speaker's point of view in a meaningful way by going through

personal experiences which results in a lasting and profound understanding that cannot be achieved by using generalizations (Rorty, 1991). This way, the speaker and listener come together on cognitive and emotional levels that permit listeners to relate to the speaker through their own personal experiences and grasp the presented information at the same time (Abrahamson, 2011). According to Abrahamson (2011) “This engagement represents a remarkable, and yet common, interpersonal experience”.

Abrahamson (2011) even relates a personal experience where a story told during a lecture had stuck with a student for about ten years. It was not just the story that the student remembered, but also the concept behind it and what it was meant to explain.

This encounter affected Abrahamson deeply and helped reinforce the conviction that storytelling has power and that it is a great technique for speakers to attach emotional meaning to a contextual concept that allows it to be transferred to a listener’s long-term memory (Abrahamson, 2011). Peck (1989) claims that an important value of storytelling “from a cognitive perspective is that it becomes a mutual creation involving interaction and understanding between instructor and student”.

So, a story can create a mutual bond between the speaker and listener, enabling listeners to personally identify with it and the speaker if the story is based on a real-life experience.

4.1. History of storytelling in education

Before the invention of writing systems, storytelling was the primary way for individuals to preserve, share and pass on their heritage. According to Kirkwood and Gold (1983), storytelling can be found in all learning institutions and is the foundation of teaching and the profession as a whole. Starting from ancient times, from Homer and Plato, through Jesus, Li Po, and Gandhi, stories, parables, myths have been used to instruct and guide the thinking of people (Zabel, 1991). Land and Hannafin (1996) agree that teaching and learning has had its basis in narrative (storytelling) to communicate ideas and culture. Oral stories are the basis of a culture that are used to shape minds, “providing each listener with a concept of self, of knowledge, of relationship to community, and of individual motivation” (Fried, 1995). Abrahamson (2011) adds that that at the heart of human imagination and needs are stories.

According to Fisher (1985, 1987), humans at the very basis of their being are storytellers and proposes that all forms of communications are best absorbed and interpreted through a narrational perspective as humans inherently pursue a ‘narrative’ logic.

Furthermore, More (1987) states metaphors, imagery and symbols have always been one of

the primary learning tools for humans because humans effectively “code with imagery” to understand and recall words and concepts. Thus, it can be said that stories provide students, or listeners in general, a mental image to understand and remember.

4.2. Narration in Context

As outlined previously, humans have a deep connection with telling and listening to stories. Scholes (1981) claims that there is an innate need for humans to form chronological and casual connections, and these processes aid in shaping a person and making them who they are. Narrative could be defined as a primary and intricate form of human comprehension – a defining characteristic of human intelligence and of the species as a whole (Mink, 1978). In relation to this is Herrnstein-Smith’s (1981) proposed idea that humans have basic stories or profound structures for organizing experiences. Therefore, it could be concluded that the integration of storytelling in classrooms or lecture halls are useful in comprehending and applying new knowledge (Mink, 1978).

Abrahamson (2011), based on his personal observations as a lecturer and on prior research, states that storytelling is a valuable tool in assisting students with learning course material. However, he also outlines some drawbacks to this method. He voices a fear that students might develop the assumption that a course’s content is mainly based on telling stories and not valid empirical research and reality. Abrahamson (2011) emphasizes the necessity to reinstate that storytelling is to be used as a supplementary technique in teaching course content. Another concern that he points to is that students might start regarding stories as having merely an entertainment function instead of viewing stories as a break from the purely factual course content. Abrahamson (2011) claims that this can be combated by the speaker or lecturer asking follow-up questions that pertain to the story used to illustrate the course content and starting a discussion.

One more drawback that Abrahamson (2011) adds is that by employing storytelling and making it personal, the lecturer risks creating the assumption for students that they are forming a close, personal relationship with the lecturer. His suggestion to counter this is to narrate stories that are not overly personal, but still adding small anecdotes of a personal nature that, for example, about the lecturer’s flaws to indicate that they are also prone to making mistakes and have weaknesses.

The last drawback Abrahamson (2011) mentions is that using stories frequently in lectures might give a misconception about the subject of the course, leading their attention

away from the reality of it. He states that this can be countered by simply developing a balance between storytelling and providing factual empirical information.

Abrahamson (2011) states that human experiences (stories) are organized in time, giving life a sense of structure. McAdams (1997) agrees that human life stories are organized in content and time, therefore, learning stories also need this kind of familiar structure for students to absorb the information laid out before them. McAdams continues that a story should have a setting, human or human-like characters and a sequence of events or elements that give rise to reaction. The learning stories used in classrooms or lectures can provide a sense of order the teaching and interaction process. Abrahamson (2011) notes that each lecture should begin with an overview of the material covered in the previous lecture and then an outline of the current lecture should be presented, aligning with Weaver's (1981) recommendations for effective lectures. Based on Abrahamson's (2011) observations, students find the pattern of covering content, storytelling and participation to be engaging.

As mentioned previously, learning stories are not meant as entertainment and come from a traditional context. For learning stories to enhance learning and engagement, it is required for the stories to be somewhat personal, relate to the content that is being covered and to have some entertainment characteristics. Abrahamson (2011), interestingly, notes that the stories that cover a negative life experience, as opposed to overly positive and self (lecturer) promoting, are better received and can heighten mutual understanding as well as promote animated discussion.

5. Lecture Analysis

This chapter is devoted to the empirical part of the research. First, it provides a description of the selected corpus. Second, it gives an insight into the methodology of the analysis and the process of analysis itself. Finally, it presents the discussion of results and conclusions.

5.1. Research methodology

This sub-chapter is dedicated to the description of research methodology and procedure. For the theoretical basis of this paper, a review of theoretical sources was conducted relating to the topic of this research. As for the empirical investigation, qualitative research frameworks are predominantly used, specifically, discourse analysis to interpret the use of language in lectures. The empirical research procedure consists of the following steps:

1. selection of the corpus –fifteen lectures on different topics that have been presented through the Reith Lecture project;
2. data collection – examination of the selected corpus, a close reading of the transcripts and listening to the lecture recordings;
3. grouping of the findings;
4. interpretation of the findings and drawing of conclusions.

As previously stated, the selected corpus consists of fifteen lectures that have been presented and transmitted through the Reith Lecture project funded by the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation). The transcripts of the lectures were taken from an online repository and the lectures were listened to on the streaming service Spotify.

The selected lectures date from 1994 to 1999. The first lecture series selected is from January 26 to March 2, 1994, presented by Marian Warner. The overarching topic of Warner’s lectures was “Managing Mothers” in which she discussed modern myths and how women and men are portrayed in them, and how they reflect on modern society. A total of six lectures have been selected.

The second lecture series is from February 6 to March 5, 1996, presented by Jean Aitchison. The main topic of Aitchison’s lectures is “The Language Web” that delves into the evolution of language in a technology-dominated world. A total of five lectures in were presented, all of which have been selected for this research.

The third lecture series ran from April 7 to May 5, 1999 and were presented by Anthony Giddens. Giddens’s main topic of lectures is “Runaway World”, in which he

discusses globalisation, politics and their effect on tradition. Giddens presented a total of five lectures, four of which have been selected for this research.

Each of the lectures is between 3000 to 4500 words in length, based on the transcripts, while the audio recordings are up to 40 to 50 minutes long.

The following sub-chapter deals with the results of analysis of the selected lectures.

5.2. Structuring lectures

One of the first audience involvement techniques looked at in this research is the use of lecture phases. As has been previously discussed, to involve a listener in a lecture and gain their attention, the phases of the lecture have to be outlined.

Analysing the selected lectures, it can be seen that the speakers utilize this technique by stating the lecture topic, referring back to what has been said and summarizing. However, each lecturer has a different approach to this. For example, Warner seems to view her series of six lectures as one whole lecture. In the first lecture she outlines where her lecture series will be going and what topics will be looked at:

In these lectures I will be looking at the mythic accretions clustering stickily to these themes: men are no longer in control, mothers are not what they used to be, and it's the fault of Germaine Greer, Cosmopolitan and headline stars who choose to be single mothers like Michelle Pfeiffer (Warner, Lecture 1).

During the course of her lectures, she directs the listeners' attention to a specific point of the lecture that she is about to discuss: "As a footnote to this look at the serpentine metamorphoses of the monstrous female, *I would like to direct your notice* to some scientific data about the praying mantis." (Warner, Lecture 1), attracting the audience's attention to a point in the lecture. Further on in her lecture series, she refers back to something that has already been communicated, which requires the listeners to recall previously heard information which, in turn, generates involvement in the lecture as they have to actively engage themselves to recall the information: "In The Epic of Gilgamesh, *as we saw*, the harlot is sent out from the city to trap Enkidu and succeeds in gentling him with her charms." (Warner, Lecture 4)

At the end of her last lecture in the series, Warner summarizes the topics that were covered in the lectures and refers back to them. Her interpretation of the theme of the lectures is also presented to the listeners: "The modern myths I have looked at in these lectures - monstrous mothers, warrior heroes, diabolical innocents, wild beasts and savage strangers - all belong in the larger story of home, which is still being told. They are all threaded through the fabric as it is being made." (Warner, Lecture 6)

Aitchison has a slightly different approach to structuring her lectures. She provides information pertaining to the topic at the beginning of each lecture and indicates the direction of it:

- “I will be looking at some key topics: how language changes, how it began, how children learn it, and how we remember words.” (Aitchison, Lecture 1)
- “The origin of the language web has become a serious field of study only in the last 10 years or so, and will be the topic of today’s lecture.” (Aitchison, Lecture 2)
- “The predictable way in which the language web develops will be the topic of this lecture, [...]” (Aitchison, Lecture 3)
- “Words are the topic of today’s lecture. The Language Web is the title of all these lectures and the human word store [...]” (Aitchison, Lecture 4)
- “In this final lecture, I want to discuss how the huge choice available to us also sets up possible snares.” (Aitchison, Lecture 5)

Furthermore, during the course of her lectures, she continues to direct the audience’s attention to the points that will be discussed further:

- “Moving onto the 19th century, proper behaviour was a major concern to a lot of people.” (Aitchison, Lecture 1)
- “But let’s move on to the “crumbling castle” view.” (Aitchison, Lecture 1)
- “But let’s move on to the “infectious disease” view.” (Aitchison, Lecture 1)
- “But finally, I would like to stress again that we need to understand language, not try to control it.” (Aitchison, Lecture 1)
- “But let’s turn to another language trap, the “wimp effect”.” (Aitchison, Lecture 5)

Aitchison also provides information on further lectures, attracting the audience’s attention and engaging their interest to listen further:

- “I will return to this question in the third lecture. [...] Next week I’ll go right back to the beginning and discuss the origin of language in the human species.” (Aitchison, Lecture 1)
- “This all led to a more precise type of web, a web of rules, and in the next lecture I will talk about how children born today acquire this rule web whose overall structure is preordained.” (Aitchison, Lecture 2)
- “The language web then has been mostly acquired by children by around the age of 13 apart from the mixing and matching of language styles and also vocabulary, which will be the topic of next week’s lecture.” (Aitchison, Lecture 3)
- “These will be discussed in the next lecture.” (Aitchison, Lecture 4)

However, similarly to Warner, Aitchison summarizes all the topics covered at the end of her final lecture in the series instead of at the end of each individual lecture:

But let's recap. These lectures began with a cobweb of worries which I attempted to clear away. We need to understand language, I argued, not try to control it. Then I tried to extend understanding of language: how it began, how children acquire it, and how humans remember the huge web of words. Out of this wider framework, some genuine concerns emerged (Aitchison, Lecture 5).

Aitchison also provides her interpretation of the topics, inviting the audience to make their own judgement.

Taking a look at Giddens' lectures, it can be observed that he has a different approach to structuring his lectures. While in the first lecture he introduces the audience to the overarching topic of his lecture series, he does not relate the content of what is to follow in the beginning of each individual lecture: "Globalisation is the main theme of my lecture tonight, and of the lectures as a whole." (Giddens, Lecture 1)

However, throughout his lectures Giddens does continuously refer back to the topics covered previously. This engages the audience in the lecture as they have to recall information that was covered previously:

- "The debates about globalisation I mentioned at the beginning [...]" (Giddens, Lecture 1)
- "Just like the concept of risk, which I talked about in my last lecture" (Giddens, Lecture 3)
- "The idea of intimacy, like so many other familiar notions I've discussed in these lectures, sounds old but in fact is very new." (Giddens, Lecture 4)
- "The changes I have been analysing throughout these lectures explain why." (Giddens, Lecture 5)
- "Building a democracy of the emotions, of which I spoke last time, is one part of a progressive civic culture." (Giddens, Lecture 5)
- "[...] one of the main reasons, as I said earlier [...]" (Giddens, Lecture 5)

Different to the lectures previously analysed, Giddens does not provide a summary of his lectures. This, in turn, does not provide listeners with the speaker's interpretation of the topic.

5.3. Question and answer sequences

As mentioned in Chapter (), the insertion of a question serves the purpose of providing an information focus as well as to "liven and dramatise a narrative" by inserting a query which the speaker thinks is on the listeners' mind or thinks it should be (Bamford, 2001:129).

The speakers of all analysed lectures tend to frequently use question and answer sequences, where they both ask the question and provide an answer. This focuses the listeners' attention on the answer and involves them in the lecture. Furthermore, the answers the speakers provide can get across their attitude towards the topic.

Giddens in his lectures uses question-answer sequences frequently to emphasize his attitude towards the topic that is being discussed:

- “Well, who is right in this debate? I think it is the radicals.” (Giddens, Lecture 1)
- “Can we reimpose our will upon them? I believe we can. The powerlessness we experience is not a sign of personal failings, but reflects the incapacities of our institutions. We need to reconstruct those we have, or create new ones, in ways appropriate to the global age.” (Giddens, Lecture 1)
- “What about areas where the traditional family remains largely intact, as in the example of China with which I began? Will the changes observed in the West become more and more global? I think they will - indeed that they are.” (Giddens, Lecture 3)
- “Where does this leave democracy itself? Should we accept that democratic institutions are becoming marginal just at the point where democracy seems on a roll? I don't think so.” (Giddens, Lecture 4)
- “Are circumstances different now? Obviously no one can say for sure, but I believe they are. I have given the reasons why in earlier lectures.” (Giddens, Lecture 4)

The short answers Giddens gives to the questions before expanding on the topic serve to dramatize the topic and cause the audience to pay more attention to what is being said. The frequent question and answer sequences also highlight to the listener that what is being said is Giddens' opinion and that he strongly believes in it.

In contrast, Warner and Aitchison tend to ask questions and then provide longer answers, as in continuing to expand on the topic they are covering in that lecture, instead of giving short answers.

- “So to the question what do women want? - which would vex Freud so deeply later - the answer is sovereignty; and womanly wiles, women's craft and gin tend to this hidden purpose.” (Warner, Lecture 1)
- “But was he recording the evidence of his eyes? Flora are inevitably consenting subjects, but his living models, the Indians who appear in the magnificent life-size studies now in Copenhagen, may not have posed for the artist.” (Warner, Lecture 5)
- “In Northern Ireland, East Belfast men and West Belfast women both showed a tendency to pronounce “grass” as “grawss” at a time when, in theory, the two halves

of Belfast barely talked to one another. What could have been happening? The mind boggles. But the explanation was quite simple. East Belfast men sometimes visited a city-centre store staffed by mainly West Belfast women.” (Aitchison, Lecture 1)

Warner and Aitchison in their question and answer sequences tend to provide general facts and do not express personal opinions or beliefs, in contrast to Giddens’ lectures. While this takes one away from the lecture feeling more personal and like a casual conversation between the listener and speaker, it actually gives the lecture a more formal tone and that the information presented in the lecture as more factual, thus creating the notion that the information presented is more reliable.

Furthermore, Warner and Aitchison prefer to ask several questions in a row before providing answers:

- “This contemporary belief that fitness is literally embodied in physical size neglects to pay attention to the rather more important questions: what kind of way of life are the survivors defending? What society are they making?” (Warner, Lecture 2)
- “The question is no longer who is to guard the guardians, but who is to tell the story? Who can bear witness?” (Warner, Lecture 6)
- “His work puts the dominant and anguished questions of this end of the millennium: what does it mean to belong and not to belong? What way can history be told and experience be lived to bring about a sense of belonging? How does one come home?” (Warner, Lecture 6)
- “But why? At a time when English is a major world language, is it really in need of hospital treatment?” (Aitchison, Lecture 1)
- “In some cases, a superordinate term doesn’t even exist. What are baths and basins? Are they bathroom fixtures? Or sanitary fitments? What are coughs and sneezes? Are these noises indicating respiratory distress? And what about tin-openers and corkscrews, which are sometimes con-fused in slips of the tongue? No single English term covers “kitchen gadgets for opening things”.” (Aitchison, Lecture 4)

However, asking several questions in a row before providing the answers also serves to dramatize the narrative. Consecutive questions draw the audience’s attention to what is being asked as in any normal circumstances the listener would be required to answer the questions, so they have to pay heightened attention to what is being said. As these are rhetorical questions to which the speaker herself provides an answer to, they serve the purpose of refocusing the audience’s attention.

As the speaker provides the answer to the questions, the listener is focused on the answer. In their heads, the listeners might have already come up with an answer as a question expects an answer, and, as the answer is provided by the speaker, listeners might compare their answers to the speaker's. Thus, the listeners put in mental work into comparing answers, in turn putting more focus and attention to the speaker's answer and further comments.

5.4. Discourse markers

By adding discourse markers and asides to a lecture, the speaker can make the audience feel closer to them by way of thinking that the speaker is expressing their point of view and reminding them that the speaker is human. By using discourse markers and asides, the listener can be more motivated to be involved in the lecture, even if it is just listening more intently. Warner uses asides on occasion in her lectures that serve to draw the listeners' attention to what is being said:

- “Myths convey values and expectations which are always evolving, always in the process of being formed, but - *and this is fortunate* - never set so hard they cannot be changed again, and newly told stories can be more helpful than repeating old ones.” (Warner, Lecture 1)
- “But she has now turned into a man, an ordinary family man, a neighbour who - *and this is crucial* - does not look dangerous.” (Warner, Lecture 2)
- “Some historians, like Philippe Aries, have suggested (*rather influentially*) that the comparative off-handedness towards children in the past denotes indifference” (Warner, Lecture 3)
- “Odysseus earns his return through suffering and perseverance and fidelity throughout to his Goddess Athena and (*in spirit at least*) to his wife Penelope.” (Warner, Lecture 6)

To the same effect, Aitchison and Giddens also use asides, but not as frequently:

- “In 1985, bad English, *whatever that might be*, was even linked to crime by Lord Tebbit” (Aitchison, Lecture 1)
- “To many living outside Europe and North America, it looks uncomfortably like Westernisation - or, *perhaps*, Americanisation” (Giddens, Lecture 1)

Aitchison also uses discourse markers on occasion in her lectures to a similar effect as asides – to express her point of view and specific information:

- “You might expect parents to cheer as their offspring became competent language users and give them, *say*, a reward of a telephone on their 13th birthday” (Aitchison, Lecture 3)
- “It’s not chance that when dealing with large quantities of, *say*, drugs Europeans across the channel tend to talk about “avalanches”” (Aitchison, Lecture 5)

The result is that the listener is listening more intently to what is being said and, therefore, mentally involved. The asides that are used in the lectures provide a kind of respite from the overarching formal tone of the lectures and bringing it down to a more conversational tonality. This creates a notion to the listeners that the lecture is a more casual affair and not a formal presentation of facts, allowing the audience to feel more at ease and to find the lecture’s subject more relatable.

Using asides also creates an illusion to the listeners that what is being said is more impromptu than an actual rehearsed lecture. They help create a more casual mood for the lecture and help with putting the speaker and listeners on a more even footing. In academic lectures, the speaker presents oneself as one on a higher footing than the listeners - the speaker is the holder of new information that they present to the audience who are yet to process this information. To put it in very simple terms, the speaker is privileged and in power position with all the information and the listeners usually accept the position of obliged to take notice of what is being conveyed by the lecturer. By using language that is commonly used in casual conversations, the speaker steps away from the formal academic lecturing style, they create the notion of bringing themselves down from the academic lecturer’s pedestal to the level of the actual audience. Thus, the listeners view the speaker as their equal rather than a highbrow academic who is unapproachable.

5.5. Metaphors and similes

As previously mentioned in Chapter 4, rhetorical devices are one of the most effective involvement strategies that can be used. Metaphors and similes promote message processing that engage the listener’s mind. Audiences are likely to devote substantially more attention to what is being communicated in order to process and extract the meaning of a metaphor or simile.

This holds true to the lectures analysed. Similes and metaphors are liberally used in the lectures. They illustrate the points that the speaker is making by creating vivid imagery, thus engaging their audience more.

In the beginning of the first lecture, Warner uses similes to provide a vivid image of dinosaurs which she likens to animals that the listener is more familiar with: “the pterodactyl spreads its wings *like a large heron*, the snout of the mosasaurus emerges from the water *like the toothy maw of Jonah’s whale in a medieval illumination*; ichthyosaurus, with daisywheel eyes, seems to waddle on fins *as comfortably as a walrus*.” (Warner, Lecture 1). These give the audience a point of comparison, painting an image in their minds of creatures that they are familiar with as something more, thus engaging their minds.

In the analysed lectures, similes involving animals, nature and ordinary things are rather prevalent. That could be attributed to people’s ability to imagine such things more easily. While it might not require a lot of mental effort to decipher them and keep the mind engaged, they still catch the attention of the listeners. Examples of such similes are:

- “Earlier in the century, an old mutation viewpoint prevailed, that some sounds slowly turned into others, *like tadpoles gradually changing into frogs*.” (Aitchison, Lecture 1)
- “This patchwork of efficiency and inefficiency is fairly typical of behaviour that is biologically programmed: it has evolved to deal with some things, but not others, *just as rabbits nibble grass but don’t crack nuts*.” (Aitchison, Lecture 2)
- “F-words *swarm like bees* in some recent literature *and buzz about freely* in conversation.” (Aitchison, Lecture 3)
- “Most new words simply disappear, *like raindrops falling and soaking into the ground*.” (Aitchison, Lecture 4)
- “For centuries ideas about language origin have *frothed up like soap bubbles*, then burst into nothing.” (Aitchison, Lecture 2)
- “[...] mostly, the various speech sounds convey coherent messages only when combined into an overlapping chain, *like different colours of ice-cream melting into one another*.” (Aitchison, Lecture 2)
- “Humans *mop up words like sponges*.” (Aitchison, Lecture 4)

Not only do the lecturers use similes involving ordinary things, they also on occasion involve more obscure comparisons, for example:

- “[...] far from holding up the lit lamp of hope *like the little girl in Picasso’s Guernica* [...]” (Warner, Lecture 3)
- “Films - and the books they are based on - often mete out punishment to sexual women, in the same way *as spectators of the Ripper’s victims in the London Dungeon enjoy the horror even as they shudder at it*.” (Warner, Lecture 2)

- “As speakers we behave in our use of language *like surfers on the World-Wide Web.*” (Aitchison, Lecture 5)

Along with similes, metaphors are also used in the selected lectures to evoke an image in the audience’s minds and engage their attention in comprehending the meaning behind the communicated phrases.

The following metaphors are used in the analysed lectures to liven the narrative, engaging the audience’s interest in the topic by providing vivid imagery, thus, involving the audience more in the lecture:

- “[...] play areas all sink into a quagmire of prejudice [...]” (Warner, Lecture 1)

A quagmire is a swampy area where the ground is soft and is easy to sink into and loose footing, often being difficult to get out of once stuck. Thus, the metaphor illustrates prejudice as something that one easily succumbs to, sinking in deeper and deeper, and proving to be difficult to discard the prejudices once they have settled.

- “Yet, even as I speak, I can hear objections flying thick and fast [...]” (Warner, Lecture 3)
- “A wide web of worries; a cobweb of old ideas ensnares people as they think about language [...]” (Aitchison, Lecture 1)

The metaphor here compares ideas to a spider’s web as in all the ideas about a language are connected and weaved into an intricate pattern, one idea riding on the end of another. Furthermore, it is widely known that spiderwebs are notoriously tacky and will stick to anything they come in contact with. The old ideas are compared to these sticky webs as they are easy to get caught up in and difficult to rid one’s self of.

- “This view itself crumbles when examined carefully. [...] the castle of English was gradually and lovingly assembled until it reached a point of maximum splendour at some unspecified time in the past [...]” (Aitchison, Lecture 1)

In this metaphor, a view on language is compared to an old English castle that, at the time gone by was considered to be compliant to the latest standards. But as time went on, it slowly crumbled as it could not stand the test of time.

So, the view on language was up to date at the time, but as times changed and new theories developed, the old views could no longer be applied to the new version of the language and became easy to dismantle and disprove.

- “Language was a lucky choice which paid off and has been paying off ever since.” (Aitchison, Lecture 2)

Metaphors are also used to explain concepts that aid the audience in understanding what is being communicated and provide an illustration of the concept using more common things that listeners might be more familiar with:

- “Such signs course through the hardening capillaries of the social system with unprecedented fluidity, carried by a thousand different conduits in a million images and soundbites.” (Warner, Lecture 2)

Information channels and the rapid flow of information are compared to blood circulation. Just like blood flows from the heart down to the smallest capillary, so does information travel from the source to the to groups of people, to each individual.

- “A person went to the shelf in the mental lexicon where it was stored, as it were, then pulled it out. If this selection took place in too much of a hurry, a neighbour might be accidentally picked such as left instead of right or geranium instead of hydrangea.” (Aitchison, Lecture 4)

The human mind is likened to a library where words are compared to books. In a library there are thousands upon thousands of books kept, just like the mind stores thousands upon thousands of words.

- “Whorf’s best-known claim was that “standard average European” cultures are in a mental straitjacket in which events are packaged into boxes, such as days, hours, minutes [...]” (Aitchison, Lecture 5)

The metaphor illustrates the constrictive nature of culture. By abiding to the norms set by the society and culture a person lives in, they are limiting their minds to the ideas that are served to them as being the norm. This prevents a person from entertaining the possibility of different ideas and ways of living.

- “The splendiferous bouquet of current languages will be whittled down to a small posy with only a few different flowers.” (Aitchison, Lecture 5)

The current abundance of languages and the possibility of many of them going extinct is likened to a bouquet of cut flowers that is beautiful and flourishing for a time until most of the flowers wilt. The same way many languages that are spoken by small groups of people will eventually die out and only the languages that are spoken by large groups of people will remain, also taking the place of the main language for the smaller groups of people.

- “But the heritage that is thereby protected is severed from the lifeblood of tradition [...]” (Giddens, Lecture 3)

Here, the heritage of a person is given the same importance as blood in a human body, without which it would not be possible to exist.

- “Democracy might appear to flourish only in especially fertile soil, which has been cultivated in the long term. In societies, or regions, that have little history of democratic government, democracy seems to have shallow roots and is easily swept away.” (Giddens, Lecture 5)

Democracy is compared to a plant that, with different treatments and care, will turn out differently. If a plant is put in fertile soil, watered and cared for regularly, it will flourish and grow. Thus, if a country is democratic and governed correctly and justly, it will develop into a strong country with a stable government. In contrast, if a country has a weak democratic rule, it will not last for long and democracy will be overthrown.

These metaphors take a basic concept from everyday life and use it to explain and expand on a more complex idea. While it might be difficult for some listeners of the lectures to grasp a certain concept, for example, the flow of information, providing a comparison to an everyday thing, like their own blood flow, will help them visualise the concept and gain a more solid understanding of the information that is being delivered. Simplifying information ensures that a wider range of audiences will not only find it interesting but also be able to effectively comprehend the topic of the lecture.

As the Reith lectures are presented by specialists from different areas and broadcast to a wide audience that most likely are not experts on the presented lecture theme, it is imperative for the speaker to present concepts, especially complicated ones, to the audience in very basic, easy-to-understand terms.

Furthermore, using metaphors in lectures provides a type of visual aid for the listeners. They paint a picture in the listener’s mind with the use of colourful language, drawing the listener’s attention to what is being said and engaging their mind visually. The metaphor will make the listener think and visualise the concept, which will result in their meaningful refocusing on what the speaker is presenting.

5.6. Storytelling

Telling a story from the speaker’s personal experience has proved to be an invaluable tool in involving listeners in lectures and attracting their attention. Stories provide an experiential connection for the listener with the speaker, thus increasing interest in the topic and allowing the listener to relate in a way to the topic.

In the lectures that were analysed, speakers relayed their personal experiences that related to the topic being covered on more than one occasion. For example, Warner recalls her

experience of researching feminism: “When I first read this, nearly 20 years ago, I thought Pisan was absurdly coy, and felt that feminism could not proceed without facing women’s crimes as well as their wrongs - the ills they did as well as those done to them. This is still my position” (Warner, Lecture 1). Not only does she provide an insight into her thoughts then but gives also her current viewpoint.

Similarly, Giddens relays his personal experience with researching his lecture topics on more than one occasion:

When I was researching for this lecture, I came across dozens of academic books in English with 'modernity' in the title. Indeed, I have written a few myself - but I could only discover a couple of books specifically about tradition (Giddens, Lecture 3);

Relaying his difficulties in researching for the lecture could engage the audience and create a connection with any listeners that have at any point searched for literature on specific topics only to come up short even though there is plenty of literature on a related broader topic. This might be especially relevant to students as they could frequently come across such a problem in their research for school and university papers.

When I was originally working on the study of intimate relationships, I read a great deal of therapeutic and self-help literature on the subject. I was struck by something I don't believe has been widely noticed or remarked upon. If one looks at how a therapist sees a good relationship - in any of the three spheres just mentioned - it is striking how direct a parallel there is with public democracy (Giddens, Lecture 4).

This short anecdote from Giddens’ experience would be interesting for listeners who have studied or even briefly looked into human psychology. This would give these listeners an incentive to think of the parallels the speaker mentioned between relationship psychology and public democracy.

He also retells an anecdote about his great aunt when speaking on the topic of family:

If ever I were tempted to think that the traditional family might be best after all, I remember what my great aunt said. She must have had one of the longest marriages of anyone. She married young, and was with her husband for over 60 years. She once confided to me that she had been deeply unhappy with him the whole of that time. In her day there was no escape (Giddens, Lecture 4).

This gives an insight into his life and creates a connection with the listeners, allowing them to relate to Giddens and his experiences. It can clearly be perceived that it was told in jest, thus, attracting even more of the audience’s attention.

In Warner’s second lecture of the series, she starts with another story from her personal experience, hooking on to and holding the audience’s attention:

As I was going to the Future Entertainment Show held in Olympia last year, I soon found I was the only woman waiting for the Tube. The station was unusually full for the middle of the morning, with scattered young men in jeans and trainers, gaggles of young boys, one or two fathers. When the train came and the carriage doors opened, a rather dazed looking London pigeon fluttered out. A man near me laughed. "Don't worry," he said, "it's only a virtual reality pigeon." I streamed in to the show with the crowd, clutching my razzle-dazzle, hi-tech, impossible-to-forge ticket, and plunged into the roaring hall. The video games industry has grown in value from almost nothing to 700m pounds over the past four years. On multiple screens the season's new offerings in interactive play and 3-D simulation were being triggered by the very latest in ergonomic joypads to keep bleeping, scrolling, beaming up, blasting, crashing, bursting into flames and starting up again. I wasn't the only woman any longer: there were one or two grannies, one or two mums. And the marketing staff on the stalls were almost all women - "skirt power" to the trade - and they were selling and busking in green bug costumes as zools or zoozes or other technological gremlins. But we were interlopers. It was a man's world. The customers and players were almost all boys (Warner, Lecture 2).

Recalling her experience in such a situation, allows the listeners, especially the women in the audience, relate to such a story. It could be speculated that a number of the listeners will have experienced a situation where they felt out of their element, they will be able to relate to the anxiety and uneasiness the speaker might have felt at the moment. Women will have an easier time to relate to such a story as they are frequently viewed as outsiders in any technology-related field, while men are encouraged to pursue careers in it. This gender segregation would be relatable to the majority of women from any walk of life.

However, not all the stories told in the lectures were from the speaker's personal experience. To illustrate a point, stories not pertaining or involving the speaker were told, for example to illustrate and explain the concept of cunning and how protagonists in different media use it, Warner retold a story from "The Arabian Nights":

In the Arabian Nights a poor fisherman finds a bottle in his nets and when he opens it a huge angry ogre of a genie rises up and threatens the fisherman with instant death. The fisherman responds that he cannot believe that anyone so awesome and so magnificent could ever have fitted into such a little bottle, and he begs the genie to show him how he did it. The genie obliges and gradually winds himself into the vessel. The fisherman jumps on it and stoppers it up in a trice. He then refuses to let the genie out again until he has granted him fabulous riches (Warner, Lecture 2).

While the story was not of a personal experience, it is sufficiently well-known that a portion of listener's should be able to recognize it and have some associations with it.

Similarly, Aitchison retells a story relating to the misuse of words from mass media: Prince Edward, in a television interview about his old school said: "It's difficult to use capital punishment in any institution. A beating is very valuable. It shows people you've come to the end of your tether." The Prince did not plan to behead his school chums. He

had made a speech error, a slip of the tongue, and said capital punishment when he'd meant corporal punishment (Aitchison, Lecture 4).

Again, it is not a personal story, but as it was widely reported at that time about the Prince's mishap, the audience could associate with it as it was something they most likely had previously heard about.

This story also serves as an example for the point the speaker was making. Aitchison at this point in her lecture was talking about how similar sounding words sometimes can get their meanings mixed up. Choosing a well-documented event as an example ensures that a large portion of the audience would have heard about it at the very least. That in turn engages the listener in the lecture because what is being relayed to them is something familiar that they can recall in their memory.

5.7. Allusions and references

Allusions and references to literary works, popular culture or other media can be used to attract listeners' attention and engaging them in the topic being discussed. This is especially true if the thing alluded to or referenced is popularly well-known.

In the analysed lectures, speakers frequently use references, especially to popular or pop culture or current events. For example, there are frequent references to characters from pop culture that are seamlessly weaved into the lecture topic, be it things that a celebrity has done:

- “*Madonna* clutching her crotch, flexing her thighs, singing “papa don’t preach”.”
(Warner, Lecture 1)

This was a widely-broadcast event that would later appear in the press and become a frequently discussed topic. Furthermore, Madonna is a world-renowned singer that the majority of the world's population is familiar with. Thus, choosing such a prominent figure and event as an example would ensure that the listeners of the lecture could make associations, engaging them in the lecture and illustrating the point that is being made – that bad girls are the heroines in this narrative and they will not conform to male ideals and will embrace the notion of being she-beasts.

- “[...] mothers are not what they used to be, and it’s the fault of Germaine Greer, *Cosmopolitan* and headline stars who choose to be single mothers like *Michelle Pfeiffer*.” (Warner, Lecture 1)

In this excerpt, the women's magazine *Cosmopolitan* and the actress *Michelle Pfeiffer* are referred to – both names known to the general public across the world. In the lecture, they are described as spearheads for destroying the male ideals of women and planting feminist ideas

in their heads. Using notable names of magazines and actresses ensures that the majority of the audience will have knowledge of them and, as they were mentioned in the beginning of the first lecture of the series, might ensnare the attention of those listeners who previously were not interested in the lecture.

There are references to characters from popular video games, films and fantasy books:

- “And in games like *Streets of Rage*, *Mortal Combat*, *Instruments of Chaos*, *Night Trap*, *Canon Fodder*, *Street Fighter*, *Legacy of Sir Asoul*, *The Rise of the Robots*, *Zombie Apocalypse*, *Psycho Santa*, *Splatter-house*, the hero slays monsters - just as *Jason and the Argonauts* did and *Hercules* at his twelve labours.” (Warner, Lecture 2)
- “When popular myth places characters like *Slugathon* or *Robocop* centre stage, and then annihilates them until the next *Avatar* appears [...]” (Warner, Lecture 2)
- “They are brought up to play with *Action Man* and his heavy-duty, futuristic *Star Wars* arsenal. They are taught to identify with *Ninja Turtles* [...] bristling with weapons: the *Terminator*, *Robocop*.” (Warner, Lecture 2)
- “And the most familiar and revealing example is *King Kong*, the monster movie of all time, which was made in 1933 and has proved, alongside *The Wizard of Oz*, one of Hollywood’s highest earners” (Warner, Lecture 4)
- “*E.T.*, the well-known extra-terrestrial, learnt human language fast.” (Aitchison, Lecture 3)
- “*James Bond* is, or was, admired for his sexual as well as his physical heroism.” (Giddens, Lecture 4)

These references spark recognition in the listeners’ mind and focus their attention on what is being communicated. Using references to popular media will also draw the attention of younger listeners as these are the titles they would be familiar with. Using pop culture references along with heroes from classical literature and films would ensure that a wide range of listeners would be interested in the information relayed by the speaker. Furthermore, using pop culture references engages the listener into understanding how the lecture topic and the reference are connected.

The references are not limited to pop culture only, works of classical literature and their characters are also referenced:

- “The wicked stepmother in “*Snow White*” could dance to death in her red-hot shoes, but the *Sleeping Beauty* - who still comatose had borne twins to the prince in earlier versions - could only be kissed.” (Warner, Lecture 3)

- “[...] it was very helpful to read about other small, vulnerable creatures, like *Cinderella*, or *Tom Thumb*, who survive - or better still, win through - against all adversity.” (Warner, Lecture 3)
- “The murderous deeds of *Lady Macbeth* haunt his prose, bloodshed stains the sea, but he never faces the issues of race and power which the painting raises.” (Warner, Lecture 5)
- “The name of *Shakespeare’s* “savage and deformed slave”, *Caliban*, in *The Tempest*, echoes this derivation.” (Warner, Lecture 5)
- “Some of these old invented prohibitions remind one of *Alice in Wonderland*: “That’s not a regular rule. You invented it just now,” Alice complained to the King.” (Aitchison, Lecture 1)

These references to classical works of literature range from children’s stories to Shakespeare’s plays. Many listeners will have the knowledge of children’s tales either as parents or as children in kindergarten, meaning that recognition will be triggered in their minds and they will become more invested in the information presented. Similarly, the referencing of Shakespeare, a world-renowned playwright, and his works, integrating them in the lecture, will engage the listeners who have had some contact with his works.

Referencing popular works of literature will ensure that a wide range of listeners will at least have heard of them, therefore, making the lecture more educative for the listeners.

But there can also be a number of allusions, especially to biblical stories, observed in the lectures:

- “in Judaic myth, the succubus Lilith was believed to haunt cradles of new-born infants to carry them off, and the classical Lamia was a child-stealer as well as a bloodsucker.” (Warner, Lecture 1)
- “Adam had been lord of creation in the Bible, and named the beasts;” (Warner, Lecture 4)
- “Jesus called for the little children to come unto him, and Christianity worships its god as a baby in a manger [...]” (Warner, Lecture 3)

Along with the allusions to biblical stories, there are more contemporary allusions found in the lectures. For example: “Once upon a time, there were three little pigs ... and so on” (Aitchison, Lecture 2), is an allusion to children’s stories and how they usually begin and, more directly, to the story “The Three Little Pigs”. Another allusion is to “The Chinese red guards, with their devotion to Mao's little red book [...]” (Giddens, Lecture 3), alluding to the

student-led paramilitary social movement mobilized and guided by Mao Zedong in the late 1960's and the work of propaganda that they diligently followed. Further allusions pertain to the inspiration of superheroes that have super strength: "More familiar heroes who had to contend with - and master - the wild include Hercules, father to many a superman" (Warner, Lecture 4).

Several allusions can be detected in one of Warner's lectures where folk tales from East Asia are being described:

A heroine with a very small foot on her way to a feast, dressed in a cloak of king-fisher feathers produced for her by magic, loses her slipper in a Chinese fairy-tale written down in the 9th century. And the first beast bridegroom who appears only by night slips into his mortal beloved's bed in an Indian story of two thousand years ago. The hearthside crone who passes on the wisdom of the tribe, who epitomises that once-upon-a-time-when-all-was-well, has always been a polyglot cosmopolitan, in spite of her homely headshawl and those old regional clogs she wears and her funny beaked nose and her spinning wheel (Warner, Lecture 6).

While folk tales from foreign cultures are seemingly being described, the western equivalents of the stories are alluded to. "*A heroine with a very small foot on her way to a feast, dressed in a cloak of king-fisher feathers produced for her by magic, loses her slipper in a Chinese fairy-tale written down in the 9th century.*" is an allusion to the popular fairy tale "Cinderella"; "*And the first beast bridegroom who appears only by night slips into his mortal beloved's bed in an Indian story of two thousand years ago.*" alludes to the tale "Beauty and the Beast" and finally, "*The hearthside crone who passes on the wisdom of the tribe, who epitomises that once-upon-a-time-when-all-was-well, has always been a polyglot cosmopolitan, in spite of her homely headshawl and those old regional clogs she wears and her funny beaked nose and her spinning wheel*" is alluding to the witch from the fairy tale "The Sleeping Beauty".

As said before, allusions and references spark recognition in the listener's mind. Their attention is then drawn to the thing that is being said, thus generating the listener's involvement. Even a short reference to some pop culture work will catch a listener's attention and evoke their interest. They will listen more intently to the information that is being relayed after the mention of the pop culture work because the familiarity with it will have caught their attention and they will want to know in what context it is being mentioned.

5.8. Results of the analysis

From the analysis of the lectures, it can be seen that several audience involvement techniques are used in the selected Reith lectures. The most prevalent technique used is storytelling, which was used at least once in each lecture. While the stories that the speaker's told were not

always of a personal nature, they were still utilized frequently. Along with personal stories, the speaker's opted to retell tales that they had heard about or read previously, but which still were connected to the topic being covered. Mixed in with the stories were also empirical facts, statistics and other data.

Rhetorical devices, such as metaphors and similes, were also frequently used throughout the lectures that served to create a vivid image in the listeners' minds and draw their attention to what was being said. Furthermore, the use of metaphors to explain a concept using more familiar terms also added to the engagement of the audience.

On the whole, all the techniques that were looked at in this analysis served the purpose of catching the audience's attention, requiring them to put in mental effort to process the messages that were being conveyed, thus, engaging and involving them in the lectures.

Conclusion

The **goal** of this research was to analyse a selection of lectures that have been presented on BBC Radio as part of the Reith lecture project and find the techniques used by the lecturers to involve their audience in the lecture. In order to perform this research, theories and relevant literature were explored on lectures, communication and involvement.

The examination of the theories and literature uncovered that there are many techniques that can be used to involve an audience, but most of them pertained to audience involvement in written media, such as books, research papers, advertisements and so on. There has not been a large amount of research done on audience involvement in lectures.

While it would be the first thought in such a research to examine the body language of the lecturer and the audience's response to what has been said in a lecture, for example, the murmuring or chuckling of the audience when a particular point is covered in a lecture. However, as Reith lectures have been mainly broadcasted through BBC Radio, there was no immediate audience response that could be examined as only the lecturer could be heard speaking. This was the case for the selected lectures, so a different approach had to be devised. As there were transcripts available for the lectures, the analysis of them could be done as one would analyse a text. Hence, it was possible to use the theories examined on audience involvement in literary works.

For this research, the lectures for analysis were chosen by randomly selecting three lecture topics and analysing the lectures that fell under them. In total, fifteen lectures by three different authors were analysed and examined for audience involvement techniques. It was decided that the techniques that this research will examine will be lecture structuring, question and answer sequences, asides, metaphors and similes, storytelling, and allusions and references. By analysing the lecture recordings and performing a close reading of the transcripts, these techniques were identified in the selected lectures, examples were extracted and explanations on how they serve to involve the audience in the lectures was provided.

There can be a lot more research done on audience involvement in lectures and a lot more techniques that could be examined. As one of the drawbacks for this research was that the lectures were broadcast on radio, there was no immediate audience response that could be examined. Future research could be done on audience reactions because, if a listener has a physical reaction to something that has been said (e.g. murmuring, chuckling, nodding, etc.), then it can mean that they are involved in the communication process and are relating to the speaker. Moreover, the research on the rhetorical devices used in lectures can be expanded to

include more devices. Some devices that were noticed during the analysis but were not covered were repetition, use of idioms, alliterations, epithets and more. The same as described in the theoretical part of rhetorical devices, they are one of the most effective involvement strategies in many forms of communication, so further research on them should prove to be beneficial.

Thesis

1. Lectures are the main conduit of transferring information between a lecturer and a student or listener.
2. The lecturer mediates between the subject matter and the audience to produce a positive learning experience.
3. A speaker should let listeners know where the lecture will be going, what will be done during the lecture time and how the covered topic will relate to the audience.
4. Speakers can involve their audience in their lecture by making certain linguistic choices.
5. Questions are an integral part of interaction, and what the speaker says depends on what they think their audience know or would want to know.
6. Question and answer sequences serve to focus the attention of the listener on the answer, giving the impression to the listener that the question/answer sequence was taking place in a more interactive setting, involving the audience more into a lecture.
7. Rhetorical devices are one of the most effective involvement strategies in various fields of communication.
8. Allusions and references to literary works, popular culture or other media are a valuable tool in lectures as they catch the attention of listeners.
9. Storytelling is an integral technique of the learning and understanding process, regardless if it occurs in or out of a classroom.
10. Storytelling allows people to gain a better understanding of one another and the sharing of experiences through storytelling allows individuals to create mutual understanding.
11. The most prevalent technique of audience involvement in Reith lectures was storytelling which was used at least once in each of the analysed lectures.
12. Rhetorical devices were frequently used in a large part of the analysed Reith lectures to create a vivid image in the listeners' minds and draw their attention to what was being said; metaphors were often used to explain a concept using more familiar terms which also added to the engagement of the audience

References

1. Abrahamson, C.E. (2011) *Methodologies for Motivating Student Learning Through Personal Connections*. Forum on Public Policy.
2. Allison D., Tauroza S. (1996) *The Effect of Discourse Organization on Lecture Comprehension*. English for Specific Purposes. 2: 157-171.
3. Bamford, J. (2000) Interactivity in Academic Lectures: The Role of Questions and Answers. In Coulthard M., Cotterill J., Rock F. (eds.) *Dialogue Analysis VII: Working with Dialogue* (pp. 158-159). Tübingen, Max Niemeyer Verlag.
4. Bialystok, E. (1990) *Communication Strategies: A Psychological Analysis of Second Language Use*. Oxford: Blackwell.
5. Biber, D. (1988) *Variation across Speech and Writing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Biber, B. (1967) A learning-teaching paradigm integrating intellectual and affective processes. In E. M. Bower & W. G. Hollister (Eds.) *Behavioural science frontiers in education* (pp.111-155). New York: WileyPress.
7. Brown, P., Levinson, S. (1987) *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8. Chaudron C., Richards J. C. (1986) *The Effect of Discourse Markers on the Comprehension of Lectures*. Applied Linguistics 2: 115-127.
9. Clapton, W. (2015) Pedagogy and Pop Culture: Pop Culture as Teaching Tool and Assessment Practice. In Caso, Federica; Hamilton, Caitlin (ed.), *Popular Culture and World Politics: Theories, Methods, Pedagogies, E-International Relations* (pp. 169 – 175). Bristol.
10. Corbett, E. P. J. (1990). *Classical rhetoric for the modern student*. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
11. Corbett, E. P. J. (1973) *Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student*. Philosophy and Rhetoric 6 (2): 125-126.
12. Dougherty, B.K. (2002) *Comic Relief: Using Political Cartoons in the Classroom*. International Studies Perspectives, 3(3): 258-70.
13. Dudley Evans, Tony (1994) Variations in the discourse patterns favoured by different disciplines and their pedagogical implications. In: J. Flowerdew (ed.) *Academic Listening*, 146-158. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

14. Fisher, W. R. (1985) *The narrative paradigm: In the beginning*. *Journal of Communication*, 35(4), 121-134.
15. Fisher, W. R. (1987) *Human communication as a narration: Toward a philosophy of reason, value, and action*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina.
16. Flowerdew J., Miller L. (1997) *The Teaching of Academic Listening Comprehension and the Question of Authenticity*. *English for Specific Purposes* 1: 27-46.
17. Flowerdew J., Tauroza S. (1995) *The Effect of Discourse Markers on Second Language Lecture Comprehension*. *Studies in Second Language Acquisition* 17: 435-458.
18. Flowerdew, J. (1994) *Academic Listening*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
19. Fried, R. L. (1995) *The passionate teacher: A practical guide*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
20. Frost R. (2006) *Figurative Language*. <http://frostfriend.org/figurative.html>. [Accessed May 3, 2019].
21. Goffman, E. (1981) *Forms of Talk*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
22. Gold, J. (2002) *The story species: Our life-connection*. Markham, Ontario: Fitzhenry and Whiteside Limited
23. Grayson, K., Davies M., Philpott S. (2009) *Pop Goes IR? Researching the Popular Culture – World Politics Continuum*. *Politics*, 29(3): 155-63.
24. Gumperz, J. (1982) *Discourse Strategies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
25. Gumperz, J. (1992) *Contextualization and Understanding*. In A. Duranti, C. Goodwin (eds.) *Rethinking Context* (pp. 229-252). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
26. Halliday, M. A. K. (1994) *An introduction to functional grammar*. New York: Arnold.
27. Herrnstein-Smith, B. (1978) *Narrative form as a cognitive instrument*. In H. Coronary & H. Kozicki (eds.) *The writing of history: Literary form and historical understanding* (pp. 83-97). Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.
28. Hirsch, E. D., Kett, J. F., & Trefil, J. (1988) *Cultural literacy: What every American needs to know*. New York: Vintage Books.
29. Kim J., Baek Y., Choi Y.H. (2012) *The Structural Effects of Metaphor-Elicited Cognitive and Affective Elaboration Levels on Attitude Toward the Ad*. *Journal of Advertising*, 41:2, 77-96.

30. Kirkwood, W. G., & Gold, J. B. (1983) Using teaching stories to explore philosophical themes in the classroom. *Metaphilosophy* 14, 341-352.
31. Land, S. M., & Hannafin, M. J. (1996) A conceptual framework for the development of theories-in-action with open-ended learning environments. *Educational Technology Research & Development*, 44(3), 37-5.
32. Langer, E. J. (1997) *The power of mindful learning*. Reading, MA: Perseus Books.
33. Long, R., C. (1980) Writer-Audience Relationships: Analysis or Invention? *College Composition and Communication*, Vol. 31: 221-226. National Council of Teachers of English
34. Maguire, J. (1998) *The power of personal story telling: Spinning tales to connect with others*. New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher/Putnam
35. McAdams, D.P. (1997) *The stories we live by: Personal myths and the making of the self*. New York: Guilford Press.
36. Mink, L. (1978) Narrative form as a cognitive instrument. In H. Canary & H. Kozicki (eds.) *The writing of history: Literary form and historical understanding*. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.
37. More, A. J. (1987) Native Indian learning styles: A review for researchers and teachers. *Journal of American Indian Education*, 27, 17-29.
38. Murfin, R. C., Ray, S. M. (1997) *The Bedford Glossary of Critical and Literary Terms 1st ed.* Bedford Books.
39. Olsen L. A., Huckin T. N. (1990) Point-driven understanding in engineering lecture comprehension. *English for Specific Purposes* 9: 33-47.
40. Peck, J. (1989) Using storytelling to promote language and literacy development. *The Reading Teacher*, 18, 138-141.
41. Quirk, R., Greenbaum, S., Leech, G., Svartvik, J. (1985) *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language*. London: Longman.
42. Rorty, R. (1991) *Objectivity, relativism and truth: Philosophical papers*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
43. Ruane, A.E. and P. James (2012) *The International Relations of Middle Earth: Learning From The Lord of the Rings*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.

44. Sanchez, V. N. (2017) *We'll Always Have Allusions: The Cultural Function of Allusions*. Vanderbilt University.
45. Scholes, R. (1981) Language, narrative, and anti-narrative. In W. J. T. Mitchell (ed.), *On Narrative*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
46. Strodt-Lopez, B. (1991) Tying It All In: Asides in University Lectures. *Applied Linguistics* 2: 117-140.
47. Sword, H. (2012). *Stylish Academic Writing*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England.
48. Thompson, S. (1997) Why Ask Questions in Monologue? Language Choice at Work in Scientific and Linguistic Talk. In Hunston S. (ed.) *Language at Work - Selected papers from the Annual Meeting of the British Association for Applied Linguistics* (pp. 137-150) University of Birmingham, Birmingham.
49. Tierney, M.J. (2007) Schoolhouse Rock: Pedagogy, Politics, and Pop, *International Studies Perspectives*, 8(1): iii-v.
50. Walsh, P., Crawford Camiciottoli, B. (2001) Lecturing To An Unfamiliar Audience: Some Functions Of Interaction In Business Lectures Given By Visiting Academics. *Quaderni Del Dipartimento Di Linguistica*. 11. 171-183.
51. Weaver, R. L. (1981) Effective Lecturing Techniques. *The Clearing House*, 55 (1): 20-23. Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
52. Webber, J. (2005) Independence Day as a Cosmopolitan Moment: Teaching International Relations. *International Studies Perspectives*, 2(3): 281-87.
53. Weldes, J. (2006) High Politics and Low Data: Globalization Discourses and Popular Culture. In D. Yanow and P. Schwartz-Shea (eds.) *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn* (pp. 176-86). New York: M.E. Sharpe.
54. Young, L. (1990) *Language as Behaviour, Language as Code*. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
55. Young, L. (1994) University lectures - macro-structure and micro-features. In Flowerdew J. (ed.) *Academic Listening* (pp. 159-176). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

56. Zabel, M. K. (1991) Storytelling, myths, and folk tales: Strategies for multicultural inclusion. *Preventing School Failure*, 32, 28-41.

Internet Sources

1. Available from <https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/articles/4ZTNLKgrG2mSzfgC1ZYINmV/about-the-reith-lectures> [Accessed on 21 March, 2019].
2. Available from <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/lecture> [Accessed on 21 March, 2019].
3. Available from <https://profilebooks.com/jonathan-sumption.html> [Accessed on 28 October, 2019].
4. Available from <https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m00057m8> [Accessed on 28 October, 2019].

APPENDIX 1: Marina Warner's Lecture Transcripts

REITH LECTURES 1994: Managing Monsters

Lecture 1: Monstrous Mothers

In 1852, at Sydenham in south London, Queen Victoria opened the first dinosaur theme park. She presided over the unveiling of 29 full-scale models made by Benjamin Waterhouse Hawkins, who was the draughtsman Darwin himself had employed to depict the animals he found on his voyage in the Beagle. The word dinosaur - dread lizard - had been coined in 1841 by the leading palaeontologist of the time, Richard Owen, and Hawkins made his dinosaurs to Owen's state-of-the-art specifications.

They're still there. Spick-and-span signs in gold and scarlet paint direct visitors to the "Farmyard", "Boats", and "Monsters". Monsters, not dinosaurs: the distinction between natural history and myth wasn't drawn then. There, on an island in a lake, crouching under mixed plantings of large trees, the concrete creatures come into view: the pterodactyl spreads its wings like a large heron, the snout of the mosasaurus emerges from the water like the toothy maw of Jonah's whale in a medieval illumination; ichthyosaurus, with daisywheel eyes, seems to waddle on fins as comfortably as a walrus. Their inertia in the suburban London park is pastoral, reassuring: dinosaurs spending the afternoon at their club in St James's.

MUSIC: JURASSIC PARK:

A hundred and forty years on, in a much more famous park, the dinosaurs are living, moving, crying, talking - almost. The simulations and models in Jurassic Park give a glow of genuine wonder to the film. The dinosaurs are presented as authentic fore-runners in time scientifically accurate, but at the same time their character has evolved to embody contemporary fantasies. The velociraptors as they hop and scurry and pounce and give chase suspend disbelief even in the most cynical of viewers. Small, mobile, quick on their feet, hunting in pairs, and even articulate, they represent rather a change from the lumbering dinosaurs of Sydenham Park. Dinosaurs, even when called monsters, seemed benign then, but today they've become cunning, voracious, nippy - and female.

Voracious, cunning girls. Lethal - and fertile, as well. Michael Crichton's clever plot, for all its air of scientific fidelity, reveals vividly the presence of myth today. Originally grown as everyone knows from the DNA in blood found in a mosquito preserved in amber, the park's dinosaurs epitomised the chaotic natural energy of fertility governed by the secular priests of the temple of science.

Female organisms in the film prove ultimately uncontrollably fertile, resistant to all the constraints of the men of power. The story can be reduced to a naked confrontation between nature, coded female, with culture, coded male. Is the terror the velociraptors inspire in any way connected to their femaleness? It isn't emphasised as such though the book calls the park a matriarchy. Yet popular films of this kind often refract widespread concerns in metaphorical terms and then reinforce them, and no director of the contemporary cinema rivals Steven Spielberg's ability to touch a common cord. He broke all records with the takings on E.T. and now a decade later has outstripped them with Jurassic Park which has made 800 million pounds world wide.

The accelerating pace of change since the 50s has magnified the influence, the power and the dissemination of myths. As everything changes from the political map to the distribution of wealth, as human ingenuity leads to scientific breakthroughs which offer salvation and at the same time destruction, as strains on the family grow, the imagination hunts for stories to explain the pervasive malaise.

One of the stories in mass circulation today is a very old one, but it's taken on new vigour: women in general are out of control, and feminism in particular is to blame. It is odd to think that misogynist jokes used to attack women for wanting to trap men into marriage. Now the attacks run the opposite way. The tabloids bitterly quote young mothers who say: "So who needs men?" Feminism today has become a bogey, a whipping boy, routinely produced to explain all social ills. Women struggle for equality of choice in matters of sex, their grasp of sovereignty over their bodies; are blamed in particular for the rise in family breakdown, the increase in divorce, and the apparently spiralling delinquency and violence of children. In these lectures I will be looking at the mythic accretions clustering stickily to these themes: men are no longer in control, mothers are not what they used to be, and it's the fault of Germaine Greer, *Cosmopolitan* and headline stars who choose to be single mothers like Michelle Pfeiffer. By holding up to the light modern mythical nodes of this kind I hope to loosen in some cases their binding grip on our imaginations. Replying to one story with another which unravels the former has become central to contemporary thought and art, text as well as image. The idea of a kind of cultural *kontakion*, the Greek antiphonal chorus across the nave of response and reply, invocation and challenge opens a new angle of view.

The she-monster is hardly a new phenomenon. The idea of a female untamed nature which must be leashed or else will wreak havoc closely reflects mythological heroes' struggles against monsters. Greek myth alone offers a host - of Ceres, Harpies, Sirens, Moirae. Associated with fate and death in various ways, they move swiftly, sometimes on wings; birds of prey are their closest kin - the Greeks didn't know about dinosaurs - and they seize as in the word raptor. But seizure also describes the effect of the passions on the body; inner forces, looser, madness, arte, folly, personified in Homer and the tragedies as feminine, snatch and grab the interior of the human creature and take possession. Ungoverned energy in the female always raises the issue of motherhood; fear that the natural bond excludes men and eludes their control courses through ancient myth, which applies various remedies. In Aeschylus's *Oresteia*, when Orestes has murdered his mother Clytemnestra, the matriarchal Furies want justice against the matricide - but they find themselves confronting a new order - led by the god Apollo. Orestes is declared innocent, and in a famous resolution which still has power to shock audiences today, the god decrees:

The mother of what's called her offspring's no parent but only the nurse to the seed that's implanted.

The mounter, the male's the only true parent.

She harbours the bloodshoot, unless some god blasts it.

The womb of the woman's a convenient transit.

In this brutal act of legislation, the god of harmony declares that henceforward, in civilised society, only the father counts. The mother is nothing more than an incubator.

The spectre of gynocracy, of rule by women, stalks through the founding myths of our culture: both Theseus and Hercules fight with the Amazons - and vanquish their queens. The Amazon's separatist queendom made them tantalising but also monstrous in the eyes of the Greeks; the terrible massacres of their army depicted on stone reliefs and vases redounded to the fame of the Greek heroes as surely as cut-ting off Medusa's head.

In the folklore of the past, classical and medieval, the female beast, like the velociraptor, was also sometimes cunning and purposely concealed her true nature: the Sirens lured men with their deceitful songs, and later tempted fierce anchorites in the desert, approaching St Anthony for instance, with honeyed words, hiding their diabolical nether parts under sumptuous dresses. Male beasts, as in *Beauty and the Beast*, or male devils, as in the temptations of St Anthony, don't possess the same degree of duplicity; you can tell you're dealing with the devil on the whole, but when evil comes in female guise, you have to beware: the fairy queen may turn to dust in your arms, and poisonous dust at that. This is a trope that sends thrills through stories as disparate as Wagner's *Tannhauser*, in which the knight loses his soul to the carnal goddess of the Venusberg, and *Rider Haggard's*. She, where, as you might remember from the film, Ursula Andress cracks open like a speeded-up earthquake and reveals beneath the image of loveliness, nothing but a crumbling hag. But none of these dissembling serpents and she-monsters can compare with the vision of Lamia in Keats's gorgeous romance noir:

She was a gordian shape of dazzling hue
Vermilion-spotted, golden, green, and blue;
Striped like a zebra, freckled like a pard,
Eyed like a peacock, and all crimson-barred;
And full of silver moons, that, as she breathed,
Dissolved, or brighter shone, or interwreathed
Their lustres with the gloomier tapestries
She seemed, at once, some penanced lady elf,
Some demon's mistress, or the demon's self
Her head was a serpent, but ah, bitter-sweet!
She had a woman's mouth, with all its pearls complete
Her throat was serpent, but the words she spake
Came, as through bubbling honey, for Love's sake.

But when Lamia woos Lycius, she doesn't, of course, reveal her snaky shape and nature. Only at the last minute, at the wedding feast, she is unmasked. "And with a frightful scream she vanish'd" - while the poor bridegroom expires in a swoon.

Such fairy wives don't only make a pretence of being women; they also contradict all ideas of proper womanly conduct. Of the throng of mythical and monstrous enchantresses, one of the most famous and most fascinating of all is still Medea.

Medea embodies extreme female aberration, from the tragedy by Euripides in the fifth century BC to the fictional translation of her story in Toni Morrison's recent masterpiece, *Beloved*. It is through Medea's sorcery that Jason wins the Golden Fleece: she lulls the snake, its guardian, with a potion obtained from Hecate, Queen of the Night. But she also uses her magic powers to cheat her father, boil an enemy in oil, cut up her brother into little pieces, and eventually, when Jason has abandoned her, to murder her own children by him.

Euripides dramatised with powerful empathy Medea's tragedy: when Jason decides to take another wife more useful to his current ambitions, Medea, who after all had betrayed and killed so much on his behalf, turns on those she loves in revenge. Her maternity is the terrain of her authority, or rather of the authority left to her. And so she strikes at Jason where he is most vulnerable, and where his reach - and all men's - is weakest. Among bad mothers of fantasy she is the worst; and as such she speaks to our times, when the bad mother is always present as an issue, as a threat, as an excuse, as a pleasurable self-justification and as a political argument. Women still use, and abuse, the authority they are allowed as mothers, because it is what they have, or, as in Medea's case, what they have left.

Euripides's tragedy introduced Medea the child-killer, and has made this side of her much more familiar than other texts, which stress her enchantments and, in some cases, her humanity. We pick and choose bad mothers to suit our times just as we pick our dinosaurs. Apollonius Of Rhodes 200 years after Euripides in the *Voyage of Argo* doesn't mention Medea the Murderer. In his story her crime, for which she weeps piteously, consists only in eloping with Jason and cheating her father. But Medea the child murderer contravenes the most fundamental criterion of femininity - maternal love. She shares this with many fantasies of female evil: the inquisition condemned witches for cannibal feasts on children; in Judaic myth, the succubus Lilith was believed to haunt cradles of new-born infants to carry them off, and the classical Lamia was a child-stealer as well as a bloodsucker. Amulets against these harmful powers were worn in medieval Europe; Satanic cults today are held to practise the same gory rites. Myths of female aberration predispose the mind to believe in these monstrous crimes; but the same myths have also stirred resistance. An antiphonal response of women's voices who have sometimes claimed the wicked heroines as foremothers sometimes disclaimed them as slanderous fictions. In 1405, the poet and historian Christine de Pisan, a young widowed single mother, and one of the earliest women to support her family by writing, compiled a riposte to the circulating tittle tattle about women, in her *Book of the City of Ladies*.

She set up an array of heroines, geniuses, leaders, and saints, and portrayed them building a heavenly city. Among the paragons, without turning a hair, she included Medea: "Medea was very beautiful, with a noble and upright heart and a pleasant face."

Later, in a passage on the dangers of love, Pisan relates that Medea unfortunately fell in love with Jason, and listened to her passion, only to find that he abandoned her. This turned her "despondent", writes Pisan. Again, no memory of the remarkable form Medea's despondency took.

When I first read this, nearly 20 years ago, I thought Pisan was absurdly coy, and felt that feminism could not proceed without facing women's crimes as well as their wrongs - the ills they did as well as those done to them. This is still my position - when it comes to historical events; but with regard to myths which shape thought and action - and history - the question

becomes much more complicated. Every telling of a myth is a part of that myth: there is no Ur-version, no authentic prototype, no true account. Pisan's Medea is as mythically true as Euripides's Medea; Pisan is important because she is one of the first women writers to tell stories against the grain of tradition. Hers might tend to whitewash; but the tradition she inaugurated tends more to accept, even revel in the darkness.

The mythical she-monster's allure spellbound Sylvia Plath, for instance, who in the Ariel poems often contemplates atrocity with narcissistic pleasure. The phantom of Medea herself materialises in Edge, one of Plath's most troubling and potent poems, when she invokes the triple death of mother and children as if it were a female calling meeting a need, matching a desire.

The woman is perfected.
Her dead
Body wears the smile of accomplishment,
The illusion of a Greek necessity
Flows in the scrolls of her toga,
Her bare
Feet seem to be saying:
We have come so far, it is over.
Each dead child, coiled, a white serpent.

Here Plath peels away the horror which greets the sight, to uncover the voluptuous shiver it inspires. Plath herself didn't make a recording of Edge but in 1963 she read here on the radio Lady Lazarus, another of her poems in which she claims a she-monster for her own. She resists incrimination and victimhood in this poem, moving through despairing holocaust imagery to conjure the return of a Lilith-like demon. Plath defies her audience to deny her transgressive appetites - nocturnal, man-eating, child killer. She turns to fantasy and projection to increase her own powers of verbal enchantment.

Many other writers and artists and performers today have also moved on to enemy territory where Medea and other monsters are pacing. Singers, dancers, even political activists have also seized myths of female danger; moving in to occupy the metaphorical objects of derision and fear has become a popular strategy. Sometimes this takes the form of ironical co-opting of a jibe or even an insult, as in the open defiance of the black rock group called "Niggaz with Attitude" or the ironic names of women's enter-prises like the famous publishers Virago. In Zagreb five writers were recently denounced as dangerous women in the Croatian nationalist press. The targets immediately accepted the label, and their supporters now wear badges proclaiming them "opasna zena" - dangerous woman. Former misogynist commonplaces are now being seized by women - in rock music, in films, in fiction, even in pornography; women are grasping the 'she-beast' of demonology for themselves. The bad girl is the heroine of our times and transgression is staple entertainment. Madonna clutching her crotch, flexing her thighs, singing "papa don't preach". But this defiance sometimes results, it seems to me, in collusion. It can magnify female demons rather than lay them to rest, for men and for women. Madonna, as she showed in her book Sex, extols her own power in wilful and mindless

blindness to most women's continuing vulnerability in sexual matters. In her case degradation is a fantasy and she is in a unique position to choose to find it sweet. Madonna plugs into men's fear and loathing when she flaunts the insatiable pussy.

Ironies, subversion, inversion, pastiche, masquerade, appropriation - all the post-modern strategies of the last two decades are buckling under the weight of culpability the myth has entrenched. It permeates the furious response, for instance, to the increasing numbers of single mothers. Instead of inquiring into the causes of marriage breakdown, into the background to so many fatherless families, into the reasons women have become heads of households, instead of attending to the needs of women who are raising children on their own and recognising the way the work of care still stitches together the torn fabric of society, lone mothers have come under prolonged and continuing attack. Newspapers, television programmes, the Cabinet, let fly with one accusation after another: one scare story after another. Home alone children of single, working mothers, home alone children of lesbian couples, welfare swindlers, or at least leeches, are spawning child murderers, breeding monsters. And the authorities respond; a prison sentence is handed down for a woman who left her child at home when she went to work, as if sending the mother to jail would give the child the help she needed.

The recent budget allowing the vital principle that a mother can't work without some provision of childcare was at last a small step in the right direction. But the same policymakers who deregulate, who throw employment and housing on to the mercy of market forces want to regulate the family. It would be better if they stopped their law and order ranting and looked clearly at the social revolution that is taking place. Sixty-five per cent of lone parents were once married but they are now coping on their own in almost one in five families in this country, the highest proportion in the EC. Three out of four of these heads of households are women. Like the heir to the throne, more than one in six of his future subjects are being raised by lone mothers. They are, however, rather less well off as these families are amongst the poorest in the country. One of the reasons the public isn't especially afraid that Prince William will turn out a hooligan, but will most likely thrive, has more to do with the comforts he enjoys than the state of his parents' marriage. Women for the most part are doing the best they can in the circumstances and learning to survive as they go. Sometimes this entails choosing to keep the family away from the father, but very few of these families have actively sought the circumstances in which they find themselves. Yet the bitter, angry, ignorant view persists that we inhabit an imaginary cosmos where women on top are somehow killing men and usurping daddy's throne, where Madonna gyrates and strips to proclaim she is in control; that women are spearheading some feminist revolution, having it all their own way because they have been allowed to slip traditional moral restraints. I am not saying that exploitation and abuses do not happen. Nor am I denying that some women are having babies on their own on purpose. But chronic scaremongering about female behaviour, about wild sexuality and aberrant maternity distorts understanding; and matters of urgent social policy, the proper provision of childcare, tax reform, job training and retraining, nursery schools, housing, play areas all sink into a quagmire of prejudice.

A myth is a kind of story told in public, which people pass on to one another. Myths wear an air of ancient wisdom, but that is part of their seductive charm. Not all antiques are better than a modern design - especially if they are needed in ordinary, daily use. Myths offer a lens which can be used to see human identity in its social and cultural context - they can lock us up

in stock reactions, bigotry and fear, but they are not immutable, and by unpicking them, the stories can lead to others. Managing monsters means preventing them from managing us. Myths convey values and expectations which are always evolving, always in the process of being formed, but - and this is fortunate - never set so hard they cannot be changed again, and newly told stories can be more helpful than repeating old ones.

There's a beauty and the beast story that I'd like to tell you because, like many fairy tales, it shows that things are never quite as they seem and that surprises can spring from any quarter. The wedding of Sir Gawain and Dame Ragnell is a verse romance written in the mid-15th century by a forgotten and nameless English poet. It reworks the familiar fairytale theme of a young man's union with a she-monster and, by the way, produces a happy story - at first bawdy, later tender, about the possibility of mutual love and trust against the odds. King Arthur out hunting one day falls foul of a terrible warlock who agrees to spare him only on condition that the King discovers within a year the answer to that fundamental question: what do women want? If King Arthur cannot give the right answer, his head is forfeit. When his time of grace is almost up Arthur comes across a ghastly hag, a lady so foul the poet lets rip with a full-blown comic lexicon of loathliness. She knows the true answer and she will pass it on to Arthur but only if he gives her Sir Gawain for a husband. This is a bitter blow. However when Arthur tells Gawain, Gawain, that pattern of chivalry, wants nothing better than to serve his liege lord, and he agrees to the match. The loathly lady then reveals: "We desire of men, above all manner of things, to have the sovereignty. For where we have sovereignty, all is ours. Though a knight be never so fierce and ever the mastery win, of the most manliest is our desire to have the sovereignty of such a sire. Such is our craft and ginne."

So to the question what do women want? - which would vex Freud so deeply later - the answer is sovereignty; and womanly wiles, women's craft and gin tend to this hidden purpose. This solution, spoken to a classical or a Christian audience where the subordination of women was considered nature ordained by divine commandment automatically conjures the sexual and political nightmare of rule by women - velociraptors doing just as they please. But the tale of the loathly lady subsequently takes a surprising turn against the grain of its own misogyny. Gawain does indeed marry the foul hag Dame Ragnell with her boar's tusk teeth and hanging paps. And in bed on the wedding night he gallantly consents to kiss her, whereupon he finds he holds in his arms the fairest creature that ever he saw. She tells him she is bound by a spell and she then puts to him an old fey riddle: would he have her fair by night and foul by day or vice versa? It is to this conundrum that the perfect knight answers "But do as ye list now, my lady gaye". By allowing her sovereignty at that moment Sir Gawain performs the final magic which undoes the spell and his loathly lady is transformed becoming fair both by day and night, and they live together in great happiness. But for only five years, for then the poet tells us in a line which pulls the romance oddly into history, she tragically dies young.

The story based on the same material Chaucer used for the Wife of Bath in the Canterbury tales can be read at one level as yet another medieval joke about wilful wives, hen-pecked husbands, as a hostile parable about women on top. Or it can be taken to point towards a utopian destination of negotiated exchanges, of generosity and trust. Sovereignty here can of course be interpreted as domination, and the legend as a burlesque commentary on women's lusts for sex and mastery, a cautionary tale about the secret will to power of all women which men must recognise and control. But the story's sudden swerve out of comedy into romance, out of bawdy into lyricism, promises high rewards for mutual respect and extols Gawain for

his courtesy towards the loathsome, despised old hag. Sovereignty over self not over others; the right to govern one's own person, not the right to govern others. The loathly lady gives him love and Gawain brings about her restored shape. Her emancipation follows his growing understanding.

As a footnote to this look at the serpentine metamorphoses of the monstrous female, I would like to direct your notice to some scientific data about the praying mantis. "Eckehard Liske and W Jackson Davis of Santa Cruz, California videotaped the mantises' courtship while the insects thought they were in private and found a pleasant ritual dance in place of cannibalism - and with both partners surviving. The researchers say that until now scientists have distracted the insects by their presence and by watching them under bright lights - and that they didn't give them enough to eat."

This most loved creature in the surrealist bestiary of misogynist folklore, this insect famous for devouring her mate alive after mating, has been vindicated. Let them alone, give them enough to eat and look. They fall into peaceful, mutual, post-coital slumber.

Lecture 2: Boys Will Be Boys

As I was going to the Future Entertainment Show held in Olympia last year, I soon found I was the only woman waiting for the Tube. The station was unusually full for the middle of the morning, with scattered young men in jeans and trainers, gaggles of young boys, one or two fathers. When the train came and the carriage doors opened, a rather dazed looking London pigeon fluttered out. A man near me laughed. "Don't worry," he said, "it's only a virtual reality pigeon."

I streamed in to the show with the crowd, clutching my razzle-dazzle, hi-tech, impossible-to-forge ticket, and plunged into the roaring hall. The video games industry has grown in value from almost nothing to 700m pounds over the past four years. On multiple screens the season's new offerings in interactive play and 3-D simulation were being triggered by the very latest in ergonomic joypads to keep bleeping, scrolling, beaming up, blasting, crashing, bursting into flames and starting up again. I wasn't the only woman any longer: there were one or two grannies, one or two mums. And the marketing staff on the stalls were almost all women - "skirt power" to the trade - and they were selling and busking in green bug costumes as zools or zoozes or other technological gremlins. But we were interlopers. It was a man's world. The customers and players were almost all boys.

In the "chill-out zone" in the gallery, at stands and on platforms, the players at the banked consoles of games were busy zapping and slicing and chopping and head-butting and dragon-punching. Popular culture teems with monsters, with robots, cyborgs and aliens, fiends, mutants, vampires and replicants. Millennial turmoil, the disintegration of so many familiar political blocs and the appearance of new national borders, ferocious civil wars, global catastrophes from famine to Aids, threats of ecological disasters, of another Chernobyl, of larger holes in the ozone - all these dangers feed fantasies of the monstrous. At the same time, scientific achievements in genetics, reproduction, cosmetic surgery and transplants have also raised tough and unresolved ethical anxieties about the manufacture of new beings. These are reflected in myths at every level of our culture: in the plots of books, in films, advertisements, song lyrics, and games. These monsters are made actual; they seem to surround us. The

manuals accompanying the role playing game of Dungeons and Dragons illustrate the ghast or the ghoul, the flail snail or the dimensional shambola with diagrams of their thumb grip or their bite and provide maps of where they roam. And in games like Streets of Rage, Mortal Combat, Instruments of Chaos, Night Trap, Canon Fodder, Street Fighter, Legacy of Sir Asoul, The Rise of the Robots, Zombie Apocalypse, Psycho Santa, Splatter-house, the hero slays monsters - just as Jason and the Argonauts did and Hercules at his twelve labours. Indeed some of the games even quote classical adventures in their pantheons. But the computer's capacity to proliferate means that in video games there are many, many dragons, many monsters, many enemies, many aliens one after another, and they all have to be shot and blasted, hacked and slashed level by level as the player works through the stacked platforms of the plot. Some maze puzzles, some role playing games require strategy, but mostly the hero busts his way through. A review described the contest between Robocop and Terminator. "It's total cyberpunk ultra violence, the kind of game where you just kill everything. It's great."

Myths and monsters have been interspliced since the earliest extant poetry from Sumer: the one often features the other. The word myth, from the Greek, means a form of speech; while the word monster is derived, in the opinion of one Latin grammarian, from monestrum, via moneo, and encloses the notions of advising, of reminding, above all of warning. But moneo, in the word monstium, has come under the influence of Latin monstrare, to show, and the combination neatly characterises the form of speech myth often takes: a myth shows something, it is a story spoken to a purpose, it issues a warning, it gives an account which advises and tells, often by bringing into play showings of fantastical shape and invention - monsters. Myths de-fine enemies and aliens, and in conjuring them up they say who we are and what we want. They tell stories to impose structure and order. Like fiction, they can tell the truth even while they are making it all up.

Chaos threatens in various forms: the she-monster Chimera spat fire from three heads, but the hero Bellerophon flying down on the winged horse Pegasus was able to pierce her in her fiery gullet. The flames melted his spear tip and she choked to death as the lead cooled inside her. Chimera's name came to mean illusion: the ultimate monster of monsters, who is both frighteningly there and yet a spectre, who shows something real that at the same time only exists in the mind.

Reason can be awake and beget monsters. Extreme, fantastical, and insubstantial as they are, they materialise real desires and fears, they embody meaning at a deeper, psychic level. We are living in a new age of faith of sorts, of myth-making, of monsters, of chimeras. And these chimeras define human identity, especially the role of men.

In Mary Shelley's novel Frankenstein, published in 1818, one of the dominant myths today finds its most powerful and tragic expression. The book's central figures have leapt the boundaries of the novel itself into all kinds of retellings, periodic and straight. It is no accident that it is being remade yet again for the screen this year with Kenneth Branagh and Robert De Niro. Frankenstein has become the contemporary parable of perverted science, but this reading overlooks the author's much more urgent message. Mary Shelley grasped the likelihood that a man might make a monster in his own image and then prove incapable of taking responsibility for him. When the creature at last confronts Victor Frankenstein, the creator who shuns him, he pleads with him, using "thou", the archaic address of intimacy:

“I am thy creature, and I will be even mild and docile to my natural lord and king if thou wilt also perform thy part, which thou owest me. Re-member that I am thy creature; I ought to be thy Adam, but I am rather the fallen angel, whom thou drivest from joy for no misdeed. Every-where I see bliss, from which I alone am irrevocably excluded. I was benevolent and good; misery made me a fiend. Make me happy and I shall again be virtuous.” “Begone! I will not hear you. There can be no community between you and me; we are enemies. Begone, or let us try our strength in a fight, in which one must fall.”

Victor Frankenstein rejects and wants to destroy the being he has generated from his own intelligence and imagination; he can only flee, and then, when confronted, offer mortal combat - in the desire to be the victor, as his name suggests. Her novel pleads on the creature's behalf: he is capable of goodness if Frankenstein would only love him and teach him and include him, not abandon him to his pariah state. The remedy for Frankenstein's hubris does not lie in destroying the monster; Shelley writes explicitly against dealing with evil by heroic, lethal exploits. Implicitly, she is recasting the monster in the image of its creator: the creature issues from Frankenstein as his brainchild who is also his double, who acts to define him. Here the beast is the one who knows this and presses his maker to accept it. Her extraordinary and brilliant book inaugurates a new breed of monster, who is not ultimately alien, but my brother, my self.

When popular myth places characters like Slugathon or Robocop centre stage, and then annihilates them until the next Avatar appears, they are conjuring up the per-verted products of human intelligence. Unlike Mary Shelley's book, these plot lines almost invariably reject the offspring of science and propose the enemy monster's defeat through force. Nobody in this kind of story sits down to learn to talk, as Frankenstein's creature does so poignantly and so elaborately when he eavesdrops on the English lessons given in the woodland cottage by the old man and his family to the beautiful Arabian fugitive Safie.

Current tales of conflict and extermination never hear the monster say: “I am malicious, because I am miserable” or “Make me happy, and I shall again be virtuous.” The phrases sound absurd because we are so accustomed to expect the hero to have no other way of managing the monsters than slaying them.

Monsters who manifest their nature, like Frankenstein's creature, clearly present easier targets than those in disguise. Deception is a theme that runs through the history of fantasy art. It achieves a brilliant apotheosis with the replicants of Blade Runner, Ridley Scott's cult movie. Replicants are androids, impervious, almost invulnerable; but they look human and they have been artificially provided with memories of childhood. They do not know that they are monsters. As the word android implies, they are men - and yet not men at the same time. This is the ultimate, representative nightmare of this fin de siecle; 150-odd years ago, Frankenstein's creature suffered because he knew his own deformity. Jekyll and Hyde knew each other well, though the evil Hyde, as his name tells us, was already concealed within Jekyll. This is still optimistic stuff compared to Blade Runner. The film - and the book - touch a live contemporary nerve when they imagine that the robotic monsters look just like humans, that their nature is not apparent - neither to us, nor to them.

The acute, painful problem today is that these manufactured monsters are ourselves; and ourselves especially as the male of the species. A recent shift in the telling of an old, widely distributed legend illustrates rather well the new fascination and unease surrounding men: in

this urban myth, a woman living alone hears a strange sound coming from her kitchen, and going in she sees a hand working its way towards the latch through an opening that has just been sawn in the door. So she takes a poker, leaves it in the fire, waits until it is glowing, and then attacks the hand which instantly withdraws with an accompanying yell of pain. The next day the woman bumps into the child who lives next door, who tells her by the way that her father was taken to hospital the night before with a terrible burn on his hand. In the old, familiar version, the intruder was a witch; a recurrent monster in such creepy tales. But she has now turned into a man, an ordinary family man, a neighbour who - and this is crucial - does not look dangerous.

Fear of men has grown alongside belief that aggression - including sexual violence - inevitably defines the character of the young male. Another myth shadows the con-temporary concept of male nature: that intruder could be a rapist. Alongside the warrior, the figure of the sex criminal has dug deep roots in the cultural formation of masculinity. The kids who kill a series of ghouls or aliens can tell themselves they are not like the monsters they are killing. But the serial killer - the very term is of recent coinage - has a human face like theirs. He has dominated contemporary folklore, a figure of thrill and dread, for 100 years. The terror of Jack the Ripper gripped the Victorians, and present-day murderers are now interviewed on television from prison. The partwork magazine *Real Life Crimes*, giving details and methods, sells around 60,000 copies an issue. The London Dungeon features life-size mannequins of murdered prostitutes lying bespattered with blood; autopsy photographs of mutilated bodies; and a café, brightly called Ripper's Rapid Snacks.

Films - and the books they are based on - often mete out punishment to sexual women, in the same way as spectators of the Ripper's victims in the London Dungeon enjoy the horror even as they shudder at it. But video games are more scrupulous about current taboos: most of their heroes cannot be seen to attack and murder women as such - with the result that women have pretty much disappeared from the plots altogether. There is the occasional dewy-eyed girl hoodlum or pixie-haired hell-raiser or salacious spider woman, and there are some female street fighters - all active, assertive types and good examples of how positive imaging can backfire. But the effect of the almost total absence of women from this all-engulfing imaginary world of boys is to intensify the sense of apartness, of alienation, of the deep oppositeness of the female sex.

Modern myths still approach the enigma of sexual difference using very old, simple formulae - and if the girls are getting tough, the tough get tougher. In this emphasis on warrior strength, the new stories conform to very ancient ones, stories which were grounded in the different social circumstances of a military, or pastoral archaic society - the heroes of Greece, the samurai of Japan. Slaying monsters, controlling women, still offer a warrant for the emerging hero's heroic character; this feeds the definition of him as a man. But this narrative is so threadbare, it has come away from the studs that held it to the inner stuff of experience: warrior fantasies today offer a quick rush of compensatory power, but pass on no survival skills - either for a working or a family life.

When the young Achilles is hidden by his mother in women's clothes, because she knows from the oracle that he is to die in the Trojan war, it proves child's play to winkle him out. Odysseus, the crafty one, disguises himself as a merchant and goes to the court of Lycomedes, among whose daughters Achilles has been concealed. Odysseus devises a kind of Trojan horse, a chestful of gifts overflowing with jewels and trinkets and textiles - and precious

weapons. The king's daughters bedeck themselves, of course, but Achilles girds himself over his frock with sword and buckler and is unmasked by a triumphant Odysseus and carried off to win the war for the Greeks. Pika Baroque paintings exist of the warrior revealed, grasping his weapons while the girls primp; and the subject inspired a baroque tragi-comic opera by Metastasio, which in turn prompted the English version called Achilles in petticoats.

But the mighty Greek heroes are not the only models of the male. Achilles might choose a mighty sword and Hercules use muscle power and a big stick. But in the fairy-tale tradition, by contrast, heroes develop other skills. In the Arabian Nights a poor fisherman finds a bottle in his nets and when he opens it a huge angry ogre of a genie rises up and threatens the fisherman with instant death. The fisherman responds that he cannot believe that anyone so awesome and so magnificent could ever have fitted into such a little bottle, and he begs the genie to show him how he did it. The genie obliges and gradually winds himself into the vessel. The fisherman jumps on it and stoppers it up in a trice. He then refuses to let the genie out again until he has granted him fabulous riches.

Cunning and high spirits are the mark of these hopeful myths which imagine a different world, which hold out a promise of happiness and transformation. Some sceptics might object that the cunning hero or the lucky simpleton does not belong in epic or tragedy where the ideals of manliness are forged, but fairytale elements are impossible to keep separate from the grandest of myths. When Oedipus meets the sphinx, it is a battle of wits. No bloodshed accompanies his defeat of her reign of terror. After solving her riddle, he just leaves her, whereupon her mystery undone, she hurls herself from a precipice.

In Homer, Odysseus tells the cyclops that his name is Nobody. So when Odysseus blinds the cyclops in his one eye, the giant howls for help to his father, the God of the Sea, and the other Olympians. "That all the Gods here," is his cry, "nobody has blinded me," and so they do nothing. This trick from the Odyssey is literally one of the oldest in the book. The hero who lives by his wits survives in countless hard luck Puss in Boots style stories. Charlie Chaplin and even Woody Allen have worked this groove, the heroic pathetic. But the gleeful use of cunning and high spirits against brute force, the reliance on subterfuge have almost faded from heroic myths told today. In the prevailing popular concept of masculinity, as reflected in comics, rock bands, street fashion, Clint Eastwood or Arnold Schwarzenegger movies, the little man, the riddler or trickster, has yielded before the type of warrior hero, the paradigm of the fittest survivor.

It is striking to see from old footage of the Olympic Games how skinny and scrawny athletes used to be; the bigness of men, body building, muscle toning has never been so important to gender definition as it is today. This contemporary belief that fitness is literally embodied in physical size neglects to pay attention to the rather more important questions: what kind of way of life are the survivors defending? What society are they making? It is interesting that the doctrine of the survival of the fittest has become conventional wisdom. Opposing theories have pointed out that animal cooperation and respect for resources are rather more necessary for survival than dog eats dog. But ideas which stress thoughtful mutual arrangements and exchanges in nature sound like marginal utopian New Age crankery.

Cunning intelligence - in Greek the Goddess Metis - has been superseded by force as the wellspring of male authority and power; in today's morality, force even feels somehow cleaner, purer, more upright. The very word "wily", the very idea of subterfuge, carry a stain

of dishonour. Boys are not raised to be cozeners or tricksters; it would be unthinkable to train future men in lures and wiles and masks and tricks. They are brought up to play with Action Man and his heavy-duty, futuristic Star Wars arsenal. They are taught to identify with Ninja Turtles as crusaders, vigilantes, warriors on behalf of the planet, to flick a transformer toy from a flash car into a heavy duty fighting exoskeleton bristling with weapons: the Terminator, Robocop.

I am not advocating the conman over the soldier or the cozeners over the honest gentleman. That would be absurd. I am observing a trend towards defining male identity and gender through visible, physical, sexualised signs of potency rather than verbal, mental agility.

Such signs coarse through the hardening capillaries of the social system with unprecedented fluidity, carried by a thousand different conduits in a million images and soundbites. It is so obvious, but it bears repeating: no participant in the mystery celebrating the exploits of Hercules, no member of the audience at the tragedies of Agamemnon or Jason had their stories recapitulated and reproduced and beamed at him or her again and again in a frenzied proliferation of echoes. This use of repetition combines with another new and very popular form of story-telling today: the advertisement. The principal task of an ad to persuade has altered response to the myths advertising often absorbs and reinterprets. The mythic heroes of the Greek story cycles like Oedipus, like Jason, like Orestes served as tragic warnings; their pride, their knowing and unknowing crimes, the matricides and infanticides, self-blindings and suicides, all the strife and horror they undergo and perpetrate did not make them exemplary, but cautionary. They provoked terror and pity, not emulation. The tragedies they inspired offered their heroes as objects of debate, not models. No one coming out of Oedipus at Colonus would feel he wanted to be Oedipus in the way that a spaghetti Western today excites hero worship for Clint Eastwood.

But in the arenas of contemporary culture - the tv channel, the computer game, the toy shop, the street - traditional mythic figures of masculinity like the warrior and the rapist circulate and recirculate every day, setting up models, not counter-examples. They are appealing to the group's purchasing power, shaping tastes, playing on rivalry and vulnerability. They do not cry "Beware", but rather "Aspire!"

Boys will be boys, people say, when they mean aggression, violence, noise, guns. Why does an age which believes in medical and scientific intervention on a heroic scale, which works for change - and delivers it - co-exist with a determinist philosophy about human nature and gender? The point about Frankenstein assembling the monster from body parts haunts contemporary consciousness, but the book's main philosophical argument - that his viciousness is learned, not innate - that is some-how overlooked. The biological and genetic revolution already upon us can alter and save bodies, but stories which feature such bodies assume that their natures are static, determined, doomed. Rare is the character in a video game or comic strip who develops or learns to be different. Yet anthropology has shown that, in the territory of sexuality as well as other human areas, social expectation affects character.

Masculinity varies from group to group, place to place, and its varieties are inculcated, not naturally so.

Societies who expect boys to be unflinching warriors subject them to rituals of traumatic severity in order to harden them. Among the Sambias in New Guinea, a tribe in which men are warriors and nothing else, and women are feared and despised, boys are removed into

exclusive male control around the age of six, and then begin a series of violent initiations to turn them into men like their fathers. Proper, cultural masculinity does not come naturally, it seems, to a New Guinea highlander. Why should it to a child living in Kentish Town or Aberdeen?

Among another rather less remote people living today in the Balkans, in the mountains of Montenegro, the birth of a daughter inspires routine, ritual lamentation. Blood feuds are handed down from generation to generation, and if there is no son surviving in a family to carry on the feud, a daughter can be raised in his place and become a sworn virgin, a warrior in disguise to defend her family like a man. Her true sex will never again on pain of death be alluded to either in her presence or out of it. When the Serbian-Montenegrin forces in the current war in the Balkans cursed the women they raped, that they would bear children who would forever be their enemies and fight against their mother and her people, they were behaving according to a particular concept of inherited social beliefs. They were speaking out of a ferocious commitment to military values, paternal lineage and a cult of male heroism.

I am not offering an excuse, a rationale, or an adequate explanation of men's capacity to rape and kill. But I am rejecting the universalising argument about male nature that the rapes committed in former Yugoslavia are committed simply because men are rapists. This argument goes, in the words of one prominent American rights lawyer, Catherine McKinnon, "men do in war what they do in peace, only more so" and also that "similar acts are common everywhere in peacetime and are widely understood as sex". These sweeping assertions work against mobilising change; they present as sovereign truth beyond history, beyond society, the idea that the swagger and the cudgel come naturally to men due to their testosterone, a hormone that, according to this view, is always in excess.

Delinquency among young men has provoked acute alarm recently - one man in three in Britain will have been convicted of a crime by the age of 30. And it is carelessly repeated that single mothers are specially to blame. But it is interesting to look at the problem of fatherless boys from another angle. The popular argument goes that boys brought up by their mothers alone compensate through violence for the lack of a strong male role model in their lives; that they express the anger they feel at the sole female authority at home. But this could be put the other way round: the culture that produces irresponsible fathers openly extols a form of masculinity opposed to continuity, care, negotiation and even cunning - qualities necessary to make lasting attachments between men and children, men and women. These boys are not deprived of a strong masculine role model, they are not in rebellion, but are suffering from the compulsion of conforming. They are exposed to blanket saturation in a myth of masterful individualist independence. They are bit players training to be heroes in a narrative which can proceed only by conflict to rupture. Men have been abandoning their families, and almost half never see their children again after two years.

In Mary Shelley's later, apocalyptic novel, significantly called *The Last Man*, the hero exclaims: "This, I thought, is power! Not to be strong of limb, hard of heart, ferocious and daring; but kind, compassionate and soft."

It is a measure of the depth of our present failure of nerve that these words sound ridiculous, embarrassing, inappropriate; that this cry strikes one as a heap of hooey, a foolish dream, a chimera. Mary Shelley's utopianism is too ardent for our cynical times. But we can take away

from her work the crucial knowledge that monsters are made, not given. And if monsters are made, not given, they can be unmade, too.

Lecture 3: Little Angels, Little Devils: Keeping Children Innocent

In 1828, a young man was found in the market square of Nuremberg. He could write his name, Kaspar Hauser, but he could not speak, except for a single sentence: "I want to be a rider like my father." He had been kept all his life in a cellar, alone in the dark until his unexplained release that day. Although he was in his teens when he suddenly appeared, he seemed a symbolic child, a stranger to society, a tabula rasa in whom ignorance and innocence perfectly coincided. In his wild state, Kaspar Hauser offered his new minders and teachers a blueprint of human nature - un-touched. And in his case, his character fulfilled the most idealised image of original innocence.

He was sick when given meat to eat, passed out when given beer, and showed so little aggression and cruelty that he picked off his fleas without crushing them to set them free. His story attracted myth-making in his own time, and has continued to inspire writers and film-makers. The most recent work, a book-length narrative poem by the English poet David Constantine, opens with the apparition of Kaspar Hauser out of nowhere.

He stood there swaying on his sticky feet

His head was bowed, the light had hurt his eyes

The pigeons ran between his feet like toys and he was mithered by the scissoring swifts

Even an embryo raises its little paws against the din But Kaspar stood there, sucking it all in

There he remained until the windows folded their wooden lids back in rows

From all the openings of their ordinary lives, the people stared

They inched, already aghast, at all the questions he would make them ask.

Kaspar Hauser was an enigma, and after his mysterious return to the world his life never did become free from strange, turbulent incident: he was suspected of fabrication, he was assaulted and wounded by an unknown assailant, and later was thought to be the usurped heir to the throne of Baden. His innate, gentle goodness could not save him: he was attacked, seduced, betrayed, and abandoned by his would-be adoptive father, the Englishman Lord Stanhope. And finally he was murdered, in still un-solved circumstances, in 1833.

There had been other wild children who had inspired scientific experiments into human development, but Kaspar Hauser more than any other foreshadows this century's struggle with the question of the child's natural character. And his fate still offers a timely parable about the nostalgic worship of childhood innocence, which is more marked today than it has ever been: the difference of the child from the adult has become a dominant theme in contemporary mythology.

In literature this has produced two remarkable dream figures living in voluntary exile from grown-up society - Kipling's unforgettably vivid Mowgli and J M Barrie's cocky hero, the

boy who wouldn't grow up, Peter Pan. Both reveal the depth of adult investment in a utopian childhood state, and this can lead to disillusion, often punitive and callous, with the young as people. The belief that there is a proper childlike way for children to be has deep roots. In his novel about Kaspar Hauser, written in 1908, the German writer Jakob Wassermann put his finger on the dreams the boy stirred:

“This creature reeling helplessly in an alien world, his gaze cumbered with sleep, his gestures curbed by fear, his noble brow enthroned above a somewhat wasted face. The peace and purity of heart that appear in that brow, to my mind they are incontestable signs. If my suspicions prove correct, if I can lay bare the roots of this life and make its branches blossom, I shall hold up a mirror of immaculate humanity to our dull, insensitive world, and people will see that there are valid proofs of the existence of the soul which the idolaters of our times deny with so squalid a vehemence.”

In this ringing declaration we catch the full expression of a belief which still has purchase today: that the child and the soul are somehow interchangeable and that, consequently, children are the keepers and guarantors of humanity's reputation. This has inspired a wonderfully rich culture of childhood, one of the most remarkable phenomena of modern society, from an unsurpassed imaginative literature for children today to profound psychoanalytical speculations on the thinking processes and even language of the foetus. But it also has social consequences for children themselves that are not all benign.

Childhood, placed at a tangent to adulthood, perceived as special and magical, precious and dangerous at once, has turned into some volatile stuff - hydrogen, or mercury, which has to be contained. The separate condition of the child has never been so bounded by thinking, so established in law as it is today. This mythology is not fallacious or merely repressive. Myths are not only delusions - chimeras - but also tell stories which can give shape and substance to practical, social measures. How we treat children really tests who we are, fundamentally conveys who we hope to be.

The separate sphere of childhood has grown - as a social concept, as a market Possibility, as an area of research, as a Problem: children are no longer chattels, anymore than women, and new legal measures like the Children's Act give them voice and choices in decision making about their legal situation. Incest, molestation and even rape in families have always taken place, but never have more attempts been made - often with appalling clumsiness - to save children from their perpetrators.

Fiction and reportage also focus on the child as so radically different that he or she stands in an oblique relation to human society, not entirely part of it, not yet incorporated into history. Charities, in hard-pressed competition for funds, resort to more and more explicit images of maimed, starving, diseased, orphaned and doomed infants and children in order to raise money for schemes which are frequently intended to help everyone, like cancer research or water suppliers.

The injured child has become today's icon of humanity. It is no accident that the Victorian melodrama *Les Miserables* inspired one of the contemporary theatre's greatest successes, that the saucer-eyed, starveling waif staring from the posters drew thousands to the musical. The phantom face of James Bulger has become the most haunting image of present horrors and social failure - his innocence an appeal and an accusation.

Some historians, like Philippe Aries, have suggested (rather influentially) that the comparative off-handedness towards children in the past denotes indifference, and that the kind of love we expect and know today is a comparatively modern phenomenon, a bourgeois luxury. Certainly hardly any examples of children's own writings or paintings survive, and few records of their behaviour have come down, until parents - in 17th century Holland, for instance - began keeping diaries. But this does not necessarily mean parents didn't care. The testimony of graves yields another story. From Roman epitaphs to memorials in Westminster Abbey, the accents of grief sound across the centuries. On a tomb in the Etruscan necropolis of Cerveteri, near Rome, a father had these verses written for his daughter, Asiatica:

"Here lies the lifeless body of my beloved little girl, who has been plunged into a bitter death by the Fates - her unlucky life had lasted less than 10 years. Cruel fates, who have saddened my old age! For I shall always seek, little Asiatica, to see your face again, shaping its features in my mind to find some consolation. My only solace will be to see you again, as soon as possible, when, my life over, our two shades will be united."

Not only tombs, but stories too convey the intense attachment felt for children: in tragedy the murders of offspring provide the believable motive for the most terrible revenges: Clytemnestra never forgets that Agamemnon allowed her daughter Iphigenia to be sacrificed to get a fair wind for Troy. For this, in Euripides' play, she makes the first literal bloodbath of him.

It seems to me children have always been cherished. But the present cult of the child loves them for a new and different reason. It insists on children's intimate connection to a wonderful, free-floating world of the imagination. Their observable active fantasy life, their fluid make-believe play seem to give them access to a world of wisdom, and this in turn brings them close to myth and fairy-tale. These ideas were grown in the ground of Romanticism: Wordsworth's line, "heaven lies about us in our infancy", reflects, for instance, the idealism of German metaphysics at the time.

The Romantic thirst to recover childlikeness had a huge influence on the growth of interest in children and the activities of their minds. Anthologies with titles like *Myths of the Greeks and Romans*; *Tanglewood Tales*; *Tales of the Norse Gods and Heroes*, all treating myth and legend, began to be produced as children's literature in the last century. The childhood of the species - the era of myth and legend - seemed appropriate for the young. And the heroes of wonder narratives of all kinds gradually became younger, to invite the young listener or reader's identification.

This change had certain serious consequences. The tale of Cupid and Psyche for instance, which later inspired *Beauty and the Beast*, first appears in the second century ribald metaphysical novel by Apuleius, *The Golden Ass*: there, it is an adult romance, and Cupid and Psyche have been lovers for some time when Psyche breaks the spell by looking at Cupid in bed with her. The Neoplatonists in the Renaissance allegorised the tale as the spiritual quest of the Soul for love - still no hint of child protagonists or a child audience. But by the 18th century, the romance itself is transformed into the fairy-tale *Beauty and the Beast* and, filtered through the eyes of a well-meaning governess, it turns into a moral lesson in love, directed at her young charges to prepare them for tricky moments lying ahead: Beauty is certainly not going to bed with the Beast, but deciding whether or not they should get engaged.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the Grimm brothers began gathering material for their famous collection of German fairy-tales. They relied on a heterogeneous group of sources - members of their own family, servants, a tailor's wife, several landed aristocratic friends - all of them adults who had continued to pass on the stories in mixed company of men and women, old and young. The Grimms' full title, *Children's and Household Tales*, retained the hint of a universal audience, but there is no doubt that their pioneering work nourished the concept that such tales belong in a special way to children. However, the brothers quickly realised that if the tales were to become children's fare, their previous adult entertainment value - their sad-ism, eroticism, cruelty, and immoral distribution of just and unjust desserts - had to be either censored or explained. This led to clipping and tucking and letting in here and letting out there. On the whole, sex was out and violence was in, and lots of it, especially in the form of gleeful retributive justice. The wicked stepmother in "Snow White" could dance to death in her red-hot shoes, but the Sleeping Beauty - who still comatose had borne twins to the prince in earlier versions - could only be kissed.

The difficulty is that by angling such material at children in particular, the pleasure they took in it marked out bloodthirstiness, fearlessness and even callousness as childish, rather than universally human. By making children the heroes and heroines of such stories, the erotic discoveries and ordeals many of them describe had to be disinfected, leaving them latent in violent symbols and gory plots. By placing eroticism itself off limits to children, a young child's active curiosity about sex then became wicked. Children could inspire desire, but mustn't express it - again like women in the 19th century.

In the postwar period, psychoanalytic thinkers, like Bruno Bettelheim in his influential study *The Uses of Enchantment*, deepened the association of fairy-tale with children, and of cruel fantasy with the childish imagination. Bettelheim affirmed the therapeutic value of struggle and horror for the growing child, arguing that as a small, vulnerable creature suffering from adults' tyranny, it was very helpful to read about other small, vulnerable creatures, like Cinderella, or Tom Thumb, who survive - or better still, win through - against all adversity. From this perspective, nothing in fantasy was perceived as too foul or too violent. Brightly coloured picture books of "Cinderella", for instance, now include the bloody chopping of one sister's toes and the lopping of the other's heel, and climax with the final putting out of the ugly sisters' eyes.

The theory that children need to compensate for their own hapless dependence by imagining themselves huge and powerful and cruel has also normalised all manner of frightening play-acting, equating children with monsters, childhood with a savage state. Stephen Jay Gould, the biologist, has pointed out that kids do not have an innate kinship with dinosaurs, but that it has been fostered by intensive marketing; the relationship seems based in some idea of shared primitiveness - and future extinction. Lots of toys appeal to the idea of children's innate savagery - from huge, furry, clawed slippers for tiny tots to wear to bed to warn off any other beats in the night, to dinosaur lunchboxes and watches. As a gift catalogue describes, 'at the touch of a button, the fearsome Tyrannosaurus Rex emits a bloodcurdling little raw'. In the very midst of consecrating innocence, the modern mythology of childhood ascribes to children a specially rampant natural appetite for all kinds of transgressive pleasures, including, above all, the sadomasochistic thrills of fear. And these child heroes and heroines now enjoy a monopoly on all kinds of unruly passions which adults later have to learn to control in themselves.

Child protagonists have become so commonplace that the convention has become invisible. In books written for children, from the great Victorian originals like *The Water Babies* and the two Alice stories to the Billy Bunter and Angela Brazil series, the Famous Five and the Secret Seven, as well as books by original and in-spired contemporaries of ours like Sue Townsend and Joan Aiken with their vivid protagonists Adrian Mole and Dido Twite, it has become axiomatic that the child reader enjoys identifying with a child. Films reaching - successfully - for the family audience also place children centre stage: characters like Dorothy in *The Wizard of Oz*, or now Aladdin in the new Disney cartoon, have grown younger and younger as the cinema as a medium grows older.

The tendency isn't limited to the growing market in children's entertainment; the child's eye view has become one of the most adopted and fertile narrative positions in all media: Henry James mined its dense and poignant ironies in *What Maisie Knew*, still the greatest novel about divorce and what the papers call a tug-of-love baby. It is interesting to glance at a list of really successful novels and see just how many adopt a child's eye: from *The Catcher in the Rye* to *Empire of the Sun* and, more recently, Ben Okri's *The Famished Road* and Roddy Doyle's *Paddy Clarke Ha Ha Ha*. In the cinema, the device gives the camera itself its role: what the child sees, the lens follows, claiming equal impartiality of ignorance or innocence. Again, a list includes highly successful films destined for an adult audience: the big-budget *Witness*, the arthouse masterpiece *The Spirit of the Beehive*, Ingmar Bergman's lyrical and tender memoir, *Fanny and Alexander*, use the central perspective of a child to draw the spectator into a different angle of vision, to make us accept the camera's pristine truthfulness, to intensify the pathos and the drama. By making us as little children, we are helped to shed cynicism and resistance to the material on view, and to mind more, because more is at stake - the image of a child always opens up the horizon to a possible future, and so when the clouds lower, it feels darker.

The nagging, yearning desire to work back to a pristine state of goodness, an Eden of lost innocence, has focused on children. On the map of contemporary imaginative pathways, J M Barrie stands as firmly as the statue of Peter Pan gives West London children their bearings in the park. He truly became a founding father of today's cult of children when in his famous play of 1904, he made the audience responsible for the continued existence of fairyland.

CLIP: PETER PAN

Barrie had been so anxious that nobody would clap in reply that he paid a clack to do so in the first performances, but then found that it was unnecessary. Adults applaud the world of pretend and children follow. The statement of faith in fairies signals collusion with Peter Pan, the boy who never grew up. It affirms the connection of the adult with that childhood Eden in which the Lost Boys are still living. But at this point a double bind catches us in its toils for the defiance of itself admits the impossibility of Peter Pan and the Lost Boys' state. Grownups want them to stay like that for their sakes, not the children's, and they want children to be simple enough to believe in fairies too - again for humanity's sake on the whole to prove something against the evidence. Contemporary child mythology enshrines children to meet adult desires and dreams, including romantic and surrealist yearnings to live through the imagination with unfettered, unrepressed fantasy. In turn, this presupposes that the child has access to a form of desirable wisdom of potent innocence which can't tell pretend from real, sex from sexlessness, a kind of supernatural irrationality. But perhaps only a Kaspar Hauser raised in total isolation could ever meet these de-mands.

Yet, even as I speak, I can hear objections flying thick and fast: for every dozen wonderful innocents in literature or popular culture, there are unsettling figures of youthful untruth and perversity: children today, far from holding up the lit lamp of hope like the little girl in Picasso's *Guernica*, have become the focus of even greater anxiety and horror than their mothers, than even their single mothers. Michael Jackson was once a child performer of exactly that adorable cuddly cuteness that makes grown-ups purr and coo. Now a boy sprite who won't grow up, he epitomises the intense, risky, paradoxical allure of the Peter Pan myth. He leaps and dances and sings "I'm Bad", gives his estate the name Neverland, draws the passionate worship of millions of children, and then finds himself charged with child abuse.

We call children "little devils", "little monsters", "little beasts", with the full ambiguous force of the terms, all the complications of love and longing, repulsion and fear. Jesus called for the little children to come unto him, and Christianity worships its god as a baby in a manger; but the Christian moral tradition has also held, simultaneously, the inherent sinfulness of children. Original sin holds up the spectre of innate human wickedness: whatever glosses theologians put on it, Christian children have been raised to believe that without divine help the species is bound for hell.

But the Child has never been seen as such a menacing enemy as today. Surveillance cameras register the walk of young killers on their way to acts of unimaginable violence; special seats have to be made to raise these child murderers above the level of the dock; my local paper wails, "Terror tots attack frail victim"; the most notorious of the video nasties is called *Child's Play*.

Bad children - a symptom of modernity - surface again and again in some of the most powerful contemporary fiction, like Golding's classic *Lord of the Flies*, a book to bury in any time capsule seeking to convey the flavour of this half of the century. Popular Satanist entertainment, including *Rosemary's Baby*, *The Exorcist*, *Poltergeist*, build on Christian theories of demonic possession to dramatise the full-blown development of evil in seeming cherubim. Gone are the cheerful catapults and squashed toffees and fallen socks of a scallywag like William, the devilry of Dennis the Menace. Horror has spread into teenage fiction too with titles like *The Babysitter*, *The Burning Baby*, *The Dance of the Scalpel*.

Although the cultural and social investment in childhood innocence is constantly tested by experience, and assailed by doubts, it has still continued to grow. The shock of James Bulger's death was deepened by his murderers' ages, but their trial revealed a brutal absence of pity for them as children. It was conducted as if they were adults, not because they had behaved with adult consciousness but because they had betrayed an abstract myth about children's proper childlikeness. The consecration of childhood raises real-life examples of children to an ideal which they must fail - modestly by simply being ordinary kids, or horrendously, by becoming victims or criminals. But childhood doesn't occupy some sealed Eden or Neverland set apart from the grown-up world: our children can't be better than we are.

Children have never been so visible as points of identification, as warrants of virtue, as markers of humanity. Yet the quality of their lives has been deteriorating for a good 15 years in this country; one of the fastest-growing groups living in poverty are children and their mothers. The same ministers who sneer about babies on benefit and trumpet a return to basic

values fail to see that our social survival as a civilised community depends on stopping this spiralling impoverishment of children's lives.

The Child Poverty Action Group estimates that a third of all children are suffering from an unacceptably low standard of living. Of the million jobs to be created in this country between now and the year 2000, 90 per cent, yes 90 per cent will be for women according to one official forecast. And yet there is publicly funded child-care for only 2 per cent of under-3s. Meanwhile, the government is proposing to allocate 100 million pounds to creating prisons for 11 to 13 year old offenders.

To add to the difficulties economic individualism has brought us the ultimate nightmare - not just the child as commodity but the child consumer. Plenty of dinosaur lunchboxes at school; not many books in the library. Children are expensive to raise, but all the products made for them unashamedly appeal to their pester power as consumers of films, hamburgers, the right brand of trainers, video games. The child as a focus of worship has been privatised as an economic unit, has become a link in the circulation of money and desire.

That very vitality of imagination so envied in children needs to be tended and not only by expensive theme parks. Yet the BBC uproots the tradition of children's radio at a stroke, citing falling ratings. Meanwhile, in the same playgrounds where Peter and Iona Opie collected the skipping songs and hopscotch rhymes of generations, children apparently now hang around having forgotten how to play. Local oral traditions are dropping away just like larks and hedges. I am not turning into a reactionary Little England ruralist, but children's songs flourish in context in conditions when children can play together in groups in safety. At present playgrounds and other school facilities, among the only safe places for children, are routinely left idle after school hours, at weekends and during the holidays for want of funds to staff them. Fallow playgrounds are a tiny aspect of the disgrace. The hours British men work are longer than almost all their counterparts in Europe, and yet the cry goes up about children with only mothers to look after them. Children with fathers who live with them are not looked after by them either, even when they would like to, since employment is still structured to consider childcare the mother's task. And measures which would grant fathers paternity and sickness leave on behalf of children are rejected because they might jeopardise profits.

Many of these problems result from the idea that childhood and adult life are separate, when they are, in fact, inextricably intertwined. Children are not separate from adults and cannot be kept separate, unlike Mowgli or Peter Pan; they cannot live innocent lives on behalf of adults, like medieval hermits maintained at court by libertine kings to pray for them, or the best china kept in tissue in the cupboard. Nor can individuals who happen to be young act as the living embodiments of adults' inner goodness, however much adults may wish it. Without paying attention to adults and their circumstances, children cannot begin to meet the hopes and expectations of our torn dreams about what a child and childhood should be. Children are our copy, in little: in Pol Pot's Cambodia they will denounce their own families as class traitors; in affluent cities of the West, they will wail for expensive trainers with the right label like their friend's. The one thing that can be said for absolute certain about children is that they are very quick to learn.

We know by now that the man is father to the child; we fear that children will grow up to be even more like us than they already are. Kaspar Hauser, the innocent, was murdered; now we are scared that if such a wild child were to appear today he might kill us.

Lecture 4: Beautiful Beasts: The Call of the Wild

In the medieval romance *Valentine and Orson*, the Empress of Constantinople finds herself alone in a wild forest giving birth to twins. Her husband, the Emperor, has cruelly cast her out under false suspicion of adultery. A passing she-bear steals one of the children for herself. The other baby, Valentine, is rescued with his mother when a nobleman comes riding by at the right moment and takes them both home with him. This twin, Valentine, grows up at court to become a valiant prince, whilst the lost boy, Orson (or bear cub) grows up a wild, hairy man doing great mischief to all that pass through the forest. The separated twins' tumultuous legend tells how the brothers later meet, and fight, and how Valentine captures the wild man Orson:

“At the first dawn of morning, Valentine arose; and, putting on his armour, took a shield, polished like a mirror, and having arrived at the forest he climbed a high tree near the bear's cave. Presently he heard Orson, who had a buck with him which he had just killed, come roaring by; and he could not help admiring the beauty of his make and his agility, wishing it were possible to tame him. He then tore off a branch of a tree and threw it at Orson who, looking up, uttered a furious howl and darted up the tree like lightning. Valentine descended and Orson, seeing him on the ground, rushed down. Valentine held up his shield and Orson, evidently surprised and delighted, beheld his own image.”

Just as Perseus used Medusa's mask to free Andromeda from the monster, so Valentine spellbinds the wild man. The scene of Orson's capture borrows the advice of medieval bestiaries on hunting a tigress. To catch that wildest of wild beasts, a hunter should throw down a glass globe in the animal's path. She will see herself reflected in it in miniature and mistake her image for her cub. This will stop her in her tracks and she will try to pick it up, giving the huntsman time to drop a net over her. The romance *Valentine and Orson* was translated from a lost French original and printed by Caxton's successor Wynken de Worde at the beginning of the 16th century. It was reprinted many times in different adaptations, including a dynamic full-colour version by the pioneering Victorian children's illustrator Walter Crane. But it seems to be almost forgotten today, even though the story of the twin brothers - one wild, one tame - gives precious clues to historical attitudes to nature, and reveals the changing relationship between human and animal.

In *Valentine and Orson*, the bear-child becomes civilised, attains rationality and humanity at the hands of his human brother. The story does not allow Orson to remain savage, does not leave him to his fear of influence. He enters his brother's culture, and this is quickly marked by an improvement in table manners. When first brought to court on a leash like a beast, he “tore the files asunder with his claws and devoured them like a ravenous wolf. And then, thrusting his head into a cistern of water, he drank as much as might have sufficed a horse”. But Valentine soon teaches him the use of a glass and a fork. He receives baptism, but his wild nature persists. His pelt stands in for clothes, he is shaggy, unkempt, and roars incoherently at the top of his voice. The pair, now sworn companions, sally forth on more adventures and yet more against the infidel. At Valentine's side, Orson then overcomes giants and even conquers the Green Knight himself. Though he retains the character of a brute and his wild skins and his incoherent speech, these also signify natural innocence like the camel hide of John the Baptist in the desert or the penitential veil of hair worn by Mary Magdalene.

They signal too the corresponding rejection of artifice, of civilisation, of worldly vanities; in short of human culture as the carrier of an intrinsic sinfulness.

The twin boys, Valentine and Orson, stand for polarised goals. An 1822 edition for children put it straightforwardly: ‘In Valentine, we contemplate a man endowed with the education of art, whilst the person and character of Orson discover the simple workings of nature’.

A length of rope made of steel wire at one end can be interwoven with jute fibre until the other end of the rope is altogether different, and yet it will still be the same rope unbroken from end to end. Within today’s myths of human nature, the warrior and the wild creature, the child and the beast do not stand at opposite poles but are intertwined, continuous, inseparable. Yet they are also in polar opposition to one another too. In the arguments about the difference between humans and animals, there has been a pronounced change of sympathy growing ever more strongly since the 18th century, and it is the wild pole that has been radiating the greater magnetic at-traction on human imagination and allegiance.

Few Elizabethans would have considered themselves kin to a crocodile, or thought of adopting an endangered species to prevent its extinction. In Elizabeth I’s time, a courtier, bespattered with the blood foaming from the lips of a bear at a bear-baiting session, rejoiced in the sport; the early French rationalist Descartes arrived at the firm analysis that an animal was merely a machine: natural, but lacking a soul.

As we all know, our evolutionary proximity to the apes caused horror in the last century. Adam had been lord of creation in the Bible, and named the beasts; now he was merely one of their kind. The peacock no longer existed simply to delight his eyes, or the pig to fill his belly.

Of course cruelty to animals continues, and identification with them is sporadic and inconsistent. But zoos, where people thrilled to see wild creatures in the last century, are now closing down, or turning into show farms with domestic animals only; a protestor has died at a hunt meeting in an accident with the van bringing in the hounds; a father has placed his son on the race track of the Grand National to prevent cruelty to the horses; campaigns to save whales, seals, dolphins, spiders - and crocodiles - attract enormous followings, and have had some real effect on hunting and trading practices.

The desire for closeness to animal power may still stimulate the breeding of fighting dogs, but it also drives the rise in the variety of soft toys - not only the teddy bear, but many kinds of reptiles and scary animals too. Even dinosaurs are now transformed by plush and stuffing into reassuring, cuddly, domestic gods, nursery talismans.

The symbolic value of wild animals has ancient, tough mythological roots. Even when despised in an anthropocentric world, wild things have offered a standard by which human identity and exploits could be measured: their proximity often proves a legendary hero’s strength. The Greek “Alexander romance”, extant since the third century AD, is a hugely entertaining farrago of history, tall stories and esoteric wisdom. It exalts its hero, the mythic Alexander the Great, by staging a sequence of confrontations with monsters of the wilds.

The picaresque narrative follows Alexander to the borders of the known world and beyond, from where he writes letters home to his mother:

“We set out and came to a green country where . . . we saw a huge man with hair all over his body, and we were frightened. I gave orders to capture him. When he was taken he gazed at

us ferociously. I ordered a naked woman to be brought to him; but he grabbed her and ate her. The soldiers rushed up to rescue her, but he made a gnashing noise with his teeth. The rest of the natives heard him, and came running towards us out of a swamp: there were about 10,000 of them . . . I ordered the swamp to be set alight; and when they saw the fire they fled . . . They had no human intelligence, but barked like dogs.”

Alexander routs the wild men with fire, sign of the hearth and culture, in the same way as Valentine used another symbol of consciousness - the mirror - to prevail over his wild brother.

More familiar heroes who had to contend with - and master - the wild include Hercules, father to many a superman. He overcame the Nemean lion and plenty of other wild creatures. Centuries on and rather closer to home, in Maurice Sendak’s exhilarating children’s story, Max puts on his wolf suit, visits the land Where the Wild Things Are, joins in the wild rumpus and becomes their king - before he comes back home to his supper and finds it still hot.

Sometimes the distinction between taming the beasts and becoming one of them is blurred, as in the case of Max. Many a classical deity or warrior has been raised by an animal in the wilds. Zeus was suckled by Amaltheia, a nymph in the form of a she-goat, and fed with wild honey from combs found in the hollow of a tree, as can be seen in a wonderfully vigorous painting in the Dulwich Collection. Poussin’s sometimes frozen poetry appears here to be itself molten with sap and sweetness. The healer god Aesculapius was also abandoned, and nursed by a she-goat, too, and guarded by a sheepdog; the legendary founders of Rome, Romulus and Remus, were rescued by a she-wolf after being exposed on a mountainside; such legends survive in heraldry, and some families claim descent from the union of an ancestor with a wild thing - like the Lusignan, who traced their line back to Melusine, a scaly and bat-winged siren, and the Orsini, whose ancestor, as their name suggests, was reared by a bear.

The animal mother breaks the link with human parents, she helps to distinguish her charge from ordinary children, she confers on him a mark of special difference from the human. The she-goat or bear or wolf nourishes the man of destiny with her vitality - presented, in such stories, as somehow more vital than a human mother’s milk, as intrinsically natural with a capital N. The Epic of Gilgamesh, written in Sumer around 5,000 years ago, foreshadows the twins Valentine and Orson when it con-fronts the urban warlord Gilgamesh, King of Uruk, with the wild forest dweller Enkidu. Enkidu has been made by the goddess from clay dropped in the wilderness:

“His body was rough. He had long hair like a woman’s and was covered with matted hair like Samuqan’s, the god of cattle. Enkidu ate grass in the hills with the gazelle and jostled with wild beasts at the waterholes. He had joy of the water with the herds of wild game.”

Gilgamesh captures him, using a harlot as bait. The seductions of the woman subdue the wild man and he is led docile into the city. At first Gilgamesh and Enkidu fight, but then they recognise that they’re a true match for each other. This is literally meant with the full force of the word “match”. Different in appearance, origin, con-duct, they feel a twin-ship and become boon companions, beloved friends, the first buddies in literature. Until Enkidu is killed and ascends into the underworld where Gilgamesh follows him, but cannot pull him back to life. In this ancient poem, the hero takes the wild man to himself, binds him in love to his life, but inevitably fails to incorporate him totally. If he managed, the wild man would no longer be

what he is. Gilgamesh finds himself condemned to lament this impossibility and his loss for as long as he lives. This loss haunts the poem in which he appears, and the same loss continues to haunt philosophy, storytelling, myth-making, and ideas about maleness - never perhaps more so than today. The threat of entropy in nature, bought about by human achievements - by the car, the aerosol, the nuclear reactor, pesticides, genetic interference - has never been so serious, nor perhaps, even in times of millennial fever, so acutely felt. Nature, newly understood to be somehow uncontaminated, innocent, nurturing and spontaneous beckons as a remedy to the distortions and excesses of progress.

In South Queensferry near Edinburgh at the annual August Fair, a figure called the Burry Man walks through the town bearing great sceptres of harvest fruits and foliage in both hands, completely parcelled up in 42 mats made of burdock burrs and brown paper until only his eyes peep out of a prickly mask. He looks like a knobbly hedgehog. Paraded in silence all day, seven miles through the town, he is thought to assure fruitfulness for the year; in this predominantly fishing community to fill the nets. Though the custom is presented as hallowed by great and mysterious antiquity, the earliest record of his procession dates from 1746. The word "folklore" itself was only coined 100 years later and, like many folk practices with pagan undertones, the Burry Man has become more and more entrenched in the last 20 years - ironically, just as the burdock weed itself becomes more and more scarce.

When advertisers feature a bear, a mountain lion, an ibex or other wild thing to endorse the life-giving properties of a car, alcohol, mineral water or shampoo, they are also communicating an idea of heroic and untrammelled independence, free spirits. Social animals hardly have selling power. They are mostly insects or rodents or uneasy birds like rooks and not endangered. The lone hero, the pattern of modern man finds an image of himself under threat of extinction in the large mammals - the gorilla, the grizzly and the lynx.

Some useful earlier distinctions have been blurred by this nostalgic desire for the power and freedom of the wild. Metamorphosis out of human shape into another, beastly form, used to express a fall from human grace. The first metamorphosis in Ovid's great book picks up on a familiar modern myth that even Plato mentioned, in *The Republic*. Lycaon, ruler of Arcadia, kills and cooks a hostage. For this lack of hospitality, Zeus turns him into the first werewolf. Calisto is changed into a little bear by Hera in revenge for the love Zeus feels for her; Circe mockingly degrades Odysseus's men when she changes them into swine.

In the parallel, predominantly Christian tradition, such animal mutations were the work of the Devil. Indeed, as fairy-tales often evolve out of religious stories, the de-feat of an ogre like Bluebeard recapitulates many comforting Christian tales about women who unwittingly marry the Devil but with the help of the Virgin Mary free themselves in the end from his binding charms. Even Bluebeard's name contains a memory of those "shagge-hair'd blue devils" of the Bible, represented in stained-glass windows and on the mystery play stage, where they would caper with firecrackers gripped between their teeth.

The forms which the Devil adopted also coincidentally reproduced actual threats to people and livestock in times of famine, when wolves and even bears entered the villages from their lairs in the wild. Tales about such predators did not need to grow in the telling: there is a ring of genuine terror in the report of the Dutch mariners who, in 1597, were looking for a northern passage to China, and found the pack ice closing in and the phantom shapes of polar bears hovering, waiting to pounce on the dying crew.

It is blithely symptomatic of contemporary forgettings that we now find bears sweet. The return to human form used to be the quest, the reward, the reason of the fairy-tale in the first place. But beastly shape is now becoming an appealing alternative, even a prize, a more valuable rather than a degraded state. Listen to the scene-setting of a recent video game called *Altered Beast*:

“It is the time of gods and myths and legends. When men were warriors and courageously fought unnatural enemies in the endless battle of good against evil. It is the time of the *Altered Beast* . . . Although you were once a brave and awesome Roman Centurion, the rigours of this journey demand a supernatural display of strength. So you are be-stowed with the powers of the *Altered Beast*. The power to transform your being into a part animal, part human creature of formidable force.”

As you advance through the levels and perils of the game, you - former soldier - mutate into various animals, all of them capable of great mischief like Enkidu, like Orson: first a Werewolf, next a Were dragon, a Were bear, and at last, a Gold Werewolf, in which guise you can defeat the ogre and rescue Athena - wisdom - whom he has been holding captive.

This load of old cobblers is very interesting because the game’s metamorphoses are running counter to the traditional current of Western myth and folklore, in which the human absorbs the animal, by taming it and mastering it. Even more fundamentally, it contradicts the underlying value of the Gilgamesh-Enkidu, Valentine-Orson pairings that the human hero remains superior, however deep his reliance on his beast ally, however urgent his attachment. The new myth of the wild calls into question the privilege of being a human at all.

This new assignation of higher value to wild creatures gains force when there is a woman in the picture. In *The Epic of Gilgamesh*, as we saw, the harlot is sent out from the city to trap Enkidu and succeeds in gentling him with her charms. The energy of the wild figure and myth when it meets a woman transmutes into desire which can prove the undoing of the wild elements in his nature. This in turn can make or break him. The change of attitude over time to this encounter can be seen very clearly in the different ways the ancient fairy-tale of “Beauty and the Beast” has been told.

Until rather recently, the Beast suffered from his disfigurement; sometimes it expressed just punishment for earlier bad behaviour. Under the evil spell, the Beast fears that nobody will ever love him in this form and he will never be freed. Even as late as the Cocteau film of 1946, for instance, the Beast feels himself doomed in his beastliness. Against his will, he hunts wild creatures and tears them limb from limb to devour them raw; his great claws and mane smoulder after a kill. He can only speak monosyllabically to la Belle, and his brutishness repels her. But la Belle will release him, eventually, from this confining, animal realm through those human qualities of mercy and love.

Enchanting as the film is, and fascinating as the Beast’s charms are, Cocteau’s film was already quaint in its symbolist allegiance to the redemptive powers of civility - of art and beauty and romance.

Many earlier, popular versions of the story show, by contrast, a marked preference for the beast. And the most familiar and revealing example is *King Kong*, the mon-ster movie of all time, which was made in 1933 and has proved, alongside *The Wizard of Oz*, one of Hollywood’s highest earners. *King Kong* gives a new spin to the old tale when it opens with

the lugubrious prophecy: "And lo, the beast looked upon the face of beauty. And it stayed its hand from killing. And from that day, it was as one dead." The plot unfolds how an intrepid adventurer, Carl Denham, has heard about a prodigious mystery, the "Eighth Wonder of the World". Everything about Kong places him in direct succession to the monstrous wild men of myth and legend. *Homo sylvestris* was the name of the missing link between the brute and the human, and was imagined by some early palaeontologists as a species of upright orangutan, a great ape. Kong's jungle kingdom, sealed behind a fortified wall and massive gates, exists beyond the borders of the known world on an island recorded only by one sea captain who is now dead. The island, once it comes into view, all precipitous cliffs and hulking doomy crags, was significantly modelled on Gustav Dore's engravings for *Paradise Lost*. And it is pertinent that Dore's bible had also inspired early reconstructions of primitive man. Again, as in *The Epic of Gilgamesh*, a woman has been used as bait - a blonde, the actress Fay Wray, who after her performance in this film became the first of the adored screamers of Hollywood.

The film begins by firmly establishing a primordial savage King of the Jungle, the Beast Kong. But after Fay Wray's abduction, the film begins to sway sympathies in another direction. Fear and loathing gradually change to identification; sexuality moves to the centre of the story, and the great ape becomes a figure of a man - a desiring, aspiring, frustrated, tragic male. When Kong does not eat Fay Wray or violate her, but carries her off to a rocky height, anticipating the last sequence on an urban pinnacle, he examines her and the audience is caught up in his wonder at her flimsy delicacy in his great paw. The scene was censored in 1938 for its sexual intimacy. It shows Kong picking off a filmy sliver of skirt and then sniffing his fingers with twitching nostrils as the music turns soft and tender. Later when Kong is put on show in New York, cruciform on gallows as if at a slave auction, he becomes an emblem of civilisation's savagery. His animal wildness shows up the limits of human culture. When he thinks the exploding flashbulbs of the cameras are going to harm Fay Wray, he breaks his shackles. His freedom rampage through the city in pursuit of the blonde then begins.

King Kong turns into an ironical critique of human society, of its cruelty and greed and love of show. The sympathy it displays towards the beast rather than the beauty grows stronger throughout, however illogically, until the climactic end. When Carl Denham first captured Kong, stunning him with gas bombs, he ordered him to be tied up and cried out, "We'll give him more than chains . . . We'll teach him Fear." The chains, the fear, mark the end of his wild days; repression, domestication. At one level, the monster represents nature versus humanity; at another, he dramatises a worse danger for men: women. The crushing of Kong becomes just another episode in the long tragic chronicle about male libidos unjustly slapped down. Fay Wray's rejection of him inaugurates a rich tradition in popular culture of sympathetic monsters spurned. Such plots neatly manage a stack of pleasures: they flatter women with evidence of their remarkable powers to excite and tame the primitive; they excuse men their deep down wild impulses; and they explain their failure to gratify them.

At the same time, the story upholds the terror of predatory male power because that justifies the need for chivalrous vengeance and continual control of women: King Kong is a rescue romance and there is nothing else for Fay Wray to do but scream like a terrified child.

But even while she screams, she never quite quells the idea that all beauties deep down really want a beast: that Kong might be the monster of her dreams. Beastliness means sexiness, or so many a modern hero would like to think.

MUSICAL CLIP: BEAUTY AND THE BEAST

This Gaston, God's gift to women, singing songs in praise of himself, is one of two Beasts in the recent Disney cartoon of Beauty and the Beast. Both are suitors for Belle's love and it is the one in human shape who loses out: the hunky beefcake, a Sylvester Stallone lookalike, falls to a horrible and well deserved death off a precipice at the Beast's castle. But as for Belle's lover in animal form - half minotaur, half lion - Belle attends to his personal growth. He learns to weep, not roar, and wins her through his cultural attributes - especially his amazingly well stocked library. Unlike Gaston, he does not go hunting and shooting; he is aware of his shortcomings, and grieves like a good existentialist at his condition. The film promises its audience Prince Charming will turn out a New Man, virile yet tender, natural yet cultivated, in touch with his emotions, childlike in the best sense, yet mature and responsible in his attitude. All he needed was the love of a good woman.

This is a woman's film: the script is by Linda Wolverton and it shows throughout that it has in mind an audience of mums and daughters. It is an ingenious attempt to negotiate the extremely tricky ground of women's attraction to male appetite. But the animators invest the Beast with such allure that they cannot find a way to bring him back to humankind without bathos. After the Beast, Prince Charming can only be a comedown.

Angela Carter wrote several dazzling variations of the "Beauty and the Beast" tale in her collection *The Bloody Chamber* and challenged the tradition of taming or civilising or otherwise containing the Beast. In "The Tiger's Bride", she turns the traditional ending upside down, and it is Beauty who metamorphoses, shedding her human shape in the last lines of the story:

"He dragged himself closer and closer to me, until I felt the harsh velvet of his head against my hand, then a tongue, abrasive as sandpaper. He will lick the skin off me! And each stroke of his tongue ripped off skin after successive skin, all the skins of a life in the world, and left behind a nascent patina of shining hairs. My ear-rings turned back to water and trickled down my shoulders; I shrugged the drops off my beautiful fur."

It is too easy to dismiss visions of the Beast's newfound nobility as male self-flattery, or even, more seriously, as sentimental justifications of toughness, brute strength, independence - the same stuff of the warrior. The beast, the wild man Enkidu and the bear-child Orson issue exciting invitations to a journey, to pleasure. Their domain cannot be the exclusive property of one sex.

In modern myth, it is not that the boundary has been eroded between human and animal - rather, the value given to each side in the contrast has changed. And contemporary stories are finding a way to answer the call of the wild.

Lecture 5: Cannibal Tales: The Hunger for Conquest

In 1844 the great Victorian art historian and critic John Ruskin was bought a painting by his father, as a reward for the success of his book, *Modern Painters*. It was a picture by Turner, which Ruskin admired above all others, saying of it: "I believe, if I were reduced to rest Turner's immortality upon any single work, I should choose this."

Ruskin kept the painting for nearly 25 years, until he found the subject, he said, too painful, and had to part with it. Before that, he had evoked his Turner in one of his most gorgeous hymns to the sublime:

"... purple and blue, the lurid shadows of the hollow breakers are cast upon the mist of night, advancing like the shadow of death upon the guilty ship as it labours amidst the lightning of the sea, its thin masts written upon the sky in lines of blood, girded with condemnation in that fearful hue which signs the sky with horror, and, cast far along the desolate heave of the sepulchral waves, incarnadines the multitudinous sea."

In all this welter of praise, Ruskin never tackled the subject of the painting at all. It is usually known as *The Slave Ship*, but its full title is "Slavers throwing overboard the dead and dying - Typhon coming on". In the foreground, the drowning slaves are just visible, while shoals of sea monsters are racing towards them to gorge on them.

Turner had read a history of the abolition of slavery and found that in 1783 the owners and captain of a ship called the *Zong* were charged with fraud by an insurance company. They had claimed for the deaths of a cargo of slaves by drowning. The policy did not cover death from illness, and so the captain had thrown overboard, on three successive days, 122 sick men and women in order to collect the money for them. The insurance company proved their case. No further criminal proceedings, however, were instituted by the courts against the *Zong's* masters.

Turner painted this extraordinary synthesis of the trade's horror seven years after the abolition of slavery. His approach sublimates the theme: the drowning scarcely appear. One black leg, shackled at the ankle, breaks the surface of the seething water in the foreground; alongside, pairs of hands are raised making imploring gestures which rhyme - with ghastly irony - the fins of many fish cresting the waves as they arrive for the feast. Huge links of chain thrash in the water, rather implausibly, but marking the position of submerged bodies below. Turner was always more interested in the weather than in people, and he gives us just the one black leg, the waving hands, and the great glassy visage and gaping maw of pink sea monsters.

Turner's symbolic approach to the tragedy was later mirrored in Ruskin's evasive-ness. Ruskin suggests a crime and cannot bring himself to name it. The ship is guilty. The murderous deeds of *Lady Macbeth* haunt his prose, bloodshed stains the sea, but he never faces the issues of race and power which the painting raises. In-stead he is vague.

"The whole picture," he wrote, "is dedicated to the most sublime of subjects and impressions, the power, majesty and deathfulness of the open, deep, illimitable sea".

The sea has played a central role in the making of British identity, and Turner is of course its most passionate painter, as well as one of the most conscious patriots ever to paint. And in *The Slave Ship*, Turner is reflecting on the passing of that grandeur of spirit he saw in Britain's rule, that glorious adventure and mastery which the Empire represented around the world. The picture is an elegy for a lost vision, and perhaps an ideal too. The victims are there not for their own sakes as protagonists, but as witnesses. Yet what is of acute interest is that

Turner gives so many different strokes and col-ours to the single metaphor of consuming and being consumed, devouring and being devoured. The dazzling wake of sunset and its reflection, which cleaves the painting in two, itself resembles a kind of parted mouth open for swallowing. But consuming retains its mercantile meaning too. Turner added some lines from a poem he had written to the picture when he sent it to the Royal Academy in 1840. "Hope, hope, fallacious hope, where is thy market now?" The bodies in the water are goods destined for market and now spoiled. The false hope is the trader's hope for profit. Turner's whiskered, jowly, even pink sea monsters moving in to feed on flesh stand for the well-fed but still hungry, pink, whiskery merchants who trade in Africans. He identifies himself with them - not with the dead and dying, not with the slaves. And behind the slavers linger the shadow of Turner and his own kind. He writes that verse of the poem, however bitterly, in the voice of the profiteer who has lost his cargo.

Something else is also hinted by the imagery of the marine feast in the painting: an allusion to the deep-seated racial myth of cannibalism, to the much repeated notion that the people who were sold as slaves were barbarians. And the most laconic sign of the barbarian has been, since classical times, cannibalism. Those cannibal fish preying on human flesh, representing the slave traders, bring to mind the question Montaigne put three hundred years earlier when he asked, who were the barbarians: Christians who hanged, drew and quartered their fellows, tortured them with irons and burned them alive at the stake, or savages who waited till their victims were dead before they cooked them? Turner's painting raises a similar doubt: who are the cannibals now, us or them?

MUSICAL CLIP (A LITTLE PRIEST): SWEENEY TODD

Cannibalism has become popular myth, turning up in the chilly outhouse aesthetic of Peter Greenaway's cinema and in thrillers like *Silence of the Lambs*. Hannibal Lecter, cannibal letcher, has become such a famous character that, like a myth, he is larger than the story which produced him. *Sweeney Todd*, featuring the demon barber who ate his victims in meat pies, included a jolly flesh-eating duet and became an international hit.

Cannibal stories are still widespread. The Independent on Sunday recently published an article about New Guinea. "Now the Yali go to church," said the lead-in, "and most seem to have accepted the idea of God. But it isn't long since some of the missionaries were eaten". Needless to say, on reading the article it is clear that no one the author (Norman Lewis) talked to had ever eaten anyone; it is just some-thing that had always been said that was easily believed about this warrior tribe who hunt with bows and arrows and wear long penis gourds and not much else.

Stories of cannibalism like rape were not always connected to myths about barbarians, or even about monstrosity. Control of the processes of consumption confers great power, as we know from the priests officiating at the Christian Mass. The faithful eat the body and drink the blood of Christ in the sacrament of the Eucharist, and this repeated miracle of transubstantiation possibly meets a fundamental human desire to incorporate the object of passion, of wonder, of worship, dread, of love. Every time a mother squeezes her child and murmurs, "Mmm, you're so good I'm going to eat you," she is using the same imagery of union, of total commingling intimacy; every time lovers pretend to gnaw and bite each other, they are tapping the same metaphor. Oddly enough the fantasy of cannibalism is naively self-flattering: those enemies want nothing better than to eat me because I am so delicious. In

these well-named acts of communion, a slippage occurs - between actual and symbolic consumption of human flesh - and the arguments about the real presence of Jesus's body and blood have entangled further the confusion about the reality of cannibal acts.

Cannibalism is not, of course, a peculiarly Christian theme; it is common in classical myth, where it is an activity of the gods, on the whole, like rape. Zeus, king of all the gods, survives only because his mother, Rhea, foils his father's plan to eat him, as he has eaten all his elder brothers and sisters. She wraps up a baby-shaped stone in swaddling bands and Cronus swallows it happily; Cronus had been told that one of his sons would supplant him, hence his desire to rid himself of them. But his method of doing so later casts him in the maternal role: for Zeus, when he grows up, gives his father a drug which makes him vomit up alive all the other children in his body. In this way, the famous Olympians - Hera, Demeter, Hades, Hestia, Poseidon - re-enter the world, twice born of their father, begotten and brought forth. The devouring here acts as a prelude to birth. The incorporation turns into a surrogate pregnancy.

The Greeks, it must be said, often felt awkward about the spectacular uncoothness of divine conduct. The poet Pindar in his first Olympian ode apologises for mythic extravagance and then exclaims: "Far be it from me to call any one of the blessed gods a cannibal." But he had to as he went on to describe the feast at which the Ti-tan, Tantalus, served up his son to see if the gods could tell the difference between roast animal and human flesh.

Cannibalism often occurs in myth alongside incest; both demonstrate the gods' outrageous flouting of human laws. Cronus commits one crime against human order by eating his children, and another because they are his by his sister Rhea. Cannibalism is a key metaphor of outrageous transgression and its imagery traditionally conveys another: the crime of incest. This language recurs in medieval stories like the romance of Appolonius of Tyre, one of the best loved tales of the Middle Ages, extant in dozens of languages and manuscripts since the 10th century. The romance opens with a king and his daughter, the classic fairy-tale couple. Only in this case, he will not relinquish his beloved princess, but, "spurred on by the frenzy of his lust, he took his daughter's virginity by force in spite of her lengthy resistance". Afterwards she wants to kill herself, but her nurse - like Juliet's, an unreliable counsellor - persuades her to resign herself to her lot and live as her father's secret concubine. Her father than wards off all suitors by setting an impossible enigma. If they cannot solve it, they will die. Many come and many fail.

Shakespeare's late fairy-tale play *Percles* was based on the Appolonius and the riddle is put to the hero. "I am no viper, yet I feed on mother's flesh which did me breed". It does not seem very tangled, and indeed Appolonius guesses that the lovely girl is living in sinful union with her father. "Nor did you lie," he tells the king, "when you said 'I eat my mother's flesh'. Look to your daughter." Incest figures as a form of metaphorical cannibalism: eating your own. It also conveys a terrible incapacity to recognise your own: cannibals fail to see their prey as their kind, and this is an act which effectively exiles them from common humanity. Both acts also relate to fears and longings in deeper ways: in both, the perpetrator oversteps the bounds of kinship. When Princess Marie Bonaparte was considering incest with her son, she asked Freud, who was analysing her, his opinion, and he responded with a comparison to cannibalism. He wrote to her: "There are no grounds whatever against eating human flesh instead of animal flesh. Still most of us would find it quite impossible". She seems to have agreed.

But the first image that springs to most people's minds when they hear the word cannibal is not a Greek god, or a fairy-tale villain. I was brought up for some of my childhood in Belgium, surrounded by images of their colony - the Congo, as Zaire was then known; among them many jokes about "long pig", and much talk of missionaries trussed and spitted or standing in stewpots over cooking fires, as patient as early Christian martyrs in the arena. Some of this was facetious, but at the same time it was not questioned - as it is not in Evelyn Waugh's *Black Mischief*. Behind these preconceptions lies a history.

In the age of the conquistadores, the word "cannibal" was adopted from the people of "Carib", in whom Columbus confidently recognised the famed anthropophagi, or man-eaters, of myth. Like the gold which he was certain was always round the next headland, it was always the tribe over the next ridge who were feasting on human flesh. Columbus left the myth of cannibalism thriving, but no account of the practice. By the 15th century, the sign of being a barbarian, rather than an ogre, was a preference for cooked rather than raw human flesh. The word "barbecue" is indeed one of the words, like "hammock", borrowed into English from the language of the Taino people of the Americas. Though the Taino themselves were famed for their gentleness, the evolution of the word "Carib" into "cannibal" conveys how Indians in the Caribbean came to be considered eaters of human flesh, never happy unless they were roasting the spiced joints of their victims on these ingenious grills over open fires. The name of Shakespeare's "savage and deformed slave", Caliban, in *The Tempest*, echoes this derivation.

Eye-witness accounts have proved highly elusive, believers in cannibalism taking the view that nobody survived to tell the tale, sceptics arguing that the fantasy recurs in almost all people's insults against aliens: Christians were obvious candidates for the accusation during the Roman persecutions; later, in the Middle Ages, pogroms were unleashed against Jews charged with eating Christian children; the same outrage was considered routine among witches (they needed to render down baby fat to make their flying ointment - only then could they take off on their broomsticks to the Sabbath). So one excessive fantasy becomes necessary to another in the mad but lucid circuitry of the imagination. In Australia, Aborigines were credited with a particular taste for Chinese; rumours of their manhunts spread and are still being repeated, with no evidence whatsoever.

When the Dutch painter Albert Eckhout was commissioned to paint the flora and fauna and inhabitants of Brazil by the great soldier Prince Johan Maurits of Nassau, he produced the most powerful existing early portraits of different tribes people - men and women and children. In 1641 he painted a woman of the Tapuya tribe with a severed foot sticking out of the basket on her back, toying with a severed arm in her hand. But was he recording the evidence of his eyes? Flora are inevitably consenting subjects, but his living models, the Indians who appear in the magnificent life-size studies now in Copenhagen, may not have posed for the artist. He may have supplied features from his own presuppositions. Eckhout even depicts a hunting party in the distance, actually positioned between the woman's parted legs, right under the apron of leaves she is wearing while her hound laps at the ground between her feet baring its teeth - all this conveying barbarous appetites.

Cannibalism marks its practitioners as throwbacks, barbarians, stone-age men, yet the conqueror's imagery can betray that he himself is the devourer, like the slavers throwing overboard the dead and dying. Trophy-hunting is not the province of sav-ages: the cabinets of

curiosities of the early modern connoisseur were filled with grisly spoils. The phrase “I’ll have your guts for garters” catches the universal impulse.

Cannibalism is used to define the alien, but actually mirrors the speaker. By tar-ringing the savage with the horror of cannibalism, settlers, explorers, colonisers could vindicate their own violence. It is a psychological manoeuvre of great effectiveness. Seeing the conquered as brute barbarians helped the confidence of the first empire-builders. Early on, however, there were dissenting voices. Montaigne, who had reminded his readers that they were as savage as their victims, lamented the plundering of the New World in a great threnody:

“. . . so many goodly citties ransacked and razed; so many nations de-stroyed and made desolate; so many infinite millions sic of harmelesse peoples of all sexes, stages and ages, massacred, ravaged and put to the sword; and the richest, the fairest and the best part of the world top-siturvied, ruined and defaced for the traffick in Pearles and Pepper. Oh mechanical victories, oh base conquest!”

Montaigne’s passionate defence of the Indians seems to have affected Shakespeare in *The Tempest*. The play was inspired by the miraculous survival of a group of ear-ly colonists after a shipwreck in the Caribbean; and Shakespeare follows reports of first contacts when he describes how Caliban greets the mariners kindly and helps them survive by gathering unfamiliar food and fishing for them. Like the Indians whom buccaneers treated with - Roger North in Guyana and Walter Raleigh in Virginia - Caliban shows the new arrivals, Prospero and his daughter, “the wonders of the isle”.

In spite of the overtones of Caliban’s name, Shakespeare does not represent his “monster” as a consumer of human flesh at all, but rather of “pig-nuts” and “filberts”. But Shakespeare’s portrait is ambiguous, as the amount and variety of stagings and interpretations show. He calls Caliban “savage”, “a freckled whelp, hag-born”, who does not know language before Prospero teaches him and has since learnt only how to curse.

This contradiction at the heart of the characterisation has turned Caliban into a mythic figure beyond the confines of *The Tempest*, and he has consequently become a key symbol in the discussion of colonialism, and of its attendant ills, including racism.

Caliban has been played over the years as a kind of fish, or as a manatee, as a wild man like Orson the bear-cub, as a green man, a classical Satyr, a half-naked Indian, or, as one actor’s wife commented, “half-monkey, half-coconut”. In the post-war period, when the various empires were beginning to unravel, the figure of the dis-possessed native slave inspired new interpretations - from Caliban’s point of view. W H Auden, in *The Sea and the Mirror* of 1944, glimpsed how Caliban might refuse to be the subject of his masters’ serene providence, how the relations of dominance and economic power might crack. The colonial psychologist Octave Mannoni pioneered in 1950 the explicit interpretation of Caliban as a colonial subject, raging impotently against his oppression, unable to articulate his freedom or his rights, caught in a vicious spiral of powerlessness and petty retaliation.

Caliban’s role touches one of the most sensitive areas in contemporary race relations; he reveals once again how the perception of civilisation and barbarism so often turns on the question of alliance and family. The exchange between Prospero and Caliban, when Prospero gives the reasons for his rejection of Caliban, is highly revealing.

PROSPERO:

I have us'd thee,
Filth as thou art, with human care; and lodg'd thee
In mine own cell, till thou didst seek to violate
The honour of my child . . .

CALIBAN:

O ho, O ho! would's't it had been done!
Thou didst prevent me; I had peopled else
This isle with Calibans.

So Caliban's segregation as a monster beyond the pale takes place only after he has tried to "violate" Miranda. Before that, he had lived with them, as if he were one of the family.

But one rape could hardly have engendered a population for the island - these lines express those old fears of heterodox misalliance; they also hint at a kind of incest between Caliban as Prospero's foster child and Miranda, Prospero's daughter. Caliban's threat conveys too the fear of hybridisation: the monster might produce monstrous progeny.

These same fantasies continue in popular attitudes to black immigration and to intermarriage between races. Caliban's threat of proliferation continues to resonate: when people are asked to give the size of the black population in Britain, they some-times put it as high as a quarter of the total. The true figure is around a twentieth. The Runnymede Trust in 1991 conducted a survey and found that more than 90 per cent made wildly exaggerated guesses at this proportion.

The *Tempest* concludes with the restoration of harmony, the obedient love of Miranda and Ferdinand, and Caliban's promise that he will "be wise hereafter and sue for grace", a reference to his possible baptism.

It is interesting to note that in 1611, that is around the time Shakespeare was writing the play, the son of a prince from Guinea called Caddibiah - another echo of the name Caliban - was christened in the church of St Mildred Poultry in the City of London, the very quarter where stood the Rose and the Globe theatres and the inns Shakespeare frequented. The boy had been entrusted to a John Davies, of the English ship the *Abigail*, by his father. Or so the baptismal register related.

Even if the coincidence of his name Caddibiah is meaningless, the presence of the Christian, African youth in London upsets received ideas about the history of migration; it puts pay to the prevalent opinion that black people only arrived in this country with the waves of workers invited after the war. There are entries in parish registers from the 17th century of births and deaths of children born to English and African couples; while abroad, in the new possessions, intermarriage was far more common than has been admitted. Not all converted, however: the brother-in-law of the famous princess of the Algonquin tribe, Pocahontas, refused to be baptised, preferring, a contemporary reported, "to sing and dance his diabolical measures".

The Church of St Mildred Poultry was bombed in the blitz. Only office buildings, gleaming in glass and steel, now rise around the area. The disappearance of so many of the old City buildings has been followed by the disappearance of most of the residents. This scattering in

itself has carried off the memory of an earlier time - including the recollection of the earliest black Englishmen and women. Yet far less historically attested tales cling on about cannibals practising savage rites in some distant place.

It would be silly to pretend that in the violence of conquest nobody was ever barbarically dismembered or butchered or hideously dealt with after death, and there is evidence for ritual ingestion of human remains at funeral feasts, as well as the obvious bloodthirsty human sacrifices of the Aztecs. But empirical support for cannibalism as a routine form of sustenance has never been found. That it was a needed source of protein, as one historian has even suggested, is simply fanciful. Yet the idea refuses to go away. A BBC series on the empire included an introduction to the Caribbean which said: "When the British first arrived, the necklace of lush tropical islands was still largely the preserve of cannibals". This was 1972. It is really only in the last decade that historical study has established how deeply fantasy shapes the story and the chronicles of conquest. Cannibalism helped to justify of course the presence of the invader, the settler, the trader, bringing civilisation. The centre has to draw outlines to give itself definition. The city has need of the barbarians to know what it is. The self needs the other to establish a sense of integral identity. If my enemies are like me, how can I go on feeling enmity against them?

That imagery of forbidden ingestion masked other powerful longings and fears - about mingling and hybridity, about losing definition, about swallowing and being swallowed - fears about a future loss of identity, about changes that history itself brings.

But new voices are being raised to confront this legacy. The terrible story which inspired Turner to paint *The Slave Ship* has continued to resonate; it has that extreme, cautionary quality of myth. Barry Unsworth, in his novel *Sacred Hunger*, developed the Zong's crime: and the Guyanese-born poet David Dabydeen has written a long lyric sequence, called *Turner* - which, unlike the artist, unlike Ruskin - gives a voice to one of the drowned slaves in the painting and imagines the atrocity from his point of view. The drowned slave struggles to dream of the future he has lost and still wants to make, but his memories oppress him:

No noise

Comes from my mouth, no lamentation

As I fall towards the sea, my breath held

In shock until the waters quell me.

Struggle came only after death, the flush

Of betrayal, the hate hardening my body

Like cork, buoying me when I should have sunk to these depths. . .

I wanted to begin anew in the sea

but . . . my face was rooted

In the ground of memory, a ground

stampeded

By herds of foreign men who swallow all its fruit

And leave a trail of dung for flies
To colonise; a tongueless earth, bereft
Of song except for the idiot witter
Of wind through a dead wood.

Dabydeen is using his poem to repair that loss, he is putting his song in the place of his subject's imposed silence. From submersion, from engulfment, the images can return, the drowned can rise, the devoured be pieced together and the cannibalised past be heard, telling its stories.

Lecture 6: Home: Our Famous Island Race

In the Cabinet War Rooms in Whitehall London, an austere, utility-furnished warren of basement offices, where, as the brochure says, "everything is absolutely authentic", you can still see Churchill's high, lumpy single bed. There is a battery of turquoise, scarlet and cream Bakelite telephones on view, a few skimpy electric bar fires and many very ample ashtrays.

Strategic maps - of the world, of the British Empire - unfurl on the walls, with lines of coloured wool indicating the position of the armies - red for the British front line, black for the German, blue for the Free French, mauve for Vichy. Invasion is the issue, and this modest basement was the nerve centre of the resistance.

The rooms were opened to the public by the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, in the spring of 1984, not long after the victory in the Falklands. It is a monument to one defining moment of national identity, opened to the public at another. There, Churchill's rousing calls, broadcast from these rooms in September 1940, are replayed to the visitor.

Churchill makes his appeal to the British as members of an island race. But significantly the evidence of the maps hanging on the walls around give the lie to the image of the isolated sceptred isle, the little world all on its own. They make it clear that the nation could only survive through connection across borders, through the convoys which set out from the ports and entrepots of the Empire, its allies and sympathisers. Here they are, marked on the map: Kingston, Jamaica; Port-of-Spain, Trinidad; Aruba, Curacao, Bermuda, Puerto Rico, Recife, Halifax, St John, Sydney, Gibraltar, Oran, Algiers, Casablanca, the Azores, Dakar, Bathurst, Freetown, Reykjavik, and many others. Other islands, a constellation of islands, other harbours, a star map of interconnection, a necklace of as many stones set in as many seas, the collaboration of many peoples and places and ports; the antithesis of self-sufficiency in isolation.

The myth of national identity desires to forget this historical contingency, this interrelatedness. As a national hero, Churchill still has no rival, as Mrs Thatcher knew. In her memoirs, she remarks, with disingenuous cosiness, "I am glad that Chequers played a large part in the Falklands story. Churchill had used it quite a lot during the Second World War and its atmosphere helped to get us all together". Throughout, Thatcher stresses that the Falklanders are "an island race, like the people of the United Kingdom".

In a dreamier vein, John Major earlier also resisted encroachment from abroad, from the Continent, evoking a permanent, unchanging national idyll in his famous speech to the

Conservative Europe group in the Mansion House in April 1993. The Prime Minister invoked “a country of long shadows on county grounds, warm beer, invincible green suburbs, dog lovers - and as George Orwell said, ‘old maids bicycling to Holy Communion through the morning mist’.” “Britain,” the Prime Minister promised, will survive unamendable in all essentials.”

Orwell was writing in 1941, and it doesn't really need me to say that all these essentials have been through some amendments - not least that old maids might be bicycling to church to administer the sacrament as priests. The nostalgic strain of the British temper was parodied, with cool irony, by W H Auden in *The Sea and the Mirror*. There, Caliban imagines a colonial servant, adrift among imperial possessions, yearning to return:

“Carry me back, Master, to the cathedral town where the canons run through the water meadows with butterfly nets and the old women keep sweetshops in the cobbled side-streets, carry me back to the days before my wife had put on weight, back to the years when the beer was cheap and the rivers really froze in winter . . . Give me my passage home, take us home . . .”

Home takes us back to a golden afternoon in the past, and this brings in the question of memory, which in turn raises history as an issue. Voltaire's justly famous epi-gram declares that history is *une fable convenue*, an agreed fable: contemporary nationalisms press agreement to their version; this is why history has become such an acute, immediate issue, why members of a democracy which wishes to survive have to take part in the telling of the story, examine and resist the self-serving fables of political ambitions.

In the new states of former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, old city names and old street names have returned, monuments defaced and old ones freshly reinstated. In Zagreb, the square of the Victims of Fascism has been renamed the Square of the Croatian Kings; old tsars and old tyrants are being recovered from the annals; in Italy, Alessandra Mussolini, the granddaughter of the dictator, is even able to trade on the family name.

Arguing with the past, like paying taxes, like observing the law, like queuing, like not playing music full blast when others will be disturbed, has suddenly become a vital part of being a member of society, an ordinary but important act of citizenship, a factor in establishing the idea of home as a place you would like to belong to, and might be allowed to stay. With the upheavals in Eastern Europe, Western Europe begins to stir too, and different fundamentalist groups have discovered the power of historical arguments to shape their reality. The British, floundering after years of authority abroad, fear loss of self when the story is changing. Rising nationalists of different stripes finger different culprits: Europe, former Commonwealth citizens, new immigrants from the former Eastern Bloc and elsewhere. And the hunger for the ascertainable, unamendable homeland turns dangerous.

While European nations struggle increasingly to define their difference from one another, another population has grown in numbers in their midst. For thousands, home has become a mythical lost continent, visible under the flux, but harder than ever to reach. The UN Council for Refugees cannot even estimate how many thousands, perhaps millions of people are on the move, or will be in the coming years, as new borders are drawn on the map, year by year, sometimes week by week. Like a forest fire, they drive people into flight as they advance.

Never have there been so many newly patrolled territories, keeping one lot in and another lot out. Not since the huge emigrations at the beginning of this century have so many people looked for work in other countries. Italy, Spain and Greece, according to one report, may have a million illegal residents. In San Francisco recently, I asked a taxi driver where he was from. "I'm an illegal," he replied, without hesitation, as if it were a well-established nationality in itself. Homelessness is the predicament of our time.

In France, the homeless are called *les sans-abri*, the shelterless ones. Some of the earliest writing in the world represents a roof, an inverted "v" on two poles, the same cipher children draw in their first scribbles, alongside the stick figures of family and self. But home, in English, also encloses the idea of *patria*, which in French or Italian is conveyed as *pays* and *paese*, words distinct from *ma maison* or *casa mia*, and this theme lies even more acutely at the core of contemporary concerns.

Home meant native land to the earliest homeward voyager - Odysseus. For Homer's Odysseus, home simply meant Ithaca, the island he owned and governed: home as property and place of authority. His patrimony, inherited from his father and guarded by his wife Penelope during his long absence, is symbolised in Homer by Odysseus's marital bed, which he himself built around an olive tree still living, still rooted in the soil of his island. The question of home is so simple in *The Odyssey*. Odysseus earns his return through suffering and perseverance and fidelity through-out to his Goddess Athena and (in spirit at least) to his wife Penelope.

But home ownership, that flag of Toryism, cannot be translated into home in the larger sense any longer; some people may indeed have assembled their own bed from a DIY kit under their own roof in the country where they were born, but not even this assures them that they are home. Second, third, fourth generation peoples born in the US or in the UK feel themselves part of what Salman Rushdie has called, in a memorable phrase, "imaginary homelands", countries of the mind, of memory, of history, of faith and increasingly of racial species and micro-species - nations composed of hankerings and loss, of a utopian nostalgia.

The struggle for the story of the past sets markers on the map of the present which in turn chart the future. But memory leads down many roads: to triumphalism, on the one hand, to grudge on the other, as well as to discovery and reparation. Roots revivalism - the politics of nostalgia - can lead to reinvigorated pride among muffled or neglected peoples and groups; but remembering sufferings like the loss of home can also be made a pretext for vengeance in the present.

Increasingly the old ideas of assimilation to an adopted country are being over-taken by a different thinking on identity and belonging, by a new mythology of home as somewhere else to which attachment is felt by blood, by religion, by language, or even by choice.

Growing ethnic hatreds between peoples who share the same streets and closely resemble one another argue their cause from historical wrongs: memory and imagination pitch in to tell their stories in the contest for borders, for dominion, and for righteousness. Monsters breed in this terrible playground of fabricated identities. At the core of the struggle for home lies the struggle for the way the story of place is told. Between what is remembered and what is forgotten, the self takes its bearings for home. The question is no longer who is to guard the guardians, but who is to tell the story? Who can bear witness?

At the heart of Romantic nationalism lies the interdependency of home, identity, heritage and women - and this mythology of the hearth continues to flourish in the present nationalist revival. The Grimm brothers, living at a time of Germany's struggles against Napoleonic occupation, belonged to the literary and scholarly circles determined to maintain and foster and define their national culture in the face of the invader. They became passionate about stories told by ordinary German people, which had previously been scorned as mere old wives tales, as the nonsensical wishful thinking of the illiterate - coarse and foolish romancing - and the brothers began to collect the stories for their famous anthology which first appeared in 1812. The stories were seen as authentic and archaic, flowing from the streams of the forests, falling with the needles of the pine trees. The brothers exalted over the word perfect repetition of some of their sources because this seemed to them evidence of the stories' immemorial antiquity of unbroken homegrown tradition. The Grimms did not notice, however, that one or two stories rather resembled the fairy-tales in Charles Perrault's famous French collection of over a century earlier, and that yet others echoed Italian stories of an even earlier date. It is only today, after much scholarly research into fairy-tales, that it has become plain that the Grimm brothers' sources were saturated in the French tradition, which itself goes back to the Italian and the Arabian and the Indian and the Chinese. Of all branches of literature, fairy-tales offer the strongest evidence of bonds in common across borders of nations, race and language.

A heroine with a very small foot on her way to a feast, dressed in a cloak of king-fisher feathers produced for her by magic, loses her slipper in a Chinese fairy-tale written down in the 9th century. And the first beast bridegroom who appears only by night slips into his mortal beloved's bed in an Indian story of two thousand years ago. The hearthside crone who passes on the wisdom of the tribe, who epitomises that once-upon-a-time-when-all-was-well, has always been a polyglot cosmopolitan, in spite of her homely headshawl and those old regional clogs she wears and her funny beaked nose and her spinning wheel. This motley, mongrel, volatile character of folklore is of crucial importance because even while stories are patently connected to particular places and peoples, as in the case of Hindu epics or the Irish legends, they are not immutable. They are not even recuperable in some imagined integrity, because the act of recuperation itself and the context of the retelling affect the interpretation. The primordial past, in all its longed-for simplicity and purity, cannot lie hidden inside them like a perfume still smelling in some Pharaoh's tomb. Home lies ahead, in the unfolding of the story in the future, not behind, waiting to be regained.

Home in myth promises an end to questing, to wandering, to trouble - home is closure, the arrival brings the story to an end, with all the wicked suitors dead, the faithful dog happy in his last breath, and your wife still staunch and true at her pious task of weaving your father's shroud. Your return signals your escape from misadventures, the great public events of your career - in a sense you can now shut the door on history. The domestic hearth, coded female, burns to the side of the great events with which the returning hero busied himself.

The effect is that home does not figure at the centre of the story, nor as the product of enterprise, as the sum of the work of its members, as evolving - as earned even - through men and women's labour together. In this, Odysseus, the Greek wanderer of myth, anticipates the fracture between home and factory of the industrial revolution, and the present separation between the woman's realm and the men's, women's control of household and children, men's work and street life, with occasional homings - to Mum with the laundry, to the wife,

or the girlfriend, with a bottle by way of apology. This myth disconnects home from work, makes women's tasks seem natural, timeless, somehow inevitable; it contributes to the continuing inability of our society to appreciate that raising a family and making a home is labour, as intricately bound up with economic conditions as any other kind of work.

The association of the primordial, static, authentic origin with the feminine realm runs deep in national myths, in this country, and perhaps in all of former Christendom where the Virgin Mary and her child symbolised an unsullied state of humanity and promised redemption. But England was "Our Lady's dower", and Marian devotion flung a blue mantle of churches dedicated to her over the whole country until the Reformation. Her symbolic function then passed to queens, beginning with Gloriana or Astraea, Elizabeth I, and culminating in the present trinity of Queen Mother, Queen and Princess Diana.

An exemplary exhibition at the National Gallery in London recently interpreted the exquisite anonymous Wilton Diptych, painted around 1395. Richard II appears there, kneeling to the Virgin, accompanied by two of England's sainted kings, Edward the Confessor and Edmund. They offer an image of a new adoration of the kings, with three English monarchs in the place of the Magi, and their offering, perhaps, the country itself, whose banner, blazoned with the red cross of St George, is being held by one of the company of angels who surround the Virgin, and who all wear the livery badge of the king himself, the White Hart. The banner's staff is surmounted by a tiny globe in which the tiny world, the sceptred isle, has been painted in miniature.

The exhibition revealed that this icon, giving every apparent sign of profound spirituality, still contains powerful partisan arguments about king and country. Richard II himself was a prime mover in fostering the concept of a sacred monarchy. But what is highly significant, from the point of view of modern ideas of national identity, is that when Richard II is shown extending his royal court to include heaven and the heavenly host, he is also yielding himself to a paradise of women presided over by the Virgin.

The icon's royalism, in its delicacy and sense of the sacred, would seem to have little in common with our contemporary monarchy, with Charles and Di, or Prince Philip and the Queen and the shouting headlines, the dirty tricks, the squalid eavesdropping. But they are still connected. The Wilton Diptych conveys an enduring and vital idea of the imaginary homeland, which the monarchy today is expected to embody. Much of the present disgust with the Royal Family is not rooted in a re-publican philosophy but in a nostalgic royalist idealism.

Ancient, holy and enduring - Shakespeare enshrined this idea in many plays about kingship and England, but most of all in Richard II, in John of Gaunt's ringing an-them. Here, in the famous speech, the metaphors of heaven, island, fortress and house follow one upon the other as if by force of logic; and these images again turn back on themselves to invoke natural bodily origin, land as mother:

This royal throne of kings, this scepter'd isle,
This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars,
This other Eden, demi-paradise,

This fortress built by Nature for herself
Against infection and the hand of war,
This happy breed of men, this little world,
This precious stone set in the silver sea,
Which serves it in the office of a wall,
Or as a moat defensive to a house,
Against the envy of less happier lands,
This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England,
This nurse, this teeming womb of royal kings, . . . this dear, dear land . . .

The Virgin's former dower, the enclosed and impregnable isle: aspects of the mythic kingdom present in Richard II's icon, and repeated in Shakespeare's rhetoric. Yet, at the very same time, the imagery contradicts the insularity of the message. The iconography of the Wilton Diptych, for all its ideological patriotism, draws on the Catholic church's Latin culture, jumping geographical borders, ignoring blood ties; the artist himself was a travelling man, as experts can tell from the techniques he used. Without these international, cultural means of expression, the diptych would be meaningless. Nativism in splendid solitude cannot be achieved at all, any more than a fairy-tale can be purely home-grown.

The monarchy's symbolic role in the country's sense of identity has grown as its political power has withered. Present public anger with the Royal Family does not focus on constitutional flaws, or on the social damage of aristocratic privilege, but concentrates instead on their behaviour - they are betraying the monarchy's mystique, the ideal of Royal Britain; they are defiling the chrism and the orb, the abbey and the palace, the coach and twelve, the colour trooped, all the glittering paraphernalia the tourist boards have presented as the nation since the invention of colour photography. The personal conduct of the Royal Family, since Victoria's reign, has been expected to offer the domestic version of this sanctity, the hearthside story of national identity - with a certain class colouring, of course.

The Queen and her mother also distilled a familiar essence of Britain - with their horses and corgies, Malvern water and Earl Grey tea, cardigans, brogues, silver-framed photographs, jigsaw puzzles and the wireless, their weak and not entirely reliable menfolk. That catchphrase, "so very different from the home life of our own dear Queen," still used to characterise anything untoward, was first spoken in Victoria's time, and it still conveys the extent to which the Queen symbolises the imaginary norm of the nation's personality.

So it is striking that the Windsor Castle fire did not much stir her subject's sympathy. Only 25,000 pounds was sent towards the 40 million needed for the repair fund. To make up the deficit, Buckingham Palace was open to the public for the first time. The Queen thus resorted to putting one home on show in order to restore another, but popular reproachfulness revealed that her country house burning down was fitting punishment for her family's failure to keep faith with the national and moral idea of home.

The same matriarchal atavism runs down through to the Conservatives' belief in the traditional role of the mother in the home, even while their economic policies make it impossible. Diana's perfections appeared at first fully warranted by the wide-spread trust in

her virginity. The mythic tenacity of this image of the symbolic female nation is so great that it is making it hard for the British people to let go of Diana. She will be crowned Queen, promised the Prime Minister, even though she would be living apart from the King. It would be interesting to see the answer to a poll asking the public to choose between Charles for King on his own or Diana as Queen Regent until William grows up.

Could there be another way of talking about home, without harking back to nostalgic lies about the hearth, the throne, the greensward, the island race? What is home ground? And how can it be made - now, for today?

Derek Walcott was given the 1992 Nobel Prize for literature. He was born in St Lucia, when it was a British colony, and has inherited through his grandparents - both black and white - a double uprootedness: on one side transportations of black slaves from west Africa to work sugar in the British West Indies; on the other, the displacement of those colonists who, to serve the Empire, left "home" (as England was always known, however long those colonial families had been gone).

In his poetry and drama, Walcott has worked back and forth over the relations of home and history, of loss and memory - like the swooping swifts of the Caribbean. His work puts the dominant and anguished questions of this end of the millennium: what does it mean to belong and not to belong? What way can history be told and experience be lived to bring about a sense of belonging? How does one come home? Over the last 20 years, Walcott has struggled with the Odyssean idea of home as native place, with a yearning to return to origins, and he speaks out against the nationalisms that assault communities and their peace, against xenophobia. Walcott declares instead, "I bear/my house inside me, everywhere".

It is vital not to abdicate from the making of this interior dwelling place. For stories held in common make and remake the world we inhabit. Walcott reproduces the dense mesh of modern identity, with its multiple compass points, its layered experiences; he stands witness to a rich - and painful - story made in common by both invader and invaded, coloniser and colonised, migrants and residents, crossing over all moats and fortress walls, navigating the oceans, like the convoys on the map in the Cabinet War Rooms.

In a lyric poem of 1979, *The Schooner Flight*, the narrator leaves home, breaks with his past, his roots, and ships as a seaman on board a schooner called *Flight*:

Though my 'Flight' never pass the incoming tide
of this inland sea beyond the loud reefs
of the final Bahamas, I am satisfied
if my hand gave voice to one people's grief.
Open the map. More islands there, man,
than peas on a tin plate, all different size,
one thousand in the Bahamas alone,
From mountains to low scrub with coral keys,
and from this bowsprit I bless every town,

the blue smell of smoke in hills behind them,
and the one small road winding down them like twine
to the roofs below; I have only one theme:
The bowsprit, the arrow, the longing, the lunging heart
the flight to a target whose aim we'll never know,
vain search for one island that heals with its harbour
and a guiltless horizon . . .

There is no safe place from the injuries of history; home as a place or time of innocence can only be an illusion. But the poet does not recover the bitter past to serve pre-sent grudges - his acts of remembering, his quest for identity are grounded in generosity.

The way Walcott has worked the material of his complicated memories and inheritance in the Caribbean represents an exemplary openness to making a new model of the homeland, which does not exclude, but rather includes, which does not justify, but seeks to understand. No home is an island, no homegrown culture can thrive in permanent quarantine.

The modern myths I have looked at in these lectures - monstrous mothers, warrior he-roes, diabolical innocents, wild beasts and savage strangers - all belong in the larger story of home, which is still being told. They are all threaded through the fabric as it is being made. In Derek Walcott's stage version of *The Oddysey*, Menelaus, King of Sparta, declares "We earn home, like everything else." Walcott does not mean paying the rent or the mortgage. He means taking part in the journey - using memory, imagination, language to question, to remember and to repair; to wish things well without sentimentality, without rancour, always resisting the sweet seduction of despair.

APPENDIX 2: Jean Aitchison's Lecture Transcripts

REITH LECTURES 1996: The Language Web

Lecture 1: A Web of Worries

Is our language sick? You might think so, judging from complaints in newspapers: "The standard of speech and pronunciation in England has declined so much . . . that one is almost ashamed to let foreigners hear it." "The language the world is crying out to learn is diseased in its own country." "We are plagued with idiots on radio and television who speak English like the dregs of humanity, to the detriment of our children."

But why? At a time when English is a major world language, is it really in need of hospital treatment? A wide web of worries; a cobweb of old ideas ensnares people as they think about language - any language, and this must be swept away. But clearing the cobwebs is only the first stage. The Language Web is the title of all these lectures. Webs, especially cobwebs, may entangle. But webs themselves are not a tangle. They have a preordained overall pattern, though everyone is different in its details. Nature forces humans to weave the language web in a particular way, whatever language they speak. We are free only within a preset framework, so liberty within limits will be a major theme. I will be looking at some key topics: how language changes, how it began, how children learn it, and how we remember words.

But first, the cobweb of worries must be removed. This envelops all of language, though especially language change. Yet humpbacked whales alter their songs every year and no-one has complained.

Naturally language changes all the time; this is a fact of life. In the 14th century, Geoffrey Chaucer noted that: "in forme of speche is chaunge" (language changes), and the same is true today. But change is one thing; decay is another. Is British English really changing for the worse, as some people argue?

Of course it isn't. Over 100 years ago, linguists - people who work on language - realised that different styles suit different occasions, but that no part of language is ever deformed or bad. People who dispute this are like cranks who argue that the world is flat. Yet flatter views about language are still widespread. As the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure said over 75 years ago: "No other subject has spawned more absurd ideas, more prejudices, more illusions or more myths". Things haven't changed very much since then. On inspection, the web of worries surrounding change turns out to be largely traditional, somewhat like the worries that each new generation of parents has about its offspring. Laments about language go back for centuries.

A 14th century monk complained that the English practised strange stammering, chattering, snarling and grating tooth-gnashing: "strange wlaffyng, chytering, harryng, and gar-ryng grisbittyng". And the complaints continued. "Tongues, like governments, have a natural tendency to degeneration," wrote the lexicographer Samuel Johnson, in the preface to his famous Dictionary of the English Language published in 1755.

Eighteenth century worries are perhaps understandable. Around 1700, the seemingly fixed grammar of Latin aroused great admiration, at a time when English itself was in a fairly fluid state. Many people hoped to lay down similar firm precepts for English, and assumed that somebody, somewhere, knew what "correct" English was. Jonathan Swift wrote a famous

letter to the Lord Treasurer in 1712 urging the formation of an academy to regulate language usage. He complained that many “gross improprieties” could be found in the language of even the “best authors”. But “correct English” was as hard to define then as it is now. In practice upper and middle class speech was often praised as “good”, artificially supplemented by precepts from logic and imitations of various Latin usages. These invented rules often get confused with genuine language rules.

All languages have their own “rules” in the sense of recurring subconscious patterns. In English, we usually place the verb inside the sentence, and say: “The spider caught the fly”. In Welsh, the verb comes first: “Caught the spider the fly”, and in Turkish it comes last, “The spider the fly caught” or “A bottle of good wine I want”. Without these genuine rules, communication would break down. “Henry ate an octopus” does not mean the same as “An octopus ate Henry”.

But genuine “rules” or “patterns” need to be distinguished from artificially imposed ones. For example, an old and illogical belief that logic should govern language has led in English to a ban on the double negative, as in “I don’t know nothing”, which is now standardly: “I don’t know anything”. This is odd, because in most languages of the world, the more negatives, the stronger the negation.

This was true in 13th century English. Chaucer in *The Canterbury Tales* said of the courteous knight roughly: “He never said no bad thing to nobody”. In Chaucer’s words:

He nevere yet no vileyene ne sayde
In all his lyf unto no maner wight
He was a verray, parfit gentil knyght.

The prohibition on double negatives may have begun with Robert Lowth, an 18th century Bishop of London, who wrote *A Short Introduction to English Grammar*. Perhaps his high status as a bishop led people to believe that his strictures on language were divinely inspired. The ban stuck. In the late 19th century, for example, an educator commented: “The student is instructed how contrary to reason is a double negative”. Yet it never entirely disappeared. It is still found in some varieties of English, as in the old music hall song: “I don’t not know no-one who don’t want no nine inch nails. I don’t not know no-one who don’t want no nine inch nails. I know the King, I know the Queen, I know the Prince of Wales, but I don’t not know no-one who don’t want no nine inch nails.”

Another artificially imposed rule involves “different to”. “I am irritated by the frequent use of the words ‘different to’ on radio and other programmes,” ran a letter to a daily paper. “In my schooldays of 50 years ago we were taught that things were alike to and different from. Were our teachers so terribly ignorant?” Well, different to is found even in the 17th century. “How much different art thou to this curs’d spirit here,” said the dramatist Thomas Dekker in 1603. The imposition of “different from” is a misguided attempt to make English behave more like Latin. But it is pointless to judge one language by the standards of another. Some of these old invented prohibitions remind one of Alice in Wonderland: “That’s not a regular rule. You invented it just now,” Alice complained to the King.

Moving onto the 19th century, proper behaviour was a major concern to a lot of people. Etiquette books were popular and precepts about language were issued alongside advice about

table manners. Consider some of the instructions in *Don't*, a manual of mistakes and improprieties more or less prevalent in conduct and speech, which was published around 1880. Don't drink from your saucer; don't wear diamonds in the morning; don't neglect the small hairs that project from the nostrils and grow about the apertures of the ears; don't say gents for gentlemen, nor pants for pantaloons. These are inexcusable vulgarisms. Don't say transpire when you mean occur. Don't say "loads of time" or "oceans of time". Say "ample time" or "time enough". Don't use a plural pronoun when a singular is called for. "Everybody put on their hats" illustrates a prevalent error. Don't say "It is him." Say "It is he" ... and so on and so on. Some of these artificial rules have been passed down from generation to generation. Their main effect is to make people insecure, to worry that they might not be using the right phrase, just as they might get anxious that they are not using the right type of spoon for soup.

Again and again etiquette, morals and speech are confused. Groombridges' *Annual Reader*, a manual of recitation for the use of schools, said in 1867: "Speech is a gift of God, and the habit of speaking correct English next to good morals is one of the best things in the world". We might laugh at this quaint confusion of morals and speech, except that it is still found nowadays. In 1985, bad English, whatever that might be, was even linked to crime by Lord Tebbit, then a key government figure. He said: "If you allow standards to slip to the stage where good English is no better than bad English, where people turn up filthy . . . at school . . . all those things tend to cause people to have no standards at all, and once you lose standards then there's no imperative to stay out of crime."

This tangled web of worries around language shows that many people, including some of those who rule our country, are back in the dark ages over understanding how it works.

But it is oversimple to lump all language worries together, and just dismiss them. The different strands of worry need to be teased out. Above all, three overlapping accusations recur, which can be called the "damp spoon" syndrome, the "crumbling castle" view, and the "infectious disease" assumption.

The "damp spoon" image comes from a newspaper writer, who has a "queasy distaste" for the "vulgarity" of some current usages, "precisely the kind of distaste I feel at seeing a damp spoon dipped in the sugar bowl or butter spread with the bread-knife". She implies that sloppiness and laziness cause much of language change.

The notion that change is due to laziness has been around for a long time. In the last century, many people had a romantic notion of primitive tribes as noble savages. The linguist Max Muller, for example, argued that there's "a laziness inherent in civilisation, so that sophisticated people no longer use the forceful articulatory movements required for primitive tongues, which are a preference for relatively easy sounds produced fairly far forward in the mouth." But this is rubbish; sounds move back in the mouth as well as forwards. One that has moved back is the increasingly common pronunciation of bu'er with a glottal stop in place of older butter. But Be'y 'ad a bi' of bi'er bu'er requires a lot of muscular tension and can-not be regarded as a lazy development.

The only truly lazy speech is drunken speech, where alcohol affects coordination, and English is not getting like drunken speech. Some years ago researchers at the University of Texas checked this out. They plied student volunteers with slugs of neat whiskey every twenty minutes for six hours; and before each new drink, they asked the students to read a word list

and chat. They found that the bumbles and mumbles of drunkards were fairly unlike the alterations in normal change. Drunken people keep vowels much the same, but lengthen consonants which get dragged out. They are also likely to pronounce 's' and 'ch' as 'sh'. These effects are due to a temporary lack of muscular coordination and are not happening in English as a whole.

CLIP: EXAMPLE OF DRUNKEN SPEECH

The omission in spoken speech of past tense endings is also sometimes claimed to be laziness, as in "Pamela jump back" rather than "Pamela jumpED back". "Peter climbed carefully down" rather than "Peter climbED carefully down". But these omissions enable speech to be speeded up, and are unlikely to destroy the meaning. So there is a trade off between smooth, fast speech and slow, careful, jerky speech. Faster speech involves more words per minute and cannot be classed as laziness. Of course fast speech forms occur mostly in casual conversation. But informal speech is not intrinsically "worse" than formal speech. It is just different. Humans naturally adapt their speech to suit the situation: they slow it down for babies and strangers, and they speed it up for friends. Eventually, some of these changes found in fast speech will creep into all types of spoken language. Only actors pronounce handbag as it is written.

CLIP: THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST

Lady Bracknell: Where did the charitable gentleman who had a first class ticket for this seaside resort find you?

Jack Worthing: In a handbag.

Lady Bracknell: A handbag?

Almost everybody else says "hambag". Once a change of this type has occurred, hearers often judge the older, outmoded form to be pedantic and less streamlined.

But let's move on to the "crumbling castle" view. This treats the English language as a beautiful old building with gargoyles and pinnacles which need to be preserved intact, as implied in statements by the writer John Simon: Language, he argues, should be treated like "parks, national forests, monuments, and public utilities . . . available for properly respectful use but not for defacement or destruction".

This view itself crumbles when examined carefully. It implies that the castle of English was gradually and lovingly assembled until it reached a point of maximum splendour at some unspecified time in the past. Yet no year can be found when language achieved some peak of perfection, like a vintage wine. Nor have those who claim that English is declining ever suggested what this date might have been.

And the "beautiful building" notion presupposes that rigid systems, once assembled, are better than changing ones. This is untrue. In the animal world, flexibility is a great advantage, and animals which adhere to fixed systems often lose out. Consider the blue-footed booby, a seabird which lives on the Galapagos Islands. This gannet behaves according to a rule of thumb: in the nest feed it; out of the nest ignore it. So if a young booby falls out of its nest, it inevitably dies - even when the nest is at ground level. A less rigid system might allow the

parent boobies to assess whether or not the squawking displaced youngster was one of their own; and, if so, push it back into the nest. But the booby's rigid system doesn't allow for this.

The ever-shifting nature of language keeps it flexible, so it can cope with changing social circumstances, as with the rush of new words relating to cars in the 20th century, such as the recent "autochondria" - from "automobile" and "hypochondria" - someone with excessive concern for the health of their car.

"Crumbling castle" supporters might argue that such additions are trivial and allowable, as long as older forms are preserved as well. But in the long run this is impossible, as shown by the increasing loss of old past tense forms, which provide a clear example of how earlier forms get whittled away. First, the old irregular forms gradually get forgotten, especially when the verbs are rarely used ones. In this century, "gelded" and "girded" have mostly replaced "gelt" and "girt" as the past tense forms of "geld" and "gird", and many people don't even realise a change has occurred. Replacement can happen even with better known verbs. The clothes designer Donna Karan, discussing the letters she received, said: "Anything that beared my name, I'd open". Second, new uses of old forms tend to acquire regular endings as in "shoot up" of drugs: "Someone passed me this syringe and I shooted up," said a drug taker in the Guardian. Third, any new forms receive regular inflections as in the word "bland out" - "become conformist". "Those that didn't burn out, blanded out", according to a writer in the New Musical Express. So more and more old forms are wiped away, as new, regular forms flood in. But this is not disintegration. Sweeping up old oddments is good housekeeping, or rather, good language-keeping. Gradual neatening up of patterns is inevitable and essential. In this way, the mind avoids becoming overloaded with unpredictable oddments.

Neatening up also happens with nouns. Houses were once housen and shoes were shoen, parallel to oxen. Imported words get tidied up, too. The Italian word graffito, "scratch", has been in use in English for well over a century, usually in the plural graffiti, meaning "scratches or scribbles on walls". Recently this plural has begun to be treated as if it were the singular. "Graffiti is disgusting," proclaimed an official notice on a London bus. Not everyone likes this. "The solecism a graffiti is surprising and distressing", according to a letter in the Daily Telegraph. But most English plurals now end with 's', so the treatment of graffiti as singular is in line with the general tidying up process, which has been going on for centuries. Language is not crumbling away. It is maintaining itself pretty efficiently.

But let's move on to the "infectious disease" view. In an article entitled Polluting Our Language, the writer expressed a widespread view that we somehow "catch" changes from those around us, and that we ought to fight such diseases: "The whole-sale spread of corruption may surely be ascribed to mere infection, to the careless, unthinking assimilation of the floating germs which envelop us." Change is indeed brought about through social contact, so the catching notion is not entirely wrong. But the "disease" metaphor falls down. People pick up changes because they want to. They want to fit in with social groups, and they adapt their hairstyle, clothes, and language, to those of people they admire, as with the Jocks and Burnouts, teenagers in a suburban high school in Detroit. Jocks were regular guys who joined in school sports and wanted to conform. Burnouts were rebels who took drugs and behaved unconventionally. The speech of these two groups showed clear differences with the Jocks imitating the standard adult pattern, but the Burnouts moving away from it. Adapting to those around is normal human behaviour. In Northern Ireland, East Belfast men and West Belfast women both showed a tendency to pronounce "grass" as "grawss" at a time when, in

theory, the two halves of Belfast barely talked to one another. What could have been happening? The mind boggles. But the explanation was quite simple. East Belfast men sometimes visited a city-centre store staffed by mainly West Belfast women. It's well known that shop assistants match their speech to that of their customers, and this is what was happening. The shop assistants were then transferring the pronunciation to their friends.

But changes aren't random. They take hold only if the language is predisposed to move in a particular direction. Social contact can trigger a change only if it was already likely to happen. The predisposition factor is often overlooked. At any time, in any language, a number of potential change-points exist. Anomalies tend to get smoothed out, as with the tidying up of past tenses and plurals. Human ears and the human vocal tract cause others. Consonants at the end of words are a weak spot in languages, since ends of words are pronounced with less force than beginnings: it's Kick, not kiCK. In British English, "t" at the end of words is eroding, moving from street to stree(t) and in the long run, it will be stree. The change is found in so-called Estuary English, around the Thames Estuary. It's also found in Scotland around Glasgow.

CLIP: BILLY CONNOLLY: A lot of kids like me. They don't come to the con-certs or shows; but in Glasgow, in the stree(t), the kids all shout at me and things.

Over time, end-of-word consonants may largely disappear, as has happened in some dialects of Chinese, several Polynesian languages, and, nearer at hand, in French and Italian, where most words now end in vowels: Una bottiglia di vino bianco, "a bottle of white wine". Oddly, people who dislike this change often praise languages such as Italian as being "beautiful" even though many Italian words are simply Latin without their endings: Italian vino, "wine", was once Latin vinum.

Changes are normally triggered by personal contact, as with the Belfast shop assistants, and not via the media. The media are often blamed for change, but their role is indirect. Newspapers can popularise new words such as "bonk", "yomp" and "wimp", and radio and television can influence attitudes towards language. These days, they send the sensible but indirect message that it's all right to talk in different ways. Janet Street-Porter, Lenny Henry, Cilla Black and others show that variety is the spice of linguistic life.

JANET STREET PORTER: Take a look at this. Elementary certificate. That's a laugh because I couldn't swim. If you imagine me swimming without my glasses on. I mean that is a real laugh.

LENNY HENRY: And then she worked for several years. And then I was born in '58 and then I sort of lived in and around Dudley and grew up with a West Midlands accent, which is really weird.

CILLA BLACK: Anybody in the audience tonight remember me when I first start-ed? (shouts of "yes") Oh gosh, you're older than ya look. You are indeed.

Their different accents, like their different clothes, are a mark of individuality.

Variety is the key to language change. Earlier in the century, an old mutation viewpoint prevailed, that some sounds slowly turned into others, like tadpoles gradually changing into

frogs. This is now outmoded. According to a newer view, variant forms arise, each used in a different area or speech style. Then one of the newcomers gets used more and more often and gradually ousts the older form, like a young cuckoo heaving an existing bird out of the nest. In some situations, a whole nestful of young cuckoos compete with each other and with older forms. They may squabble for a long time until one wins out.

This process is clearest in the case of vocabulary. It happened with the word “partner”, which is now the standard word for life-companion. But at one time numerous words competed: live-in lover, mate, and for heterosexuals, posslq, an acronym for “persons of opposite sex sharing living quarters”. Then the word “partner” gradually pushed the other terms aside.

The young cuckoo process also happens with pronunciation as with the butter and bu'er variants which are competing in British English. They're likely to co-exist, maybe for a longish time. Eventually bu'er may well win out, as these examples show. No change can occur without variation, though variation can sometimes exist without change.

Variation in speech is the norm. Our linguistic wardrobe contains a range of speech styles, which we suit to the occasion. Bus-conductors, bosses and babies need to be addressed in different ways. Change often happens when one particular variant expands its usage. But which variants should be used where and when still causes arguments as sharp as barbed-wire, especially as nowadays being “matey” is often more important than being “proper”, resulting in increasing approval of informal styles of speech, including swearing. I will return to this question in the third lecture.

Meanwhile, the tangled web of worries around language shows how little most people know about it. Next week I'll go right back to the beginning and discuss the origin of language in the human species. A web of deceit and a web of friendship combine to produce the real web: the web of language.

But finally, I would like to stress again that we need to understand language, not try to control it. Samuel Johnson said this better than anyone else in 1755 in the preface to his dictionary: When we see men grow old and die ... we laugh at the elixir that prom-ises to prolong life to a thousand years; and with equal justice may the lexicographer be derided ... who shall imagine that his dictionary can embalm his language ... With this hope, however, academies have been instituted to guard the avenues of their languages ... but their vigilance and activity have hitherto been in vain ... to enchain syllables and to lash the wind are equally the undertakings of pride.

Lecture 2: A Web of Deceit

For centuries ideas about language origin have frothed up like soap bubbles, then burst into nothing. Over two thousand years ago, the Egyptian King Psammetichus reportedly gave instructions for two newborn children to be brought up in total isolation. To his disappointment, their earliest word was “bekos”, the Phrygian word for “bread”. The king reluctantly concluded that the Phrygians predated the Egyptians. But according to John Webb, a 17th century writer, Chinese was possibly the original language of humankind. Happily it was spoken by Noah and his family in the Ark he assumed, and so survived the flood. In the mid-19th century, Abbot O'Donnelly, a Frenchman, claimed a new and prodigious discovery

of the original universal language, supposedly found on an Egyptian obelisk. His translation, he boasted, was “sufficient to open the eyes of a mole”. But no one listened, he lamented, with his words and results being blown away by the wind. As one weird idea after another bubbled up, language origin was regarded as a playground for cranks and the topic was banned in 1866 by the Linguistic Society of Paris, the most prominent linguistic association of the time. And disapproval continued. “The greater part of what is said and written upon it is mere windy talk,” said the linguist William Dwight Whitney in 1893.

The origin of the language web has become a serious field of study only in the last 10 years or so, and will be the topic of today’s lecture. A fresh look at the role of language has led to new ideas about how it all started. Traditionally, humans are regarded as reliable fact-swappers, and conveying information is often claimed to be the primary purpose of language. This view was put forward by philosophers, such as the 17th century thinker John Locke, who stated that language is “the great conduit whereby men convey their discoveries, reasonings and knowledge from one to another”. But this idea is misleading. Language is good at transferring some types of data, especially negative reports, such as, “No buses will run on Sunday”, or “The milk hasn’t arrived” - provided that the speaker is telling the truth.

But it’s bad at other types, especially spatial information, where instructions such as “Take the third turning on the right, then the fourth on the left” would be much clearer on a map. And as for tying knots, Hilaire Belloc once said, “If you can describe clearly without a diagram the proper way of making this or that knot, then you’re a master of the English tongue”. Perhaps he should have said, “You’ll have considerable difficulty describing a knot however many languages you’ve mastered.” Language is also bad at conveying pain or emotion. This patchwork of efficiency and inefficiency is fairly typical of behaviour that is biologically programmed: it has evolved to deal with some things, but not others, just as rabbits nibble grass but don’t crack nuts.

Early human language was probably not a fact-swapping device. Its original role can be uncovered by looking at behaviour which we share with our ape relatives, according to anthropologists.

Humans, alongside other primates, are often called social animals: they have firm family ties and also interact strongly at the group level. This social background has promoted two types of behaviour: they like grooming one another, and they can make guesses about the mental state of others - intelligent primates can put themselves into one another’s shoes, as it were. These abilities tie in with two things which language is especially good at: interacting with others, and influencing them.

Humans use language to keep in touch with one another, to weave a web of friendship. Speech is a close-quarters type of interaction, and social talking may be a substitute for the friendly grooming found among monkeys, according to one theory. The “Hello, how are you? Isn’t it a nice day?” kind of greeting has even been called “grooming talking”.

Friendly gossip can be thought of as a kind of mutual grooming, in which the participants take it in turns to stroke one another.

MUSIC: GOSSIP CALYPSO

Traditionally gossip is associated with women, but it is not just women yakking. Consider a conversation in P.G. Wodehouse’s novel *Carry On Jeeves*. “What ho!” I said. “What ho!” said

Motty. “What ho, what ho!” I continued. “What ho, what ho, what ho!” Motty replied. Even if they’ve got nothing to say humans take it in turns to mouth empty greetings at one another. Such conversational turn taking starts early in life. Listen to a mother and baby. Mother says, “And how’s my little darling today?” Then typically waits until the baby coos or burps or otherwise takes its turn before she continues:

MOTHER INTERACTING WITH BABY

“Look who I found. (baby makes sound) Yes, where does he belong? (baby chatters)”

Such turn taking may have predated language. Mothers and babies have possibly cooed and gurgled at one another for millennia. Turn taking is often a kind of ritual. You can frequently guess what the participants are planning to say. If you apologise, “Oh I’m terribly sorry, I spilt some coffee on your carpet,” you expect the problem to be minimised. “Oh please don’t worry. It really doesn’t matter.” Similar patterns are found all over the world. And solidarity speak - that is vocalising to strengthen social ties - extends to chance before sports matches. Take the New Zealand rugby team Haka. (FX: Rugby team)

This can be matched by chimpanzee pant-hoots, which, according to some recent research, are male solidarity calls. (FX: chimpanzee pant-hoots)

Human grooming talking is satirised by the science fiction writer Douglas Adams. Ford, a being from another planet, was puzzled by the peculiar human habit of continually stating, restating the very obvious as in “It’s a nice day” or “You’re very tall”, or “So this is it, we’re going to die.” His first theory was that if humans didn’t keep exercising their lips, their mouths probably seized up. After a few months of observation, he’d come up with a second theory: if human beings don’t keep exercising their lips, their brains start working.

But humans don’t just verbally scratch each other’s backs. They use language to influence and persuade one another. An effective persuader must be able to imagine events from another person’s point of view. In fashionable jargon, he or she must have a “theory of mind”. Without it, persuasion is a hit-and- miss affair.

Animals who possess a theory of mind are good at social manipulation: they can intentionally deceive one another, a skill found among most primate species, though some are better at it than others. Monkeys are fairly poor at it. Baboons and great apes are good at it. Among the great apes, chimpanzees, our close relatives, are extremely skilled deceivers. An infant chimp may scream as if it’s being attacked in order to persuade its mother to comfort and feed it. An older chimp may lead others away from hidden food, then double back and scoff the lot by itself. This ability to deceive has been labelled Machiavellian intelligence. Our ape relatives use deception almost always for selfish reasons. Humans differ, in that deception can be used for good purposes, as well as bad: for reasons of tact, as well as for dishonesty. Humans are not only good deceivers, but also good persuaders and good sympathisers: they can calculate how to influence others, and how to please them. An ability to deceive is therefore an advantage - as long as it is used wisely.

All this deceit may at first sight seem a long way from language. But a crucial connection exists. The ultimate goal of learning to speak may be lying, or more accurately a spin-off from lying - the ability to talk convincingly about things which are absent or even non-existent. This property of language, known as displacement, is one of its great strengths. Talking about

the past and future is important in any human society and imaginary events loom large in songs and literature. Once upon a time, there were three little pigs ... and so on.

A web of deceit, an ability to fib is therefore crucial to language. This may seem bizarre since most of us disapprove of lying. "Matilda told such dreadful lies, it made one gasp and stretch one's eyes," said Hilaire Belloc in his cautionary tales for children, in which lying Matilda is burnt to death. Yet even in England where we pride ourselves on being straightforward social lying is approved of. Politicians, sales persons, parents, maybe all of us are economical with the truth when it suits us, and little white lies are an essential component of politeness. Mrs Skewton, a character in Charles Dickens' novel *Dombey and Son* couldn't stop yawning as she was shown around Warwick Castle, but she assured her guide that for her yawning was a demonstration of delight. A truly tactful lady.

Friendship and deceit are therefore essential prerequisites of language. But they alone were not enough to trigger it. Human language developed only when these pre-language webs were combined with a unique human feature - a complex sound structure.

All primates can hear and discriminate a wide range of sounds, but the phonetic skills of non-human primates are minimal for two reasons. First, they can't easily suppress their own spontaneous calls. Withholding them is not impossible, as shown by Papoose, a female gorilla who wanted to mate with Titus, a youngish animal, rather than the older dominant male in the group. She and Titus managed to retain secrecy by suppressing normal copulatory calls. In another case, Figan, a chimp who was given some bananas, eventually learned not to make excited calls bringing other chimps to the scene. Second, vocal fine tuning is impossible for other apes. The sounds they make are variable and unclear, partly because they can't close off the passage to the nose. (FX: ape sounds)

But in humans the tongue forms roughly a right angle with the windpipe, like an upside down letter "l" and a larynx (or voice box) is lower than in chimps. This enables humans to shut off the nasal cavity when they speak and to make a range of precise and recognisable non-nasal sounds. Human vocal precision is quite odd, by primate standards, and the human sound system has more in common with birdsong than the grunts of our ape cousins.

Birds are capable of precise vocal control. So much so that Lord Monboddo, an English eccentric, claimed in 1773 that we humans learned how to sing and speak from birds, especially cuckoos, ravens and parrots - just as he assumed we discovered how to spin and weave from spiders. But birds and humans are not copying one another. Independently, they have each evolved a sound system which shares a number of features. Humans have a number of instinctive cries: a baby's scream of pain or yell of hunger is recognisable worldwide. (FX: baby crying)

These cries are not real language, which exists alongside as a separate system. Similarly many birds have a few preset calls such as a call to congregate or a danger cry. (FX: birds)

They also have more complex songs whose outline is fixed, but whose finer details often have to be learned.

Language proper is itself double-layered. Single noises are only occasionally meaningful: mostly, the various speech sounds convey coherent messages only when combined into an overlapping chain, like different colours of ice-cream melting into one another. In birdsong also, individual notes are often of little value, the sequence is what matters. (FX: birdsong)

In both humans and birds, control of this specialised sound-system is exercised by one half of the brain, usually the left half, and the system is learnt relatively early in life. And just as many human languages have dialects, so do some bird species. In California the white-crowned sparrow has songs so different from area to area that Californians can supposedly tell where in the state they are by listening to these sparrows. (FX: sparrows)

Like humans also, some birds, such as hornbills, take it in turns to vocalise. (FX: hornbills)

So we humans are a zoological curiosity. Just as the hoatzin, a weird type of bird, has a stomach somewhat like that of a cow, and a Newfoundland, a weird type of dog, has webbed feet a bit like a duck's - so humans, a weird type of ape, have evolved a communication system more like that of birds than that of their ape cousins. Yet the parallels between humans and birds must not be over-emphasised because there are also wide differences. Mostly only male birds sing and female birds burst into song only if injected with the male hormone testosterone; and differences between the songs of different birds are far greater than the differences between human languages, which are remarkably similar in their overall structure. In addition human language is an intimate style of communication compared with bird-song, which unamplified carries over greater distances, sometimes several kilometres. The record is probably held by the kakapo, a New Zealand flightless parrot whose sonic booms attract mates from several kilometres away. (FX: kakapo)

Humans can sometimes adapt the tones and rhythm of their language to produce long distance communication, as in the talking drums of Africa. (FX: drums) Such adaptations reveal one further unique feature of human language: it can be transferred to other media - drum beats, sign language or writing. But the parallels between human language and birdsong are striking. Complex sound systems tend to acquire similar characteristics. This indicates that both human language and birdsong are the end product of a long period of evolution with basic mechanisms innately built into their owners.

Arguments continue about how humans acquired their birdlike skill. Apart from the sounds, the ground-plan, the basic web structure, is similar in all human languages, indicating that they developed from a common inherited root. Modern humans and human language probably came from one area of the globe, from Africa. Archaeological traces and clues from DNA and blood groups support this conclusion. One scenario is known as the East Side story. Several hundred thousand years ago, we and our chimp cousins spread across Africa. Then a major earthquake, or "tectonic event", as it is sometimes called, created the Great Rift Valley, splitting Africa into lush forest to the west and relatively dry savannah to the east. The chimps were left in the tree-filled west. Future humans were stranded in the arid east. Their dry savannah became even drier, and they were forced to adapt, or die. One adaptation was meat-eating, as humans learnt to supplement their vegetarian diet by scavenging. This promoted brain growth, which may have aided the development of language.

Nature is over generous in providing pathways along which animals may evolve; multiple routes are available for exploitation. Evolution is as much a case of sup-pressing some options as it is of selecting others. Language may have been a lucky choice out of a range of alternatives. Comments by the poet Robert Frost on his life could well apply to the human race as a whole: "Two roads diverged in a wood and I - I took the one less travelled by, and that has made all the difference." Once a particular path has been chosen, this constrains

future choices - just as leaves which fall off trees cannot leap back on again. Language was a lucky choice which paid off and has been paying off ever since.

But just how it all got started is still partly a puzzle. Early words could have arrived via several routes. In the last century, three ideas predominated. According to a so-called “pooh-pooh” theory, language began as cries of emotion: “ooh! aah! ai! ha!”. But a “dingdong” proposal, that language started by imitating natural sounds, was supported by Charles Darwin. He speculated that an “unusually wise ape-like animal” may have imitated the growl of a beast of prey, and so informed his fellows of the danger. A “yo-he-ho” hypothesis, that heaving and hauling gave rise to words, is the most plausible of these early ideas: the vocal cords were in origin membranes deep in the throat which closed off the lungs, making the ribcage rigid when some effort is required. The grunt as the air is expelled can be heard in some old sea shanties.

MUSICAL CLIP: SEA SHANTY

Yet the problem is not so much how sounds arose as how particular sounds came to be used as symbols, with firm meanings. A vervet, an agile African monkey with a black face and a long tail, may represent an intermediate phase. Vervets have warning calls which distinguish different types of danger: at a chatter they stand on their hind legs and look around for a snake, at a rraup they dive into the undergrowth as if hiding from an eagle, and at a chirp they climb a tree and look around for a lion or leopard. Squirrel monkeys in South America also distinguish between different perils. But these monkey danger calls are not pure naming. They are a cry of fear, a warning to others, and only partially a symbol. Naming for the sake of naming is a major hurdle for animals. The naming insight, the realisation that things have names is hard for them to grasp, though it comes naturally to humans.

A stack of single words was probably in common use long before any “grammar” emerged. Rules, in the sense of recurring patterns, could have started in more than one way. Individual words might have been placed together, much as many children start off with single words such as “hi”, “bye-bye”, “mummy”, “daddy”, which they later combine in a predictable way as in “bye-bye daddy”, “hi mummy” and so on.

CLIP OF MOTHER AND CHILD

Child: Car do’y (dolly) Car do’y.

Mother: Car dolly.

Child: Car do’y (dolly)

Mother: Car with dolly in it.

Of course those who set language going in the first place were unlikely to be babies. But neatening up was a more likely way for rules to emerge. Numerous words were probably placed together randomly and repetitively. “Meat I want.” “Meat meat want I,” for example - perhaps not unlike the sign sequences of the chimp Nim Chimpsky who was taught a language with signs for words. Nim tended to repeat items. Like most chimps, he was fairly greedy, and his food anxiety gave rise to many repeated signs as in “Eat me eat,” “Nut Nim nut,” “Drink eat, drink eat.” His longest recorded sound-sequence was: “Give orange me. Give eat orange me. Eat orange. Give me eat orange. Give me you.” The message was clear: Nim wanted an orange.

But for more complex messages, those which go beyond obvious requests, more structure is needed. In language change today optional patterns become habits. Then the habits become obligatory. Our best guess is that something similar happened at the origin of language. Even Nim Chimpsky showed some signs of this process. When requesting food, he almost always put the food word first as in “Grape eat,” “Banana Nim eat,” “Apple me eat.” Human beings also have inbuilt preferences, some of which may have predated language. When humans talk about two items, they prefer to locate the small than the large. They say “The cat sat on the mat,” “the bird perched on the tree” rather than “The mat lay under the cat,” “The tree stood under the bird.” It is part of the human mindset to envisage the world in this way. As another preference, all over the world humans are more likely to say the equivalent of “Harriet was hit by a cabbage” rather than “A cabbage hit Harriet.” Animate beings tend to get placed before inanimate things. Again humans prefer to put verbs near the objects affected. A sequence - “Henry ate an apple” or “Henry an apple ate” - is statistically more likely in the languages of the world than “Ate Henry an apple.” Even though this last order is not impossible; it is found in Welsh, for example (we towelled Henry aval (ph)). Many more preferences can be found and they sometimes clash, which is why all languages are not more similar.

But in general preferences become tendencies, tendencies become habits, and habits become rules. This provides some clues as to why languages do not fly apart in crazy ways. The human mindset pushes our thoughts in certain directions. Language possibly language neatened itself up with rules only gradually: “If it all gets too much of a muddle, try a bit of organisation” might have been a subconscious maxim - perhaps somewhat like the man who supposedly lost an open umbrella on his untidy desk: this made him decide to tidy it up. Language was probably at first messy and only partially structured, but acquired more and firmer rules as it became more complex. This all led to a more precise type of web, a web of rules, and in the next lecture I will talk about how children born today acquire this rule web whose overall structure is preordained.

So after at least 50,000 years of evolution, the language web is the same the world over in its broad outline. Some 19th century travellers were surprised by this: “The grammar is precise and somewhat complicated . . .” said a Mr Bell in 1899 about the language of the Miskitu Indians, who live on the north-east coast of South America. He continued: “It seems strange to find among an uncultivated and uncivilised race rules of grammar as precise and well known as are used by the most cultivated nations of Europe . . . How is this to be explained?”

Lecture 3: Building the Web

E.T., the well-known extra-terrestrial, learnt human language fast. His earflap opened and he listened intently. His circuits buzzed, assimilating, synthesising. Thus inspired, the language centre of his marvellous brain came fully on. Yet E.T.’s magical ability is almost matched by that of human children. As the American statesman Benjamin Franklin once said: “Teach your child to hold his tongue. He’ll learn fast enough to speak.”

Children talk so readily because they instinctively know in advance what languages are like, as in the spider’s web the outline is pre-programmed and the network is built up in a preordained sequence. The predictable way in which the language web develops will be the topic of this lecture, including how adults can help or some-times even slow down a child’s progress.

Language has a biologically organised schedule; children everywhere follow a similar pattern. In their first few weeks babies mostly cry. As Ronald Knox once said: “A loud noise at one end and no sense of responsibility at the other.” Crying exercises the lungs and vocal chords. But crying may once have had a further evolutionary purpose. Yelling babies may have reminded parents that their offspring exist. Deaf winged doves forget about their existing brood and go off and start another.

From six weeks onwards infants coo, or even mew according to some older accounts, which sometimes compare these early gurgles to the twittering of birds. From around six months babies babble language-like sounds. “He called me mummy” is a typical squawk of a delighted new parent as a child exercises its mouth with repetitive sounds. Over interpretation by parents is why the words “mama”, “papa” and “dada” are found all over the world for “mother” and “father”, closely followed by “kaka” for excrement.

A widespread myth circulates that infants burble all sounds of every language. This is untrue. The range is in fact rather limited. The myth arose partly because some early researchers found it hard to distinguish infant gurgles and partly because children do indeed produce some sounds not found in the language they are learning. This English child is making a sound remarkably like a French “r”. But a babbling drift occurs in which children gradually veer towards the sounds found in their own language. For example Chinese babies babble single syllables with different tones. Single words - “ooh”, “da” - are produced from around the edge of a year. Good parents often play naming games with youngsters. They point to a black, fluffy blob in a book and say, “cat.” Little Bobby or Susie imitates, saying maybe “ga.” The discovery that “ga” is a name for the dark splodge comes later. Children don’t at first realise that sounds can be labels for things. Early words are tied strongly to a location and often relate to a whole scene. The word “da” for a toy duck might be for one particular duck as it floats in a particular bath. Only later will “da” be used for a duck away from the bath, and later still extended to all ducks and maybe swans, geese and even toy boats.

The naming insight, the discovery that things have names, is a major leap forward. Children pass this milestone at various times, typically before the age of 18 months. Parents don’t usually notice it, it seems so normal, because adults expect things to have names. But for youngsters the naming discovery can come as a shock, as shown by occasional children who come to it late. Helen Keller was deaf and blind from the age of 2. Then when she was 6, her teacher held her hand under a flow of water and spelled out the word W.A.T.E.R on the other. She later wrote: “Somehow the mystery of language was revealed to me. I knew then that W.A.T.E.R meant the wonderful cool something that was flowing over my hand. That living word awakened my soul, set it free. Everything had a name. Every object which I touched seemed to quiver with life”.

The naming insight is followed by a naming explosion. Names come popping out of children like stars out of fireworks. This eruption in vocabulary leads to word combinations: “Mummy push”, “car dolly” and so on.

CLIP: CHILD WITH MOTHER

Child: Car d’olly (dolly), car d’olly.

Mother: Car with dolly in it.

Some phrases are novel as “Bye-bye sock” or “Gone kitty”, which are unlikely to have been copied from adults. Recurring patterns are found, as with “Sand toe” - I’ve got sand in my toes; “sand eye” - I’ve got sand in my eye; and “sand hair” - I’ve got sand in my hair.” The parents were probably too busy mopping the sand off this child to admire the consistency of its language rules.

Youngsters extract their own rules from the speech around and reapply them, as shown by the wug test devised by Jean Berko Gleason in the 1950s. “Here is a wug,” she said, showing a picture of a birdlike creature. Then she showed two of them. “Now there are twooooo ...” “Wugs,” responded children from a very young age. Another animal was a “gutch”.

Male: This is a gutch. This is a gutch. So there are two ...?

Children: Gutches!

Child: We both said it at the same time.

Children don’t always get it right first time. Two year old Sophie learned the words “broken”, “fallen” and “taken”. She wrongly concluded that English past tenses end in ‘en’. She then invented a whole range of new past tense forms such as “boughten”, “builden”, “riden”, “getten”, “cutten”, “wanten”, “touchen”, “tippen” - as in “Me tippen that over.” Sophie gradually dropped these ‘en’ forms, probably when she discovered the normal past tense for each verb. Children dislike finding two words which mean exactly the same thing and usually drop one of them.

By the age of 3 children utter long sentences, though some things, such as pronouns, still cause problems. Three year old Adam said his doll “shuts she’s eyes” instead of “shuts her eyes”.

Adam: When she lies down, she shuts she’s eyes.

Mother: She does.

At around three and a half children talk freely. By this time, they have acquired most of the constructions used by adults. This is true of monolingual children and also bilingual ones. A few gaps still exist for all children up to the age of around 10 and word learning goes on throughout life.

This predictable sequence of events is typical of biologically scheduled behaviour, as pointed out by Eric Lenneberg, a pioneer in this field. His book *Biological Foundations of Language*, published in 1967, was a major landmark. Before then natural behaviour, as seals naturally swim, was usually separated from nurtured or learned behaviour as seals can be taught to jump through hoops. Lenneberg showed that this divide is over simple. Most natural behaviour requires some learning. Pigeons naturally fly, but they have to spend time learning how to stay in the air. Conversely, learning would be impossible if it did not build on natural talents. Pigeons can be trained to distinguish between letters of the alphabet, but only because they already have acute eyesight.

Language is an example of maturationally controlled behaviour, Lenneberg pointed out - behaviour which is pre-programmed to emerge at a particular stage in an individual’s life, providing the surrounding environment is normal. Walking and sexual behaviour are clear examples. Such behaviour emerges before it’s critically needed, yet can’t be forced to appear

before it's scheduled. Some learning is required but the learning can't be significantly speeded up by coaching. No external event or conscious decision causes it and a regular sequence of milestones can be charted.

An ability to cope with language structure is largely separate from general intelligence. In recent years several so-called "cocktail party chatterers" have been discovered - children who have a non-verbal IQ so low that they may not even know their own age, but who speak fluently. As at cocktail parties, they talk for the sake of talking and their speech may not make sense. Take Laura, an American teenager. "I was 16 last year and now I'm 19 this year," or "It was no regular school. It was just good old no buses." Such chatterbox children aren't just repeating set phrases because they make grammatical mistakes which they're unlikely to have heard, as in Laura's statement that: "Three tickets were gave out by a police last year."

Just as bees learn fast to distinguish flowers from, say, balloons or bus-stops, so human children are preset by nature to pick out natural language sounds. They don't get distracted by barking dogs or quacking ducks. Their learning is innately guided; inbuilt signposts direct youngsters, so they instinctively pay attention to certain linguistic features such as stressed vowels and word order. Children's main task is to discover which of these features have priority in the language or languages they are acquiring, just as bees have to learn whether to look for heather, roses or lilies.

A biological time clock ordains the sequence in which the language web is woven, though not the exact dates. But no-one's quite sure when the clock starts ticking and when it stops. According to Lenneberg, a critical period is set aside by nature between the ages of 2 and 13. After that, the acquisition of language is difficult, he assumed. Lenneberg turns out to be partially wrong and partially right. He's wrong about the start point. Language acquisition begins well before the age of 2. Babies only a few days old can pick out their own language according to some French research, as shown by increased sucking movements when familiar sounds are played to them. So infants still in the womb may become accustomed to the rhythms of the language spoken around them. And language development does not come to a shuddering halt at adolescence, as Lenneberg assumed. Vocabulary even undergoes a spurt at this time. So the idea of a fixed critical period is now disputed.

Yet most people find it easier to learn languages when they're young, so a sensitive period may exist - a time early in life when acquiring language is easiest and which tails off gradually, though never entirely. A natural sieve hypothesis is one idea put forward to explain this: very young children may extract only certain limited features from what they hear and may automatically filter out many complexities. Later learners may have lost this inbuilt filter and be less able to cope as everything pounds in on them simultaneously.

A tuning in hypothesis is another possibility. At each age a child is naturally attuned to some particular aspect of language. Infants may be tuned into the sounds, older children to the syntax, and from around 10 onwards the vocabulary becomes a major concern. Selective attention of this type fits in well with what we know about biologically programmed behaviour.

The outlines of the language web are therefore preordained. Acquiring language involves weaving in the network details of one's own native tongue with particular portions scheduled to be filled in at particular ages. Japanese, Welsh or Samoan - children handle all languages with equal efficiency. The American linguist Noam Chomsky has suggested that children

might be innately endowed with advanced information on the main ways in which languages can vary, so a child may have to discover whether it's dealing with an English type language, which puts verbs in front of its objects, or a Turkish type one which does the reverse. Once the decision is made the child metaphorically sets a switch with multiple repercussions. It's as if the child was sitting in a linguistic bath and watching which way water swirled down the plughole - clockwise or anti-clockwise. Once the youngster had found this out, then it would automatically know the linguistic equivalent of whether it was in the northern or southern hemisphere and whether days got warmer to the north or to the south.

Chomsky makes acquiring language sound like turning on a light - more instantaneous than it really is - but his theory rightly emphasises that any language holds together in a network of implications. If a language has one type of construction, others are predictable from it. If, as in English, a language has verbs before its objects, as in "climb the tree", then it will also probably have prepositions before nouns as in "up the tree". A language such as Hindi or Turkish would have the reverse and say as it were "the tree climb" and "the tree up".

But natural web spinning can be both helped and sometimes hindered by the speech of those around. Early research talked of Motherese, mother's speech. This left out fathers and friends, so Caretaker speech became the fashionable term - later amended to Caregiver speech and, in academic publications, to CDU, Child Directed Utterances. I'll leave it at Caregivers. Another term "baby talk" is best avoided because it usually refers to "gee-gee", "puff-puff", "moo-cow" type words, so puzzlingly widespread in England when talking to babies or sending Valentines. Caregiver speech can be odd. Some parents are more concerned with truth than with language. The ill-formed "Daddy hat on" might meet with approval. "Yes, that's right" if daddy was wearing a hat. But the well formed "Daddy's got a hat on" might meet with disapproval. "No, that's wrong" if daddy wasn't wearing a hat. You might expect children to grow up telling the truth, but speaking ungrammatically as some early research has pointed out. In fact the opposite happens.

Parents also pick on etiquette - "Say please" - or swear words - "Don't let me hear you say that word again." Or occasional pronunciation problems - "Say Trisha, not Twisha." If they do pick on language formation, it's often verb endings. This may be useful if the child is tuned in at that time to learning these. If not, the correction is likely to be ignored. One much quoted conversation was about baby rabbits. "My teacher holded the baby rabbits and we patted them," said the child. "Would you say she held them tightly?" asked mother. "Oh no, she holded them loosely," replied her daughter.

At best, a sensitive parent provides support by being aware of structures to which the child is attuned. Mostly parents muddle along, sometimes getting it right, sometimes wrong.

CLIP: FATHER AND CHILD

Child: Daddy, Daddy sing, Daddy sing ... Daddy king.

Father: Daddy King?

Child: Daddy sing, king. Daddy ... king, king, king.

Father: Are they kings? He's got a beard, so he might be a king. I don't know, but he's certainly wearing very fancy clothes.

Child: Daddy king, Daddy king, Daddy sing.

Father: Oh you want me to sing! I thought you were saying king.

At worst, a grumbling tone of voice can sap confidence: a child may realise that something is wrong, but not always know what. Only talk directly addressed to the youngster has an effect. Vincent, a hearing child born to deaf parents, learned to communicate with sign language. He himself could hear and he used to sit in front of the television and watch the pictures with fascination. But apparently he didn't pay any attention to the sounds. He didn't start to speak until he went to school where people talked to him. And a recent survey in Manchester found that television can delay speech development even in some normal children. They are riveted by the colours and flashing lights and tune out the sounds.

But even with face to face contact, the young learner sets the agenda: clear, varied utterances directly addressed to the youngster are the silken strands out of which the child builds the language web. Caregivers speech is extra useful when the same words come in more than once in different ways. Many parents do this naturally. "Now Patsy, where did you get that knife? Give the knife to mummy. Give mummy the knife. There's a good girl." The talk has to grab the child's attention. Joint enterprises are all important. Parents often find it easier to talk to girls, mainly because they involve them more often in domestic chores. "Come and help mummy with the potatoes", mothers often say to their daughters. "But go outside and play foot-ball" they command their sons. Not surprisingly some families end up with chattering, potato-peeling girls and tongue-tied football-kicking boys. This is one reason why girls are often a step ahead of boys in their language.

But if people talk to them, all children respond well. They enjoy pit-patting the conversational ball backwards and forwards.

CLIP: FATHER AND SON

Father: Will you put your coat on, please?

Child: Why?

Father: Because we're going out.

Child: Why?

Father: To see Aunty Mary.

Child: Why?

Father: Because Aunty Mary's going to give us tea.

Child: Why?

Father: Because we're hungry and we need to go to her house for some tea.

Child: Why?

Father: Well what would happen if we didn't eat?

Child: Why?

Father: (laughs)

At this point Father realised Junior wasn't interested in the answers, but was treating the conversation as a game, which he wanted his father to go on playing. So children build the

language web by extracting what they need from the talk they hear around them. Most are efficient chatterers long before they go to school, but they still need to learn which type of speech to use when - so-called communicative competence. Babies and bank managers must be addressed in different ways, just as different clothes are required for the beach and a wedding. A doctor speaking to another doctor might talk about a “circumorbital hematoma”, but to a schoolboy it’d be a black eye.

The language web then has been mostly acquired by children by around the age of 13 apart from the mixing and matching of language styles and also vocabulary, which will be the topic of next week’s lecture.

You might expect parents to cheer as their offspring became competent language users and give them, say, a reward of a telephone on their 13th birthday, but the acquisition story is not yet over. At this age language suddenly becomes a mud-slinging match between generations, at least in England. Teenagers want to talk like their pals, but parents disapprove. A father was shocked when his daughter informed him that she didn’t dare talk in her posh home voice at school; she’d lose her friends. Teenage stropiness is partly to blame with predictable kicks at convention, though this is normally a temporary phase. Teenagers’ language usually gets less extreme as they approach adult life. But changing speech styles also tangle people up. These days formal speech, like a top hat, is used on fewer occasions. Informal speech, like an open-necked shirt, is felt to be friendly. In this easygoing atmosphere “being proper” is often regarded as less important than being “matey”.

Matiness and casualness are sometimes emphasised by swearing. F-words swarm like bees in some recent literature and buzz about freely in conversation. Today’s swear words are undergoing a bleaching process, a fading of meaning that happens in all semantic change. In the last century oaths using the name of God were widely disapproved of. Then they gradually lost their power to shock. These days F-words and S-words no longer horrify so many people. Their meaning has weakened as the original connection with sex and excrement fades.

Perhaps a new linguistic anxiety is taking over for those who aren’t bothered by four-letter words. Political correctness may be the replacement worry. Some people would rather say an F-word than label anyone mentally deficient or retarded. They’d prefer “mentally challenged” or “developmentally inconvenienced”. This increased sensitivity to others is a useful trend even though these new PC words may sound somewhat bureaucratic.

But the war of words between the generations is also entwined with the usual cobweb of worries which surround language change. Parents want their offspring to use so-called Standard English. What exactly they mean by this is a question which has long ensnared people in its sticky and dusty threads. The word “standard” is ambiguous. It can mean either a value which has to be met, as in a high standard, or it can be uniform practice as in standard behaviour. These two meanings of standard have long been confused. For example, in 1836 a treatise which offered “principles of remedy for defects of utterance” commented that “the common standard dialect is that in which all marks of a particular place of birth and residence are lost and nothing appears to indicate any other habits of intercourse than with the well-bred and well-informed wherever they may be found”. So Standard English came to be thought of as the speech of the educated. This was often assumed to be the language of Oxford, so-called Oxford English, and of the big public schools. So the word “standard” moved from meaning general usage to that of a specific group to be emulated.

But it's important to distinguish between accent, which describes pronunciation, and dialect which involves grammar. As a recent survey commissioned by the National Curriculum Council pointed out, spoken Standard English is not an accent. Pronunciation has always varied and Standard English includes a variety of accents. Different accents are a sign of identity, a badge of one's area. They're a problem only if they're hard to understand. Meanwhile, the grammar of English is fairly similar across the British Isles. Standard spoken English is usually defined as the grammatical forms used in formal public contexts, and they don't vary very much.

But language is always changing and a few fluctuating forms cause a disproportionate amount of anxiety. The phrase "for you and I" in place of the presumed correct form "for you and me" came out top of the complaints in letters written to the BBC about language. Yet several well-known figures have used it in public quite recently, including Oxford-educated Lady Thatcher who commented that: "It's not for you and I to condemn the Milawi economy." There's a surprising mismatch between what people condemn and the condemned forms they use without noticing. Let's hope that the next generation will shake itself free of this cobweb of pseudo worries.

As this lecture has pointed out, the language web, like a spider's web, is woven in a preordained way. As with spiders, a lot of time and effort has to go into the weaving process. But humans, unlike spiders, can think about the webs they have woven. This sometimes gives rise to a superfluous cobweb of worries. Ideally the final layers of a child's web-building would be supplemented by two extra conscious strands: tolerance of minor variations and an interest in each other's speech.

In Bernard Shaw's play *Pygmalion*, performed in 1916, the character Henry Higgins refers to the flower girl Eliza Doolittle as a "squashed cabbage leaf", complaining that "a woman who utters such depressing and disgusting sounds has no right to be anywhere, no right to live". This narrow-minded view is luckily disappearing. Increasingly, people are beginning to realise that variety is the spice of linguistic life.

In John Agard's poem *Listen Mr Oxford Don*, the West Indian speaker claims to be bashing up the language:

Listen Mr Oxford Don

I'm a man on de run

and a man on de run

is a dangerous one

I have no gun

I have no knife

But mugging de Queen's English

is the story of my life

I'm not a violent man, Mr Oxford Don

I only armed wit human breath

but human breath

is a dangerous weapon

But he's not blowing the Queen's English down. Nor is he breathing germs over it. Quite the contrary: with his skilled word-weaving, he's breathing extra life in-to the language.

Lecture 4: A Web of Words

Dean Farrar, a respected 19th century intellectual, once eavesdropped on some apple pickers. "I once listened for a long time to the conversation of three peasants who were gathering apples among the boughs of an orchard. And as far as I could conjecture, the whole number of words they used did not exceed 100," he guessed. They managed with this low number, he suggested, because "the same coarse expletives recurred with a horrible frequency in the place of every single part of speech." Dean Farrar, like numerous others, grossly underestimated the number of words known by native speakers of English, or any language.

Words are the topic of today's lecture. The Language Web is the title of all these lectures and the human word store, with its multitude of links, is perhaps the most truly web-like of all aspects of language - even though up till recently both the size and the importance of the internal dictionary, or mental lexicon, has been underestimated.

A false but popular view is that the size of a person's lexicon is about two-thirds of Shakespeare's vocabulary whose plays contain around 30,000 different words. But far more words exist now than in Shakespeare's time and many speakers probably know twice as many as he did. An educated native speaker of English knows at least 50,000 words, according to our best guestimates. The word "know" refers to "potentially active vocabulary", that is, words which could be used spontaneously, even though words such as igloo, gladioli, or trombone, might occur only occasionally. Humans mop up words like sponges. By the age of 5, most English-speaking children can actively use around 500 words; and more are added fast, often quite long and complex ones.

Child: There's all different kinds. There's triceratops', a pachycephalosaurus, a crocodile, an ankylosaurus. That's a barosaurus, a diplodocus, a brachiosaurus, a triceratops.

The total number of words rises to 20,000 around the age of 13, and to 50,000 or more by the age of about 20. These figures have been arrived at by tests on the proportion of words known in various dictionaries. A typical university student can use the equivalent of two-thirds of the Concise Oxford Dictionary, which claims to contain around 75,000 entries. Though most people also know dozens of quite specialised words, which don't always find their way into dictionaries - as with chemists who know the chemical elements.

MUSICAL CLIP: THE ELEMENTS SONG

Averaging it out, between the ages of 5 and 20 a native English speaker acquires more than 10 words a day. That's more than 300 a month and well over 3,000 a year, though the words are unlikely to be acquired at a smooth rate. This far surpasses the achievements of those few chimpanzees who have been taught so-called "words" via signs or pictures. Their total rarely reaches 500 in spite of intensive coaching. As one researcher concluded: "The only way to begin to account for the child's wizardry as a word-learner, given the sheer weight of how

much there is to be learnt, is to grant that the child brings a great deal to the ‘original word game’ : word-learning ability is clearly inbuilt in humans.

At one time learning words was thought to be like beachcombing: strolling along the shoreline, picking up different shaped pebbles and shells, which were then stacked up in a mental museum. This is still the view taken by some language learners, as in Hanif Kureishi’s novel *The Buddha of Suburbia*, which described an immigrant keen to get accepted: “Dad always carried a tiny blue dictionary with him, making sure to learn a new word every day. At the weekends I’d test him on the meaning of ‘analeptic’, ‘frutescent’, ‘polycephalus’ and ‘orgulous’. He’d say, “You never know when you might need a heavyweight word to impress an Englishman.”

But words are not separate pebbles. They are woven into a complex web whose multiple links enable humans to remember and find so many words so quickly. At a first glance words are like coins with two sides: meaning on the one side, and sounds on the other. These two sides can get detached. Sometimes the meaning gets linked to the wrong sounds. Prince Edward, in a television interview about his old school said: “It’s difficult to use capital punishment in any institution. A beating is very valuable. It shows people you’ve come to the end of your tether.” The Prince did not plan to behead his school chums. He had made a speech error, a slip of the tongue, and said capital punishment when he’d meant corporal punishment. At other times people know the meaning of the word they want but can’t think of the sounds, which they’re sure are “on the tip of their tongue”. They’re just out of reach, like a submerged dream that floats under the surface of memory.

Word meaning is the side of the coin people often think about first, though humans can’t usually explain the meanings of the tens of thousands of words they use. Defining words like a dictionary is a technical skill which only lexicographers acquire, as Blackadder discovered when he tried to rewrite the dictionary.

CLIP: BLACKADDER

Blackadder: Right. Next “A” - “A-B”.

Baldrick: “A-B”. Well it’s a buzzing thing, ain’t it? “A buzzing thing.”

Blackadder: Baldrick, what have you done?

Baldrick: I’ve done “C” and “D”.

Blackadder: Right. Let’s have it then.

Baldrick: Right. Big blue wobbly thing that mermaids live in. Sea.

Blackadder: Yes, tiny misunderstanding. Still my hopes weren’t high. What about “D”?

Baldrick: I’m quite pleased with “dog.”

Blackadder: Yes and your definition of “dog” is?

Baldrick: Not a cat.

A view that words have fixed, precise meanings is an old one which goes back at least to Aristotle. It’s still found today. According to the novelist Evelyn Waugh, words have basic inalienable meanings, departure from which is either conscious metaphor or inexcusable

vulgarity. Traditionally, a word is viewed as a cake, with a set recipe, whose ingredients can be ticked off on a list - sometimes called a check-list view of meaning. But the checklist idea works only occasionally, mainly for technical terms such as square, which is “a closed flat figure, with four sides of equal length, and all interior angles equal”. It works also for some consciously invented meanings, as in a bureaucratic definition of a cow. “A cow is a female bovine animal which has borne a calf, or has, in the opinion of the minister, been brought into a herd to replace one which has borne a calf.”

But in most cases, woolly boundaries and fuzzy edges are the norm. Word meanings are like stretchy pullovers whose outline contour is visible, but whose detailed shape varies with use. In the words of R.G. Collingwood, “the proper meaning of a word is never something upon which the word sits like a gull on a stone. It is some-thing over which the word hovers, like a gull over a ship’s stern”. This has been known for quite a long time. Nearly 40 years ago, the philosopher Wittgenstein pointed out the “family resemblance” phenomenon, using the word game as an example. Like members of a family, every game has similarities with some other game: ring-a-roses and tennis involve physical activity, tennis and chess require a winner, chess and patience are normally played indoors, and so on - but no one factor links them all. More than 20 years ago, the sociolinguist William Labov drew attention to the “fuzzy edges” problem, by asking people to name various containers. They not only disagreed with one another over bowls, cups and vases; but were inconsistent from day to day. Certain shapes were clear instances of particular containers, but others varied: something might be a bowl when full of potatoes, but a vase when it held flowers.

A possible solution to all this fuzziness was proposed in the mid-1970s by a psychologist, Eleanor Rosch: humans do not rank all members of a category equally, she pointed out. They judge some to be very good examples, and others less so. So robins and blackbirds are very good birds, which she labelled prototypes. Canaries and doves are less good birds; toucans and ducks are bad birds; and a penguin is a very bad bird indeed. People analyse the characteristics of the best bird, the prototype, and allow anything which sufficiently resembles it to belong to the category “bird”. This explains how humans deal with oddities, why ostriches, emus and one-legged, albino blackbirds can be accepted as birds.

But children take time to discover adult prototypes. One small girl latched onto a crescent moon as a prototypical moon. She then labelled anything which was crescent shaped and shiny as “moon” including curved cow horns, a slice of lemon, and a shiny green leaf. For another child, a “ra-ra” began as something dead and bloody which the cat brought in, maybe from the noise made by the animal as it chewed its catch. She then applied the word to her own blood-smearred cuts and bruises and, later, to red cherries in ice-cream. Adult style ranking may take a long time to emerge. Eleven year olds were inconsistent when asked to select the best examples of a cate-gory. Older children tended to give top ranking to items which were important to them. They gave high priority to parrots among birds because they found them eye-catching, and to potatoes among vegetables because they like potato chips.

In different cultures some unexpected differences sometimes surface. English speakers expect vehicles to have wheels and regard cars and buses as the best examples. French speakers are less fussy about the wheels, and some even accept skis and lifts as examples of “un vehicule”, a vehicle. Several Italian teachers of English judged that a goose was not a bird on the grounds that it was a fowl; and that a walnut was a fruit, a dried fruit. And some Swedish

teachers of English denied that berries could be fruits. They had all been influenced by their own language even though they were unaware of this.

But the human word-web involves much more than a set of prototypes. It's multidimensional. Each word is an intersection point at which numerous strands meet. Some of these linking threads can be identified by "slips of the tongue", when people accidentally substitute one word for another. "Do you have a refrigerator in your car?" someone asked me. They meant air-conditioner, showing that names for different cooling mechanisms were linked in their mind. Strong ties exist between words within the same domain of meaning, so "brother" may get substituted for "sister", "aunt" for "niece", "tomorrow" for "yesterday", and so on. Sigmund Freud, incidentally, suggested that word substitutions had some deeper significance as when the Austrian President declared a meeting of parliament closed when he meant opened. Freud comments: 'No doubt the President secretly wished he was in a position to close the sitting, but this seems over imaginative. Perhaps the words 'close' and 'open' are just tightly linked in the mind and some distraction caused the President to pronounce the wrong one.'

Patients with brain damage sometimes provide further evidence of word links. A stroke victim may look at a lemon and name it apple or orange. The word-name has not necessarily disappeared from memory. Instead, closely connected words may have become confused, just as normal speakers cannot always remember which is which among different breeds of dog or makes of car.

How these word-clusters form in people's minds has long been a puzzle. But the answer may be quite simple. Words which can replace one another in a sentence structure often occur together, as orange and lemon: "Oranges and lemons say the bells of St Clement's." "Roses are red, violets are blue." "Girls and boys come out to play." "Parsley, sage, rosemary and thyme." Even antonyms, opposites, are probably learned because they tend to occur near one another: "Don't mix clean clothes with dirty ones", "You'll have to take the rough with the smooth", "She doesn't know if she loves him or hates him", and so on.

And people often use a couple of words from the same domain to avoid using a more general, technical term which covers them both. They talk about "brothers and sisters", not siblings; "rain and snow", rather than precipitation. "Please put the knives and forks on the table" is more usual than cutlery, which is a fairly formal term. "You'll find the cutlery on the fourth floor, Madam." In some cases, a superordinate term doesn't even exist. What are baths and basins? Are they bathroom fixtures? Or sanitary fittings? What are coughs and sneezes? Are these noises indicating respiratory distress? And what about tin-openers and corkscrews, which are sometimes con-fused in slips of the tongue? No single English term covers "kitchen gadgets for opening things".

Noticing which words occur together is a natural human talent. It's the key to sounding like a native speaker. People who grow up speaking British English don't talk about rank butter or rancid eggs or rotten weeds. They reliably refer to rancid butter, rotten eggs and rank weeds, even though rancid, rank and rotten tend to have overlapping definitions in dictionaries.

Similarly with chase and pursue. English speakers use them with different objects, even though they might not consciously realise it. We chase runaway horses, burglars, balls and other physical things, as in "More friggin' football. Bunch o' tarts going round a field chasing a ball!" That example, by the way, was from the British National Corpus, a databank of

spoken as well as written English. But we pursue abstract ideas, aims, targets and policies as in, “We need to take the initiative in pursuing a strategy for employment and growth”. So footfalls are not normally pursued, nor are targets chased - even though the meaning follows after is given for both chase and pursue in some dictionaries.

And humans learn how to handle new words by paying attention to the other words around, as with “wimp”. This word is widely used, but it’s crept into dictionaries only recently, so must have been learned some other way. In a survey of “wimp” words in newspapers over 80 per cent were accompanied by clues to its meaning, that of a feeble male. “He hates wimps and needs strong people”. You were a hunk if you drove a Mustang; a wimp if you drove anything else. He was a go-getter, a doer, not some depressed wimp and so on.

Humans then are super sensitive to words which occur together. Sensitivity to surrounding words is now thought to be the key to learning grammatical rules. Verbs especially are the maypole around which a sentence revolves and they determine its structure. For example, you have to put something somewhere as in “Herbert put the jellyfish in the bath”. You can’t just say “Herbert put the jellyfish”. The sentence structure must have been picked up by listening to the words around.

But words don’t just have meaning links. They also have a sound structure. Information about how humans retrieve word sounds comes from malapropisms - similar sounding words which get confused, as in “he told a funny antidote” for “he told a funny anecdote”. Mrs Malaprop, the character in Sheridan’s play *The Rivals*, said things such as, “As angry as an allegory on the Banks of the Nile” when she meant “alligator”. With real adults a bathtub effect is found: the word is like a person submerged in a bath, their head and feet out of the water with the head further out than the feet. People get the beginnings of words right, after that the ends, and the middle not very well, as in “transcendental medication” for transcendental meditation. It’s a policy I regard as indispensable,” said a government spokesman. He actually meant “indefensible”. And “You keep newborn chicks warm in an incinerator,” proclaimed a lecturer. She had meant to say “incubator”.

People also remember the word-rhythm and stressed vowel most of the time, though not as well as the beginnings and ends. Numerous similar words are distinguished fast, mostly by their different beginnings, as with ability and debility or virility and sterility.

MUSICAL CLIP: WHEN YOU ARE OLD AND GRAY

Children, on the other hand, are better than adults at word rhythm, and not so good at word beginnings, as in: “Daddy, please will you buy me an ice-cream toilet” for “ice-cream cornet”, and “the lion and the leprechaun” for “the lion and the unicorn”, “gandigoose” for “bandicoot” and “marmadillo” for “armadillo”. They eventually shift over to an adult-like system, partly because they learn to read and partly because they discover that word beginnings provide a faster way to find words.

Of course humans don’t just remember old words. They also coin new ones. “A dead cat bounce” is a temporary and deceptive share recovery before a final crash. “Greenism” is commitment to preserving the environment. “Middlescence” comes between adolescence and senescence. A “magaholic” is an insatiable magazine reader and a “golden parachute” is a large sum of redundancy money which allows the person dismissed from employment to float gently down to the problem of being unemployed. Most new words simply disappear, like

raindrops falling and soaking into the ground. Only a few get caught in the bucket of public attention and make their way into dictionaries. As an 18th century writer James Bramston expressed it: "Like South Sea stock expressions rise and fall. King Edward's words are now no words at all." Coining words begins early. Young children easily make up new words, but many of them are odd by adult standards. "I'm souping," said a 3-year old as it ate soup. Even 11 and 12 year olds make a lot of odd guesses. For example, a group was asked: "Suppose there was an insect called a wug, what would be a good word for a very small wug?" Woggle, wuggable, and wugtugbug were among the suggestions made. But adult-type responses, usually wuglet or wugling, became much commoner among teenagers, though several suggested miniwug or microwug. This ties in with an explosion of mini and micro-prefixes in the language as a whole. The mini micro rocket took off in the 1960s with words such as minicar, minibar, miniskirt and microwave becoming commonplace. From then on "mini" cropped up everywhere. "I must have been out of my mini mind," commented one writer.

Confidence in handling word formation may be one reason behind a leap in vocabulary which occurs around the age of 13. It's a skill non-native speakers find hard to master. Sometimes word they think should exist simply don't. "A principle of idealisation is applied manywhere," said a Japanese scientist in the preface to his book.

But every time we speak, we have to pick from this huge number of words, old and new. At one time searching for a word was assumed to be like hunting for a book in a library. A person went to the shelf in the mental lexicon where it was stored, as it were, then pulled it out. If this selection took place in too much of a hurry, a neighbour might be accidentally picked such as left instead of right or geranium instead of hydrangea. But this neat library model is unlikely. It's more as if humans pull out a number of words from the bookshelves all at once and then replace those they don't want. The mind subconsciously over-prepares itself, by activating more words than can be used. The most direct evidence comes from blends, when two or more words are combined into one, as in "she chuttled", from chuckled and chortled, "It's cold in Greeceland" - a blend of Greenland and Iceland, but said in a Greek restaurant. "He was given a standing applause," said a politician, blending a standing ovation with loud applause. Another time the government were accused of "shrugging their feet" over an important issue. The speaker presumably meant either shrugging their shoulders or dragging their feet.

Both meaning and sound are interwoven in the selection process. A musician commented about the conductor Toscanini: "He had very little symphony with modern music," meaning sympathy. The words sound similar, and Toscanini often conduct-ed symphonies. Both were probably aroused in the mind, then the wrong one selected. Such errors indicate that it is normal to arouse more words than are needed, and to suppress those which are unwanted. Sometimes the wrong word is suppressed.

An initial idea progressively fans out, it seems, and spreads to associated words. Eventually numerous different words may be ready to go, all of them resembling the word required in some way or other. Words that fit both the sound and the meaning get progressively more aroused and others fade away. Finally a winner will pop up, like toast out of a toaster; occasionally the wrong one if there are two or more similar candidates. All of this happens in less time than an eye blink.

So many words are aroused because so many words are linked. The human word-web is not two-dimensional or even three-dimensional; it's multi-dimensional. In a Michael Frayn play, *Alphabetical Order*, a character tries to find where a secretary filed an important piece of information. Most probably she'll have it filed under whoever said it, which we don't know, or the occasions he said it upon, which we don't know either, but conceivably she may also have it filed under corporal punishment or punishment corporal or labour party or parties labour. The human mind would probably have filed it in all these places.

But manipulating the vast, intertwined web of words inevitably leads to short cuts. Narrowing down the options can involve unseen snares. These will be discussed in the next lecture. Yet how lucky most of us are that we can so quickly locate the words we need out of the 50,000 or so we have stored. Our skill in doing this perhaps only becomes apparent when compared to someone who has lost this ability, as sometimes happens to stroke victims. This frustrating condition is described in Nabakov's *Pale Fire*: She still could speak. She paused and groped and found what seemed at first a serviceable sound, but from adjacent cells imposters took the place of words she needed and her look spelt imploration as she sought in vain to reason with the monsters in her brain.

Words are often felt to hold magical power. A survivor from the Titanic reportedly said, "My maiden name was Trout. How could I possibly drown?" But the most magical aspect of language is probably the huge number of words we know, and the speed with which we find the ones we want.

Lecture 5: The World Wide Web

We human beings are odd compared with our nearest animal relatives. We've lost most of our hair. We wear clothes. And, according to the writer Mark Twain, we're the only animal who blushes or who needs to. But our oddest characteristic is our language. Unlike animals, we humans can say what we want, when we want. "Alfred burned the cakes", "Amanda plans to breed bandicoots", and "Mermecolions intrigue me" are all possible utterances, even though Alfred burned the cakes over 1,000 years ago, Amanda's bandicoot breeding plans are in the future, and mermecolions are mythical creatures, a cross between a lion and an ant with sex organs the wrong way round. This open-endedness, the ability to talk about anything at any time is uniquely human. In contrast, many animals are limited in the signals they can send. One species of grasshopper selects between six possible chirps, meaning roughly "Life is good ... Get off my patch ... I'm feeling sexy ... That female's mine ... How about making love?" And finally, "I did enjoy that." It's as if humans had to choose between hello, goodbye and I love you. Animals then are linguistically limited, but all normal humans can produce and understand any number of new words and sentences. Humans use the multiple options of language often without thinking. But blindly, they sometimes fall into its traps. They are like spiders who exploit their webs, but themselves get caught in the sticky strands. In this final lecture, I want to discuss how the huge choice available to us also sets up possible snares.

The human mind subconsciously cuts down on the potential language pathways, and in so doing ensnares the thoughts of its speakers. It is a tangle which humans either make for themselves or is made for them by skilful persuaders. Persuasion is of course a major use of language, maybe one of its original uses. Everyone needs to be on their guard. Overt mind

bending is usually easy to detect. Advertisements go in for obvious mind bashing and the speakers at Speakers Corner are clearly trying to influence us.

CLIP: SPEAKER AT SPEAKERS CORNER

The BBC is a godless, cursed organisation spreading the cancer of unbelief, of sin ... in children ... the nakedness, women naked. You are going to die!

But less direct persuasion may trap the unwary. Language worries worth worrying about do exist. They rarely appear to be major perils, but, like a banana skin or a loose paving stone, they can trip people up and cause more damage than might be foreseen. A single strand in a spider's web might at first catch a fly by one leg, but then entrap it further. Speakers therefore need to be watch out. If they clear their minds of pseudo worries, such as anxiety about split infinitives, then they might have more energy left to notice these genuine pitfalls.

The gobbledegook syndrome is the most straightforward of these snares. Gobblede-gook can be defined as pretentious or unintelligible jargon, as when a young man impresses others with idle chatter of a transcendental kind in Gilbert and Sullivan's opera *Patience*.

MUSICAL CLIP: GILBERT AND SULLIVAN'S PATIENCE

Gobbledegook needs to be translated into comprehensible language, though it must not be confused with technical vocabulary. A doctor talking to another doctor might justifiably use words such as "electroencephalography" or "mesenteric adenitis".

However, medical terms can become gobbledegook if used inappropriately. "Is there any history of cardiac arrest in your family?", a doctor asked. "We never had no trouble with the police" was the indignant reply.

Politically correct terms are sometimes labelled gobbledegook, but this is not entirely justified. The PC movement has some beneficial spin-offs - "firefighter" or "bar person" in an ad makes it clear that either sex can apply. The PC movement is still young and some PC phrases sound very bureaucratic, as with "visually challenged" for blind or "developmentally inconvenienced" for older mentally retarded. But PC hearts are in the right place even if their tongues or pens are twisted up in sesquipedalian words. PC phrases need to be looked at unemotionally one by one. Some terms simply reflect a normal distinction between written language, which is fairly formal, and spoken language, which is relatively informal. Other expressions overlap with euphemisms, though these rarely present a serious threat to understanding. It does not need a linguist to point out that the bus company which re-structured its fares was just raising them, or that workforce imbalance correction simply means sacking people.

In sentence structure gobbledegook is usually due to lack of time and care, as perhaps with the personal pension plan which defined foreign emoluments as "earnings of a person resident but not domiciled in the UK from duties performed wholly or partly in the UK for a non-resident employer". It's as clear as dirty dish water and perhaps more time should have been spent drafting it. As the French writer Pascal once said, "I have made this letter longer than usual only because I have not had time to make it shorter". So gobbledegook delays understanding and can also cause misunderstanding. Only recently a member of the European Parliament commented: "The treaties are so complicated that very few people can possibly understand what they mean. Fraudsters are having a field day simply because the regulations

are so complex”. Overall gobbledegook is easy to spot, though less easy to cure because lucid speaking and writing take time and practice. But it is worth making the effort. Good communicators are like cooks squeezing a lemon: they extract the essence, then convey the full flavour to the consumers whether in speech or writing.

But let’s turn to another language trap, the “wimp effect”. Humans subconsciously notice which words occur together. Newspapers kept reminding us that George Bush had shaken off his wimp image. President Bush has decisively buried his lingering image as a White House wimp, we were told; but in so doing they were rein-forcing his negative image. The Bush wimp pairing insured that he remains perhaps permanently associated with wimp-hood, however undeservedly. And in a newspaper report about the New York police force, the word “corruption” occurred 65 times. An inquiry was only just starting, yet the consistent nearness of the words “police” and “corruption” as in “police corruption power and analysis unit” guaranteed that New Yorkers would feel anxious about their police even before any investigation had taken place.

So humans may be subconsciously trapped by their language. Linguistic freedom was seriously questioned over 60 years ago, first by Edward Sapir, then by Benjamin Lee Whorf, two American linguists. Their ideas became known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Sapir stated:

“Human beings do not live in the objective world alone . . .but are very much at the mercy of their particular language . . . The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached”.

Their detailed claims are far more clear, though they undoubtedly cover much more than the common observation that some cultures have more subdivisions than others for particular vocabulary areas. By the way, the most quoted example - that Eskimos have numerous words for snow - has been grossly exaggerated, as explained in an article aptly titled The Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax. British skiers possibly outdo Eskimos, or, more accurately, speakers of the Inuit language in the varieties of snow they can name.

Whorf’s best known claim was that “standard average European” cultures are in a mental straitjacket in which events are packaged into boxes, such as days, hours, minutes: a length of time, he argued, “is envisioned as a row of similar units, like a row of bottles”. In the American-Indian language Hopi, a different linguistic situation prevails, he suggested. An English utterance such as “They stayed 10 days” be-comes in Hopi, “They stayed until the 11th day” or “They left after the 10th day”. According to Whorf, “Our ‘length of time’ is not regarded as a length but in Hopi as a relation between two events in lateness”.

But all Whorf has pointed out here is that the Hopi language expresses “time” in a different way from English. Hopi and English speakers need not envisage time differently: it is a hypothesis which needs to be tested, and which he himself failed to test. So Sapir and Whorf tried to identify possible language traps. They may have been struggling to express an even wider entrapment in language, which I have called the frog-in-a-well problem. This comes from a Chinese folk tale about a frog which had lived all its life in a well. One day it hopped out, and was astonished to find what a limited view of the world it had always had.

In English, a clear example of this is the use of generic “he”; that is “he” supposedly referring to either sex. A widespread assumption exists that use of “he” for he and she presents no problem, especially if a disclaimer is attached: when I say “he”, I mean “he” or “she”.

But “he” is far from neutral. Both men and women assume generic “he” refers primarily to men. In a typical study, 20 university students - 10 men and 10 women - were asked to listen to a number of sentences such as: “When a botanist is in the field, he is usually working,” and say in each case, as quickly as possible, yes if the sentence could refer to a female or no if the sentence could not refer to a female. Ninety-five per cent of the subjects, both males and females, made errors, and said that “he” sentences could not refer to females. But when the sentence was changed to a genuinely sex-neutral wording, such as “a botanist who is in the field is usually working,” the number who assumed that the sentence did not include females dropped to 43 per cent. In another study, 10 university students - 5 men and 5 women - were asked to read paragraphs involving a neutral between sexes person, such as “beginning writer” but which contained the pronoun “he”. Afterwards they were asked if the “beginning writer” was male, female, or unspecified. Only 20 per cent consistently said unspecified. And there are numerous similar studies.

Humans behave like spiderlings who never venture outside their web. They create their own limited mental pictures of the world. The word “week” is often quoted. A week has no concrete reality in the external world. Yet most native speakers of English have a mental model of a sequence of seven days, which is divided into two chunks - five working days followed by two rest-days, the “weekend” - or some-times it is six working days followed by one rest-day.

MUSICAL CLIP: NEVER ON SUNDAY

They have this idealised notion of a week, even though they may organise their own working life quite differently, and may know that technically the week begins on a Sunday. In contrast, an Inca week had 10 days, nine working days followed by market day, on which the king changed wives.

These mental models can be handed down from generation to generation, and they can reinforce cultural norms. The word “mother” represents a cluster of at least three different ideas, as the linguist George Lakoff has pointed out. First a birth idea - the mother gives birth to the child; second, a nurturing idea - the mother looks after the child; third, a marital idea - the mother is the wife of the father. This cluster of ideas has helped to give rise to a stereotype of a “proper mother” as one who gives birth, stays at home and nurtures, and is married to the father. The stereotype persists even though it is increasingly out of touch with modern society.

To take another example, many British people assume that they live in a society organised in tiers. They have a mental model of a layer cake with rich upper class at the top, comfortably off middle class in the centre, and struggling working class at the bottom. Yet numerous socioeconomic studies have shown that the middle class versus working class divide is one of differing lifestyles, not position on an economic hierarchy. As an actor noted, “We were poor, but we had a piano, so I suppose we were middle class”.

Powerful mental images may be preserved or even created by metaphors, it has been suggested. Expressions such as “Pauline was rich in ideas”, or “Alan had a wealth of experience” presuppose that accumulating money might be a praiseworthy aim.

Consider the emotion of anger. This is often envisaged as heated liquid in a container, as George Lakoff has pointed out. It's like a whistling kettle which builds up a head of steam: "Mark's anger simmered", "Helen seethed with rage", "Neil's blood boiled". Overheated liquid is liable to burst out, as in "Mary blew her top", "Matthew exploded".

Such metaphors reflect genuine mental images, according to psycholinguistic experiments. When asked about an idiom such as "hit the ceiling", speakers imagine containers bursting open and their contents spouting upwards. They do not imagine a person with springs on their heels hitting their head on the ceiling.

Arguably, the "liquid in a container" image could lead people to assume that explosion is a natural consequence of overheating, and justify outbursts of rage. This is unlike the situation in some parts of India, where anger is still thought of as heat, but dry heat which requires lubrication. So universal tendencies may have different cultural manifestations.

Fear provides the reverse scenario. Physiologically humans either freeze or flee, yet almost all English metaphors stress freezing or empty containers, not fleeing: "Peter froze with terror", "Marigold was rooted to the spot", Peggy's limbs turned icy cold", "Paul's courage drained away". A petrified English speaker might stand still rather than attempt to escape. It is a worrying possibility, though one which has not yet been checked out. But entrapment in existing traditional metaphors is not the only danger. Metaphor is a powerful device for changing people's attitudes. Nukespeak is the most publicised example: phrases such as "nuclear shields", "nuclear umbrella" might lead people to assume that nuclear devices are essential safety equipment, it's been argued, and distract attention from their potential danger. The surgical language of the Gulf War described air strikes as having "pin-point accuracy" in the hope of persuading people that the war damaged only buildings rather than humans, it has been claimed.

Metaphors are "hi-tech" devices for changing people's minds. The linguist Susan Elgin used to get annoyed when friends she was visiting left their television on. She found it insulting. Then she read that for the younger generation, "the television is the flickering fire on the hearth". The metaphor changed everything for her - instantly. She now understood why the television set was left on, and was no longer annoyed by it. She comments: "I wouldn't expect them to put out the fire in their fireplace out during my visit: why should they turn off their television?"

Metaphors used by politicians and journalists can affect attitudes. Humans can be dehumanised by aligning them with illness, as when Ronald Reagan vowed to fight the "communist cancer", or with animals as when couriers who carry drugs are re-ferred to as "ants" or "mules". An electronics firm, which was faring badly, was said to have "binged on the 1980s consumer boom" and was now attempting to recover from "the hangover". The metaphor of binging implies some degree of foolhardiness rather than sheer economic bad luck. But metaphors do not automatically catch on and influence people. They have to fit in with a feeling in the air, or zeitgeist, which differs from language to language. In psychobabble metaphors have to achieve cultural resonance and avoid cognitive dissonance since we humans are like spiders who get accustomed to moving along some strands of our web and not others. A few images are widely accepted: a notion that up is good and down is bad may be universal. "Paul is going up in the world", "Jack's down on his luck", "Henrietta's moving up the ladder". These may have equivalents everywhere, but other

images are local. It's not chance that when dealing with large quantities of, say, drugs Europeans across the channel tend to talk about "avalanches", but we in Britain refer to "floods".

Or consider wine. Wine drinkers are prepared to believe that wine can be breezy, flabby, chocolaty, meaty or even chewy, but puzzlement and fury erupt-ed when a wine critic suggested a wine smelt of hamster cages and worse. As a wine editor acidly commented: "Things like cobwebs, sumo wrestlers' jockstraps and un-swept floorboards simply don't belong in a tasting note".

Successful metaphors have to be both sufficiently ear-catching to make people take notice, but sufficiently ordinary to be acceptable. An organisation might be called an octopus: most people know an octopus has eight legs which reach out and cling and pull. But to call it a starfish or a squid would be unlikely to have the same effect, because people are less aware of how these animals behave. So the moral is twofold. Watch out for clever metaphors which might bend your mind. And conversely, if you yourself want to influence anyone, use metaphor, though use it care-fully.

But what about language itself? Metaphor has shaped, perhaps misshaped, our views about how it works. The most widely-used metaphor is that of a game. The image is an oldish one. At the beginning of this century, the Swiss linguist de Saussure suggested that language was like a game of chess, in which all the pieces are interdependent: just as a single chess piece, such as a knight, acquires a value only in relation to the other chess pieces on the board, the same is true of pieces of language; and the philosopher Wittgenstein also talked about language as a game.

The game image is useful. But all metaphors can potentially mislead, in that any metaphor fits only partially. The game metaphor fits the rule-governed nature of language, but it perhaps over-emphasises its neatness and tidiness.

A more revealing image, now that we know more about language, may be the language web, the image and title of these lectures. The language web is potentially vast, though each language exploits only a small part of the available possibilities. We may laugh at daleks and other fictional robots with their narrow range of vocabulary and speech sounds, but we humans are similarly limited in our thoughts. (FX: dalek repeating word 'exterminate')

As speakers we behave in our use of language like surfers on the World-Wide Web. Those who browse in this extensive computer network soon find time runs out, just as it would if a spider were to try and cover the whole network of its own web. In the circumstances, we narrow down the number of tracks we go along, and select a few recurring routes. Ultimately, we must take care not to behave like the Chinese frog, which jumped back into its well because it couldn't stand the freedom outside.

This World-Wide Web notion ties in with current ideas about how the mind works. Up till a few years ago standard digital computers provided the major metaphor for human language processes. Yet this analogy has not proved particularly fruitful. Old style computers worked in too rigid a way. Now the brain itself is being taken as a source of inspiration for understanding the mind; and also, incidentally, for devising new computers. Increasingly the brain is turning out to be like a massive spider's web with its numerous circuits and multiple

interconnections. We ourselves narrow these down in a way that is inevitable yet merits serious thought.

But let's recap. These lectures began with a cobweb of worries which I attempted to clear away. We need to understand language, I argued, not try to control it. Then I tried to extend understanding of language: how it began, how children acquire it, and how humans remember the huge web of words. Out of this wider framework, some genuine concerns emerged.

Yet there is one extra worry to add in: language loss. Ninety per cent of the world's languages may be in danger. Around 6,000 languages are currently spoken in the world. Of these, half are moribund in that they are no longer learned by the new generation of speakers. A further 2,500 are in a danger zone in that they have fewer than 100,000 speakers. This leaves around 10 per cent of the current total as likely survivors a century from now. Of course languages inevitably split, just as Latin split into the Romance languages - so some new languages may emerge, but the diversity will be much reduced. The splendiferous bouquet of current languages will be whittled down to a small posy with only a few different flowers. To take a random example, it is unlikely that Menya will survive. It is a language fairly unlike English, spoken in Papua New Guinea by only a small number of people. (Example of Menya language) In 100 years time such recordings may be our only record of it.

"Worry about words," the writer AP Herbert once said. "For whatever else you may do, you will be using words always. All day, and every day, words matter. Before you die the aeroplane may be as out of date as the rickshaw . . . But words will still matter." He was quite right to tell us to worry about words. But, I'd like to add, it's important to worry about them in the right way.

APPENDIX 3: Anthony Giddens' Lecture Transcripts

REITH LECTURES 1999: Runaway World

Anthony Giddens

Lecture 1: Globalisation

A friend of mine studies village life in central Africa. A few years ago, she paid her first visit to a remote area where she was to carry out her fieldwork. The evening she got there, she was invited to a local home for an evening's entertainment. She expected to find out about the traditional pastimes of this isolated community. Instead, the evening turned out to be a viewing of *Basic Instinct* on video. The film at that point hadn't even reached the cinemas in London. Such vignettes reveal something about our world. And what they reveal isn't trivial. It isn't just a matter of people adding modern paraphernalia - videos, TVs, personal computers and so forth - to their traditional ways of life. We live in a world of transformations, affecting almost every aspect of what we do. For better or worse, we are being propelled into a global order that no one fully understands, but which is making its effects felt upon all of us. Globalisation is the main theme of my lecture tonight, and of the lectures as a whole. The term may not be - it isn't - a particularly attractive or elegant one. But absolutely no-one who wants to understand our prospects and possibilities at century's end can ignore it. I travel a lot to speak abroad. I haven't been to a single country recently where globalisation isn't being intensively discussed. In France, the word is mondialisation. In Spain and Latin America, it is globalization. The Germans say globalisierung.

The global spread of the term is evidence of the very developments to which it refers. Every business guru talks about it. No political speech is complete without reference to it. Yet as little as 10 years ago the term was hardly used, either in the academic literature or in everyday language. It has come from nowhere to be almost everywhere. Given its sudden popularity, we shouldn't be surprised that the meaning of the notion isn't always clear, or that an intellectual reaction has set in against it. Globalisation has something to do with the thesis that we now all live in one world - but in what ways exactly, and is the idea really valid?

Different thinkers have taken almost completely opposite views about globalisation in debates that have sprung up over the past few years. Some dispute the whole thing. I'll call them the sceptics. According to the sceptics, all the talk about globalisation is only that - just talk. Whatever its benefits, its trials and tribulations, the global economy isn't especially different from that which existed at previous periods. The world carries on much the same as it has done for many years.

Most countries, the sceptics argue, only gain a small amount of their income from external trade. Moreover, a good deal of economic exchange is between regions, rather than being truly world-wide. The countries of the European Union, for example, mostly trade among themselves. The same is true of the other main trading blocs, such as those of the Asia Pacific or North America.

Others, however, take a very different position. I'll label them the radicals. The radicals argue that not only is globalisation very real, but that its consequences can be felt everywhere. The global marketplace, they say, is much more developed than even two or three decades ago,

and is indifferent to national borders. Nations have lost most of the sovereignty they once had, and politicians have lost most of their capability to influence events. It isn't surprising that no one respects political leaders any more, or has much interest in what they have to say. The era of the nation state is over. Nations, as the Japanese business writer Kenichi Ohmae puts it, have become mere 'fictions'. Authors like Ohmae see the economic difficulties of last year and this as demonstrating the reality of globalisation, albeit seen from its disruptive side.

The sceptics tend to be on the political left, especially the old left. For if all of this is essentially a myth, governments can still intervene in economic life and the welfare state remain intact. The notion of globalisation, according to the sceptics, is an ideology put about by free-marketeers who wish to dismantle welfare systems and cut back on state expenditures. What has happened is at most a reversion to how the world was a century ago. In the late 19th Century there was already an open global economy, with a great deal of trade, including trade in currencies.

Well, who is right in this debate? I think it is the radicals. The level of world trade today is much higher than it ever was before, and involves a much wider range of goods and services. But the biggest difference is in the level of finance and capital flows. Geared as it is to electronic money - money that exists only as digits in computers - the current world economy has no parallels in earlier times. In the new global electronic economy, fund managers, banks, corporations, as well as millions of individual investors, can transfer vast amounts of capital from one side of the world to another at the click of a mouse. As they do so, they can destabilise what might have seemed rock-solid economies - as happened in East Asia.

The volume of world financial transactions is usually measured in US dollars. A million dollars is a lot of money for most people. Measured as a stack of thousand dollar notes, it would be eight inches high. A billion dollars - in other words, a million million - would be over 120 miles high, 20 times higher than Mount Everest.

Yet far more than a trillion dollars is now turned over each day on global currency markets, a massive increase from only 10 years ago, let alone the more distant past. The value of whatever money we may have in our pockets, or our bank accounts, shifts from moment to moment according to fluctuations in such markets. I would have no hesitation, therefore, in saying that globalisation, as we are experiencing it, is in many respects not only new, but revolutionary.

Yet, I don't believe either the sceptics or the radicals have properly understood either what it is or its implications for us. Both groups see the phenomenon almost solely in economic terms. This is a mistake. Globalisation is political, technological and cultural, as well as economic. It has been influenced above all by developments in systems of communication, dating back only to the late 1960's.

In the mid-19th Century, a Massachusetts portrait painter, Samuel Morse, transmitted the first message, "What hath god wrought?", by electric telegraph. In so doing, he initiated a new phase in world history. Never before could a message be sent without someone going somewhere to carry it. Yet the advent of satellite communications marks every bit as dramatic a break with the past. The first communications satellite was launched only just over 30 years ago. Now there are more than 200 such satellites above the earth, each carrying a vast range of information. For the first time ever, instantaneous communication is possible from one side of the world to the other. Other types of electronic communication, more and more integrated

with satellite transmission, have also accelerated over the past few years. No dedicated transatlantic or transpacific cables existed at all until the late 1950's. The first held less than 100 voice paths. Those of today carry more than a million.

On the first of February 1999, about 150 years after Morse invented his system of dots and dashes, Morse code finally disappeared from the world stage, discontinued as a means of communication for the sea. In its place has come a system using satellite technology, whereby any ship in distress can be pinpointed immediately. Most countries prepared for the transition some while before. The French, for example, stopped using Morse as a distress code in their local waters two years ago, signing off with a Gallic flourish, I quote: 'Calling all. This is our last cry before our eternal silence'. Instantaneous electronic communication isn't just a way in which news or information is conveyed more quickly. Its existence alters the very texture of our lives, rich and poor alike. When the image of Nelson Mandela maybe is more familiar to us than the face of our next door neighbour, something has changed in the nature of our everyday experience.

Nelson Mandela is a global celebrity, and celebrity itself is largely a product of new communications technology. The reach of media technologies is growing with each wave of innovation. It took 40 years for radio in the United States to gain an audience of 50 million. The same number were using personal computers only 15 years after the PC was introduced. It needed a mere four years, after it was made available for 50 million Americans to be regularly using the Internet.

It is wrong to think of globalisation as just concerning the big systems, like the world financial order. Globalisation isn't only about what is 'out there', remote and far away from the individual. It is an 'in here' phenomenon too, influencing intimate and personal aspects of our lives. The debate about family values, for example, that is going on in many countries, might seem far removed from globalising influences. It isn't. Traditional family systems are becoming transformed, or are under strain, in many parts of the world, particularly as women stake claim to greater equality. There has never before been a society, so far as we know from the historical record, in which women have been even approximately equal to men. This is a truly global revolution in everyday life, whose consequences are being felt around the world in spheres from work to politics.

Globalisation thus is a complex set of processes, not a single one. And these operate in a contradictory or oppositional fashion. Most people think of it as simply 'pulling away' power or influence from local communities and nations into the global arena. And indeed this is one of its consequences. Nations do lose some of the economic power they once had. However, it also has an opposite effect. Globalisation not only pulls upwards, it pushes downwards, creating new pressures for local autonomy. The American sociologist Daniel Bell expresses this very well when he says that the nation becomes too small to solve the big problems, but also too large to solve the small ones.

Globalisation is the reason for the revival of local cultural identities in different parts of the world. If one asks, for example, why the Scots want more independence in the UK, or why there is a strong separatist movement in Quebec, the answer is not to be found only in their cultural history. Local nationalisms spring up as a response to globalising tendencies, as the hold of older nation-states weakens.

Globalisation also squeezes sideways. It creates new economic and cultural zones within and across nations. Examples are the Hong Kong region, northern Italy, or Silicon Valley in California. The area around Barcelona in northern Spain extends over into France. Catalonia, where Barcelona is located, is closely integrated into the European Union. It is part of Spain, yet also looks outwards.

The changes are being propelled by a range of factors, some structural, others more specific and historical. Economic influences are certainly among the driving forces, especially the global financial system. Yet they aren't like forces of nature. They have been shaped by technology, and cultural diffusion, as well as by the decisions of governments to liberalise and deregulate their national economies.

The collapse of Soviet communism has added further weight to such developments, since no significant group of countries any longer stands outside. That collapse wasn't just something that happened to occur. Globalisation explains both why and how Soviet communism met its end. The Soviet Union and the East European countries were comparable to the West in terms of growth rates until somewhere around the early 1970s. After that point, they fell rapidly behind. Soviet communism, with its emphasis upon state-run enterprise and heavy industry, could not compete in the global electronic economy. The ideological and cultural control upon which communist political authority was based similarly could not survive in an era of global media.

The Soviet and the East European regimes were unable to prevent the reception of western radio and TV broadcasts. Television played a direct role in the 1989 revolutions, which have rightly been called the first "television revolutions". Street protests taking place in one country were watched by the audiences in others, large numbers of whom then took to the streets themselves.

Globalisation, of course, isn't developing in an even-handed way, and is by no means wholly benign in its consequences. To many living outside Europe and North America, it looks uncomfortably like Westernisation - or, perhaps, Americanisation, since the US is now the sole superpower, with a dominant economic, cultural and military position in the global order. Many of the most visible cultural expressions of globalisation are American - Coca-Cola, McDonald's.

Most of giant multinational companies are based in the US too. Those that aren't all come from the rich countries, not the poorer areas of the world. A pessimistic view of globalisation would consider it largely an affair of the industrial North, in which the developing societies of the South play little or no active part. It would see it as destroying local cultures, widening world inequalities and worsening the lot of the impoverished. Globalisation, some argue, creates a world of winners and losers, a few on the fast track to prosperity, the majority condemned to a life of misery and despair. And indeed the statistics are daunting. The share of the poorest fifth of the world's population in global income has dropped from 2.3% to 1.4% over the past 10 years. The proportion taken by the richest fifth, on the other hand, has risen from 70% to 85%. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 20 countries have lower incomes per head in real terms than they did two decades ago. In many less developed countries, safety and environmental regulations are low or virtually non-existent. Some trans-national companies sell goods there that are controlled or banned in the industrial countries - poor quality medical

drugs, destructive pesticides or high tar and nicotine content cigarettes. As one writer put it recently, rather than a global village, this is more like global pillage.

Along with ecological risk, to which it is related, expanding inequality is the most serious problem facing world society. It will not do, however, merely to blame it on the wealthy. It is fundamental to my argument that globalisation today is only partly Westernisation. Of course the western nations, and more generally the industrial countries, still have far more influence over world affairs than do the poorer states. But globalisation is becoming increasingly de-centred - not under the control of any group of nations, and still less of the large corporations. Its effects are felt just as much in the western countries as elsewhere.

This is true of the global financial system, communications and media, and of changes affecting the nature of government itself. Examples of 'reverse colonisation' are becoming more and more common. Reverse colonisation means that non-western countries influence developments in the west. Examples abound - such as the Latinising of Los Angeles, the emergence of a globally-oriented high-tech sector in India, or the selling of Brazilian TV programmes to Portugal.

Is globalisation a force promoting the general good? The question can't be answered in simple way, given the complexity of the phenomenon. People who ask it, and who blame globalisation for deepening world inequalities, usually have in mind economic globalisation, and within that, free trade. Now it is surely obvious that free trade is not an unalloyed benefit. This is especially so as concerns the less developed countries. Opening up a country, or regions within it, to free trade can undermine a local subsistence economy. An area that becomes dependent upon a few products sold on world markets is very vulnerable to shifts in prices as well as to technological change. Trade always needs a framework of institutions, as do other forms of economic development. Markets cannot be created by purely economic means, and how far a given economy should be exposed to the world marketplace must depend upon a range of criteria. Yet to oppose economic globalisation, and to opt for economic protectionism, would be a misplaced tactic for rich and poor nations alike. Protectionism may be a necessary strategy at some times and in some countries. In my view, for example, Malaysia was correct to introduce controls in 1998, to stem the flood of capital from the country. But more permanent forms of protectionism will not help the development of the poor countries, and among the rich would lead to warring trade blocs.

The debates about globalisation I mentioned at the beginning have concentrated mainly upon its implications for the nation-state. Are nation-states, and hence national political leaders, still powerful, or are they becoming largely irrelevant to the forces shaping the world? Nation-states are indeed still powerful and political leaders have a large role to play in the world. Yet at the same time the nation-state is being re-shaped before our eyes. National economic policy can't be as effective as it once was. More importantly, nations have to rethink their identities now the older forms of geopolitics are becoming obsolete. Although this is a contentious point, I would say that, following the dissolving of the cold war, nations no longer have enemies. Who are the enemies of Britain, or France, or Brazil? Nations today face risks and dangers rather than enemies, a massive shift in their very nature.

It isn't only of the nation that such comments could be made. Everywhere we look, we see institutions that appear the same as they used to be from the outside, and carry the same names, but inside have become quite different. We continue to talk of the nation, the family,

work, tradition, nature, as if they were all the same as in the past. They are not. The outer shell remains, but inside all is different - and this is happening not only in the US, Britain, or France, but almost everywhere. They are what I call shell institutions, and I shall talk about them quite a bit in the lectures to come. They are institutions that have become inadequate to the tasks they are called upon to perform.

As the changes I have described in this lecture gather weight, they are creating something that has never existed before, a global cosmopolitan society. We are the first generation to live in this society, whose contours we can as yet only dimly see. It is shaking up our existing ways of life, no matter where we happen to be. This is not - at least at the moment - a global order driven by collective human will. In-stead, it is emerging in an anarchic, haphazard, fashion, carried along by a mixture of economic, technological and cultural imperatives.

It is not settled or secure, but fraught with anxieties, as well as scarred by deep divisions. Many of us feel in the grip of forces over which we have no power. Can we re-impose our will upon them? I believe we can. The powerlessness we experience is not a sign of personal failings, but reflects the incapacities of our institutions. We need to reconstruct those we have, or create new ones, in ways appropriate to the global age.

We should and we can look to achieve greater control over our runaway world. We shan't be able to do so if we shirk the challenges, or pretend that all can go on as before. For globalisation is not incidental to our lives today. It is a shift in our very life circumstances. It is the way we now live.

Lecture 3: Tradition

When Scots get together to celebrate their national identity, they do so in ways steeped in tradition. Men wear the kilt, with each clan having its own tartan - and their ceremonials are accompanied by the wail of the bagpipes. By means of these symbols, they show their loyalty to ancient rituals - rituals whose origins go far back into antiquity.

Except for the fact that they don't. Along with most other symbols of Scottishness, all these are quite recent creations. The short kilt seems to have been invented by an English industrialist from Lancashire, Thomas Rawlinson, in the early 18th Century. He set out to alter the existing dress of highlanders to make it convenient for workmen.

Kilts were a product of the industrial revolution. The aim was not to preserve time-honoured customs, but the opposite - to bring the highlanders out of the heather and into the factory. The kilt didn't start life as the national dress of Scotland. The low-landers, who made up the large majority of Scots, saw highland dress as a barbaric form of clothing, which most looked on with some contempt. Similarly, many of the clan tartans worn now were devised during the Victorian period, by enterprising tailors who correctly saw a market in them.

Much of what we think of as traditional, and steeped in the mists of time, is actually a product at most of the last couple of centuries, and is often much more recent than that. The case of the Scottish kilt comes from a celebrated volume by the historians Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, called *The Invention of Tradition*. They give examples of invented traditions from a variety of different countries, including colonial India.

The British set up an archaeological survey in the 1860s to identify the great monuments of India and to preserve Indian 'heritage'. Believing local arts and crafts to be in decline, they collected together artefacts to put in museums. Before 1860, for ex-ample, Indian soldiers and the British both wore Western-style uniforms. But in the eyes of the British, Indians had to look like Indians. The dress uniforms were modified to include turbans, sashes and tunics regarded as 'authentic'. Some of the traditions they invented, or half invented, continue on in the country today, although of course others were later rejected.

Tradition and custom - these have been the stuff of most people's lives for most of human history. Yet it is remarkable how little interest scholars and thinkers tend to show in them. There are endless discussions of modernisation and what it means to be modern, but few indeed about tradition. When I was researching for this lecture, I came across dozens of academic books in English with 'modernity' in the title. Indeed, I have written a few myself - but I could only discover a couple of books specifically about tradition.

It was the 18th Century Enlightenment in Europe that gave tradition a bad name. One of its major figures, the Baron D'Holbach, put things this way. I quote: 'Instructors have long enough fixed men's eyes upon heaven, let them now turn them upon earth. Fatigued with an inconceivable theology, ridiculous fables, impenetrable mysteries, puerile ceremonies, let the human mind apply itself to the study of nature, to intelligible objects, sensible truths, and useful knowledge. Let the vain chimeras of men be removed, and reasonable opinions will soon come of themselves, into those heads which were thought to be forever destined to error'.

It is clear that D'Holbach never intended a serious engagement with tradition and its role in society. Tradition here is merely the shadow side of modernity, an implausible construct that can be easily brushed aside. If we are really to get to grips with tradition, we can't treat it merely as folly. The linguistic roots of the word tradition are old. The English word has its origins in the Latin term tradere, which meant to transmit, or give something to another for safekeeping. Tradere was originally used in the context of Roman Law, where it referred to the laws of inheritance. Property that passed from one generation to another was supposed to be given in trust - the inheritor had obligations to protect and nurture it.

It might seem that the notion of tradition, unlike kilts and bagpipes, has been around for many centuries. Once more, appearances are deceptive. The term 'tradition' as it is used today is actually a product of the last 200 years in Europe. Just like the concept of risk, which I talked about in my last lecture, in mediaeval times there was no generic notion of tradition. There was no call for such a word, precisely because tradition and custom were everywhere.

The idea of tradition, then, is itself a creation of modernity. That doesn't mean that one shouldn't use it in relation to pre-modern or non-Western societies, but it does imply that we should approach the discussion of tradition with some care. By identifying tradition with dogma and ignorance, the Enlightenment thinkers sought to justify their absorption with the new.

Disentangling ourselves from the prejudices of the Enlightenment, how should we understand 'tradition'? We can make a good start by going back to invented traditions. Invented traditions and customs, Hobsbawm and Ranger suggest, aren't genuine ones. They are contrived, rather than growing up spontaneously; they are used as a means of power; and they haven't existed

since time immemorial. Whatever continuity they imply with the long-term past is largely false.

I would turn their argument on its head. All traditions, I would say, are invented traditions. No traditional societies were wholly traditional, and traditions and customs have been invented for a diversity of reasons. We shouldn't suppose that the conscious construction of tradition is found only in the modern period. Moreover, tradition always incorporates power, whether they are constructed in a deliberate way or not.

Kings, emperors, priests and others have long invented traditions to suit them-selves and to legitimate their rule.

It is a myth to think of traditions as impervious to change. Traditions evolve over time, but also can be quite suddenly altered or transformed. If I can put it this way, they are invented and reinvented.

Some traditions, of course, such as those associated with the great religions, have lasted for hundreds of years. There are core prescriptions of Islam, for instance, that nearly all Muslim believers would hold to, and which have remained recognisably the same over a very long period. Yet whatever continuity there is in such doctrines goes along with many changes, even revolutionary changes, in how they are interpreted and acted upon. There is no such thing as a completely pure tradition. Like all the other world religions, Islam drew upon a dazzling variety of cultural re-sources - that is, other traditions. The same was true of the Ottoman empire more generally, which incorporated Arab, Persian, Greek, Roman, Berber, Turkish and Indian influences, among others, across the years.

But it is simply wrong to suppose that for a given set of symbols or practices to be traditional, they must have existed for centuries. The Christmas address by the Queen, which is broadcast every year in Britain, has become a tradition. Yet it only started in 1932. Endurance over time is not the key defining feature of tradition, or of its more diffuse cousin, custom. The distinguishing characteristics of tradition are ritual and repetition. Traditions are always properties of groups, communities or collectivities. Individuals may follow traditions and customs, but traditions are not a quality of individual behaviour in the way habits are.

What is distinctive about tradition is that it defines a kind of truth. For someone following a traditional practice, questions don't have to be asked about alternatives. However much it may change, tradition provides a framework for action that can go largely unquestioned. Traditions usually have guardians - wise men, priests, sages. Guardians are not the same as experts. They get their position and power from the fact that only they are capable of interpreting tradition's ritual truth. Only they can decipher the real meanings of the sacred texts or the other symbols involved in the communal rituals.

The Enlightenment set out to destroy the authority of tradition. It only partially succeeded. Traditions remained strong for a long while in most of modern Europe and even more firmly entrenched across most of the rest of the world. Many traditions were reinvented and others were newly instituted. There was a concerted attempt from some sectors of society to protect or adapt the old traditions. After all, this is basically what conservative philosophies have been, and are, all about. Tradition is perhaps the most basic concept of conservatism, since conservatives believe that it contains stored up wisdom.

A further reason for the persistence of tradition in the industrial countries was that the institutional changes signalled by modernity were largely confined to public institutions - especially government and the economy. Traditional ways of doing things tended to persist, or be re-established, in many other areas of life, including everyday life. One could even say there was a sort of symbiosis between modernity and tradition. In most countries, for example, the family, sexuality, and the divisions between the sexes remained heavily saturated with tradition and custom.

Two basic changes are happening today under the impact of globalisation. In the Western countries, not just public institutions but everyday life is becoming opened up from the hold of tradition. And other societies across the world that remained more traditional are becoming detraditionalised. I take it this is at the core of the emerging global cosmopolitan society I have spoken of in previous lectures.

This is a society, I argued last week, living after the end of nature. Few aspects of the physical world, in other words, are any longer just natural - unaffected by human intervention. It is also a society living after the end of tradition. The end of tradition doesn't mean that tradition disappears, as the Enlightenment thinkers wanted. On the contrary, in different versions, it continues to flourish everywhere. But less and less - if I can put it this fashion - is it tradition lived in the traditional way. The traditional way means defending traditional activities through their own ritual and symbolism - defending tradition through its internal claims to truth.

A world where modernisation is not confined to one geographical area, but makes itself felt globally, has a number of consequences for tradition. Tradition and science sometimes mingle in odd and interesting ways. Consider, for instance, the much-discussed episode that happened in India in 1995, when the deities in some Hindu shrines appeared to drink milk. On the same day, several million people, not only in India but throughout the world, tried to offer milk to a divine image. Denis Vidal, an anthropologist who has written about this phenomenon, remarks that I quote again: 'by manifesting themselves simultaneously in every country of the world inhabited by Indians, the Hindu deities may have succeeded in performing the first ever miracle in tune with an era haunted by the slogan of globalisation'. Just as interestingly, it was widely felt - by believers as well as non-believers - that scientific experiments were needed to authenticate the miracle. Science was enlisted in the service of faith. Tradition in such an example isn't only still alive, it is resurgent. Yet traditions also often succumb to modernity, and are doing so in some situations all over the world. Tradition that is drained of its content, and commercialised, becomes either heritage or kitsch - the trinkets bought in the airport store. As developed by the heritage industry, heritage is tradition repackaged as spectacle. The refurbished buildings at tourist sites may look splendid, and the refurbishment may even be authentic down to the last detail. But the heritage that is thereby protected is severed from the lifeblood of tradition, which is its connection with the experience of everyday life.

In my view, it is entirely rational to recognise that traditions are needed in society. We shouldn't accept the Enlightenment idea that the world should rid itself of tradition altogether. Traditions are needed, and will always persist, because they give continuity and form to life. Take academic life, as an example. Everyone in the academic world works within traditions. Even academic disciplines as a whole, like economics, sociology or philosophy, have traditions. The reason is that no one could work in a wholly eclectic fashion. Without intellectual traditions, ideas would have no focus or direction.

However, it is part of academic life continually to explore the limits of such traditions, and foster active interchange between them. Tradition can perfectly well be defended in a non-traditional way - and that should be its future. Ritual, ceremonial and repetition have an important social role, something understood and acted upon by most organisations, including governments. Traditions will continue to be sustained insofar as they can effectively be justified - not in terms of their own internal rituals, but as compared to other traditions or ways of doing things.

This is true, I think, even of religious traditions. Religion is normally associated with the idea of faith, a sort of emotional leap into belief. Yet in a cosmopolitan world, more people than ever before are regularly in contact with others who think differently from them. They are required to justify their beliefs, in an implicit way at least, both to themselves and others. There cannot but be a large dollop of rationality in the persistence of religious rituals and observances in a detraditionalising society. And this is exactly as it should be.

As tradition changes its role, however, new dynamics are introduced into our lives. These can be summarised as a push and pull between autonomy of action and compulsiveness on the one hand, and between cosmopolitanism and fundamentalism on the other. Where tradition has retreated, we are forced to live in a more open and reflective way. Autonomy and freedom can replace the hidden power of tradition with more open discussion and dialogue. But these freedoms bring other problems in their wake. A society living on the other side of nature and tradition - as nearly all Western countries now do - is one that calls for decision-making, in everyday life as elsewhere. The dark side of decision-making is the rise of addictions and compulsions.

Something really intriguing, but also disturbing, is going on here. It is mostly confined to the developed countries, but is becoming seen among more middle class groups elsewhere too. What I am speaking about is the spread of the idea and the reality of addiction. The notion of addiction was originally applied exclusively to alcoholism and drug-taking. But now any area of activity can become invaded by it. One can be addicted to work, exercise, food, sex - or even love. The reason is that these activities, and other parts of life too, are much less structured by tradition and custom than once they were.

Like tradition, addiction is about the influence of the past upon the present; and as in the case of tradition, repetition has a key role. The past in question is individual rather than collective, and the repetition is driven by anxiety. I would see addiction as frozen autonomy. Every context of detraditionalisation offers the possibility of greater freedom of action than existed before. We are talking here about human emancipation from the constraints of the past. Addiction comes into play when choice, which should be driven by autonomy, is subverted by anxiety. In tradition, the past structures the present through shared collective beliefs and sentiments. The addict is also in thrall to the past - but because he or she cannot break away from what were originally freely chosen lifestyle habits.

As the influence of tradition and custom shrink on a world-wide level, the very basis of our self-identity - our sense of self - changes. In more traditional situations, a sense of self is sustained largely through the stability of the social positions of individuals in the community. Where tradition lapses, and life-style choice prevails, the self isn't exempt. Self-identity has to be created and recreated on a more active basis than before. This explains why therapy and counselling of all kinds have become so popular in Western countries. When he initiated

modern psychotherapy, Freud thought he was establishing a scientific treatment for neurosis. What he was in effect doing was constructing a method for the renewal of self-identity, in the early stages of a detraditionalising culture.

After all, what happens in psychotherapy is that the individual revisits his or her past in order to create more autonomy for the future. Much the same is true in the self-help groups that have become so common in Western societies. At alcoholics anonymous meetings, for instance, individuals recount their life histories, and receive support from others present in stating their desire to change. They recover from their addiction essentially through rewriting the story-line of their lives.

The struggle between addiction and autonomy is at one pole of globalisation. At the other is the clash between a cosmopolitan outlook and fundamentalism. One might think that fundamentalism has always existed. This is not so - it has arisen in response to the globalising influences we see all round us. The term itself dates from the turn of the century, when it was used to refer to the beliefs of some Protestant sects in America, particularly those who rejected Darwin. Yet even in the late 1950's there was no entry for the word 'fundamentalism' in the large Oxford English dictionary. It has come into common coinage only over the past two or three decades.

Fundamentalism is not the same as either fanaticism or authoritarianism. Fundamentalists call for a return to basic scriptures or texts, supposed to be read in a literal manner, and they propose that the doctrines derived from such a reading be applied to social, economic or political life. Fundamentalism gives new vitality and importance to the guardians of tradition. Only they have access to the 'exact meaning' of the texts. The clergy or other privileged interpreters gain secular as well as religious power. They may look to take over the reins of government directly - as happened in Iran - or work in conjunction with political parties.

Fundamentalism is a controversial word, because many of those called fundamentalists by others wouldn't accept the term as applying to themselves. So can an objective meaning be given to it? I think it can, and I would define it in the following fashion. Fundamentalism is beleaguered tradition. It is tradition defended in the traditional way - by reference to ritual truth - in a globalising world that asks for reasons. Fundamentalism, therefore, has nothing to do with the context of beliefs, religious or otherwise. What matters is how the truth of beliefs is defended or asserted.

Fundamentalism isn't about what people believe but, like tradition more generally, about why they believe it and how they justify it. It isn't confined to religion. The Chinese red guards, with their devotion to Mao's little red book, were surely fundamentalists. Nor is fundamentalism primarily about the resistance of more traditional cultures to Westernisation - a rejection of Western decadence. Fundamentalism can develop on the soil of traditions of all sorts. It has no time for ambiguity, multiple interpretation or multiple identity - it is a refusal of dialogue in a world whose peace and continuity depend on it.

Fundamentalism is a child of globalisation, which it both responds to and utilises. Fundamentalist groups almost everywhere have made extensive use of new communications technologies. Before he came to power in Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini circulated videos and cassettes of his teachings. Hindutwa militants have made extensive use of the Internet and electronic mail to create a 'feeling of Hindu identity'.

Whatever form it takes - religious, ethnic, nationalist, or directly political, I think it right to regard fundamentalism as problematic. It is edged with the possibility of violence, and it is the enemy of cosmopolitan dialogue. Yet fundamentalism isn't just the antithesis of globalising modernity, but poses questions to it. The most basic one is this: can we live in a world where nothing is sacred? I have to say, in conclusion, that I don't think we can. Cosmopolitans, of whom I count myself one, have to make plain that tolerance and dialogue can themselves be guided by values of a universal kind.

All of us need moral commitments that stand above the petty concerns and squabbles of everyday life. We should be prepared to mount an active defence of these values wherever they are poorly developed, or threatened. None of us would have anything to live for, if we didn't have something worth dying for.

Lecture 4: Family

Among all the changes going on today, none are more important than those happening in our personal lives - in sexuality, emotional life, marriage and the family. There is a global revolution going on in how we think of ourselves and how we form ties and connections with others. It is a revolution advancing unevenly in different regions and cultures, with many resistances. As with other aspects of the runaway world, we don't know what the ratio of advantages and anxieties will turn out to be. In some ways, these are the most difficult and disturbing transformations of all. Most of us can tune out from larger problems for much of the time. We can't opt out, however, from the swirl of change reaching right into the heart of our emotional lives.

There are few countries in the world where there isn't intense discussion about sexual equality, the regulation of sexuality and the future of the family. And where there isn't open debate, this is mostly because it is actively repressed by authoritarian governments or fundamentalist groups. In many cases, these controversies are national or local - as are the social and political reactions to them. Politicians and pressure groups will suggest that if only family policy were modified, if only divorce were made harder or easier to get in their particular country, solutions to our problems could readily be found.

But the changes affecting the personal and emotional spheres go far beyond the borders of any particular country, even one as large as the United States. We find the same issues almost everywhere, differing only in degree and according to the cultural context in which they take place.

In China, for example, the state is considering making divorce more difficult. In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, very liberal marriage laws were passed. Marriage is a working contract, that can be dissolved, I quote: 'when husband and wife both desire it'.

Even if one partner objects, divorce can be granted when 'mutual affection' has gone from the marriage. Only a two week wait is required, after which the two pay \$4 and are henceforth independent. The Chinese divorce rate is still low as compared with Western countries, but it is rising rapidly - as is true in the other developing Asian societies. In Chinese cities, not only divorce, but cohabitation is becoming more frequent.

In the vast Chinese countryside, by contrast, everything is different. Marriage and the family are much more traditional - in spite of the official policy of limiting childbirth through a mixture of incentives and punishment. Marriage is an arrangement between two families, fixed by the parents rather than the individuals concerned.

A recent study in the province of Gansu, which has only a low level of economic development, found that 60% of marriages are still arranged by parents. As a Chinese saying has it: 'meet once, nod your head and marry'. There is a twist in the tail in modernising China. Many of those currently divorcing in the urban centres were married in the traditional manner in the country.

In China there is much talk of protecting the family. In many Western countries the debate is even more shrill. The family is a site for the struggles between tradition and modernity, but also a metaphor for them. There is perhaps more nostalgia surrounding the lost haven of the family than for any other institution with its roots in the past. Politicians and activists routinely diagnose the breakdown of family life and call for a return to the traditional family.

Now the 'traditional family' is very much a catch-all category. There have been many different types of family and kinship systems in different societies and cultures. The Chinese family, for instance, was always distinct from family forms in the West. Arranged marriage was never as common in most European countries, as in China, or India. Yet the family in non-modern cultures did, and does, have some features found more or less everywhere.

The traditional family was above all an economic unit. Agricultural production normally involved the whole family group, while among the gentry and aristocracy, transmission of property was the main basis of marriage. In mediaeval Europe, marriage was not contracted on the basis of sexual love, nor was it regarded as a place where such love should flourish. As the French historian, Georges Duby, puts it, marriage in the middle ages was not to involve 'frivolity, passion, or fantasy'.

The inequality of men and women was intrinsic to the traditional family. I don't think one could overstate the importance of this. In Europe, women were the property of their husbands or fathers - chattels as defined in law.

In the traditional family, it wasn't only women who lacked rights - children did too. The idea of enshrining children's rights in law is in historical terms relatively recent. In premodern periods, as in traditional cultures today, children weren't reared for their own sake, or for the satisfaction of the parents. One could almost say that children weren't recognised as individuals. It wasn't that parents didn't love their children, but they cared about them more for the contribution they made to the common economic task than for themselves. Moreover, the death rate of children was frightening. In Colonial America nearly one in four infants died in their first year. Almost 50% didn't live to age 10.

Except for certain courtly or elite groups, in the traditional family sexuality was always dominated by reproduction. This was a matter of tradition and nature combined. The absence of effective contraception meant that for most women sexuality was inevitably closely connected with childbirth. In many traditional cultures, including in Western Europe up to the threshold of the 20th Century, a woman might have 10 or more pregnancies during the course of her life.

Sexuality was regulated by the idea of female virtue. The sexual double standard is often thought of as a creation of the Victorian period. In fact, in one version or another it was central to almost all non-modern societies. It involved a dualistic view of female sexuality - a clear cut division between the virtuous woman on the one hand and the libertine on the other. Sexual promiscuity in many cultures has been taken as a positive defining feature of masculinity. James Bond is, or was, admired for his sexual as well as his physical heroism. Sexually adventurous women, by contrast, have nearly always been beyond the pale, no matter how much influence the mistresses of some prominent figures might have achieved.

Attitudes towards homosexuality were also governed by a mix of tradition and nature. Anthropological surveys show that homosexuality - or male homosexuality at any rate - has been tolerated, or openly approved of, in more cultures than it has been out-lawed. Those societies that have been hostile to homosexuality have usually condemned it as specifically unnatural. Western attitudes have been more extreme than most; less than half a century ago homosexuality was still widely regarded as a perversion and written up as such in manuals of psychiatry.

Antagonism towards homosexuality is still widespread and the dualistic view of women continues to be held by many - of both sexes. But over the past few decades the main elements of people's sexual lives in the West have changed in an absolutely basic way. The separation of sexuality from reproduction is in principle complete. Sexuality is for the first time something to be discovered, moulded, altered. Sexuality, which used to be defined so strictly in relation to marriage and legitimacy, now has little connection to them at all. We should see the increasing acceptance of homosexuality not just as a tribute to liberal tolerance. It is a logical outcome of the severance of sexuality from reproduction. Sexuality which has no content is by definition no longer dominated by heterosexuality.

What most of its defenders in Western countries call the traditional family was in fact a late, transitional phase in family development in the 1950's. This was a time at which the proportion of women out at work was still relatively low and when it was still difficult, especially for women, to obtain divorce without stigma. On the other hand, men and women by this time were more equal than they had been previously, both in fact and in law. The family had ceased to be an economic entity and the idea of romantic love as basis for marriage had replaced marriage as an economic contract. Since then, the family has changed much further. The details vary from society to society, but the same trends are visible almost everywhere in the industrialised world. Only a minority of people now live in what might be called the standard 1950's family - both parents living together with their children of the marriage, where the mother is a full time housewife, and the father the breadwinner. In some countries, more than a third of all births happen outside wedlock, while the proportion of people living alone has gone up steeply and looks likely to rise even more.

In most societies, like the US, marriage remains popular - the US has aptly been called a high divorce, high marriage society. In Scandinavia, on the other hand, a large proportion of people living together, including where children are involved, remain unmarried. Moreover, up to a quarter of women aged between 18 and 35 in the US and Europe say they do not intend to have children - and they appear to mean it.

Of course in all countries older family forms continue to exist. In the US, many people, recent immigrants particularly, still live according to traditional values. Most family life,

however, has been transformed by the rise of the couple and coupledness. Marriage and the family have become what I termed in an earlier lecture shell institutions. They are still called the same, but inside their basic character has changed.

In the traditional family, the married couple was only one part, and often not the main part, of the family system. Ties with children and other relatives tended to be equally or even more important in the day to day conduct of social life. Today the couple, married or unmarried, is at the core of what the family is. The couple came to be at the centre of family life as the economic role of the family dwindled and love, or love plus sexual attraction, became the basis of forming marriage ties.

A couple once constituted has its own exclusive history, its own biography. It is a unit based upon emotional communication or intimacy. The idea of intimacy, like so many other familiar notions I've discussed in these lectures, sounds old but in fact is very new. Marriage was never in the past based upon intimacy - emotional communication. No doubt this was important to a good marriage but it was not the foundation of it. For the couple, it is. Communication is the means of establishing the tie in the first place and it is the chief rationale for its continuation.

We should recognise what a major transition this is. 'Coupling' and 'uncoupling' provide a more accurate description of the arena of personal life now than do 'marriage and the family'. A more important question for us than 'are you married?' is 'how good is your relationship?'

The idea of a relationship is also surprisingly recent. Only 30 or so years ago, no one spoke of 'relationships'. They didn't need to, nor did they need to speak in terms of intimacy and commitment. Marriage at that time was the commitment, as the existence of shotgun marriages bore witness. While statistically marriage is still the normal condition, for most people its meaning has more or less completely changed. Marriage signifies that a couple is in a stable relationship, and may in-deed promote that stability, since it makes a public declaration of commitment. However, marriage is no longer the chief defining basis of coupledness.

The position of children in all this is interesting and somewhat paradoxical. Our attitudes towards children and their protection have altered radically over the past several generations. We prize children so much partly because they have become so much rarer, and partly because the decision to have a child is very different from what it was for previous generations. In the traditional family, children were an economic benefit. Today in Western countries a child, on the contrary, puts a large financial burden on the parents. Having a child is more of a distinct and specific decision than it used to be, and it is a decision guided by psychological and emotional needs. The worries we have about the effects of divorce upon children, and the existence of many fatherless families, have to be understood against the background of our much higher expectations about how children should be cared for and protected.

There are three main areas in which emotional communication, and therefore intimacy, are replacing the old ties that used to bind together people's personal lives - in sexual and love relations, parent child relations and in friendship. To analyse these, I want to use the idea of what I call the 'pure relationship'. I mean by this a relationship based upon emotional communication, where the rewards derived from such communication are the main basis for the relationship to continue.

I don't mean a sexually pure relationship. Also I don't mean anything that exists in reality. I'm talking of an abstract idea that helps us understand changes going on in the world. Each of the three areas just mentioned - sexual relationships, parent-child relations and friendship - is tending to approximate to this model. Emotional communication or intimacy, in other words, are becoming the key to what they are all about.

The pure relationship has quite different dynamics from more traditional social ties. It depends upon processes of active trust - opening oneself up to the other. Self-disclosure is the basic condition of intimacy. The pure relationship is also implicitly democratic. When I was originally working on the study of intimate relationships, I read a great deal of therapeutic and self-help literature on the subject. I was struck by something I don't believe has been widely noticed or remarked upon. If one looks at how a therapist sees a good relationship - in any of the three spheres just mentioned - it is striking how direct a parallel there is with public democracy.

A good relationship, of course, is an ideal - most ordinary relationships don't come even close. I'm not suggesting that our relations with spouses, lovers, children or friends aren't often messy, conflictful and unsatisfying. But the principles of public democracy are ideals too, that also often stand at some large distance from reality.

A good relationship is a relationship of equals, where each party has equal rights and obligations. In such a relationship, each person has respect, and wants the best, for the other. The pure relationship is based upon communication, so that understanding the other person's point of view is essential.

Talk, or dialogue, are the basis of making the relationship work. Relationships function best if people don't hide too much from each other - there has to be mutual trust. And trust has to be worked at, it can't just be taken for granted.

Finally, a good relationship is one free from arbitrary power, coercion or violence. Every one of these qualities conforms to the values of democratic politics. In a democracy, all are in principle equal, and with equality of rights and responsibilities comes mutual respect. Open dialogue is a core property of democracy. Democratic systems substitute open discussion of issues - a public space of dialogue - for authoritarian power, or for the sedimented power of tradition. No democracy can work without trust. And democracy is undermined if it gives way to authoritarianism or violence.

When we apply these principles - as ideals, I would stress again - to relationships, we are talking of something very important - the possible emergence of what I shall call, a democracy of the emotions in everyday life. A democracy of the emotions, it seems to me, is as important as public democracy in improving the quality of our lives.

This holds as much in parent-child relations as in other areas. These can't, and shouldn't, be materially equal. Parents must have authority over children, in everyone's interests. Yet they should presume an in-principle equality. In a democratic family, the authority of parents should be based upon an implicit contract. The parent in effect says to the child: 'If you were an adult, and knew what I know, you would agree that what I ask you to do is legitimate'.

Children in traditional families were - and are - supposed to be seen and not heard. Many parents, perhaps despairing of their children's rebelliousness, would dearly like to resurrect

that rule. But there isn't any going back to it, nor should there be. In a democracy of the emotions, children can and should be able to answer back.

An emotional democracy doesn't imply lack of discipline, or absence of authority. It simply seeks to put them on a different footing.

Something very similar happened in the public sphere, when democracy began to re-place arbitrary government and the rule of force. And like public democracy the democratic family must be anchored in a stable, yet open, civil society. If I may coin a phrase - 'It takes a village'.

A democracy of the emotions would draw no distinctions of principle between heterosexual and same-sex relationships. Gays, rather than heterosexuals, have actually been pioneers in discovering the new world of relationships and exploring its possibilities. They have had to be, because when homosexuality came out of the closet, gays weren't able to depend upon the normal supports of traditional marriage. They have had to be innovators, often in a hostile environment.

To speak of fostering an emotional democracy doesn't mean being weak about family duties, or about public policy towards the family. Democracy, after all, means the acceptance of obligations, as well as rights sanctioned in law. The protection of children has to be the primary feature of legislation and public policy. Parents should be legally obliged to provide for their children until adulthood, no matter what living arrangements they enter into. Marriage is no longer an economic institution, yet as a ritual commitment it can help stabilise otherwise fragile relationships. If this applies to heterosexual relationships, I don't see why it shouldn't apply to homosexual ones too.

There are many questions to be asked of all this - too many to answer in a short lecture. I have concentrated mainly upon trends affecting the family in Western countries. What about areas where the traditional family remains largely intact, as in the example of China with which I began? Will the changes observed in the West become more and more global?

I think they will - indeed that they are. It isn't a question of whether existing forms of the traditional family will become modified, but when and how. I would venture even further. What I have described as an emerging democracy of the emotions is on the front line in the struggle between cosmopolitanism and fundamentalism that I described in the last lecture. Equality of the sexes, and the sexual freedom of women, which are incompatible with the traditional family, are anathema to fundamentalist groups. Opposition to them, indeed, is one of the defining features of religious fundamentalism across the world.

There is plenty to be worried about in the state of the family, in Western countries and elsewhere. It is just as mistaken to say that every family form is as good as any other, as to argue that the decline of the traditional family is a disaster. I would turn the argument of the political and fundamentalist right on its head. The persistence of the traditional family - or aspects of it - in many parts of the world is more worrisome than its decline. For what are the most important forces promoting democracy and economic development in poorer countries? Well, they are the equality and education of women. And what must be changed to make these possible? Most importantly, what must be changed is the traditional family.

In conclusion, I should emphasise that sexual equality is not just a core principle of democracy. It is also relevant to happiness and fulfilment. Many of the changes happening to

the family are problematic and difficult. But surveys in the US and Europe show that few want to go back to traditional male and female roles, much less to legally defined inequality. If ever I were tempted to think that the traditional family might be best after all, I remember what my great aunt said. She must have had one of the longest marriages of anyone. She married young, and was with her husband for over 60 years. She once confided to me that she had been deeply unhappy with him the whole of that time. In her day there was no escape.

Lecture 5: Democracy

On November 9th, 1989, I was in Berlin - in what was then West Germany. At the meeting I had come to take part in, some of those present were from East Berlin. One such person, who was away that afternoon, later came back in a state of some excitement. He had been in the East, and was told that the Berlin Wall was on the point of being opened.

A small group of us got down there very quickly. Ladders were being put against it and we started to climb up. But we were pushed back by television crews who had just arrived on the scene. They had to go up first, they said, so that they could film us scaling the ladders and arriving at the top. They even persuaded some people to go back down and climb up twice, to make sure they had good TV footage.

Thus is history made in the closing years of the 20th Century. Television not only gets there first, it stages the spectacle. In a way, as I shall go on to argue, the TV crews had the right to push themselves to the front. For television had an important role in making the opening of the wall happen, as it did more generally in the transformations of 1989 in Eastern Europe. The driving force of the 1989 revolutions was democracy or self-rule. And the spread of democracy in the recent period has been strongly influenced by the advance of global communications.

Democracy is perhaps the most powerful energising idea of the 20th Century. There are few states in the world today that don't call themselves democratic. The Soviet Union and its East European dependencies called themselves 'people's democracies', as communist China continues to do. Virtually the only countries that are explicitly non-democratic are the last remaining semi-feudal states like Saudi Arabia - and even these are hardly untouched by democratic currents.

What is democracy? The issue is a contentious one, and many different interpretations have been offered. I shall mean by it the following. Democracy is a system involving effective competition between political parties for positions of power. In a democracy, there are regular and fair elections, in which all members of the population may take part. These rights of democratic participation go along with civil liberties - freedom of expression and discussion, together with the freedom to form and join political groups or associations.

Democracy isn't an all or nothing thing. There can be different forms, as well as different levels, of democratisation. Democracy in Britain and the United States, for instance, isn't all of a piece. A British traveller in the US once enquired of an American companion: 'how can you bear to be governed by people you wouldn't dream of inviting to dinner?' to which the American replied, 'how can you bear to be governed by people who wouldn't dream of inviting you to dinner? More or less everyone is a democrat now, but it certainly wasn't always so. Democratic ideas were fiercely resisted by established elites and ruling groups in

the 19th Century, and often treated with derision. Democracy was the inspiring ideal of the American and French revolutions, but for a long while its hold was limited. Only a minority of the population had the vote. Even some of the most fervent advocates of democratic government, such as the philosopher John Stuart Mill, argued that limitations should be imposed on it. Mill recommended that some of the electorate should have more votes than others, so that in his words, the 'wiser and talented' have more influence than the 'ignorant and less able'.

Democracy in the West only became fully developed in the current century. Before the First World War, women had the right to vote in only four countries - Finland, Norway, Australia and New Zealand. They didn't get the vote in Switzerland until as late as 1974. Moreover, some countries that became fully democratic later experienced relapses. Germany, Italy, Austria, Spain and Portugal all had periods of authoritarian rule or military dictatorship during the period from the 1930's to the 1970's. Outside Europe, North America and Australasia, there have only been a small number of long-standing democracies, such as Costa Rica in Latin America.

Over the past few decades, however, much of this has changed, and in a remarkable way. Since the mid-1970s, the number of democratic governments in the world has more than doubled. Democracy has spread to over thirty more countries, while all the existing democratic states have kept democratic institutions in place. These changes began in Mediterranean Europe, with the overthrow of the military regimes in Greece, Spain and Portugal. The second group of countries where democracy spread - this time mainly in the early 1980s, was in South and Central America. Some twelve countries established or re-established democratic government, including Brazil, Peru and Argentina.

The story continues across all continents. The transition to democracy post 1989 in Eastern Europe, and parts of the ex Soviet Union, was followed in a number of countries in Africa. In Asia, with some problems and reversals, democratisation has been going on over the whole period since the early 1970s - in South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Thailand and Mongolia. India has remained a democratic state since its independence in 1947.

Of course, some states making the transition to democracy fall short of full democratisation, or appear to have stalled along the way. Russia is only one of many examples. Others are simply putting back what existed before. Argentina, and some other Latin American countries, have had democratic government previously, as have the Czech Republic, or Poland in Eastern Europe. Since democratic governments have in Eastern Europe often been overthrown, we can't be sure how permanent any of these democratic transitions will be. Yet democracy has made nearly as much advance during the past thirty years as it did over more than a whole century before that. Why? One possible answer is offered by those who take a triumphalist view of the Western combination of democracy and free markets. This is that other systems have been tried and have failed. Democracy has come out top because it is best. It simply took most countries outside the Western ambit some while to recognise this.

I wouldn't dispute part of the argument. Democracy is best. But as an account of the recent waves of democratisation, it is hardly adequate. It doesn't explain why such changes should happen at this juncture in history.

To get a better explanation, we need to resolve what I shall call the paradox of democracy. The paradox of democracy is this. On the one hand, democracy is spreading over the world, as

I have just described. Yet in the mature democracies, which the rest of the world is supposed to be copying, there is widespread disillusionment with democratic processes. In most Western countries, levels of trust in politicians have dropped over past years. Fewer people turn out to vote than used to, particularly in the US. More and more people say that they are uninterested in parliamentary politics, especially among the younger generation. Why are citizens in democratic countries apparently becoming disillusioned with democratic government, at the same time as it is spreading around the rest of the world?

The changes I have been analysing throughout these lectures explain why. For increasing numbers across the world, life is no longer lived as fate - as relatively fixed and determined - authoritarian government becomes out of line with other life experiences, including the flexibility and dynamism necessary to compete in the global electronic economy. Political power based upon authoritarian command can no longer draw upon reserves of traditional deference, or respect.

In a world based upon active communication, hard power - power that comes only from the top down - loses its edge. The economic conditions that the Soviet Union couldn't handle - the need for decentralisation and flexibility - were mirrored in politics. Information monopoly, upon which the political system was based, has no future in an intrinsically open framework of global communications.

In the East European events of 1989, large numbers of people took to the streets. But - unlike almost any other revolution in history - there was remarkably little violence. What seemed a system of implacable power - Communist totalitarianism - faded away as though it had hardly existed. Few thought apartheid in South Africa could disappear without being forcibly overthrown. But it did. The only episodes of violence that occurred in 1989 were involved in the seizure of television stations. Those who invaded them got their priorities right. The communications revolution has produced more active, reflexive citizenries than existed before. It is these very developments that are at the same time producing disaffection in the long-established democracies. In a detraditionalising world, politicians can't rely upon the old forms of pomp and circumstance to justify what they do. Orthodox parliamentary politics becomes remote from the flood of change sweeping through people's lives.

Where does this leave democracy itself? Should we accept that democratic institutions are becoming marginal just at the point where democracy seems on a roll? I don't think so.

Some very interesting findings are revealed in the opinion polls carried out in different Western countries about trust in government. People have indeed lost a good deal of the trust they used to have in politicians and orthodox democratic procedures. They haven't lost their faith, however, in democratic processes. In a recent survey in the US and the major West European countries, well over 90% of the population said they approved of democratic government. Moreover, contrary to what many assume, most people aren't becoming uninterested in politics as such. The findings actually show the reverse. People are more interested in politics than they used to be. This includes the younger generation. Younger people are not, as has so often been said a generation X, disaffected and alienated.

What they are, or many of them are, is more cynical about the claims politicians make and concerned about questions that they feel politicians have little to say about. Many regard politics as a corrupt business, in which political leaders are self-interested, rather than having the good of their citizens at heart. Younger people see issues such as ecological questions,

human rights, family policy and sexual freedom as most important. On an economic level, they don't believe that politicians are able to deal with the forces moving the world. As everyone understands, many of these go beyond the level of the nation state. It isn't surprising that activists should choose to put their energies into special interest groups, since these promise what orthodox politics seems unable to deliver.

How can democracy and active government be sustained when they seem to have lost their purchase on events? I think there are answers. What is needed in the democratic countries is a deepening of democracy itself. I shall call this democratising democracy. But democracy today must also become transnational. We need to democratise above the level of the nation. A globalising era demands global responses, and this applies to politics just as much as any other area.

A deepening of democracy is required, because the old mechanisms of government don't work in a society where citizens live in the same information environment as those in power over them. Western democratic governments, of course, have never been as secretive as communist states or other types of authoritarian government. Yet secretive in some contexts they certainly have been. Think, for example, of how much was concealed by the US and British governments in the cold war period about nuclear testing and weapons development. Western democratic systems have also involved old-boy networks, political patronage and backstage deals. They frequently make use of traditional symbolism, and traditional forms of power, that are less than wholly democratic. The House of Lords in the UK is only one of the most obvious of such examples. As traditions lose their grip, what once seemed venerable, and worthy of respect, almost overnight can come to appear quaint, or even ridiculous.

It was not by accident there have been so many corruption scandals in politics around the world in the past few years. From Japan to Germany, France and the US to the UK, corruption cases have made the news. I doubt that corruption is more common in democratic countries than it used to be. Rather, in an open information society it is more visible, and the boundaries of what counts as corruption have shifted. In Britain, for example, the old boy network in the past was simply the way in which things were done, even when left of centre parties were in power. Such networks have hardly disappeared, but much of what used to happen through them, and be widely accepted, is now defined as illegitimate.

The democratising of democracy will take different forms in different countries, depending on their background. But there isn't any country so advanced that it is exempt. Democratising democracy means having an effective devolution of power, where - as in Britain - power is still strongly concentrated at the national level. It means having effective anti-corruption measures at all levels.

It often implies constitutional reform, and the promotion of greater transparency in political affairs. We should also be prepared to experiment with alternative democratic procedures, especially when these might help bring political decision-making close to the everyday concerns of citizens. Peoples' juries, for example, or electronic referenda, won't replace representative democracy, but they can be a useful complement to it.

Political parties will have to get more used to collaborating with single issue groups, such as ecological pressure groups, than they have in the past. Some people see contemporary societies as fragmented and disorganised, but in fact the opposite is true. People are getting more involved in groups and associations than they used to. In Britain, 20 times more people

belong to voluntary or self-help groups than are members of political parties, and much the same is true of other countries.

Single issue groups are often at the forefront in raising problems and questions that may go ignored in orthodox political circles until too late. Thus well before the BSE crisis in the UK groups and movements had been warning about the dangers of contamination in the food chain.

The democratising of democracy also depends upon the fostering of a strong civic culture. This is absolutely central. Markets cannot produce such a culture. Nor can a pluralism of special interest groups. We shouldn't think of there being only two sectors of society, the state and the marketplace - or the public and the private. In between is the area of civil society, including the family and other non-economic institutions. Building a democracy of the emotions, of which I spoke last time, is one part of a progressive civic culture. Civil society is the arena in which democratic attitudes, including tolerance, have to be developed. The civic sphere can be fostered by government, but is in its turn its cultural basis.

The democratising of democracy isn't relevant only to the mature democracies. It can help build democratic institutions where they are weak and undernourished. In Russia, for instance, where gangster capitalism is rife, and strong authoritarian over-tones persist from the past, a more open and democratic society can't be built in only a top down manner. It has to be constructed bottom up, through a revival of civic culture. Replacing state control with markets, even if they were more stable than they are, wouldn't achieve this end. A well-functioning democracy has been aptly compared to a three-legged stool. Government, the economy and civil society need to be in balance. If one dominates over the others, unfortunate consequences follow. In the former Soviet Union, the state dominated most areas of life. Hence, there wasn't an energetic economy and civil society was all but killed off.

We can't leave the media out of this equation. The media, particularly television, have a double relation to democracy. On the one hand, as I have stressed, the emergence of a global information society, is a powerful democratising force. Yet television, and the other media, tend to destroy the very public space of dialogue they open up, through a relentless trivialising, and personalising, of political issues. Moreover, the growth of giant multinational media corporations means that unelected business tycoons can hold enormous power.

Countering such power can't be a matter of national policy alone. Crucially, the democratising of democracy can't stop at the level of the nation state. As practised up to now, democratic politics has presumed a national community that is self-governing and able to shape most of the policies that concern it. It has presumed the sovereign nation. But under the impact of globalisation, sovereignty has become fuzzy. Nations and nation-states remain powerful, but there are large democratic deficits opening up - as the political scientist, David Held points out - between them and the global forces that affect the lives of their citizens. Environmental risks, fluctuations in the global economy, or global technological change, do not respect the borders of nations. They escape democratic process - one of the main reasons, as I said earlier, for the declining appeal of democracy where it is best established.

Talk of democracy above the level of the nation might seem quite unrealistic. Such ideas, after all, were widely spoken of a hundred years ago. Instead of an era of global harmony, there arrived two world wars, more than a hundred million people have been killed in warfare during this century.

Are circumstances different now? Obviously no one can say for sure, but I believe they are. I have given the reasons why in earlier lectures. The world is much more interdependent than it was a century ago, and the nature of world society has changed. As a reverse side of the coin, the shared problems we face today - such as global ecological risks - are also much greater.

How might democracy be fostered above the level of the nation-state? I would look to the transnational organisations as much as to the international ones. The United Nations, as its very name indicates, is an association of nation states. For the moment at least, it rarely challenges the sovereignty of nations, and indeed its charter asserts that it should not do so. The European Union is different. I would see it as forging a way that could, and very likely will, be followed in other regions too. What is important about the EU isn't that it is located in Europe, but that it is pioneering a form of transnational governance. Contrary to what some of its supporters, and its critics say, it is not a federal state or a super nation-state. But nor is it merely an association of nations. The countries that have entered the EU have voluntarily given up some of their sovereignty in order to do so.

Now the European Union isn't itself particularly democratic. It has famously been said of the EU that if it applied to join itself, it wouldn't get in. The EU doesn't meet the democratic criteria it demands of its members. Yet there is nothing in principle that prevents its further democratisation and we should press hard for such change.

The existence of the EU drives home a cardinal principle of democracy, when seen against the background of the global order. This is that the transnational system can actively contribute democracy within states, as well as between them. The European courts, for example, have made a range of decisions, including measures protecting individual rights that hold within the member countries. As we look round the globe, at the end of the 20th Century, we can see cause for optimism and pessimism in about equal measure. The expansion of democracy is a case in point.

On the face of it, democracy seems a fragile flower. In spite of its spread, oppressive regimes abound, while human rights are routinely flouted in states around the world. In Kosovo, that unfolding tragedy, hundreds of thousands have been forced from their homes, and all pretence of the rule of law abandoned. I would like to quote some words here, from a reporter on the spot: 'nearly half a million refugees' he says, are in Macedonia now. How they are to be fed, nobody knows ... Come over into Macedonia and help us!' This was published in the Toronto Daily Star. The reporter was Ernest Hemingway, the date - October 20, 1922. One might be forgiven for thinking that some problems are simply intractable, without hope of resolution. Democracy might appear to flourish only in especially fertile soil, which has been cultivated in the long term. In societies, or regions, that have little history of democratic government, democracy seems to have shallow roots and is easily swept away.

Yet perhaps all this is changing. Rather than thinking of democracy as a fragile flower, easily trampled underfoot, perhaps we should see it more as a sturdy plant, able to grow even on quite barren ground. If my argument is correct, the expansion of democracy is bound up with structural changes in world society. Nothing comes without struggle. But the furthering of democracy at all levels is worth fighting for and it can be achieved. Our runaway world doesn't need less, but more government - and this, only democratic institutions can provide.

Dokumentārā lapa

Bakalaura darbs “Audience Involvement Techniques in Reith Lectures” (Auditorijas iesaistes paņēmieni Rīsa lekcijās) izstrādāts LU Humanitāro zinātņu fakultātē.

Ar savu parakstu apliecinu, ka pētījums veikts patstāvīgi, izmantoti tikai tajā norādītie informācijas avoti un iesniegtā darba elektroniskā kopija atbilst izdrukai.

Autors: Herta Holste

06.01.2020.

Rekomendēju/nerekomendēju darbu aizstāvēšanai

Vadītāja: lektore Rasma Mozere

06.01.2020.

Recenzents:

06.01.2020.

Studiju metodiķe: Sintija Zankovsa

Darbs iesniegts Anglistikas nodaļā 06. 01. 2020.

Darbu pieņēma:

Darbs aizstāvēts bakalaura gala pārbaudījuma komisijas sēdē

2020. gada..... janvārī, prot. Nr., vērtējums

Komisijas sekretāre: