"Tagad" loma laikapziņā. Fenomenoloģisks pētījums
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Latvijas Universitāte
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lav
Abstract
Fenomenoloģiskajā filosofijā laika problēma veido vienu no centrālajiem tās aspektiem. Aplūkojot Huserla fenomenoloģijā sniegtās atbildes uz šo problēmu, tiek secināts, ka tās nespēj sniegt apmierinošu risinājumu, jo balstās problemātiskās premisās, un tiek piedāvāta jauna laikapziņas koncepcija, kuras centrā ir „tagad” kā kvalitatīva vienība. Darbā tiek aizstāvēta tēze, ka laikapziņu neveido tīri formāla pēctecīgu, viens otru izslēdzošu „tagad” momentu virkne, neatkarīga no šo momentu piepildošajiem saturiem, bet gan kvalitatīvu vienību savstarpēja daļēja pārklāšanās.
In the phenomenological movement the problem of time constitutes one of its central questions. By considering Husserl’s answers to this problem it will be concluded that they do not present satisfactory solution to the problem and a new conception of time-consciousness is proposed, in the center of which lies Now as a qualitative unity. It will be maintained that time-consciousness does not consist from a series of purely formal moments of the Now, which in their existence exclude each other, but rather from a partial overlapping of the qualitative unities.
In the phenomenological movement the problem of time constitutes one of its central questions. By considering Husserl’s answers to this problem it will be concluded that they do not present satisfactory solution to the problem and a new conception of time-consciousness is proposed, in the center of which lies Now as a qualitative unity. It will be maintained that time-consciousness does not consist from a series of purely formal moments of the Now, which in their existence exclude each other, but rather from a partial overlapping of the qualitative unities.