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**DECONSTRUCTING OPPOSITION TO MUSLIM  
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES IN THE NORDIC-  
BALTIC REGION: THE CASE OF NORWAY AND  
LATVIA**

**PRET MUSULMAŅU IMIGRANTIEM UN BĒĢLIEM  
VĒRSTU AIZSPRIEDUMU DEKONSTRUKCIJA  
BALTIJĀ UN SKANDINĀVIJĀ: LATVIJAS UN  
NORVĒGIJAS GADĪJUMI**

MASTER THESIS

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## Anotācija

Musulmaņu imigrācijas jautājums ir bijis vienmēr strīdīgs Eiropā, bet notiekošā bēgļu krīzes to vēl vairāk ir saasinājusi.

Maģistra darbā uzmanība ir pievērsta Ziemeļbaltijas reģionam, lai:

- 1) noskaidrotu, kā pēckara ekonomika un politika (kā piemēram, viesstrādnieku programmas, bēgļu politika un piespiedu iedzīvotāju pārvietošana) ir izveidojusi mūsdienu musulmaņu kopienas Norvēģijā un Latvijā;
- 2) analizētu publisko diskursu par musulmaņu imigrāciju Norvēģijā un Latvijā kopš 2015. gada.

Leona Taivāna Latvijā un Andera Breivika (*Anders Behring Breivik*) Norvēģijā ideoloģiskais diskurss ir raksturots, analizēts un interpretēts. Pētījumā ir sniegta arī sešu plašsaziņas rakstu – “personisko bēgļu naratīvu” – kritiskā diskursa analīze, atsedzot tajos islāmfobijas pazīmes.

Iegūtie rezultāti liecina, ka, lai gan islāmfobijas diskurss ir līdzīgi saplūdis viscaur Eiropā, sabiedrības attieksmi pret migrantiem joprojām lielā mērā ietekmē vēsturiskie un socioekonomiskie faktori.

**Atslēgvārdi:** Islamfobija, Norvēģija, Latvija, nacionālisms, socioekonomika, identitātes politika

## **Abstract**

The topic of Muslim immigration has always been contentious in Europe, but the ongoing refugee crisis has brought the issue to a head. This thesis focuses in on the Nordic-Baltic region, exploring how postwar economic and political forces such as guest worker programs, refugee policies and forced population transfers have shaped the present Muslim populations of Norway and Latvia—as well as public discourse surrounding Muslim immigration to the countries since 2015. The ideological discourse of Anders Behring Breivik in Norway and Leons Taivāns in Latvia is characterized and discussed, and six examples of “personal refugee narrative” articles are analyzed for Islamophobic subtext according to the principles of critical discourse analysis. The results indicate that while Islamophobic discourse is converging to a singularity due to its dogmatic simplicity, public attitudes are still largely informed by historical and economic context.

**Keywords:** Islamophobia, Norway, Latvia, nationalism, socioeconomics, identity politics

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“They deeply hate all that is *ours*.”

—Leons Taivāns

## Introduction

The fear of Muslims in the West is many things, but it has never been a fear of the unknown. Rather, so complete and absolute has our conception of the *essence* of the Muslim been that we continue to impugn as circumstantial her attempts at self-representation. While appearing, at first, to be in natural diametric opposition, the ideologies of Islamic fundamentalism and Islamophobia agree on a single basic premise—that Muslims are essentially different to Westerners and “our/their” civilization. These ideologies offer us, in exchange for the uncertain prospect of *knowing what we will see*, the promise that we will *see only that which we know*. Yet after we have accepted their terms and declared victory over the unknown, we are only able to see that which we know *makes us afraid*.

The current refugee crisis and strings of recent terrorist attacks in Europe, through their scale and theater, have had tremendous power to feed our fears. Muslim immigration now stands as the singular issue with the most potential to disrupt and reorganize the international political order of the West since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims continue to rise at a disconcerting rate—according to Pew, the year 2015 marked a 13% increase from the previous year in social harassment of Muslims in Europe<sup>1</sup>—and the identity crisis of our century has only been made worse by the exploitative misdirection of economic anxieties into irreconcilable identity politics.

This thesis will focus on the exploitation of ideology in the Baltic-Nordic region, far removed from the Islamic world, and the cases of two countries—Norway and Latvia—for which the single source of terroristic violence in the past decade has not come from Islam, but rather from the *fear of Islam*. Latvia’s score on the 2016 Global Terrorism Index is listed as zero, while Norway’s remains at 2.077 due to the lasting impact of the 2011 attacks.<sup>2</sup>

The **theoretical and methodological basis** of this thesis is based on cultural studies (Edward Said), sociology (Steven Castles, Rogers Brubaker, Richard Mole), philosophy of

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<sup>1</sup> Kayatoun Kishi, “Muslims, Jews Faced Social Hostilities in Seven-In-Ten European Countries in 2015,” *Pew Research Center*, April 12, 2017, accessed May 22, 2017, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/12/muslims-jews-faced-social-hostilities-in-seven-in-ten-european-countries-in-2015/>

<sup>2</sup> Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2016*, 11, accessed May 30, 2017, <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2016.2.pdf>.

social science (René Girard), sociolinguistics and critical discourse analysis (Norman Fairclough, Teun van Dijk), Marxian economics and historical materialism (Slavoj Žižek).

The **research aim** of the present work is threefold: (1) to characterize the divergent political and socioeconomic contexts underlying postwar Muslim migration to Western Europe and the Baltic States, (2) to analyze the relationship between ideology and the social practice of discourse employed by those in positions of social influence (politicians, scholars, journalists and terrorists), and (3) to illustrate with more than binary subtlety how public attitudes on Muslim immigration have evolved before and after 2015.

**The first chapter** provides a brief justification for the choice to focus on Norway and Latvia in particular, including brief commentaries on the countries' current geopolitical orientations, shared historical subjection to military dominant neighbors, current demographic situations and pre-20<sup>th</sup> century Muslim populations. This chapter is intended mostly for readers who may not necessarily be familiar with either Scandinavian or Baltic history outside of a general European context.

**The second chapter** compares the political and socioeconomic factors motivating major Muslim migrations to Western Europe in general—and Norway in particular—during the 20<sup>th</sup> century (i.e., guest worker programs during the “economic miracle”, family reunification and asylum policies) with the political factors that brought about the same in the Latvian SSR (“the internationalization of industry”, i.e., population transfers). The chapter also explains how intergroup prejudices were aggravated and exploited by politicians and policymakers after the 1973–75 recession in the case of Western Europe—and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the case of occupied Latvia—to divide, conquer and exploit the working class. The chapter also provides statistical context for modern discussion by detailing refugee movements into Latvia and Norway, both in absolute numbers and relative to various socioeconomic and demographic indices (data which can be viewed in tabular form in appendix 1).

**The third chapter** explores the social practice of discourse in Latvia and Norway by three groups with considerable power to influence public attitudes: journalists, academics and lone-wolf terrorists. First, a brief characterization of general media coverage of Muslims and refugees is provided, followed by a description of the media environments of both countries. Second, the argumentation of the Latvian academic Leons Taivāns is described and criticized. Third, selected excerpts of six articles representing a trend towards “personal refugee narratives” in the Latvian press are analyzed for Islamophobic subtext. Finally, the ideology

of Norway's most infamous advocate of Islamophobia, the mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik is discussed, as well as the media coverage of his attacks.

The **fourth chapter** presents a compilation of research of public opinion carried out from the decades leading up to the beginning of the refugee crisis in 2015 and beyond, providing insight into the evolution of public opinion towards Muslim immigrants and refugees in Latvia and Norway over this period. Differing reactions to the individual components of an identity assigned to Muslim immigrants by public discourse (“Muslim”, “immigrant” and “other race”) are presented and discussed, and attitudes in the two countries are compared.

The thesis then closes with a **conclusion**, the presentation of **theses**, three **appendices** and a **bibliography** of consulted and cited works.

Despite this thesis being a comparative study of public attitudes in Norway and Latvia, it is *fundamentally not about “Norwegians” or “Latvians”*. Rather, I am inclined to believe that any kind of hasty, normative assessment of the values, culture or collective character of social groups has been proven throughout history to be mutually detrimental to minority and majority groups alike. Trends in public attitudes in this thesis identified by the admittedly fallible method of the sociological survey are not identified for the purposes of assigning blame or hierarchy to nations, but rather are to be examined as symptoms of the true overarching theme of this study—power—and the maintenance of its unequal structures by, among other forces, the social process of public discourse.

Similarly, despite the fact that Muslims are mentioned in the title of this work, this thesis is also *fundamentally not about “Muslims”* (there is no shortage of non-Muslim “experts” elsewhere willing to speak on the Muslims’ behalf, should the reader so desire to be enlightened). My only attempt to describe Muslims would be to offer the following understanding, based on empirical research,<sup>3</sup> of the actual living people unquestionably referred to by the utterance of the word “Muslim”, who by way of their actual existence supersede in importance any cartoon existing within the framework of Orientalist dogma. The word “Muslim” refers to almost one in four people alive today—the 1.6 billion followers of Islam. Other than a belief in the existence of one God, the belief of the prophet Muhammad as his messenger and the belief of the Quran as the word of God, there is little other descriptive information that applies to every individual example of this group to be offered by

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<sup>3</sup> Pew Research Center, “The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society,” April 30, 2013, accessed May 24, 2017, <http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-overview/>

the label in itself—much in the same way that the enormous diversity of those who self-identify as “Christian” or “Jewish” belies the spuriousness of universals derived solely on the basis of these terms alone. One of the only things the overwhelming majority of the world’s Muslims *do* agree on is the belief that violence cannot be justified in the name of their religion. To dispute this is to deny the agency of human beings to represent themselves.

It is not my intention to advocate on behalf of any political group, but it also must be acknowledged that any discussion of power relations is inherently political. This work must be read with the understanding that it is grounded in a primary political assumption that the social equality of categories of persons based on ascribed characteristics over which individuals have little or no control—race, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual orientation, etc.—is both beneficial to and necessary for the healthy functioning of a democratic society. While inequality—be it social or economic—may benefit particular groups in the short-term, long-term inequalities of any kind lead to societal conflict and dysfunction and, in extreme but historically observable cases, the implosion of democracies.

This research is motivated by a personal desire to stress the importance of *context* when navigating the multiple identities that we apply to others and ourselves in society, as well as the importance of respecting self-representation over the drawing of intractable and illusionary lines of battle.

## 1. Why Norway and Latvia?

At first glance, the Nordic-Baltic region (consisting of the Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden and the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) is a peculiar locale for a comparative study of the socioeconomic and political aspects of Muslim immigration—being far removed in latitude from even the “Near” East. However, the countries of Norway and Latvia were chosen for three main reasons: (1) to compare and contrast the development of hostility against Muslim immigrants as a product of different historical and economic processes on either side of the Iron Curtain (at a level of detail that would not require a manuscript of hundreds of pages), (2) to contrast how different ideological axes (socioeconomic vs. ethnic) and political power balances (right-wing vs. left-wing) have affected the rise of ethno-nationalism and Islamophobia, (3) and to judge the extent of the convergence of the countries’ respective public attitudes as the refugee crisis takes hold in Europe. The next few introductory subchapters will prepare the reader for engagement by briefly presenting relevant geopolitical, demographic and historical background to those who may be unfamiliar with either country or the Nordic-Baltic Region as a whole.

### 1.1. Geopolitics and intergovernmental organizations

New geopolitical trends (namely, international defense cooperation in the wake of the re-emergence of an assertive Russia) are bringing the Baltics and Nordics closer together as a somewhat cohesive region. Surveys of the public and statements by heads of state in the Baltics have expressed a desire for increased geopolitical orientation towards and affiliation with the Nordics (“Northern Europe”) over the post-Soviet domain (“Eastern Europe”).<sup>4</sup> Latvia and Norway are members of many of the same intergovernmental economic and security organizations—NATO (of which neither Sweden nor Finland are members), the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), Northern Dimension, the OSCE and OECD—though Norway stands out in its continued public opposition to membership in the EU,<sup>5</sup> which all

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<sup>4</sup> Eitvydas Bajarūnas, “Cooperation of Nordic-Baltic Countries in the Areas of Security and Defence,” *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review* 11, no. 1 (2013): 84, accessed May 29, 2017, doi:10.2478/v10243-012-0024-1.

<sup>5</sup> Baldur Thorhallsson, “The Outsiders: Norway and Iceland,” in *The Nordic Countries and the European Union: Still the Other European Community?*, eds. Caroline Howard Grøn, Peter Nedergaard and Anders Wivel (London: Routledge, 2015), 42.

three Baltics joined in 2004.<sup>6</sup> EU membership has subordinated Latvia to the European Commission's authority on the issue of refugee resettlement from other member states, which has especially affected anti-immigrant discourse within the country.

## 1.2. Demographics

Norway and Latvia have very small populations: 5.19 and 1.94 million, respectively,<sup>7</sup> and are among the most sparsely populated countries in Europe (Norway with 17.1 persons/km<sup>2</sup> in 2015, Latvia—31.8, well below the EU average of 117.1).<sup>8</sup> Latvian life expectancy at birth is 73.9 years, among the bottom of the list of OECD countries, while Norway fares better in ninth place at 81.8 years.<sup>9</sup> The populations of both countries are aging, with individuals over 65 expected to constitute 23 percent of their respective populations by 2050.<sup>10</sup> Both Latvia's and Norway's total fertility rates (live births per woman) in 2015 were below the replacement level of 2.1 for developed countries with low mortality, at 1.70 and 1.72, respectively (though both were higher than the EU-28 average of 1.58).<sup>11</sup>

Latvia is faced with a particularly dire demographic situation due to a confluence of low fertility and heavy emigration to more prosperous and attractive Western and Central European countries. Latvia's emigration pattern has accelerated in recent years from "opportunity migration" (taking advantage of access to the European free labor market after Latvia's accession to the EU in 2004) to "crisis migration" (fleeing financial problems and high unemployment since the 2008 recession).<sup>12</sup> Adding to the negative outlook is Latvia's relatively high mortality rate, which continues to be affected by—among other factors—high rates of alcohol-related mortality (especially for males).<sup>13</sup> Between 2015 and 2016, Latvia's natural increase (population change not accounting for migration) was -6.5 thousand and its

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<sup>6</sup> Peter Van Elsuwege, *From Soviet Republics to EU Member States: A Legal and Political Assessment of the Baltic States' Accession to the EU* (Boston: Brill, 2008), xxi.

<sup>7</sup> World Bank, "Population, total," accessed May 14, 2017, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>; Central Statistics Bureau of Latvia, "IE01. Population and main data of vital statistics by month," accessed May 29, 2017, [http://data.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/en/Sociala/Sociala\\_\\_isterm\\_\\_iedz/IE0010m.px/?rxid=a79839fe-11ba-4ecd-8cc3-4035692c5fc8](http://data.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/en/Sociala/Sociala__isterm__iedz/IE0010m.px/?rxid=a79839fe-11ba-4ecd-8cc3-4035692c5fc8)

<sup>8</sup> Eurostat, "Population density," accessed May 6, 2017, <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00003&plugin=1>

<sup>9</sup> OECD, *Health at a Glance 2015: OECD Indicators* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015), 49.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 195.

<sup>11</sup> Eurostat, "Fertility statistics," accessed May 14, 2017, [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Fertility\\_statistics](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Fertility_statistics)

<sup>12</sup> D. Göler, Z. Krišjāne and M. Bērziņš, "International Migration in the Periods of Transition and Crisis: The Case of Latvia," *Baltic Region 2* (2014): 78–81.

<sup>13</sup> S. Popova et al., "Comparing Alcohol Consumption in Central and Eastern Europe to other European Countries," *Alcohol and Alcoholism* 42, no. 5 (2007): 467, accessed May 29, 2017, doi:10.1093/alcalc/agl124.

total population change for the period was -17.1 thousand.<sup>14</sup> The demographic situation of the country is so severe that Latvia is projected to lose 19.1 percent of its population by the year 2050—making it the sixth-fastest shrinking country in the world.<sup>15</sup> On an emotional and political level, Latvia’s untenable demographic situation has certainly contributed to the longevity of the sense of “national threat” in the majority population—a looming sense of national extinction—originally triggered by forced population transfers and strict Russification policies during the Soviet period and carrying over into the post-independence period as a dominant political ideology best characterized by Boym’s concept of *restorative nostalgia*, or the “[rebuilding] of one’s homeland with paranoid determination”.<sup>16</sup> Assuming current demographic trends do not reverse in the coming years, current trends in population aging and the exodus of working-age individuals from the country will render the solvency of Latvia’s pension fund, as well as its labor market, increasingly dependent on immigrants.

Both Norway’s natural increase (birth rate minus death rate) of 18.3 thousand and total population change of 47.5 thousand were positive between 2015 and 2016.<sup>17</sup> These positive demographic trends, however, are also largely supported by immigrants: in 2012, 23 percent of all newborns in Norway had an immigrant mother, two-and-a-half times this percentage fifteen years earlier.<sup>18</sup> Between 2004 and 2013, the percentage of Norwegians living in Norway with only Norwegian grandparents had decreased by seven percent relative to the country’s population as a whole, but has also fallen slightly in absolute numbers—indicating that the combined number of deaths and emigrations outpaced births and immigrations for this group.<sup>19</sup> Though Norway’s social security solvency is safe at present due to wise public investment of state oil revenue in the social safety net, the same demographic transition is nonetheless taking place in the country.

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<sup>14</sup> Eurostat, “Population and Population Change Statistics,” accessed May 29, 2017,

[http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Population\\_and\\_population\\_change\\_statistics](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Population_and_population_change_statistics)

<sup>15</sup> United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, Key Findings and Advanced Tables*, working Paper No. ESA/P/WP.241.

<sup>16</sup> Svetlana Boym, “Nostalgia and Its Discontents,” *Hedgehog Review* 9, no. 2 (2007): 15.

<sup>17</sup> Eurostat, “Population.”

<sup>18</sup> Marianne Tønnessen, “Fertility Rates and Other Demographics Among Immigrants and Children of Immigrants Born in Norway,” *Statistics Norway*, January 29, 2014, accessed May 29, 2017,

<https://www.ssb.no/en/forskning/demografi-og-levekaar/fruktbarhet-og-familiedemografi/fertility-rates-and-other-demographics-among-immigrants-and-children-of-immigrants-born-in-norway>

<sup>19</sup> Kristina Kvarv Andreassen, Minja Tea Dzamarija and Tove Irene Slaastad, “Innvandrere og norskfødte med innvandrerforeldre – befolkningsstatistikk,” *Samfunnsspeilet* 5 (2013): 14.

### 1.3. Delayed independence

Historically, both Norway and Latvia are positioned between imperial great powers, and have been subject to foreign meddling in domestic affairs on the whims of European power politics, stoking nationalist sentiment in both countries for centuries. In contrast to its Scandinavian counterparts (but similarly to the Baltic republics) Norway's political independence arrived late by European standards. In 1814, after a 417-year personal union with Denmark, Norway rejected the terms of the Treaty of Kiel (in which Denmark ceded Norway to Sweden) and declared independence—but even this had to be secured by appealing to Sweden's rival power Great Britain.<sup>20</sup> Though it retained its own constitution, Norway was forced into a dual monarchy with Sweden until 1905. Leiren quotes a passage from an 1814 edition of *The Annual Register* stating that the annexation of Norway by Sweden, “without any references to the wishes of the inhabitants, [will] be regarded as [an exemplification] of the submission that will be required from the smaller powers to the determinations of the greater, in settling that *balance* which has for centuries been the unsolved problem of European politics.”<sup>21</sup> Sweden did not recognize Norway's departure from the personal union until 1905, at which point the country gained full independence “for the first time in almost four centuries of almost unbroken foreign influence”.<sup>22</sup> Norway's delayed independence best parallels multiple points in the Latvian timeline, with parts of the country's present-day territory having been under the dominion of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Swedish Empire, Imperial Russia, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The idea of delayed and besieged nationhood and resentment towards militarily dominant neighbors has certainly played a role in the national identity politics of both countries up to the present day.

### 1.4. Historical Muslim communities

In regards to Muslim immigration, both Norway and Latvia are similar in that these faith communities were extremely limited or nonexistent before post-1945 labor migrations. According to Norris, the first Muslims to reside in Latvia were ethnic Tatars attached to the Imperial Russian army in the latter half of the eighteenth century. They numbered no more than 1,000, and only a very small minority remained in the country after completing their

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<sup>20</sup> Terje I. Leiren, “Norwegian Independence and British Opinion: January to August 1814,” *Scandinavian Studies* 47, no. 3 (1975): 364.

<sup>21</sup> W. Otridge et al., ed. *The Annual Register*, 56. London: Baldwin, Craddock and Joy, 1814.

<sup>22</sup> Stuart Burch, “Norway and 1905,” *History Today* 55, no. 6 (2005): 2.

military service, though enough of them remained that a Muslim cemetery was built in Riga in 1890. Most of Riga's congregation left the city during World War I; by 1935, only four extended families comprising sixty-six individuals remained.<sup>23</sup>

Though Finland—then a part of the Russian Empire—was home to garrisoned Tatars and Kazakhs for the very same reasons, there is no evidence of any historical Muslim community in Norway, a country possessing no colonies and very few immigrants of any kind other than fellow Scandinavians prior to the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>24</sup> However, after the Second World War, economic and political forces would bring the first sizeable communities to both the Nordics on the Western side of the Iron Curtain, and the Baltics in the East.

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<sup>23</sup> Harry Norris, *Islam in the Baltic: Europe's Early Muslim Community* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 112–13.

<sup>24</sup> Jørgen S. Nielsen, *Muslims in Western Europe* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 7.

## 2. Muslim Immigration and Refugees in Context, 1945–Present

### 2.1. Western Europe’s “economic miracle”

In Western Europe, the thirty-year period bookended by the end of the Second World War in 1945 and the economic crisis of 1973–75 was known as the “economic miracle” (*Wirtschaftswunder*) for a reason. The immediate postwar years were a period of massive expansion in Western European industrial production and rapid economic growth—so rapid, in fact, that the combined output of capitalist countries doubled in the sixteen-year period between 1952 and 1968.<sup>25</sup> The initial spark for this period of growth was provided by billions of dollars of investment from the United States in European industrial infrastructure under the Marshall Plan, motivated in part by the belief of American policymakers that foreign trade and investment, the reconstruction of European trading partners and the creation of an integrated, multilateral system of world trade were essential to America’s economic interests.<sup>26</sup> This investment provided for the construction of thousands of factories in European industrial centers—as well as hundreds of thousands of opportunities for employment. However, many European economies were already facing labor shortages due to the deaths of large segments of their working-age populations in the war. Politicians decided, without lengthy public debate, to solve this problem by opening their labor markets to workers from other European countries on a temporary basis.<sup>27</sup> Britain was the first to create a labor program specifically for war refugees, the European Voluntary Worker scheme, though the civil rights of these workers were extremely limited and only single men were approved.<sup>28</sup>

#### 2.1.1. Guest worker programs

The first real “guest worker” (a translation of the euphemistic German term *Gastarbeiter*) programs recruited men mostly from Spain, Portugal and Italy. However, by even the early sixties, growth in production had outpaced the ability of either sluggish domestic population increase or the available supply of European immigrants to meet the demand for labor.

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<sup>25</sup> Andrew Glyn and John Harrison, *The British Economic Disaster* (London: Pluto Press, 1980), 5.

<sup>26</sup> Michael J. Horgan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 26.

<sup>27</sup> Philip L. Martin and Mark J. Miller, “Guestworkers: Lessons from Western Europe,” *ILR Review* 33, no. 3 (1980): 317.

<sup>28</sup> Stephen Castles, “The Guest-Worker in Western Europe - An Obituary,” *International Migration Review* 20 (1986): 762.

Employers and governments recognized that the sustainability of the boom and its elevated rates of capital accumulation rested upon continuous and proportional expansions of both the scale of production and the size of the labor pool. This can be explained by the *law of diminishing marginal returns* in neoclassical economic theory, that is, the idea that the marginal product of labor will decrease and eventually become negative if a single input factor of production is continually increased with all other input factors remaining fixed.<sup>29</sup> When applied specifically to the scenario of industrial production, the law dictates that continuous investment in what Marx refers to as *constant capital* or “the means of production...the raw material, auxiliary material and the instruments of labor”,<sup>30</sup> without a proportional increase in *variable capital* or labor power, will eventually lead to an equilibrium point at which further investment is no longer profitable due to the progressively negative effect of wage inflation on value added as a result of production—itsself caused by increased employer competition for a fixed pool of workers operating in their own best economic interests. However, if variable capital increases proportionally to constant capital (a feat only achievable under postwar European demographic conditions by the import of immigrant labor) the demand for labor remains static—keeping production costs low and the influx of investment high.

Foreign labor had additional depressive effects on wages beyond a simple numerical reduction in labor demand due to the failure of governments to enact protections against “social dumping” (a term, according to the European Parliament, generally used to refer to “unfair competition due to the application of different wages and social protection rules to different categories of workers”<sup>31</sup>). The exploitation of guest workers—further facilitated by their lack of access to unions and inability to lobby politically for adequate working conditions or social amenities—also limited the leverage of local labor unions in wage negotiations amid the “race to the bottom”. Local backlash that arose from the deleterious effects of unfair competition on the bargaining power of local labor unions, however, was offset by increased opportunities afforded to locals to ascend from dirty, physically demanding and low-paying jobs to higher status, white-collar employment. This increased economic mobility further reinforced the cycle of social dumping: demand for consumer

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<sup>29</sup> Elizabeth Mohn, “Diminishing Returns (Economics),” Salem Press Encyclopedia (January 2016): Research Starters, EBSCOhost, accessed May 25, 2017.

<sup>30</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital, Volume I: The Process of the Production of Capital*, ed. Frederick Engels and Ernest Untermann, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1867), 146.

<sup>31</sup> Marianne Thyssen, “Parliamentary Questions,” 27 May 2015, accessed May 29, 2017, E-008441-15. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2015-008441&language=EN>

goods increased as more locals left the bottom tiers of employment and increased their incomes; this in turn motivated employers to find further cost-cutting measures. Nonetheless, immigrants were the ideal proletariat for the European working classes as well as the bourgeoisie: an exploitable, voiceless underclass without political representation.

As capital continued to accumulate, a desire on the part of employers to keep returns high by continuously expanding industrial production overrode any political will to keep immigrants out for any reason other than an inability or unwillingness to perform unskilled labor for a low wage. The specific social backgrounds of immigrants became of increasingly less importance relative to their status as low-cost, expendable labor units. Labor markets were opened to women, black colonials, Indian “coolies”, East Asians and Muslims. The governments of most sending countries were generally willing to allow their laborers to emigrate as well, as this provided relief from unemployment at home. All that mattered to the authorities of receiving countries in the height of the economic expansion was that laborers were mobile, physically healthy and able to work; after all, they would—according to the plan—eventually return home the moment their labor was no longer needed.

However, what the architects of the guest labor programs did not anticipate is that this moment would never definitively arrive. The rapid establishment of an immigrant labor class led to a segmentation of European economies, the result of two main phenomena: the upward mobility of indigenous populations, and conscious efforts on the parts of employers to undermine class-based solidarity by exploiting ethnic and racial tensions.<sup>32</sup> The phenomenon of upward social mobility was not reversible after it began—local working-class populations were generally unwilling to return to the jobs delegated to the immigrant underclass. The labor demand for jobs that had since been “race-typed”—often of a thankless and low-paying nature but also essential to the basic functioning of the economy—could not be met by indigenous workers who had grown to see themselves as above this sort of work. Therefore, though guest workers themselves were precluded from social integration in their host countries, *their labor* was more or less fully integrated into the new economic structure of Western Europe.

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<sup>32</sup> Michael Reich, David M. Gordon and Richard C. Edwards, “Dual Labor Markets: A Theory of Labor Market Segmentation,” *American Economic Review* 63, no. 2 (1973): 360.

### 2.1.2 Expansion and the end of the miracle

When the definition of an “acceptable” immigrant had expanded sufficiently to include “Orientals” by the sixties and seventies, Muslims began to migrate to Western Europe in significant numbers. By 1970, more than half a million immigrants from the French colonies of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia resided in France.<sup>33</sup> The Federal Republic of Germany negotiated guest worker contracts with Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963 and Tunisia in 1965.<sup>34</sup> By the early seventies, more than half a million Turks lived and worked in the Federal Republic of Germany—slightly less than a third of the number of guest workers in the country overall.<sup>35</sup> By 1967, the United Kingdom’s immigrant population included former colonial subjects from West Pakistan and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), Indian Muslims from Gujarat, Turkish Cypriots, Malaysians, West Africans and Yemenis.<sup>36</sup> The former Dutch colonies of Indonesia and Suriname (Dutch Guyana) were the primary sources of Muslim immigration to the Netherlands (especially after Suriname was granted independence in 1975; many wished to retain Dutch passports.)<sup>37</sup>

Sweden and Denmark became the first countries in the Nordics to host Turkish populations numbering in the thousands, with the first mosques being built by 1967 and 76, respectively,<sup>38</sup> by 1970, both countries’ Muslim populations had expanded to over 15,000 individuals.<sup>39</sup> Finland’s case was unique in Europe in that the country was both saddled with \$300 million of war reparation payments to the USSR,<sup>40</sup> and forced to reject Marshall Plan aid due to Soviet pressure.<sup>41</sup> The country’s labor force stopped its expansion by the early sixties, predating immigration waves from Muslim-majority countries; therefore, the number of Muslims as a percentage of Finland’s population remained unchanged from 0.2% between 1950 and 2010.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Castles, “The Guest Worker,” 764.

<sup>34</sup> Slobodan Djajić, “Guest-Worker Programs,” *CESifo DICE Report* 12, no. 2 (2014): 16.

<sup>35</sup> Gökçe Yurdakul, *From Guest Workers Into Muslims: The Transformation of Turkish Immigrant Associations in Germany* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), 25

<sup>36</sup> Nielsen, *Muslims*, 44.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 67.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 84, 89.

<sup>39</sup> Houssain Kettani, “World Muslim Population: 1950 – 2020,” *International Journal of Environmental Science and Development* 1, no. 2 (2010), Table 4.4., accessed May 29, 2017, doi:10.7763/ijesd.2010.v1.28.

<sup>40</sup> Olavi Lounasmeri, “Finnish War Reparations,” *Bank of Finland Monthly Bulletin* 26, no. 11–12 (1952): 20.

<sup>41</sup> Riitta Hjerpe, “An Economic History of Finland,” *EH.net*, accessed May 25, 2017, <https://eh.net/encyclopedia/an-economic-history-of-finland/>

<sup>42</sup> For absolute and relative estimates of the Muslim populations of the Nordic-Baltic countries in the decades between 1950 and 2010, see appendix 1.

Norway was a fairly late comer to guest worker programs, beginning only in the late sixties to import labor.<sup>43</sup> Pakistanis, largely from the Punjab region, were the only sizeable group to work as immigrant labor in the late sixties, followed by Moroccan Berbers, Turks and Kurds in the beginning of the seventies. Guest workers in Norway were mostly single men, leading to increased “chain migration” in later years.<sup>44</sup> Following the example of its neighbor Sweden, Norway adopted a relatively hands-off cultural policy towards immigrants from the outset, allowing them to maintain their culture and religion in private undisturbed.<sup>45</sup> However, the guest worker program only lasted for five years, being abolished by 1975, after which the main increases in Muslim immigrants came from family reunification and asylum policies (see chapter 2.2).<sup>46</sup>

As more and more immigrants streamed into Europe, it seemed as if the growth would never end. However, in 1973, Europe’s economic miracle came crashing to Earth: a Middle Eastern oil embargo caused a massive spike in oil prices and triggered a global recession.<sup>47</sup> The supply shock of oil increased shipping and transportation costs for the production of consumer goods, raising prices on almost all commodities. Rising production costs also exerted downward pressure on production—reducing labor demand and leading to a rise in unemployment rates to at least some degree in most European countries. Higher consumer prices spurred unions to demand higher wages to account for higher costs of living, contributing to inflation. At the same time, the industrial expansion that drove the European economies began to reach its physical and logistical limits and slowed to a standstill. As Castles explains,

...by the end of the sixties [there was] was an over-accumulation of capital, leading to high demand for other factors of production. There were simply too many factories requiring labor, raw materials, transport, ancillary services, land, water and air, in a small geographical area. This meant that the cost of all these production factors was soaring...A further consequence of over-industrialization was pollution and destruction of the environment, leading to emission controls, which further increased costs.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Nielsen, *Muslims*, 94.

<sup>44</sup> Christine M. Jacobsen, *Islamic Traditions and Muslim Youth in Norway* (Leiden: Brill NV, 2011), 15.

<sup>45</sup> Grete Brochmann and Anne Britt Djuve, “Multiculturalism or Assimilation? The Norwegian Welfare State Approach,” in *Debating Multiculturalism in the Nordic Welfare States*, ed. Peter Kivisto and Östen Wahlbeck (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 221.

<sup>46</sup> Jacobsen, *Islamic Traditions*, 16.

<sup>47</sup> Jonas Pontusson and Damian Raess, “How (and Why) Is This Time Different? The Politics of Economic Crisis in Western Europe and the United States,” *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.* 15 (2012): 14.

<sup>48</sup> Castles, “The Guest-Worker,” 774.

As soon as production stagnated and the previously insatiable demand for labor disappeared, politicians put a stop to the recruitment of further immigrant labor. Between 1973 and 1975, almost all guest worker programs were ended in Europe, and governments introduced tighter restrictions on new immigration, especially from the last areas to be included—former colonies and the Orient.

By 1973, unemployment had risen among immigrants, but many remained in their host countries illegally or with expired work permits. Although many immigrants had originally planned only to work and save money for a few years before returning to their homelands, their exploitative wages often precluded them from earning enough to complete their mission. With no money to buy land or property in their home countries, immigrants had little motivation to leave Europe. Deportation was certainly debated by politicians due to public pressure; however, both the expense of deportation and the segmentation of labor markets made this unrealistic and economically unfeasible. Business leaders were generally opposed to deportation on the grounds that the supply of local workers willing to do be relegated to the type of low-status employment held by immigrants would be severely limited regardless of high unemployment, contributing to even further wage inflation in large and crucial segments of the economy in the event of their departure. Furthermore, employers were able to mitigate elevated production costs by employing an increasing number of unemployed former guest workers in the shadow economy—avoiding payroll taxes and regulations and sidestepping local unions. The legality of their employment made little difference to immigrants, who did not have rights or benefits even when employed *legally*. Politicians were eventually forced to accept the reality of the situation: that the demand for immigrant labor had persisted throughout the recession due not to expansions of constant capital but rather to market segmentation—a phenomenon which would continue as the continent underwent a process of deindustrialization, and as greater shares of the local populations transitioned to tertiary industry (service sector) employment.

Rather than deny that their guest worker programs had had unintended effects, governments began to enact pragmatic policies to encourage the integration of settlers. Restrictions on family reunification for former guest workers were eased to some extent in most European countries. While many guest workers repatriated to their home countries anyways in the wake of the recession, many who chose to stay permanently were joined by their families and dependents, causing immigrant populations in Europe to stabilize or even increase in every country that had hoped to reduce their numbers with reactionary anti-immigration policies. As migrants began to see their inadequate economic and social

situations in their new countries as long-term or permanent, they began to publically demand social amenities—housing, education and health services. This was certainly understandable—immigrants had largely been crammed into substandard housing in decaying inner cities, with no access to the social safety net to which they had contributed.

### 2.1.3. Scapegoating

For many working-class Europeans, guest workers programs provided the first opportunities to make contact with Muslims. Unfortunately, the Arab countries were already being blamed for the OPEC oil embargo that caused the recession, and the perfect conditions were already in place for public anti-Muslim antipathy. Muslim immigrants were much more outwardly—and perilously—different than previous Southern or Eastern European immigrant groups: they had darker skin, spoke unfamiliar languages, wore different clothes, lived separately from locals in segregated neighborhoods, worshipped differently and held different cultural values. These differences would not have been sufficient to inspire virulent and irrational hatred *per se*, but certainly lent them themselves easily to exploitation.

*Mimetic theory*, developed by the French philosopher René Girard in the book *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, describes how social groups coexisting in a society (in this case, the bourgeoisie and the political classes on one hand, and the native working classes on the other) solve mimetic conflicts (those which arise through competitive and mutually-reinforcing desires, in this case the sense of entitlement to capital by right of the *property* of the former or the *citizenship* of the latter) through the unconscious symbolic destruction of the *scapegoat mechanism*, a group that is (1) represented in neither of the groups in conflict and (2) unable to defend itself from destruction.<sup>49</sup> Muslim immigrants, with no institutional power or legal rights, were the ideal candidates.

Pretext for the scapegoating of Muslim immigrants was established in a number of ways. Firstly, by restricting immigrant flows immediately after the recession, the political class sent an implied message that immigration was somehow the cause of the unemployment that many locals were now facing. Pre-existing prejudice against Muslims, who began to stream in just prior to the recession, obfuscated the important factual distinction between the *correlation* of immigration and unemployment on one hand, and the *causation* of unemployment *by* immigration on the other. Politicians were reluctant to dispel this *post hoc*

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<sup>49</sup> René Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World* (Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 1987).

*ergo propter hoc* anti-immigrant argument on the grounds that it did serve the convenient purpose of deflecting public attention from the responsibility of policymakers for a third variable—irresponsible, inhumane and unsustainable supply-side economics—that motivated both the expansion of immigration in the first place, as well as the over-industrialization of Western Europe that worsened the economic collapse. Secondly, because increasing black market employment of unemployed guest workers also intensified feelings of unfair economic competition, racial prejudices were reinforced specifically among the local working classes in a pattern explained by *self-interest theory*, i.e., the idea that “individuals develop negative affects and rigid stereotypes towards individuals with whom they are in competition and conflict”<sup>50</sup>, in this case for manual labor jobs (notice also the shift in support since the 1980s for far-right and populist political parties from their prewar power base of the middle classes<sup>51</sup> to “nontraditional segments of the working and lower-middle classes”<sup>52</sup>). Thirdly, for the local middle classes and petty bourgeoisie, the formation of an economic underclass by immigrants working low-status, race-typed jobs fed into pre-existing intellectual notions of white supremacy and Western cultural superiority, generating disdain. Finally, immigrants came to be associated with the crime and urban decay of the segregated, run-down neighborhoods in which they were forced to live (the stereotype of immigrants as criminals is more robust in Norway than in any other country in the Nordic-Baltic region; see table 6 in appendix 2). In summary, regardless of their original intentions, policymaker’s apparent prioritization of business interests over the utilitarian needs of society at large during the “economic miracle” of 1945–73 had the side effect of creating an environment in which the scapegoat mechanism was evoked but never fully able to be destroyed—prolonging the conflict into the present reality.

## **2.2 Refugees and the expansion of Norway’s Muslim population**

While Norway was a latecomer to guest worker programs, its welcoming policies to refugees in the nineties (which can trace their ideological lineage to Fridtjof Nansen’s tenure

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<sup>50</sup> Lincoln Quillian, “Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe,” *American Sociological Review* 60, no. 4 (1995): 587.

<sup>51</sup> “Theodore Geiger... interpreted the rise of fascism as a panic reaction of the economically endangered middle strata – including the lower levels of salaried employees.” Val Burris, “The Discovery of the New Middle Classes,” *Theory and Society* 15, no. 3 (1986): 333.

<sup>52</sup> Kai Arzheimer, “Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western Europe, 1980–2002,” *American Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 2 (2009).

as the League of Nation's High Commissioner for Refugees in 1921)<sup>53</sup> grew the country's Muslim population significantly during the decade. Norway granted blanket asylum to around 13,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992 in the wake of the Bosnian War. These refugees were expected to return to their country after stability had returned to the Balkans, but only a few thousand repatriated in the mid-nineties. Most of these refugees arrived as families, so reunification did not substantially affect this population's demographics after the war.<sup>54</sup>

As is seen in other European countries, the country's Muslim population has become highly concentrated in the capital city, and the first purpose-built mosque was constructed in Oslo in 1994 by the Pakistani Muslim community—eighty percent of whom live within the city.<sup>55</sup>

In contrast to Denmark, which maintains a fairly stable immigrant population, Norway's immigrant population has doubled since 2000.<sup>56</sup> As of 2017, over 700,000 immigrants and 150,000 Norwegians born to immigrant parents reside in Norway. The most common Muslim-majority countries of origin for Norwegian immigrants are as Somalia (28,696), Iraq (22,493), Syria (20,823), Pakistan (19,973), Iran (17,169), Afghanistan (15,986), Bosnia-Herzegovina (13,591), Turkey (11,300), Kosovo (10,034), Morocco (5,796) and Sudan (4,264).<sup>57</sup> While not all immigrants from these countries can be assumed to profess the Muslim faith, Nielsen notes that more than half of the projected number of Muslims actively belong to a faith-based organizations.<sup>58</sup> In a 2006 survey of schoolchildren in Oslo, 17.6 percent of respondents self-identified as Muslims, up 4.6 percent from 1996.<sup>59</sup>

There are 188,000 persons living in Norway with a refugee background as of 2015. This group constitutes 28 percent of immigrants overall, or 3.6 percent of the overall population (with 138,000 of these having been granted refugee status). The three most common countries of origin for refugees in Norway are Somalia, Iraq and Iran, all Muslim

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<sup>53</sup> Betsy Cooper, "Norway: Migrant Quality, Not Quantity," *Migration Policy Institute*, May 1, 2005, accessed May 29, 2017, <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/norway-migrant-quality-not-quantity>

<sup>54</sup> Statistics Norway, "Bosnians – the integration champions?" February 8, 2017, accessed May 29, 2017, <http://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/bosnians-the-integration-champions>

<sup>55</sup> Jacobsen, *Islamic Traditions*, 16.

<sup>56</sup> Silje Vatne Pettersen and Lars Østby, "Immigrants in Norway, Sweden and Denmark," *Statistics Norway*, November 10, 2014, accessed May 29, 2017, [https://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/\\_attachment/204333?\\_ts=1497ab86428](https://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/_attachment/204333?_ts=1497ab86428).

<sup>57</sup> Statistics Norway, "Immigrants and Norwegian-born to Immigrant Parents, 1 January 2017," March 2, 2017, accessed May 29, 2017, <https://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/statistikker/innvbef/aar/2017-03-02?fane=tabell&sort=nummer&tabell=297399>

<sup>58</sup> Nielsen, *Muslims*, 94.

<sup>59</sup> Tormod Øia and Viggo Vestel, "Møter i den flerkulturelle," (Oslo: Norsk institutt for forskning om oppvekst, velferd og aldring, 2007), 162.

majority countries.<sup>60</sup> Although Sweden has four times the number of refugees per capita than Norway, Norway is still ranked second in the Nordic-Baltic region.

Since the 2015 refugee crisis, Norway has been among the top five recipients of refugees per capita. Under political pressure from populist political parties, the Nordics introduced border controls for the first time since the introduction of the Nordic passport union in 1954, and introduced new restrictions on family unification and reductions in social benefits for asylum seekers and refugees. This resulted in 69–84% reductions in new asylum seekers in the Nordic countries between autumn 2015 and autumn 2016.<sup>61</sup> The northern border crossing with Russia has seen almost a complete stop to border crossings by asylum seekers.<sup>62</sup> Approximately fifty-five percent of asylum applications were accepted by Norwegian immigration authorities in 2015.<sup>63</sup>

### **2.3. Population transfers and the “national threat” in Latvia**

#### **2.3.1. The Soviet nightmare**

As the Western European “economic miracle” began to take hold in the years after the Second World War, the people the occupied Latvian SSR hoped in vain for a “miracle” of their own. Despite the defeat of the Nazi Germany, the postwar situation in Latvia was bleak: the population had suffered tremendously during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, losing a third of its population in World War I and the subsequent Latvian War of Independence, and another third due to war and repressions in the 1940s.<sup>64</sup> The country was now led by a puppet government subordinate to the brutal regime of Joseph Stalin.

After its annexation into the Soviet Union, Latvia became absorbed into the centrally planned Soviet economy and subject to a policy of rapid industrialization. The Soviet state invested 40% more capital in real terms in public sector industry, transport and construction than the previous Tsarist government.<sup>65</sup> The Latvian population, similarly to other European countries devastated by the war, was not able to meet the increased demand for unskilled

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<sup>60</sup> Statistics Norway, “Refugees in Norway,” January 28, 2016, accessed May 29, 2017, <http://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/refugees-in-norway>

<sup>61</sup> Tobias Etzold, “Refugee Policy in Northern Europe: Nordic Countries Grow Closer but Differences Remain,” *SSOAR – Social Science Open Access Repository*, EBSCOhost, accessed May 29, 2017, 1–2.


<sup>62</sup> Statistics Norway, “Refugees.”

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> Jukka Rislakki, *The Case for Latvia: Disinformation Campaigns Against a Small Nation: Fourteen Hard Questions And Straight Answers about a Baltic Country* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2014), 44.

<sup>65</sup> Mark Harrison, “Soviet Agriculture and Industrialisation,” in *Agriculture and Economic Growth from the Eighteenth Century to the Present*, eds. John A. Davis and Peter Mathias (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 194.

labor produced by high levels of industrial capital investment. However, it is of critical importance to understand that while European policymakers pursued economic policies intended to maximize economic growth (and eventually resorting to recruiting foreign guest workers once labor demand exceeded local supply) Soviet economic policies were politically motivated and intended to accelerate the ethnic cleansing of the occupied republics—deliberately concentrating heavy industry in locations where unskilled foreign laborers could be used as a tool to dilute the concentration of “problematic” ethnicities (see figure 2.1). For this reason, the occupied Latvian SSR was one of the most heavily industrialized republics—despite the country’s clear economic unsuitability as a center of heavy industry. The marginal output of Latvian industrial production was limited on both ends by transportation costs incurred from the import of raw materials from the East, and the export of finished products back to the East—one of the many internal economic factors contributing to the later period of stagnation under Brezhnev that eventually resulted in the breakup of the USSR.



**Figure 2.1. Theoretical comparison of foreign labor importation schemes in Western Europe and the Soviet Union.** Note the reversals between *intended effects* and *side effects* between capitalist and Soviet migrations, as well the positive overall effect on economic growth in the former scenario and the negative overall effect in the latter.

The oft-repeated notion that the Soviet occupying power contributed positively to the Latvian economy—popular in pro-Kremlin propaganda—was debunked in a paper by Krūmiņš using official documentation recovered from public archives. According to Krūmiņš’ calculations, over the course of the occupation, the Soviet state invested into the Latvian SSR only *18.8 percent of the funds that it received from it in revenue*.<sup>66</sup>

The ethnic cleansing of Latvia was furthered by the Stalinist deportations of thousands of individuals deemed by the Soviet state to be “class enemies”—former

<sup>66</sup> Gatis Krūmiņš, “The Investments of the USSR Occupying Power in the Baltic Economies – Myths and Reality,” accessed May 31, 2017, <https://www.va.lv/lv/lapa/raksti>

landowners, law enforcement officers, educators, politicians and bureaucrats, almost all of them ethnic Latvians.<sup>67</sup> In addition to unskilled Russian-speaking immigrants, thousands of Red Army soldiers and officers were stationed in Riga, designated the headquarters of the Baltic Military District.<sup>68</sup> By the beginning of 1989, the percentage of ethnic Russians residing in Latvia had risen to 34 percent, more than tripling pre-war levels of 10.5 percent;<sup>69</sup> at the same time, ethnic Latvians had fallen to just 52 percent of the population.<sup>70</sup> Despite Lenin's stated distaste for chauvinistic Russian nationalism,<sup>71</sup> Latvians were subject to a number of Russification policies under the guise of "internationalism": the declaration of Russian as the official language, the proliferation of officially sanctioned Russian cultural events, and the censorship (enforced by strict criminal penalties) of the expression of Latvian culture in cultural and academic fields alike.<sup>72</sup> For Latvians, the end of the nightmare in 1991 could not have come sooner.

### 2.3.2. The hijacking of the "national threat"

Outside of negationist revisionism and pro-Kremlin propaganda, there is little disagreement among historians in Latvia that an organized conspiracy against the continued existence of the Latvian nation as a distinct entity existed during the Soviet period. The two-pronged Soviet assault of ethnic cleansing and culturally-repressive Russification policies led to the genesis of the narrative of the "national threat"—the emotional weight of which was so potent as to escalate political dialogue, as Brubaker describes, to the level of "hyperbolic and irresponsible...[warnings] of cultural 'extinction', 'annihilation', even 'genocide'".<sup>73</sup> However, almost immediately after Latvia's achievement of independence, the narrative was repurposed as an ideological tool—as all *good* narratives tend to be—and used as a pretext for the continued maintenance of *ethnic* over *civic* consciousness in circumstances far beyond its justifiable context.

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<sup>67</sup> Terry Martin, "The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing," *Journal of Modern History* 70, no. 4 (1998): 820.

<sup>68</sup> Sigurd Grava, "The Urban Heritage of the Soviet Military Regime," *Journal of the American Planning Association* 59, no. 1 (1993): 9, MasterFILE Premier, EBSCOhost, accessed May 29, 2017.

<sup>69</sup> Henrihs Strods, "Sovietization of Latvia 1994–1991," in *The Hidden And Forbidden History Of Latvia Under Soviet And Nazi Occupations 1940–1991*, ed. Valters Nollendorfs and Erwin Oberländer (Riga: Institute of the History of Latvia, 2005), 219.

<sup>70</sup> Rislakki, *The Case for Latvia*, 44.

<sup>71</sup> Mehmet Oğuzhan Tulun, "Russification Policies Imposed on the Baltic People by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union," *Uluslararası Suçlar ve Tarih* no. 4 (2013): 147.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 149.

<sup>73</sup> W. Rogers Brubaker, "Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States," *International Migration Review* 26, no. 2 (1992): 274.

This is not to suggest that the struggle between civic and ethnic nationalism is new phenomenon; rather, it has existed in Latvia at least since the country's experience as a multinational state within the Russian Empire. Germane cites the writings of Latvia's first Social Democratic prime minister, Mārgers Skuejeneeks, who wrote of the distinction between two types of nationalism: the aggressive nationalism of the bourgeoisie, which sought to dominate through jingoism, imperialism and cultural chauvinism—and the nationalism of the oppressed working classes, who struggled for basic linguistic and cultural rights.<sup>74</sup> He cautioned that one form of nationalism could easily metastasize into the other given the correct political and economic circumstances (certainly, the fall of Communism would suffice as a condition). Skuejeneeks cautioned with some foresight in 1913 that “once the goal of ensuring basic linguistic and political rights is achieved, the cultural nationalism of the national proletariat could be hijacked by power-hungry members in order to satisfy their own ambition of gaining advantage over other ethnic groups”, a phenomenon which he had already detected in the Latvian nationalist movement.<sup>75</sup> His reservations were vindicated just twenty years later when the Latvian Social Democratic Worker's Party—the country's last defenders of civic nationalism—were banned as a result of a coup d'état by his successor, the prime-minister-turned-dictator Kārlis Ulmanis (a frequent user of the slogan “Latvia for Latvians”).<sup>76</sup>

Considering the resumption of the 1930's-style ethno-politics in the democratic discourse of post-independence Latvia, a reader of Skuejeneeks' writings on the dangers of the cynical exploitation of nationalism could be excused for believing the author wrote in the twenty-first century. According to Zepa and Šūpule,

[Latvian] political parties continue to engage in political confrontation over ethnic policy, hindering social integration instead of promoting it, thereby enhancing ethnic tensions in society. Representatives of the political elite continue to exploit ethnicity to mobilize supporters in their elections, thereby acting as a key catalyst of ethnic tensions.”<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Marina Germane, “Civic or Ethnic Nation? Two Competing Concepts in Interwar Latvia,” *Nations and Nationalism* 18, no. 3 (2012): 447, accessed May 29, 2017, doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00533.x.

<sup>75</sup> Mārgers Skuejeneeks, *Latvija. Zeme un Eedzīvotāji* (Riga: A. Gulbis, 1922), quoted in Marina Germane, “Civic or Ethnic Nation? Two Competing Concepts in Interwar Latvia,” *Nations and Nationalism* 18, no. 3 (2012): 448, accessed May 29, 2017, doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00533.x

<sup>76</sup> Deniss Hanovs and Valdis Tēraudkalns, “Happy Birthday, Mr. Ulmanis!,” *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 15, no.1 (2014): 69.

<sup>77</sup> Brigita Zepa and Inese Šūpule, “Ethnopolitical Tension in Latvia: Factors Facilitating and Impeding Ethnic Accord,” in *Latvian-Russian Relations: Domestic and International Dimensions*, ed. Nils Muižnieks (Riga: University of Latvia, 2006): 37.

In one sense, the electoral choices presented to Latvian voters are simple and black-and-white: political campaigns are generally based around either a pledge to protect the linguistic and cultural interests of the Latvian ethnos from Russia, which poses a present danger to the nation (e.g., Latvia from the Heart, Union of Greens and Farmers [ZZS], The National Alliance, Unity, or the newly-formed populist KPV LV), or a pledge to protect the linguistic and cultural rights of the Russian-speaking minority from oppression by Latvian ethno-nationalists (Social Democratic Party “Harmony”).<sup>78</sup> In another sense, every choice is a similar shade of grey: Latvia’s parliamentary democracy is unique among post-Soviet and Western European democracies alike in its complete lack of left-wing or center-left representation in the Latvian government since 1991.<sup>79</sup> Despite the Harmony party’s branding and self-presentation as a “social democratic” party, it exhibits many tendencies characteristic to the traditional domain of right-wing politics: opposition to immigration and refugee rights,<sup>80</sup> support for the Russian Orthodox Church<sup>81</sup> and social conservatism (including but not limited to opposition to gay rights).<sup>82</sup> Mole argues that the tendency of Latvian political parties to represent two sides of the same coin has led to “a democratic paradox” in which parties agree on the basis of real policy but have fundamental, intractable (though ultimately, constructed) identity-based differences:

The confrontation between different political positions is replaced by confrontation between ‘essentialist forms of identification (Latvian-ness) and non-negotiable moral values’. In other words, in Latvia the battle between right and left has been replaced by the battle between right and wrong.<sup>83</sup>

Ethnicities, minorities, classes, interest groups and activists that do not fit into either the camp of Latvian ethno-cultural identity or Russian linguistic identity (e.g., LGBTQ individuals, Muslims, union members, secularists, etc.) have no clear place in the country’s

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<sup>78</sup> Tom Lansford, *Political Handbook of the World 2014* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2014): 808.

<sup>79</sup> Mole, “Nationality,” 547.

<sup>80</sup> “The issue has created an unusual degree of political unity. The opposition Harmony Center, widely perceived as a party of Russian-speakers, helping the nationalists to push through a law stripping the government of the right to accept more refugees without putting it to a parliamentary vote in future.” Leonid Ragozin, “Latvians Find Unity in Rejecting Refugees,” *Politico*, September 25, 2015, accessed May 29, 2017, <http://www.politico.eu/article/latvia-migration-asylum-crisis-baltics-eu/>.

<sup>81</sup> Valdis Teraudkalns, “Religion and Politics in Latvia at the Beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” *Religion in Eastern Europe* 31, no. 2 (2011): 14. *Academic Search Complete*, EBSCOhost, accessed May 29, 2017.

<sup>82</sup> “Latvian Parliament Committee Strikes Blow For Gay Rights,” *The Baltic Times*, September 12, 2006, accessed May 29, 2017, <http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/16311/>

<sup>83</sup> Mole, “Nationality,” 547.

essentialist trench warfare, and as a result have no real political advocates in the Latvian parliament.<sup>84</sup>

The Latvian population as a whole has expressed deep dissatisfaction with these political developments (to see how these attitudes have changed over time since 2004, consult appendix 2). According to the Standard Eurobarometer survey of public opinion, distrust of the Saeima (Latvia's parliament) has never dipped below 71 percent since 2004, while distrust in Latvian political parties has never dropped below an astonishing 85 percent in the same period—both indices have been consistently higher than the EU average.<sup>85</sup>

According to Masso et al., “one of the factors contributing to the large drop in the levels of political trust”<sup>86</sup> is the level of economic inequality in the country, which is among the highest in the EU. Latvia is unique among the Baltic states in that it has experienced a continuous increase in income inequality since 1991 (the Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality, remained generally stable in Lithuania between 1993 and 2004, and has decreased continuously in Estonia since 1993).<sup>87</sup> All former Soviet republics experienced economic shocks in their transition to market economies, but many of the economic hardships faced by the Latvian people today two decades after independence are more directly the result of supply-side economic policies dictated by a cadre of “ultra-liberalistic politicians and economists”—flat tax rates, anemic social spending, low wage growth and weak unions.<sup>88</sup> As a consequence of the concentration of the country's ideology around the center-right, Latvians (especially ethnic Latvians) have no real electoral means by which to proclaim any specific socioeconomic mandate or deliver themselves from the actual “national threat”: the dire economic situation of the working classes. According to Rodin, the Latvian public is acutely aware of this: the two most common reasons cited for ethnic conflict in Latvia have nothing to do with language, culture or references to the specter of Putin, but rather “political and economic inequality” and “the economic crisis”.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> “In countries where ethnicities have been polarized (Estonia, Latvia...), minorities have either been excluded from politics or have formed important ethnic parties.” Zoltan D. Barany and Robert G. Moser, eds., *Ethnic Politics After Communism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005): 8.

<sup>85</sup> European Commission, “Public Opinion,” accessed May 29, 2017, <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm>

<sup>86</sup> Jaan Masso et al., “GINI Country Report: Growing Inequalities and their Impacts in the Baltic States Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,” 3, accessed May 26, 2017, [http://archive.uva-aias.net/uploaded\\_files/publications/Baltics.pdf](http://archive.uva-aias.net/uploaded_files/publications/Baltics.pdf)

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>88</sup> Rislakki, *The Case for Latvia*, 206.

<sup>89</sup> Mihail Rodin, “Ethno-Political Conflicts and National Identity in Latvia. Attachment to the Report,” OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, September 30, 2013, accessed May 27, 2017 <http://www.osce.org/odihr/106116>

Since the gaining of independence, Latvians have the constitutional right to interact with the state and be educated in Latvian, which is the sole official language of the state. They also have the right to freely express their ideas and their culture. Moreover, while the share of the population represented by ethnic Latvians has not reached interwar levels of 75–77 percent,<sup>90</sup> statistical data is simply not supportive of the notion that any ethnicity constitutes a threat to the Latvians’ status as the proportional majority ethnic group in their country: in fact, the percentage of the Latvian population reporting their ethnicity as Latvian has increased in every census since 1989, while the percentage of individuals reporting their ethnicity as Russian or Belarussian has consistently declined over this same period (see table 2.1). While demographics *do* threaten the Latvian nation, it is doubtful that the stoking of inter-ethnic conflict will have any effect on actual demographic issues like birth rates or economic emigration.

**Table 2.1 Ethnic composition of Latvian population in percent, 1989–2014**

	1989	2000	2011	2014
Latvians	52.0	57.7	60.5	61.4
Russians	34.0	29.6	26.8	26.0
Belarussians	4.5	4.1	3.6	3.4
Poles	2.3	2.5	2.3	2.2
Other/Unspecified	3.7	3.4	4.4	4.7

*Source:* Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, “Latvia 2015: Statistics in Brief,” Riga: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (2015): 9.

Ethnic relations in the real world have also improved considerably since Latvian independence. According to Tabuns, Latvians and non-Latvians alike rate their relations with other groups as friendly, and inter-ethnic violence has always been exceedingly rare.<sup>91</sup> Highly politicized points of ethno-political contention such as the issue of Russian-speaking non-citizens in the country are solving themselves passively—retirees with Soviet passports continue to die off. Moreover, an increasing number of individuals too young to have their political identity shaped by direct experience of the Soviet occupation are entering the national electorate. Taking all of these factors into consideration, it would seem as driving a

<sup>90</sup> Rislakki, *The Case for Latvia*, 42.

<sup>91</sup> Aivars Tabuns, “Attitudes Towards the State and Latvian Foreign Policy,” in *Latvian-Russian Relations: Domestic and International Dimensions*, ed. Nils Muižnieks (Riga: University of Latvia, 2006): 22.

wedge between Latvians and the Russian-speaking population will become increasingly less powerful a political device in the decades ahead. This does not mean, however, that the Latvian power elite have reconsidered the usefulness of post-Soviet cynicism—rather, they simply have begun to adapt their existing, familiar and effective ideological narrative to fears conveniently generated elsewhere in Europe, ultimately creating the “National Threat 2.0”: Muslim immigrants. Starting strong with an impressive display of virtue signaling, the Latvian parliament has moved to ban the *niqab*, a face covering worn by *virtually no one* in the country.<sup>92</sup> The repercussions of this trend are patently clear:

Politicians must be willing to lead public opinion... If politicians of any party play to anti-immigrant sentiment, then there is little hope of turning European publics towards immigration... Public suspicion can be quickly transformed into loud, ugly opposition if a politician or party lends its support. This is true everywhere in Europe.<sup>93</sup>

The degradation of Latvian public opinion will be revisited in chapter four.

### 2.3.3. Latvia’s Muslims

The Soviet population transfers resulted in the first migrations of Muslims to Latvia since Tatar troops in the Russian Imperial army were garrisoned in the country in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. A Muslim subset of the Russian-speaking population from other Soviet republics—including Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Armenia and Georgia—formed the basis of the renewed faith community.<sup>94</sup> The last Soviet census conducted in 1989 listed approximately 12,000 persons of Muslim background residing in Latvia,<sup>95</sup> though the vast majority of these Soviet citizens re-emigrated elsewhere after the collapse of the country. As of the end of 2015, 16 Muslim congregations are registered within the country.<sup>96</sup> Estimates

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<sup>92</sup> Anita Stasulane, “Islamophobia in Latvia: National Report 2016” in *European Islamophobia Report 2016*, ed. Enes Bayrakli and Farid Hafez, (Istanbul: Turkuvaz Haberleşme ve Yayıncılık A.Ş., 2017), 334.

<sup>93</sup> Randall Hansen, “Migration to Europe Since 1945: Its History and Its Lessons,” *The Political Quarterly* 74, no. 1 (2003): 32

<sup>94</sup> Norris, *Islam*, 98.

<sup>95</sup> Valters Ščerbinskis, “Latvia,” in *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Volume 6*, eds. Jørgen Nielsen, Samim Akgönül, Ahmet Alibašić and Egdunas Raciūnas (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 364.

<sup>96</sup> Central Statistics Bureau of Latvia, “PRG13. Registered Religious Congregations by Denomination at the End of Year,” accessed May 29, 2017, [http://data.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/en/visp/visp\\_\\_ikgad\\_\\_politika/PR0130.px/table/tableViewLayout2/?rxid=a79839fe-11ba-4ecd-8cc3-4035692c5fc8](http://data.csb.gov.lv/pxweb/en/visp/visp__ikgad__politika/PR0130.px/table/tableViewLayout2/?rxid=a79839fe-11ba-4ecd-8cc3-4035692c5fc8).

vary of the exact size of the community, but usually fall between 2,000<sup>97</sup> and 6,500<sup>98</sup> individuals.

There are a few important distinctions to be made between the Muslim community established by population transfer in Latvia and those established in postwar Western Europe and the Nordic countries through guest worker programs and asylum policies. Firstly, the Muslim community in Latvia until very recently has been treated as a subset of the Russian-speaking immigrant community and a vestige of the Soviet period—they are defined thus as “Soviet immigrant” first and “Muslim” second. Secondly, the postwar Soviet population transfers responsible for the presence of the Soviet Muslim community—ordered unilaterally by Stalin—are considered by the Latvian government and intergovernmental organizations to have been an action of an illegal occupation (indeed Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits an occupying power from deporting or transferring “parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies”),<sup>99</sup> creating the same persisting questions of citizenship, legal status and discourse of being “uninvited guests” that surrounds Latvia’s Russian-speaking Soviet immigrants (but does not apply at all to Western Europe’s guest workers or naturalized immigrants, the majority of whom entered their countries of settlement legally with the consent of governments in legal continuity with the ones existing today). Thirdly, in contrast to Muslim communities elsewhere in Europe, the shared experience of the Latvian Muslim community under Soviet state atheism has led to an increased emphasis on ethno-cultural identities over Islamic identity.<sup>100</sup>

#### 2.3.4. Refugees since 2015

According to the Latvian Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs, Latvia is to receive 531 asylum seekers under the European Commission’s Migration Program (which the country voted in favor of)<sup>101</sup> in the period between July 2015 and July 2017, around half of whom will be relocated from Italy and Greece. Most of these refugees are of Syrians, Eritrean

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<sup>97</sup> Pew Research Center, “Mapping The Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Population,” October 2009, accessed May 27, 2017, 31, <http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population/>

<sup>98</sup> Houssain Kettani, “World Muslim Population.”

<sup>99</sup> International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention),” August 12, 1949, Article 49.

<sup>100</sup> Norris, *Islam*, 99.

<sup>101</sup> Ragozin, “Latvians Find Unity in Rejecting Refugees.”

or Iraqi origin.<sup>102</sup> In combination with estimates of the percentage of Muslims among the populations of the top three countries of origin (Syria—92%, Iraq—99%, Eritrea—36.5%),<sup>103</sup> it can be assumed that refugee quota scheme will double Latvia's refugee population,<sup>104</sup> and grow the Latvian Muslim community by a factor of around one-fifth. However, the total Muslim population will still not exceed even one third of one percent of the country's population of 1,944,200<sup>105</sup> in 2016 (consult appendix 1 to compare the growth of Muslim populations in the Nordic-Baltic region from 1950–2010 and refugee resettlement statistics since 2015). According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Latvia ranks 128<sup>th</sup> in the world in the number of refugees adjusted for GDP per capita, as well as for the number of refugees per square kilometer of territory. Similar to Estonia, Latvia had around 0.1 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants in 2015. This is 3.9 times fewer than the figure for Lithuania, 91.4 times fewer than in Norway, and 146.6 fewer than Sweden, the country with the most refugees in the Nordic-Baltic region.<sup>106</sup> The country received 157 new asylum applications in the first three months of 2017, which is a marked increase over the same period in 2016; however, it is unclear how many of these will be accepted, or if this trend will continue. Overall, both the number of refugees and the number of Muslims in the country is certainly no cause for hysterics.

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<sup>102</sup> Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs, "Receipt Of Asylum Seekers In Latvia: Frequently Asked Questions And Answers," accessed May 29, 2017, <http://www.pmlp.gov.lv/en/home/services/asylum-seeking/receipt-of-asylum-seekers-in-latvia-frequently-asked-questions-and-answers.html>

<sup>103</sup> Pew, "Mapping The Global Muslim Population," 17, 30.

<sup>104</sup> "531, more than twice the number it has accepted since the restoration of independence in 1991." Ragozin, "Latvians Find Unity in Rejecting Refugees."

<sup>105</sup> Central Statistics Bureau of Latvia, "IE01. Population."

<sup>106</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Mid-Year Trends, June 2015*, accessed May 26, 2017, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocAttachment.zip?COMID=57695b494>.

### 3. Discourse, Media and Terror

#### 3.1. The role of the press

In an age of instant information, it is impossible to discuss the formation of public opinion on any issue without discussing the powerful position of the media to shape public discourse. Journalists do not merely document and recount objective facts and events, but construct a common framework of reality, “setting the agenda” for the public. To quote McCombs: “for nearly all of the concerns on the public agenda, citizens deal with a second-hand reality, a reality that is structured by journalists’ reports about these events and situations.”<sup>107</sup> This is especially true when discussing public attitudes towards Muslim immigrants in Northern Europe, thousands of miles from the Middle East.

As Stasulane notes, “since local TV channels and news agencies rarely send their reporters to the ‘hot spots’, the information [consists] of republished news provided by Western information agencies.”<sup>108</sup> In the Western press—often translated and passed on to local audiences in the small countries of the North—refugees are often referred to in dehumanizing terms used more often for insects, plagues and natural disasters—a tidal wave<sup>109</sup>, a swarm<sup>110</sup>, a flood<sup>111</sup>, etc. Crowds of hundreds or thousands of Muslims inundate the barricades of Europe in re-aired footage, described in cold, statistical language. While it is easy from these terms to get a sense of the seriousness and scope of the crisis, it is easy to forget individual humanities along the way. Deaths from boat collapses in the Mediterranean are reported like a scrolling news ticker of football score—individual names and faces are withheld. *There are simply too many for any one of them to be important or remembered.* As Said writes,

In newsreels or newsphotos, the Arab is always shown in large numbers. No individuality, no personal characteristics or experiences. Most of the pictures represent mass rage and misery, or irrational (hence hopelessly eccentric) gestures.

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<sup>107</sup> Maxwell McCombs, *Setting the Agenda: The Mass Media and Public Opinion* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 1.

<sup>108</sup> Stasulane, “Islamophobia in Latvia,” 331.

<sup>109</sup> Bruno Waterfield, “Regime’s Collapse Could Create ‘Tidal Wave’ of Refugees,” *The Telegraph*, February 22, 2011, accessed April 1, 2017, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8339945/Regimes-collapse-could-create-tidal-wave-of-refugees.html>

<sup>110</sup> BBC, “David Cameron Criticized Over Migrant ‘Swarm’ Language,” *BBC*, July 30, accessed April 1, 2017 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-33716501>

<sup>111</sup> Mladen Grgic, “Why the Flood of Refugees Will Not Stop No Matter What Happens in Syria,” *The Huffington Post*, March 4, 2016, accessed April 1, 2017, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mladen-grgic/why-the-flood-of-refugees\\_b\\_9358866.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mladen-grgic/why-the-flood-of-refugees_b_9358866.html)

Lurking behind all of these images is the menace of jihad. Consequence: a fear that the Muslims (or Arabs) will take over the world.”<sup>112</sup>

Local journalists, then, with their own prejudices, social backgrounds and particular understanding of their audience, are tasked with the often-problematic responsibility of managing public relations for a group they neither belong to, nor are equipped to understand.

Given the circumstances, it is at least fortunate that journalists in Norway and Latvia enjoy safety and a high level of editorial freedom: Norway, in fact, topped the rankings in the 2017 World Press Freedom Index.<sup>113</sup> Latvia scored comparatively lower, coming in twenty-eighth place, but this must be put into perspective: the United Kingdom and the United States were ranked fortieth and forty-third.<sup>114</sup> Latvian-language journalism in the country was specifically praised for its editorial independence; the country’s lower score in comparison to its preceding countries was mostly attributed to the quality of its Russian-language journalism, which was criticized as being rife with pro-Kremlin propaganda and disinformation.<sup>115</sup> (The ethnic polarization of news sources is both acute and problematic in the country: according to Rislakki, “fifty-two percent of non-Latvians say they watch news broadcasts and political programs on Russian television almost every day, while only a minority watches such programs in Latvia on TV.”)<sup>116</sup> Specific analysis of Russian-language media is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, in general, Latvia’s Russian-language media can be characterized by a tendency towards distorted and frightening portrayals of Muslims and refugees, often evoking crime, terrorism and rape. This rare alignment of interests between pro-Kremlin forces on one hand, and Latvian ethno-nationalists on the other, can be inferred to be a coincidence of Russia’s acute desire to drive any available wedge between its former satellite states and the European Union and Latvians’ desire for sovereignty. However, as the next subchapter will explore, even lofty intentions to inform and educate can be unintentionally and sub-textually distorted by ideological undertones.

### **3.2. The personal refugee narrative**

Professional journalists are uniquely aware of their responsibility as the gatekeepers of public discourse. If the only way to educate a public conditioned to fear outsiders is to

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<sup>112</sup> Said, *Orientalism*, 287.

<sup>113</sup> Reporters Without Borders, “Norway,” accessed May 20, 2017, <https://rsf.org/en/Latvia>

<sup>114</sup> Reporters Without Borders, “United Kingdom,” accessed May 20, 2017, <https://rsf.org/en/united-kingdom>; Reporters Without Borders, “United States,” accessed May 20, 2017, <https://rsf.org/en/united-states>

<sup>115</sup> Reporters Without Borders, “Latvia,” accessed May 20, 2017, <https://rsf.org/en/Latvia>.

<sup>116</sup> Rislakki, *The Case for Latvia*, 51.

simulate the social connections we are wired to seek, then the journalist's antidote to callous dehumanization of the refugee is the publishing of the *personal refugee narrative*. The personal refugee narrative is often short in length, easily digestible, and based on an excerpted interview with an individual or family of refugees, referenced on a first-name basis in the text. Geopolitical events and the horrors of war and instability are ignored, if only for a moment. Noble attempts by local journalists to paint relatable pictures of real human beings are occasionally rather unfortunately bungled (such as the rather ironic use of exactly the same refugee stock photo to accompany personal narrative pieces on two different people in two of the articles later investigated),<sup>117</sup> but are sincere nonetheless in their intention to counter the negative quality of the narratives that remain in their absence.

However, a critical distinction must be made that personal narratives, while perhaps satisfactorily simulating a familiarizing conversational experience with a real person, are nonetheless themselves products of their own context—one further step removed in subjectivity from that of their subjects. A lack of awareness of this context—the preconceptions held by the author about their subjects and their readers alike—can dilute the power of the narrative as an avenue for empowerment of the disempowered and humanization of the dehumanized.

However, Beach notes that for a narrative to be considered “good”, it must be plausible and coherent, “in that everything is neatly encompassed by the narrative, leaving few or no loose ends.”<sup>118</sup> Of course, real people's lives are not so neatly packaged into moral and inanimate forces, and we run into successive layers of subjectivity the further away we get from the notion of “direct experience” (assuming such a thing exists).

Using six articles from the Latvian media as examples, the remainder of this subchapter will attempt to use personal refugee pieces intended for popular consumption as illustrations of this phenomenon. Four articles were selected from four popular private news

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<sup>117</sup> Anna Kalēja, “Bēglis no Irākas: mēs neesam Latvijā naudas dēļ,” *Vesti.lv*, May 27, 2016, accessed April 1, 2017, <http://lat.vesti.lv/news/17131>; Anna Kalēja, “Bēglis Latvijā sapņo par darbu bankā,” *Vesti.lv*, July 18, 2016, accessed April 1, 2017, <http://lat.vesti.lv/news/19173>

<sup>118</sup> Lee Roy Beach, *Narrative Thinking and Decision Making: How the Stories We Tell Ourselves Shape Our Decisions, and Vice Versa* (2009): 23, accessed May 31, 2017, <http://leeroybeach.com/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/manuscript.pdf>.

sources: *Vesti*,<sup>119</sup> *Kas Jauns*,<sup>120</sup> and *Delfi*;<sup>121</sup> and two were selected from LSM,<sup>122</sup> the Latvian Public Broadcasting Service. The six articles consist of 4,205 words in total, and were found by searching for “bēgļu stāsts Latvijā 2016” (“*refugee story in Latvia*”) in a search engine of online news. Articles in the Latvian language were deliberately chosen as to have an easily identifiable target audience of the relatively homogenous Latvian language community. The articles were coded and analyzed using the principles of critical discourse analysis outlined by van Dijk,<sup>123</sup> Fairclough<sup>124</sup> and Baxter<sup>125</sup> in order to identify embedded Islamophobic narratives: threads of discourse, in this case, that run counter to their author’s intent, inadvertently confirming stereotypes while attempting to discredit them.

After applying critical discourse analysis, three overarching and related themes emerged: the “*positive*” narrative, the “*exceptionalist*” narrative, and the “*cultural compatibility*” narrative. Behrman’s criticism of the refugee narratives of in modern fiction is also consulted and referenced,<sup>126</sup> based on the assumption that a journalist’s determination of what is worth including or emphasizing in a short biographical piece—with inherent political implications and targeted to a particular national audience—is sufficiently fictionalizing for literary narrative criticism to apply without significant modification.

The first narrative thread to emerge is the narrative of positivity. The first epithet given to a female refugee was the phrase “smiling mother of three”; the use of the adjective “smiling” as well as the use of the diminutive form *māmiņa* (“mother”) in favor of the more neutral *māte* are at once informal, familiar and non-threatening. The attitudes and emotions of refugees towards their new home country are overwhelmingly described in positive terms. The same woman was quoted as saying that she did not know what to wish for because

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<sup>119</sup> Kalēja, “Bēgļi no Irākas”; Kalēja, “Bēgļi Latvijā sapņo.”

<sup>120</sup> Alekss Pjats, “Šeit ir klusi un ļoti skaista daba,” sīriešu bēgļu stāsta, kāpēc izvēlējušies tieši Latviju,” *Kas Jauns*, May 2, 2016, accessed April 1, 2017, <http://jauns.lv/raksts/zinas/25301-seit-ir-klusi-un-loti-skaista-daba-siriesu-begli-stasta-kapec-izvelejusies-tiesi-latviju-foto>

<sup>121</sup> “Trīs zēnu bērnība uz jumta jeb Sīriešu bēgļu stāsts no Jordānijas,” *Calis.lv*, October 21, 2015, accessed April 1, 2017, <http://www.delfi.lv/calis/jaunumi/tris-zenu-berniba-uz-jumta-jeb-siriesu-beglu-stasts-no-jordanijas.d?id=46616909>

<sup>122</sup> Vita Anstrate, “Bēgļu stāsti Latvijā: Irākie Dina – jaunie, kura cer šeit kļūt par inženieri,” *LSM*, July 19, 2016, accessed April 1, 2017, <http://www.lsm.lv/lv/raksts/cilvekstasti/dzive/beglu-stasti-latvija-irakiete-dina-jauniete-kura-cer-seit-klut-par-inzenieri.a192557/>; Vita Anstrate, “Bēgļu stāsti Latvijā: Sīriete Bunana Latvijā var justies droši par saviem trīs bērniem,” *LSM*, July 21, 2016, accessed April 1, 2017, <http://www.lsm.lv/lv/raksts/latvija/zinas/beglu-stasti-latvija-siriete-bunana-latvija-var-justies-drosi-par-saviem-tris-berniem.a192901>

<sup>123</sup> Teun A. van Dijk, *Discourse and Power* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008).

<sup>124</sup> Norman Fairclough. *Language and Power* (Harlow: Longman, 2001).

<sup>125</sup> Judith Baxter, “Discourse-Analytic Approaches to Text and Talk” in *Research Methods in Linguistics*, ed. L. Litosseliti (London: Continuum, 2010).

<sup>126</sup> Simon Behrman, “Between Law and the Nation State: Novel Representations of the Refugee,” *Refuge* 32, no. 1 (2016): 38–42.

“everything [in Latvia] is great”, wishing only for the “desire to appreciate it more”. Other refugees praise the quiet and natural beauty of the country, with no criticism of the post-asylum experience. While this narrative is the weakest of the three established by the analysis of the corpus in terms of implication, it does offer a reflection of Latvian society based on the narratives that the authors attempt to counter: the authors believe their society to be too quick to complain about their own circumstances, and believe that their society stereotypes refugees as young, threatening, single men.

The second narrative present is the most pervasive: notions of the exceptionalism of the subject, supportive of an assumption that sees the counterexample as the best antidote to negative stereotyping. The author discredits negative narratives that he/she believes the target audience to hold by emphasizing a narrative of their subject that runs counter to these narratives. Unfortunately, the exceptionalist narrative creates two problems: by implying that their refugee’s positive characteristics are exceptional, the author indirectly reinforces the very negative stereotypes that they are attempting to discredit; by romanticizing the subject, the author creates an implausible caricature, working against one of the main aims of the personal narrative—to humanize the subject.

The headline of one article emphasizes the fact that the refugees have not come “for money”, but to “live in security and peace”. The fact that the author believes a desire on the part of their particular refugee to live in peace is noteworthy is *itself* noteworthy. This headline seems to imply that many others—just not this particular case—are in it for the money, i.e. the “economic migrant” narrative. It is doubtful that the author consciously believes or was trying to make the case that other refugees are opportunistic fortune-seekers (in fact, likely the opposite); however, the assumptions that are made about the prejudices of the target audience provide insight into the author’s social context.

In another article, an author writes, “Karzan stands out from other asylum seekers with his height and relatively liberal attitude towards religion”. While the point is attempting to be made that not all refugees or asylum seekers are necessarily fundamentalist—countering the negative “Islamist refugee” narrative—similarly to the other example, it also reinforces the narrative that it *is* typical of refugees to be religious fundamentalists; otherwise, Karzan would not stand out.

Behrman criticizes the exceptional narrative used in the novel *Refugee Boy*<sup>127</sup> for its blameless and romanticized main character, driving the implicit narrative that only worthy

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<sup>127</sup> Benjamin Zephaniah, *Refugee Boy* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2001).

refugees deserve empathy and rights, making the case that “the romanticized figure of the literary exile ends up denying, albeit in positive terms, a genuine refugee voice, as much as the current impersonal hegemonic concept of the refugee as found in law”.<sup>128</sup> The same criticism can be applied to the fictionalized versions of the *smiling* mother, the refugee who is *not in it for the money*, or the *comparatively liberal* Karzan: do their stories require a sympathetic and simplified retelling for them to be deserving of peace?

The final narrative to be discussed within the boundaries of this subchapter is the notion of “cultural compatibility” and assimilation. The first thread of this narrative to be examined is the onus of responsibility for assimilation. Refugees in all the articles were largely described in passive terms, using verbs like “hoping”, “dreaming” and “waiting”; however, when it comes to assimilation, they suddenly take an active role: “These refugees have all the necessary tools to live and thrive in Latvia. For others without language skills or without motivation...it will be a different story”. This narrative ignores any part of the local society to work to accept and integrate refugees, indicating that the author places responsibility for their success squarely at their own feet. This is an interesting contrast from the positive narrative describing an ideal version of the country where everything “is great”; there must be some work to be done.

But perhaps the most characteristic was the narrative embedded in the following quote: “even though [he] is a Muslim, he is ready to accept Latvian traditions and culture.” This assumes that Latvian culture and Muslim culture are incompatible—that there is some sort of paradox inherent in an existence as a Muslim in Latvia. It also seems to establish some religions as being more “Latvian”; which these could be is unclear. Could it be Latvian paganism, due to the invocation of Latvian “traditions”, Christianity or European humanistic secularism? Other narratives emphasize instances in which refugees speak Latvian rather than English, or play up participation in folk dancing and weaving flower crowns—a narrative that conflates Latvian ethnicity with Latvian residency, and denies the existence of parallel cultural narratives in the country at large.

Journalists are certainly not to blame for attempting to bring some humanity to highly convoluted problems such as the refugee crisis via the employment of easily digestible narratives. However, we must simply be aware of the fact these narratives are not accurate evidence upon which to base judgment, whether positive or negative. Narratives *can* be a good way to familiarize ourselves with an unfamiliar group, but precautions must be taken to

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<sup>128</sup> Behrman, “Between Law and the Nation State,” 38.

consider narratives as a product of their authorship, and as fragmentary reflections targeted to a specific group for a specific purpose.

### 3.3. Taking the bait

Though some journalists identify with a responsibility to inform, most media companies are private businesses *primarily interested in profit*—motivating an unfortunate trend towards irresponsible sensationalism when it comes to sensitive and emotionally charged topics. As Stasulane notes, “Although the views expressed by the Latvian media [are] not manifestly Islamophobic as a whole, their efforts to increase revenues by attracting the maximum audience prevailed: the press tended to attract readers by means of flashy and scandalous headlines that were abusive towards Muslims.”<sup>129</sup> The general tendency towards tabloidism makes a significant—even if passive—contribution to the fomentation of anti-Muslim bias by lowering the bar for what is considered constructive, newsworthy discourse.

A number of far-right groups in both Latvia and Norway have begun to organize political activities and demonstrations since the beginning of the refugee crisis. Groups such as Tēvijas Sargi (‘The Guards of the Fatherland’), Taisnīgums (‘Justice’) and Antiglobālisti (‘Anti-Globalists’) have staged highly publicized protest actions against the European Commission’s refugee resettlement scheme in Latvia, and groups such as the Norwegian Defence League (NDL) and Stop the Islamization of Norway (SIAN) have taken to the streets in a similar fashion to Germany’s far-right PEGIDA movement.<sup>130</sup> Religion is often a proxy for race for many of these groups, (e.g., picket signs advocating for the racial purity of Latvia stand alongside threats to send female Latvian politicians to Cologne to be raped by “the blacks”).<sup>131</sup> The Latvian National Front, a group that started as a nationalist group targeting Russian-speaking Soviet migrants, has switched the focus of its propaganda efforts to Muslims, whom they see as a more serious threat. Stasulane notes that these groups so far lack the financial resources for large-scale organization, remaining scattered and loosely organized; however, this does not prevent these groups from taking advantage of local media more than willing to give them free press.

Discriminatory personalities have also taken advantage of the media’s willingness to be repeatedly baited with deliberate controversy for self-serving promotional ends. There is

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<sup>129</sup> Stasulane, “Islamophobia in Latvia,” 324.

<sup>130</sup> Sindre Bangstad, “Islamophobia in Norway: National Report 2015,” in *European Islamophobia Report 2015*, ed. Enes Bayrakli and Farid Hafez (Istanbul: Turkuvaz Haberleşme ve Yayıncılık A.Ş., 2016), 406.

<sup>131</sup> Stasulane, “Islamophobia in Latvia”, 339.

little intention on the part of either journalists or interviewees in this case to engage in any real dialogue—characteristic statements are either unverifiable, uncontestable generalizations—biased presumptions at best, racist abuse at worst—usually published without disclaimers or editorial commentary. While merely publishing statements does not constitute an endorsement of their content, continuously confusing the provocation of thought with mere provocation is an abandonment of the principles of journalistic integrity.

Leons Taivāns, a professor of Asian Studies at the University of Latvia, has baited a significant amount of national media attention with his openly Islamophobic ideology and adherence to the notion of the “clash of civilizations”. His status as a professor has afforded him a soapbox as a local *expert of the Orient*—however, the products of his recent interactions with the media are indicative of a preference for polemics and universal declarations over anything resembling scholarly argumentation. A quick sampling of headlines featuring the professor reads like the rantings of a street preacher: “What Is Happening Now With European Civilization is Suicide”,<sup>132</sup> “Daesh’s Vision—Caliphate in Europe; The Formation of a Muslim Community Is a Threat to Latvia”,<sup>133</sup> “Everything Shows That Europe is Through!”,<sup>134</sup> “If an Immigrant Community is Formed In Latvia, Be Prepared for a Terrorist Attack”.<sup>135</sup>

Taivāns’ arguments are characteristic of all of the traits differentiating Islamophobia from simple criticism of Muslims or Islam:

Islamophobia is about a dominant group of people aiming at seizing, stabilising and widening their power by means of defining a scapegoat – real or invented – and excluding this scapegoat from the resources/rights/definition of a constructed ‘we’. Islamophobia operates by constructing a static ‘Muslim’ identity, which is attributed in negative terms and generalised for all Muslims. At the same time, Islamophobic images are fluid and vary in different contexts as Islamophobia tells us more about the Islamophobe than it tells us about the Muslims/Islam.<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> Elīna Lāce, “Leons Taivāns: ‘Tas, kas pašlaik notiek ar Eiropas civilizāciju, ir pašnāvība,’” *Talsu Vestis*, January 2, 2017, accessed May 21, 2017, <http://www.talsuvestis.lv/lv/zinas/leons-taivans-tas-kas-paslaik-notiek-ar-eiropas-civilizaciju-ir-pasnaviba/>

<sup>133</sup> “Taivāns: ‘Daesh’ vīzija - kalifāts Eiropā; drauds Latvijai - musulmaņu kopienas izveidošanās,” *Delfi*, November 25, 2015, accessed May 21, 2017, <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/taivans-daesh-vizija-kalifats-eiropa-drauds-latvijai-musulmanu-kopienas-izveidosanas.d?id=46759201>

<sup>134</sup> “Profesors Taivāns: ‘Viss norāda, ka ar Eiropu ir cauri!’,” *Apollo*, November 23, 2015, accessed May 29, 2017, <http://apollo.tvnet.lv/zinas/profesors-taivans-viss-norada-ka-ar-eiropu-ir-cauri/712392>

<sup>135</sup> Linda Eltermane, “Taivāns: Ja Latvijā parādīsies imigrantu kopiena, tad esiet gatavi, terorakti būs,” *Vesti.lv*, November 22, 2015, accessed May 31, 2017, <http://lat.vesti.lv/news/taivans-ja-latvija-paradiesies-imigrantu-kopiena-tad-esiet-gatavi-terorakti-bus?7884?7884>

<sup>136</sup> Enes Bayrakli and Farid Hafez, eds., *European Islamophobia Report 2015* (Istanbul: Turkuvaz Haberleşme ve Yayıncılık A.Ş, 2016), 7.

The professor deals only in absolutes, his language couched in use of *us* (a term which is also not extended to include Latvia's Russian-speaking inhabitants) and *them*, usually referring to a nonspecific, caricaturized conflation of Muslims, Arabs, religious extremists and terrorists—interchangeable in his ideologically-based construction of the world. In one interview, he uses high unemployment rates among refugees in other countries—without considering any systematic socioeconomic discrimination—as evidence of the “social parasitism” of Muslim immigrants, a claim similar in form to Julius’ concept of the *economic libel* employed in anti-Semitic discourse, i.e., the charge that “Jews, who are self-interested, acquisitive, and unproductive by nature, financially exploit non-Jews.”<sup>137</sup> Julius explains that anti-Semitic libels tend also to “share the premise that Jews hate or despise non-Jews”; unsurprisingly, Taivāns also claims in the same interview that “they” (Muslims? Arabs? Terrorists?) “deeply hate all that is ours”.<sup>138</sup>

Taivāns’ Islamophobic rhetoric only takes on a specifically Latvian character when he attempts to co-opt ethnic Latvian resentment towards its Russian-speaking populations into the debate over Muslim immigration—claiming that Muslims will choose to integrate with the Russian-speaking population over the ethnic Latvian population, further undermining Latvian national identity. He claims in another interview: “from various sources we hear that the majority of Muslims are peaceful; however, it is the silent and passive majority that does not protest against radicalism. The Soviet Union also consisted of a silent majority.”<sup>139</sup> The absurd subtext of this analogy is an immediately clear dog-whistle to a Latvian reader with the appropriate context: Though they may seem peaceful to the untrained eye, we must not forget that Muslims are collectively responsible for the actions of ISIS or al-Qaeda, much in the same way that *anyone who speaks Russian in Latvia* is collectively responsible for their own—but more importantly—*our* ethnic Latvian suffering during the Soviet occupation. In two parallel sets of insinuated conflations—Muslims with radicals, Russian-speakers with the Soviet government—Taivāns employs a similar kind of logic that is often applied by anti-Semites to Jews, who are, by virtue of being Jewish “responsible for certain evils [anti-Semites] claim the Jews brought about”.<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> Anthony Julius, *Trials of the Diaspora: A History of Anti-Semitism in England* (Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2010), 69.

<sup>138</sup> “Profesors Taivāns: ‘Nav ko cerēt uz saulainu nākotni - Eiropā uzvarēs musulmaņi,’” *Kasjauns.lv*, February 3, 2017, accessed May 18, 2017, <http://jauns.lv/raksts/zinas/31-profesors-taivans-nav-ko-ceret-uz-saulainu-nakotni-eiropa-uzvares-musulmani>

<sup>139</sup> Ģirts Vikmanis, “Leons Taivāns: Bēgļi slietas pievienoties krievvalodīgajiem,” *Latvijas Avīze*, December 9, 2015, accessed May 21, 2017, <http://www.la.lv/begli-slietas-pievienoties-krievvalodigajiem/>

<sup>140</sup> Jan Narveson, “Collective Responsibility,” *Journal of Ethics* 6 (2002): 180, accessed May 21, 2017, doi:10.1023/A:1015823716891.

Examples of Taivāns' sophistry extend far beyond the examples mentioned, but it is clear that in general, the professor continues to promote an outdated and simplistic worldview to Latvian students of history through his institutional work—and to the public at large through his incendiary interviews given to unscrupulous journalists willing to be exploited for money.

Of course, criticizing the ideological bias of one individual in multiple pages as I have done would be trivial to the discussion of such a large and complex issue if not for the fact that Taivāns occupies a position of institutional power in Latvia. Taivāns' continued leadership of his department implies that racist conflation and biased generalizations are tolerated as being within the realm of acceptable discourse in the country, and his authority affords him an air of credibility that journalists and politicians continue to take at face value—repeating his inflammatory comments to sell newspapers or take potshots at a straw enemy. It is perhaps not entirely surprising that Taivāns' ignorance goes unchecked, as the Orientalist discourse he employs—used as an excuse for the consolidation of political power of a group based on a constructed national identity—is convenient to the Latvian power structure. *This is not to suggest that the professor or his ideology should be undemocratically silenced or suppressed*—rather, the best counter to Islamophobic ideology is to publically and thoroughly bring to light its dubious grasp on logic and facts.

If Islamophobic ideology is left unchecked, however, there is some cause for concern. The “clash of civilizations” trope has been used by American neoconservatives and Islamic fundamentalists alike as a pretext for violence (in fact, according to a study of 383 Lebanese Muslims and Christians by Sidanius et al., the belief in the incompatibility of “American” and “Arab” civilization is the best *predictor* of support for fundamentalist violence.)<sup>141</sup> Taivāns' rather fatalistic prediction that Muslims, in the end, will win “the war” is particularly reminiscent of the intellectual rigor of another man, who wrote that “we have lost the democratical [sic] struggle to defend Europe from deliberate cultural annihilation”.<sup>142</sup> Anders Behring Breivik, however, captured the attention of the media by more direct means.

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<sup>141</sup> Jim Sidanius et al., “Support for Asymmetric Violence among Arab Populations: The Clash of Cultures, Social Identity, or Dcounterdominance?,” *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations* 19, no. 3 (2015): 343–359.

<sup>142</sup> Andrew Berwick, *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*, 802, accessed May 18, 2017, [https://fas.org/programs/tap/\\_docs/2083\\_-\\_A\\_European\\_Declaration\\_of\\_Independence.pdf](https://fas.org/programs/tap/_docs/2083_-_A_European_Declaration_of_Independence.pdf)

### 3.4. Far-right terror

On July 22, 2011, Anders Behring Breivik killed 77 people in two separate terror attacks: a bombing of the Norwegian parliament that killed eight, and a shooting spree of 69 young people at a political summer camp on a small island run by the youth wing of the Norwegian Labor Party. While this was not the first terrorist attack motivated by anti-Muslim ideology in Norway (the Ahmadiyya mosque in Frogner was damaged by a dynamite attack carried out by a member of the neo-Nazi National People's Party in 1985, injuring one),<sup>143</sup> it was unprecedented in its brutality and sophistication—eliminating any doubt in Norway and Europe at large that anti-Muslim groups and individuals in Europe could be ignored or dismissed any longer as marginal fringe groups.

As Breivik's attacks unfolded, "terrorism experts" on major Western television news networks such the BBC and Fox News claimed that the attacks bore all the "the hallmarks" of Al Qaeda (a coded reference, above all, to *dead white people*); however, when images of the real perpetrator as a Norwegian right-wing extremist emerged, they were forced to correct their assumptions.<sup>144</sup> It is unclear whether television pundits possessed the self-awareness to realize the irony in their initial assignments of blame—and their own roles in the propagation of the narratives about Islam that radicalized Breivik in the first place. Regardless, a new, brutal reality—the susceptibility of even the most peaceful, prosperous and stable societies to lone-wolf terrorism—was forced upon the world.

It was argued—as it tends to be when a white man commits mass murder—that Breivik must have been mentally ill to carry out the grisly attacks. However, this psychiatric double standard is never applied to terrorists with jihadist motives. *The white man who kills is a "psycho"—the Christian, a pretender—but a Muslim who commits evil is simply doing what his religion compels him to do.* (As Glenn Greenwald wrote of the 2016 Orlando nightclub shooting: "Orlando may be strongest example yet showing how mental illness is ignored as factor when mass shooter is non-white").<sup>145</sup> Though Breivik was found to be insane by an initial psychiatric evaluation, the Norwegian public (and Breivik himself in his defense proceedings) heavily criticized the findings and methodology of the examiners,

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<sup>143</sup> Trond Lepperød, "Han er Norges første muslim," *Nettavisen.no*, accessed May 16, 2017, <http://www.nettavisen.no/nyheter/3517814.html>

<sup>144</sup> Lee Marsden and Heather Savigny, "Religion, media and security," in *The Routledge Handbook of Religion and Security*, ed. Chris Seiple, Dennis R. Hoover and Pauletta Otis (New York: Routledge, 2013): 205.

<sup>145</sup> Glenn Greenwald. Twitter Post. June 13, 2016. <https://twitter.com/ggreenwald/status/742316149438832640>

leading to a second evaluation deeming him fit to stand trial.<sup>146</sup> The final decision of the Norwegian court “interpreted [Breivik’s] far-right views as not psychotic but shared by other people, too”, officially recognizing the killer’s motivation as ideological.<sup>147</sup> Whereas 9/11 trained us to fear foreign bogeymen (al-Qaeda, and now ISIS) living among us undetected, the Norway attacks underscored that Western culture and its institutional racism are also capable of creating monsters. It ultimately makes no difference to a terrorist’s victims whether he *loves* or *hates* Islam.

Breivik stated in a manifesto distributed shortly before the attack (published under the pseudonym Andrew Berwick as *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*)<sup>148</sup> that his hand was forced by a need to bring to attention a plot by Muslims and multiculturalists to conquer Europe.<sup>149</sup> His targets were not Muslims, but Norwegian “traitors”: the Labor party that he believed was responsible for irresponsible immigration policies and the destruction of Norway as an ethnic nation-state.

Of course, the extreme acts of individuals cannot be predicted as deterministic consequences of a particular societal or political conditions, but it is possible that one key ingredient in Breivik’s turn to violence (and a condition that is yet missing in a country such as Latvia) was a reaction to an atmosphere of liberal ideological conformity in Norway that silenced rather than challenged his ideas. Deloy cites the following quote by André Grjebine:

Norway represents a tolerant, consensual model of society. On the other hand however the underlying conformism prevents any other opinion from being heard. It was impossible to foresee the Breivik phenomenon but it is clear that in this country which is reputed for its peaceful tranquillity the tension expressed is all the stronger since it has been repressed for so long.<sup>150</sup>

In Sophie Fiennes’ critically-acclaimed documentary *The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology*, the cultural theorist and psychoanalytic philosopher Slavoj Žižek compares Breivik to the protagonist of the 1976 film *Taxi Driver*, Travis Bickle, who is driven by the corruption he

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<sup>146</sup> Daniel Fisher, “Norway Killer Anders Behring Breivik Trial: Day Eight as it happened,” *The Telegraph*, April 25, 2012, accessed May 30, 2017, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/norway/9225229/Norway-killer-Anders-Behring-Breivik-trial-day-eight-live.html>

<sup>147</sup> Harri Virtanen, “The King of Norway: negative individuation, the hero myth and psychopathic narcissism in extreme violence and the life of Anders Behring Breivik,” *Journal of Analytic Psychology* 58, no. 5 (2013): 671.

<sup>148</sup> Andrew Berwick, *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*, accessed May 18, 2017, [https://fas.org/programs/tap/\\_docs/2083\\_-\\_A\\_European\\_Declaration\\_of\\_Independence.pdf](https://fas.org/programs/tap/_docs/2083_-_A_European_Declaration_of_Independence.pdf)

<sup>149</sup> Aslak Syse, “Breivik – The Norwegian Terrorist Case,” *Behav. Sci. Law* 32 (2014): 389–391.

<sup>150</sup> Corinne Deloy, “The Rightwing Opposition Might Return to Office Thanks to the Norwegian General Elections,” *Robert Schumann Foundation*, September 9, 2013, accessed May 31, 2017, <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/doc/oe/oe-1447c-en.pdf>

sees in New York to commit a suicidal, vigilante killing spree at the film's conclusion. According to Žižek, the vigilante's strong desire to be a hero to those whom he fantasizes (due to his ideology) as being victimized—an underage prostitute violently controlled by a pimp for Bickle, the Norwegian nation at the hands of Muslims for Breivik—is not, in itself, enough of a cause to trigger an impulse of violence; it is only when this heroic desire is combined with a perception of the victim's participation in her own victimhood and unwillingness to be rescued—proven in Breivik's mind by broad Norwegian support for multiculturalism—that cognitive dissonance catalyzes violence against the perceived enemy as well as the self by negating the will to self-preservation (Breivik did not expect to be allowed to be captured alive):

Even the most brutal violence is the enacting of a certain symbolic deadlock...Violence is never just abstract violence. It is a kind of brutal intervention in the real to cover up a certain impotence concerning what we may call cognitive mapping...Exactly the same holds for the terrifying outburst of violence—Anders Behring's Breivik's murderous spree—in Oslo.<sup>151</sup>

In summary, it must be stressed that even though Islamophobic ideology is proliferating in public discourse, the democratic value of *freedom of speech* should be protected at all costs. The countering of fear and hatred with reason and dialogue—rather than the simpler but counterproductive solution of unilateral suppression—is the most important tool the humanist has to counteract the forces of destructive ideology. The freedom of speech does not shelter ideology from criticism, but it does ensure that the nonviolent democratic process is open to all members of society.

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<sup>151</sup> Slavoj Žižek, *The Pervert's Guide to Ideology*, DVD, directed by Sophie Fiennes, New York: Zeitgeist Films, 2012.

## 4. Public Opinion and Political Outcomes

This final chapter will attempt to judge the evolution of public opinion in Latvia and Norway towards Muslim immigrants and refugees from the 1990s to the present, focusing especially on changes in public attitudes since the beginning of the refugee crisis. While recognizing that further research is sorely needed to truly separate the thoughts of *real people* from the words spoken by politicians, agitators and journalists on their behalf, the first subchapter consists of a review of nine surveys of public opinion that have been carried out in Latvia, including three waves of the European Values Study, the Standard Eurobarometer, one quantitative survey conducted as part of a thesis at the University of Latvia, and three surveys carried out by private research institutions. The second subchapter questions the misconception that the Norwegian public has turned against immigrants since the Breivik attacks (despite the 2013 election of a right-wing coalition government) with the discussion of a number of recent surveys. For tabular data of survey results discussed in this chapter, consult appendix 2.)

### 4.1. Latvia

#### 4.1.1. Attitudes prior to 2015

As a part of the 1990,<sup>152</sup> 1999,<sup>153</sup> and 2008<sup>154</sup> waves of the European Values Study (EVS), Latvian residents ( $N = 1506$  in 2008; 1013—1999; 903—1990) were asked a series of questions about which categories of people they would not like to have as neighbors. The 2008 wave of the survey expanded to include questions intended to identify specific stereotypical attitudes about immigrants. These surveys are a useful tool for comparing prejudices towards individual components of the identity assigned by public discourse to the Muslim immigrant—“person of a different race” (Middle Eastern or North African), “Muslim”, and “immigrant”—between countries (see appendix 2, tables 3–7 to compare responses in the entire Nordic-Baltic region). Fieldwork for the 2017–2018 wave of the World Values Survey—a related standardized international survey of social values and

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<sup>152</sup> EVS, *European Values Study 1990, Latvia*, GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, Germany, ZA4474, accessed May 28, 2017, doi:10.4232/1.4460.

<sup>153</sup> EVS, *European Values Study 1999, Latvia*, GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, Germany, ZA3792, accessed May 28, 2017, doi:10.4232/1.11543.

<sup>154</sup> EVS, *European Values Study 2008, Latvia*, GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, Germany, ZA4767, accessed May 28, 2017 doi:10.4232/1.10162.

attitudes—is being conducted at the time of the writing of this thesis; unfortunately, results will not be available for at least a few years.

The majority of Latvian residents expressed a high level of tolerance towards other races, Muslims and immigrants. According to the EVS, only a small minority (fourteen percent) of Latvian residents indicated in 2008 that they would not like to have a person of a different race as a neighbor (1999—5%; 1990—13%). (However, rather peculiarly, slightly less than half of those surveyed agreed with the statement that the cultural assimilation of immigrants is to the benefit of society—a possible indicator of a nonetheless racial over cultural construction of national identity.) Twenty-nine percent of Latvian EVS respondents indicated in 2008 that they would not like to have a Muslim as a neighbor (1999—15%; 1990—26%). Only one in five respondents indicated that they would not like to have a foreign worker or immigrant as a neighbor (1999—10%; 1990—31%). Twenty-two percent indicated that there were already too many immigrants in the country, and fourteen percent indicated they felt alienated from their own country due to the number of immigrants (these items were new for the 2008 survey).

Sixty-five percent, however, expressed the anxiety in 2008 that “in the future, the proportion of immigrants will become a threat to society”; a majority of those surveyed also expressed the common anti-immigrant stereotypes that immigrants contribute to crime (63%), burden the country’s welfare system (63%), take jobs that would otherwise be held by locals (63%) and undermine the country’s cultural life (51%).

A rare qualitative study commissioned by the Latvian Ministry of Justice in 2008 determined based on ten in-depth expert interviews provided an excellent summary of these attitudes. The researchers concluded that although Latvian attitudes towards refugees and asylum seekers could be categorized as “indifferent, negative and intolerant”, they are also based on hearsay and refugee stereotypes rather than personal experience (according to the researchers, only six percent of the Latvian population admitted ever being in contact with a refugee or person of alternative status).<sup>155</sup>

#### 4.1.2. Attitudes since 2015

A 2015 survey of Latvian residents ( $N = 1000$ ) conducted by the private research company SKDS using the direct interview method indicated that sixty percent of respondents

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<sup>155</sup> Kvalitatīvo Pētījumu Studija, *Pētījums “Jauno sabiedrības locekļu integrācija,”* 2008, accessed May 30, 2017, <https://www.tm.gov.lv/lv/cits/eiropas-beglu-fonda-projekts-jauno-sabiedrības-locekļu-intergrācija>

chose the issue of refugees as the most important topic of the upcoming year (2016), eclipsing the economy, corruption or relations with Russia.<sup>156</sup> Respondents also indicated that refugees posed the single greatest threat to society: thirty-two percent of respondents believed themselves to be personally threatened by refugees, while fifty-three percent believed refugees to pose a threat to the nation.<sup>157</sup> However, the results the 2016 Eurobarometer survey are in direct conflict with SKDS' results: the most prominent issues topping its list are all of an economic or social nature—health and social security (42%), unemployment (30%) and taxation (26%). Terrorism (1%) and immigration (8%) are issues of low concern.<sup>158</sup> Due to the high level of disagreement between these two studies, further research is necessary.

A different study of Latvian residents ( $N = 1002$ ) conducted in 2015 by SKDS using the direct interview method indicated that seventy-eight percent of respondents believed that Latvia should accept fewer or no asylum seekers from the Middle East and North Africa.<sup>159</sup> Dietrich's 2015 ( $N=1028$ ) study indicated slightly less resistance, with only around sixty-five percent of respondents disagreeing to some extent with the acceptance of refugees into Latvia.<sup>160</sup> However, the generalizability of her results are limited by sampling error, as the demographics of her respondents are skewed heavily towards youth, females, students and foreigners, demographics likely to be more sympathetic to refugees. Murašovs et al. cite a more representative European Commission figure estimating Latvian resistance to refugee acceptance at about 80%, the highest in the EU.<sup>161</sup> Resistance to refugee resettlement was determined to be the highest among males, the uneducated, the unemployed (trends seen throughout Europe) as well as among those who consume media primarily from Russian-language sources (a variable particular to Latvia's media environment).

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<sup>156</sup> SKDS, *DNB Latvijas barometrs nr.86 (21.12.2015.) Gada kopsavilkums un prognozes* (Riga: DNB, 2015): 13, accessed May 28, 2017, <https://www.dnb.lv/lv/dnb-latvijas-barometrs>

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>158</sup> "What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?" European Commission, "Public Opinion."

<sup>159</sup> SKDS, "Pētījums: Uzticēšanās institūcijām, politiku darbības vērtējums un uzskati sabiedriski politiskos jautājumos," (unpublished raw data, Riga, 2015): 39.

<sup>160</sup> Karolin Dietrich, "The Refugee Topic in Latvia and Estonia – Policy, Attitude and Reaction," master's thesis, University of Latvia, 2015.

<sup>161</sup> European Migration Network, *EMN Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum 2014: A Synthesis of Annual Policy Reports 2014 Submitted by EU Member States and Norway* (Brussels: European Commission, 2015), cited in Vadims Murašovs et al., "Expecting Refugees in Latvia: Negative Stereotyping," *Economics and Business* 29, no.1, 56.

## 4.2. Norway

Prior to the refugee crisis, Norwegians were both generally tolerant of immigrants and becoming more tolerant over time. According to the Atlas of European values, only small minorities (less than one in five in any category) of Norwegian respondents have indicated prejudices against immigrants since 1990 (1990—16%; 1999—10%; 2008—6%), Muslims (1990—21%, 1999—19%; 2008—14%) and people of another race (1990—12%, 1999—8%, 2008—6%). Furthermore, as the data indicates, prejudices have consistently decreased over this period. However, rather paradoxically, Norwegians also expressed the *highest levels* of two stereotypes in 2008—that immigrants contribute to crime (71%) and burden the welfare state (66%)—in the entire Nordic-Baltic region. At least the latter stereotype may be explained by Norway’s status as the wealthiest nation in the region, with high quality (but expensive) social benefits. We see again that *economic factors* are the best motivators of public attitudes.

Norway’s election of a right wing government in 2013 marked the first non-Labor government since 2005. Notably, the coalition that formed was the first in Norwegian history to include the Progress Party as a junior partner (*Fremskrittspartiet* or FrP), a party to which Breivik belonged to for a number of years before being banned.<sup>162</sup> The turn of events in this election has been cited by conservative-leaning foreign press as evidence of a general turning of the Norwegian majority against immigration and multiculturalism (and a validation of Breivik’s point). Despite the way in which Norwegian politics have been exploited to fit the general narrative of “a continent-wide stirring of ethnic consciousness”, this notion needs to be discarded as the narrativized fiction that it is: political strategists strongly warned against the association of the Progress Party and Breivik or his attacks due to the fact that the political exploitation of the tragedy would likely backfire against anyone cynical enough to politicize the issue; as a result, the election results were largely decided by economic issues, and the attacks and issues of Muslim immigration were *not* cited as a central campaign issue by any local source. Though Norway’s immigration and refugee policies have tightened significantly as a *result* of the election of the conservative coalition (see chapter 2.2), recent surveys suggest this is the work of politicians and *not the direct will of the majority of the public*.

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<sup>162</sup> Deloy, “The Rightwing Opposition,” 2.

A study conducted by Statistics Norway in 2016<sup>163</sup>, the first of its kind after the refugee crisis, indicated a general decline in the belief that immigrants contribute to working life or enrich cultural life—as well as an increase in the belief that immigrants contribute to crime—when compared with the agency’s previous studies from 2007 and 2015. Increases in stereotypes have undisputedly been problematic in the years since the crisis, but two points made by the researchers must also be considered: (1) at no point did more than eighteen percent of Norwegians believe that immigrants did not economically or culturally contribute, and (2) a majority of Norwegians still do not believe immigrants contribute to crime (this, however, contradicts the 2008 figure from the Atlas of European Values, cited in the beginning of this subchapter, of 71% agreement with this belief).

At the time of this thesis’ writing, anti-immigration attitudes seem to be back on the ebb. According to a 2017 survey by Ipsos,<sup>164</sup> fifty-three percent of Norwegians in 2017 expressed that immigration was good for Norway. The three most often-cited reasons for Norwegians to believe immigration was good for the country were a belief in multicultural society, labor demand, and the importance of helping others. It is impossible to deny that support for immigration declined in absolute terms after 2008; however, the researchers concluded in their report that despite a reactive shock to the beginning of the crisis in 2015, Norwegian attitudes have been trending back towards tolerance over the course of the crisis. Increasing percentages of people also express positive attitudes towards integration, and fewer express anxiety about refugees entering Europe and their country. Despite the narrative that we have been presented, the data supports that Islamophobia, for now, is losing the war of ideas in Norway.

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<sup>163</sup> Statistics Norway, “Attitudes Towards Immigrants and Immigration, 2016,” December 21, 2016, accessed May 31, 2017, <http://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/statistikker/innvhold>

<sup>164</sup> Ipsos, “Ipsos April 2017: Holdninger til innvandring og integrering,” accessed May 30, 2017, [http://ipsos-mmi.no/sites/default/files/Ipsos\\_Rapport%20Innvandring%20%28002%29.pdf](http://ipsos-mmi.no/sites/default/files/Ipsos_Rapport%20Innvandring%20%28002%29.pdf)

## Conclusions

Islamophobic ideology follows similar discursive patterns throughout the Nordic-Baltic region and Europe as a whole: primarily, the construction of a monolithic Muslim culture; the conflation of ethnic, religious, racial and political identities; and a frequent use of in-group identifiers such as “us” and “them”. While antipathy towards Muslims has existed in Europe for centuries, the roots of the current controversy surrounding Muslim immigration in Europe can be traced to the period immediately following the Second World War.

Postwar Muslim immigration to Western Europe was the result of increases in industrial production and labor demand (fueled in part by investment from the United States) outpacing European labor supply. Guest worker programs were beneficial to overall long-term growth in participating European economies, but they also produced social inequality and structural weaknesses such as market segmentation that amplified the negative effects of the 1973 recession—especially for the working class. Muslim immigration as a part of guest worker programs was intended to be temporary, but the nature of guest worker policies brought about a set of circumstances that resulted in permanent settlement, chain migration (family reunification), and the stabilization of immigrant populations, even after restrictions on migration were introduced.

Postwar Muslim immigration to the occupied Baltic states, on the other hand, was a side effect of Soviet policies (namely, industrialization and population transfers) that prioritized political domination over economic growth. These policies were both destructive to the Latvian economy (worsening later economic instability) and traumatic to the sense of Latvian identity. In contrast to Western Europe, a distinct sense of religious identity over linguistic identity failed to develop in Latvia’s Muslim community prior to the refugee crisis.

The trauma of the Soviet ethnic cleansing of Latvia has been politicized and exploited since the country’s independence by politicians seeking to capture the vote of the country’s ethnic Latvians. Similarly, Latvian ethno-nationalism *itself* has been politicized and exploited with the help of pro-Kremlin propaganda by politicians seeking to capture the vote of the Russian-speaking demographic. As a result, Latvia’s democracy has failed to develop a needed socioeconomic ideological axis in its system of political parties. Due to this, Latvians are not able via democratic means to address the socioeconomic problems caused by neoliberal economic policies, resulting in low civic engagement and widespread general dissatisfaction with political and governmental institutions. Latvian intergroup relations are

slowly improving as the post-Soviet generation enters the electorate, but pre-existing anti-Russian biases are being mutated into antipathy towards Muslims.

Islamophobic discourse is present in both Norway and Latvia in direct and indirect forms. Overt Islamophobia, while remaining on the ideological fringe, has been overrepresented in public discourse due to the mass media's willingness to publicize far-right groups and inflammatory public personalities in the pursuit of ratings and readership, but at the expense of journalistic integrity. Islamophobic subtext is propagated by insufficient knowledge of Islam among journalists, and a lack of awareness of their own stereotypes and social contexts. The best method by which democratic societies may counter Islamophobia and prevent far-right terrorism is through rational and critical engagement with, rather than suppression of, Islamophobic discourse.

The idea that Europe as a whole is turning towards ethnic nationalism and against immigration is not supported by evidence. Opposition to immigration spiked immediately after the beginning of the refugee crisis, but has since begun to stabilize in Norway, and was never supported by a majority of the Norwegian population. While more sociological research is badly needed due to contradictory results, Latvian opposition to immigrants and refugees can be characterized as being at historic highs. However, positive developments can be facilitated in both countries in the following three ways: (1) an increase in dialogue and cultural contacts between the titular nationality and the countries' Muslim community, (2) an increased emphasis on the importance of journalistic standards (especially in Russian-language media in the case of Latvia) and through (3) reductions in social, and especially socioeconomic, inequality—undeniably a highly-aggravating factor in intergroup relations.

Whereas Norway and Latvia are radically different in terms of wealth, the pursuit of these ends are in the national interest of both nations, as immigration will be increasingly required as the century progresses for future demographic growth, the mitigation of population aging, and the maintenance of respective social security nets (especially pensions)—regardless of public or political opinion.

## List of Theses

- Postwar Muslim immigration to Western Europe was primarily the result of economic forces, whereas in Eastern Europe, it was the result of mainly political forces.
- The scapegoating of immigrants (and especially Muslims), a form of political exploitation, was and continues to be made possible by the exploitation of centuries-old ethnic, religious and racial tensions with the aim of suppressing class solidarity.
- The prioritization of profit (or political bias) over accuracy and quality in mass media is responsible for the overrepresented position of Islamophobia in public discourse.
- Anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes may be reduced by dialogue and cultural contact, improvements in journalistic standards, and reductions in socioeconomic inequality.

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## Appendix 1

### Nordic-Baltic Muslim Immigration and Refugee Statistics

**Table 1. Absolute and relative Muslim population estimates in the Nordic-Baltic region, 1950–2010**

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
<b>Denmark</b>							
Abs.	427	458	15,772	16,394	97,659	106,708	202,807
%	0.01	0.01	0.32	0.32	1.90	2.00	3.70
<b>Estonia</b>							
Abs.	2,973	3,283	3,822	5,450	7,837	1,644	1,607
%	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.37	0.50	0.12	0.12
<b>Finland</b>							
Abs.	802	886	921	956	997	1,035	1,069
%	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
<b>Iceland</b>							
Abs.	14	18	20	23	153	169	1,251
%	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.06	0.38
<b>Latvia</b>							
Abs.	7,406	8,060	10,616	13,061	19,175	6,884	6,497
%	0.38	0.38	0.45	0.52	0.72	0.29	0.29
<b>Lithuania</b>							
Abs.	4,621	5,001	5,337	4,778	10,724	2,801	2,604
%	0.18	0.18	0.17	0.14	0.29	0.08	0.08
<b>Norway</b>							
Abs.	4,245	4,655	5,041	5,311	50,898	75,779	99,534
%	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	1.20	1.69	2.05
<b>Sweden</b>							
Abs.	701	748	16,086	24,391	102,706	302,132	499,965
%	0.01	0.01	0.20	0.30	1.20	3.41	5.38

Source: Houssain Kettani, “World Muslim Population: 1950 – 2020,” *International Journal of Environmental Science and Development* 1, no. 2 (2010): 145–53, accessed May 29, 2017, doi:10.7763/ijesd.2010.v1.28.


**Table 2. Indicators of refugee capacity and contribution in the Nordic-Baltic Region, mid-2015**

	Refugees/ GDP per capita	Refugees per 1,000 inhabitants	Refugees/ 1,000 km <sup>2</sup>
	Ratio		
Denmark	0.40	3.15	402.28
Estonia	-	0.09	2.59
Finland	0.29	2.15	35.26
Iceland	-	0.32	1.02
Latvia	0.01	0.10	3.04
Lithuania	0.04	0.36	16.32
Norway	0.70	9.14	147.40
Sweden	3.06	14.66	318.42
	Rank		
Denmark	80	45	36
Estonia	139	116	132
Finland	83	54	77
Iceland	139	93	146
Latvia	129	112	128
Lithuania	115	91	93
Norway	70	19	54
Sweden	56	9	41


Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Mid-Year Trends, June 2015*, accessed May 26, 2017, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opensslAttachment.zip?COMID=57695b494>

## Appendix 2


### Selected Public Opinion Survey Results



**Figure 1. Public distrust of political parties, Latvia and EU average.** “I would like you to ask a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or not to trust it? Political parties.” European Commission, “Public Opinion,” accessed May 26, 2017, <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/18/groupKy/85>



**Figure 2. Public distrust of parliament, Latvia and EU average.** “I would like you to ask a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or not to trust it? The (NATIONALITY) Parliament.” European Commission, “Public Opinion,” accessed May 26, 2017, <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/18/groupKy/85>



**Figure 3. Satisfaction with democracy in Latvia, 2004–2016.** “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not satisfied at all with the way democracy works in (your country)?” European Commission, “Public Opinion,” accessed May 26, 2017, <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/chartType/lineChart/theMeKy/45/groupKy/226/savFile/10000>.

**Table 3. Percentage of people in Nordic-Baltic region who would not like to have foreign workers/immigrants as neighbors**

	1990	1999	2008
Denmark	12	11	6
Estonia	17	21	31
Finland	5	13	15
Iceland	8	3	3
Latvia	31	10	20
Lithuania	15	24	28
Norway	16	10	6
Sweden	9	3	7

Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number and based on average responses to the 1990, 1999 and 2008 European Values Studies. *Source:* Atlas of European Values, “Atlas of European Values,” accessed May 28, 2017, <http://www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu/new/home.php>

**Table 4. Percentage of people in Nordic-Baltic region who would not like to have Muslims as neighbors**

	1990	1999	2008
Denmark	15	16	11
Estonia	21	22	32
Finland	10	19	22
Iceland	12	12	7
Latvia	26	15	29
Lithuania	34	33	46
Norway	21	19	14
Sweden	17	9	16

Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number and based on average responses to the 1990, 1999 and 2008 European Values Studies. *Source:* Atlas of European Values, “Atlas of European Values,” accessed May 28, 2017 <http://www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu/new/home.php>

**Table 5. 1990–2008: Percentage of people in Nordic-Baltic region who would not like to have people of a different race as neighbors**

	1990	1999	2008
Denmark	7	7	4
Estonia	19	15	23
Finland	25	12	9
Iceland	8	3	1
Latvia	13	5	14
Lithuania	20	10	14
Norway	12	8	6
Sweden	6	2	6

Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number and based on average responses to the 1990, 1999 and 2008 European Values Studies. *Source:* Atlas of European Values, “Atlas of European Values,” accessed May 28, 2017, <http://www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu/new/home.php>

**Table 6. Percentage of people in Nordic-Baltic region who believe immigrants worsen crime, drain the welfare system or undermine cultural life**

	Worsen crime	Drain welfare	Undermine culture
Denmark	69	62	38
Estonia	61	62	46
Finland	65	60	33
Iceland	63	46	34
Latvia	63	63	51
Lithuania	63	65	48
Norway	71	66	43
Sweden	58	51	38

Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number and are based on average responses to the 2008 European Values Study. *Source:* Atlas of European Values, “Atlas of European Values,” accessed May 28, 2017, <http://www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu/new/home>

**Table 7. Percentage of people in Nordic-Baltic region who believe migrant workers should be admitted freely, admitted if jobs are available, severely restricted or prohibited**

	Admitted freely	Welcome if jobs	Restricted	Prohibited
Denmark	5	39	56	1
Estonia	9	45	41	6
Finland	8	38	52	3
Iceland	10	51	37	2
Latvia	8	37	44	11
Lithuania	9	46	35	9
Norway	5	51	42	2
Sweden	14	44	39	3

Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number and are based on average responses to the 2008 European Values Study. *Source:* Atlas of European Values, “Atlas of European Values,” accessed May 28, 2017, <http://www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu/new/home.php>

### **Appendix 3: Requirements for the Elaboration and Defending of Graduation Papers**

The master's thesis "Deconstructing Opposition to Muslim Immigration and Refugees in the Nordic-Baltic Region: The Case of Norway and Latvia" is elaborated in the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Latvia.

Herewith I confirm with my signature that the research has been conducted individually, as well as the fact that only the indicated sources of literature have been used in the paper and that the electronic copy of the paper corresponds to the printout.

Author: David Wayne Whitlock

I recommend/do not recommend this thesis for defense

Advisor: academic degree, Name Surname \_\_\_\_\_  
/signature and date/

Opponent: academic degree, Name Surname \_\_\_\_\_  
/signature and date/

Paper submitted in the Department of Latvian and Baltic Studies \_\_\_\_\_

Person authorized by the dean: Dr. hist. Inese Runce \_\_\_\_\_

(signature)

Paper has been defended in the session of the Commission on Master Graduation

Examination \_\_\_\_\_, Minutes No. \_\_\_\_\_

(date)

Secretary of the Commission: Dr. hist. Inese Runce \_\_\_\_\_

(signature)