| dc.creator | Podnieks, Karlis | |
| dc.date | 2009-01 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-09-02T03:36:17Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2013-09-02T03:36:17Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-09-02 | |
| dc.identifier | http://scireprints.lu.lv/158/1/Podnieks_Modeling_Indirect_Final.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | Podnieks, Karlis (2009) Is Scientific Modeling an Indirect Methodology? The Reasoner, 3 (1). pp. 4-5. ISSN 1757-0522 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://dspace.lu.lv/dspace/handle/7/1770 | |
| dc.description | Imagine, quarks will be retained as a construct in all future physical theories. Do physicists need more than this kind of invariance to claim the "real existence" of quarks and believe in having a "direct representation" of them?
If we consider modeling not as a heap of contingent structures, but (where possible) as evolving coordinated systems of models, then we can reasonably explain as "direct representations" even some very complicated model-based cognitive situations. Scientific modeling is not as indirect as it may seem. "Direct theorizing" comes later, as the result of a successful model evolution. | |
| dc.format | application/pdf | |
| dc.language.iso | lav | en_US |
| dc.publisher | University of Kent, Centre for Reasoning | |
| dc.relation | http://www.thereasoner.org/ | |
| dc.relation | http://scireprints.lu.lv/158/ | |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en_US |
| dc.subject | B Philosophy (General) | |
| dc.title | Is Scientific Modeling an Indirect Methodology? | |
| dc.type | Article | |
| dc.type | PeerReviewed | |
