Legal and political challenges of seizing Russian assets for Ukraine’s reconstruction: an analysis under international law

Abstract

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has prompted calls from the West to confiscate over $300 billion in frozen Russian Central Bank assets to finance Ukraine’s reconstruction, yet these assets remain untouched. Therefore, this thesis explores to what extent can the seizure of Russian sovereign assets for Ukraine’s reconstruction be reconciled with principles of international law, and what could be the broader implications of such measures for the stability and legitimacy of the international order. The thesis concludes that current international law upholds enforcement immunity for central bank reserves. However, a plausible, though contested, pathway exists via narrowly framed third-party countermeasures by G7 states. A more legally secure option would involve Ukraine assigning its reparation claims, thereby converting G7 states into directly injured parties. This approach, however, requires further analysis regarding its feasibility. Politically, concerns over precedent, retaliation, or reserve currency destabilization are not borne out by historical or current evidence.